Regulatory Guide 1.13: Difference between revisions

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{{Adams
{{Adams
| number = ML13350A371
| number = ML070310035
| issue date = 12/31/1975
| issue date = 03/19/2007
| title = Spent Fuel Storage Facility Design Basis
| title = Spent Fuel Storage Facility Design Basis
| author name =  
| author name = Jones S
| author affiliation = NRC/OSD
| author affiliation = NRC/NRR/ADES/DSS/SBPB
| addressee name =  
| addressee name =  
| addressee affiliation =  
| addressee affiliation =  
| docket =  
| docket =  
| license number =  
| license number =  
| contact person =  
| contact person = Jones Steve, NRR/DSS/SBPB, 415-2712
| document report number = RG-1.013, Rev. 1
| case reference number = DG-1162
| document report number = RG-1.013, Rev. 2
| package number = ML070190158
| document type = Regulatory Guide
| document type = Regulatory Guide
| page count = 3
| page count = 12
}}
}}
{{#Wiki_filter:U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION                                                                                                                           Revision 1 December 1975 REGULATORY GUIDE
{{#Wiki_filter:U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION                                                                 March 2007 Revision 2 REGULATORY GUIDE
        OFFICE OF STANDARDS DEVELOPMENT
                                    OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REGULATORY RESEARCH
                                                                            REGULATORY GUIDE 1.13 SPENT FUEL STORAGE FACILITY DESIGN BASIS
                                              REGULATORY GUIDE 1.13 (Draft was issued as DG-1162, dated October 2006)
                SPENT FUEL STORAGE FACILITY DESIGN BASIS


==A. INTRODUCTION==
==A. INTRODUCTION==
1. Loss of Water from Storage Pool
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is issuing this regulatory guide to provide current guidance regarding the design basis for spent fuel storage facilities. This regulatory guide endorses (with certain additions, clarifications, and exceptions) Design Objectives for Light-Water Spent Fuel Storage Facilities at Nuclear Power Plants, which the American National Standards Institute/American Nuclear Society issued as ANSI Standard N210-1976/ANS-57.2-1983 (Ref. 1).
    *                                                          1.
            General Design Criterion (GDC) 61, Fuel Storage and Handling and Radioactivity Control, set forth in Appendix A, General Design Criteria for Nuclear Power Plants, to Title 10, Part 50, of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR Part 50), Domestic Licensing of Production and Utilization Facilities (Ref. 2), requires that fuel storage and handling systems be designed to ensure adequate safety under anticipated operating and accident conditions. Specifically, GDC 61 requires (1) periodic inspections;
(2) suitable radiation shielding; (3) appropriate containment, confinement, and filtering systems;
(4) residual heat removal capability consistent with its importance to safety; and (5) prevention of significant reduction in fuel storage inventory under accident conditions.


General Design LrtIerilon oi,                         rue, atoragt andi                  Unless protective measures are taken, loss of water Handling Criteria for Nuclear Power Plants," of Appen-                                 from a fuel storage pool could cause ove~htating of the dix A, "General Dsign Critria for Nuclear Power                                        spent luel and resultant damage to ftef-cladding integ- Plants," to 10 CFR          .....
To augment those requirements, the spent fuel pool design basis is also covered by GDC 2, Design Bases for Protection Against Natural Phenomena; GDC 4, Environmental and Dynamic Effects Design Bases; and GDC 63, Monitoring Fuel and Waste Storage. In addition, Regulatory Guide 1.26, Quality Group Classifications and Standards for Water-, Steam-, and Radioactive-Waste-Containing Components of Nuclear Power Plants (Ref. 3), and Regulatory Guide 1.29, Seismic Design Classification (Ref. 4), respectively, detail the quality groups and seismic categories, which are referenced in this guide.
                                      ...Part
                                            . ..50," "Licensing
                                                              .. . o


====f. Production====
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) issues regulatory guides to describe and make available to the public methods that the NRC staff considers acceptable for use in implementing specific parts of the agencys regulations, techniques that the staff uses in evaluating specific problems or postulated accidents, and data that the staff need in reviewing applications for permits and licenses. Regulatory guides are not substitutes for regulations, and compliance with them is not required. Methods and solutions that differ from those set forth in regulatory guides will be deemed acceptable if they provide a basis for the findings required for the issuance or continuance of a permit or license by the Commission.
                                                                              ..               rity i and could    l resultl in release  ee of rapoacti


====v. piaterials====
This guide was issued after consideration of comments received from the public. The NRC staff encourages and welcomes comments and suggestions in connection with improvements to published regulatory guides, as well as items for inclusion in regulatory guides that are currently being developed.
                                                                                                                                                                .,*'c            to to and Utilzation Facilities," requires that fuel storage and                               the environment, Natural events                            as
                                                                                                                                                            .a          q        or handling systemls be designed to .assure              . .. adequate...      ..safety  m~~hgh  winds, coue                      "uia s.....
                                                                                                                  coul damamge th&:itlotlL,*'citihr              aamage ue or arcyo under norm al and .postulated    . ..        ... accident .conditions.


..        It also
The NRC staff will revise existing guides, as appropriate, to accommodate comments and to reflect new information or experience. Written comments may be submitted to the Rules and Directives Branch, Office of Administration, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001.
                                                                                        ..    by bytthe the generation                . ._c-rt&igihnilS or highl g nera ion.ofo rrd*)jes.                                    directly or winds requires that these systems be designed with appropriate                                                 cause ,,,d,-,,,                        ,,, to fasn    hiuldwinso th, containment, confinement, and filtering systems and be                                 could also c.uns he fa` ,eto.                        withsta..n tofall noct designed to prevent significant recduction in the L.oolant                              polcesiwith            c          f-caloJfwithsta                  t      occur- inventory of the storage facility          . . ... under accident        , condi- .  wen ulo u~cwz¢
                                                                                                          w......ithu.tC9        Oceras.      of.w.tertig              tgrty tions. This guide describes a method acceptable to the                                  wud                "he.. c cn.


NRC staff for implementing this criterion.
Regulatory guides are issued in 10 broad divisions: 1, Power Reactors; 2, Research and Test Reactors; 3, Fuels and Materials Facilities;
4, Environmental and Siting; 5, Materials and Plant Protection; 6, Products; 7, Transportation; 8, Occupational Health; 9, Antitrust and Financial Review;
and 10, General.


DISCUSSIONW                          Drftiling" olheavy w.* ro y loads, such as a 100-ton fuel cask, cl,*
Requests for single copies of draft or active regulatory guides (which may be reproduced) should be made to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555, Attention: Reproduction and Distribution Services Section, or by fax to (301) 415-2289; or by email to Distribution@nrc.gov.
 
Electronic copies of this guide and other recently issued guides are available through the NRCs public Web site under the Regulatory Guides document collection of the NRCs Electronic Reading Room at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/ and through the NRCs Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS) at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html, under Accession No. ML070310035.
 
This regulatory guide contains information collections that are covered by the requirements of 10 CFR Part 50 which the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) approved under OMB control number 3150-0011. The NRC may neither conduct nor sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, an information collection request or requirement unless the requesting document displays a currently valid OMB control number.


==B. DISCUSSION==
==B. DISCUSSION==
o w probability, cannot be ruled out in plant
Background This revision of Regulatory Guide 1.13 addresses guidelines for conformance with the GDCs that are relevant to the design of spent fuel storage facilities. Since the NRC issued Revision 1 of the guide in 1975, the staff has added considerations regarding inspections, radiation shielding by adequate water levels, coolant cleanup systems, and residual heat removal capability, including provisions for adequate natural circulation through the storage racks. In addition, this guide addresses the impact of high-burnup fuel, updated earthquake engineering criteria, and updated limits on potential offsite exposure.
                                                                                              ." t          ents where such loads are positioned or moved It is important that futel handling and storage faciltfe* i It di        to:                                                                lin-r over the fuel pool. Possible solutions to this be designed to"potential                                                                              problem include (1) preventing, preferably by I                                                                      a. Prevent lotdesign rather than interlocks, heavy loads from being a. P t lo              lifted over the pool; (2) using a highly reliable handling would uncover fuel.                                                                   sys:em designed to prevent dropping of heavy loads as a result of any single failure; or (3) designing the pool to b. Protect the fuel from mechanical damage.                                      withstand dropping of the load without significant S. ....                    leakage from the pool area in which fuel is stored.


