ML17262B058

Forwards Response to NRC 920707 RAI Re Emergency Response capability/NUREG-0737,Suppl 1,in Ref to Util 920313 Ltr on Reg Guide 1.97 Concerning Post Accident Instrumentation.Eops Reviewed Against Variable Classification Criteria

ML17262B058
Person / Time
Site:	Ginna
Issue date:	10/14/1992
From:	Mecredy R ROCHESTER GAS & ELECTRIC CORP.
To:	Andrea Johnson NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM), Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
RTR-NUREG-0737, RTR-NUREG-737, RTR-REGGD-01.097, RTR-REGGD-1.097 NUDOCS 9210220288
Download: ML17262B058 (40)

Text

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, REGULATO*. INFORMATION DISTRIBUTION ZSTEM (RIDE)

I ACCESSION NBR:9210220288 DOC.DATE: 92/10/14 NOTARIZED: NO DOCKET FACIL:50-244 Robert Emmet Ginna Nuclear Plant, Unit 1, Rochester G 05000244 AUTH. NAME AUTHOR AFFILIATION MECREDY,R.C. Rochester Gas 6 Electric Corp.

RECIP.NAME RECIPIENT AFFILIATION JOHNSON,A.R. Project Directorate I-3

SUBJECT:

Forwards response to RAI re NUREG 0737,suppl 1, "Emergency Response Capability" 6 rev to reg guide 1.97,rev 3, "Post Accident Instrumentation Comparison. Table." I DISTRIBUTION CODE: A003D COPIES RECEIVED:LTR $ ENCL i SIZE: 3 D TITLE: OR/Licensing Submittal: Suppl 1 to NUREG-0737(Generic Ltr 2-33)

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. NOTES:License Exp date in accordance with 10CFR2,2.109(9/19/72). 05000244 RECIPIENT COPIES RECIPIENT COPIES ID CODE/NAME LTTR ENCL ID CODE/NAME LTTR ENCL PD1-3 LA 1 1 PD1-3 PD 1 1 JOHNSON,A 2 2 D

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A NOTE TO ALL "RIDS" RECIPIENTS:

PLEASE HELP US TO REDUCE WASTE! CONTACT THE DOCUMENT CONTROL DESK.

ROOM Pl-37 (EXT. 504-2065) TO ELIMINATEYOUR NAME FROM DISTRIBUTION LISTS FOR DOCUMENTS YOU DON'T NEED!

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~/rztzz zznrm ROCHESTER GAS AND ELECTRIC CORPORATION ct 89 EAST AVENUE, ROCHESTER N.Y. 14649-0001 ROBERT C MECREDY TELEPHONE Vice President Cinna Nudear Production October 14, 1992 AREA CODE TtB 546 2700 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Document Control Desk Attn: Allen R. Johnson Project Directorate I-3 Washington, D.C. 20555

Subject:

Emergency Response Capability/NUREG 0737, Supplement 1 R. E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant Docket No. 50-244

, Ref.(1): NRC letter, A. Johnson to R. Mecredy (RGGE), "Emergency Response Capability Request for Additional Information", dated July 7, 1992.

(2): RGGE letter, R. Mecredy to M. Hodges (NRC), "NUREG 0737 Supplement 1/Regulatory Guide 1.97: Comparison of Ginna Post Accident Instrumentation," dated March 13, 1992.

Dear Mr. Johnson:

By letter dated July 7, 1992 (Reference 1), your office requested additional information regarding the post accident instrumentation capabilities at Ginna Station. Enclosure 1 to that letter listed sixteen items requiring response. Attachment 1 to this letter provides the requested response.

In addition your request has made evident the need for us to revise our, "Regulatory Guide 1.97, revision 3/Ginna Post Accident Instrumentation Comparison Table", attachment 3, table 1 of our letter dated March 13, 1992 (Reference 2). This revision, along with a summary of changes, is provided as Attachment 2 to this letter. You will notice in this revised table that several Type A variables have been reclassified. This resulted from a detailed review of the current Ginna Emergency Operating Procedures against the variable classification criteria. The previous table reflected classifications dating back to our original submittals on the subject, over five years ago.

We hope that the information provided herein'adequately addresses your concerns. We are prepared to support any further discussions required to resolve these questions.

Very t, uly yours,

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Robert C. Mecr dy (P~gO" BJF/246 9Zg0ZZOZ88 9ZiOf Ob5 PDR ADOCH, 05000Z~gp PDK~

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xc'r. Allen R. Johnson (Mail Stop Project Directorate I-3 14D1)

Washington, D.C. 20555 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region I 475 Allendale Road King of Prussia, PA 19406 US NRC Ginna Senior Resident Inspector

Attachment 1 The responses below are numbered to be consistent with the Request for Additional Information (RAI), attached to USNRC letter, A.R.

Johnson to R.C. Mecredy (RGE), "Emergency Response Capability Request for Additional Information," dated July 7, 1992.

RCS Cold Leg RGGE concurs with the conclusion of the RAI that one channel of environmentally qualified RCS Cold Leg Temperature should be recorded. RGGE will assess the means of providing this capability (dedicated recorder or plant process computer), the cost of the modification, and <<any time constraints to establish a schedule for this upgrade. At this time, we expect completion of this modification during the 1994 Refueling Outage. We would like to note that currently a channel of RCS Cold Leg Temperature (not environmentally qualified) is recorded both via a dedicated recorder and by the plant process computer.

2. Containment Sump Water Level Narrow Range The Ginna Containment design incorporates two sumps, Sump A (instrument sump) directly below the reactor vessel, and Sump B which is used for post-accident recirculation. Sump A extends from approximately elevation 205'0" up to the Containment basement floor level, elevation 235'8". Sump A can hold less than 50,000 gallons. The instrumentation listed under Item 33 of Table 1 of our March 13, 1992 submittal as narrow range measures liquid level in Sump A up to roughly the Containment basement floor. This sump would quickly become filled during LOCA conditions, and is therefore only useful during normal operation for detection of small leaks, and as an initial indication of a LOCA. Liquid in Sump A is not available for post-accident recirculation. Therefore considered Type C, category 3 post accident instrumentation.

it is The bottom of Sump B (elevation 227'2") is approximately eight feet below the containment basement floor (elevation 235'8").

The suction for sump recirculation operation of the Residual Heat Removal (RHR) system is in Sump B approximately one foot above the bottom. Item 23 of Table 1 of our March 13, 1992 submittal (i.e. wide range), lists instrumentation to monitor liquid level in Sump B. Two channels of five level switches

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each correspond to levels of 8, 78, 113, 180, and 214 inches from the bottom of Sump B. 214 inches corresponds to approximately 500,000 gallons in Sump B. These instruments are used during an accident to verify that water is being delivered to Containment, and to verify adequate level for the operator to initiate sump recirculation these channels are considered Type A if required. Therefore category 1 post-accident instruments.

NRC SER dated 12/4/90 found the instrumentation provided to monitor both sump levels to be acceptable.

Containment Isolation Valve Position Regulatory Guide 1.97, revision 3 recommends containment isolation valve position indication to verify "accomplishment of isolation". At Ginna, containment isolation occurs concurrent with a Safety Injection (SI) signal, i.e. when pressurizer pressure drops below a nominal 1723 psig, steam line pressure drops below a nominal 514 psig, or containment pressure exceeds a nominal 4.0 psig. Containment isolation can also be manually initiated from the control room.

Receipt of an SI signal causes the operator to enter emergency operations procedure E-O, "Reactor Trip or Safety Injection".

Step 12, an immediate action step, requires the operator to verify containment isolation. This step verifies "accomplishment of isolation" well before any containment isolation valves outside containment experience a harsh environment. At no other time in the EOP's is the operator directed to monitor this position indication. Since it is not credible for penetrations once isolated to spuriously open (minimum of two failures required), it is not necessary for the operator to reverify the isolation function during recovery operation when these valves may be exposed to a harsh environment.

