ML16225A208: Difference between revisions

From kanterella
Jump to navigation Jump to search
(Created page by program invented by StriderTol)
(Created page by program invented by StriderTol)
Line 1: Line 1:
{{Adams
#REDIRECT [[IR 05000259/2016002]]
| number = ML16225A208
| issue date = 08/11/2016
| title = NRC Integrated Inspection Report 05000259/2016002, 05000260/2016002, and 05000296/2016002
| author name = Blamey A
| author affiliation = NRC/RGN-II/DRP/RPB6
| addressee name = Shea J
| addressee affiliation = Tennessee Valley Authority
| docket = 05000259, 05000260, 05000296
| license number = DPR-033, DPR-052, DPR-068
| contact person =
| case reference number = EA-14-005
| document report number = IR 2016002
| document type = Inspection Report, Letter
| page count = 47
}}
See also: [[see also::IR 05000260/2016002]]
 
=Text=
{{#Wiki_filter:UNITED STATES
                                NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
                                                REGION II
                            245 PEACHTREE CENTER AVENUE NE, SUITE 1200
                                      ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30303-1257
                                          August 11, 2016
EA-14-005
Mr. J.W. Shea
Vice President, Nuclear Licensing
Tennessee Valley Authority
1101 Market Street, LP 3D-C
Chattanooga, TN 37402-2801
SUBJECT:        BROWNS FERRY NUCLEAR PLANT - NRC INTEGRATED INSPECTION
                REPORT 05000259/2016002, 05000260/2016002, AND 05000296/2016002
Dear Mr. Shea:
On June 30, 2016, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at
your Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant, Units 1, 2, and 3. On July 15, 2016, the NRC inspectors
discussed the results of this inspection with Mr. K. Bronson and other members of your staff.
Inspectors documented the results of this inspection in the enclosed inspection report.
NRC inspectors documented two findings of very low safety significance (Green) in this report.
One of these findings involved violations of NRC requirements. Additionally, NRC inspectors
documented one Severity Level IV violation with no associated finding. Because of their very
low safety significance, the NRC is treating these violations as noncited violations (NCVs)
consistent with Section 2.3.2.a of the Enforcement Policy.
If you contest the violations or significance of these NCVs, you should provide a response
within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington DC 20555-0001; with
copies to the Regional Administrator, Region II; the Director, Office of Enforcement, United
States Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001; and the NRC Resident
Inspector at Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant.
In addition, if you disagree with a cross-cutting aspect assignment or a finding not associated
with a regulatory requirement in this report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the
date of this inspection report, with the basis for your disagreement, to the Regional
Administrator, RII, and the NRC Senior Resident Inspector at Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant.
 
J. Shea                                      2
In accordance with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 2.390, Public Inspections,
Exemptions, Requests for Withholding, of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter, its
enclosure, and your response (if any) will be available electronically for public inspection in the
NRCs Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of
NRCs Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS). ADAMS is
accessible from the NRC Website at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public
Electronic Reading Room).
                                            Sincerely,
                                            /RA/
                                            Alan Blamey, Chief
                                            Reactor Projects Branch 6
                                            Division of Reactor Projects
Docket Nos.: 50-259, 50-260, 50-296
License Nos.: DPR-33, DPR-52, DPR-68
Enclosure: NRC Integrated Inspection Report 05000259/2016002,
            05000260/2016002 and 05000296/2016002
cc: w/encl. Distribution via ListServ
 
