NRC Generic Letter 1983-43

NRC Generic Letter 1983-043: Reporting Requirements of 10 CFR Part 50, Sections 50.72 & 50.73 & Standard Technical Specifications

ML031080599
Person / Time
Site:	Beaver Valley, Millstone, Hatch, Monticello, Calvert Cliffs, Dresden, Davis Besse, Peach Bottom, Browns Ferry, Salem, Oconee, Mcguire, Nine Mile Point, Palisades, Palo Verde, Perry, Indian Point, Fermi, Kewaunee, Catawba, Harris, Wolf Creek, Saint Lucie, Point Beach, Oyster Creek, Watts Bar, Hope Creek, Grand Gulf, Cooper, Sequoyah, Byron, Pilgrim, Arkansas Nuclear, Braidwood, Susquehanna, Summer, Prairie Island, Columbia, Seabrook, Brunswick, Surry, Limerick, North Anna, Turkey Point, River Bend, Vermont Yankee, Crystal River, Haddam Neck, Ginna, Diablo Canyon, Callaway, Vogtle, Waterford, Duane Arnold, Farley, Robinson, Clinton, South Texas, San Onofre, Cook, Comanche Peak, Yankee Rowe, Maine Yankee, Quad Cities, Humboldt Bay, La Crosse, Big Rock Point, Rancho Seco, Zion, Midland, Bellefonte, Fort Calhoun, FitzPatrick, McGuire, LaSalle, 05000000, Zimmer, Fort Saint Vrain, Shoreham, Satsop, Trojan, Atlantic Nuclear Power Plant, Clinch River, Skagit, Marble Hill, Crane
Issue date:	12/19/1983
From:	Eisenhut D Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To:
References
GL-83-043, NUDOCS 8312190371
Download: ML031080599 (23)

UNITED STATES

VW ,NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555 December 19, 1983 TO ALL LICENSEES AND APPLICANTS FOR OPERATING POWER REACTORS

AND HOLDERS OF CONSTRUCTION PERMITS FOR POWER REACTORS

Gentlemen:

Subject: Reporting Requirements of 10 CFR Part 50, Sections 50.72 and 50.73, and Standard Technical Specifications (Generic Letter No. 83-43 )

Section 50.72 of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations has recently been revised and will become effective January 1, 1984. A new Section 50.73 of Title 10 of the Code of the Federal Regulations has recently been added and it will also become effective January 1, 1984. Section 50.72 revises the immediate notification requirements for operating nuclear power reactors.

The new Section 50.73 provides for a revised Licensee Event Report System.

Copies of each of these sections to 10 CFR Part 50 are enclosed for your information.

Since paragraph (g) of Section 50.73 specifically states that: "the require- ments contained in this section replace all existing requirements for licensees to report 'Reportable Occurrences' as defined in individual plant Technical Specifications," the reporting requirements incorporated into the "Admin- istrative Controls" section of your facility's technical specifications may require modification. Also, the definition "Reportable Occurrence" may need to be replaced by a new term, "Reportable Event." We will make these changes in the current version of Standard Technical Specifications (STS) for all nuclear power reactor vendors and in the technical specifications for plants not yet licensed.

Enclosed are model technical specification in STS format showing the revisions which you should make in the "Administrative Control" and "Definitions" sections of your facility's technical specifications to implement these regulation changes. Other conforming changes to your technical specifications will be required to reflect the revised reporting requirements. For example, technical specifications requiring a Licensee Event Report rather than a Special Report for operating conditions where the specific activity limits of the reactor coolant are exceeded should be changed to reflect the need for a Special

8312190371 )

-2- Report rather than a Licensee Event Report within 30 days with the stated information requested in the requirements. Some technical specifications currently require Special Reports or other routine reporting of events in lieu of a Licensee Event Report. Such reports are still required but the technical specification wording will need revision. These changes, where applicable, should also be included in your amendment request to modify your technical specifications. We will incorporate these changes, where applicable, in our next revision to the Standard Technical Specifications for all nuclear power reactor vendors.

Because this change to the technical specifications is clarifying and made at the request of the Conmmission, you are not required to remit a license fee for the change.

This request has been approved by OMB Clearance Number 3150-0011, which expires April 30, 1985.

Sincerely, v--CC, " (

Darrell . Ei enhut, irector Division of Licensing Enclosures:

1. Revisions to STS Reporting Requirements, in Section 1.0,

"Definitions," and Section 6.0,

"Administrative Controls"

2. Revised Section 10 CFR Part 50.72

3. New Section 10 CFR Part 50.73

X . , I

ENCLOSURE

REVISIONS TO STS REPORTING REQUIREMENTS

IN SECTION 1.0, "DEFINITIONS" AND

SECTION 6.0, "ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROLS"

1.0 DEFINITIONS

Delete the term, "REPORTABLE OCCURRENCE".

Add the term, "REPORTABLE EVENT" with the following definition:

"A REPORTABLE EVENT shall be any of those conditions specified in Section 50.73 to 10 CFR Part 50.

6.0 ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROLS

6.1 RESPONSIBILITY (No changes)

6.2 ORGANIZATION (No changes)

6.3 UNIT STAFF QUALIFICATIONS (No changes)

6.4 TRAINING (No changes)

6.5 REVIEW AND AUDIT

6.5.1 UNIT REVIEW GROUP (URG)

6.5.1.6 RESPONSIBILITIES

Revise f. to read as follows: "Review of all REPORTABLE EVENTS."

6.5.2 COMPANY NUCLEAR REVIEW AND AUDIT GROUP (CNRAG)

6.5.2.7 REVIEW

Revise g. to read as follows: "All REPORTABLE EVENTS;"

6.6 REPORTABLE OCCURRENCE ACTION

Revise title to read as follows: REPORTABLE EVENT ACTION

6.6.1 Revise to read as follows:

"The following actions shall be taken for REPORTABLE EVENTS:

a. The Commission shall be notified and a report submitted pursuant to the requirements of Section 50.73 to 10 CFR

Part 50, and b. Each REPORTABLE EVENT shall be reviewed by the (URG), and the results of this review shall be submitted to the (CNRAG)

and the (Vice President - Nuclear Operations).

-2-

6.7 SAFETY LIMIT VIOLATION (No changes)

6.8 PROCEDURES AND PROGRAMS (No changes)

6.9 REPORTING REQUIREMENTS

6.9.1 ROUTINE REPORTS (Delete "AND REPORTABLE OCCURRENCES")

6.9.1.9 REPORTABLE OCCURRENCES (Delete)

6.9.1.10 PROMPT NOTIFICATION WITH WRITTEN FOLLOWUP (Delete)

6.9.1.11 THIRTY-DAY WRITTEN REPORTS (Delete)

6.9.1.12 RADIAL PEAKING FACTOR LIMIT REPORT (W Only)

(Change to 6.9.1.9)

6.10 RECORD RETENTION

6.10.1 Revise c. to read as follows: "All REPORTABLE EVENTS;"

6.11 RADIATION PROTECTION PROGRAM (No changes)

6.12 HIGH RADIATION AREA (Optional) (No changes)

6.13 PROCESS CONTROL PROGRAM (PCP) (No changes)

6.14 OFFSITE DOSE CALCULATION MANUAL (ODCM) (No changes)

6.15 MAJOR CHANGES TO RADIOACTIVE LIQUID, GASEOUS AND SOLID WASTE

TREATMENT SYSTEM (No changes)

C

Federal Register / Vol. 48. No. 188 / Monday, August 29, 1983 / Rules and Regulations 39039

---

Part 20 of this chapter. The licensee 150.20 RecognitIon of Agreement State Commission. Washington. D.C. 20555;.

shall send a copy of the report to each .Ucenes. Telephone (301) 492-4973.

appropriate State agency that has SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATlOPC

authority over the particular well- (b] Notwithstanding any provision to drilling operation. The report must the contrary in any specific license 1. Background contain the following information: issued by an Agreement State to a On February 29, 1980. the Commission

(1) Date of occurrence. person engaging in activities in a non- amended its regulations without prior

(2) A description of the irretrievable Agreement State or in offshore waters notice and comment to require timely well-logging source involved. including under the general licenses provided in and accurate licensee reporting of radionuclide. quantity. and chemical this section, the general licenses information following significant events and physical form. provided in this section are subject to at operating nuclear power reactors (45

(3) Surface location and identification the provisions of if 30.7 (a) through (e), FR 13434). The purpose of the rule was of well. 30.14(d) and If 30.34, 30.41, and 30.51 to to provide the Commission with

(4) Results of efforts to immobilize- 30.63. inclusive, of Part 30 of this immediate reporting of twelve types of'

and seal the source in place. chapter; 1 40.7 (a) through (e) and significant events where immediate

(5) Depth of source. JI 40.41. 40.51, 40.61, 40.63. inclusive, Commission action to protect the public

(6) Depth of the top of the cement 40.71 and 40.81 of Part 40 of this chapter;

and 1 70.7 (a) through (e) and I § 70.32. health and safety may be required or plug. where the Commission needs accurate

(7) Depth of the well. 70.42. 70.51 to 70.56. inclusive, 70.60,

70.62, inclusive. and 70.71 of Part 70 of and timely information to respond to

(8) Any other information (eg.. heightened public concern. Although the warning statement) contained on the this chapter; and to the provisions of Parts 19, 20, and 71 and Subpart B of rule was made immediately effective.

permanent identification plaque. comments were solicited. Many

(9) Notifications made to State Part 34 of this chapter. In addition, any person engaging in activities in non- - commenters believed the rule was in agencies. some respects either vague and

(10) A brief desciption of the- - Agreement States or in offshore waters under the general licenses provided in ambiguous or overly broad.

attempted recovery efforts. After obtaining experience with (d) Any licensee or applicant for a this section:

• * .0 . * notifications required by the rule. the license may apply to the Commission for Commission published in the Federal approval of proposed procedures to Dated at Bethesda, Maryland. this 2th day of August. 1983. . Register a notice of proposed abandon an irretrievable well-logging rulemaking on December21. 1981 (468R-;

source in a manner not otherwise For the Nuclear Regulatory Comission.

authojized in paragraph (a) of this -ack W. Roa. 61894) and invited public commnent. The, Acting Executive DirectorforOperations. proposal was made to meet two section. objectives: change 10 CFR 50.54 to JM Doc Ad3 Filed 45 am)

PART 150-EXEMPTIONS AND implement Section 201 of the NRC's 1980

BILsNG CODE 7690-01-U

CONTINUED REGULATORY Fiscal Year Authorization Act and AUTHORITY IN AGREEMENT STATES change 10 CFR 50.72 to more clearly AND IN OFFSHORE WATERS UNDER 10 CFR Part 50 specify the significant events requiring SECTION 274 licensees to immediately notify NRC.

Immediate Notification Requirements The problems and issues which this

7. The authority citation for Part 150 is of Significant Events At Operating rulemaking addresses and the solutions revised to read as follows: Nuclear Power Reactors that it provides can be utinmarized in Authotity Sectibn 161. 68 Stat. 948. as Nuclear Regulatory five broad areas: -

AmE=CY.

amended. a 274. 73 Stat. 688 (42 US.C.

220. 22); sec. 201.88 Stat 1242. as - Comission.- -r 2. AuthorizationActforays - -=

amended (42 U.S.C. 541) -- -.-a I aot:Final eile. - -

Section 201 of the Nuclear Regulatory Sections 150. 50.15 50.15a 50.31 1SO32 SUmGARY: The Nuclear Regulatory *'CommissionAuthorization Aect for:-

also issued under seas. ile(2) 81. 8 Stat. 923. Fiscal Year 1980 (Pub. L 96 295)

935. as amended. secs 83. 84, 2 Stat. 3033. Commission is amending its regulations

3039 (42 US.C. 2014e(2). 2111.2113. 2114). which require timely and accurate provides:

Section 1V014 also issued under sec. 53. 68 information from licensees following (a)Section 103 of the Atomic Energy Act of Stat. 90 as amended (42 U.S.C. 2073). significant events at commercial nuclear 1954 is amended by adding at the end thereof Section 1517a also issued under sec. 22 68 power plants; Experience with-existing the following new subsections: f. Each license Stat. O3 (42 US.C. 2152). Section 150.30 also requirementi and public comments on a issued for a utilization facility under this issued under sec. 234. 83 Stat. 444 (42 U.S.C. proposed revision of the rule indicate section or section 1Q4b. shall require as a- -

that the existing regulation should be condition thereof that in case of any accident For the purposes of sec. 223, 8 Stat 9S8as could result in an unplanned release of amended (42 U.S.C 2273); I I 150.20b)(2)-(4) amended to clarify reporting criteria and whicb quantities of fission products in excess of and 15021 are issued under ae isib. 68 Stat. to require early reports only on those allowable limits for normal operation --

s8 as amended (42 U.IC.220 1fb)k. 1250.14 matters of value to the exerCise of the established by the Commission. the licensee-7 is issued under sec. 162 68 StaL 949. as Commissiojis responsibilities.1>he shall immediately so notify the Commission.'

amended (42 U.S.C. 2201(i)); and 11 150.16- amended regulation will clarify the list Violation of the condition prescribed by this

150.19 and 150.20(b)(1) are issued under sec. of reportable events and provide the subsection may, in the Commission's

161o. 68 Stat. 9S. as amended (42 U.,S.C. Commission with more useful reports discretion. constitute grounds for license

2201(lo)). regarding the safety of operating nuclear revocation. In accordance weth section 18r of power plants. this Act. the Commission shall promptly

§J Iso.3, 150.14, 15C.M5 150.15a, 150.30, amend each license for a utilization facility

150.31, 1502.32 (Anmended] EFFECTIVE DATE: January 1.1984.

issued under this section or section 104b.

9. In I 15020. the introductory text of FOR FURTthER INFORMAnION CONTACO which is in effect on the date of enactment of paragraph (b) is revised to read as Eric W. Weiss, Office ofInspection and this subsection to include the provisions -

follows: Enforcement, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory required under this subsection.

.* " i- .

394 Federal Register I Vol. 48, No. 168 / Monday. August 29. 1983 1 Rules and Regulations Ac.orgiy. this rulemnakng includes prepare detailed written reports for Conditions of Licenses (§ 50.54)

an amendment to 10 CFR 50.S4 that certain events (48 FR 33850). A few commenters said that the would add an appropriate notification 4. Coordination with Licensee s "Commission already has the ability to requirement as a condition in the EmergencyPan enforce its regulations and does not operating license of each nuclear need to incorporate the items as now utilization facility licensed under section The current scheme for licensees'

emergency plans includes four proposed into conditions of license."