At some point following initial containment isolation the operator may be directed to open specific containment penetrations. In order to open penetrations the operator must first manually reset the Containment Isolation function, and then manually reset interlocks for the individual valve(s).

The operator is directed to open specific valves for specific purposes, such as restoring control air,to containment, or restoring RCP seal flow. The position of such valves is determined by monitoring the process functions for which the valves were opened.

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Since isolation is verified prior to these valves seeing a harsh environment, RG&E does not. consider it necessary to environmentally . qualify this indication. Seismic qualification of the indicating lamps is being addressed under the SQUG program, which has been previously approved by the NRC for use at Ginna.

4., RHR Heat Exchanger Outlet Temperature Following the injection phase of a design basis accident the Residual Heat Removal (RHR) System can be used to remove decay heat from the reactor core by one of three methods:

1. Normal cooldown taking suction from the loop A hot leg and discharging to the loop B cold leg;

2. Sump recirculation taking suction from the Containment Sump B and discharging into the reactor vessel upper plenum;

3. High head sump recirculation taking suction from Containment Sump B and discharging to the safety injection pump(s) suction which in turn discharges into the RCS cold legs.

In order for the RHR heat exchanger outlet temperature RTD to experience a harsh environment significant, fuel failure must occur. For situations where normal cooldown (1) or high head sump recirculation (3) are used, the RHR heat exchanger outlet temperature RTD is not exposed to a harsh environment and therefore environmental qualification is not required.

Post-accident cooldown utilizing either methods 2 or 3 above is accomplished using procedure ES-1.3 "Transfer to Cold Leg Recirculation." This procedure requires manual alignment of component cooling water to the RHR heat exchangers, and manual adjustment of RHR flow. Therefore it is highly unlikely that the heat exchangers do not function. This procedure directs the operator to verify adequate core cooling using core exit thermocouples and reactor vessel level indication (step 14).

Both indications are environmentally qualified. Verification of core cooling is considered an acceptable alternate means of verifying RHR system effectiveness.

5. Refueling Water Storage Tank Level RGGE has confirmed that loss of instrument bus 1A will not cause a loss of main control board indication of RWST level channel LT-920. The portion of this channel containing the

transmitter and main control board indicator is isolated from the computer indication portion of the channel by a Foxboro model M/66B current repeater, powered from instrument bus 1C.

Primary System Power Operated Relief Valve Position We have reviewed the criteria used to classify post-accident instrumentation at Ginna and have determined that we have misclassified primary system power operated relief valve (PORV) position indication as Type A. We concur with Regulatory Guide 1.97, revision 3 that the correct classification should be Type D, with Category 2 qualifications. The existing configuration meets these criteria. We would like to note that although not environmentally qualified, discharge temperature indication does provide backup indication of PORV position, and is supplied from a separate safety related power source. Seismic qualification of the indicating lamps is being addressed under the SQUG program, which has been previously approved by the NRC for use at Ginna.

Main Steam Flow We have reviewed the criteria used to classify post-accident instrumentation at Ginna and have determined that we have misclassified Main Steam Flow indication as a Type A variable.

We concur with Regulatory Guide 1.97, revision 3, that the correct classification should be Type ,D, with Category 2 qualifications. The existing configuration meets these criteria.

The nomenclature 1A/1C entered in Table 1 of our March 13, 1992 submittal as the power source for two channels of main steam flow, and six channels of main feedwater flow (Xtem 68) represents the Advanced Digital Feedwater Control System (ADFCS) power supply system which auctioneers from instrument buses 1A and 1C. This design has been shown to maintain the independence of the two buses.

Letdown Outlet Flow Regulatory Guide 1.97, revision 3 defines design flow as "the maximum flow anticipated in normal operation". The maximum letdown flow anticipated during normal operation (isolation valve for the largest of three flow restricting orifices open) is 60 gpm. Therefore the range of theinstrument listed, 0 100 gpm, provides indication of 0 167> design flow as

'I defined in Regulatory Guide 1.97, revision 3, and therefore exceeds the recommended range. Our entry in Table 1, Item 76 of our March 13, 1992 submittal will be modified to reflect this.

9. High-Level Radioactive Liquid Tank Level Waste drain tank level (LT-1001) indication is provided at the Waste Disposal Panel in the Auxiliary building. In addition high'tank level alarms at the panel, and consequently at the main control board (Waste Disposal Panel annunciator). Any operator action based on LT-1001 requires manipulation at the Waste Disposal Panel, and therefore an operator would be dispatched to the panel where the indication is available. We consider this alarm to provide adequate control room Waste Drain Tank level indication. Waste drain tank level indication is also available at a remote terminal in the Technical Support Center.

10. Status of Standby Power Bulk Nitrogen header pressure (PT-1066) is displayed at the Waste Disposal Panel. In addition low header pressure is alarmed at the panel and consequently at the main control board. Any operator action based on PT-1066 would require local action, and therefore an operator would be dispatched to the panel where the indicator is available.

While the Nitrogen Gas header monitored by PT-1066 does provide nitrogen gas blankets to several radioactive decay tanks, it is not an energy source as described in Regulatory Guide 1.97, revision 3. Therefore RG6E will remove it from its list of post accident instrumentation (Table 1, Item 83).

11. Particulates and Halogens The range deviations for containment vent and plant vent particulate and halogen monitors were evaluated and found acceptable in NRC SER dated December 4, 1990, same subject (Item 3.3.22). The associated TER states that the regulatory guide basis assumes one common vent whereas Ginna Station has two vents. The ranges monitored are adequate to measure all credible releases through the vents. The ability to obtain post-accident effluent grab samples (i.e. SPING monitor filter changeout) from the plant vent and containment vent, thereby extending the monitored range, was evaluated during NRC inspection 50-244/88-20 and found to be acceptable.

12. Plant and Environs Radiation The provided range deviations for portable sampling were evaluated and found acceptable in NRC SER dated December 4, 1990, same subject. As stated in the accompanying TER "Because of the potential for personnel exposure, the licensee would not use portable instrumentation to assess radiation levels greater than the provided ranges."

13. Redundancy and Separation When modifying safety related electrical circuits, including post-accident category 1 instruments, RG&E attempts to comply with IEEE Standard 384-1981, section 6.1 separation criteria if practicable. Deviations from this criteria are addressed in the modification specific safety analysis. RG&E does not consider that separation of individual redundant circuits in the control room would provide any significant benefit, given the existing original design configuration, which does not provide for separation. RG&E has demonstrated the ability to achieve safe shutdown in the event of a complete loss of the control room in response to Appendix R. We believe that this adequately addresses credible multiple failures of redundant equipment in the control room.

14. Equipment Identification As stated in our March 13, 1992 submittal RG&E feels that the appropriate place to address control board instrumentation labeling and demarcation is in our Detailed Control Room Design Review (DCRDR). This review was performed in accordance with NUREG-0700, and has been reviewed and approved by the NRC. Labeling, demarcation, and color coding of control board instruments is in accordance with the Ginna DCRDR, and the Ginna Human Factors Manual. No requirement exists for commonality of identification of post-accident monitoring instrumentation.

While we concur with the RAI that the Type A post-accident instruments do constitute the minimum set of required indications to be monitored following a design basis event, they do not necessarily constitute the most appropriate instruments to be monitored for any specific event or at any given time. For example the initial actions required of the control board operator during emergency operations involve monitoring instruments to verify proper actuation of automatic safety systems (Type D variables). Depending on the situation, this could include category' instruments. We

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believe that a common designation for specific post-accident instruments does not provide useful information, could lead to confusion, and may actually distract the operator from monitoring other more appropriate instruments.

We have reviewed the list of Ginna post-accident Category 1 Types A, B and C instruments. Of the variables monitored, non-qualified indication exists for only three. Of these three, two are clearly distinguishable from qualified channels due to range (Containment Pressure channel PT-944 has a range of 0 to 5 psig), and labeling (Pressurizer Level channel LI-433A is labeled "PRZR Cold Calib Level" and is only used for filling the pressurizer).be evaluated, Unqualified channels for RCS Cold Leg Temperature will and means provided to ensure that operators are aware that these channels may not provide correct indication if exposed to a harsh environment.

