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{{Adams
#REDIRECT [[IR 05000456/1996023]]
| number = ML20129H247
| issue date = 10/23/1996
| title = Insp Repts 50-456/96-23 & 50-457/96-12 on 960727-0906. Violations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Operations, Maintenance,Engineering & Plant Support
| author name =
| author affiliation = NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
| addressee name =
| addressee affiliation =
| docket = 05000456, 05000457
| license number =
| contact person =
| document report number = 50-456-96-12, 50-457-96-12, NUDOCS 9610310182
| package number = ML20129H243
| document type = INSPECTION REPORT, NRC-GENERATED, TEXT-INSPECTION & AUDIT & I&E CIRCULARS
| page count = 20
}}
See also: [[see also::IR 05000457/1996012]]
 
=Text=
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,
;                                                                                            l
                                  U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMISSION
'
                                                REGION III
        Docket Nos:          50-456, 50-457
,        License Nos:          NPF-72, NPF-77
4
l        Report No:            50-456/96012; 50-457/96012
a
:        Licensee:            Commonwealth Edison (Comed)
:        Facility:            Braidwood Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2                        '
.
        Location:            RR #1, Box 84
                              Braceville, IL 60407
                                                                                              I
:        Dates:                July 27 through September 6, 1996                            i
:
        Inspectors:          C. Phillips, Senior Resident Inspector                        ,
;                              M. Kunowski, Resident Inspector
d
'
                              E. Cobey, Resident Inspector
                              T. Esper, Illinois Department of Nuclear Safety
        Approved by:          Lewis F. Miller, Jr., Chief
                              Reactor Projects Branch 4
1
e
i
$
j
i
i
    9610310182 961023                                                                      j
    PENT  ADDCK 05000456
    O                PDR              ,
                                                                                            l
                                                                                            l
 
      _ _ _ _ _ .              .._. . ..          .  _ _ _ .            . . _ _ . . . _ . - - - - _ _. __
    &
                                                                                                            !
l
l                                                              EXECUTIVE SUMARY                              ,
j
                                                                                                            .
.
                                                Braidwood Nuclear Plant, Units 1 & 2                        :
j                                          NRC Inspection Report 50-456/96012; 50-457/96012                  !
'
                                                                                                            l
                  This inspection included aspects of licensee operations, engineering,
j                  maintenanco, and plant support. The report covers a 6-week period of resident            ;
;
                  inspection.                                                                              l
.                                                                                                            ,
                  Operations
!
i
                                                                                                            )
!                  -
                          On August 14, operators failed to close ID0001D, the ID diesel generator
i                        fuel oil storage tank inlet isolation valve, and failed to verify the              1
i                        valve closed on August 16. The failure to ensure the valve was closed
                          resulted in an inadvertent transfer of about 2000 gallons of diesel fuel
'
;                        oil between outside storage tanks and the IB and ID diesel fuel oil
;                        tanks on August 16 while operators were trying to fill the IB diesel-
;                        driven auxiliary feedwater pump day tank.
                  -
                          On August 21, the inspectors identified that independent verification of
i                        valve manipulations performed during the 2B DG operability monthly
i                        surveillance was not conducted as required by the surveillance                    l
!
'
                          procedure. Subsequent interviews by the inspectors of several operators            j
,                        indicated the operators were not familiar with the requirements of                '
;                        Braidwood Administrative Procedure BwAP 100-18, " Independent
                          Verification."
;                  -
                          On August 25, valve IAB8478, the Unit 1 boric acid tank recirculation              ;
.                        throttle valve, was found mispositioned open during the performance of            !
l                        procedure Bw0P AB-6, " Transfer Of The Boric Acid Batching Tank To Unit 1          l
;
                          Boric Acid Tank." The licensee concluded the valve had been
i                        mispositioned the previous day during an earlier performance of Bw0P AB-
l                        6.  The inspectors concluded that the failure to throttle and close
{                        IAB8478 was due to a personnel error.
.
                  Maintenance
i
!
                    -
                          On July 31, the inspectors identified the section of the surveillance
;                        procedure used to perform the monthly operability run required the
                          operator to start the diesel in accordance with Bw0P-11, "DG Startup."
.                        Bw0P-ll required the operator to manually cycle ISX169A, the essential
l                        service water valve to diesel jacket water cooling valve, prior to the
d
                          diesel generator start. The inspectors concluded that cycling ISX169A
e                        prior to the start of the diesel was preconditioning the diesel                    l
                          generator.
.
                                                                                                            1
i                                                                                                          l
t
  !                                                                                                        !
!                                                                    2                                    )
                                                                                                            !
                                                                                                            l
                                                                                                            4
                                                                                                            1
'
                                                                                                            l
 
                                                                =-      -
    ,
  .  -
        -
              The inspectors observed instrument maintenance (IM) personnel perform
              surveillance test BwIs 6.4.1-200, " Analog Operational Test / Surveillance
              Calibration of Containment Hydrogen Monitoring Analyzer Indicating Loop,
              for IPS48J, Train B Containment Hydrogen Monitor," and concluded that
,              the IM personnel understood the task, utilized good work practices, and
,
              followed plant procedures.                                                j
        faaineerina
i        -
              The inspectors identified that control room drawings that were marked as
:              " AUTHORIZED FOR USE" were not up to date and had no indication that a
4
              revision was pending, and were being used in the control room for work
j              involving troubleshooting and preparing out-of-service boundaries. In
              addition, the licensee identified a backlog of 65 completed
<
              modifications involving over 2000 drawings which had not been updated.
              The inspectors concluded the backlog of out-of-date drawings was a
#
              significant weakness.                                                      l
        Plant Support
.
'
.
          -
              The inspectors observed during frequent routine tours that contaminated
              and high radiation areas were clearly marked, that general areas and
'
              emergency core cooling pump rooms were clean and free of debris, and
              that leakage of potentially contaminated liquid was minimal and properly
              contained.
.
l
2
                                                  3
 