c. Provide the capa                    y      .limiting the potential offsite exposures in the                                     ificant release of radioactivity fro                        .                                                Even if the measures described above to prevent loss of leak-tight integrity are followed, small leaks may still If spe            el      rage cilities are not located within                  occur as a result of structural failure or other unfcresetn the priý                  a,          ontainment or provided with                    events. For example, equipment failures in systems adequate              ective features, radioactive materials could                     connected to the pool could result in loss of water from be released             the environs as a result of either loss of                    the pool if such loss is not prevented by design. A
It is important that the spent fuel storage pool structures, systems, and components be designed to accomplish the following:
      water from the storage pool or mechanical damage to                                    permanent fuel-pool-coolant makeup system with a fuel within the pool.                                                                  moderate capability, and with suitable redundancy or
*        prevent loss of water from the fuel pool that would lead to water levels that are inadequate for cooling or shielding
      '*Lines indicate substantive changes from previous issue.                              backup, could prevent the fuel from being uncovered if I                  I    I
*        protect the fuel from mechanical damage
                            USNRC REGULATORY GUIDES                                          Comments should be sent to the Secretary of the Commission, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington. D.C. 205.            Attentionm Doclsting and Regutlatory Guides are issued to describ.        and make Available to the Public      Service Section.
*        provide the capability to limit potential offsite exposures in the event of a significant release of radioactivity from the fuel or significant leakage of pool coolant
*        provide adequate cooling to the spent fuel to remove residual heat If spent fuel storage facilities are not designed to the above considerations, radioactive materials could be released to the environs, or personnel could be exposed to unacceptable radiation fields.


malthods accopthble to the NRC %talf of implementing specific pensl OL the Commntision s regulations, to delineate techniques used by the stall in Ovltu            The guides ate issued in the following ton broad divisions eting speciitc problems or postulated accidents, or to provide guidance to appli.
The specific measures discussed in the following sections address the above design considerations.


cnlto. Regulatory Guides ate not substitute* for regulations. and compliance            1  Power Reactors                      6 Product*
Loss of Water from the Storage Pool Unless protective measures are taken, loss of water from a storage pool could cause the spent fuel to overheat, resulting in damage to fuel cladding integrity and, possibly, a release of radioactive materials to the environment. Natural events, such as earthquakes or high winds, could damage the fuel pool either directly or by generating airborne missiles. Designing the facility to withstand these occurrences without significant loss of watertight integrity is necessary to protect the spent fuel. Furthermore, adequate water levels above the top of the spent fuel assemblies should always be maintained because the water serves as a radiation shield for personnel. Provisions for maintaining adequate water levels are important not only for fuel cooling, but also for this shielding effect.
  ,
      with them is not required Methods and solutions different from those set out in         2.  Research and Test Reactors          7. Transportation the guides will be acceptable it they provide a basie for the findings requisite to      J. Fuels end Materials Fi-cilities      8, Occupational Health thdisluAnCe or continuance of a permit or license by the Commistion                    4.  Eneronmental and Siting              9 Antitrust Review S  Materials and Plant Protection      to General Demrents and suggestions fo, inmprovements ,n these guides are encouraged t alt times, and guides will be tevised. as AppOoprrate. to accommodate corn Copies of published guides may be obtained by wrraten request indicating the emals and to retlect new inoormation or emper.ence H*owever. cOmments on divisions desitrd to the U S Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Washington. D C.


this guide, of received within about two months Alter ilt issuance. will be par, titcilarly usetul in evaluating the need lot .n early revisiont                          2M,. Attention Oirector. Oltice of Staedards Development
Rev. 2 of RG 1.13, Page 2


such leaks should occur. Early detection of pool leakage      suitably controlled during refueling operations. The and fuel damage could be provided by pool-water-level          design of the ventilation and filtration system should be monitors and radiation monitors designed to alarm both        based on the assumption that the cladding of all of the locally and in a continuously manned location. Timely        fuel rods in one fuel bundle might be breached. The 01 operation of building filtration systems can be assured      inventory of radioactive materials available for leakage by actuating these systems by a signal from local              from the building should be based on the assumptions radiation monitors.                                            given in Regulatory Guide 1.25, "Assumptions Used for Evaluating the Potential Radiological Consequences of a
The design should also consider the possibility of dropping a heavy load, such as a spent fuel cask.
  2. Mechanical Damage to Fuel                                  Fuel Handling Accident in the Fuel Handling and Storage Facility for Boiling and Pressurized Water The release of radioactive material from fuel may          Reactors" (Safety Guide 25).
  occur during the refueling process, and at other times, as        5. The spent fuel storage facility should have at least a result of fuel-cladding failures or mechanical damage        one of the following provisions with respect to the caused by the dropping of fuel elements or the dropping        handling of heavy loads, including the refueling cask:
  of objects onto fuel elements.


a. Cranes capable of carrying heavy loads should Missiles generated by high winds can also be a             be prevented, preferably by design rather than by potential cause of mechanical damage to fuel. Designing        interlocks, from moving into the vicinity of the pool; or the fuel storage facility to prevent such missiles from contacting the fuel would eliminate this concern.                       b. Cranes should be designed to provide sirgle-.
Heavy-load-handling systems should be designed to preclude the positioning of heavy loads over the spent fuel pool to avoid direct damage to the pool in the event that the load-handling system was to fail.
                                                                  failure-proof handling of heavy loads, so that a single A relatively small amount of mechanical damage to           failure will not result in loss of capability of the the fuel might cause significant offiite doses if no dose      crane-handling system to perform its safety function; or- reduction features are provided. Use of a controlled leakage building surrounding the fNel storage pool, with                c. The fuel pool should be designed to withstand, associated capability to limit releases of radioactive          without leakage that could uncover the fuel, the impact material resulting from a refueling accident, appears          of the heaviest load to be carried by the crane from the feasible and would do much to eliminate this concern.           maximum height to which it can be lifted. If this approach is used, design provisions should be made to  
 
This capability can be provided either by interlocks and stops or, preferably, by arranging the handling system to preclude positioning a load over the pool. However, the spent fuel casks must still be handled in the cask-loading area adjacent to the storage pool, creating a potential for damaging the watertight integrity of the pool. Therefore, the design of the pool structure should consider the possibility of dropping the fuel cask in this critical area. Regulatory Position 5 (in Section C of this guide)
further discusses this measure.
 
Other potential paths for loss of coolant inventory involve storage pool wall penetrations (e.g., piping)
and gates that separate the pool from other fuel-handling areas. Locating all piping penetrations above the minimum pool water levels and using devices to prevent siphon flow (such as siphon breakers and check valves) greatly reduces the possibility of a significant loss of coolant. Moreover, the bottoms of gated openings should be well above the top of the fuel seated in the storage racks, and the areas that are separated from the pool by a single gate should be small enough to prevent significant loss of coolant into these areas, assuming that the areas are initially drained and the gates seals fail.
 
Even if the measures described above are followed, leakage through the pool liner or evaporation of coolant following loss of the forced cooling system may result in a continuing loss of coolant inventory.
 
Therefore, a permanent fuel-pool-coolant makeup system is important to maintain adequate coolant levels during an accident. An appropriate backup system is also important to ensure reliability of the makeup function and, depending on the design of the cooling system, the backup system may or may not need to be permanently installed. (See Regulatory Position 8 in Section C of this guide.)
        Detecting and containing spent fuel pool leaks is important to maintain adequate coolant levels and reduce radiation exposures to personnel. Radiation monitors and pool water level monitors designed to alarm both locally and in a permanently staffed location (e.g., control room) allow for leak detection, while proper drainage and sumps allow for containment of leaks.
 
Mechanical Damage to Fuel The release of radioactive material from fuel may occur during the fuel-handling process as a result of fuel-cladding failures or mechanical damage caused by dropping the fuel elements or dropping objects onto them.
 
Externally or internally generated missiles (e.g., from tornadoes or turbine failures) can be a potential cause of mechanical damage to spent fuel. Designing the fuel storage facility to protect against such missiles is an important consideration. Generally, the spent fuel pool walls and adequate water levels above the fuel assemblies can provide protection from these missiles.
 
The burnup of fuel has been increasing in U.S. nuclear power plants as utilities have been extending the length of operating cycles. The mechanical properties of fuel may change with longer operating cycles. For instance, high-burnup fuel may become more brittle (i.e., possess lower ductility and fracture toughness) and, therefore, be more vulnerable to failure. In order to protect high-burnup fuel from mechanical damage, this potential vulnerability should be considered in the design of spent fuel handling and storage facilities.
 