We anticipate this change can be made within six months of issuance of Ginna Regulatory Guide 1.97 SER.

15. Interfaces Due to the original design of Ginna Station, some existing RG 1.97 designated Category 1 and 2 instruments are not isolated from other circuits and components which would have less stringent design criteria. In the original design of the plant all instrument indication was considered non-safety related. Consequently indicators were normally designed to share the same instrument loop with controllers, annunciators, and plant process computer (PPCS) inputs. Qualification of these various components including the indicators was comparable, i.e. control grade. This portion of the instrument loop is isolated from what was then considered the safety-related portion of the channel if applicable (i.e. RPS or ESFAS).

With the replacement of the PPCS at Ginna, qualified isolation panels (MUX panels) were installed for all inputs to the PPCS.

However, separation of redundant input cables to these panels was not upgraded. Circuit separation is discussed in the response to question 13. Isolation from control circuits for Category 2 indications would only be a concern if the control functions were subject to a harsh environment, since seismic qualification and redundancy is not required for Category 2.

There is no harsh environment for the equipment at Ginna Station. The degree of redundancy for Category 1 indications minimizes the potential for complete loss of indication.

Generally only one channel of these variables provides a controlling function. Also, generally these loops are contained within the control room, where fault levels are minimized. Given the demonstrated ability to safely shutdown the plant outside the control room, and the limited benefit which is considered to be available by additional electrical

isolation in the control room, given existing separation conditions (see question 13), RG&E does not feel that a detailed analysis of each individual loop can be justified.

For the reasons discussed above, RG&E does not feel that categorical isolation of all existing category 1 and 2 indication loops, from control functions is warranted. When it can be accommodated during a major modification, pro-active efforts are made to isolate and upgrade Category 1 indicators in accordance with current standards. We consider this a good faith effort to meet the intent of the Regulatory Guide.

16. Commitment to R.G. 1.97 RG&E has provided documentation comparing Ginna Station post-accident instrumentation to the recommendations of Regulatory Guide 1.97, revision 3. Deviations from the guidance have been explicitly identified, with supporting justification.

RG&E post-accident instrumentation is identified in the Ginna UFSAR. As such, any modifications to the equipment must have a safety evaluation performed in accordance with 10CFR50.59.

This assures that future modifications to the post-accident instrumentation will not degrade its performance. As described in our responses to question 13 and 15, RG&E attempts to comply with current standards for separation, redundancy, and isolation. Design criteria and safety for modifications analyses alternative standards if "current criteria"acceptability document cannot be met.

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ATTACHMENT 2 Table 1, revision 1 Com arison of Ginna Post-Accident Instrumentation to Re ulator Guide 1.97 Revision 3 Criteria Summary of Changes ITEM s CHANGE REASON FOR CHANGE

1. 2,4,5,10, Deleted as Type A Review of variables against 17 I 21 variables current emergency procedures, and classification criteria established that these variables no longer meet the classification criteria for Type A.

2. 27 Added RCS Hot Leg Formerly Type A variables Channels

3. 41 Corrected range The range provided satisfies cited in note to 10 all recommendations psia to 3004 design

4. 46 Added Containment Formerly Type A variable. New hydrogen equipment identification concentration number represents change in channels plant nomenclature

5. 51, 52 Changed loop Designation change does not designators for affect equipment attributes.

channels LT-934, PT-936, and PT-940.

6. 55 Added High Pressure Formerly Type A variable Injection (SI) Flow Channels

7. 59 Added Pressurizer Formerly Type A variable PORV position indication

8. 67 Added Main Steam Formerly Type A variable.

Flow channels; Category changed to reflect corrected category lack of environmental for FT-498, FT-499 qualification of these 2 channels

9. 69 Added standby Formerly Type A variable auxiliary feedwater flow channels

10. 76 Corrected channel See Attachment 1, Item 8.

range

11. 80 Added note regarding NRC RAI requested this location of clarification indication

ITEM s CHANGE REASON FOR CHANGE

12. 83 Deleted channel PT- The channel does not monitor a 1066. "power source" as described in RG 1.97, revision 3. See Attachment 1, Item 10.

13. 84 Added containment Formerly Type A variable.

high radiation channels BJF/032

Attachment 2 Page 1 of 20 Table 1, revision 1 Comparison of Glnna Post Accident Instrumentatlon to Regulatory Guide 1.97, Revision 3 Criteria C.R. RECORDER TYPE VARIABLE, CAT. RANGE EEQ SEISMIC QA P.S. IND. CHART COMP COMMENTS 1 n.a. Aux Feedwater Flow 1 Plant Specific y es yes full 1E yes Plant Specific A Fi'-2001 (MDAFW/SGA) 1 0 - 275 gpm (0-138%) mild yes SR 1A FI-2021A no F2021 two per redundant function provided Fl'-2013 (MDAFW/SGA) 1 0 - 275 gpm (0-138%) mild yes SR 1C FI-2029 no F2029 FT-2002 (MDAFW/SGB) 1 0 - 275 gpm (0-138%) mild yes SR 1C FI-2022A no F2022 Fl'-2014 (MDAFW/SGB) 1 0- 275 gpm (0-138%) mild yes SR 1A FI-2030 no F2030 Fi'-2006 (fDAFW/SGA) 1 0- 500 gpm (0-125%) mild yes SR 1C FI-2023A no F2023 FT-2007 (fDAFW/SGB) 1 0 - 500 gpm (0-125%) mild yes SR lA FI-2024A no F2024 also satisfies 469 deleted Core Exit 3 n.a. Thermocouples 1 Plant Specific yes yes full 1E yes Plant Specific A Tl - T39 1 0-2300'F yes yes SR 1A CETA no yes 39 CEPs are provided. Technical 1C CETB Specifications require a minimum of four operable per quadrant. 19 CET's ate associated with the A train and 20 with the B Train.

also satisfies N's 30,37 deleted deleted

Attachment 2 Page 2 of 20 Table 1, revision 1 Comparison of Ginna Post Accident Instrumentatlon to Regulatory Guide 1.97, Revision 3 Criteria C.R. RECORDER TYPE VARIABLE EEQ SEISMIC QA P.S. IND. CHART COMP COMMENTS 6 n.a Containment Pressure 1 Plant Specific yes yes full lE y es Plant Specific A FI'-945 1 0-60 psig jjcs ycs SR 1A PI-945 no P0945 ~eserecorders are proposed to be removed Fi'-946 1 10-200 psia ycs ycs SR 1B PI-946 yes* no with inputs to the SAS/PPCS provided PT-947 1 0-60 psig yes yes SR lc PI-947 no P0947 instead.

Pl'-948 1 10-200 psia ycs ycs SR 1C PI-948 yes* . no Ff-949 1 0-60 psig yes yes SR 1B PI-949 no P0949 PT-950 1 10-200 psia ycs yes SR MQ483PI-950 no no also satisfies items ¹35,41 Condensate Storage 7 n.a. Tank Level 1 Plant Specific yes yes full 1E yes Plant Specific A LT-2022A (tank A) 1 0-24 ft mild ycs SR 1A LI-2022A no L2022A The transmitters are not located in a Seismic LT-2022B (tank B) 1 0-24 ft mild ycs- SR 1C LI-2022B no no Category 1 building. The tanks are connected by a locked open 10" line.

8 n.a. Pressurizer Pressure 1 Plant Specific yes yes full lE yes plant specific A PT429 1 1700-2500 psig yes yes SR lA PI429 PR429 P0429 PR429 has the capability of recording any PT430 1 1700-2500 psig yes yes SR 1B PI430 PR429 F0430 one of the four channels at a time (switch PI'431 1 1700-2500 psig jjcs ycs SR 1C PI431 PR429 F0431 selectable).Although channel FI'449 is not PT449 1 1700-2500 psig ycs ycs SR 1D PI449 PR-429 P0449 powered from a safety related supply, it is maintained as a catagory 1 variable in all other aspects. Its protection signals are failsafe.