      .
, ,
    .  .
i
1
:
I
                                            Renort Details
i        Summary of Plant Status
:
i        Unit 1 entered the period at or near 100 percent power and operated routinely
*
          for nearly the entire period. The unit began a ramp down to full shutdown at
i        8:00 p.m. on September 6 to repair steam leaks on the C and D steam
4
          generators.          ,
          Unit 2 entered the period at or near 100 percent power and operated routinely
          until July 29, at 1:00 p.m. At this time, the licensee reduced power to 42
          percent due to a leaking safety injection system relief valve (paragraph
          01.1). The relief valve was gagged and Unit 2 was returned to 100 percent
          power at 7:00 a.m. on July 30 and operated at or near 100 percent power for
          the remainder of the period.
                                            I. Operations
          01    Conduct of Operations
          01.1 Unit 2 Power Reduction Due To Safety Iniection (SI) Relief Valve Leakaae  j
            a.  Inspection Scone (71707)
                On July 29, during the performance of BwVS 5.2.f.2-1, "ASME Surveillance
                Requirements for the 2A SI Pump," the safety injection relief valve,
                2SI8851, lifted which caused both trains of SI.to be potentially
                inoperable. The relief valve was on a common header for both SI trains.
                As a result, the licensee entered Technical Specification (TS) 3.0.3 and
                commenced reducing power in preparation for a plant shutdown to less
                than 350*F. The licensee subsequently made a one hour non-emergency      !
                report in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(1)(1)(A). The inspectors
                attended several planning meetings and observed several tests associated
                                                  '
                with the valve lifting.                                                  ,
            b.  Observations and Findinas
                Prior to plant shutdown, the licensee determined that the relief valve,
                2SI8851, could be gagged shut and both trains of SI declared operable,
                based on engineering judgement that the two remaining relief valves in
                the system were sufficient to provide over-pressure protection. This
                action was approved by the Plant Operations Review Committee and the
                plant shutdown was subsequently terminated. The licensee initiated a
                Level II Problem Identification Form (PIF) to investigate and determine
                the root cause of this event.
                                                                                          '
            c.  Conclusions
                The inspectors concluded the licensee's decisions regarding the Unit 2
                power reduction, engineering evaluation, and return to power were
                appropriate.
                                                    1
                                                                              _.
 
  '
,  .
      02    Operational Status of Facilities and Equipment
      02.1 Essential Service Water (SX) System
        a. Inspection Scone (71707)
            The inspectors reviewed the SX system, including' system lineups and
            drawings, and the design bases in the updated final safety analysis
            report. The inspectors also performed a walkdown of the system and          .
            safety-related components cooled by the system for proper configuration.    '
            In addition to SX system piping and components, safety-related
            components checked for proper configuration included diesel generator        i
            coolers, component cooling water system heat exchangers, diesel and          ,
            motor driven auxiliary feedwater pump coolers, centrifugal charging pump    '
            coolers, SI pump coolers, residual heat removal pump coolers, spent fuel    4
            pool cooling pump coolers, and primary containment refrigeration units.
            The inspectors also interviewed the SX system engineer and site
            engineering personnel.                                                      ;
        b. Observations and Findinas
            The inspectors performed a walkdown of the SX pump rooms and noted the
            following items:
                                                                                        ;
            -
                  The condition of the floors and walls was good and had improved
                  since repairs for ground water leakage were completed.
            -
                  Previously identified seal leaks on the pumps were repaired. The        l
                  walkdown revealed only one small water leak (packing leak on IA0V-    )
                  SX178, the SX return from auxiliary feedwater pump IB heat
                  exchangers isolation valve) which was contained and properly            i
                  routed to a floor drain.
            -
                  Action requests (ARs) had been generated and AR identification
                  tags were in place for items requiring repair or preventive
                  maintenance (PM). There were about 20 AR tags found in the IB &
                  2B SX pump room and about 16 AR tags found in the 1A & 2A SX pump
                  room. Conditions addressed on the AR tags included oil leaking
                  from motor operated valve (MOV) operators, incorrectly set MOV
                  limit switches, minor SX pump bearing oil leaks, missing / damaged
                  insulation, and a valve replacement PM task required.
            -
                  The IB SX pump suction strainer must be manually backwashed due to
                  an auto timer malfunction, as indicated by caution tag 95-1-0626        l
                                                                                          '
                  hung on October 3, 1995.
            -    Tools, hoses, and equipment were stored in a back corner of the 1A
                  and 2A SX pump room. The tools and equipment were not in use and
                  no work was in progress in the area. This condition was reported
                  to the operating shift.
                                                  2
                                                                                          l
                                                                                          l
                        .      . - . .-.  _ - -
                                                                -    .    .    _  .- .
 
                                      -
                                          .
                                              - .    _ - . . -      ---            - -    --
    ,
  .  *
                                                                                              y
'
                                                                                              I
!
                -
                        All items on the system requiring ma'intenance were identified by
.                        AR tags, which indicated that operations and engineering personnel    !
:                        were monitoring the system.
!
.                The SX system and associned components were aligned as required by Bw0P
;                SX-M1, " Unit 1 Operating Mechanical Alignment," and Bw0P SX-M2, " Unit 2
!                Operating Mechanical Alignment."                                              !
i
i            c.  Conclusions
2
i                The inspectors concluded the following:
j
                -
                        The overall material condition of the SX system was satisfactory      i
;                        with an improving trend.                                              :
                .
                        The housekeeping in the SX pump rooms was acceptable.
;                -
                        The alignment of the SX system components was good.
l        04    Operator Knowledge and Performance                                            )
i                                                                                              !
        ~04.1  Overfill of the IB and ID Diesel Generator (DG) Oil Storace Tanks
!            a.  Inspection Scone (71707)
,                                                                                            1
!                On August 16, the IB and 10 DG fuel oil storage tanks were overfilled.        !
l              -The licensee was unable to determine how much oil was spilled. However,      .
:                the inspectors estimated about 2000 gallons of fuel was inadvertently        I
t                transferred from outside tanks to the inside 18 and ID tanks because of      i
,
                a valve mispositioning. The inspectors reviewed the licensee's prompt        :
!                investigation report of the event; walked down the valve locations; _        l
i                reviewed Bw0P DO-13, " Filling the Unit 1 Diesel Auxiliary Feedwater Pump
;                Day Tank From The 125,000 or 50,000 Gallon Fuel Oil Tanks," and Bw0P D0-      ;
3                7, " Filling a Unit 1 DG Storage Tank From The 50,000 or 125,000 Gallon      j
!                Fuel Oil Storage Tank"; interviewed one of the operators involved in the      '
!                event; and discussed the event with operations management.
'
            b.  Observations and Findinas
                The licensee's prompt investigation report stated the following:
                .    .the IB and 10 DG fuel oil storage tanks were filled on August 14;
                                                                                              '
                .      the supply isolation valve (100001D) to the 10 DG fuel oil storage
                        tank was left throttled open on August 14, when it should have
                        been closed, per step F.22 of Bw0P D0-7, due to an incomplete
                        turnover by operators and an incorrect valve position verification
                        by an operator after filling the DG fuel oil storage tanks;          4
                .
                        licensee personnel were attempting to fill the IB auxiliary
                        feedwater pump day tank on August 16 which shares a common fill
                        line with the IB and 10 DG fuel oil storage tanks;
                                                    3
 