 
__ ML16225A208 _______      SUNSI REVIEW COMPLETE        FORM 665 ATTACHED
OFFICE        RII:DRP            RII:DRP            RII:DRP          RII:DRP        RII:DRS            HQ:RTTB
SIGNATURE    Via Email/RA/DED    Via Email/RA/TAS4 Via Email/RA/AMR4 Via Email/RA/ADN Via Email/RA/JRP1 Via Email/RA/MSP
NAME          D. Dumbacher        T. Stephen        A. Ruh            A. Nielsen      J. Panfel          M. Peck
DATE                7/29/2016          7/29/2016          7/29/2016        7/28/2016      7/28/2016          7/28/2016
E-MAIL          YES    NO        YES      NO      YES      NO      YES      NO    YES      NO        YES      NO
COPY?
OFFICE        RII:DRS            RII:DRS            RII:DRP          RII:DRP
SIGNATURE    Via Email/RA/CAF2  Via Email/RA/EMS  Via Email/RA/CRK1 AJB3
NAME          C. Fontana          S. Sanchez        C. Kontz          A. Blamey
DATE                8/1/2016          8/3/2016          8/8/2016        8/11/2016      8/  /2016        8/  /2016
E-MAIL          YES    NO        YES      NO      YES      NO      YES      NO    YES      NO        YES      NO
COPY?
     
J. Shea                                  3
Letter to Joseph W. Shea from Alan Blamey dated August 11, 2016.
SUBJECT:      BROWNS FERRY NUCLEAR PLANT - NRC INTEGRATED INSPECTION
              REPORT 05000259/2016002, 05000260/2016002, AND 05000296/2016002
Distribution w/encl:
D. Gamberoni, RII
L. Gibson, RII
OE Mail
RIDSNRRDIRS
PUBLIC
RidsNrrPMBrownsFerry Resource
 
              U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
                                REGION II
Docket Nos.:  50-259, 50-260, 50-296
License Nos.:  DPR-33, DPR-52, DPR-68
Report No.:    05000259/2016002, 05000260/2016002, 05000296/2016002
Licensee:      Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA)
Facility:      Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant, Units 1, 2, and 3
Location:      Corner of Shaw and Nuclear Plant Road
              Athens, AL 35611
Dates:        April 1, 2016, through June 30, 2016
Inspectors:    D. Dumbacher, Senior Resident Inspector
              T. Stephen, Resident Inspector
              A. Ruh, Resident Inspector
              C. Fontana, Emergency Preparedness Inspector
              S. Sanchez, Senior Emergency Preparedness Inspector
              A. Nielsen, Senior Health Physicist
              J. Panfel, Reactor Inspector
              M. Peck, Senior Reactor Technical Instructor
              C.Kontz, Senior Project Engineer
Approved by:  Alan Blamey, Chief
              Reactor Projects Branch 6
              Division of Reactor Projects
                                                                  Enclosure
 
                                          TABLE OF CONTENTS
Summary of Findings ........................................................................................................ 3
Summary of Plant Status .................................................................................................. 5
Reactor Safety
      1R01 Adverse Weather Protection (71111.01) ..................................................... 5
      1R04 Equipment Alignment (71111.04) ................................................................ 6
      1R05 Fire Protection (71111.05) ........................................................................... 6
      1R06 Flood Protection Measures (71111.06) ....................................................... 7
      1R11 Licensed Operator Requalification Program (71111.11) ............................. 8
      1R12 Maintenance Effectiveness (71111.12) ....................................................... 9
      1R13 Maintenance Risk Assessments
              and Emergent Work Control (71111.13) ................................................... 10
      1R15 Operability Determinations and Functionality Assessments (71111.15)... 10
      1R18 Plant Modifications (71111.18) .................................................................. 11
      1R19 Post Maintenance Testing (71111.19) ....................................................... 12
      1R22 Surveillance Testing (71111.22) ................................................................ 14
      1EP2 Alert and Notification System Testing (71114.02) ..................................... 14
      1EP3 Emergency Preparedness Organization Staffing
              and Augmentation System (71114.03) ...................................................... 15
      1EP4 Emergency Action Level and Emergency Plan Changes (71114.04)........ 15
      1EP5 Correction of Emergency Preparedness Weaknesses (71114.05) ........... 16
      1EP6 Drill Evaluation (71114.06) ........................................................................ 18
Radiation Safety
      2RS6 Radioactive Gaseous and Liquid Effluent Treatment (71124.06).............. 18
      2RS7 Radiological Environmental Monitoring Program (REMP) (71124.07) ...... 19
Other Activities
      4OA1 Performance Indicator Verification (71151)............................................... 21
      4OA2 Problem Identification and Resolution (71152) ......................................... 22
      4OA3 Followup of Events and Notices of Enforcement Discretion (71153) ........ 25
      4OA5 Other Activities .......................................................................................... 26
      4OA6 Meetings, Including Exit ............................................................................ 29
 