9 n.a. Pressurizer Level 1 Plant Specific yes yes -full 1E yes Plant Specific A LT426 1 0-100% ycs jjcs SR 1A LI426 LR428 L0426 Level instrumentation does not cover the LT427 1 0-100% jjcs ycs SR 1B LI-427 LR428 L0427 hemispherical top and bottom of the LT428 1 0-100% jjcs ycs SR 1C LI428 LR428 L0428 pressurizer.

also satisfies item ¹60 10 deleted

Attachment 2 Page 3 of 20 Table 1, revision 1 Comparison of Ginna Post Accident Instrumentation to Regulatory Guide 1.97, Revision 3 Criteria C.R. RECORDER

¹ TYPE VARIABLE CAT. RANGE EEQ SEISMIC QA P.S. IND. CHART COMP COMMENTS RCS Cold Leg 11 n.a Temperature 1 Plant Specific ye s ye s fu ll 1E ye s Plant Specific A TE409B-1 (Loop A) 1 0-700 OF yes yes SR lA TI409B-1 no>> no* <<Currently two channels, TE450, TE451 are TE410B-1 (Loop B) 1 0-700 OF yes yes SR 1C TI410B-1 no* no* recorded (chait and PPCS). These channels are not post accident environmentally qualified. A modiTication to provide recording (PPCS or chart) of one qualified channel is proposed.

also satisfies item ¹28 12 deleted 13 n.a. RCS Pressure 1 Plant Specific y es yes full 1E yes Plant Specific A PT420 1 0-3000 psig yes yes SR 1A PI420 PR420 P0420 PT420A 1 0-3000 psig yes yes SR 1C PI420A PR-420A P0420A also satisfies items ¹29,40 RHR Flow (low 14 n.a. pressure injection) 1 Plant Specific yes yes full 1E yes Plant Specific A FT-626 1 0-4000 gpm yes yes SR 1C F1426 FR-626 F0626

• Fl'-931A and FI'-931B monitor RHR flow (FT-xxx)** (1) (0 - 4000gpm) (yes) (yes) (SR) (1A) (yes) (no) (yes) toContainmentSprayandSIpumpssuction.

Fl'-931A (Loop A)* 1 0- 2200 gpm yes yes SR 1C FI-931A no no <<<<AredundantflowtransmittertoFT426 FT-931B(LoopB)<<1 0-2200gpm yes yes SR 1B FI-931B no no utilizing the same primary element is proposed.

also satisfies items ¹49, 56 Reactor Vessel Level 15 n.a. Indication System 1 Plant Specific yes yes full 1E ye s Plant Specific A LT490A 1 0- 100% yes yes SR 1A LI490A no L0496A RVLIS receives 'correction'nputs from sensor LT490B 1 0- 100% yes yes SR 1C LI490B no L0496B line temperature, RCP status, RHR flow, SI flow, CETs, RCS pressure, and Tcold. Where both channels have common inputs the input signals to each channel are isolated.

also satisfies item ¹31

Attachment 2 Page 4 of 20 Table 1, revision 1 Comparison of Ginna Post Accident Instrumentation to Regulatory Guide 1.97, Revision 3 Criteria C.R. RECORDER

¹ TYPE VARIABLE CAT. RANGE EEQ SEISMIC QA IND. CHART COMP COMMENTS Refueling Water 16 n.a. Storage Tank Level 1 Plant Specific yes yes full 1E yes Plant Specific LT-920 1 0- 100% mild yes SR 1C* LI-920 no L0920

• Computer indication of this channel also LT-921 1 0- 100% mild yes SR 1A LI-921 no L0921 requires power from 1A.

also satisfies item ¹57 17 deleted Steam Generator Wide Two per Steam Generator required for 18 n.a. Range Level 1 Plant Specific yes yes fu 11 1E yes Plant Specific two loop plants A LT-504 (SG A) 1 0-100% ycs jjcs SR 1A LI-504 LR-504 L0504 Two per Steam Generator provided.

LT-505 (SG A) 1 0-100% yes ycs SR 1C LI-505 LR-505 L0505 LT-506 (SG B) 1 0-100% ycs ycs SR 1A LI-506 LR-506 L0506 LT-507 (SG B) 1 0-100% ycs ycs SR 1C LI-507 LR-507 L0507 also satisfies item ¹65 Steam Generator 19 n.a. Narrow Range Level 1 Plant Specific yes yes full 1E y es Plant Specific A LT461 (SG A) 1 0-100% yes yes SR 1A LI461 yes* L0461

• Median of 3 channels per generator is LT462 (SG A) 1 0-100% ycs ycs SR 1C LIW2 yes* L0462 recorded.

LT463 (SG A) 1 0-100% ycs jjcs SR 1D LIW3 yes* L0463 Although channels LT463 and LT471 are not LT471 (SG B) 1 0-100% ycs ycs SR 1D LI471 yes~ L0471 powered from a safety related supply, they are LT472 (SG B) 1 0-100% ycs jjcs SR 1A LI472 jjCS* L0472 maintained as catagory 1 variables in all other LT473 (SG B) 1 0-100% ycs ycs SR 1B LI473 yes* L0473 aspects. also satisfies item ¹65 Steam Generator 20 n.a. Pressure 1 Plant Specific yes yes full 1E ye s Plant Specific A PT468 (SG A) 1 0-1400 psig yes yes SR 1A PIC 68 no F0468 PT469 (SG A) 1 0-1400 psig ycs yes SR 1B PI469 no F0469 PTAS (SG B) 1 0-1400 psig ycs ycs SR 1C PI478 no F0478 PTP79 (SG B) 1 0-1400 psig ycs ycs SR MQ483PI479 no F0479 PT-482 (SG A) 1 0-1400 psig yes yes SR 1C PIP 82A no P0482 PT-483 (SG B) 1 0-1400 psig ycs ycs SR 1B PI483A no F0483 also satisfies item ¹66

Attachment 2 Page 5 of 20 Table 1, revision 1 Comparison of Ginna Post Accident Iustrumentatlon to Regulatory Guide 1.97, Revision 3 Criteria C.R. RECORDER TYPE VARIABLE CAT. RANGE EEQ SEISMIC QA P.S. IND. CHART COMP COMMENTS 21 deleted RCS Subcooling 22 n.a. iMonltor 1 Plant Specific yes ye s fu ll 1E yes Plant Specific A TI409A 1 0- 100'F subcooled yes yes SR 1A TI-409A no *TSUBA*GinnaEOPs provide the means for TIP 10A 1 0- 100 'F subcooled yes yes SR 1C TIPIOA no *TSUBB determining subcooling based on CET's and RCS pressure. The SAS/PPCS also calculates subcooling using these variables. Both capabilities exceed the range recommended in RG 1.97, rev 3. Also satisfies item ¹32 Containment Sump 23 n.a. Wide Range Level 1 Plant Specific y es yes full 1E yes Plant Specific A LC-942 (A-E) 1 8, 78, 113, 180,214 in ycs yes SR 1A yes no yes Five discrete level switches per channel, 214 LC-943 (A-E) 1 8,78, 113, 180,214 in yes yes SR 1C yes no yes inch indication corresponds to approximately

'500,000 gallons.

also satisfies items ¹34, 43 24 B Neutron Flux 1 1E-6 % -100 %popover yes yes full 1E yes Plant Specific B N-31, N-32 (SR) 3 1E-1 to 1E6cps (SR) no yes SR** 1A/1B NI-31, 32 yes* yes Neutron flux indication is considered a backup N-35,N-36 (R) 3 lE-11 tolE-3Amps(IR) no yes SR** 1A/1B NI-35, 36 yes>> yes type B indication at Ginna and is therefore NAIA,B;NBA,B; 3 0 to 100%power (PR) no yes SR** lA/1B NI41,42 yes* yes considered catagory 3.