'C3 or 104b. of the Atomic Energy Act of

1954. as amended. 42 U.S.C. 2133. 2134b. Emergency Classes. When the licensee The Commission has decided to These facilities generally are the declares one of the four Emergency promulgate the proposed revision of commercal nuclear power facilities Classes, it must report this to the 1 50.54, "Conditions of Licenses." in which produce electricity for public Commission as required by I 50.72- The order to satisfy the intent of Congress as consurptio. Research and test reactors lowest of the four Emergency Classes. expressed in Section 201 of the Nuclear are not subject to the license condition Notification of Unusual Event, has Regulatory Commission Authorization as they are licensed under section Ul4a. resulted in unnecessary emergency Act for Fiscal Year 1980. This Act and or 104c. of the Act. Under the declarations. Events that fall within the its relationship to 1 50.54 are discussed amendment to 10 CFR 50.54. licensees. Unusual Event class have been neither in detail in the Federal Register notice fauling wder sections 103 or 104b. would emergencies in themselves nor for the proposed rule (46 FR 61894).

be required. as a condition of their precursors of more serious events that are emergencies. CoordinationWith Other Reporting respective operating licenses, to notify the NRC imediately of events specified Although changes to the definition of Requi.rerments (FinaiRule § 50.72)

in 10 CFR 50. the Emergencl Classes are not being Seven commenters said that the NRC

made in this ruemaking. a new should coordinate the requirements of 10

Z Urnecessa,7Reports reporting scheme that would ultimately CFR 50.72 with other rules, with Several categories of reports required eliminate "Unusual Event' as an NUREG-0654. "Criteria for Preparation by 3 50.72 are not useful to the NRC. Emergency Class requiring notification can be adopted consistent with this rule. and Evaluation of Radiological Among these categories are reports of Emergency Response Plans and worker imy.smnall radioactive A proposed rulemaking which would Preparedness in Support of Nuclear releases. and msnor security problems. redefine the Emergency Classes in I 50A7 is in preparation and may soon Plants." and with Regulatory Guide L16.

For example, reports are presently , "Reporting of Operating Information required if a worker onsite experience be published for public comment. This final rulemaking makes possible the . . ." Many of these letters identified chest pai or another illness not related overlap. duplication. and inconsistency to radiation and is sent to a hospital for elimination of "Unusual Event" as an emergency class without further among NRC's reporting requirements.

evaluation or if the vent stack monitor moves upw'd-a few percent yet amendment of 1 50.2 by including in The Commission is making a radiation levels -. =ain 1000,0 times the category of non-Emergencies the concerted effo-t to ensure consistent below tec!hnica specdfication limits; or if subcategory of "one-hour reports" and coordinated reporting requirements.

the security computer malfunctions for a The requirements contained in the

5. Vogue orAmbiiuous RepoatrW revision of 10 CFR 50.72 are being few minutes. Criteria This rulemaking eliminates such coordinated with revision of 1 50.73.

The reporting criteria in I 507 have § 50.551e) Appendix E of Part 50,

reporting req-irements from 1 50.72 and in general clarifies and narrows the been revised in order to clarify their § 20.402, § 73.7L and Part 2a.

scope of reporting. However.revision of scope and intent The criteria were revised for the proposed rule and in Citing 10 CFR 50.72 as a Basisfor Part 73 of the Commission's regulatons Notification (Final le H50.72fa)[41)

is necessary to resolve all problems with response to public comment The security reports. . ?

"Analysis of Comments" portionof this A few commenters objected to citing Federal Register notice describes in 5s0.72 as a basis whenmaldng a a TenniLokgy. Phrasing.ad eportiqg more detail specific examples of

- . telephone notification. The letters of

77ieshol changes in wording intended to comment questioned the purpose. legal The various sections of 10 CFR 50 eliminate vagueness or ambiguity. effect. and burden on the licensee.

have different phrasin. terminology. IL Analysis of Comments The Commission does not believe that and thresholds in the reporting criteria. Twenty letters of comment were it is an nnecessary burden for a --

Even when no different meaning is in response to the Federal licensee to know and identify the basis intended a cbange in wording can cause received Register notice published on December for a telephone notification required by

21, 1981 (48 FR 618943.1 Of the twenty I 50.72. There have been many This rulemaking has been carefully letters of comment received. the vast occasions when a licensee could Dot tell written to use terminology. phrasing majority (15 of 20) were from utilities the NRC whether the telephone and reporting thresholds that are either owning or operating nuclear power notification was being made in identical to or similar to those In 1 50. plants. Tbis Federal Register notice accordance with Technical whener possible. Other conformin described the proposed revision of 10 Specifications. 10 CFR 50.72 some other..

amend to Parts 20L2L73. and in CFR 50.7Z -Notification. of Significznt requirement, or was just a courtesy call I 5055 and Apendix E of Part 50 are Events." and 10 CFR 50.54. "Conditions Unless the licensee can identify the under development of Licenses." A discussion of the more nature of the report, it is difficult for the As a parallel activity to the significant comments follows NRC to know what significance the preparation of I 50.72Z on July 28 I8 licensee attaches to the report. and it the Commission has published a &Cocam ese doculeoU a are*ihbl fr becomes more difficult for the NRC to Lcensme Event Report (LER) Rule public inspection nd copain for a let in lbel a.C

street.K.W. respond quickly and properly to the I 50.73) which requires licensees for Public Docamnt Room 1717 H

event.

operating nuclear power plants to Wasmotn. A.C 255

Federal Register . Vol. 48. No. 168 / Monday. August 29. 1983 / Rules and Regulations ;39D41 I.7.'ec'A:e S.h-tdoi.n (FinalRule airborne concentrations decrease or occuring at operating nuclear power f 50.72(bj.` Jji)) until respiratory protection devices are plants. A deadline shorter than one hour utilized. They noted that these events was not adopted because the Several corpenters objected to the are fairly cornmon and should not be Commission does not want to interfere use of t.e term. "immediate shutdown." reportable unless the required with the operator's ability to deal with saying that Technical Specifications do evacuation affects the entire facility or a ar. accident or transient in the first few not use such a term. major part of it. criical minutes.

The te= is used in some but not all The Commission agrees. The wording Therefore. based on these comments Technice! Specifications. Consequently. of this criterion has been changed to the Co-.=.ssion has revised the and its experience. the NRC has include only those events which estabhIshed a "four-hour report." as was reporting criterion in question. The final significantly hamper the ability of site suggested.

rule requires a report upon the initiation personnel in performance of duties of apy nuclear power plant shutdown necessary for safe operation. Reactor Scrams (FinalRule required by Technical Specifications. One commenter was concerned that § 50. 72(b)(2)fii))

Plant OperoLtng andEmergency events occurring on land owned by the Several cormmenters said that reactor Procedures(Fi."alRule § 50.72(bJ(lffli)) utility adjacent to its plant might be sc-ams. particularly those scrams below reportable. This is not the intent of this power operation. should not require Several commenters said that the reporting requirement The NRC is notification of the NRC within one hour.

reporting criteria should not make concerned with the safely of plant and reference to plant operating and In response to these comments. the personnel on the uility's site and not Commission had changed the reporting emergenty procedures because: with non-nuclear activities on land a. It woud take operators too long to deadline to four hours. However, the adjacent to the plant Commission does not regard reactor decide whether a plant condition was covered by the procedures, Explicit Threats (FinalRule scrams as "non-events," as stated in b. The procedures cover events that § 5a72(bJ(1)(vi)J some letters of comment. Information are not of concern to the NRM and related to reactor scrams has been A few commenters said that the intent useful in identifying safety-related c. The procedures valy from plant to of the term. 'ixplicitly threatens." was plant problems. The Commission agrees that unclear. Those conmnenting wofidered four hours is an appropriate deadline for Vl.flhe the pleat operating personnel what level of threat was L-vo'ved. The should be familiar with plant this reporting requirement because these term. "explicitly threatens. " has been procedures, it is true that procedures deleted from the final rule. Instead. the events are not as important to vary from plant to plant and cover immediate safety as are some other final rule refers to "any event that poses events.

events other than those which an actual threat to the safety of the compromise plant safety. However, the nuclear power plant" HI 50.72(b)[1)[vi)] Radiooctive Release Threshold (Final wording of the reporting criteria has and gives examples so that it is clear the Rule f 50..72(b(2)(iv))

been mode-ed (R50.72fb)(1)ii) in the Commission Is interested in real or final rule) to narrow the reportable actual threats as opposed to threats Several commenters said that the events to those that significantly without credibility. threshold of 25% of allowable limits for radioactive releases was too low for compromise plant safety. Notification Timing (FinalRule one-hour reporting.

Notwithstanding the fact that the procedures vary from plant to plant. the § Sa 721b)[2)) Based upon these comments and its Commission has found that this criterion The commenters generally had two experience. the Commission has points to make regarding the timing of changed the threshold of reporting to results in rNotifications indicative of serious events. The narrower. more reports to the NRC. First. the comments those releases exceeding two times Part supported notification of the NTRC after 20 concentrations when averaged over a

6peClic wording will make it possible for plant operating personnel to Identify appropriate State or local agencies have period of one hour. This will eiminate beei notified. Second.- two commenters reports of releases that represent reportable events under their specific negligible risk to the public.

operating procedures. requested a new four-to six-hour report category for events not warranting a The Commimssion has found that low Building Erocuotion (FinalRule report with one hour. level radioactive releases below two f 50.772(bJ}(iiiJJ Allowing more time for ceporting times Part 20 concentrations do not. in Ten coarsnenters said that the some non-Emergency events would themselves, warrant immediate proposed I 50.72(b)(6J[Wii) regarding lessen the impact of reporting on the radiological response.

Zany accidental, unplanned or individuals responsible for maintaining This paragraph requires the reporting uncontrolled release resulting in the plant in-a safe condition. Limiting of those events that cause an unplanned evacuation of a building" was upclear the extension of the deadline to four or uncontrolled release of a significant and counterproductive in that it could hours ensures that the report is made amount of radioactive material to offsite cause reluctance to evacuate a building. when the Information is fresh in the areas. Unplanned releases should occur Many of these commenters stated that minds of those involved and that it is infrequently; however. when they occur.

the reporting of in-plant releases of more likely to be made by those at least moderate defects have occurred radioactivity that require evacuation of involved rather than by others on a later in the safety design or operational individual rooms was inconsistent with shifLt' ' control established to avoid their the general thrust of the rule to require Other,'more significant non- occurrence and. therefore, these events reporting of significant events. They Emergency events and all declarations should be reported.

ncled that minor spills, small gaseous of an Emergency must continue to be PersonnelRodioactireContanination wauste releases. or the disturbance of reported within one hour. The one-hour (FinalRule 5 50.72(b)(2)f(v')

cc-aminated particulate matter (e.g., deadline is necessary if the Commission dust) may all require the temporary is to fulfill its responsibilities during and Several commenters objected to the evacuation of individual rooms until the following the most serious events use of vague terms such as "extensive

39042 Federal Register / Vol. 48, No. 168 / Monday, August 29, 1983 / Rules and Regulations.

onsite conma'nation" and "'readily from a license condition or technical the containment). Examples of this type removed- in one of the reporting criteria specification. of situation include:

of the proposed rule. Poaragrph50.72(bffl)(ii), (a) Fuel cladding failures in the Based on this comment, new criteria encompassing events previously reactor. or in the storage pool. that have been prepared that use more classified as Unusual Events and some exceed expected values. or that are sneviflc terms. For examnle, one new events captured by proposed unique or widespread. or that are c terion requires reporting of "Any I 50.72(b)(1) was added to provide for caused by unexpected factors, and event re-" .ngthe transport of a consistent, coordinated reporting would involve a release of significant radioactively contaminated person to an requirements between this rule and 10 quantities of fission products.

olfsite medical facility for treatmenl." CFR 50.73 which has a sL-ni!ar provision. (b) Cracks and breaks in the piping or Experience with telephone notifications Public comment suggested that there reactor vessel (steel or prestressed d~ade to tl.e NRC Operations Center should be similarity of terminology. concrete) or major components in the suggests that this new criterion will be phrasing. and reporting thresholds primary coolant circuit that have safety easily understood. between i 50.72 and I 50.73. The intent relevance (steam generators. reactor of this paragraph is to capture those coolant pumps, valves, etc.).

lL Paragraph-by-Paragraph Explanation events where the plant. including its (c) Significant welding or material of the Rule principal safety barriers. was seriously defects in the primary coolant system.

Padrcz,-ch 50. 72a) reflects some degraded or in an unanalyzed condition. (d) Serious temperature or pressure c~nsolda: of language that was For example. small voids in svstems transients.

repeated in various subparagraphs of designed to remove heat from the (e) Loss of relief and/or safety valve the proposed rule. In general, the intent reactor core which have been previously functions during operation.

and so^pe of this paragraph do not shown through analysis not to be safety (I)Loss of containment function or reflect any change from the proposed significant need not be reported. integrity including:

rule. However, the accumulation of voids that (i) Containment leakage rates Several titles were added to this and could inhibit the ability to adequately exceeding the authorized limits, subsequent sections. For example, remove heat from the reactor core, (ii) Loss of containment isolation.

paragraph 50.72.(b) is titled -Non- particularly under natural circulation valve function during tests or operation, Energency Events' and it has two conditions, would constitute an (iii) Loss of main steam isolationr subparagrap!s: (b)1). titled. 'One-Hour unanalyzed condition and would be valve function during test or operation.

Reports" and (b)(2) "Four-Hour reportable. In addition, voiding in or instrument lines that results in an (iv) Loss of containment cooling Reports.' Tle events which have a one- erroneous indication causing the hour deadline are those having the capability. --

operator to misunderstand the true 50.72(b)(1)(il)

potential to escalate to ah Emergency condition of the plant is also an Parograph C!ass. The fcu--hour deadline is encompassing a portion of proposed unanalyzed condition and should be 50.72(b)(2), was reworded to correspond expan-e_d in the analysis of paragraph reported.