.
    -
            1D0001D was required to have been verified closed by Bw0P D0-13
            prior to the start of filling the IB auxiliary feedwater pump day
            tank and the operator incorrectly verified the valve closed on
            August 16 by visually observing the stem position instead of
            physically checking the valve shut;
    -
            the operator that checked the valve shut on August 16 understood
            that a visual verification of valve position was acceptable; and
    -
            the excess fuel oil was collected in the fire and oil sump which
            was later flushed to the waste water treatment system.
    The inspectors ir.terviewed the operator that checked the 1D0001D shut on
    August 16. He stated that he thought, at the time, it was acceptable to
    visually verify a valve position. However, operations management later
    stated to the inspectors that visual verification of valve position did
    not meet their expectations.
    The licensee performed the following corrective actions:
    -
            All crews of non-licensed operators were taken into the field and
            instructed on how to properly verify the position of a valve.
    -
            The operators involved with filling the IB and 10 diesel fuel oil
            tanks and the IB diesel-driven auxiliary feedwater pump day tank
            were counselled.
    -
            Operations training staff were instructed on valve positiot
            verification.
    The inspectors reviewed diesel fuel oil tank readings from August 15 and
    concluded that licensee personnel inadvertently transferred about 2000
    gallons of fuel oil from outside fuel oil tanks to inside fuel oil tanks
    on August 16 because 100001D was mispositioned.
  c. Conclusions
    The inspectors concluded that the failure to close 1D0001D on August 14  l
    and verify the valve was closed on August 16 was a violation of
    10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion V. This licensee identified and
    corrected violation is being treated as a Non-Cited Violation,
    consistent with Section VII.B.1 of the NRC Enforcement Policy (50-
    456/96012-01).                                                            i
    Valve mispositionings and configuration control weaknesses were
    discussed in Inspection Report 96005. Five violations were issued and a  !
    civil penalty was assessed. Unclear expectations regarding the            !
    manipulation and independent verification of valves was not identified    j
    at the time as a root cause; therefore, no corrective actions were        i
    proposed.                                                                !
                                                                              l
                                                                              !
                                          4
 
                                  .    _        __
  .
    .
i            The inspectors also concluded that the operations personnel interviewed
,
            were unaware of management expectations to physically check a valve in
            its proper position were not clearly communicated to operations
            personnel.                                                                '
      04.2 Imoroner Indeoendent Verification of Valve Manioulations Durina DG
            Surveillance Testina
        a.  Inspection Scone (61726)
            The inspectors observed the monthly operability surveillance for the 28
            DG on August 21, which was performed in accordance with 2Bw0S 8.1.1.2.a-
,            2, '2B DG Operability Monthly (Staggered) And Semi-annual (Staggered)
            Surveillance," Bw0P-11, "DG Startup," and Bw0P-12, "DG Shutdown."
        b.  Observations and Findinas
            During the performance of 2Bw05 8.1.1.2.a-2, the inspectors identified
            that independent verification of valve manipulations performed in steps
            F.9.7 through F 9.9 was not conducted. These steps required independent
            verification of the manipulation of the 2B DG day tank instrument leg
'
'
            drain valve (2002116B), the 2B DG starting air receiver drain valves
4
            (2SA1478/D), and the 2B DG starting air separator drain valves
            (2SA1418/D).
            Braidwood Administrative Procedure BwAP 100-18, " Independent            l
!            Verification," required independent verification of proper system
            alignment during the performance of safety-related surveillances. In
            addition, BwAP 100-18 required the type of independent verification to
.            be " apart-in-action" which was defined as each individual had to
;            independently verify that the action to be taken was correct prior to
            taking the action and then verify that the correct action was taken.
            However, the operator performing the valve manipulations did not
l            independently verify the position of any of the valves upon completion
l            ef their operation. The independent verification performed consisted of
4
            one operator watching the other perform the evolution without performing
:            any specific action which would have verified that the proper action had
            occurred.
            Subsequent interviews of the two operators who performed the independent
            verification and two senior reactor operators (SR0s) from the same
            operating crew revealed the following:
,
            .
                    The operators stated they did not understand that they were
j                  required to independently perform the same actions.
            -
                    The operators stated that if they knew what the valve was,
                    checking the valve label was not required.
;
            -
                    The operators and at least one SR0 knew that there was guidance on
                    how to perform independent verifications but did not know in what
-                  procedure it could be found.
,                                              5
.
 
    --        .-.--..- - --- -.-.._- -.                                                .  . - - ~ -.
; -
;*    .                                                                                              ;
i
.
:
I                -
                              The operators could not remember the last time they were trained
p                              on independent verification.                                            I
                                                                                                      !
!
i                In response to the inspectors concerns, the licensee discussed
                independent verification with all the operations crews during shift
:
!
                turnovers. During this discussion, the procedural requirements of BwAP
                100-18 were reviewed.
!          c.  Conclusions                                                                            i
!
                The inspectors concluded that the failure to perform independent
                verification of valve manipulations as specified in the surveillance
i              procedure was a violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion V (50-
1              457/96012-02a). The inspectors also concluded that the operators did
l              not understand how to correctly perform independent verification in
,              accordance with BwAP 100-18, " Independent Verification."
l
!        04.3 Unit 1 Boric Acid Tank Recirculation Throttle Valve Miscositioned
i
j          a.    Inspection Scone (71707)
:
;              On. August 25, valve IAB8478, the Unit I boric acid tank recirculation
i              throttle valve, was found opened instead of closed, by the' licensee,
                during the performance of procedure Bw0P AB-6,-" Transfer Of The Boric
                Acid Batching Tank To Unit 1 Boric Acid Tank." Licensee personnel
                performed a prompt investigation into the event. The inspectors
                reviewed the investigation report, Bw0P AB-6, BwAP 100-20, " Procedure
                Usage and Adherence," BwAP 100-18, " Independent Verification," and
                interviewed one of the operators involved in the event.
          b.  Observations and Findinas
                According to BwAP 100-20, the station had three procedure use
                categories:
                  -            " Continuous Use" procedures required that each step be read prior
                              to the performance of the step.
                  -
                              " Reference Use" procedures required that the procedure be reviewed
                              prior to the performance of the task, the procedure be available
                              at the location, and stated that the procedure should be referred
                              to, as needed, by the workers to ensure the steps were being
                              performed in the proper order, and procedural steps should be
                              signed off as the appropriate steps were completed.
                  -            "Information Use" procedures should be reviewed prior to the
                              performance of the task, the procedure should be available at the
                              locations, and should be referred to, as needed, by the workers.
                The licensee stated the following observations and findings in the
                prompt investigation report:
                                                          6
 