Rev. 2 of RG 1.13, Page 3
 
Limiting Offsite Release of Radioactivity Since a relatively small amount of mechanical damage to the fuel could cause significant radiation doses to personnel and releases to the environment, radiation monitors and confinement structures should be provided. A controlled leakage building with appropriate ventilation systems can provide necessary confinement, while a safety-grade filtration system may also be necessary to limit offsite dose consequences.
 
Filtering and cleanup systems for the spent fuel pool coolant are important to maintain pool coolant radioactivity as low as reasonably achievable. Proper removal and disposal of corrosion products, radioactive materials, and other impurities from the coolant minimizes exposures to radiation.
 
Segmented leak channels, proper drainage, and sumps for collecting and containing leakage from the pool liner should be used to limit offsite release of radioactivity in the coolant.
 
Spent Fuel Cooling Removal of decay heat from the spent fuel pool is an important safety consideration required by GDC 61. Providing a forced cooling and circulation system maintains the pool water at acceptable temperatures for spent fuel handling during all heat load conditions, including full-core offloads during refueling.
 
The design of the spent fuel racks should consider the ability of the coolant to naturally circulate through these racks. Improper design of the racks could prevent some fuel assemblies from receiving adequate coolant flow under certain conditions, resulting in overheating and possible cladding failures.
 
Adequate coolant circulation ensures protection of the fuel from thermal damage, provided that the fuel remains covered by water.
 
ANSI Standard N210-1976/ANS 57.2-1983 This regulatory guide endorses ANSI Standard N210-1976/ANS-57.2-1983 (Ref. 1),
with the following additions, clarifications, and exceptions.
 
Additions
*        This guide directly considers a thermal-hydraulic analysis of coolant flow through the spent fuel storage racks and the prevention of nucleate boiling under all anticipated operating conditions.
 
*        This guide provides considerations for extreme winds and missiles generated by those winds, as well as low-trajectory turbine missiles.
 
*        This guide offers an option of preventing cask drops by using a single-failure-proof, heavy-load- handling system rather than demonstrating that dropping the fuel cask in the cask-loading area will not damage the watertight integrity of the pool.
 
*        This guide points out the need to consider the potential impact of high-burnup fuel for the design of spent fuel handling and storage facilities.
 
Rev. 2 of RG 1.13, Page 4
 
Clarifications
*      This guide provides more specific criteria for the makeup water system and its backup, including additional details concerning when the backup system must be Seismic Category I
        and the necessary makeup rates.
 
*      This guide presents details on how to prevent the cask crane from passing over the spent fuel (e.g., by using stops and interlocks or, preferably, by design).
*      This guide presents the conditions necessary to allow coolant boiling, including the ability of the pool structure and liner to withstand coolant boiling and the ability of the ventilation system to keep safety-related components safe from the effects of high temperatures and moisture.
 
*      This guide specifies the temperature conditions for a safety-related cooling system;
        specifically, the pool water during accident conditions should remain below the lesser of
        (1) the pool and structure design temperatures, or (2) 93 EC (200 EF).
Exceptions
*      ANSI/ANS-57.2-1983 states that spent fuel pool water should be maintained below 66 EC
        (150 EF) during normal operating conditions. By contrast, this regulatory guide specifies that pool water should be maintained below 60 EC (140 EF) for all heat load conditions, including full-core offloads during refueling.
 
*      ANSI/ANS-57.2-1983 states that water shielding should limit the maximum radiation dose to 2.5 millirem per hour for personnel. Instead of a dose rate, this guide specifies that the minimum pool depth for shielding should be 3 meters (10 feet) above the top of the stored fuel assemblies.
 
*      ANSI/ANS-57.2-1983 states that a high-radiation-level alarm should actuate the engineered safety feature filtration system. By contrast, this regulatory guide states that either the high- radiation-level alarm should adjust the ventilation system to contain the radiation, or the air should be filtered if the spent fuel storage facility is equipped with a filtration system designed to the guidelines of Regulatory Guide 1.52, Design, Inspection, and Testing Criteria for Air Filtration and Adsorption Units of Post-Accident Engineered-Safety-Feature Atmosphere Cleanup Systems in Light-Water-Cooled Nuclear Power Plants (Ref. 5).
*      When the term potential offsite exposuresappears in paragraphs 3, 5.(3), 5.(4), 5.5.4, and 6.5.2.3 of ANSI/ANS-57.2-1983, the phrase the Code of Federal Regulations, Title 10, Energy, Part 100
        should be replaced by the Code of Federal Regulations, Title 10, Energy, Paragraphs
        50.34(a)(1), 50.67(b)(2), or 100.11, as applicable.
 
*      Sections 20.106 and 20.3 of 10 CFR Part 20, quoted in paragraph 5, Facility Performance Requirement, of ANSI/ANS 57.2-1983, are no longer in the 2006 edition of 10 CFR.
 
Rather, those two sections have been replaced by Sections 20.1206 and 20.1003, respectively, in the 2006 edition of 10 CFR.
 
Rev. 2 of RG 1.13, Page 5
 
* The guidelines described in Section 6.4.2.14, Design for Seismic Loading, and Appendix B
  to ANSI/ANS 57.2-1983 should be replaced by NRC Regulatory Guide 1.92,Combining Modal Responses and Spatial Components in Seismic Response Analysis (Ref. 6).
* The definitions of operating basis earthquake (OBE) and safe shutdown earthquake (SSE)
  in ANSI/ANS 57.2-1983 should be replaced by those in Appendix S, Earthquake Engineering Criteria for Nuclear Power Plants, to 10 CFR Part 50. This is true for applicants for design certification or a combined license pursuant to 10 CFR Part 52, or a construction permit or operating license pursuant to 10 CFR Part 50, on or after January 10, 1997. The new definitions reflect the current NRC and industry thinking, and are in line with the definitions of OBE and SSE
  in the proposed new versions of ANS Standards 2.2, 2.10, 2.23, and 57.2. However, for an operating license applicant or holder whose construction permit was issued prior to January 10, 1997, the earthquake engineering criteria in Section VI of Appendix A to 10 CFR
  Part 100, Reactor Site Criteria (Ref. 7) (i.e., the definitions of OBE and SSE in ANSI/ANS
  57.2-1983) continue to apply.
 
Rev. 2 of RG 1.13, Page 6


==C. REGULATORY POSITION==
==C. REGULATORY POSITION==
prevent the crane, when carrying heavy loads, from moving in the vicinity of stored fuel.
With the additions, clarifications, and exceptions presented in Section B of this guide, the guidance presented in ANSI Standard N210-1976/ANS-57.2-1983 (Ref. 1) is acceptable for use in the design of spent fuel storage facilities at light-water nuclear power plants. The following resulting regulatory positions are formally presented for clarity.
 
1.        Seismic Design The spent fuel storage facility, including all structures and equipment necessary to maintain minimum water levels necessary for radiation shielding, should be designed to Seismic Category I
requirements. Appendix S, Earthquake Engineering Criteria for Nuclear Power Plants to 10 CFR Part 50
applies to applicants for a design certification or combined license pursuant to 10 CFR Part 52, or a construction permit or operating license pursuant to 10 CFR Part 50 issued on or after January 10, 1997.
 
However, for an operating license applicant or holder whose construction permit was issued prior to January 10, 1997, the earthquake engineering criteria in Section VI of Appendix A to 10 CFR Part 100,
Reactor Site Criteria, continue to apply. In addition, Regulatory Guide 1.92,Combining Modal Responses and Spatial Components in Seismic Response Analysis (Ref. 6), provides licensees and applicants with updated and improved guidance for the seismic response analysis of nuclear power plant structures, systems, and components that are important to safety, which include spent fuel handling and storage facilities.