The Commission recognizes that the to a similar provision of 10 CFR

Pamgrcph 50.72ob)(1)(i)(A) requires 50.73(a)(2)(iii). Making the requirements licensee may use engineering'judgment of 10 CFR 50.72 and 5.3 similar in reporting of -Meinitiation of any and experience to determine whether an language miclear plant shutdown required by unanalyzed condition existed. It is not increases the clarity of these Technical Specifications." Although the intended that this paragraph apply to rules and minimizes confusion.

intent and scope have not changed. the minor variations in individual The paragraph has also been change in wording between the parameters, or to problems concerning reworded to make it clear that it applies proposed and final rule is intended to sirgle pieces of equipment. For example, only external to acts of nature (e.g., tornadoes)

clarify that prompt notification is, at any time, one or more safety-related and hazards (e.g., railroad tank required once a shutdown is initiated. components may be out of service due car explosion). References to acts of In response to public comment. the to testing, maintenance, or a fault that sabotage have been removed. since term "immediate shutdown" that was has not yet been repaired. Any trivial these are covered by 1 73.71. In addition, used in the proposed rule is not used in single failure or minor error in threats to personnel from internal the finl r-l.e. The term was vague and performing surveillance tests could hazards (e.g., radioactivity releases) that unfam=i-ar to those licensees who did produce a situation in which two or hamper personnel in the performance of not have Technical Specifications using more often unrelated. safety-grade necessary duties are now covered by the term. components are out-of-service. paragraph 50.72(b)(1)(vi). This paragraph This reporng requirement is intended

• Technically, this is an unanalyzed covers those events involving an actual -

to capture those events for which condition. However, these events should threat to the plant from an external Technical Specifications require the be reported only if they involve condition or natural phenomenon. and initiation of reactor shutdown. This will functionally related components or if where the threat or damage challenges provide the NRC with early warning of they significantly compromise plant the ability of the plant to continue to safety significant conditions serious safety. When applying engineering operate in a safe manner (including the enough to warrant shutdown of the judgement. and there is a doubt orderly shutdown and maintenance of plant. regarding whether to report or not, the shutdown conditions). The licensee Parogrcph5a02(Jb)(1)(fffB) was added Commission's policy is that licensees should decide if a phenomenon or to be consistent with existing should make the report. condition actually threatens the plant.

requirements in I 50.54(x) and the Finally, this paragraph also includes For example. a minor brush fire in a existing I 50.72(c) as published in the material (e.g.. metallurgical or chemical) remote area of the site that is quickly Federal Register on April 1,1983 (48 FR problems that cause abnormal controlled by fire filghting personnel and.

13966) which require the licensee to degradation of the principal safety as a result. did not present a threat to notify the NRC Operations Center by barriers (I.e., the fuel cladding reactor the plant should not be reported.

telephone when the licensee departs coolant system pressure boundary. or However. a major forest fire. large-scale

Federal Register / Vol. 48. No. 168 / Monday. August 29. 1983 / Rules and Regulations 39043 fozD.j or major earthquake that presents S. Plant monitors necessary for is possible. because these personnel will a clear threat to the plant should be accident assessment. have a better knowledge of the reported. As another example. an Porogroph50.72(b/(Ifivi). circumstances associated with the vent.

industrial or transportation accident encompassing some portions of the Reports made within four hours of the wh~ich occurs near the site, creating a proposed II 50.72(b) (2) and (6). has event should make this possible while plant safety concern. should be been revised to add the phrase. not imposing the more rigid one hour repor:ed. "including fires, toxic gas releases. or requirements.

PzrfcDcph A.,b(1)l'ivJ. radioactive releases." This addition The reporting requirementin encompassing events previously covers the -evacuation" portionof porogroph50.72(bJ(2J(i) is similar to a classified as Unusual Events. requires paragraph 5o.72(b116)(iii) of the proposed requirement in 1 50.73. Moreover, except the reporting of those events that result rule. This change in wording for the final for referring to a shutdown reactor, this in either automatic or manual actuation rule was made in response to public reporting requirement is also similar to of the ECCS or would have resulted in comments discussed above. , the "One-Hour Report" in activation of the ECCS if some While paragraph 50.72(b(1)(liii) of the § 50.72(b)(I)(ii). However this paragraph component had not failed or an operalor final rule primarily captures acts of applies to a reactor in shutdown action had not been taken. nature, paragraph 50.72[b)(1)(v) condition. Events within this For example. if a valid ECCS signal captures other events. particularly acts requirement have less urgency and can were generated by plant conditions. and by personneL The Commission believes be reported within four hours as a "Non- the operator were to put all ECCS this arrangement of the reporting criteria Emergency."

pu .- ps in pJ.l-to-lock. though no ECCS in the final rule lends itself to more Porograph50.72(b)(2)(i) (proposed discharge occurred. the event would be precise interpretion and is consistent 50.72(b)(5)) is made a "Non-Emergency"

reportable. with those pubic comments that in response to public comment. because A "valid signal" refers to the actual requested closer coordination between the Commission agrees that the covered plant conditions or parameters the reporting requirements in this rule events generally have slightly less satisfying the requirements for ECCS and other portions of the Commission's urgency and safety significance than initiatioo. Excluded from this reporting regulations.- those events included in the "One-Hour requirement would be those instances This provision requires reporting of Reports."

where instrument drift, spurious signals. events. particularly those.caused by acts The intent and scope of this reporting hurnan error. cr other invalid signals of personnel which endanger the safety requirement have not changed from the caused actuation of the ECCS. However. of the plant or interfere with personnel proposed rule. This paragraph is such events may be reportable under in performance of duties necessary for intended to capture events during which other sections of the Commission's safe plant operations.

regulations based upon other details: in an ESF actuates. either manually or The licensee must exercise some judgment in reporting under this section. automatically, or fails to actuate. ESFs particular. paragraph 50.72(b)(2)(ii) are provided to mitigate the requires a report within four hours if an For example. a small fire on site that did consequences of the event; therefore. (1)

EndIneered Safety Feature [ESF) is not endanger any plant equipment and actuated. that did not and could not reasonably be they should work properly when called Experience with notifications made upon and (2) they should not be expected to endanger the plant. is not pursuant to 1 50.72 has shown that reportable. challenged unnecessarily.The events involing ECCS discharge to the Parogroph50.72fb)Jt) of the proposed Commission is interested both in events vessel are generally more serious than rule wos split into §50.72(b)(1Ifii) and where an ESF was needed to mitigate ESF actuations without discharge to the fSO.72Th/(2J(ij in the final rule in order the consequences of the event (whether vessel. Based on this experience. the to permit some type of reports to be or not the equipment performed Commission has made this reporting .-made within four hours instead of one properly) and events -wherean ESF

criterion a -One-Hour Report." hour because these reports have less operated unnecessarily.;-:.

Paragroph50 72(b)(1J). safety significance, In terms of their 'Actuation" of multichanmel ESF

encompassing events previously combined effect. the overall intent and Actuation Systems is defined as classified as Unusual Events, covers- scope of these paragraphs have not actuation of enough channels to those events that would impair a changed from those in the proposed rule. complete the minimum actuation logic.

licensee's ability to deal with an Since the types of events intended to be Therefore. single channel actuations, accident or emergency. Notifying the captured by this reporting requirement whether caused by failures or otherwise.

NRC of these events may permit the are similar to I SO.72(b)(I)fii). except are not reportable if they do not NRC to take some compensating that the reactor is shut dowrn the reader complete the mininum actuation logic.

measures and to more completely assess should refer to the explanation of Operation of an ESF as part of a the consequences of such a loss should I 50.72(bJ)l)(ii) for more details on planned test or operational it occur during an accident or intent. evolution need not be reported.

emergency. Paragraph50.72(b)(2) Although the However, if during the test Dr Examples of events that this criterion reporting criteria contained in the evolution the ESF actuates in a way that is intended to cover are those in which - subparagraphs of I n0.72(bJt2) were in is not part of the planned procedure.

any of the following are not available: the proposed rule. in response to public' that actuation should be reported. For

1. Safety parameter display system comment the Commission established example, if the normal reactor shutdown (SPDS). this "Non-Emergency" category for procedure requires that the control rods

2. Emergency Response Facilities those events with sliRhtly less urgency be inserted by a manual reactor trip. the iERFs). and less safety significance that may be reactor trip need not be reported.

I. Emergency communications reported within four hours instead of However. if conditions develop during facilities and equipment including the one hour. the shutdown that require an automatic Emerge.cy Notification system (ENS). The Commission wants to obtain such reactor trip, such a reactor trip should

4. Public prompt Notification System reports from personnel who were on be reported. The fact that the safety

-nIluding sirens. shift at the time of the event when this

39044 Federal Register / Vol. 48, No. 168 / Monday, August 29. 1983 / Rules- and Regulations analysis assumes that an ESF will service to perform maintenance. and the criterion. For example. the Commission actuate automatically during an event Technical Specifications permit the is increasingly concerned about the does not eliminate the need to report resulting configuration. and the system effect of a loss or degradation of what that actuation. Actuations that need not or component is returned to service had been assumed to be nonessential be reported are those initiated for within the time limit specified in the inputs to safety systems. Therefore, this reasons other then to mitigate the Technical Specifications, the action paragraph also includes those cases consec'..ences of an event (e.g.. at the need not be reported under this where a service (e.g.. heatirg.

discretion of the licensee as part of a paragraph. However, if, while the ventilation, and cooling) or input (e.g..

planned procedure). component is out of service, the licensee compressed air) which is necessary for identifies a condition that could have reliable or long-term operation of a Parograph50.72(b)2J(iii) (proposed prevented the system from performing safety system is lost or degraded. Such

50.72[b)(4)J has been revised and its intended function (e.g.. the licensee loss or degradation is reportable. if the simplified. finds a set of relays that is wired proper fulfillment of the safety function The words "any instance of personal incorrectly), that condition must be is not or can not be assured. Failures error, equipment failure, or discovery of reported. that affect inputs or services to systems design or procedural inadequacies" that It should be noted that there are a that have no safety function need not be appeared in the proposed rule have been limited number of single-train systems reported.

replaced by the words "event or that perform safety functions (e.g.. the Finally. the Commission recognizes condition." This simplification in High Pressure Coolant Injection System that the licensee has to decide when lan'g-.axe is intended to clarify what was in BWRs). For such systems. loss of the personnel actions co: d have prevented a confusing phrase to many of those single train would prevent the fulfillment of a safety function. For who commented on the proposed rule. fulfillment of the safety function of that example. when an individual improperly Also ir. response to public comment. this system and, therefore. must be reported operates or maintains a component. tha reporting requirement is a "Non- even though the plant Technical person might conceivably have made Emergency" to be reported within four -Specifications may allow such a the same error for all of the functionally hours instead of within one hour... condition to exist for a specified length redundant components (e.g. if an This paragraph is based on the of time. Also, if a potentially serious individual incorrectly calibrates one assumption that safety-related systems human error is -made that could have bistable amplifier in the Reactor and sagtures are intended to mitigate prevented fulfillment of a safety Protection Svstem. that person could tle consequences of an accident. While function, but recoverv factors resulted in conceivably incorrectly calibrate all paragraph 5o 72(b)(2)(ii) applies to the error being corrected, the error is bistable amplifiers). However, for an actual demands for actuation of an ESF. still reportable. event to be reportable it is necessary paragraph 50.72(b)(2)(iii) covers an The Commission recognizes that the that the actions actually affect or event where a safety system could have application of this and other paragraphs involve components in more than one failed to perform its intended function of this section involves a technical train or channel of a safety system. and because of one or more personnel errors, judgment by licensees. In this case. a the result of the actions must be inc!ding procedure violations; technical judgment must be made ur.dersirable from the perspective of equipment failures; or design. analysis. whether a failure or operator action that pro tectirg the health and safety of the fabrication. construction, or procedural. disabled one train of a safety system public. The components can be deficiencies. The event should be could have, but did not. affect a functionally redundant (e.g.. two pumps reported regardless of the situation or redundant train. If so, this would in different trains) or not functionally condition that caused the structure or constitute an event that "could have redundant (e.g.. the operator correctly system to be unavailable. prevented" the fulfillment of a safety stops a pump in Train "A" and. instead This reporting requirement is similar function, and, accordingly. must be of shutting the pump discharge valve in to one contained in 1 50.73. thus reported. Train "A.' he mistakenly shuts the reflecting public comment identifying If a component fails by an apparently pump discharge valve in Train "B'.

the need for closer coordination of random mechanism. it may or may not Paragmphs50.72(b)(2)(iv) (proposed reporting requirements between 1 50.72 be reportable if the functionally 50.72(b](8)) has been changed to clarify and 1 50.73. redundant component could fail by the the requirement to report releases of This paragraph includes those safety same mechanism. To be reportable. it is radioactive material. The paragraph is systems designed to mitigate the necessary that the failure constitute a similar to 120.403 but places a lower consequences of an accident (e.g. condition where there is reasonable threshold for reporting events at containment isolation. emergency doubt that the functionally redundant commercial power reactors. The lower filtration). Hence. minor operational train or channel would remain threshold is based on the significance of events such as valve packing leaks, operational until it completed its safety the breakdown of the licensee's program which could be considered a lack of function or is repaired. For example, if a necessary to have a release of this size.

control of radioactive material, should pump fails because of improper rather than on the significance of the not be reported under this paragraph. lubrication. there is a reasonable impact of the actual release. The System leaks or other similar events expectation that the functionally redundarit pump, which was also existing licensee radioactive material may. however, be reportable under other effluent release monitoring programs paragraphs. improperly lubricated. would have also This paragraph does not include those failed before it completed its safety and their associated assessment function, then the failure is reportable capabilities are sufficient to satisfy the cases where a system or component is intent of 50.72(b)(2)(iv).

removed from service as part of a and the potential failure of the plarnned evolution. in accordance with functionally redundant pump must be Based upon public comment and a an appioved procedure. and in reported. reevaluation by the Commission staff.

accordance with the plant's Technical Interaction between systems. the reporting threshold has been Specifications. For example. if the particularly a safety system and a non- changed from '25%- in the proposed rule licensee removes part of a system from safety system is also included in this to "2 times" in the final rnle and has

Federal Register / Vol. 48. No. 168 / Monday. August 29. 1983 / Rules and Regulations 391145 bKen reclassified as a "Non-Erner.gency" respond because of media or public List of Subjects in 10 CFR Part 50

tc be reported witLhin four hours instead attention.

of within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />. Antitrust. Classified information, Fire Pa.-agraph 50.72(c) (proposed 50.72(c))

Also this reporting requirement has has remained essentially unchanged prevention. Incorporation by reference.

been changed to make a more uniform from the proposed rule. except for Intergovernmental relations, Nuclear recuirement by referring to specific addition of the title "Followup power plants and reactors, Penalty.

re.lase cr.;er.a instead of referring only Notification" and some renumbering. Radiation protection. Reactor siting

7echnica: S;ecifications that may This paragraph is intended to provide crileria. Reporting and recordkeeping vay so.ew hat among facilities. the NRC with timely notification when requirements.

his reporting requirement is intended an event becomes more serious or Pursuant to the Atomic Energy Act of to capture those events that may lead to additional information or new analyses 1954, as amended, the Energy an accident situation where significant clarify an event. Reorganization Act of 1974, asamended.

amounts of radioactive material could This paragraph also permits the NRC and section 552 and 553 of Title 5 of the be released from the facility. Unplanned to maintain a continuous United States Code. the following releases should occur infrequently: amendments to Title'10, Chapter 1.Code communications channel because of the however, if they occur at the levels need for continuing follow-up of Federal Regulations, Part 50 are specffied. at least moderate defects have information or because of 'published as a document subject to occurred in the safety design or telecommunications problems.

cperational control established to avoid codification.