NBA,B; NMA,B (PR) 3 no yes SR** 1C/1D NI43,44 yes* yes

• A two pen recorder is provided with (B suffix for switchable inputs from all channels.

MCB ind.) **Protection portions of channels only.

25 B Control Rod Position 3 full ln or not full in no no comm. n.p. no no B Microprocimor Rod 3 rod position indicated in no no SS yes no yes *TheMRPIsystemispoweredfroma Position Indication twelve step increments, dedicated transformer Irom a safety related System (MRPI) as weH as indication of 480V MCC.

rods full in or not full

Attachment 2 Page 6 of 20 Table 1, revision 1 Comparison of Glnna Post Accident Instrumentatlon to Regulatory Guide 1.97, Revision 3 Criteria C.R. RECORDER

¹ TYPE VARIABLE CAT. RANGE EEQ SEISMIC QA P.S. IND. CHART COMP COMME'S RCS Boron 26 B Concentration 3 0 to 6000 ppm no no comm. n.p. no no B AIM53 (Post Accident 3 50~+0 - 600M300 ppm no no SS no no no

• The PASS instrument panel is powered Sampling System from 480 V bus 13 (non SR) via panel SB 14.

(PASS) Boron Analyzer) NRC SER dated April 14, 1986 deferred the range and accuracy capabilities of post accident sampling systems to NUREG-0737, Item II.B.3. The Ginna PASS meets these criteria.

RCS Hot Leg Water 27 B Temperature 1 50 'F - 700 F yes yes full 1E yes Plant Specific B TE409A-I (Loop A) 1 0700oF yes yes SR 1A TI409A-I no T0409A TEPIOA-I (Loop B). 1 0-700 oF yes yes SR 1C TIPIOA-I no =

T0410A RCS Cold Leg Water 28 B Temperature 1 50 'F - 700 'F yes yes full 1E yes Plant Specific

• see item ¹11, RGAE Type A variable.

29 B RCS Pressure 1 0 - 3000 pslg ye s y es full 1E yes Plant Specific A

• see item ¹13, RGB Type A variable.

Core Exit Temperature 30 B 3 200 'F - 2300 'F no no comm. n.p. no no

• see item ¹3, RGB Type A variable.

Attachment 2 Page 7 of 20 Table 1, revision 1 Comparison of Glnna Post Accident Instrumentation to Regulatory Guide 1.97, RevisIon 3 Criteria C.R. RECORDER TYPE VARIABLE EEQ SEISMIC QA P.S. IND. CHART COMP COMMENTS 31 B Coolant Inventory 1 Hot Leg bot.- flange yes yes full 1E yes plant specific

• see item ¹15, RG&E Type A variable.

RCS Degrees of 32 B Subcooiirig 2 200'Fsub-35'Fsuper y es -

no partial rel. no

• see item ¹22, RG&E Type A variable.

Containment Sump 33 B Level Narrow Range 2 Plant Specific yes: no partial rel. no no C LT-2039 (Sump A) 3 0-30ft no ~ no SS 1A LI-2039 no L2039 NRC SER dated December 4, 1990 found the LT-2044 (Sump A) 3 0-30ft no '.

no SS 1A LI-2044 no L2044 - instrumentation provided to be acceptable.

also satisfies item ¹42 Containment Sump 34 B Level olde Range 1 Plant Specific yes yes full 1E yes Plant Specific

• see item ¹23, RG&E Type A variable.

35 B Containment Pressure 1 -5 pslg to design yes yes full 1E yes Plant Specific

• see item ¹6, RG&E Type A variable.

note: The Ginna containment pressure indication covers a range of 10 psia to 300 %

design presstire.

Attachment 2 Page 8 of 20 Table 1, revision 1 Comparison of Ginna Post Accident Instrumentation to Regulatory Guide 1.97, Revision 3 Criteria C.R. RECORDER

¹ TYPE VARIABLE CAT. RANGE EKQ SEISMIC QA P.S. IND. CHART COMP COMMENTS Contain. Isolation one per redundant function reqd. Check 36 B Valve Position 1 closed / not closed yes yes full 1E yes Plant Specific valve position ind. is not reqd.

B see UFSAR Table 62.13 3 open/closed no yes SS ADC, yes no yes Isolation valves outside containment go closed for list of containment BDC prior to being exposed to a harsh environment isolation valves. and therefore environmental qualification is not reqd.. RGB has taken exception to the need to qualify indication for valves inside containment. Ref. letter RGB-NRC 5/6/91.

Core Exit Temperature 37 C 1 200'F to 2300'F ye s ye s fu 11 1E ye s Plant Specific

• see item ¹3, RGB Type A variable.

38 C RCS Radiation Level 1 .5 - 100X Tech Spec yes yes full 1E yes Plant Specific n.a. Post Accident Sampling 3 0.01mR - 1.0E04 R/hr n.a. n.a. SS n.a. no no no NRC SER dated April 14, 1986 found the System (PASS), Manual instrumentation provided to be acceptable.

Radiation Isotopic see note 1.

Spectroscopy after sample taken Gamma Analysis of 39 C Primary Coolant 3 1.0E 10 Ci/ml no no comm. n.p. no no C Post Accident Sampling 3 1.0E-S - 10 Ci/ml. n.a. n.a. SS n.a. no no no NRC SER dated April 14, 1986 found the System (PASS), Manual Range can be extended instrumentation provided to be acceptable.

Radiation Isotopic by dilution techniques.

Spectroscopy after sample taken 40 C RCS Pressure 1 0 - 3000 psig yes yes full 1E yes Plant Specific A

• see item ¹13, RG8tE Type A variable.

Attachment 2 Page 9 of 20 Table 1, revision 1 Comparison of Glnna Post Accident Instrumentatlon to Regulatory Guide 1.97, Revision 3 Criteria C.R. RECORDER TYPE VARIABLE CAT. RANGE EEQ SEISMIC QA P.S. IiND. CHART COMP COMMENTS 41 C Containment Pressure 1 -5 psig to design yes yes full 1E yes Plant Specific

• see item //6, RG&E Type A variable.

note: The Ginna containment pressure indication covers a range of 10psia to 300%

design pressure.

Containment Sump 42 C Level Narrow Range 2 top to bottom yes no partial rel. no no

• see item //33, RG&E Type C variable.

NRC SER dated December 4, 1990 found the instrumentation provided to be acceptable.

Containment Sump 43 C Level ~Vide Range 1 Plant Specific ye s ye s full 1E ye s Plant Specific

• see item //23, RG&E Type A variable.

Containment Area 44 C Radiation 3 1 to 1.0E4 R/hr no no comm. np. no no E R-2 3 0.01 - 1.0E5 Rjhr no yes SS IB yes yes R02 NRC SER dated April 14, 1986 found the =

instrumentation provided to be acceptable.

Condenser Air Exh.

45 C Noble Gas Radloact. 2 1E-6 to 1E5 itCI/cc yes no part. rel. no no E R-15 2 1E-6 to 1E-3 pCi/cc mild no SS 1D yes yes R15 *SPING monitors are powered &om a R-15A (SPING) 2 1E-6 to 1ES ltCi/cc mild no SS

• yes yes R15A dedicated transformer Irom MCC D (Safety Related).

Attachment 2 Page 10 of 20 Table 1, revision 1 Comparison of Ginna Post Accident Instrumentation to Regulatory Guide 1.97, Revision 3 Criteria C.R. RECORDER

¹ TYPE VARIABLE CAT. RANGE EEQ SEISMIC QA P.S. IND. CHART COMP COMMENTS Containment H2 46 C Concentration 1 0-10 yes ='yes full 1E yes Plant Specific C HMSLCPA 1 0-10% yes 'es SR lA no yes* CVHA ~ although the recorders are the only control HMSLCPB 1 0-10% yes ~ yyes SR 1C no yes* CVHB room indication of Containment H2 concentration, they are not considered the primary indicator. The H2 Monitor panels in the Relay room provide primary indication.