  _ .. . _ _ _          _ __ .- _ .. _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _                              _ _ _ . _
1
                                                                                                      .
!
3
                  -
                          Bw0P AB-6 required that 1AB8478 be opened, throttled to a boric
                          acid transfer pump discharge pressure between 105 and 111 pounds
;                          per square inch gauge (psig), and then closed after the boric acid
l                          transfer. Bw0P AB-6 had last been performed on August 24, but              ;
l
8
                          valve 1AB8478 had not been throttled or closed at that time.
l                -
                          Bw0P-AB-6 was an "Information Use" procedure.  BwAP 100-20 stated
i                          that "Information Use" procedures should be reviewed before and
i                          after the task.
!
i                -
                          BwAP 100-18 required that alignments of safety-related valves be
                          independently verified to be in the correct position. Several
                          safety-related components were manipulated during Bw0P AB-6, but
                          Bw0P AB-6 did not require an independent verification of valve
                          position upon completion of the evolution.
                  -
                          1AB8477, the isolation valve for IAB8478, was closed as required              ,
                          and the Unit I boric acid tank recirculation loop was isolated as            '
                          required on August 24.
                  One of the two operators involved in the evolution stated to the
                  inspectors that he did not remember closing or checking closed 1AB8478                I
                  on August 24. The operator also stated to the inspectors that 1AB8478                  l
                  was not throttled on August 24. The operator stated that the purpose of
                  throttling the valve was to prevent pump runout should the control room              ;
                  inject boric acid into the unit during performance of Bw0P AB-6. The                  i
                  operator also stated that in his nine years of experience the control                  !
                  room operators had never injected boric acid without first calling down                j
                  to ensure the proper lineup of the system. The operator stated that                    '
                  throttling the valve was unnecessary and slowed down the evolution.
                  The licensee planned to take the following corrective actions: all                    I
                  operating procedures were reviewed for the realignment of safety-related
                  valves; operating procedures involving safety-related valve
                  manipulations would be made " Reference Use" procedures by October 15,
                  1996; and where appropriate, an independent verification requirement
                  would be added to operating procedures by March 30, 1997. The operators
                  involved in the performance of Bw0P AB-6 on August 24, were counselled
                  about their incorrect actions to not shut 1AB8478.
              c. Conclusions
                  The inspectors concluded that the failure to throttle and close 1AB8478
                  on August 24 was a violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion V.
                  This licensee identified and corrected violation is being treated as a                :
                  Non-Cited Violation, consistent with Section VII.B.1 of the NRC                        '
                  Enforcement Policy (50-456/96012-03).                                                  l
                                                                                                        l
                  The inspectors concluded that the failure to throttle and close 1AB8478                ;
                  was due to a combination of a personnel error, the operator's belief                  i
                  that experience outweighed procedural requirements, and that Bw0P AB-6
                  Lid not require an independent verification of safety-related valves.
                                                              7
 
  -  -              --    - - -            ---      -      _-        .  - _-    -.
    .  .
.
f
          04.4 Conclusions on Ooerator Knowledae and Performance
.
j              The inspectors concluded that non-licensed operator performance
'
                indicated 3 lack of understanding of management expectations regarding
,
                valve position verification, independent verification requirements, and  '
                procedure adherence. The inspectors reviewed licensee prompt
                investigation documentation as discussed in paragraphs 04.1 and 04.3.
                Instructions on how to perform a prompt investigation were initiated
                after a previous investigation into an event (50-457/96009-02) was not
                initiated for several weeks afterwards. The inspectors concluded that
                in the case of the diesel oil tank overfill and the boric acid valve
                mispositioning the prompt investigation rapidly collected and documented
                good, accurate information.
          08    Miscellaneous Operations Issues (92700)
          08.1  (Closed) Insoection Followuo Item (IFI) 50-457/96009-02: No Valve
                Position Lights Lit For 2SI8801. The breaker for the motor
                operator for valve 2SI8801A, the charging pumps to cold leg
                injection isolation valve, was found not closed on May 14, 1996.
                The licensee's root cause analysis was unable to determine a cause
                for the change in the breaker's position.
                The licensee identified the non-licensed operator who went to the
                breaker and returned it to service on May 14. The operator stated to
                the inspectors that in his opinion the breaker was in a tripped
                position, but he was not positive. The licensee performed an
                operability assessment of the breaker and discounted the operator's
                statement because no credible equipment failure mechanisms could be
                identified. Based on the assessment, the licensee concluded that the
                breaker was mispositioned, but no root cause for the mispositioning was    .
                identified. The licensoe's root cause an:1y::is stated that if the        !
                breaker were to be found in the tripped condition again it would be      !
                declared inoperable. The inspectors reviewed the root cause analysis      ;
                and operability assessment and had no further concerns.
                                                                                          '
                                                                                          1
                In Inspection Report 96009, the inspectors concluded that the progress
                of the licensee's investigation was slow based on a lack of any
                investigation into the event one month after it occurred. The
                licensee's corrective action was to issue guidance on what type of event
                would be included for prompt investigation, what information was to be
                gathered, and who was responsible for starting and conducting the
                investigation. The inspectors considered these corrective actions
                acceptable, and had no further concerns regarding the slowness of the
                investigation.
                                                  8
 