.. ez occurrence and. therefore. such IV. Regulatory Analysis events should be reported. The Commission has prepared a PART 50-DOMESTIC UCENSING OF

Normal operating limits for PRODUCTION AND UTILIZATION

-ad:oactive effluent releases are based regulatory analysis on this regulation.

The analysis examines the costs and FACILITIES

on the limits of 10 CFR Part 20 which benefits of the Rule as considered by the establishes maximum annual average 1. The authority citation for Part 50

concentration in unrestricted areas. This Commission. A copy of the regulatory continues to read as follows:

reporting requirement addresses analysis is available for inspection and copying for a fee at the NTRC Public Authority: Secs. 103.104.181.182.183.186.

concentrations averaged over a one 189.68 Slat. 936. 937. 948.953. 95v4, 955.956. as hotr period and represents less than Document Room. 1717 H Street. NWV..

Washington. D.C. Single copies o! the amended. sec. 234. 83 Slat 1244. as amended C.' % of the annual quantities of (42 U.S.C. 2133. 2134. 2201. 2232. 2233. 2236.

radioactive materials permitted to be analysis may be obtained from Eric W.

Weiss, Office of Inspection and 2239. 22R?2: secs. 201. 202.206.88 Stat. 124Z2 released by 10 CFR Part 20.. 1244.1246. as amended (42 US.C. 5841.5842, Farcgrmph50.72(bJ(2)(r) (proposed Enforcement. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington. D.C. 20555. S840). unless otherwise noted.

rule 50.72[b)(7]) has three changes. The Section 50.7 also issued under Pub. L 95- first eliminates the phrase "occurring Telephone (301) 492-4973.

61., sec. 10.92 Slat. 2951 (42 U.S.C 58511.

onsate because it is implied by the V.

Paperwork Reduction Act Statement

Sections 50.58. 50.91 and 50.92 also issued s-^-e c' the rule. The second replaces under Pub. L 97-4!5, 96 Slat. 20.3 (42 U.S.C.

injury involving radiation" with The information collection 2239). Section 50.78 also issued under sec.

radioactively contaminated person.' requirements contained in this final rule 122 68 Stat. 939 142 U.S.C. 2152). Sections This change was made because of the have been approved by the Office of 0.80-50.8 also issued under sec. 184. 68 Stat.

dMcu.=ty in defining injury due to Management and Budget pursuant to the 954. as amended 142 U.S.C. 2234). Sections rac.:ation. and more importantly. Paperwork Reduction Act. Pub. L 96-511 50.100-50.102 also issued under sec. 186, 68 because 10 CFR Part 20 captures events (clearance number 3150-0011). Stat. 955 (42 U.S.C. 2236).

involving radiation exposure. VI. Regulatory Flexibility Certification For the-purposes of sec. 223, 68 Stat. 958. as The third change. in response to amended (42 U.S.C. 2273), If 50.10 (a). (b)..

public comment. was to make this In accordance with the Regulatory and (c). 50.44.50.40.50.48.50.54, and 50.80[a)

reporting requirement a four-hour Flexibility Act of 1980, S U.S.C.-605(b), .are issued under sec. olb. 68 Stat. 948. as notification. instead of one-hour the Commission hereby certifies that amended (42 U.S.C. 2201(b)): if 50.10 (b) and notification. This change was made this regulation will not have a I(c and 50.54 are issued under sec. 161i. 68 because these events have sli,-htlv less significant economic impact on a S at. 949. as amended (42 U.S.C. 2201(i)); and safety significance than those required substantial number of small entities. 11 50.55(e). 50.59(b). 50.70,50.71,50.72, and to be reported within one hour. This final rule affedn electric utilities 50.78 are issued under sec. 161o, 68 Stat. 950.

Paragraph 50.72(bJt2J(viJ (not in that are dominant in their respective as amended (4Z U.S.C. Z221(o)).

proposed rule) besides covering some service areas and that own and operate events such as release of radioactively nuclear utilization facilities licensed 2. A new paragaph (z) is added to contaminated tools or equipment to the under sections 103 and 104b. of the § 50.54 to read as follows:

pLi:.c that may warrent NRC attention. Atomic Energy Act of 1954. as amended.

&;socovers those events that would not The amendments clarify and modify § 50.54 Conditions of license.

otherwise warrant NRC attention except presently existing notification * * * * a for the interest of the news media, other requirements. Accordingly, there is no governmen! agencies. or the public. In new, significant economic impact on (z) Each licensee with a utilization termns of its effect on licensees, this is these licensees, nor do the affected facility licensed pursuant to sections 103 no: a new reporting requirement licensees fall within-the scope of the or 104b. of the Act shall immediately bec.ause the threshold for reporting definition of "smali entities" set forth in notify the NRC Operations Center of the int.-ies and radioact:ve release was the Regulatory Flexibility Act or within occurrence of any event specified in much lower under the proposed rule. the Small Business Size Standards set § 50.72 of this part.

.. :.-:ericn. Wil capture those events forth in regulations issued by the Small previously reported under other criteria Business Administration at 13 CFR Part 3. Section 50.72 is revised to read as w!ken such events require the NRC to 121. follows:

3lV Nd. 1 98. / R n Re g ai

39;346 Federal Register / Vol. 48. INo. 168 / Monday. August 29, 1983 / Rules and Regulations I5.72 I.nmediate notification (C) In a condition not covered by the when averaged over a time period of equirements for operating nudear power plant's operating and emergency one hour. aI

reactori procedures. (B)Any liquid effluent release that i (a) Ge.neral Requirernents ' (1) Each (iii) Any natural phenomenon or other exceeds 2 times the limiting combined I

nuclear power reactor under 5021(b) external condition that poses an actual Maximum Permissible Concentration or I 50.22 of this part shall notify the threat to the safety of the nuclear (MPC) (see Note I of Appendix B to Part I

N.rC Oe:aticns Center via the power-plant or significantly hampers 20 of this chapter) at the point of entry

'er-e-ecv N'otification System of: site personnel in the perfornance of into the receiving water (i.e.

'.}) The Declaration of any of the duties necessary for the safe operation unrestricted area) for all radionuclides i

17--e-gency Classes specified in the of the plant. except tritium and dissolved noble

'censees approved Emergency Plan; or (iv) Any event that results or should have resulted in Emergency Core gases. when averaged over a time period

- Iii) Of those non-Emergency events of one hour. (Immediate notifications specified in paragraph (b) of ths section. Cooling System (ECCS) discharge into the reactor coolant system as a result of made under this paragraph also satisfy

(2)If the Emergency Notification the requirements of paragraphs (a)(2)

System is inoperative, the licensee shall a valid signal.

(v) Any event that results in a major and (b1(2) of 1 20.403 of Part 20 of this make the required notifications via- chapter.)

commerical telephone service. other loss of emergency assessment dedicated telephone system, or any capability, offsite response capability, or (v) Any event requiring the transport o he: rnethod which will ensure that a communications capability (e.g.. of a radioactively cortaminated person report is wade as soon as practical to significant portion of control room to an offsite medical facility for the NRC Operations Center.'- indication. Emergency Notification treatment.

'33 The :`censee shall notify the NRC System. or offsite notification system).

(vi) Any event that poses an actual (vi) Any event or situation. relaied-o inst~epia:eiv after notification of the threat to the safety of the nuclear the health and safety of the public or appropriate State or local agencies and powerplant or signifidantly hampers site onsite personnel, or protection of the not later than one hour after the time the personnel in the performance of duties environment, for which a news release licensee declares one of the Emergency necessary for the safe operation of the is planned or notification to other Classes. nulcear powerplant including fires. toxic governrment agencies has been or will be

(4)When makLing a report under gas releases. or radioactive releases. made. Such an event may include an pazagraph ta)(3) of this section. the (2) Four-HourReports. If not reported onsite fatality or inadvertent release of licensee shall identify: under paragraphs (a) or (b)(1) of this radioactively contaminated materials.

(i) The Emergency Class declared: or section. the licensee shall notify the (ii) Either paragraph (b)(11 -One-Hour NRC as soon as practical and in all (c) Foi]owJpNotification. With Report." or paragraph (b)(Z). "Four-Hour cases. within four hours of the respect to the telephone notifications Report" as the paragraph of this section occurrence of any of the following: made under paragraphs (a) and (b) of not finca ton of the Non- (i) Any event. found while the reactor this section. in addition to making the ergenry Event. is shutdown, that, had it been found required initial notification. each

. [b) .7jon-EJergencyEvents. (1) One- while the reactor was in operation, licensee, shall during the course of the I

HoulrReports.If not reported as a would have resulted in the nuclear event declaration of an Emergency Class powerplant. including its principal (1) Immediarely report (i) any farther under par-agraph (a)of this section, the safety barriers. being seriously degraded degradation in the level of safety of the iicensee s-all notify the NRC as soon as or being in an unanalyzed condition that plant or other worsening plant practical and in all cases within one significantly compromises plant safety. conditions, including those that require hour of the occurrence of any of the *(ii)Any event or condition that results the declaration of any of the Emergency following- .m manual 6r automatic actuation of an Classes, if such a declaration has not (i)(A) The initiation of any nuclear Engineered Safety Feature [ESFJ, been previously made, or (ii) any change plant shutdown reqtired by the plant's including the Reactor Protectifn System from one Emergency Class to another, or Technical Specifications. (RPS). However, actuation of an ESF. (iii) a termination of the Emergency (B) Any deviation from the plant's including the RPS. that results from and Class.

Tec-.ncza' ,Specificationsauthorized is part of the preplanned sequence ptrsuant to 1 50.54(x) of this part. during testing or reactor operation need (2) Immediately reporL (i) the results

[ii) Any event or condition during not be reported. of ensuing evaluations or assessments of operation that results in the condition of (iii) Any event or condition that alone plant conditions, (ii) the effectiveness of the nuclear powerplant including its could have prevented the fulfillment of response or protective measures taken, principal safety barriers. being seriously the safety function of structures cr and (iii) information related to plant degraded: or results in the nuclear systems that are needed to: behavior that is not understood.

pcwe-pian: being (A) Shut down the reactor and (3)Maintain an open. continuous (A) In a unanalyzed condition that maintain it in a safe shutdown communication channel with the NRC

significantly compromises plant safety; condition. Operations Center upon request by the (B)In a condition that is outside the (B)Remove residual heat. NRC.

design basis of the plant or (C) Control the release of radioactive materiaL or Dated: at Washington. D.C. this 23d day of (D)Mitigate the consequences of an August. 198 Other reamiresnts for imedisate notification of te.t N7.C b) Lcensed operatr.1 nudcer power accident. For he Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

reactrs ame At, &ined elsewhere in thiis chapter. in [iv)(A) Any airborne radioactive Samuel 1. Chik, p2cuiar. It 20.403. i 50.3& and I 73.71. release that exceeds 2 times the

'.hese E-ergeuxy Classes am addressed in applicable concentrations of the limits Secretrcryof the Conm.mission.

.~Ltnix£ E cothai parL ia DMo- Fiteda.-2M-f s* am]

CoULTerci; telephone number of the NRC specified in Appendix B.Table II of Part sILUO CODE 71504-o COp"etions Ceiter is (2) 951-0550. 20 of this chapter in unrestricted areas.

'p.,--

nQC Federal Register / Vol. 4a, No. 144 / Tuesday. July 26. i983 / Rules and Regulations decision on whether the order should be ACTOte: Final rule. U. Rulemaking initiation amended to lower the pooling standard The Nuclear Plant Reliability Data in the manner proposed. In the absence SUMMARY. The Commission is amending (NPRD) system is a voluntary program of a suspension. costly and inefficient its regulations to require the reporting of for the reporting of reliability data by movements of producer milk would have operational experience at nuclear power nuclear power plant licensees. On to be make solely for the purpose of plants by establishing the Licensee January 30,1980 (45 FR 6793).' the NRC

pooling the milk of dairy farmers who Event Report (LER) system. The final published an Advance Notice of have historically supplied the fluid milk rule is needed to codify the LER Proposed Rulemaking that described the needs of the market. reporting requirements in order to NPRD system and invited public It is hereby found and determined that establish a single set of requirements comment on an NRC plan to make it thirty days' notice of the effective date that apply to all operating nuclear mandatory. Forty-four letters were hereof is impractical, unnecessary and power plants. The final rule applies only received in response to the advanced contrary to the public interest in that to licensees of commercial nuclear notice. These comments generally (a) This suspension is necessary to power plants. The final rule will change opposed making the NPRD system reflect current marketing conditions'and the requirements that define tihe events mandatory on the grounds that reporting to maintain orderly marketing and situations that must be reported. of reliability data should not be made a conditions in the marketing area in that and will define the information that regulatory rpquirement without the suspension costly and must be provided in each report.

inefficient movements of milk would In December 1980 the Commission EFFECTIVE DATE: January 1,1984. The decided that the requirements for have to be made solely for the purpose incorporation by reference of certain reporting of operational experience data of pooling the milk of dairy farmers who. publications listed in the regulations is have historically supplied the fluid milk needed major revision and approved the approved by the Director of the Federal development of an Integrated needs of the market. Register as of January 1.1984. Operational Experience Reporting (b) This suspension does not require of persons affected substhntial or FOR FURTHER INFORMAT-ON

CONTACT

(IOER) system. The IOER system would extensive preparation prior to the Frederick J. Hebdon. Chief. Program have combined. modified. and made effective date; and . Technology Branch. Office for Analysis mandatory the existing Licensee Event (c) The marketing problems that and Evaluation of Operational Data. Report (LER) system and the NPRD

provide the basis for this suspension U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. system SECY 80-507 discusses the action were fully reviewed at a public Washington. D.C. 20555: Telephone (301) IOER system.

hearing held on November 9-10. 1982. 492-4480. As a result of the Commission's where all interested parties had an SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

approval of the concept of an IOER

opportunity to be heard on this matter. system. the NRC published another Therefore. good cause exists for 1. Background advance notice on January 15, 1981 (46 making this order effective upon FR 3541). This advance notice explained On May 6.19 2Zthe NRC published in why the NRC needed operational publication in the Federal Register. the Federal Register (47 FR 19543)' a experience data and described the List of Subjects In 7 CFR Part 1131 Notice of Proposed Rulemaking that deficiencies in the existing LER and Milk marketing orders. Milk. Dairy would modify and codify the existing NPRD systems.