                                                SUMMARY
  05000259/2016002, 05000260/2016002, 05000296/2016002; 04/01/2016-06/30/2016;
  Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant, Units 1, 2 and 3; (Post Maintenance Testing, Maintenance of
  Emergency Preparedness, Problem Identification and Resolution of Problems)
  The report covered a three-month period of inspection by resident and regional inspectors. Two
  findings and one traditional enforcement violation were identified. The significance of inspection
  findings is indicated by their color (Green, White, Yellow, Red) using Inspection Manual Chapter
  (IMC) 0609, "Significance Determination Process" (SDP) dated April 29, 2015. Cross-cutting
  aspects are determined using IMC 0310, Components Within the Cross Cutting Areas dated
  (December 4, 2014). All violations of NRC requirements are dispositioned in accordance with
  the NRCs Enforcement Policy dated August 1, 2016. The NRC's program for overseeing the
  safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described in NUREG-1649, "Reactor
  Oversight Process," Revision 6.
A.    NRC-Identified and Self-Revealing Findings and Violations
Cornerstone: Initiating Events
  * Green. A self-revealing, finding for the licensees failure to provide adequate work
      instructions for maintenance on the Unit 3 recirculation pump discharge valve motors which
      included appropriate testing as described in Procedure NPG - SPP 06.9.3 Post Modification
      testing, was a performance deficiency.
      The performance deficiency was more than minor because it affected the equipment
      performance attribute of the Initiating Events Cornerstone and adversely affected the
      cornerstone objective to limit the likelihood of events that upset plant stability and challenge
      critical safety functions during shutdown operations. The inspector performed the initial
      significance determination using NRC Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix G,
      Attachment 3, Shutdown Operations Significance Determination Process Phase 1 Initial
      Screening and Characterization of Findings and determined that the finding was of very low
      safety significance. This finding had a cross-cutting aspect in the area of human
      performance because the licensee did not ensure that design documentation was correct and
      that work packages provided the proper tests to ensure the Variable Frequency Drives (VFD)
      / Recirculation pump trip logic. [H.7]. (Section 1R19)
Cornerstone: Mitigating Systems
  * SL IV. An NRC identified Non-Cited Violation (NCV) of Title 10 of the Code of Federal
      Regulations (CFR) 50.72(b)(3)(v) and 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v) was identified for the licensee's
      failure to notify the NRC within 8 hours and submit an LER within 60 days of discovery of a
      condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function. Specifically, the
      licensee failed to notify the NRC that the High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) system had
      been rendered inoperable due to an equipment failure. As an immediate corrective action,
      the licensee entered the violation into the licensee's corrective action program as CR
      1185268.
      The licensees failure to provide the required notification constitutes a traditional enforcement
      violation because it impacts the NRC's ability to carry out its regulatory function. The
      traditional enforcement violation was determined to be Severity Level IV because it matched
 