I. The spent fuel storage facility (including its structures and equipment except as noted in paragraph 6            6. Drains, permanently connected mechanical or below) should be designed to Category I seismic require-        hydraulic systems, and other features that by malopera- ments.                                                          tion or failure, could cause loss of coolant that woula uncover fuel should not be installed or included in the
2.       Protection Against Extreme Winds The spent fuel storage facility should be designed to (a) keep extreme winds and missiles generated by those winds from causing significant loss of watertight integrity of the fuel storage pool, and (b) keep missiles generated by extreme winds from contacting fuel within the pool. For those nuclear plants that are located in areas of the country where tornadoes cause the strongest winds, refer to Regulatory Guide 1.76, Design Basis Tornado for Nuclear Power Plants (Ref. 8), for design- basis tornado characteristics.
      2. The facility should be designed (a) to keep tor-        design. Systems for maintaining water quality and nadic winds and missiles generated by these winds from         quantity should be designed so that any maloperation or causing significant loss of watertight integrity of the fuel   failure of such systems (including failures resulting from storage pool and (b) to keep missiles generated by             the Safe Shutdown Earthquake) will not cause fuel to bej I tornadic winds from contacting fuel within the pool..           uncovered. These systems need not otherwise meet Category I seismic requirements.


3. Interlocks should be provided to prevent cranes from passing over stored fuel (or near stored fuel in a            7. Reliable and frequently tested monitoring equip- manner such that if a crane failed, the load could tip          ment should be provided to alarm both locally and in a over on stored fuel) when fuel handling is not in              continuously manned- location if the water level in the progress. During fuel handling operations, the interlocks      fuel storage pool falls below a predetermined level or if may be bypassed and administrative control used to              high local-radiation levels are experienced. The high- prevent the crane from carrying loads that are not              radiation-level instrumenttation should also actuate the necessary for fuel handling over the stored fuel or other      filtration system.
3.       Protection Against Turbine Missiles The spent fuel storage facility should be designed to protect the spent fuel from low-trajectory turbine missiles, and the storage pool should retain watertight integrity if struck by such missiles.


prohibited areas. The facility should be designed to minimize the need for bypassing such interlocks.                    8. A seismic Category I makeup system should be provided to add coolant to the poo
Regulatory Guide 1.115, Protection Against Low-Trajectory Turbine Missiles (Ref. 9), provides guidance for appropriate protection against low-trajectory turbine missiles.


====l. Appropriate====
4.       Confinement and Filtering Systems A controlled-leakage building should enclose the fuel to limit the potential release of radioactive iodine and other radioactive materials. If necessary to limit offsite dose consequences from a fuel- handling accident or spent fuel pool boiling, the building should include an engineered safety feature filtration system that meets the guidelines outlined in Regulatory Guide 1.52.
      4. A controlled leakage building should enclose the         redundancy or a backup system for filling the pool from fuel pool. The building should be equipped with an              a reliable source, such as a lake, river, or onsite seismic appropriate ventilation and filtration system to limit the     Category I water-storage facility, should be provided. If potential release of radioactive iodine and other radio-        a backup system is used, it need not be a permanently active materials. The building need not be designed to         inst.lled system. The capacity of the makeup systems withstand extremely high winds, but leakage should be          should be such that water can be supplied at a ratel
                                                            1.13-2


determined by consideration of the leakage rate that                                  
Rev. 2 of RG 1.13, Page 7
 
5.      Control of Heavy Loads Cranes capable of carrying heavy loads should be prevented, preferably by design rather than by interlocks, from moving over the pool. Furthermore, the spent fuel storage facility design should have at least one of the following provisions with respect to the handling of heavy loads, including the spent fuel cask:
(a)      Cranes should be designed to provide single-failure-proof handling of heavy loads, so that a single failure will not result in the crane handling system losing the capability to perform its safety function.
 
(b)      The spent fuel cask-loading area should be designed to withstand, without significant leakage of the adjacent spent fuel storage, the impact of the heaviest load to be carried by the crane from the maximum height to which it can be lifted.
 
6.      Drainage Prevention Drains, permanently connected mechanical or hydraulic systems, and other features that (by maloperation or failure) could reduce the coolant inventory to unsafe levels should not be installed or included in the design. No piping penetrations through the storage pool wall should be below the minimum water level required for shielding. Siphon breakers, check valves, and other devices should be used to preclude accidental draining by hydraulic systems. In addition, the spent fuel storage facility should comply with one of the following criteria:
(a)      If the spent fuel pool cooling system is designed to Quality Group C, Seismic Category I
        requirements, drains, piping, or other systems should be unable to reduce the coolant inventory to a level that would prevent the cooling system from maintaining the storage pool below its design temperature limit.
 
(b)      If the spent fuel pool is designed to allow coolant boiling during accident conditions, no drains, piping, or other systems should be installed that would allow coolant levels to drain below adequate shielding depths of approximately 3 meters (10 feet) above the top of the fuel assemblies.
 
7.      Instrumentation Reliable and frequently tested monitoring equipment should be provided to alarm both locally and in a continuously manned location if the water level in the fuel storage pool falls below a predetermined level, if the water temperature exceeds a predetermined level, or if high local radiation levels are experienced. The high-radiation-level instrumentation should signal automatic ventilation and/or filtration functions that are consistent with the dose consequence evaluation for fuel-handling accidents.
 
Rev. 2 of RG 1.13, Page 8
 
8.        Makeup Water A Quality Group C, Seismic Category I makeup system should be provided to add coolant to the pool. Appropriate redundancy or a backup system for filling the pool from a reliable source, such as a lake, river, or onsite Seismic Category I water-storage facility, should be provided.
 
If the spent fuel pool cooling system is designed to the requirements of Quality Group C, Seismic Category I,
the backup to the makeup system need not be permanently installed or designed to Seismic Category I
requirements; however, the backup system should still take water from a Seismic Category I source.
 
The makeup system and its backup should have redundant flowpaths for providing water to the storage pool.
 
The capacity of the makeup systems should exceed the larger of (1) the pool leakage rate, assuming spent fuel pool liner perforation resulting from a dropped fuel assembly, or (2) the evaporation rate necessary to remove 0.3 percent of the rated reactor thermal power.
 
9.        Pool Cooling The spent fuel storage facility should include a system for cooling the pool water in order to maintain a bulk temperature below 60 EC (140 EF) for all heat load conditions, including full-core offloads during refueling. Administrative controls may be used to ensure that this temperature limit is not exceeded. However, the minimum heat removal capacity with the forced-circulation cooling system in operation, the pool at the design temperature of the structure, and the heat sink at its maximum design temperature should exceed 0.3 percent of the reactor rated thermal power. One of the two following conditions should also be satisfied:
(a)      The spent fuel pool cooling system is designed to meet Quality Group C, Seismic Category I
          requirements.
 
(b)      The spent fuel pool cooling system is not designed to meet Quality Group C, Seismic Category I
          requirements. However, the pool structure and liner are designed to withstand coolant boiling;
          the pool makeup system and its backup are designed to Quality Group C, Seismic Category I
          requirements; and the building ventilation system has the capability to vent steam or moisture to the atmosphere to protect safety-related components from high temperatures and moisture levels.
 
If necessary to limit offsite dose consequences from venting steam or moisture during accident conditions, the ventilation system should meet the guidelines of Regulatory Guide 1.52.
 
10.      Gates and Weirs Gates and weirs that isolate the spent fuel storage pool from the adjacent fuel-handling areas should be designed to prevent the coolant inventory from being drained below the top of the fuel assemblies.
 
The volume of the fuel-handling areas adjacent to the storage pool (e.g., cask-loading area, transfer canal)
should be limited so that if the seal(s) of a single gate were to fail and the pool water drained into one of these areas, pool coolant inventory would not be reduced to a level less than 3 meters (10 feet)
above the top of the fuel assemblies.
 
11.      Fuel Cooling The spent fuel storage racks should be designed in a manner that allows for adequate coolant flow to all stored fuel assemblies. A thermal-hydraulic analysis should demonstrate that the racks provide adequate natural circulation to prevent nucleate boiling within the stored assemblies.
 
Rev. 2 of RG 1.13, Page 9
 
12.      Leakage Containment The spent fuel storage pool should include a system for detecting and containing pool liner leaks.
 
Segmented leak channels, proper drainage, and sumps for collecting and containing such leakage should be used.
 
13.      Pool Cleanup The spent fuel storage facility should be capable of maintaining safe radiation levels for personnel during anticipated operating and accident conditions. To maintain low radiation levels, a filtering system should be provided to remove radioactive materials and other contaminants from the spent fuel pool coolant.
 
This system does not need to be safety-related, but its failure should not impair safety-related systems or cause a significant decrease in the pool coolant inventory.
 