. _ _            _            _  - _ . _ . . _        - _    _ _        . __. _ _._ _  __. _ _ . __
        '
    -
      ,  .
                                                -
                                                  II. Maintenance
            M1    Conduct of Maintenance
            M1.1 Preconditionina of a DG SX Valy_g Prior to DG Surveillance Testina
              a.  Inspection Scone (61726)
                                                                                                        l
                  The inspectors observed the monthly operability surveillance for the 1A
                  DG on July 31, which was performed in accordance with IBw0S 8.1.1.2.'a-1,
                  "lA DG Operability Monthly (Staggered) And Semi-annual (Staggered)
                  Surveillance," Bw0P-ll, "DG Startup," and Bw0P-12, "DG Shutdown."
              b.  Observations and Findinas
                  The inspectors identified a concern regarding the preconditioning of
                  ISX169A, the DG SX cooling valve.          Surveillance procedure 1Bw0S
                  8.1.1.2.a-1, step F.2.5, required the DG to be started in accordance
                  with Bw0P DG-11 "DG Startup." The inspectors identified that prior to
                  the DG start, Bw0P DG-11, step F.1, required the verification of SX
                  flow, which provided cooling to the DG jacket water system, by cycling
                  1SX169A, from the DG local control panel. This step was also utilized
                  to verify the annunciator system was operable by verifying that the                  l
                  annunciators "MCC Not Proper for Auto Operation" and "ESS Service Water              I
                  Flow Low" changed states when ISX169A was cycled. This cycling resulted
                  in the valve being tested prior to the DG Stwt from the local control
                  panel and during the DG start from the auw open circuit. The automatic
                  opening of the ISX169A valve upon a D6 start was essential to the
                  operability of the diesel generator.                                                !
              c.  Conclusions                                                                          1
                  The inspectors concluded that the cycling of ISX169A prior to the DG                l
                  constituted preconditioning of the diesel generator prior to performing
                  a technical specification surveillance. 10 CFR 50, Appendix B,
                  Criterion II, " Quality Assurance," requires in part that activities
                  affecting quality shall be accomplished under suitably controlled
                  conditions. Surveillance testing required by technical specifications
                  to verify operability of equipment was an activity affecting quality.
                  On numerous occasions, including July 31, ISX169A was cycled prior to
                  the DG start. This is considered a violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B,              ,
                  Criterion II, in that the technical specification surveillance testing
                                                                                                        '
                  was not accomplished under suitable conditions (50-456/96012-04). In
                  addition, the inspectors noted that, similarly, the~ SX valves ISX1698,
                  2SX169A, and 2SX1698 for the IB, 2A, and 2B DGs were also cycled prior
                  to monthly starts.
                                                            9
 
    .
        '
  *
,    .  .
                                                                                            l
t
:
:
a
;          M1.2 Surveillance Test of 1PS48J. Train B Containment Hydroaen Monitor
              a.  Inspection Scone (62707)
'
                  The inspectors observed two Instrument Maintenance (IM) technicians
-
                  performing surveillance procedure BwIS 6.4.1-200, Analog Operational
                  Test / Surveillance Calibration of Containment Hydrogen Monitoring
4                Analyzer Indicating Loop, for IPS48J, Train B Containment Hydrogen
;                Monitor, for procedural and technical specification compliance.
.
              b.  Observations and Findinas
;                The inspectors noted the following items:
                  -
                        Personnel were working to surveillance procedure and work package
j                      -instructions.
!                -
                        All instruments used were calibrated within the accuracy
                        requirements of the test procedure and test report package.
                        Instruments used in the test were of proper range and scale.
.
                  -
                        The work area was well defined and all tools being used by IM
;
                        personnel were stored neatly within the work area.
,
                  -
                        Proper personal safety equipment (hard hats, safety glasses, ear
j                        plugs, gloves) was used by IM personnel.
i
;                -
                        Control room personnel were notified before any step that would
!
                        change control room indications or cause an alarm.
                              '
                                                                                            i
;                -
                        Technicians used self-checking and three-way communications        l
                        techniques to prevent errors.                                      l
                  -
                        Upon completion of the test, the technicians removed all equipment
;                        and tools used for the test and restored the area to pre-test
l                        conditions.
              c. Conclusions
                  IM personnel performing surveillance test BwIS 6.4.1-200 on IPS48J, the
i                train B containment hydrogen monitor, understood the task being
j                performed, utilized good work practices, and followed plant procedures.
l          M8    Miscellaneous Maintenance Issues (92902)
            M8.1  (0 pen) Violation 50-456:457/95015-01: Failure to adequately implement
j                foreign material exclusion (FME) controls as required by Braidwood
,
                  Administrative Procedure, BwAP 100-21, " Foreign Material Exclusion."
:                The licensee had completed immediate corrective actions to resolve the
j                specific deficiencies identified.    However, the FME program was being
i                revised to address the adverse trend of FME events that the licensee had
i                experienced.
                                                    10
4
i
s
            -        ,
                                                            ,-                        --.
 
                                                                                  __
    ,
  .
      .
                                                                                            ;
.
p
l              The licensee had several procedures which provided varying guidance on
!              FME. controls including BwAP 100-21, " Foreign Material Exclusion," and
.              Standardized Maintenance Procedure, SMP-M-04, " Foreign Material            .
l              Exclusion." The latter was initially implemented in August 1995;
;              however, this guidance was not completely implemented since previously
'
              written work packages were not immediately updated with those
              requirements. - As new work packages were generated, the new requirements
,
              were incorporated into them.
.                                                                                          .
              The licensee recognized that.all departments had not received training
              and were not required to follow the guidance contained in standardized
              maintenance procedures. As a result, the licensee was in the process of
              revising the guidance and incorporating all of the procedures governing
              FME into one Nuclear Station Work Procedure, NSWP-A-03, " Foreign
              Material Exclusion."- Additionally, approximately one-third of the
              maintenance personnel had not attended the required training on FME.        ,
              The licensee indicated that this training would be completed prior to        l
              the start of the next scheduled outage October 1996.                          '
              This item will remain open pending completion of the currently planned
              program revisions.
                                          III. Enaineerina
        E2    Engineering Support of Facilities and Equipment
        E2.1 Control Room Drawinas
            a. Insoection Scone (37551)                                                    .l
              Braidwood Administrative Procedure BwAP 1340-1, " Drawings Issued            l
              Procedure," Revision 10, identified two types of design drawings:      1)
              " AUTHORIZED FOR USE" drawings were verified current by the station's        j
              Central File office before issuance and were for repairs, modifications,
              troubleshooting, procedure writing, or hanging out-of-service cards for
              safety-related, ASME (American Society of Mechanical Engineers) Code, or
              other regulatory-related equipment, and 2) "FOR REFERENCE" or "FOR
              INFORMATION ONLY" drawings were not verified current before issuance and
              were not for work on safety-related, ASME Code, or other regulatory-
              related equipment.                                                            ,
              On August 8, the inspectors were in the main control room when an
              annunciator for the Unit 2 loop A Tave channel alarmed. The
              inspectors observed that the circuit card configuration for the
              Tave channel had been changed as part of the reactor coolant
              system resistance temperature detector bypass elimination
              modification (RTDBE) completed during the Unit 2 refueling outage
              which ended in May 1996. However, the control room drawings had
              not yet been revised. In that the drawing used was for " REFERENCE
              USE" only, the presence of out-of-date drawings was not unexpected
              by control room personnel; however, a problem identification form
              was written to document what had happened.
                                                  11
                                                                    . --        ..      .
 