                                              4
    example 6.9.d.9 of the NRC Enforcement Policy. Because the violation is a traditional
    enforcement violation, no cross-cutting aspect was assigned. (Section 4OA2)
Cornerstone: Emergency Preparedness
  * Green. The inspectors identified an NCV of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations
    (CFR) Part 50.54(q)(2), for the licensees failure to declare a Notification of Unusual Event
    (NOUE) within 15 minutes of entry conditions being met. Specifically, on April 6, 2016, at
    3:05 pm, Browns Ferry Unit 3 main control room (MCR) operators received a high-high
    radiation alarm on the main steam lines (MSL) that met Emergency Action Level (EAL) 1.4-U
    for declaring a NOUE. The licensee initiated CR 1159943 to address the issue.
    This performance deficiency was more than minor because it was associated with the
    Emergency Preparedness cornerstone attribute of Emergency Response Organization
    Performance, and adversely affected the cornerstone objective of ensuring that a licensee is
    capable of implementing adequate measures to protect the health and safety of the public in
    the event of a radiological emergency. Specifically, on April 6, 2016, personnel did not
    declare a NOUE within 15 minutes of initial indications that EAL 1.4-U had been exceeded.
    The performance deficiency is associated with the Emergency Classification Planning
    Standard, and is considered a Risk Significant Planning Standard (RSPS). The failure to
    declare a NOUE when directed by the EAL Matrix is considered a lost or degraded RSPS in
    accordance with Section 4 of Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 0609, Appendix B. Section
    4.3.e of IMC 0609, Appendix B, provides the significance determination for a Failure to
    Implement, and the performance deficiency was determined to be of very low safety
    significance (Green). The finding was associated with a cross-cutting aspect in the
    Procedure Adherence component of the Human Performance area because individuals did
    not follow processes, procedures and work instructions that would have led them to declare
    in a timely manner [H.8]. (Section 1EP5)
B.  Licensee-Identified Violations
    No findings were identified.
 
                                        REPORT DETAILS
Summary of Plant Status:
Unit 1 operated at or near 100 percent rated thermal power (RTP) for the entire inspection
period except for a planned downpower to 65 percent on May 12, 2016 for main steam isolation
valve (MSIV) testing and rod pattern adjustment.
Unit 2 operated at or near 100 percent RTP for the entire inspection period.
Unit 3 operated at or near 100 percent RTP except for a planned downpower to 60 percent for
MSIV testing and rod sequence exchange on June 4, 2016.
1.      REACTOR SAFETY
        Cornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, and Barrier Integrity
1R01 Adverse Weather Protection (71111.01)
  .1    Readiness for Seasonal Extreme Weather Conditions:
    a. Inspection Scope
        After the licensee completed preparations for seasonal high temperatures, the
        inspectors walked down the Unit 3 shutdown board room chiller systems. These
        systems were selected because their safety related functions could be affected by
        adverse weather. The inspectors reviewed documents listed in the Attachment,
        observed plant conditions, and evaluated those conditions using criteria documented in
        Procedure NPG-SPP-7.1.7, Station Seasonal Readiness and 0-GOI-200-3, Hot Weather
        Operations. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment. This activity constituted
        one inspection sample sample as defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.01.
    b. Findings
        No findings were identified.
  .2    Summer Readiness of Offsite and Alternate AC Power Systems:
    a. Inspection Scope
        The inspectors performed the annual review of the licensees readiness of offsite and
        alternate alternating current (AC) power systems prior to the onset of the high grid
        loading season. The inspectors reviewed procedures affecting these areas and the
        communications protocols between the transmission system operator and the licensee
        to verify that appropriate information is exchanged when issues arise that could impact
        the offsite power system. The inspectors reviewed the generic industry issue for
        switchyard Open Phase Circuits, performed thermal monitoring checks of the offsite
        power supply systems, reviewed draft design changes for the open phase issue, and
        interviewed appropriate plant personnel to assess deficiencies and plant readiness for
        summer high grid loading. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment. The
 
