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{{Adams
#REDIRECT [[IR 05000346/1985018]]
| number = ML20127C981
| issue date = 06/13/1985
| title = Insp Rept 50-346/85-18 on 850409-0531.Noncompliance Noted: Failure to Notify Appropriate Personnel That Fire Detection Equipment Removed from Svc & Failure to Properly Implement License Condition Re Operation of Startup Feedwater Pump
| author name = Jackiw I
| author affiliation = NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
| addressee name =
| addressee affiliation =
| docket = 05000346
| license number =
| contact person =
| document report number = 50-346-85-18, NUDOCS 8506240084
| package number = ML20127C954
| document type = INSPECTION REPORT, NRC-GENERATED, INSPECTION REPORT, UTILITY, TEXT-INSPECTION & AUDIT & I&E CIRCULARS
| page count = 4
}}
See also: [[see also::IR 05000409/2005031]]
 
=Text=
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                                U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
                                            REGION III
      o
        Report No. 50-346/85018(DRP)
        Docket No. 50-346                                      License No. NPF-3
        Licensee:  Toledo Edison Company
                    Edison Plaza, 300 Madison Avenue
                    Toledo, Ohio 43652
        Facility Name:  Davis-Besse 1
        Inspection At:  Oak Harbor, OH
        Inspection Conducted: April 9.through May 31, 1985
        Enforcement Conference:    May 24, 1985
        Inspectors:  W. Rogers
                      D. Kosloff
                      M. Ring
                      M.YO                                                /,[13 /8E
        Approved By:  IP N. Jackiw, Chief
                      Projects Section 28                              Date
        Inspection Summary
        Inspection on April 9 through May 31, 1985 (Report No. 50-346/85018(DRP))
        Areas Inspected:    Special inspection of the circumstances surrounding three
        events: removal of the security and fire protection computer from service
        without the shift supervisor being informed; exceeding the thermal power for
        the reactor coolant flow available and having one channel of the reactor
        protection system set lower than the allowable setpoint; and the discovery of
        a non-licensed operator asleep while implementing a condition of the license.
        The inspection involved 27 inspector-hours onsite by two NRC inspectors.
        Results: Three items of noncompliance were identified (failure to notify
        appropriate personnel that fire detection equipment was removed from service;
        failure to perform the action statements of Technical Specification 3.2.5
        associated with reactor power and reactor protection system setpoints; and
        failure to properly implement a condition of the license associated with
        operation of the startup feedwater pump).
                  62{00
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              0
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                                            DETAILS
      1. Persons Contacted
          T. Murray, Assistant Vice President, Nuclear Mission
          S. Quennoz, Plant Manager
          W. O' Conner, Operations Superintendent
          L. Simon, Operations Supervisor
          J. Lingenfelter, Technical Superintendent
          The inspectors also interviewed other licensee employees, including
          members of the technical, operations, maintenance, I&C, training and
          health physics staff.
          Enforcement Conference on May 24, 1985
          Toledo Edison Personnel
          R. Crouse, Vice President, Nuclear Mission
          T. Murray, Assistant Vice President, Nuclear Mission
          S. Quennoz, Plant Manager
          R. Peters, Nuclear Licensing Manager
          NRC Personnel
          J. Keppler, Administrator, Region III
          C. Norelius, Director, Division of Reactor Projects
          W. Shafer, Chief, Projects Branch 2
          I. Jackiw, Chief, Projects Section 2B
          W. Rogers, Senior Resident Inspector
          D. Kosloff, Resident Inspector
          M. Ring, Reacto.' Inspector
          M. McCormick-Barger, Reactor Inspector
          B. Berson, Legal Counsel
          W. Schultz, Enforcement Coordinator
      2. Inoperable Fire Protection Computer
          While reviewing the unit log on April 9, 1985 the inspector noted that
          the security and fire protection computer had been shutdown for
          maintenance from 0915 to 1120 and the Shift Supervisor had no knowledge
          of the shutdown. The Toledo Edison Nuclear Quality Assurance Manual
          (NQAM) Section 14.0 requires that the plant manager establishes and
          maintains a program in which the operating status of equipment is known
          at all times.    Section 14.1.1.1 of the NQAM further requires that the
          shift supervisor grant permission to release equipment or systems for
          maintenance or test. Failure to inform the shift supervisor of the
!        equipment status at all times is considered a violation (346/85018-01).