                              _. _ _ ._ . _ _ _ _ . _ _ . _ .. _ ... .-. _ _ _ .- . . _ _ .
i  .
      -
        ,
    ,
i
,            The inspectors subsequently reviewed sets of piping and
;            instrumentation diagrams (P& ids) and electrical bus schematics
              (" key diagrams") used in the control room for day-to-day
1
              operations and occasional out-of-service'(005) preparation. These
              drawings were stamped " AUTHORIZED FOR USE."
!                                                                                            l
              In addition, the inspectors interviewed personnel in_the site                  '
.            engineering group who'were responsible for marking-up drawings to
.
'
              show changes that were part of planned or ongoing modifications.
              After a modification was completed and the affected components or
              systems were returned'to service, this group was responsible for
              drafting final revisions of the drawings and sending them to the
I            offsite, corporate Central Drawing Facility, where final drawings              1
              were made and converted to microfilm.                                          l
              Finally, the inspectors interviewed personnel from the station's
'
;            Central File office, in which a copy of marked-up drawings for
!            modifications was maintained, and from which " AUTHORIZED FOR USE"
i            drawings were distributed to maintenance personnel and others in
i
              need of current drawings and " REFERENCE USE" drawings'were                    l
s            distributed to workers who did not necessarily need current
;            revisions. Central File personnel also updated the " AUTHORIZED
              FOR USE" drawings used by control room personnel.
L
          b. Observations and Findinas
              The response of the control room crew to the alarm was good.
:
              There were good communications among operators and supervisors and
'            a good review of control room indications to ensure a plant
              transient was not occurring. Likewise, the initial                            ,
i            troubleshooting by the operators involving a review of compu:er                I
i            points and electrical drawings was done with enthusiasm and a
i            sense of challenge.
!-            However, the inspectors observed during a review of the
i            " AUTHORIZED FOR USE" control room drawings, that sheet 2 of M-60,
              the Unit I reactor coolant system, and sheet 4 of M-135, the
~
                                                                                            j
.            Unit 2 reactor coolant syster, had not been marked up to show the              <
,            equipment affected by the RiDBE or marked to indicate a revision
i            to the drawing was pending. The RTDBE had been complete on Unit I
!            in the fall of 1995 and on Unit 2 in the spring of 1996.                      ;
1
i            In addition, the inspectors noted that several key diagrams were
i            not the current revisions or marked up to show revisions were                  ,
              pending:
l                                                                                            ]
I            -      diagrams 20E-1-4007A and D, 480V ESF Substation Busses                  ,
:                    131X (IAP10E) and 132X (IAP12E), revisions L (current
I                    revisions were M),
;
i
;
)                                                                        12
i
}
!.
R
                                                    w.  -
 
                                                                .            -
  ,
,
                                                                                J
,
l
    -
            diagrams 20E-1-4012A-D, 120 VAC Instrument Bus 111-
;          114, revisi:ns P, N, L, and S (current revisions were
,
            R,P,M,ahiT),and
J
    -      diagram 20F 1-4008E, 480V Aux Bld ESF MCC 131X2
,          (IAP25E) tnd 131X2A (IAP25E-A), was not marked up to
i
            show revisions pending for modifications P20-1-92-601
;          (October 30,1995) and E20-1-96-254 (July 2,1996).
                                                          .
.  Braidwood Administrative Procedure, SWAP 1340-1, " Drawings Issued
!    Procedure," Revision 10, stated, in part, that P& ids or key
!    diagrams which were issued and maintained current through Central
1
    File were marked as " AUTHORIZED FOR USE," would have open design
i
    changes listed on the drawing, and could be used for
                                                                                )
j    troubleshooting, writing temporary procedures, or preparing an              i
,    out-of-service. Procedure BwAP 330-1, " Conduct Of Operations,"            '
*
    Revision 18, required, in part, that only controlled, approved
a
'
    documents, such as P& ids and key diagrams, were to be used by
    shift operating personnel to conduct operations, and that these            l
i    documents were to be maintained current. Contrary to these two
<
'
    procedures, as of August 8, P& ids and key diagrams that were                l
    marked " AUTHORIZED FOR USE" and used by shift operating personnel          l
    in the control room were not maintained current.
                                                                                J
    As part of corrective actions, the licensee removed all identified
    drawings marked as " AUTHORIZED FOR USE" from use and replaced them with    !
    "INFORMATION USE ONLY" drawings. The licensee has ensured that all
    " AUTHORIZED FOR USE" drawings must be obtained from a Central File
    clerk. Administrative clerks were auditing all drawings and stamping
    them " revision pending" where appropriate.
    Finally, the site engineering group apprised the inspectors that
    there was a large backlog of incorporating drawing changes (over
    2000) from the two RTDBEs into approved design drawings, such as
    P& ids and electrical drawings. The backlog was attributed to
    available staffing levels and the need to convert the original
    manually marked-up drawings to the computer drafting format. The
    inspectors also asked about the status of drawing revisions for
    other modifications that had been completed. Site engineering
    personnel were unable to. provide the status on the 65
    modifications that were currently completed. At the exit meeting
    on September 5, the licensee stated to the inspectors that
    additional designers had been assigned to work on the backlog and
    that many of the RTDBE drawings had since been revised and sent
    offsite for conversion to microfilm. A schedule had been
    established for further reducing the backlog. All RTDBE drawings
    were scheduled to be revised by December 11.    In addition, a
    monthly report on the status of drawing revisions for completed
    modifications had been initiated, based on corporate engineering
    guidelines.
                                      13
 