                                            6
      inspectors completed one Summer Readiness of Offsite and Alternate AC Power
      Systems sample as defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.01.
  b. Findings
      No findings were identified.
1R04 Equipment Alignment (71111.04)
      Partial System Walkdown
  a. Inspection Scope
      The inspectors performed partial walkdowns of the following three systems to verify the
      operability of redundant or diverse trains and components when safety equipment was
      inoperable. The inspectors focused on identification of discrepancies that could impact
      the function of the system and, therefore, potentially increase risk. The inspectors
      reviewed applicable operating procedures, walked down control system components,
      and determined whether selected breakers, valves, and support equipment were in the
      correct position to support system operation. The inspectors also verified that the
      licensee had properly identified and resolved equipment alignment problems that could
      cause initiating events or impact the capability of mitigating systems or barriers and
      entered them into the corrective action program (CAP). Documents reviewed are listed
      in the Attachment. The inspectors completed three Equipment Alignment Partial
      Walkdown samples as defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.04.
      *    Unit and shutdown boards with a focus on general design criteria (GDC) 17 and auto
          transfer functions
      *    Unit 2 Core Spray system
      *    Unit 2 Reactor Water Cleanup system
  b. Findings
      No findings were identified.
1R05 Fire Protection (71111.05)
.1  Fire Protection Tours
  a. Inspection Scope
      The inspectors reviewed licensee procedures for transient combustibles and fire
      protection impairments, and conducted a walkdown of the fire areas (FA) and fire zones
      (FZ) listed below. Selected FAs/FZs were examined in order to verify licensee control of
      transient combustibles and ignition sources; the material condition of fire protection
      equipment and fire barriers; and operational lineup and operational condition of fire
      protection features or measures. The inspectors verified that selected fire protection
      impairments were identified and controlled in accordance with procedures. The
      inspectors reviewed applicable portions of the Fire Protection Report, Volumes 1 and 2,
      including the applicable Fire Hazards Analysis, and Pre-Fire Plan drawings, to verify that
      the necessary firefighting equipment, such as fire extinguishers, hose stations, ladders,
 
                                            7
      and communications equipment, was in place. Documents reviewed are listed in the
      attachment. This activity constituted five Fire Protection Walkdown inspection samples,
      as defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.05.
      * Fire Zone 1-6, Unit 1 Reactor Building, Elevation 639 south of column line R
      * Fire Zone 25-2, Residual Heat Removal Service Water (RHRSW) pump room A
      * Fire Zone 25-3, Residual Heat Removal Service Water (RHRSW) pump room C
      * Fire Zone 2-6, Unit 2 Reactor Building, Elevation 639 south of column line R
      * Fire Zone 3-4, Unit 3 Reactor Building, Elevation 621 and 639 north of column R
  b. Findings
      No findings were identified.
.2    Annual Drill Observations
  a. Inspection Scope
      On May 05,2016, the inspectors observed an unannounced fire drill in the Unit common
      Control building, 593 elevation in the Communications Board room. The inspectors
      assessed fire alarm effectiveness; response time for notifying and assembling the fire
      brigade; the selection, placement, and use of firefighting equipment; use of personnel
      fire protective clothing and equipment (e.g., turnout gear, self-contained breathing
      apparatus); communications; incident command and control; teamwork; and firefighting
      strategies. The inspectors also attended the post-drill critique to assess the licensees
      ability to review fire brigade performance and identify areas for improvement. Following
      the critique, the inspectors compared their findings with the licensees observations and
      to the requirements specified in the licensees Fire Protection report. This activity
      constituted one Annual Drill Observation inspection sample as defined in Inspection
      Procedure 71111.05.
  b. Findings
      No findings were identified.
1R06 Flood Protection Measures (71111.06)
.1    Internal Flooding
    a. Inspection Scope
      The inspectors reviewed two internal flood protection measures samples for the Unit 2
      Reactor Water Cleanup rooms and the Diesel Generator Building internal flood design to
      verify that flood mitigation plans were consistent with the design requirements and risk
      analysis assumptions and that equipment essential for reactor shutdown was properly
      protected from a flood caused by pipe breaks in the rooms/building. Specifically, the
      inspectors reviewed the licensees moderate energy line break flooding study to fully
      understand the licensees flood mitigation strategy, reviewed licensee drawings and then
      verified that the assumptions and results remained valid. The inspectors walked down
      the areas to verify the assumed flooding sources, adequacy of common area drainage,
      and flood detection instrumentation to ensure that a flooding event would not impact
 