Licensee Event Report (LER) system.

products.

Interested persons were invited to On June &1981. the Institute of submit written comments to the Nuclear Power Operations (INPO)

PART 1131-[AMENDED] announced that because of its role as an Secretary of the Commission by July 6,

§1131.7 [Amendedl 1982. Numerous comments were active user of NPRDs data it would It is therefore ordered.That the received. After consideration of the assume responsibility for management aforesaid provisions in I 1131.7(c) of the comments and other factors involved. and funding of the NPRD system.

order are hereby suspended for the the Commission has amended the Further, INPO decided to develop months of August and September 1983. proposed requirements published for criteria that would be used in its Effective date: July 25. 1983. public comment by clarifying the scope management audits of member utilities and content of the requirements.

to assess the adequacy of participation (Sme1-19. 48 Stat. 3L as amended (7 U.S.C in the NPRD system.01-674)) particularly the criteria that define which operational events must be The two principal deficiencies that Signed at Washington. D.C. on: July22L had previously made the NPRD system

1983. reported.

an inadequate source of reliability data C W. MCMMfan. The majority of the comments on the were the inability of its committee Assistant Secretary. Marketingand proposed rule- (1) Questioned the management structure to provide the'

InspectionService. meaning and intent of the criteria that necessary technical direction and a low IPR Doc 83-=W rFed 72- 4: &ml defined the events which must be level of participation by the utilities. The IULING COOD3':o-a-u reported. (2) questioned the need for commitments and actions by INPO

reporting certain specific types of provided a basis for confidence that'

events. and (3) questioned the need for these two deficiencies would be NUCLEAR REGULATORY certain Information that would be corrected. For example. centralizing the COMMISSION required to be Included in an LER. management and funding of NPRDS

Sedtion 111 of this notice discusses the within INPO should overcome the

10 CFR Parts 20 and 50 comments' li rAore detail. previous difficulties associated with Licensee Event Report System management by a committee and

'Copies of the docunents ar available for public inspection and copying for a fee at the Public funding from several independent AnENCY Nuclear Regulatory Document Room at 1717 H Street NW. Washington. organizations. Further. with INPO

Conrrniss ion. D.C. focusing upon a utility'. participatidn in

Federal Register / Vol. 48, No. 144 / Tuesday, July 26, 1983 / Rules and Regulations 33851 NPRDS as a specific evaluation comprehensive integrated analytically- 2. Four commenters felt that the lev'el parameter during routine management versatile system. of effort would be increased but not and plant audit activities, the level of The Brookhaven Study. published as' significantly.

utility participation, and therefore, the BNL/NUREG 51609. NURE9/CI4 3206, 3. One commenter felt that the quality and quantity of NPRDS data. discusses data collection and storage q proposed rule would have a minimal should significantly increase. However, procedures to support multivariate, effect on the level of effort required.

the Commission will continue to have an multicase analysis. While the range of 4. Two commenters felt that the active role in NPRDS by participating in reactor configurations in the U.S. proposed rule would significantly reduce an NPRDS User's Group. by periodically ntftlear industry presents some the number of LERs filed.

assessing the quality and quantity of methodological and interpretative 5. Thirteen commenters endorsed the information available from NPRDS, and problems, these difficulties should not objective of improving LER reporting but by auditing the timely availability of the ,be insurmountable. The Commission felt that changes in the proposed rule information to the NRC. believes that the NRC should have as a were needed. These commenters did not Since there was a likelihood that specific objective the development, directly address the resource issue.

NPRDS under INPO direction would demonstration, and implementation of 6. Five commenters endorsed the meet the NRC's need for reliability data. an integrated system for collecting and proposed rule and/or felt that it was a it was no longer necessary to proceed analyzing operational data that will significant improvement over the with the IOERS. Hence, the collection of employ the predictive and analytical existing reporting requirements.

detailed technical-descriptions of potential of multicase, multivariate Based on these comments and its own significant events could be addressed in analyses. Accordingly, the staff has a separate rulemaking to modify and assessment of the impact of this rule, the been directed to undertake the work Commission has concluded that the codify the existing LER reporting necessary to develop and demonstrate requirements. See SECY 81-494 for impact of this rule will be no greater such a cost-effective integrated system than the impact of the existing LER

additional details concerning IOERS. of operational data collection and However, the Commission wishes to requirements, and this rule will not make It explicitly clear that it is relaxing analyses. place an unacceptable burden on the the reporting requirements with the If the design of the system affected licensees.

expectation that sufficient utility demonstrates that such a system is feasible and cost-effective, development RelationshipBetween the LER Rule participation, cooperation, and support (ff50.73) and the Immediate Notification of the NPRD system will be forthcoming. of the system to the point of initiating rule should be completed by July 1986. Rule (f 50.72)

If the NPRD system does not become operational at a satisfactory level in a m. Analysis of Comments As a parallel activity to the reasonable time, remedial action by the preparation of £ 50.73, the Commission Commission in the form of additional The Commission received forty-seven is amending its regulations (i 50.72)

rulemaking may become necessary. (47] letters commenting on the proposed which require that licensees for nuclear On October 6, 1981, the NRC rule. Copies of those letters and a power plants notify the NRC Operations published an advanced notice (46 FR detailed analysis of the comments are Center of significant events that occur at

49134) that deferred development of the available for public inspection and their plants. On December 21, 1981, the IOER system and sought public copying for a fee at the NRC Public Commission published in the Federal comment on the scope and content of Document Room at 1717 H Street. NW., Register a proposed rule (48 FR 61894)

the LER system. Six comment letters Washington, D.C. A number of the more that described the planned changes in were received in response to this substantive issues are discussed below. § 50.72.

ANPRM. All of the comments received Licensee Resources The Federal Register notice were reviewed by the staff and were accompanying the proposed LER rule considered in the development of the Of particular concern to the (i.e., 1 50.73) stated that additional proposed LER rule. See SECY 82-3 ' for Commission was the impact that the changes anticipated to § 50.72 would be additional details. proposed rule would have on the made but they would be "'

• largelyl This rule identifies the types of resources used by licensees to prepare administrative and the revised 1 50.72 reactor events and problems that are LERs. The Commission's-goal was to' would not be significantly modified nor believed to be significant and useful to assure thatthe scope of the rule would would it be published again for public the NRC in its effort to identify and not increase the overall level of effort comment." Several commenters resolve threats to public safety. It is above that currently required to comply disagreed with this conclusion.

designed to provide the information with the existing LER requirements. The commenters did, however, agree necessary for engineering studies of Thirty letters of the 47 received with the Commission's position that operational anomalies and trends and contained comments on the overall inconsistencies and overlapping patterns analysis of operational acceptability of the proposed rule or requirements between the two rules occurrences. The same information can commented directly on the question of need to be eliminated.

also be used for other analytic scope and/or resources associated with The Commission has carefully procedures that will aid in identifying the proposed rule. The views of the reviewed the proposed requirements in accident precursors. commenters can be characterized as the LER and Immediate Notification The Commission believes that the follows: rules and has concluded that although NRC should continue to seek an 1. Five commenters felt that the scope changes to both have been made improved operational data system that and level of effort would-be greatly (largely in response to public comments)

will maximize the value of operational expanded by the proposed rule. to clarify the intent of the rules, the data. The system should encompass and Estimates included an increase of 100 original intent and scope have not been integrate operational data of events and man-years for the entire industry, an significantly changed. Therefore, the problem sequences identified in this increase of three times the current effort, Commission has concluded that these rule, NPRDS data, and such other and an increase of $100,000 and 2 man- two rules need not be published again information as is required for a years annually for each plant. for public comment.

N._"

33832l 33852 Federal Register / Vol. 48. No. 144 / Tuesday, July 26, 1983 / Rules and Regulations Federal Register I Vo~~~~~~~~~~l.4,N.14IuedyJly2,18 RlsanRgutis

_

EngineeringJudgment LERs). They noted that reports of RPS this rule. but did not change the original actuations are already reported to the scope of intent of the requirements. In In the Fderal Register notice that NRC In the Monthly Operating Status addition In order to make the accompanied the proposed rule, the Report as well as telephoned to the requirements in II 50.72 and 50.73 more Commission stated that licensee's NRC Operations Center. compatible. the order (i.e., numbering) of engineering judgment may be used to In addition. the Institute of Nuclear the criteria In I 50.73 has been changed.

decide If an event Is reportable. Several Power Operations (INPO) analyzed the The changes are noted In the discussion commenters expressed the belief that frequency o reactor scrams during a of each paragraph below.

some wording should be added to the one-month period. This analysis Finally, conforming amendments are rule of reflect that the NRC will also use indicated that an average of 55 reactor being made to various sections of Parts judgment in enforcement of this trips would bb reportable each month 20 and 50 In order to reduce the regulation where the licensee Is under the proposed rule. LNPO equated redundancy in reporting requirements requested to use engineering judgment. this to 80 additional LERs per year for that apply to operating nuclear power The Commission believes that the LER all currently operating plants, or plantL In generaL these amnendments rule adequately discusses the need for approximately 32 man-years of will require that and application of the concept of additional effort for all the currently 1. Licensees that have an Emergency

"engineering judgment." The concept operating plants based upon the Notification System (ENS) make the itself includes the recognition of the assumption that each LER requires 100 reports required by the subject sections existence of a reasonable range of man-hours of effort to prepare and via the ENS. All other licensees will Interpretation regarding this rule, and analyze. continue to make the reports to the consequently the Commission The Comdission still believes that Administrator of the appropriate NRC

recognizes and hereby acknowledges ESP actuations, including reactor trips, Regional Office.

the need for flexibility In enforcement frequently era associated with 2 Written reports required by the actions associated with this rule. The significant plant transients and are subject sections be submitted to the Commission believes that this concept Is indicative of events that are of safety NRC Document Control Desk in sufficiently clear and that additional sirniflcance. In additioan. if the ESF are Washington. D.C. with a copy to the explicit guidance is not necessary. being challenged during routine Offices.

transients, that fact Is of safety appropriate Regional Reporting Schedul; 3. Holders of licenses to operate a significance and should be reported. nuclear power plant submit the written In the Federal Register notice that In addition, the Commission does not accompanied the proposed rule, the. agree with the estimate that each LER reports required by the subject sections Commission stated that It had not yet submitted for a routine reactor trip In accordance with the procedures decided if the reports should be would require. on the average. 100 man- described in I 50.73(b).

submitted in fifteen days or thirty days hours to prepare and analyze. Licensees The criteria contained in the subject following discovery of a reportable are already required to make internal sections which define a reportable event event Many commenters stated that the evaluation of and document significant have not been modified.

time frame for reporting LERs should not events IIncluding reactor trips. Similar changes are also planned as be less than thirty days after the Therefore. the incremental impact of part of curent activities to make more discovery of a reportable event. preparing and analyzing the LER should substantive changes to Part 21.

One commenter estimated the impact be significantly less than 100-man hours. I 50.55(e). and 1 73.71.

of a requirement to submit a report In addition, the actual increase in NonconservativeInterdependence

-sooner than 30 days following discovery burden would be offset by reductions in of a reportable event would be an the burden of reporting less significant Several commenters expressed increase of approximately 40 man years events that would no longer be difficulty in understanding the meaning per year for the currently operating reportable. of the phrase "nonconservative plants. In addition the commenter interdependence" as used in the estimated that if a summary report were Coordination With OtherAeporting proposed I 50.73(a)13). The wording of also required the reporting burden Requirements I 50.73(a)(3) (I 50.73(a)(2)(vii) of this would increase an additional 12 man Several commenters noted. that the final rule) has been changed to eliminate years for the currently operating plants. proposed rule did not appear to be the phrase "non conservative In response to these comments, the coordinated with other existing interdependence" by specifically Commission has decided to require that reporting requirements, and that defining the types of events that should LERs be submitted within 30 days of duplication of licensee effort might be reported. The revised paragraph does discovery of a reportable event or result. They recommended that LER not, however, change the intent of the situation reporting be consolidated to eliminate original paragraph.

potentil duplication of other existing Sabotage and Threats of Violence Reporting'ofReactor Tips reporting requirements.

Section 50.73ta)(1) of the proposed The Commission has reviewed Several commenters noted that the rule (I 50.73(a)(2)[ivj of the final rule) existing NRC reporting requirements. security-related reporting requirements required reporting of any event which (e.g., 10 CFR Parts 20 and 21, 1 50.55(e), of I 50.73(a)(B) (I 50.73(a)(2)(lii) of this results In an unplanned manual or I 50.72, 1 50.73, i 73.71, and NUREG- final rule)) were already contained In automatic actuation of any Engineered 0854) And has attempted, to the extent greater detail in 10 CFR 73.71. For Safety Feature (ESF) Including the practicable, to eliminate redundant Instance, 1 73.71 requires an act of Reactor Protection System (RPS). Many reporting and to ensure that the various sabotage to be reported Immediately, commenters agreed that these events reporting~reqbtremcnts are consistent. followed by a written report within 15 should be trended and analyzed. but Many of the changes in the final LER days. The proposed rule would have disagreed that they deserve to be rule are as a result of this effort. These required an LER to be filed within 30

singled out as events of special changes resulted in extensive revisions days. Although distribution of reports is sig1ificance (i e., events reportable as in the wording of criteria contained in somewhat different, redundant reporting

Federal Register / Vol. 48, No. 1-44 Tuesday, July 26. 1983 / Rules and Regulations 338,53 would have occurred. The commenters in NPRDS as an alternative. It is our Several commenters argued that the recommended that the Commission understanding, however, the NPRDS will inclusion of the requirement that the ensure consistency between if 50.73 soon adopt the EUS system titles, so a licensee perform an engineering and 73.71. distinction should no longer exist. In evaluation of certain events at the staff's In response to these comments the addition. LERs frequently include request appeared unjustified and would Commission has deleted the reporting of systems that are not included ih the add substantially to the burden of sabotage and threats of violence from scope of NPRDS (i.e.. an NPRDS system reporting. They argued that the licensee

1 50.73 because these situations are identification does not exist) while EUS, should be required to submit only the adequately covered by the reporting on the other hand. includes all of the specific additional information required requirements contained in i 73.71. systems commonly found in commercial for the necessary engineering evaluation nuclear power plants. Further, NPRDS rather than to perform the evaluation.