14.      High-Burnup Fuel The mechanical properties of fuel may change with longer operating cycles. For instance, high-burnup fuel may become more brittle (i.e., possess lower ductility and fracture toughness)
and, therefore, be more vulnerable to failure. In order to protect high-burnup fuel from mechanical damage, this potential vulnerability should be considered in the design of spent fuel handling and storage facilities.


==D. IMPLEMENTATION==
==D. IMPLEMENTATION==
would be expected as the result of damage to the fuel storage pool from the dropping of loads, from earth-                     Any of the alternatives in Regulatory Position C.5 of quakes, or from missiles originating in high winds.*                  Revision I may be applied at the option of applicants for construction perinits and operating licenses for all
The purpose of this section is to provide information to applicants and licensees regarding the NRC staffs plans for using this regulatory guide. No backfitting is intended or approved in connection with the issuance of this guide.
*The staff is considering the development of additional guidance      plants, regardless of the date of application.
 
Except in those cases in which an applicant or licensee proposes or has previously established an acceptable alternative method for complying with specified portions of the NRCs regulations, the NRC staff will use the methods described in this guide to evaluate (1) submittals in connection with applications for construction permits, standard plant design certifications, operating licenses, early site permits, and combined licenses; and (2) submittals from operating reactor licensees who voluntarily propose to initiate system modifications that have a clear nexus with the subject for which guidance is provided herein.
 
REGULATORY ANALYSIS / BACKFIT ANALYSIS
        The regulatory analysis and backfit analysis for this regulatory guide are available in Draft Regulatory Guide DG-1162, Spent Fuel Storage Facility Design Basis (Ref. 10). The NRC issued DG-1162 in October 2006 to solicit public comment on the draft of this Revision 2 of Regulatory Guide 1.13.
 
Rev. 2 of RG 1.13, Page 10
 
REFERENCES
1. ANSI/ANS 57.2-1983, Design Objectives for Light-Water Spent Fuel Storage Facilities at Nuclear Power Plants, American National Standards Institute/American Nuclear Society, La Grange Park, Illinois, 1983.1
2. U.S. Code of Federal Regulations, Title 10, Part 50, Domestic Licensing of Production and Utilization Facilities, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC.2
3. Regulatory Guide 1.26, Quality Group Classifications and Standards for Water-, Steam-,
  and Radioactive-Waste-Containing Components of Nuclear Power Plants, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC.3
4. Regulatory Guide 1.29, Seismic Design Classification, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC.3
5. Regulatory Guide 1.52, Design, Inspection, and Testing Criteria for Air Filtration and Adsorption Units of Post-Accident Engineered-Safety-Feature Atmosphere Cleanup Systems in Light-Water-Cooled Nuclear Power Plants, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC.3
6. Regulatory Guide 1.92, Combining Modal responses and Spatial Components in Seismic Response Analysis, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC.3
7. U.S. Code of Federal Regulations, Title 10, Part 100, Reactor Site Criteria, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC.2
1 Copies may be obtained from the American Nuclear Society, 555 North Kensington Avenue, La Grange Park, Illinois
  60526; telephone (708) 352-6611; fax (708) 352-0499. Purchase information is available through the Web-based ANS store at http://www.ans.org/store/vi-240124.
 
2 All NRC regulations listed herein are available electronically through the Electronic Reading Room on the NRCs public Web site, at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/cfr. Copies are also available for inspection or copying for a fee from the NRCs Public Document Room at 11555 Rockville Pike, Rockville, MD; the PDRs mailing address is USNRC PDR, Washington, DC 20555; telephone (301) 415-4737 or (800) 397-4209;
  fax (301) 415-3548; email PDR@nrc.gov.
 
3 All regulatory guides listed herein were published by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission or its predecessor, the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission. Most are available electronically through the Electronic Reading Room on the NRCs public Web site, at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/reg-guides/. Single copies of regulatory guides may also be obtained free of charge by writing the Reproduction and Distribution Services Section, ADM, USNRC, Washington, DC 20555-0001, by fax to (301) 415-2289, or by email to DISTRIBUTION@nrc.gov.
 
Active guides may also be purchased from the National Technical Information Service (NTIS). Details may be obtained by contacting NTIS at 5285 Port Royal Road, Springfield, Virginia 22161, online at http://www.ntis.gov, by telephone at (800) 553-NTIS (6847) or (703) 605-6000, or by fax to (703) 605-6900. Copies are also available for inspection or copying for a fee from the NRCs Public Document Room (PDR), which is located at 11555 Rockville Pike, Rockville, Maryland; the PDRs mailing address is USNRC PDR, Washington, DC 20555-000
 
===1. The PDR===
  can also be reached by telephone at (301) 415-4737 or (800) 397-4209, by fax at (301) 415-3548, and by email to PDR@nrc.gov.
 
Rev. 2 of RG 1.13, Page 11
 
8.  Regulatory Guide 1.76, Design-Basis Tornado for Nuclear Power Plants, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC.3
9.  Regulatory Guide 1.115, Protection Against Low-Trajectory Turbine Missiles, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC.3
10. Draft Regulatory Guide DG-1162, Spent Fuel Storage Facility Design Basis, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC, October 2006.4
4 Draft Regulatory Guide DG-1162 is available electronically under Accession #ML062680291 in the NRCs Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS) at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html.


concerning protection against missiles that might be generated by plant failures such as turbine failures. For the present, the protection of the fuel pool against such missiles will be evaluated on a case-by-case basis.
Copies are also available for inspection or copying for a fee from the NRCs Public Document Room (PDR), which is located at 11555 Rockville Pike, Rockville, Maryland; the PDRs mailing address is USNRC PDR, Washington, DC
    20555-0001. The PDR can also be reached by telephone at (301) 415-4737 or (800) 397-4209, by fax at (301) 415-3548, and by email to PDR@nrc.gov.


1.13-3}}
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Revision as of 19:51, 13 March 2020

Spent Fuel Storage Facility Design Basis
ML070310035
Person / Time
Issue date: 03/19/2007
From: Steve Jones
NRC/NRR/ADES/DSS/SBPB
To:
Jones Steve, NRR/DSS/SBPB, 415-2712
Shared Package
ML070190158 List:
References
DG-1162 RG-1.013, Rev. 2
Download: ML070310035 (12)


U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION March 2007 Revision 2 REGULATORY GUIDE

OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REGULATORY RESEARCH

REGULATORY GUIDE 1.13 (Draft was issued as DG-1162, dated October 2006)

SPENT FUEL STORAGE FACILITY DESIGN BASIS

A. INTRODUCTION

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is issuing this regulatory guide to provide current guidance regarding the design basis for spent fuel storage facilities. This regulatory guide endorses (with certain additions, clarifications, and exceptions) Design Objectives for Light-Water Spent Fuel Storage Facilities at Nuclear Power Plants, which the American National Standards Institute/American Nuclear Society issued as ANSI Standard N210-1976/ANS-57.2-1983 (Ref. 1).

General Design Criterion (GDC) 61, Fuel Storage and Handling and Radioactivity Control, set forth in Appendix A, General Design Criteria for Nuclear Power Plants, to Title 10, Part 50, of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR Part 50), Domestic Licensing of Production and Utilization Facilities (Ref. 2), requires that fuel storage and handling systems be designed to ensure adequate safety under anticipated operating and accident conditions. Specifically, GDC 61 requires (1) periodic inspections;

(2) suitable radiation shielding; (3) appropriate containment, confinement, and filtering systems;

(4) residual heat removal capability consistent with its importance to safety; and (5) prevention of significant reduction in fuel storage inventory under accident conditions.

To augment those requirements, the spent fuel pool design basis is also covered by GDC 2, Design Bases for Protection Against Natural Phenomena; GDC 4, Environmental and Dynamic Effects Design Bases; and GDC 63, Monitoring Fuel and Waste Storage. In addition, Regulatory Guide 1.26, Quality Group Classifications and Standards for Water-, Steam-, and Radioactive-Waste-Containing Components of Nuclear Power Plants (Ref. 3), and Regulatory Guide 1.29, Seismic Design Classification (Ref. 4), respectively, detail the quality groups and seismic categories, which are referenced in this guide.

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) issues regulatory guides to describe and make available to the public methods that the NRC staff considers acceptable for use in implementing specific parts of the agencys regulations, techniques that the staff uses in evaluating specific problems or postulated accidents, and data that the staff need in reviewing applications for permits and licenses. Regulatory guides are not substitutes for regulations, and compliance with them is not required. Methods and solutions that differ from those set forth in regulatory guides will be deemed acceptable if they provide a basis for the findings required for the issuance or continuance of a permit or license by the Commission.