Containment Effluent 47 C Noble Gas at Release 2 1E-6 to 1E-2 ttCi/cc yes . no partial rel. no no C R-12(Cont.Purge Vent) 2 1E-6 to IE-21tCi/cc mild no SR IA ycs yes yes

• SPING Monitors are powered via a dedica R-14 (Plant Exh. Vent) 2 lE-6 to lE-1 itCi/cc mild . no SS 1A yes ycs yes tranformer from MCC D (Safety Related).

R-31(SG SteamLineA) 2 1E-1 to 1E3pCi/cc mild -: no SS (yes) no yes SPING monitors R-12A (Cont. Purge Vent)

R-32 (SG Steam Line B) 2 1E-1 to 1E3 pCi/cc mild; no SS (yes) no ycs and R-14A (Plant Exhaust Vent) are also available to monitor noble gas releases as well as particulates and iodine.

Containment Effluent 4S C Noble Gas at Pen.etc. 2 1E-6 to 1E-2 ttCi/cc yes no SS rel. no no

• see item ¹47. These monitors are considered to provide adequate monitoring of all credible releases.

49 D RHR System Flow 2 0 - 110 lo design yes no partial rel. no no A

• see item ¹14, RGAE Type A variable.

RHR Heat Exchanger 50 D Outlet Temperature 2 40 'F - 350 'F yes no partial rel. no no n.a. TE627 3 50'F-400'F no 'o SS TSC no no T0627 NRC SER dated 12/4/90 found the range pmvidcd acceptable.

Attachment 2 Page 11 of 20 Table 1, revision 1 Comparison of Ginna Post Accident Instrumentation to Regulatory Guide 1.97, Revision 3 Criteria C.R. RECORDER

¹ TYPE VARIABLE CAT. RANGE EEQ SEISMIC QA P.S. IND. CHART COMP COMMENTS Accumulator Tank 51 D Level 2 10 % - 90 % yes no partial n.p. no no n.a. LT-934 (Loop A) 3 +7 inches from nominal no no SS 1C LI-934 no no NRC SER dated 12/4/90 found the LT-935 (Loop A) 3 +7 inches from nominal no no SS 1B LI-935 no no instrumentation provided acceptable. The LT-938 (Loop B) 3 27 inches from nominal no no SS 1C LI-938 no no category 3 designation is consistent with LT-939 (Loop B) 3 +7 inches from nominal no no SS 1B LI-939 no no RG&Es category determination philosophy.

Accumulator Tank 52 D Pressure 2 0 - 750 psig yes no partial n p. no no n.a. PT-936 (Loop A) 3 0- 800 psig no no SS 1C PI-936 no no NRC SER dated 12/4/90 deferred resolution o PT-937 (Loop A) 3 0- 800 psig no no SS 1B PI-937 no no these deviations to generic staff review of this PT-940 (Loop B) 3 0- 800 psig no no SS 1C PI-940 no no issue. The category 3 designation is consistent PT-941 (Loop B) 3 0- 800 psig no no SS 1B PI-941 no no with RG&E's category determination philosophy.

Accumulator Iso.

53 D Valv,e Position 2 open I closed yes no partial n p. no no n.a MOV-841 (Loop A) 3 open/closed no yes SS ADC yes no no Valves are locked open and d~nergized.

MOV-865 (Loop B) 3 open/closed no yes SS BDC yes no no NRC SER dated 12/4/90 found the instrumentation provided acceptable.'oric Acid Charging Flow 2 0 - 110 % design yes no partial rel. no no n.a. Fl'-128 2 0-75 gpm mild no SS 1D FI-128B no F0128 NRC SER dated 4/14/86 found the instrumentation provided acceptable High Pressure 55 D InJectlon (SI) Flow 2 0 - 110 % design yes no partial rel. no no D FI'-924 (SIP B) 2 0-1000 gpm yes yes SR 1A FI-924 no F0924A FT-925 (SIP A) 2 0-1000 gpm yes yes SR 1B, 1C FI-925 no F0925A

Attachment 2 Page12of20 ~

Table 1, revisIon 1 Comparison of Glnna Post Accident Instrumentatlon to Regulatory Guide 1.97, Revision 3 Criteria C.R. RECORDER

¹ TYPE VARIABLE CAT. RANGE EEQ SEISMIC QA P.S. IND. CHART COMP COMMENTS Low Pressure 56 D Injection (RHR) Flow 2 0 - 110 fo design yes no partial rel. no no

• sce item ¹14, RGB'ype A variable.

57 D R)VST Level 2 top to bottom y es no partial rel. no no

• see item ¹16, RGAE Type A variable.

58 D RCP Status 3 motor current no no comm. n.p. no no D 4.16 kV Bus ammeters 3 0- 1200 A no no SS n.a. yes no yes and RCP breaker status lights Pressurizer PORVs 59 D and Safeties Position 2 closed I not closed yes no partial rel. no no D ZS430 (PORV) 2 open/close yes yes SR BDC ycs no V0430

• The RTD's downstream of these valves, ZS431C (PORV) 2 open/close ycs ycs SR - BDC yes no V0431 TE438 (PORVs) and TE436 and TE437 TE438(discharge temp.) 3* O'F - 300'F no yes SS lA TI438 no no (Safeties), are available in the control room ZT434(SafetyValve) 2 open-close(inches) yes . ycs SS 1A yes no no and are considered backup indication of valve ZT435 (Safety Valve) 2 open - close (inches) ycs ycs SS 1A yes no no position.

TE436;12437(dis temp) 3* 0'F -400'F no yes SS 1A yes, yes no no 60 D Pressurizer Level 1 top to bottom ye s yes full 1E yes Plant Specific A

• see item ¹9, RGB Type A variable.

note: level indication does not cover the hemispherical top and bottom portions of the pressurizer.

Attachment 2 Page 13 of 20 Table 1, revision 1 Comparison of Ginna Post Accident Instrumentation to Regulatory Guide 1.97, Revision 3 Criteria C.R. RECORDER TYPE VARIABLE CAT. RANGE EEQ SEISMIC QA P.S. IND. CHART COMP COMMENTS Pressurizer Heaters 61 D Status 2 electric current y es no partial rel. no no D control bank breaker 2 closed/auto/on mild no SS ADC yes no no NRC SER dated 12/4/90 found the status lights instrumentation provided acceptable.

backup bank breaker 2 closed/auto/on mild no SS BDC yes no no status lights 480V Bus voltage and 2 0- 1500 kW mild no SS n.a. yes no yes kW demand Pressurizer Relief 62 D (Quench) Tank Level 3 top to bottom no no comm. n.p. no no D LT442 3 0- 100% no no SS 1B LI442 no L0442 Pressurizer Relief 63 D (Quench) Tank Temp. 3 50 'F - 750 'F no no comm. n p. no no D TE439 3 (50 'F - 400 'F) no no SS 1A TI439 no T0439 NRC SER dated 12/4/90 found the instrument range acceptable.

Pressurizer Relief 64 D (Quench) Tank Press. 3 0 psig to design no no comm. n p. no no D PT440 3 0 - 150 psig no no SS 1B PI440A no F0440 rupture disk setpoint is 100 psig.

PI440B Steam Generator Wide two per generator required for two loop 65 D Range Level 1 tube sht - separators yes yes full 1E yes Plant Specific plants

~ see item 818, RGAE Type A variable.

Attachment 2 Page 14of20 ~.

Table 1, revision 1 Comparison of Glnna Post Accident Instrumentation to Regulatory Guide 1.97, Revision 3 Criteria C.R. RECORDER

¹ TYPE VARIABLE CAT. RANGE EEQ SEISMIC QA P.S. IND. CHART COMP COMMENTS Steam Generator Pressure 2 atm. - 20% > safety yes no partial rel. no no

• see item ¹20, RG&E Type A variable.