                                              8
      reactor shutdown capabilities. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment. The
      inspectors completed two Internal Flooding samples as defined in Inspection Procedure
      71111.06.
  b. Findings
      No findings were identified.
1R11 Licensed Operator Requalification and Performance (71111.11)
.1  Licensed Operator Requalification
  a. Inspection Scope
      On April 12, 2016, the inspectors observed a licensed operator training session for an
      operating crew according to the Unit 2 Simulator Exercise Guide (SEG) OPL173S414,
      Fire Safe Shutdown Procedures, Revision 1 and SEG OPL 173S060 Security Event
      Response and Control Room Abandonment, Rev 16.
      The inspectors specifically evaluated the following attributes related to the operating
      crews performance:
      *    Clarity and formality of communication
      *    Ability to take timely action to safely control the unit
      *    Prioritization, interpretation, and verification of alarms
      *    Correct use and implementation of procedures including Abnormal Operating
          Instructions, Emergency Operating Instructions and Safe Shutdown Instructions
      *    Timely control board operation and manipulation, including high-risk operator actions
      *    Timely oversight and direction provided by the shift supervisor, including ability to
          identify and implement appropriate technical specifications actions such as reporting
          and emergency plan actions and notifications
      *    Group dynamics involved in crew performance
      The inspectors assessed the licensees ability to assess the performance of their
      licensed operators. The inspectors reviewed the post-examination critique performed by
      the licensee evaluators, and verified that licensee-identified issues were comparable to
      issues identified by the inspector. The inspectors reviewed simulator physical fidelity
      (i.e., the degree of similarity between the simulator and the reference plant control room,
      such as physical location of panels, equipment, instruments, controls, labels, and related
      form and function). Documents reviewed are listed in the attachment. This activity
      constituted one Observation of Requalification Activity inspection sample as defined in
      Inspection Procedure 71111.11.
  b. Findings
      No findings were identified.
 
                                              9
.2  Control Room Observations
  a. Inspection Scope
      Inspectors observed and assessed licensed operator performance in the plant and main
      control room, particularly during periods of heightened activity or risk and where the
      activities could affect plant safety. Inspectors reviewed various licensee policies and
      procedures covering Conduct of Operations, Plant Operations and Power Maneuvering.
      Inspectors utilized activities such as post maintenance testing, surveillance testing and
      other activities to focus on the following conduct of operations as appropriate;
      *    Operator compliance and use of procedures.
      *    Control board manipulations.
      *    Communication between crew members.
      *    Use and interpretation of plant instruments, indications and alarms.
      *    Use of human error prevention techniques.
      *    Documentation of activities, including initials and sign-offs in procedures.
      *    Supervision of activities, including risk and reactivity management.
      *    Pre-job briefs.
      This activity constituted one Control Room Observation inspection sample as defined in
      Inspection Procedure 71111.11.
  b. Findings
      No findings were identified.
1R12 Maintenance Effectiveness (71111.12)
.1  Routine
  a. Inspection Scope
      The inspectors reviewed the specific structures, systems and components (SSC) within
      the scope of the Maintenance Rule (MR) (10CFR50.65) with regard to some or all of the
      following attributes, as applicable: (1) Appropriate work practices; (2) Identifying and
      addressing common cause failures; (3) Scoping in accordance with 10 CFR 50.65(b) of
      the MR; (4) Characterizing reliability issues for performance monitoring; (5) Tracking
      unavailability for performance monitoring; (6) Balancing reliability and unavailability; (7)
      Trending key parameters for condition monitoring; (8) System classification and
      reclassification in accordance with 10 CFR 50.65(a)(1) or (a)(2); (9) Appropriateness of
      performance criteria in accordance with 10 CFR 50.65(a)(2); and (10) Appropriateness
      and adequacy of 10 CFR 50.65 (a)(1) goals, monitoring and corrective actions. The
      inspectors compared the licensees performance against site procedures. The
      inspectors reviewed, as applicable, work orders, surveillance records, problem
      evaluation reports (PERs), system health reports, engineering evaluations, and MR
      expert panel minutes; and attended MR expert panel meetings to verify that regulatory
      and procedural requirements were met. Documents reviewed are listed in the
 