This guide was issued after consideration of comments received from the public. The NRC staff encourages and welcomes comments and suggestions in connection with improvements to published regulatory guides, as well as items for inclusion in regulatory guides that are currently being developed.

The NRC staff will revise existing guides, as appropriate, to accommodate comments and to reflect new information or experience. Written comments may be submitted to the Rules and Directives Branch, Office of Administration, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001.

Regulatory guides are issued in 10 broad divisions: 1, Power Reactors; 2, Research and Test Reactors; 3, Fuels and Materials Facilities;

4, Environmental and Siting; 5, Materials and Plant Protection; 6, Products; 7, Transportation; 8, Occupational Health; 9, Antitrust and Financial Review;

and 10, General.

Requests for single copies of draft or active regulatory guides (which may be reproduced) should be made to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555, Attention: Reproduction and Distribution Services Section, or by fax to (301) 415-2289; or by email to Distribution@nrc.gov.

Electronic copies of this guide and other recently issued guides are available through the NRCs public Web site under the Regulatory Guides document collection of the NRCs Electronic Reading Room at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/ and through the NRCs Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS) at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html, under Accession No. ML070310035.

This regulatory guide contains information collections that are covered by the requirements of 10 CFR Part 50 which the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) approved under OMB control number 3150-0011. The NRC may neither conduct nor sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, an information collection request or requirement unless the requesting document displays a currently valid OMB control number.

B. DISCUSSION

Background This revision of Regulatory Guide 1.13 addresses guidelines for conformance with the GDCs that are relevant to the design of spent fuel storage facilities. Since the NRC issued Revision 1 of the guide in 1975, the staff has added considerations regarding inspections, radiation shielding by adequate water levels, coolant cleanup systems, and residual heat removal capability, including provisions for adequate natural circulation through the storage racks. In addition, this guide addresses the impact of high-burnup fuel, updated earthquake engineering criteria, and updated limits on potential offsite exposure.

It is important that the spent fuel storage pool structures, systems, and components be designed to accomplish the following:

  • prevent loss of water from the fuel pool that would lead to water levels that are inadequate for cooling or shielding
  • protect the fuel from mechanical damage
  • provide the capability to limit potential offsite exposures in the event of a significant release of radioactivity from the fuel or significant leakage of pool coolant
  • provide adequate cooling to the spent fuel to remove residual heat If spent fuel storage facilities are not designed to the above considerations, radioactive materials could be released to the environs, or personnel could be exposed to unacceptable radiation fields.

The specific measures discussed in the following sections address the above design considerations.

Loss of Water from the Storage Pool Unless protective measures are taken, loss of water from a storage pool could cause the spent fuel to overheat, resulting in damage to fuel cladding integrity and, possibly, a release of radioactive materials to the environment. Natural events, such as earthquakes or high winds, could damage the fuel pool either directly or by generating airborne missiles. Designing the facility to withstand these occurrences without significant loss of watertight integrity is necessary to protect the spent fuel. Furthermore, adequate water levels above the top of the spent fuel assemblies should always be maintained because the water serves as a radiation shield for personnel. Provisions for maintaining adequate water levels are important not only for fuel cooling, but also for this shielding effect.

Rev. 2 of RG 1.13, Page 2

The design should also consider the possibility of dropping a heavy load, such as a spent fuel cask.

Heavy-load-handling systems should be designed to preclude the positioning of heavy loads over the spent fuel pool to avoid direct damage to the pool in the event that the load-handling system was to fail.

This capability can be provided either by interlocks and stops or, preferably, by arranging the handling system to preclude positioning a load over the pool. However, the spent fuel casks must still be handled in the cask-loading area adjacent to the storage pool, creating a potential for damaging the watertight integrity of the pool. Therefore, the design of the pool structure should consider the possibility of dropping the fuel cask in this critical area. Regulatory Position 5 (in Section C of this guide)

further discusses this measure.

Other potential paths for loss of coolant inventory involve storage pool wall penetrations (e.g., piping)

and gates that separate the pool from other fuel-handling areas. Locating all piping penetrations above the minimum pool water levels and using devices to prevent siphon flow (such as siphon breakers and check valves) greatly reduces the possibility of a significant loss of coolant. Moreover, the bottoms of gated openings should be well above the top of the fuel seated in the storage racks, and the areas that are separated from the pool by a single gate should be small enough to prevent significant loss of coolant into these areas, assuming that the areas are initially drained and the gates seals fail.

Even if the measures described above are followed, leakage through the pool liner or evaporation of coolant following loss of the forced cooling system may result in a continuing loss of coolant inventory.

Therefore, a permanent fuel-pool-coolant makeup system is important to maintain adequate coolant levels during an accident. An appropriate backup system is also important to ensure reliability of the makeup function and, depending on the design of the cooling system, the backup system may or may not need to be permanently installed. (See Regulatory Position 8 in Section C of this guide.)

Detecting and containing spent fuel pool leaks is important to maintain adequate coolant levels and reduce radiation exposures to personnel. Radiation monitors and pool water level monitors designed to alarm both locally and in a permanently staffed location (e.g., control room) allow for leak detection, while proper drainage and sumps allow for containment of leaks.

Mechanical Damage to Fuel The release of radioactive material from fuel may occur during the fuel-handling process as a result of fuel-cladding failures or mechanical damage caused by dropping the fuel elements or dropping objects onto them.

Externally or internally generated missiles (e.g., from tornadoes or turbine failures) can be a potential cause of mechanical damage to spent fuel. Designing the fuel storage facility to protect against such missiles is an important consideration. Generally, the spent fuel pool walls and adequate water levels above the fuel assemblies can provide protection from these missiles.

The burnup of fuel has been increasing in U.S. nuclear power plants as utilities have been extending the length of operating cycles. The mechanical properties of fuel may change with longer operating cycles. For instance, high-burnup fuel may become more brittle (i.e., possess lower ductility and fracture toughness) and, therefore, be more vulnerable to failure. In order to protect high-burnup fuel from mechanical damage, this potential vulnerability should be considered in the design of spent fuel handling and storage facilities.

Rev. 2 of RG 1.13, Page 3

Limiting Offsite Release of Radioactivity Since a relatively small amount of mechanical damage to the fuel could cause significant radiation doses to personnel and releases to the environment, radiation monitors and confinement structures should be provided. A controlled leakage building with appropriate ventilation systems can provide necessary confinement, while a safety-grade filtration system may also be necessary to limit offsite dose consequences.

Filtering and cleanup systems for the spent fuel pool coolant are important to maintain pool coolant radioactivity as low as reasonably achievable. Proper removal and disposal of corrosion products, radioactive materials, and other impurities from the coolant minimizes exposures to radiation.

Segmented leak channels, proper drainage, and sumps for collecting and containing leakage from the pool liner should be used to limit offsite release of radioactivity in the coolant.

Spent Fuel Cooling Removal of decay heat from the spent fuel pool is an important safety consideration required by GDC 61. Providing a forced cooling and circulation system maintains the pool water at acceptable temperatures for spent fuel handling during all heat load conditions, including full-core offloads during refueling.

The design of the spent fuel racks should consider the ability of the coolant to naturally circulate through these racks. Improper design of the racks could prevent some fuel assemblies from receiving adequate coolant flow under certain conditions, resulting in overheating and possible cladding failures.

Adequate coolant circulation ensures protection of the fuel from thermal damage, provided that the fuel remains covered by water.

ANSI Standard N210-1976/ANS 57.2-1983 This regulatory guide endorses ANSI Standard N210-1976/ANS-57.2-1983 (Ref. 1),

with the following additions, clarifications, and exceptions.

Additions

  • This guide directly considers a thermal-hydraulic analysis of coolant flow through the spent fuel storage racks and the prevention of nucleate boiling under all anticipated operating conditions.
  • This guide provides considerations for extreme winds and missiles generated by those winds, as well as low-trajectory turbine missiles.
  • This guide offers an option of preventing cask drops by using a single-failure-proof, heavy-load- handling system rather than demonstrating that dropping the fuel cask in the cask-loading area will not damage the watertight integrity of the pool.
  • This guide points out the need to consider the potential impact of high-burnup fuel for the design of spent fuel handling and storage facilities.