Main Steam Flow (or 67 D SG safety valve pos.) 2 0 - 110 % design yes no partial rel. no no D Fl'464 (SG A) 2 0- 3.8E6 pph yes yes SR 1A FI-464 yes+ Q F0464

• denotes auctioneered power supply from the FT465,(SG A).. 2 0- 3.8E6 pph ycs ycs SR 1B FI465 yeso% F0465 Advanced Digital Feedwater Control System FT-474 (SG B) 2 0- 3.8E6 pph ycs ycs SR lc FI474 yeso& F0474 (ADFCS).

FT475 (SG B) 2 0 - 3.8E6 pph yes yes SR 1D FI475 yes' F0475 **Median of 3 channels per SG is recorded.

FT-498 (SG A) 3 0- 3.8E6 pph no yes SS lA/1C*FI498 yes' F0498 Fl'499 (SG B) 3 0- 3.8E6 pph no yes SS 1A/1C* FI499 yes+ Q F0499 68 D Main Feedwater Flow 3 0 - 110 % design no no comm. n.p. no no D FT466 (SG A) 3 0- 3.8E6 pph no no SS lA/1C FI466 yes* F0466

• Recorders FR465 (SG A) and FR-475 (SG Fl'467 (SG A) 3 0- 3.8E6 pph no no SS 1A/1C FI467 yes* F0467 B) record median flow of the 3 channels.

FT476 (SG B) 3 0- 3.8E6 pph no no SS 1A/1C FI476 yes* F0476 Main Feedwater Flow transmitters receive FI'477 (SG B) 3 0 - 3.8E6 pph no no SS 1A/1C FI477, yes* F0477 power Irom the Digital Feedwater Contml FT-500 (SG A) 3 0- 3.8E6 pph no no SS 1A/1C FI-500 yes* F0500 System (ADFCS). Power for the system is FI'-503 (SG B) 3 0- 3.8E6 pph no no SS 1A/1C FI-503 yes* F0503 auctioneetcd from buses 1A and 1C.

Auxiliary Feedwater 69 D Flovr 2 0 - 110 % design yes no partial rel. no no A

• see item ¹1, RG&E Type A variable.

D Fi'4084 (Standby *) 2 0-250 gpm (0-125%) mild yes SR lA FI4084 no - F4084 *~ Ginna Station has a manual standby D Fl'4085 (Standby *) 2 0-250 gpm (0-125%) mild yes SR 1C FI4085 no F4085 auxiliary feedwater, which duplicates the capacity of the motor driven main auxiliary feedwater system.

Condensate Storage 70 D Tank Level 1 Plant Specific yes yes full 1E yes Plant Specific

~ see item ¹7, RG&E Type A variable.

Attachment 2 Page 15 of 20 Table 1, revision 1 Comparison of Ginna Post Accident Instrumentation to Regulatory Guide 1.97, Revision 3 Criteria C.R. RECORDER

¹ TYPE VARIABLE CAT. RANGE EEQ SEISMIC QA P.S. IND. CHART COMP COMMENTS Containment Spray 71 D Floav 2 0 - 110 'Io design yes no partial rel. no no n.a. none

• indirect indication of Containment Spray flow is available using SI flow and RHR fiow. NRC SER dated 12/4/90 found this acceptable.

Containment Fan 72 D Heat Removal 2 Plant Specific y es no partial rel. no no n.a. none

• indirect indication of Containment Fan heat removal is available using containment air temperature, sump tempemture and-containment pressure. NRC SER dated 12/4/90 found this acceptable.

Containment Alr 73 D Temperature 40 oF 4PP oF yes no partial rel. no no D TE-6031 (elev. 245'0") 2 O'F - 300'F (yes) (yes) SS ** no yM- yes 6 Environmentally qualified Containment Air TE-6035 (elev. 261'") 2 O'F - 300'F (yes) (yes) SS ** no yes* yes Temperature RTD's are being installed during TE4036 (elev. 261'") 2 0'F - 300'F (yes) (yes) SS ** no yes* yes the 1992 Refueling outage. NRC SER dated TE-6037 (elev. 261'") 2 O'F - 300'F (ycs) (yes) SS *~ no yes* yes 12/4/90 found the range deviation to be TE-6038 (elev. 261'") 2 O'F - 300'F (yes) (yes) SS ~* no yes* yes acceptable. *recorded at ILRTpanel TE-6045 (elev. 286'4") 2 0'F - 300'F (yes) (yes) SS ~* no yes* yes ** lE supply from MCC 1D (B train)

Containment Sump 74 D Temperature 5P oF 2SP oF yes no partial rel. no no n.a. TE490 A/B (Sump A) 2 0 oF - 360 oF yes yes SR lA/1C no no yes TE490A/B and TERIA/B are dual element TE491 A/B(%3'above 2 0 F-360oF yes yes SR 1A/1C no no yes RTD's. The 'A'lements are powered from bus basement floor) 1A and the 'B'lements are powered from bus 1C. Each element is available on the PPCS as a separate point.

Reactor Mater 75 D Makeup Flow (CVCS) 2 0 - 110 % design yes no partial rel. no no n.a. FT-111 2 5- 75 gpm (0'- 100%) mild no SS 1D no FR-110 no NRC SER dated 12/4/90 found the instrument mnge acceptable.

Attachment 2 Page 16 of 20 ~,

Table 1, revision 1 Comparison of Ginna Post Accident Instrumentatlon to Regulatory Guide 1.91, Revision 3 Criteria C.R. RECORDER

¹ TYPE VARIABLE CAT. RANGE EEQ SEISMIC QA P-S ~ IND. CHART COMP COMMENTS 76 D Letdown Flow (CVCS) 2 0 - 110 lo design yes no partial rel. no no n.a. FT-134 2 0 - 100gpm (0 - 167 %) mild no SS 1D FI-134 no F0134 Volume Control Tank 77 D Level 2 top to bottom y es no partial rel. no no n.a. LT-112 2 0- 100% mild no SS 1B LI-112 no L0112 CGA Temperature to 78 D ESF System 4P oF 2PP oF yes no partial rel ~ no no n.a. TE421 (Component 2 O'F - 225'F mild no SS 1B TI421 no T0621 NRC SER dated 12/4/90 found the Cooling Water heat instrumentation provided to be acceptable.

exchanger temperature)

CCW Flow to ESF 79 D System 2 0 - 110% design yes no partial rel. no no n.a. FT-619 (Component 2 0- 7000 gpm mild no SS 1C no no F0619 The CCW System is prealigned with flows to Cooling Water System various ESF components manually adjusted flow) using local flow indicating switches. RG 1.97 states that the purpose of this variable is to monitor operation. The instrumentation provided meets this intent.

Hi Level Radioactive 80 D Liquid Tank Level 3 top to bottom no no comm. n.p. no no D LT-1001 (Waste Drain 3 ~0-100% no no SS no no no Indication of both tank levels are available at Tank) the radwaste panel, and remotely at a terminal LT-1003 (Reactor 3 0- 100% no no SS

• no no L1003 in the Technical Support Center.

~ Normally fed fmm 480 V bus 14 (Train A)

Coolant Drain Tank) with a manual backup to 480 V bus 16 (Train B)

Attachment 2 Page 17 of 20;~,

Table 1, revision 1 Comparison of Ginna Post Accident Iustrumentatlon to Regulatory Guide 1.97, Revision 3 Criteria C.R. RECORDER

¹ TYPE VARIABLE CAT. RANGE EEQ SEISiMIC QA P.S. IND. CHART COM P COMME'S Radioactive Gas 81 D Holdup Tank Pressure 3 0 - 1SO lo design no no comm. n.p. no uo n.a. Ff-1036 (Tank 1) 3 0 - 150psig (0 - 100%) no no SS no no no Design of each tank, and its safety valve Ff-1037 (Tank 2) 3 0 - 150psig (0 - 100%) no no SS no no no setpoint is 150 psig. Normal radgas pump Fl'-1038 (Tank 3) 3 0- 150psig (0- 100%) no no SS no no no operating pressure is <100 psig. NRC SER PT-1039 (Tank 4) 3 0- 150psig (0- 100%) no no SS no no no dated 12/4/90 found this range deviation acceptable.