Evacuation of Rooms or Buildings includes only 39 component identifiers The rule has been modified to require Many commenters stated that the (e.g.. valve, pump). The Commission only the submittal of any necessary reporting of in-plant releases of believes that this limited number does additional information requested by the radioactivity that require evacuation of not provide a sufficiently detailed Commission in writing.

individual rooms (l 50.73(a)(7) in the description of the component function proposed rule or (1 50.73(a)(2)(x) of this involved. IV. Specific Findings final rule) was inconsistent with the general thrust of the rule to require Function ofFailedComponents and Overview of the LER System reporting of significant events. They Status of Redundant Components When this final LER rule becomes noted that minor spills, small gaseous Many commenters said that effective, the LER will be a detailed waste releases, or the disturbance of information required in (I 50.73(b)(2) (vi) narrative description of potentially contaminated particulate matter (e.g., and (vii) of the proposed rule should not significant safety events. By describing dust) may all require the temporary be a requirement in the LER. They in detail the event and the planned evacuation of individual rooms until the argued that this information is readily corrective action, it will provide the airborne concentrations decrease or available in documents previously basis for the careful study of events or until respiratory protection devices are submitted to the NRC by licensees and conditions that might lead to serious utilized. They noted that these events are available for reference. accidents. If the NRC staff decides that are fairly common and should not be The final rule (§ 50.73(b)(2)(i](G)) has the event was especially significant reportable unless the required been modified to narrow the scope of from the standpoint of safety, the staff evacuation affects the entire facility or a the information requested by the may request that the licensee provide major portion thereof. additional information and data In response to these comments the Commission.

While this general information may be associated with the event.

wording of this criterion (1 50.73(a)(2)(x) The licensee will prepare an LER for in the final rule) has been changed to available in licensee documents previously submitted to the NRC. the those events or conditions that meet one significantly narrow the scope of the or more of the criteria contained in criterion to include only those events Commission believes that a general which significantly hamper the ability of understanding of the event and its I 50.73(a). The criteria are based significance should be possible without primarily on the nature, course, and site personnel to perform safety-related consequences of the event. Therefore.

activities (e.g., evacuation of the main reference to additional documentation control room). which may not be readily or widely the final LER rule requires that events available. particularly to the public. which meet the criteria are to be EnergyIndustry Identification System The Commission continues to believe reported regardless of the plant Many commenters noted that the that the licensee should prepare an LER operating mode or power level, and requirement to report the Energy in sufficient depth so that regardless of the safety significance of Industry Identification System (EUS) knowledgeable readers who are the components, systems. or structures component function identifier and conversant with the design of involved. In trying to develop criteria for system name of each component or commercial nuclear power plants, but the identification of events reportable as system referred tG in the LER are not familiar with the details of a LERs, the Commission has concentrated description would be a significant particularplant. can understand the on the potential consequences of the burden on the licensee. general characteristics of the event (e.g.. event as the measure of significance.

They suggested instead that the the cause. the significance, the Therefore, the reporting criteria, in NPRDS component Identifiers be used in corrective action). As suggested by the generaL do not specifically address place of the EMIS component identifiers commenters, more detailed information classes of initiating events or causes of which are not yet widely used by the to support engineering evaluations and the event. For example, there is no industry. case studies will be obtained. as requirement that all personnel errors be The Commission continues to believe needed. directly from the previously reported. However, many reportable that EIS system names and component submitted licensee documents. events will involve or have been function identifiers are needed in order initiated by personnel errors.

Engineering Evaluationsr Finally, it should be noted that that LERs from different plants can be compared. We do not., however, suggest The overview discussion of the licensees are permitted and encouraged that the EIIS identifiers be used proposed rule contains the following to report any event that does not meet throughout the plant, but only that they statement: "If the NRC staff decides that the criteria contained in 1 50.73(a), if the be added to the LER as it is written. A the event was especially significant licensee believes that the event might be simple, inexpensive table could be used - from the standpoint of safety. the staff of safety significance, or of generic to translate plant identifiers into may request that the licensee perform interest or concern. Reporting equivalent EIIS identifiers. an engineering evaluation of the event requirements aside, assurance of safe The Commission considered the and describe the results of that operation of all plants depends on system and component identifiers used evaluation." accurate and complete reporting by each

33654 Federal Register / Vol. 48, No. 144 / Tuesday, July 28, 1983 / Rules and Regulations licensee of all events having potential consequences of an event (e.g., at the accident (eg., containment Isolation, safety significance. discretion of the licenses ad part of a emergency filtration). Hence, minor planned procedure or evolution). operational events Involving a specific Paragraph-by-ParogrophExplanotionof Sections 50.73(a)(2) (v) and (vi) component Such as valve packing leaks, the LEA Rule (proposed I 50.73(aJ(2)J require reporting which could be considerd a lack of The significant provisions of the final of: control of radioactive material, should LER rule are explained below. The * * * * * not be reported under this paragraph.

explanation follows the order in the (v) Any event or condition that alone could System leaks or other similar events proposed rule. have prevented the fulfillment of the safety may, however, be reportable under other Paragraph 50.73(a)(2J(lv) (proposed function of structures or systems that are paragraphs.

paragraph 50.73(a)(1)) requires reporting needed to: It should be noted that there are a of: "Any event or condition that resulted (AJ Shut down the reactor and maintain It limited number of single-train systems in manual or automatic actuation of any in a safe shutdown condition; that perform safety functions (e.g.. the Engineered Safety Feature (ESF), (B)Remove residual heat, (C) Control the release of radioactive High Pressure Coolant Injection System Including the Reactor Protection System in BWRs). For such systems, loss of the (RPS). However, actuation of an ESF, material; or (D)Mitigate the consequences of an single train would prevent the including the RPS, that resulted from accident. fulfillment of the safety function of that and was part of the preplanned (vi) Events covered in paragraph (a)(2)(v) system and, therefore, must be reported sequence during testing or reactor of this section may include one or more even though the plant Technical operation need not be reported." personnel errors, equipment failures, and/or Specifications may allow such a This paragraph requires events to be discovery of design, analysis, fabrication, condition to exist for a specified limited reported whenever an ESF actuates construction, and/or procedural length of time.

either manually or automatically, inadequacies. However, individual component failures need not be reported It should also be noted that, if a regardless of plant status. It is based on potentially serious human error is made the premise that the ESFa are provided pursuant to this paragraph if redundant equipment in the same system was operable that could have prevented fulfillment of to mitigate the consequences of a and available to perform the required safety a safety function, but recovery factors ignificant event and, therefore: (1)They function. resulted in the error being corrected, the should work properly when called upon, error Is still reportable.

and (2)they should not be challenged The wording of this paragraph has frequently or unnecessarily. The been changed from the proposed rule to The Commission recognizes that the Commission is interested both in events make it easier to read. The intent and application of this and other paragraphs where an ESF was needed to mitigate scope of the paragraph have not been of this section involves the use of the consequences (whether or not the changed. engineering judgment on the part of equipment performed properly) and The intent of this paragraph is to licensees. In this case, a technical events where an ESF operated capture those events where there would judgment must be made whether a unnecessarily. have been a failure of a safety system to failure or operator action that did

"Actuation" of multichannel ESF properly complete a safety function, actually disable one train of a safety Actuation Systems is defined as regardless of when the failures were system, could have, but did not, affect a actuation of enough channels to discovered or whether the system was redundant train within the ESF system.

complete the minimum actuation logic needed at the time. If so, this would constitute an event that (i.e., activation of sufficient channels to This paragraph is also based on the "could have prevented" the fulfillment cause activation of the ESF Actuation assumption that safety-related systems of a safety function, and, accordingly, System), Therefore, single channel and structures are intended to mitigate must be reported.

actuations, whether caused by failures the consequences of an accident. While If a component fails by an apparently or otherwise, are not reportable if they I 50.73(a)(2)(iv) of this final rule applies random mechanism it may or may not do not complete the minimum actuation to actual actuations of an ESF, be reportable if the functionally logic. I 50.73(a)(2)(v) of this final rule covers redundant component could fail by the Operation of an ESF as part of a an event or condition where redundant same mechanism. Reporting is required planned operational procedure or test structures, components, or trains of a if the failure constitutes a condition (e.g., startup testing) need not be safety system could have failed to where there is reasonable doubt that the reported. However, if during the planned perform their intended function because functionally redundant train or channel operating procedure or test, the ESF of: one or more personnel errors, would remain operational until it actuates in a way that is not part of the including procedure violations; completed its safety function or is planned procedure, that actuation must equipment failures; or design, analysis, repaired. For example, if a pump in one be reported. For example, if the normal fabrication, construction, or procedural train of an ESF system fails because of reactor shutdown procedure requires deficiencies. The event must be reported improper lubrication, and engineering that the control rods be inserted by a regardless of the situation or condition judgment indicates that there is a manual reactor trip, the reactor trip need that caused thestructure or systems to reasonable expectation that the not be reported. However, if conditions be unavailable, and regardless of functionally redundant pump in the develop during the shutdown that whether or not an alternate safety other train, which was also improperly require an automatic reactor trip, such a system could have been used to perform lubricated. would have also failed reactor trip must be reported. the safety function (e.g.. High Pressure before it completed its safety function, The fact that the safety analysis Core Cooling failed, but feed-and-bleed then the actual failure is reportable and assumes that an ESF will actuate or Low Pressure Core Cooling were the potential failure of the functionally automatically during certain plant available'to provide the safety function redundant pump must be discussed in conditions does not eliminate the need of,,core cooling). the LER.

to report that actuation. Actuations that The applicability of this paragraph For safety systems that include three need not be reported are those initiated includes those safety systems designed or more trains, the failure qf two or more for reasons other than to mitigate the to mitigate the consequences of an trains should be reported if, in the

Federal Register / Vol. 48, No. 144 / Tuesday, July 26, 1983 / Rules and Regulations 33855 judgement of the licensee, the functional (D) Mitigate the consequences of an within the time limit specified in the capability of the overall system was accident." Technical Specifications. the action jeopardized. This paragraph has been changed to need not be reported under this Interaction between systems: clarify the intent of the phrase, paragraph. However, if, while the train particularly a safety system and a non- "nonconservative interdependence."' or component is out of service. the safety system, is also included in this Numerous comment letters expressed licensee identifies a condition that could criterion. For example, the Commission difficulty in understanding what-this have prevented the whole system from is increasingly concerned about the phrase meant; so the paragraph has performing its intended function (e.g.,

effect of a loss or degradation of what been changed to be more specific. The the licensee finds a set of relays that Is had been assumed to be non-essential new paragraph is narrower in scope wired incorrectly), that condition must inputs to safety systems. Therefore, this than the original paragraph because the be reported.

paragraph also includes those cases term is specifically defined, but the Section 50.73(a)(z)(i) (proposed where a service (e.g.. heating. basic intent is the same. £ 50.73(a)(4)) requires reporting of:

ventilation, and cooling) or input (e.g., This paragraph requires those events to be reported where a single cause "(A) The completion of any nuclear compressed air) which is necessary for plant shutdown required by the plant's reliable or long-term operation of a produced a component or group of components to become inoperable in Technical Specifications or -

safety system is lost or degraded. Such loss or degradation is reportable if the redundant or independent portions (i.e., "(B) Any operation prohibited by the proper fulfillment of the safety function trains or channels) of one or more plant's Technical Specifications: or is not cannot be assured. Failures that systems having a safety function. These "(C) Any deviation from the plant's affect inputs or services to systems that events can identify previously Technical Specifications authorized have no safety function need not be unrecognized common cause failures pursuant to I 50.54(x) of this part."

reported. and systems interactions. Such failures This paragraph has been reworded to Finally the Commission recognizes can be simultaneous failures which more clearly define the events that must that the licensee may also use occur because of a single initiating be reported. In addition, the scope has engineering judgment to decide when cause (i.e.. the single cause or been changed to require the reporting of personnel actions could have prevented mechanism serves as a common input to events or conditions "prohibited by the fulfillment of a safety function. For the failures): or the failures can be plant's Technical Specifications" rather example, when an individual improperly sequential (i.e., cascade failures), such than events where "a plant Technical operates or maintains a component, he as the case where a single component Specification Action Statement is not might conceivably have made the same failure results in the failure of one or met" This change accommodates plants error for all of the functionally more additional components. that do not have requirements that are redundant components (e.g., if he To be repotable, however, the event specifically defined as Action incorrectly calibrates one bistable or failure must result in or involve the Statements.

amplifier in the Reactor Protection failure of independent portions of more This paragraph now requires events to System, he could conceivably than one train or channel in the same or be reported where the licensee is incorrectly calibrate all bistable different systems. For example, if a required to shut down the plant because amplifiers). However, for an event to be cause or condition caused components the requirements of the-Technical reportable it is necessary that the in Train "A" and "B" of a single system Specifications were not met. For the actions actually affect or involve to become inoperable. even if additional purpose of this paragraph. "shutdown:'

components in more than one train or trains (e.g., Train."C") were still available, the event must be reported. In is defined as the point in time where the channel of a safety system, and the *Technical Specifications require that the result of the actions must be undesirable addition, if the cause or condition plant be in the first shutdown condition from the perspective of protecting the caused components in Train "A' of one system and in Train "B" of another required by a Limiting Condition for health and safety of the public. The Operation (e.g- hot standby (Mode 3) for components can be functionally system (i.e., a train that is assumed in redundant (e.g., two pumps in different the safety analysis to be independent) to PWRa with the Standard Technical become inoperable, the event must be Specifications). If the condition is trains) or not functionally redundant corrected before the time limit for being (e.g.. the operator correctly stops a pump reported. However, if a cause or shut down (Leo, before completion of the in Train "A' and, instead of shutting the condition caused components in Train

"A" of one system and Train "A" of shutdown), the event need not be pump discharge valve in Train "A." he another reported.

mistakenly shuts the pump discharge system (i.e., trains that are not assumed in the safety analysis to be In addition. If a condition that was valve in Train "B"). prohibited by the Technical independent), the event need not be Section 50.73(a)(2)(vii} (proposed reported unless it meets one or more of Specifications existed for a period of

§ 50.73(a)(3)) requires the reporting of: time longer than that permitted by the the other criteria in this section.

"Any event where a single cause or In addition, this paragraph does not Technical Specifications, it must be condition caused at least one include those cases where one train of a reported even if the condition was not independent train or channel to become system or a component was removed discovered until after the allowable time inoperable in multiple systems or two from service as part of a planned had elapsed and the condition was independent trains channels or to evolution, in accordance with an rectified immediately after discovery.

become inoperable in a system designed approved procedure, and in accordance Section 50.73(a)(2)(ii) (proposed to: with the plant's Technical I 50.73(a)(5)) requires reporting of: "Any (A) Shut down the reactor and Specifications. For example, if the event or condition that resulted in the maintain it in a safe shutdown licensee removes part of a system from condition of the nuclear power plant, condition, service to perform maintenance, and the including its principal safety barriers.