Rev. 2 of RG 1.13, Page 4

Clarifications

  • This guide provides more specific criteria for the makeup water system and its backup, including additional details concerning when the backup system must be Seismic Category I

and the necessary makeup rates.

  • This guide presents details on how to prevent the cask crane from passing over the spent fuel (e.g., by using stops and interlocks or, preferably, by design).
  • This guide presents the conditions necessary to allow coolant boiling, including the ability of the pool structure and liner to withstand coolant boiling and the ability of the ventilation system to keep safety-related components safe from the effects of high temperatures and moisture.
  • This guide specifies the temperature conditions for a safety-related cooling system;

specifically, the pool water during accident conditions should remain below the lesser of

(1) the pool and structure design temperatures, or (2) 93 EC (200 EF).

Exceptions

  • ANSI/ANS-57.2-1983 states that spent fuel pool water should be maintained below 66 EC (150 EF) during normal operating conditions. By contrast, this regulatory guide specifies that pool water should be maintained below 60 EC (140 EF) for all heat load conditions, including full-core offloads during refueling.
  • ANSI/ANS-57.2-1983 states that water shielding should limit the maximum radiation dose to 2.5 millirem per hour for personnel. Instead of a dose rate, this guide specifies that the minimum pool depth for shielding should be 3 meters (10 feet) above the top of the stored fuel assemblies.
  • ANSI/ANS-57.2-1983 states that a high-radiation-level alarm should actuate the engineered safety feature filtration system. By contrast, this regulatory guide states that either the high- radiation-level alarm should adjust the ventilation system to contain the radiation, or the air should be filtered if the spent fuel storage facility is equipped with a filtration system designed to the guidelines of Regulatory Guide 1.52, Design, Inspection, and Testing Criteria for Air Filtration and Adsorption Units of Post-Accident Engineered-Safety-Feature Atmosphere Cleanup Systems in Light-Water-Cooled Nuclear Power Plants (Ref. 5).
  • When the term potential offsite exposuresappears in paragraphs 3, 5.(3), 5.(4), 5.5.4, and 6.5.2.3 of ANSI/ANS-57.2-1983, the phrase the Code of Federal Regulations, Title 10, Energy, Part 100

should be replaced by the Code of Federal Regulations, Title 10, Energy, Paragraphs

50.34(a)(1), 50.67(b)(2), or 100.11, as applicable.

  • Sections 20.106 and 20.3 of 10 CFR Part 20, quoted in paragraph 5, Facility Performance Requirement, of ANSI/ANS 57.2-1983, are no longer in the 2006 edition of 10 CFR.

Rather, those two sections have been replaced by Sections 20.1206 and 20.1003, respectively, in the 2006 edition of 10 CFR.

Rev. 2 of RG 1.13, Page 5

  • The guidelines described in Section 6.4.2.14, Design for Seismic Loading, and Appendix B

to ANSI/ANS 57.2-1983 should be replaced by NRC Regulatory Guide 1.92,Combining Modal Responses and Spatial Components in Seismic Response Analysis (Ref. 6).

in ANSI/ANS 57.2-1983 should be replaced by those in Appendix S, Earthquake Engineering Criteria for Nuclear Power Plants, to 10 CFR Part 50. This is true for applicants for design certification or a combined license pursuant to 10 CFR Part 52, or a construction permit or operating license pursuant to 10 CFR Part 50, on or after January 10, 1997. The new definitions reflect the current NRC and industry thinking, and are in line with the definitions of OBE and SSE

in the proposed new versions of ANS Standards 2.2, 2.10, 2.23, and 57.2. However, for an operating license applicant or holder whose construction permit was issued prior to January 10, 1997, the earthquake engineering criteria in Section VI of Appendix A to 10 CFR

Part 100, Reactor Site Criteria (Ref. 7) (i.e., the definitions of OBE and SSE in ANSI/ANS

57.2-1983) continue to apply.

Rev. 2 of RG 1.13, Page 6

C. REGULATORY POSITION

With the additions, clarifications, and exceptions presented in Section B of this guide, the guidance presented in ANSI Standard N210-1976/ANS-57.2-1983 (Ref. 1) is acceptable for use in the design of spent fuel storage facilities at light-water nuclear power plants. The following resulting regulatory positions are formally presented for clarity.

1. Seismic Design The spent fuel storage facility, including all structures and equipment necessary to maintain minimum water levels necessary for radiation shielding, should be designed to Seismic Category I

requirements. Appendix S, Earthquake Engineering Criteria for Nuclear Power Plants to 10 CFR Part 50

applies to applicants for a design certification or combined license pursuant to 10 CFR Part 52, or a construction permit or operating license pursuant to 10 CFR Part 50 issued on or after January 10, 1997.

However, for an operating license applicant or holder whose construction permit was issued prior to January 10, 1997, the earthquake engineering criteria in Section VI of Appendix A to 10 CFR Part 100,

Reactor Site Criteria, continue to apply. In addition, Regulatory Guide 1.92,Combining Modal Responses and Spatial Components in Seismic Response Analysis (Ref. 6), provides licensees and applicants with updated and improved guidance for the seismic response analysis of nuclear power plant structures, systems, and components that are important to safety, which include spent fuel handling and storage facilities.

2. Protection Against Extreme Winds The spent fuel storage facility should be designed to (a) keep extreme winds and missiles generated by those winds from causing significant loss of watertight integrity of the fuel storage pool, and (b) keep missiles generated by extreme winds from contacting fuel within the pool. For those nuclear plants that are located in areas of the country where tornadoes cause the strongest winds, refer to Regulatory Guide 1.76, Design Basis Tornado for Nuclear Power Plants (Ref. 8), for design- basis tornado characteristics.

3. Protection Against Turbine Missiles The spent fuel storage facility should be designed to protect the spent fuel from low-trajectory turbine missiles, and the storage pool should retain watertight integrity if struck by such missiles.

Regulatory Guide 1.115, Protection Against Low-Trajectory Turbine Missiles (Ref. 9), provides guidance for appropriate protection against low-trajectory turbine missiles.

4. Confinement and Filtering Systems A controlled-leakage building should enclose the fuel to limit the potential release of radioactive iodine and other radioactive materials. If necessary to limit offsite dose consequences from a fuel- handling accident or spent fuel pool boiling, the building should include an engineered safety feature filtration system that meets the guidelines outlined in Regulatory Guide 1.52.

Rev. 2 of RG 1.13, Page 7

5. Control of Heavy Loads Cranes capable of carrying heavy loads should be prevented, preferably by design rather than by interlocks, from moving over the pool. Furthermore, the spent fuel storage facility design should have at least one of the following provisions with respect to the handling of heavy loads, including the spent fuel cask:

(a) Cranes should be designed to provide single-failure-proof handling of heavy loads, so that a single failure will not result in the crane handling system losing the capability to perform its safety function.

(b) The spent fuel cask-loading area should be designed to withstand, without significant leakage of the adjacent spent fuel storage, the impact of the heaviest load to be carried by the crane from the maximum height to which it can be lifted.

6. Drainage Prevention Drains, permanently connected mechanical or hydraulic systems, and other features that (by maloperation or failure) could reduce the coolant inventory to unsafe levels should not be installed or included in the design. No piping penetrations through the storage pool wall should be below the minimum water level required for shielding. Siphon breakers, check valves, and other devices should be used to preclude accidental draining by hydraulic systems. In addition, the spent fuel storage facility should comply with one of the following criteria:

(a) If the spent fuel pool cooling system is designed to Quality Group C, Seismic Category I

requirements, drains, piping, or other systems should be unable to reduce the coolant inventory to a level that would prevent the cooling system from maintaining the storage pool below its design temperature limit.

(b) If the spent fuel pool is designed to allow coolant boiling during accident conditions, no drains, piping, or other systems should be installed that would allow coolant levels to drain below adequate shielding depths of approximately 3 meters (10 feet) above the top of the fuel assemblies.

7. Instrumentation Reliable and frequently tested monitoring equipment should be provided to alarm both locally and in a continuously manned location if the water level in the fuel storage pool falls below a predetermined level, if the water temperature exceeds a predetermined level, or if high local radiation levels are experienced. The high-radiation-level instrumentation should signal automatic ventilation and/or filtration functions that are consistent with the dose consequence evaluation for fuel-handling accidents.

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8. Makeup Water A Quality Group C, Seismic Category I makeup system should be provided to add coolant to the pool. Appropriate redundancy or a backup system for filling the pool from a reliable source, such as a lake, river, or onsite Seismic Category I water-storage facility, should be provided.