• NormaHy fed from 480 V bus 14 with a manual backup to 480 V bus 16.

Emerg.Ventilatiou 82 D Damper Position 2 open / closed y es no partial rel. uo uo D ZT-7970 (mini-purge) 3 open/closed no yes SS ADC yes no no Mini-purge valves are locked closed and only ZT-7971 (mini-purge) 3 open/closed no . yes SS ADCi yes no - no openned for containment pressure control.

ZT-7445 (mini-purge) 3 open/closed no yes SS ADC yes no no These valves are in their safety related position ZT-7478 (mini-purge) 3 open/closed no yes SS ADC 'es no no prior to any adverse conditions and do not change position throughout any accident.

'Iherefore EQ is not deemed necessary.

Stdby power / Energy 83 D Imp. to Safety Status 2 Plant Specific yes - no partial rel. uo no D EDG A, B: V, kW, A 3 0-500V,0-3000A,0-2MW mild no SS n.a. yes no yes 125VDC A, B: V, A 3 0-150 V,0-50 A mild no SS n.a. yes no yes PT-2023 (instrument Air) 3 0 - 160 prig mild -

no NS PI-2023 no no FT455 (PORV, SI Acc) 2 0- 1000 psig mild no SS 1B PITS no no PT-456 (PORV, SI Acc) 2 0 - 1000 psig mild no SS 1A F1456 no . no Contalumeat High Radiation Monitor 1 1 - 1E7 R/hr yes yes full 1E yes Plant Specific R29 1 1 R/hr - 1E7 R/hr yes yes SR 1A RM-29 yes R29 R30 1 1 R/hr - 1E7 R/hr yes yes SR 1C RM-30 yes R30 85 E Rad. Exposure Rate-Access rqd. areas 3 1F 1 - 1FA,R/hr no 'o comm. n.p. no no 3 0.1 - 1E7 mR/hr no no SS various yes yes yes based monitors located, and qualified to sahsfy NUREG4654

Attachment 2 Page 18 of 20 ~,

Table 1, revision 1 Comparison of Ginna Post Accident Instrumentation to Regulatory Guide 1.97, Revision 3 Criteria C.R. RECORDER TYPE VARIABLE CAT. RANGE EEQ SEISMIC QA P.S. IND. CHART COMP COMMENTS Airborne Rad Release 86 E Noble Gas and Flow 2 lE 1E5 ttCVcc yes no partial rel. no no

• see item N47 RG&E Type C variable Airborne Rad Release.

87 E Part. and Halogens 3 1E 1E2 itCI/cc no no comm. n.p. no no E R-12A (Cont. Vent) 3 1E-5-10)tCi/cc no no SR yes R12A

• SPING Radiation monitors are powered halogens, 1E-6-1)tCi/cc from a dedicated supply from MCC D (Safety R-14 A (Plant Exh. Vent) 3 particulate no no SR yes R14A Related).

5E-5-50@ Ci/cc halogens, 2.5E-5-25)tCi/cc part.

Airborne Radio. and 88 E Part. (portable samp.) 3 1E 1E-3 pCi/cc no no comm. n.p. no no E Various fixedand portable 3 1E-12-1E-3 itCi/cc no no SS n.a. no no no samplers (Aliquot or diluted sample)

Plant and Environ.

89 E Radiation (portable) 3 1E 1E4 R(rad)/hr no no comm. n.p. no no beta radiations and photons E Various portable 3 lEA - 1E3 R/hr gamma no no SS n.a. no no no instrumentation 1E 1E3 R/hr beta Plant and Environ.

90 E Radioactivity - (port.) 3 isotopic analysis no no comm. n.p. no no E Multichannel Gamma 3 IE4= 10 jiCi no no SS'a. no no no Ray Spectrometer

Attachment 2 Page 19 of 20' Table 1, revision 1 Comparison of Glnna Post Accident Instrumentation to Regulatory Guide 1.97, Revision 3 Criteria C.R. RECORDER TYPE VARIABLE CAT. RANGE EEQ SEISMIC QA P.S; IND: CHART COMP COMMENTS 91 E E

>Vind Direction wind direction (met tower) 3 3 0- 360'o 0 - 360O no no no comm.

SS n.p.

~

no no no RK-32 WD033

• the weather tower currently receives power WD150 directly via an offsite supply.

WD250 92 E YVind Speed 3 0-50 mph no ~ no comm. n.p. no no E wind speed at 33, 150, 3 0- 100 mph no no SS

• no RK-32 WS033

• the weather tower currently receives power 250 ft elevations (met , WS150 directly via an offsite supply.

tower) WS250 Estimation of 93 E Atmospheric Stab. 3 based on vert. AT no no comm. n.p. no no E RTD's at 33, 150,250 ft 3 4-20'F between each no I no SS yes** no WDT1

• the weather tower currently receives power elevations (met tower) elevation WDT2 directly via an offsite supply.

• • Temperatures at each elevation are displayed in the control room.

Accident Sampling: gross activity, gamma spectrum, 94 E RCS and Sump 3 various no no comm. n.p. no no boron chloride dissolved Hl OI p E gross activity (grab samp) 3 1- 1E6ltCi/cc (dilution) no no SS no no no

• The PASS panel is powered from 480 V bus gamma spectrum 3 mutichannel analyser no no SS no no no 13 (non SR) via panel SB14. NRC review of boron content 3 50 - 6000 ppm no no SS no no no the PASS capability was documented under chloride content 3 5ppb- 100ppm no no SS no no no NUREG-0737 Item KB.3 (SER dated dissolved hydmgen 3 10- 2000 cc/Kg no no $$ no no no 4/14/84). NRC SER dated 12/4/90 concludes dissolved oxygen, pH 3P 0.1-20ppm, 1-13 pH nopo nopo SS,SS no, no no, no no, no that the minor range deviations are acceptable.

Accident Sampling: Hydrogen content, oxygen content, 95 E Containment Air 3 various no no comm. n.p. no no gamnla spectrum E Hydrogen content 3 0- 10 % (PASS) no no SS na. no no no Hydrogen concentration is also available using Oxygen content 3 0- 30 % (PASS) no no SS na. no no no the installed Type A Hydrogen Monitors, see Gamma Spectnun 3 multichannel analysis no no SS na. no no no item N5.

Page 20 of 20 Attachment 2 Table 1, revision 1 1.97, Revision 3 Criteria Notes Radioactivit Con~tration or Radiation Level in Circulatin Pr'oolant (Isotopic Analysis)

The original design basis for implementation of NUREG-0737 Topic II.B.3, involves sampling requirements to perform a radiological analysis within a three hour time period for "certain radionuclides in the reactor coolant...". The NUREG-0737 Clarification, dated October 31, 1980, (2)(d),

states uAlternatively, have inline monitoring capabilities to perform all or part of the above analysis". Ginna's response involved the selection of semi-automated manual dilution techniques involving. sample withdrawl and preparation of the sample aliquot by the Post-Accident Sampling System@ not a inline monitoring capability. The remote-manual sampling and dilution capabilities of the existing installed equipment are equivalent to Category 3, Type C attributes.

The Ginna Post-Accident Sampling System (PASS) is equipped with remote~ual abilities to acquire a Reactor Coolant System (RCS) sample, then manipulate the sample by diluting it approximately 1000:1. The dilutant may then be manually delivered to either of two diverse counting facilities at Ginna Station for multichannel spectrometer isotopic analyses. The PASS panel is utilized by Health Physics technicians at least once per week to produce routine proceduralized analyses when the unit is on-line.

Regulatory Guide 1.97 guidance for radiation concentration determinations states that Category 1, Type C attributes apply to this measurement variable with the purpose stated to be detection of breach (Fuel Cladding Topic). Fuel cladding breach detection is not within the Ginna licensing basis but is acknowledged to be a concern during Functional Restoration activities. Functional restoration activity is beyond the Ginna licensing basis. No EOP activity involved with design basis DBA occurrences requires that the radiation concentration determination in RCS be performed, and there's no consequent operator action requirement.