  .                            _      _ _ _ . _ _ ______. _ _ _ . . .
      ,
    .  .
I
                                                                                  i
                                                                                  l
                                                                                  ,
!            c. Conclusions                                                        {
'
                                                                                  l'
.
                The inspectors concluded that the failure to provide current
i              revisions of " AUTHORIZED FOR USE" drawings to control room
                personnel was an example of a violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B,
                Criterion V (50-456/96012-02b). The inspectors also concluded
                that the untimely revision of RTDBE design drawings and the lack  ;
                of a current status of drawing revisions for completed
                modifications was a significant weakness.                          l
          E8    Miscellaneous Engineering Issues (92903)
          E8.1  (Onen) Licensee Event Reoort (LER) 50-456/96009: Violation of
                Technical Specifications Due to Safety Injection Valves Lifting    J
                and Failing to Reseat. As discussed in 01.1, on July 29, during
                an extended run of the 2A SI pump, the licensee identified that
                valve 2SI8851, the common cold leg injection line relief valve,
                lifted and failed to reseat. The pump run was terminated and the
                valve was subsequently gagged closed while the licensee
                investigated why the valve lifted. On August 2, as part of.the
                investigation, the licensee ran the 1A SI pump to determine if the
                associated relief valves lifted. Valve ISI8853A, the 1A SI pump
                hot leg injection line relief valve, lifted and was subsequently
                gagged closed.    It was replaced on August 15. The licensee bench
                tested the valve after its replacement and determined that it was
                set to lift at 1680 psig vice the 1750 psig setpoint. The valve
                was subsequently sent offsite to a contracted laboratory for
                further evaluation. . The replacement of valve 2SI8851, which
                requires both trains of SI to be out-of-service, was scheduled for
                the spring 1997 Unit 2 refueling outage.
                In addition to the vendor evaluation of ISI8853A and the
                replacement of 2S18851, other corrective actions included adding
                the SI relief valves to the station's inservice testing (IST)
                program, an evaluation of other relief valves for periodic
                testing, verifying the lift setpoint of the SI relief valves at
                the next unit refuel outage, and conducting an effectiveness
                review of all corrective actions for this problem. As discussed
                in Inspection Report 93011, the licensee was not required by the
                current governing 1983 version of ASME Section XI, to include the
                relief valves in the IST program.                                  l
                                                                                    i
                The inspectors monitored the licensee's investigation and          !
                subsequent testing. The lack of a pre-job walkdown of the work    l
                area by radiation protection and maintenance personnel caused a    '
                delay in replacing the ISI8853A valve on August 15, but overall,  i
                the investigation and testing were well conducted. This LER will  J
                remain open pending inspector review of the vendor's evaluation of
                the ISI8853A valve and completion of the corrective actions.        ;
                                                                14
                                                                                    ,
 
                                            ._ _ .. _._ _ __ _ _ _ ._. _ __ _ _ -
    ,
  .  .
                                        IV. PLANT SUPPORT
        R1    Radiological Protection and Chemistry Controls
        RI.1 General Comments (71750)
              Using Inspection Procedure 71750, the inspectors conducted frequent
              tours of the radiologically protected area and found that high radiation
              areas and contaminated areas were clearly marked. General areas and
              emergency core cooling system pump rooms were clean and leakage was
              minimal and contained. The amount of contaminated area was small and
              provided only a minimal barrier to normal operations.
        R8    Miscellaneous Radiological Protection and Chemistry Controls Issues
        R8.1  (closed) Violation 50-456:457/96002-02: Inadequate procedure for
              operating sample heat trace control equipment while taking a
              containment air sample. The inspectors verified through
              discussion with personnel and a review of documents- that the
              corrective actions stated in the licensee's response, dated
              April 10, 1996, to the Notice of Violation had been taken. The
              actions appeared adequate.
        F2    Status of Fire Protectior, Facilities and Equipment
        F2.1 Repair of Carbon Qic tide System Valves (71750)
                                                                                      ,
          a. Inspection Scone
              On August 14, the inspectors observed equipment operators place
              an 00S to repair 0C0036, the master selector valve for the
              auxiliary building carbon dioxide system, to repair a flange leak.
              A week earlier, the valve had been replaced when it and IC0030A,        ,
              the local release valve for area IEE1 of the Unit I upper cable          ,
              spreading room, were found by licensee personnel to be leaking by        ,
              their seats during a routine surveillance. The inspectors also          '
              verified that firewatch personnel had been stationed in the seven
              rooms affected by the 00S.
                                                                                      ,
          b. Observations and Findinas
              The maintenance work on 0C0036 was rielayed about five hours while a
              fourth valve was added to the original three valves in the 00S. From
              discussions with licensee personnel, the inspectors determined that poor
              communications in the operations department caused the delay. A reactor
              operator (RO) in the 005 group did not approve the original three-valve
              00S request, but wanted the fourth valve added. The disapproval, which
              occurred at the end of the R0's shift (day shift), was relayed to the
              fire marshall, who wrote the 00S request, but the explanation for the
              disapproval was not. Because of a perceived urgency to start the work,
              the fire marshall had an SRO on afternoon shift approve the 00S. The
,            next day, when the RO returned to work, the need to add the fourth valve
                                                  15
                                                                .      _          _
 
  .            .
  .
.
                                                                                  1
                                                                                  l
                                                                                  i
                                                                                  l
                                                                                  l
                                                                                  i
                                                                                  '
          to the 005 was conveyed to the fire marshall, who subsequently halted
          work until that was done.
          The inspectors also reviewed the licensee's investigation of the
          failure of- the original 0C0036 valve. The licensee found that six
          internal screws were missing from the valve disc retainer plate.
          One screw was found in the seat of the IC0030A valve, causing it.
          to leak, but the other five were not found and were believed by
          licensee personnel to be somewhere in the carbon dioxide system.
          The licensee's initial evaluation indicated that the remaining
          five screws would not prevent any of the 36 area valves in the
          system from opening, because of the valve design, but that a screw
          could lodge in the seat arid prevent valve closure. The licensee
          was not able to determine if.the screws were missing because of a
          maintenance error, manufacturing error, or design problem.
                                                                                  :
          Procedure BwHS 4002-025, " Upper Cable Spreading Room Zone 1S-50
          Low Pressure CO, System Actuation Surveillance," was revised to          !
          improve controls over access to tested areas in case one or more        j
          of the remaining five screws lodged in a local release valve after      ;
          the valve was opened for a test and to require a visual check of
          the valve after the test to look for any screws. The licensee            !
          also planned to either inspect the currently in place 0C0036 valve
          for improperly tightened screws or to verify the valve to be new
          or rebuilt by the vendor.
                                                                                  !
    F2.2 Fire Drill
      a.  Insnection Scone                                                        j
          On August 31, the inspectors observed a weekend fire drill, which
          included the town of Braidwood volunteer fire department.                !
                                                                                  !
      b.  Observations and Findinas                                                l
                                                                                  l
          The inspectors determined that overall, the fire drill went well. The
          inspectors observed good communications between personnel from the town  l
          of Braidwood fire department and station fire protection personnel. An  i
          unlabelled inoperable fire hydrant was discovered by the licensee during
          the drill and a PIF was written. The licensee's follow-up review
          determined that the need to label the hydrant as 00S was not printed out ;
                                                                                  '
          on the list used by the group that implemented fire protection
          compensatory measures because the entire list was not electronically
          transferred from the fire marshall. The licensee no longer
          electronically transmits the data. The licensee planned to hand deliver
          the list of compensatory measures to the fuel handling department.
    F2.3 Conclusions on Status of Fire Protection Facilities and Eauipment
          The inspectors concluded that the delayed 00S on the carbon
          dioxide system valves and the unlabelled hydrant indicated that
          support of some fire protection activities needed improvement.
                                            16
                                  .
 