l        A discussion of the occurrence with the shift supervisor revealed that
          although he had been informed that the security and fire protection
          computer was to be shutdown for maintenance that morning he was not
          notified at the time the computer was actually shutdown. He established
                                                2
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          fire watch patrols in accordance with existing plant procedures after
          his independent discovery that the computer had been shutdown.    During
          the enforcement conference the licensee stated that the areas in question
          were being patrolled due to fire protection equipment other than the fire
          detectors being out of service. The licensee further stated that the
          security supervisor has been designated as the individual to inform the
          shift supervisor when the computer is taken out of service.
      3. Inaccurate Reactor Power Measurements
          The limiting condition for operation of Technical Specification 3.2.5
          requires reactor coolant flow to be equal to or greater than a specific
          value. The action statement associated with this limiting condition
          requires that, within four hours, reactor power be reduced by 2% for
          every 1% that flow is less than the given value. From approximately 1720
          on April 19, 1985 until approximately 0220 on April 20, 1985 thermal
          power was approximately 98%. At this time the limit for thermal power
          was between 96.42% and 95.8%. Failure to maintain proper reactor power
          for the indicated reactor coolant flow is considered an item of
          noncompliance (346/85018-02).    The events surrounding this condition are
          discussed in Inspection Report No. 85009. During the enforcement confer-
          ence the licensee confirmed that for approximately twelve hours one of the
          four reactor power indicators was set less than actual reactor power by
          2.2% during the same time period in question. This indicator provides
          an input to the Reactor Protection System (RPS). These examples were the
          result of the licensee's failure to recognize that a feedwater flow
          indicator that had failed a week before provided an input to the computer
          heat balance calculation which is the standard by which the reactor power
          indicators are calibrated and which is the operators' primary indication
          of reactor thermal power.
      4. Startup Feedwater Pump Piping Monitoring
          While touring the startup feedwater pump / auxiliary feedwater pump
          (SUFP/AFWP) area on April 24, 1985 at approximately 1210 the inspector
!        observed that the only other person in the room was a sleeping
          non-licensed operator. The plant was in hot standby and the SUFP was in
          operation. Paragraph 2.C.(3)(t) of the facility's operating license
          requires that the licensee station an individual in the SUFP/AFWP area
          during operation of the SUFP to monitor the SUFP/ turbine plant cooling
          water (TPCW) piping status in the room. In the event of SUFP/TPCW pipe
          leakage the operator is to trip the SUFP locally or notify the control
!
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      room to trip the SUFP, and isolate the SUFP/TPCW piping. Failure to
      properly monitor the SUFP/TPCW piping status is considered an item of
      noncompliance (346/85018-03). Subsequently, another licensee employee
      entered the room and awakened the operator in the presence of the
      inspector. The inspector notified the operator's supervisors of the
      occurrence.    The licensee took disciplinary action against the sleeping
      individual.
    5. Enforcement Conference
      An Enforcement Conference was held on May 24, 1985 in the NRC Region III
      office to discuss the circumstances surrounding the violations identified
      during the inspection that was initiated on April 9, 1985.
      The meeting was opened by Mr. J. G. Keppler, Regional Administrator.    He
      described in general terms the violations that were identified during the
      inspection. The licensee representatives were informed that individually
      the three violations were not cause for serious concern; however, more
      importantly there was an apparent overall breakdown in communication
      between site and corporate management as well as between corporate
      managers.    The licensee representatives admitted they did not learn of
      the violations in a timely manner and were not directly involved in the
      corrective actions that were taken. The plant manager described
      corrective actions that had been taken to resolve each of the violations.
      The NRC staff concluded that these actions addressed the specific problems
      but did not adequately deal with the root cause which was lack of manage-
      ment oversight and communication. The licensee representatives expressed
      their concern, said they understood the problem and would take immediate
      steps to ensure that Davis-Besse management would become more involved in
      plant operation.
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