(B) Remove residual heat. Technical Specifications permit the being seriously degraded, or that (C) Control the release of radioactive resulting configuration, and the system resulted in the nuclear power plant material: or or component is returned to service being:

GGARRA

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"(A) In an unanalyzed condition that radioactivity levels Als BWR air ejector safety of the nuclear power plant or significantly compromised plant safety: monitor that exceeded the Technical siguificantly hampered sits personnel In

"(3) In a condition that was outside Speclication' limits. the performance of duties necessary for the design basis of the plant; or (o)Cracks and breaks in piping, the the sate operation of the nuclear power

'(C) In a condition not covered by the reactor vessel, or major components in plant including fires, toxic gas releaseso plant's operating and emergency the primary coolant circuit that have or radioactive releases."

procedures." safety relevance (steam generators, This paragraph has been reworded to This paragraph requires events to be reactor coolant pumps, valves, etc.) Include physical hazards (internal to the reported where the plant, including Its (d) Significant welding or material plant) to personnel (e~g.. electrical firesn.

principal safety barriers. was seriously defects in the primary coolant system. In addition, In response to numerous degraded or in an unanalyzed condition. (e) Serious temperature or pressure comments, the scope has been narrowed For example, small voids in systems transients (e.g.. transients that violate so that the hazard must hamper the designed to remove heat from the the plant's Technical Specifications). ability of site personnel to perform reactor core which have been previously (I) Loss of relief and/Ior safety valve safety-related activities affecting plant shown through analysis not to be safety operability during test or operation safety.

significant need not be reported. (such that the number of operable In-plant releases must be reported if However, the accumulation of voids that valves or man-way closures is less than they require evacuation of rooms or could inhibit the ability to adequately required by the Technical buildings containing systems important remove heat from the reactor core, Specifications). to safety and, as a result, the ability of particularly under natural circulation (gi Loss of containment function or the operators to perform necessary conditions, would constitute an integrity (e:p., containment leakage rates safety functions is significantly unanalyzed condition and must be exceeding the authorized limits). hampered. Precautionary evacuations of reported. In addition. voiding in Section 50.73(a)(2)(iii) (proposed I 50.73(a)(3)) requires reporting of: "Any rooms and buildings that subsequent instrument lines that results in an evaluation determines were not required erroneous indication causing the natural phenomenon or other external condition that posed aft actual threat to need not be reported.

operator to significantly misunderstand Proposed I 50.73(a)(8) was Intended to the true condition of the plant is also an the safety of the nuclear power plant or unanalyzed condition and must be significantly hampered site personnel in capture an event that involved a the performance of duties necessary for controlled release of a significant reported. amount of radioactive material to offsite The Commission recognizes that the the safe operation of the nuclear power licensee may use engineering judgment plant." areas. In addition, "significant" was and experience to determine whether an This paragraph has been reworded to based on the plant's Technical unanalyzed condition existed. It is not make it clear that it applies only to acts Specification limits for the release of intended that this paragraph apply to of nature (e.g., tornadoes) and external radioactive material. However, this minor variations in individual hazards (e.g., railroad tank car section has been deleted because the parameters, or to problems concerning explosion). References to acts of reporting of these events is already single pieces of equipment. For example, sabotage have been removed because required by I 50.73(a)(2)(1) and I 20.405.

at any time, one or more safety-related they are covered by 1 73.71. In addition, Section 50.73(a)(2) (viii) and (ix)

components maj be out of service due threats to personnel from internal (proposed I 50.73(a)(9)] require reporting to testing, maintenance, or a fault that hazards (e.g.. radioactivity releases) are of:

has not yet been repaired. Any trivial now covered by a separate paragraph * * * *

single failure or minor error in (I 50.73(a)(2)(x)). (vili)(A) Any airborne radioactivity release performing surveillance tests could This paragraph requires those events that exceeded 2 times the applicable produce a situation in which two or to be reported where there is an actual concentrations of the limits specified in Table more often unrelated, safety-related threat to the plant from an external IIof Appendix B to Part 20 of this chapter in components are out-of-service. condition or natural phenomenon, and unrestricted areas, when averaged over a Technically, this is an unanalyzed where the threat or damage challenges time period of one hour.

condition. However, these events should the ability of the plant to continue to (B)Any liquid effluent release that operate in a safe manner (including the exceeded 2 times the limiting combined be reported only if they involve Maximum Permissible Concentration (MPC)

functionally related components or if orderly shutdown and maintenance of (see Note I of Appendix B to Part 20 of this they significantly compromise plant shutdown conditions). chapter) at the point of entry into the safety. The licensee is to decide if a receiving water (i.e., unrestricted area) for all Finally, this paragraph also includes phenomenon or condition actually radionuclides except tritium and dissolved material (e.g.. metallurgical, chemical) threatened the plant. For example, a noble gases, when averaged over a time problems that cause abnormal minor brush fire in a remote area of the period of one hour.

degradation of the principal safety site that was quickly controlled by fire (ix)Reports submitted to the Commission barriers (i.e.. the fuel cladding. reactor fighting personnel and, as a result, did Inaccordance with paragraph (a)(2)(vill) of not present a threat to the plant need this section also meet the effluent release coolant system pressure boundary, or reporting requirements of paragraph the containment). not be reported. However, a major forest 20.405(a)(5) of Part 20 of this chapter.

Additional examples of situations fire, large-scale flood, or major * * * * 0

included in this paragraph are: earthquake that presents a clear threat (a) Fuel cladding failures in the to the plant must be reported. Industrial Paragraph (viii) has been changed to reactor or in the storage pool, that or transportation accidents that clarify the requirements to report exceed expected values, that are unique octurred near the site and created a releases of radioactive material. The or widespread. or that resulted from plant safety concern must also be paragraph is similar to § 20.405 but unexpected factors. reported. places a lower threshold for reporting (b) Reactor coolant radioactivity Section 50.73(a)(2)(x) (proposed events at commercial power reactors.

levels that exceeded Technical l 50.73(a)(7)) requires reporting of: "Any The lower threshold is based on the Specification limits for iodine spikes or. event that posed an actual threat to the significance of the breakdown of the

_ _

Federal Register / V il. 48, No. 144 / Tuesday. July 25,1983 / Rules and Regulations 33857

_

licensee's program necessary to have a in a condition not analyzed in the Safety "Special Reports" of the Technical release of this size, rather than on the Analysis Report) under reasonable and Specifications are still required.

significance of the impact of the actual credible alternative conditions, such as V. Regulatory Analysis release. power level or operating mode. For Reports of events covered by example.'if an event occurred while the The Commission has prepared a

§ 50.73(a)(2)(viii) are to be made in lieu plant was at 15% power and the same' regulatory analysis for this final rule.

of reporting noble gas releases that event could have occurred while the The analysis examines the costs and exceed 10 times the instantaneous plant was at 100% power, and, as a benefits of the alternatives considered release rate, without averaging over a result, the consequences would have by the Commission. A copy of the time period, as implied by the been considerably more serious, the regulatory analysis is available for requirement of 5 20.405(a)(5). licensee must assess and report those inspection and copying for a fee at the Paragraph 50.73(b) describes the consequences. NRC Public Document Room. 1717 H

format and content of the LER. It Paragraph 50.73(b)(4) requires that the Street, N.W., Washington. D.C. Single requires that the licensee prepare the licensee describe in the LER any copies of the analysis may be obtained LER in sufficient depth so that corrective actions planned as a result of from Frederick J. Hebon. Chief, Program knowledgeable readers conversant with the event that are known at the time the Technology Branch, Office for Analysis the design of commercial nuclear power LER is submitted, including actions to and Evaluation of Operational Data, plants, but not familiar with the details reduce the probability of similar events U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

of a particular plant, can understand the occurring in the future. After the initial Washington. D.C. 20555: Telephone (301)

complete event (i.e., the cause of the LER is submitted only substantial 492-4480.

event, the plant status before the event, changes in the corrective action need be and the sequence of occurrences during VI.

Paperwork Reduction Act Statement

reported as a supplemental LER.

the event). Paragraph 50.73(c) authorizes the NRC The Nuclear Regulatory Commission Paragraph 50.73(b)(1) requires that the staff to require the licensee to submit has submitted this rule to the Office of licensee provide a brief abstract specific supplemental information Management and Budget for such describing the major occurrences during beyond that required by § 50.73(b). Such review as may be appropriate under the the event, including all actual information may be required if the staff Paperwork Reduction Act. Pub. L 90-

component or system failures that finds that supplemental material is 511. The date on which the reporting contributed to the event, all relevant necessary for complete understanding of requirements of this rule become operator errors or violations of an unusually complex or significant effective reflects inclusion of the 60-day procedures, and any significant period which the Act allows for such corrective action taken or planned as a event. Such requests for supplemental information must be made in writing. review.

result of the event. This paragraph is needed to give LER data base users a and the licensee must submit the VII. Regulatory Flexibility Certification brief description of the event in order to requested information as a supplement to the initial LER within a time period In accordance with the Regulatory identify events of interest. mutually agreed upon by the NRC staff Flexibility Act of 1980, 5 U.S.C. 605(b),

Paragraph 50.73(b)(2) requires that the the Commission hereby certifies that licensee include in the LER a clear, and the licensee.

Paragraph 50.73(f) gives the NRC's this rule will not have a significant specific narrative statement of exactly economic impact on a substantial what happened during the entire event Executive Director for Operations the authority to grant case-by-case number of small entities. This final rule so that readers not familiar with the affects electric utilities that are details of a particular plant can exemptions to the reporting requirements contained in the LER dominant in their respective service understand the event The licensee areas and that own and operate nuclear should emphasize how systems, system. This exemption could be used to limit the collection of certain data in utilization facilities licensed under components. and operating personnel sections 103 and 104b of the Atomic performed. Specific hardware problems those cases where full participation would be unduly difficult because of a Energy Act of 1954, as amended. The should not be covered in excessive amendments clarify and modify detail. Characteristics of a plant that are plant's unique design or circumstances.

Paragraph 50.73(g) states that the presently existing notification unique and that influenced the event requirements.

(favorably or unfavorably] must be reporting requirements contained in

5 50.73 replace the reporting Accordingly, there is no new, described. The narrative must also significant economic impact on these describe the event from the perspective requirements in all nuclear power plant Technical Specifications that are licensees, nor do these licensees fall of the operator (e.g.. what the operator within the scope of the definition of saw, did, perceived, understood, or typically associated with Reportable Occurrences. "small entities" set forth in the misunderstood).

Paragraph 50.73(b)(3) requires that the The reporting requirements Regulatory Flexibility Act or the Small LER include a summary assessment of superseded by £ 50.73 are those Business Size Standards set out in the actual and potential safety contained in the Technical Specification regulations issued by the Small Business consequences and implications of the sections that are usually titled "Prompt Administration at 13 CFR Part 121.

event. This assessment may be based on Notification with Written Followup" List of Subjects the conditions existing at the time of the (Section 6.9.1.8) and "Thirty Day Written event. The evaluation must be carried Reports" (Section 6.9.1.9). The reporting 10 CFR Part20

out to the extent necessary to fully requirements that have been superseded Licensed material, Nuclear power assess the safety consequences and are also described in Regulatory Guide plants and reactors. Penalty, Reporting safety margins associated with the 1.16. Revision 4, "Reporting of Operating and recordkeeping requirements.

event. An assessment of the event under Information-Appendix A Technical alternative conditions must be included Specification," Paragraph 2, "Reportable 10 CFR PAR TS 50

if the incident would have been more Occurrences." The special report Incorporation by reference, Antitrust, severe (e.g., the plant would have been typically described in Section 6.9.2 Classified information, Fire protection.

33OSS Federal Register / Vol. 48, No. 144 I Tuesday, July 26, 1983 / Rules and Regulations Intergovernmental relations, Nuclear (C] Any deviation from the plant's (D) Mitigate the consequences of an power plants and reactors, Penalty, Technical Specifications authorized accident.

Radiation prote+/-tion, Reporting and pursuant to I 50.54(x) of this part. (viii)(A) Any airborne radioactivity recordkeeping requirements. (ii) Any event or condition that release that exceeded 2 times the Under the authority of the Atomic resulted in the condition of the nuclear applicable concentrations of the limits Energy Act of 1954. as amended, the power plant, including its principal specified in Appendix B. Table 1 of Part Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, as safety barriers, being seriously 20 of this chapter in unrestricted areas.

amended, and 5 U.S.C. 552 and 553, the degraded, or that resulted in the nuclear when averaged over a time period of following amendments to 10 CFR Parts power plant being: one hour.

20 and 50 are published as a document IA) In an unanalyzed condition that (B) Any liquid effluent release that subject to codification. significantly compromised plant safety; exceeded 2 times the limiting combined pD) In a condition that was outside the Maximum Permissible Concentration PART 50-DOMESTIC LICENSING OF design basis of the plant; or (MPC) (see Note 1 of Appendix B to Part PRODUCTION AND UTILIZATION (C)In a condition not covered by the 20 of this chapter) at the point of entry.

FACIUTIES plant's operating and emergency into the receiving water (i.e.,

procedures. unrestricted area) for all radionuclides

1. The authority citation for Part 50 (iii) Any natural phenomenon or other except tritium and dissolved noble continues to read as follows: external condition that posed an actual gases, when averaged over a time period Authority: Sacs. 103,104. 1, 182.183.188. threat to the safety of the nuclear power of one hour.

189, 61 Stat. 938, 937. 948, 953, 954, 95. 958 as plant or significantly hampered site (ix) Reports submitted to the amended, sec. 234, 83 Stat. 1244. as amended personnel in the performance of duties Commission in accordance with

(42 U.S.C. 2133. 2134, 2201, 2232, 2233, 2238, necessary for the safe operation of the paragraph (a)(2)(viii) of this section also

2239. 2282); sacs. 201 202. 206.8 Stat. 1242, nuclear power plant. meet the effluent release reporting

1244, 1248. as amended (42 U.S.C. 5841, 5842, (iv) Any event or condition that requirements of paragraph 20.405(a)(5)

5848). unless otherwise noted. resulted in manual or automatic of Part 20 of this chapter.

Section 50.7 also issued under Pub. L 95-. actuation of any Engineired Safety (x) Any event that posed an actual

602, sec. 10, 92 Stat. 2951 (42 U.S.C. 5851]. Feature (ESF), including the Reactor threat to the safety of the nuclear power Sections 50.58. 50.91 and 50.92 also issued plant or significantly hampered site under Pub. L 97-415, 96 Stat. 2073 (42 U.S.C.