        . . _  __    _ _ _ _ . .  .  _ _ _ _ _    _ . _ _ - _ . - _ _ . . _ - . . _ . _ _. . . _ . .
    -
.
      ,
                                                                                                        l
  ,
                                                                                                        l
                                                                                                        l
              The reason for the failure of 0C0036 is an Inspection Followup                            !
              Item 50-456/96012-05. The inspectors concluded the performance of                        '
              the station fire brigade and the coordination with the Braidwood
              fire department during the drill was good. The inspectors                                )
              concluded that the safety consequence of the outside fire hydrant                        .
              being unlabeled was small because it was not a fire suppression                        -
                                                                                                      ;
              system required by 10 CFR 50, Appendix R.                                                j
                                      V. Management Meetings
        X1    Exit Meeting Summary                                                                  ;
              The inspectors presented the inspection results to members of licensee
              management at the conclusion of the inspection on September 5,1996.
              The licensee acknowledged the findings presented.
              The inspectors asked the licensee whether any materials examined during
              the inspection should be considered proprietary. No proprietary
              information was identified.
                                                                                                      :
                                                                                                      ,
                                                  17
 
  _  _. .        - _ . . _ _ .      __      __              . . -  ._.  _._ _. _ __ _
            '
    *
      .      .
;
!
!
,
i                                            PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED
                                                                                          '
                Licensee
s              *H. G. Stanley, Site Vice President
                *T. Tulon, Station Manager
;              *H. Pontious, Nuclear Licensing Administrator
l'              *M. Pavey, Regulatory Performance Administrator
                *J. Nalewajka, Integrated Analysis Administrator
i                K. Bartes, Executive Assistant
                  W. McCue, Support Services Director
.'                R. Flessner, Site Quality Verification Director
>
                *R. Byers, Maintenance Superintendent
]               *D. Miller, Work Control Superintendent
                  T. Simpkin, Regulatory Assurance Supervisor
i
~
                *H. Cybul, System Engineering Supervisor
                *A. Haeger, Health Physics / Chemistry Supervisor
..
                *W.    Dupuis, Maintenance Staff Supervisor
{              *J. Meister, Engineering Manager
!                D. Cooper, Operations Manager
!
                  M. Turbak, Independent Safety Engineering Group Supervisor
,
                *B. Claveau, Operations
j              *M. Cassidy, Regulatory Assurance - NRC Coordinator
:                                                                                          ;
                                                                                            '
}                L. Miller, Chief, Reactor Projects Branch 4
?
                *C. Phillips, Senior Resident Inspector
;              *M.    Kunowski, Resident Inspector
j              *E. Cobey, Resident Inspector
                IDEi
                  T. Esper
;
                *            Present at the exit meeting                                    l
4
!
l
.
i
I
:
k
4
                                                              18
]
1
 
    _ _ _ _ _
  -
              '
      .        .
4
i
                                              INSPECTION PROCEDURES USED
4
                  IP 37551:  Onsite Engineering
i                IP 61726:    Surveillance Observations
                  IP 62707:  Maintenance Observation
-
                  IP 71707:    Plant Operations
l                IP 71750:    Plant Support Activities
                  IP 92700:  Onsite Followup of Written Reports of Nonroutine Events at Power
:                              Reactor Facilities
;                IP 92902:    Followup - Maintenance
j                IP 92903:    Followup - Engineering
            .
[                                        ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED
i
                  Ooened
;
'
                  50-456/96012-01                        NCV  diesel fuel oil valve mispositioned
j                50-456/96012-02                        VIO  failure to follow procedures
;
                  50-456/96012-03                        NCV  boric acid valve mispositioned
j                50-456/96012-04                        VIO  failure to ensure suitable
                                                              conditions for testing
;                50-456/96012-05                        IFI  reason for valve failure
                  Closed
                  50-456/96002-02; 50-457/96002-02      VIO  inadequate procedure for operating
i                                                              sample heat trace control equipment
{                50-457/96009-02                        IFI  no valve position lights lit for
-
                                                              2S18801
-
                  50-456/96012-01                        NCV  diesel fuel oil valve mispositioned
j                50-456/95012-03                        NCV  boric acid valve mispositioned
                  Discussed
l                50-456/96009                          LER  violation of TS due to SI valves
                                                              lifting and failing to reseat
l                50-456/95015-01; 50-457/95015-01      VIO  failure to adequately implement FME
i                                                              Controls
i
                                                      .
                                                            19
                                                                                                  _
 
                _              __          .    . .    _ _ _ _ _ .    ..
    ,
  .  . .
                                    LIST OF ACRONYMS USED
          AR      Action Request
!          ASME    American Society of Mechanical Engineers
l          CFR    Code of Federal Regulations
l          DG      Diesel Generator
l          ESF    Emergency Safety Feature                                        ,
          FME    Foreign Material Exclusion                                        ,
          IFI    Inspection Followup Item                                          ;
i          IM      Instrument Maintenance
l          IST    Inservice Testing
          LER    Licensee Event Report
          MOV    Motor Operated Valve
          NCV    Non-Cited Violation
l          NRC    Nuclear Regulatory Commission
l          00S    Out of Service
l          PIF    Problem Identification Form
l          P&ID    Piping and Instrumentation Diagrams
'
          PDR    Public Document Room
          PM      Preventive Maintenance
          psig    Pounds Per Square Inch Gauge
          R0      Reactor Operator
          RTDBE  Resistance Temperature Detector Bypass Elimination Modification
          SI      Safety Injection
i
          SRO    Senior Reactor Operator
'
          SX      Essential Service Water System
          TS      Technical Specification
          VIO    Violation
i
                                                                                    ,
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