If the spent fuel pool cooling system is designed to the requirements of Quality Group C, Seismic Category I,

the backup to the makeup system need not be permanently installed or designed to Seismic Category I

requirements; however, the backup system should still take water from a Seismic Category I source.

The makeup system and its backup should have redundant flowpaths for providing water to the storage pool.

The capacity of the makeup systems should exceed the larger of (1) the pool leakage rate, assuming spent fuel pool liner perforation resulting from a dropped fuel assembly, or (2) the evaporation rate necessary to remove 0.3 percent of the rated reactor thermal power.

9. Pool Cooling The spent fuel storage facility should include a system for cooling the pool water in order to maintain a bulk temperature below 60 EC (140 EF) for all heat load conditions, including full-core offloads during refueling. Administrative controls may be used to ensure that this temperature limit is not exceeded. However, the minimum heat removal capacity with the forced-circulation cooling system in operation, the pool at the design temperature of the structure, and the heat sink at its maximum design temperature should exceed 0.3 percent of the reactor rated thermal power. One of the two following conditions should also be satisfied:

(a) The spent fuel pool cooling system is designed to meet Quality Group C, Seismic Category I

requirements.

(b) The spent fuel pool cooling system is not designed to meet Quality Group C, Seismic Category I

requirements. However, the pool structure and liner are designed to withstand coolant boiling;

the pool makeup system and its backup are designed to Quality Group C, Seismic Category I

requirements; and the building ventilation system has the capability to vent steam or moisture to the atmosphere to protect safety-related components from high temperatures and moisture levels.

If necessary to limit offsite dose consequences from venting steam or moisture during accident conditions, the ventilation system should meet the guidelines of Regulatory Guide 1.52.

10. Gates and Weirs Gates and weirs that isolate the spent fuel storage pool from the adjacent fuel-handling areas should be designed to prevent the coolant inventory from being drained below the top of the fuel assemblies.

The volume of the fuel-handling areas adjacent to the storage pool (e.g., cask-loading area, transfer canal)

should be limited so that if the seal(s) of a single gate were to fail and the pool water drained into one of these areas, pool coolant inventory would not be reduced to a level less than 3 meters (10 feet)

above the top of the fuel assemblies.

11. Fuel Cooling The spent fuel storage racks should be designed in a manner that allows for adequate coolant flow to all stored fuel assemblies. A thermal-hydraulic analysis should demonstrate that the racks provide adequate natural circulation to prevent nucleate boiling within the stored assemblies.

Rev. 2 of RG 1.13, Page 9

12. Leakage Containment The spent fuel storage pool should include a system for detecting and containing pool liner leaks.

Segmented leak channels, proper drainage, and sumps for collecting and containing such leakage should be used.

13. Pool Cleanup The spent fuel storage facility should be capable of maintaining safe radiation levels for personnel during anticipated operating and accident conditions. To maintain low radiation levels, a filtering system should be provided to remove radioactive materials and other contaminants from the spent fuel pool coolant.

This system does not need to be safety-related, but its failure should not impair safety-related systems or cause a significant decrease in the pool coolant inventory.

14. High-Burnup Fuel The mechanical properties of fuel may change with longer operating cycles. For instance, high-burnup fuel may become more brittle (i.e., possess lower ductility and fracture toughness)

and, therefore, be more vulnerable to failure. In order to protect high-burnup fuel from mechanical damage, this potential vulnerability should be considered in the design of spent fuel handling and storage facilities.

D. IMPLEMENTATION

The purpose of this section is to provide information to applicants and licensees regarding the NRC staffs plans for using this regulatory guide. No backfitting is intended or approved in connection with the issuance of this guide.

Except in those cases in which an applicant or licensee proposes or has previously established an acceptable alternative method for complying with specified portions of the NRCs regulations, the NRC staff will use the methods described in this guide to evaluate (1) submittals in connection with applications for construction permits, standard plant design certifications, operating licenses, early site permits, and combined licenses; and (2) submittals from operating reactor licensees who voluntarily propose to initiate system modifications that have a clear nexus with the subject for which guidance is provided herein.

REGULATORY ANALYSIS / BACKFIT ANALYSIS

The regulatory analysis and backfit analysis for this regulatory guide are available in Draft Regulatory Guide DG-1162, Spent Fuel Storage Facility Design Basis (Ref. 10). The NRC issued DG-1162 in October 2006 to solicit public comment on the draft of this Revision 2 of Regulatory Guide 1.13.

Rev. 2 of RG 1.13, Page 10

REFERENCES

1. ANSI/ANS 57.2-1983, Design Objectives for Light-Water Spent Fuel Storage Facilities at Nuclear Power Plants, American National Standards Institute/American Nuclear Society, La Grange Park, Illinois, 1983.1

2. U.S. Code of Federal Regulations, Title 10, Part 50, Domestic Licensing of Production and Utilization Facilities, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC.2

3. Regulatory Guide 1.26, Quality Group Classifications and Standards for Water-, Steam-,

and Radioactive-Waste-Containing Components of Nuclear Power Plants, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC.3

4. Regulatory Guide 1.29, Seismic Design Classification, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC.3

5. Regulatory Guide 1.52, Design, Inspection, and Testing Criteria for Air Filtration and Adsorption Units of Post-Accident Engineered-Safety-Feature Atmosphere Cleanup Systems in Light-Water-Cooled Nuclear Power Plants, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC.3

6. Regulatory Guide 1.92, Combining Modal responses and Spatial Components in Seismic Response Analysis, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC.3

7. U.S. Code of Federal Regulations, Title 10, Part 100, Reactor Site Criteria, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC.2

1 Copies may be obtained from the American Nuclear Society, 555 North Kensington Avenue, La Grange Park, Illinois

60526; telephone (708) 352-6611; fax (708) 352-0499. Purchase information is available through the Web-based ANS store at http://www.ans.org/store/vi-240124.

2 All NRC regulations listed herein are available electronically through the Electronic Reading Room on the NRCs public Web site, at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/cfr. Copies are also available for inspection or copying for a fee from the NRCs Public Document Room at 11555 Rockville Pike, Rockville, MD; the PDRs mailing address is USNRC PDR, Washington, DC 20555; telephone (301) 415-4737 or (800) 397-4209;

fax (301) 415-3548; email PDR@nrc.gov.

3 All regulatory guides listed herein were published by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission or its predecessor, the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission. Most are available electronically through the Electronic Reading Room on the NRCs public Web site, at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/reg-guides/. Single copies of regulatory guides may also be obtained free of charge by writing the Reproduction and Distribution Services Section, ADM, USNRC, Washington, DC 20555-0001, by fax to (301) 415-2289, or by email to DISTRIBUTION@nrc.gov.

Active guides may also be purchased from the National Technical Information Service (NTIS). Details may be obtained by contacting NTIS at 5285 Port Royal Road, Springfield, Virginia 22161, online at http://www.ntis.gov, by telephone at (800) 553-NTIS (6847) or (703) 605-6000, or by fax to (703) 605-6900. Copies are also available for inspection or copying for a fee from the NRCs Public Document Room (PDR), which is located at 11555 Rockville Pike, Rockville, Maryland; the PDRs mailing address is USNRC PDR, Washington, DC 20555-000

1. The PDR

can also be reached by telephone at (301) 415-4737 or (800) 397-4209, by fax at (301) 415-3548, and by email to PDR@nrc.gov.

Rev. 2 of RG 1.13, Page 11

8. Regulatory Guide 1.76, Design-Basis Tornado for Nuclear Power Plants, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC.3

9. Regulatory Guide 1.115, Protection Against Low-Trajectory Turbine Missiles, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC.3

10. Draft Regulatory Guide DG-1162, Spent Fuel Storage Facility Design Basis, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC, October 2006.4

4 Draft Regulatory Guide DG-1162 is available electronically under Accession #ML062680291 in the NRCs Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS) at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html.

Copies are also available for inspection or copying for a fee from the NRCs Public Document Room (PDR), which is located at 11555 Rockville Pike, Rockville, Maryland; the PDRs mailing address is USNRC PDR, Washington, DC

20555-0001. The PDR can also be reached by telephone at (301) 415-4737 or (800) 397-4209, by fax at (301) 415-3548, and by email to PDR@nrc.gov.

Rev. 2 of RG 1.13, Page 12