Protection System (RPS). However,

2239). Section 50.78 also issued under sec. actuation of an ESF, including the RPS, personnel in the performance of duties

122, O8Stat. 939 (42 U.S.C. 2152). Sections that resulted from and was part of the necessary for the safe operation of the

50.80-50.81 also issued under sec. 184. 68 Stat. preplanned sequence during testing or nuclear power plant including fires,

854, as amended (42 U.S.C. 2234). Sections reactor operation need not be reported. toxic gas releases, or radioactive

50.100-50-102 also issued under sec. 18S. 58 (v) Any event or condition that alone releases.

Stat. 955 (42 U.S.C. 2238). could have prevented the fulfillment of (b) Contents. The Licensee Event For the purposes of sec. 223. 58 Stat. 958, as the safety function of structures or Report shall contain:

amended (42 U.S.C. 7273). it 50.10 (a). (b), systems that are needed to: (1) A brief abstract describing the and (c), 50.44. 50.4e. 50.48. 50.54, and 50.30(a) (A) Shut down the reactor and major occurrences during the event, are issued under sec. ebib, 68 Stat. 948, as maintain it in a safe shutdown including all component or system amended (42 U.S.C. 2201(b)); II 50.10( b) and (c) and 50.54 are issued under sec. 16i. 88 condition; failures that contributed to the event Stat. 949, as amended (42 U.S.C. 2201(i)); and (B) Remove residual heat and significant corrective action taken

1I 50.55(e). 50.59(b). 50.70, 50.71, 50.72. and (C) Control the release of radioactive or planned to prevent recurrence.

50.78 are issued under sec. 151o, 68 Stat. 950. material; or (2)(i) A clear, specific, narrative as amended (42 U.S.C. 2201(o)). (D) Mitigate the consequences of an description of what occurred so that accident. knowledgeable readers conversant with

2. A new 150.73 is added to read as (vi) Events covered in paragraph the design of commercial nuclear power follows: (a)(2)(v) of this section may include one plants, but not familiar with the details I 50.73 Ucenso event report systemL or more procedural errors, equipment of a particular plant, can understand the failures, and/or discovery of design. complete event.

(a) Reportable events. (1) The holder analysis, fabrication, construction. and/ (ii) The narrative description must of an operating license for a nuclear or procedural inadequacies. However, include the following specific power plant (licensee) shall submit a individual component failures need not information as appropriate for the Licensee Event Report (LER) for any be reported pursuant to this paragraph if particular event:

event of the type described in this redundant equipment in the same (A) Plant operating conditions before paragraph within 30 days after the system was operable and available to the event.

discovery of the event. Unless otherwise perform the required safety function. (B) Status of structures, components.

specified in this section, the licensee (vii) Any event where a single cause shall report an event regardless of the or systems that were inoperable at the or condition caused at least one start of the event and that contributed to plant mode or power level, and independent train or channel to become the event.

regardless of the significance of the inoperable in multiple systems or two structure, system, or component that (C) Dates and approximate times of independent trains or channels to occurrences.

initiated the event. become inoperable in a single system (D) The cause of each component or

(2) The licensee shall report: designed 'to: system failure or personnel error, if (i)(A) The completion of any nuclear (AJ Shut down the reactor and known.

plant shutdown required by the plant's maiutain it in aesafe shutdown (E) The failure mode, mechanism, and Technical Specifications, or condition; effect of each failed component. if (B) Any operation or condition (Bj Remove residual heat; known.

prohibited by the plant's Technical (C) Control the release of radioactive (F)The Energy Industry Identification Specifications; or material; or System component function identifier

Federal Register / Vol. 48, No. 144 / Tuesday. July 26. 1983 / Rules and Regulations 339

338-59 and system name of each component or components that could have performed PART 20-STANDARDS FOR

system referred to in the LER. the same function as the components PROTECTION AGAINST RADIATION

(1) The Energy Industry Identification and systems that failed during the event.

System is defined in: IEEE Std 803-1983 3. In 520.402, paragraph (a) is revised;

(4) A description of any corrective the introductory text of paragraph (b) is (May 16, 1983) Recommended Practices actions planned as a result of the evernt for Unique Identification Plants and revised; and a new'paragraph (e) is including those to reduce the probability added to read as follows:

Related Facilities-Principles and of similar events occurring in the Ruture.

Definitions. 120.402 Reports of thet or los of

(2) IEEE Std 803-1983 has been (15) Reference to any previous similar events at the sameplant that are known Ncensed matertaL

approved for incorporation by reference by the Director of the Federal Register. to the licensee. (a)(1) Each licensee shall report to the A notice of any changes made to the (6) The name and telephone number of Commission, by telephone, immediately material incorporated by reference will a person within the licensee's after it determines that a loss or theft of be published in the Federal Register. organization who is knowledgeable licensed material has occurred in such Copies may be obtained from the about the event and can provide quantities and under such circumstances Institute of Electrical and Electronics additional information concerning the that it appears to the licensee that a Engineers, 345 East 47th Street. New event and the plant's characteristics. substantial hazard may result to persons York, NY 10017. A copy is available for in unrestricted areas.

(c) Supplemental information. The (2) Reports must be made as follows:

inspection and copying for a fee at the Commission may require the licensee to Commission's Public Document Room. (i) Licensees having an installed sdbmit specific additional information Emergency Notification System shall

1717 H Street, NW'., Washington. D.C.

and at the Office of the Federal Register, beyond that required by paragraph (b) make the reports to the NRC Operations

1100 L St. NW.. Washington. D.C. of this section if the Commission finds Center in accordance with I 50.72 of this (G) For failures of components with that supplemental material is necessary chapter.

multiple functions, include a list of for complete understanding of an (ii) All other licensees shall make systems or secondary functions that unusually complex or significant event. reports to the Administrator of the were also affected. These requests for supplemental appropriate NRC Regional Office listed (H) For failure that rendered a train of information will be made in writing and in Appendix D of this part.

a safety system inoperable, an estimate the licensee shall submit the requested (b) Each licensee who makes a report of the elapsed time from the discovery information as a supplement to the under paragraph (a) of this section shall.

of the failure until the train was returned initial LER. withing 30 days after learning of the loss to service. (d) Submission of reports. Licensee or theft, make a report in writing to the (I) The method of discovery of each Event Reports must be prepared on US. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, component or system failure or Form NRC 366 and submitted within 30 Document Control pesk. Washington.

procedural error. days of discovery of a reportable event D.C. 20555. with a copy to the O)(1) Operator actions that affected or situation to the U.S. Nuclear appropriate NRC Regional Office listed the course of the event, including Regulatory Commission, Document in Appendix D of this part. The report operator errors, procedural deficiencies, shall include the following information:

or both, that contributed to the evenL Control Desk. Washington, D.C. 20555.

• * * 0 *

(2) For each personnel error, the The licensee shall also submit an licensee shall discuss: additional copy to the appropriate NRC (e) For holders of an operating license (i) Whether the error was a cognitive Regional Office listed in Appendix A to for a nuclear power plant. the events error (e.g., failure to recognize the actual Part 73 of this chapter. included in paragraph (b) of this section plant condition, failure to realize which (e) Report legibility. The reports and must be reported in accordance with the systems should be functioning, failure to copies that licensees are required to procedures described in £50.73 (b), (c),

recognize the true nature of the event) or submit to the Commission under the (d), (e), and (g) of this chapter and must a procedural error. provisions of this section must be of include the information required in (ii) Whether the error was contrary to sufficient quality to permit legible paragraph (b) of this section. Events an approved procedure, was a direct reproduction and micrographic reported in accordance with 1 50.73 of result of an error in an approved processing. this chapter need not be reported by a procedure, or was associated with an duplicate report under paragraph (b) of (f)Exemptions. Upon written request this section.

activity or task that was not covered by from a licensee including adequate an approved procedure: 4. In 1 20.403, the introductory text of justification or at the initiation of the paragraphs (a) and (b) is revised, and (iii) Any unusual characteristics of the work location (e.g., heat, noise) that NRC staff, the NRC Executive Director paragraph (d) is revised to read as directly'contributed to the error, and for Operations may, by a letter to the follows:

(iv) The type of personnel involved licensee, grant exemptions to the reporting requirements under this. { 20A403 Notiflcatons of khldent.

(i.e., contractor personnel, utility- licensed operator. utility nonlicensed section. (a) Immediate notification. Each operator, other utility personnel). (g) Reportable occurrences. The licensee shall Immediately report any (K) Automatically and manually requirements contained in this section events involving byproduct, source, or initiated safety system responses. replace all existing requirements for special nuclear material possessed by (L)The manufacturer and model licensees to report "Reportable the licensee that may have caused or number (or other identification) of each Occurrences" as defined in individual threatens to cause:

component that failed during the event. plant Technical Specifications.

0 * * 0 0

(3) An assessment of the safety The following additional amendments (b) Twenty-four hour notification.

consequences and Implications of the are also made to Parts 20 and 50 of the Each licensee shall within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> of event. This assessment must include the regulations in this chapter. discovery of the event, report any event availability of other systems or involving licensed material possessed

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--- '-.- D Ir.. AO MAL 1LA I Tu~sday. July 28. 1983 I Rules and Regulations

338G0

l Federal R~egiaier jT V0&. -ut, -0-d *- I

u (iv)Corrective steps taken or planned (I)Licensees that have an installed by the licenses that may have caused or to prevent a recurrence. Emergency Notification System shall threatens to cause: * * * * * make the initial notification to the NRC

• * * * *

(c)(1) In addition to any notification Operations Center in accordance with (d)Reports made by licensees in 150.72 of this part.

required by 1 20.403 of this part, each (Ii)All other licensees shall make the response to the requirements of this licensee shall make a report in writing of initial section must be made as follows: notification by telephone to the levels of radiation or releases of of the appropriate NRC

(1) Licensees that have an installed radioactive material in excess of limits Administrator Emergency Notification System shall Regional Office listed in Appendix D,

specified by 40 CFR Part 190. Part 20, of this chapter.

make the reports required by paragraphs "Environmental Radiation Protection (a) and (b) of this section to the NRC (7) Written reports. Holders of an Standards for Nuclear Power license for a nuclear power Operations Center in accordance with Operations," or in excess of license operating I 50.72 of this chapter. plant shall submit a written report to the conditions related to compliance with 40 Commission concerning the incidents

(2)All other licensees shall make the CFR Part 190.

reports required by paragraphs (a) and (2)Each report submitted under Included In paragraphs (c) (1) and (2) of (b) of this section by telephone and by paragraph (c)(1) of this section must this section In accordance with the telegram. mailgram, or facsimile to the describe: procedures described in 1 50.73 (b), (c),

Administrator of the appropriate NRC exposure of (d), (a), and (g)of this part. Incidents D of (I)The extent of reported in accordance with 150.73 of Regional Office listed in Appendix Individuals to radiation or to radioactive this part. material; this part need not also be reported under S.In 1 20.405, paragraphs (a) and (c) (II)Levels of radiation and paragraphs (c) (1)or (2)of this section.

are revised, and new paragraphs (d) and concentrations of radioactive material Dated at Washington. D.C. this 20th day of (a) are added to read as follows: involved- July 1983.

(Ill) The cause of the exposure, levels, For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

120.405 Rept of ovexposurm and or concentrations; and J.ChIlk, excessIve laels asnd concentrations. Samuel (iv) Corrective steps Taken or planned Secretary of the Commission.

(a)(1) In addition to any notification to assure against a recurrence, including JFR Do= SW l 7-2- :45 aml required by I 20.403 of this part. each the schedule for achieving conformance BILUNG CODS 759041t- licensee shall make a report in writing with 40 CFR Part 190 and with concerning any one of the following associated license conditions.

types of incidents within 30 days of its (d) For holders of an operating license occurrence: for a nuclear power plant. the incidents DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY

(i) Each exposure of an individual to included in paragraphs (a) or (c) of this radiation in excess of the applicable Customs Service of this section must be reported in accordance limits in I I 20.10 or 20.104(a) with the procedures described in 19 CFR Part 134 part, or the license; paragraphs 50.73 (b), (c), (d). (e), and (g)

(ii)Each exposure of an individual to of this chapter and must also include the (T.D. 83-1551 radioactive material in excess of the information required by paragraphs (a)

applicable limits in II 20.103(a)(1), and (c) of this section. Incidents Customs Regulations Amendments

20.103(a)(2), or 20.104(b) of this part, or reported in accordance with I 50.73 of Relating to Country of Origin Marking in the license; this chapter need not be reported by a AGENCY: Customs Service, Treasury.

(iii) Levels of radiation or duplicate report under paragraphs (a) or concentrations of radioactive material in (c)of this section. ACTiON: Final rule.

a restricted area in excess of any other (e) All other licensees who make applicable limit in the license; reports under paragraphs (a) or (c) of SUMMARY: This document amends the (iv) Any incident for which this section shall, within 30 days after Customs Regulations to establish notification is required by 1 20.403 of learning of the overexposure or certification requirements for importers this part; or excessive level or concentration, make a with respect to the country of origin (v)Levels of radiation or report in writing to the U.S. Nuclear marking of certain articles repacked in Regulatory Commission, Document the United States after release from concentrations of radioactive material Customs custody. This change requires (whether or not involving excessive Control Desk, Washington, D.C. 20555, importers to certify to the district exposure of any individual) in an with a copy to the appropriate NRC director having custody of the articles unrestricted area in excess of ten times Regional Office listed in Appendix D of that: (a) If the importer does the any applicable limit set forth in this part this part. repacking. the new container must be or in the license. UCENSING OF marked in accordance with applicable

(2)Each report required under PART 50-DOMESTIC

PRODUCTION AND UTILIZATION law and regulations; or (b) if the article paragraph (a)(1) of this section must is sold or transferred, the importer must describe the extent of exposure of FACILITIES

notify the subsequent purchaser or individuals to radiation or to radioactive 6. In I 50.38, new paragraphs (c)t5) repacker, in writing, at the time of sale material. including: and (7)are added to read as follows: or transfer, that any repacking of the (I)Estimates of each individual's article must conform to the marking exposure as required by paragraph (b) 150.36 FechnIcal spectlcattons.

requirements. The purpose of this of this section: change is to ensure that an ultimate (ii)Levels of radiation and purchaser in the Unitea States is aware concentrations of radioactive material (B)Initial Notification. Reports made of the country of origin of the imported involved; to the Commission by licensees in article.

(iii) The cause of the exposure, levels response to the requirements of this be made as follows; EFFECTtIE OATE: October 24.1983.

or concentrations: and section must