                                            10
      attachment. This activity constituted four Maintenance Effectiveness inspection samples
      as defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.12.
      *  Maintenance Rule evaluation of Unit 3 Anticipated Transient Witout SCRAM (ATWS)
          / Alternate Rod Insertion (ARI) trips and reliability improvement plan
      *  Maintenance Rule accounting of Unit 3 Recirculation pump start failures on 3-20-16
          due to improper discharge valve LS-3 setting.
      *  Component Class GE CR 105 Contactors
      *  Unit 3 Core Spray System and Room Coolers
  b. Findings
      No findings were identified.
1R13 Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Evaluation (71111.13)
  a. Inspection Scope
      For planned online work and/or emergent work that affected the combinations of risk
      significant systems listed below, the inspectors examined on-line maintenance risk
      assessments, and actions taken to plan and/or control work activities to effectively
      manage and minimize risk. The inspectors verified that risk assessments and applicable
      risk management actions (RMA) were conducted as required by 10 CFR 50.65(a)(4)
      applicable plant procedures. As applicable, the inspectors verified the actual in-plant
      configurations to ensure accuracy of the licensees risk assessments and adequacy of
      RMA implementations. Documents reviewed are listed in the attachment. This activity
      constituted six Maintenance Risk Assessment inspection samples as defined in
      Inspection Procedure 71111.13.
      *  Unit 3 Automatic Depressurization System valve 3-PCV-1-22 out of service
      *  Tornado Watch on April 1, 2016
      *  Shutdown Bus 2 on alternate feed and B emergency desiel generator (EDG) out of
          service. April 25-29, 2016
      *  Unit 3 Yellow Risk due to residual heat removal (RHR) Loop II out of service
      *  Units 1 and 2 Yellow risk due to D1 residual heat removal service water (RHRSW)
          pump out of service, 1 of 2 battery chargers out of service for 'C' DG, Shutdown Bus
          2 on alternate feed, and non-functional 3EC / C desiel generator (DG) crosstie
          capability
      *  Unit 3 Yellow Risk due to Main Bank 3 battery out of service
  b. Findings
      No findings were identified.
1R15 Operability Determinations and Functionality Assessment (71111.15)
  a. Inspection Scope
      The inspectors reviewed the operability/functional evaluations listed below to verify
      technical adequacy and ensure that the licensee had adequately assessed technical
 
                                            11
      specification (TS) operability. The inspectors reviewed applicable sections of the
      Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) to verify that the system or component
      remained available to perform its intended function. In addition, where appropriate, the
      inspectors reviewed licensee procedures to ensure that the licensees evaluation met
      procedure requirements. Where applicable, inspectors examined the implementation of
      compensatory measures to verify that they achieved the intended purpose and that the
      measures were adequately controlled. The inspectors reviewed PERs on a daily basis
      to verify that the licensee was identifying and correcting any deficiencies associated with
      operability evaluations. Documents reviewed are listed in the attachment. This activity
      constituted six Operability Evaluation inspection samples as defined in Inspection
      Procedure 71111.15.
      *  High Pressure Fire Protection System break discrepant minimum wall thickness
          calculations (CR 1178002)
      *  Automatic bus transfer of Unit Board 1B to Start Bus 1B was not blocked while
          Shutdown Bus 2 was supplied by Unit Board 1B (CR 1165168)
      *  Lower than expected RHRSW Flow to 1B RHR Heat Exchanger (CR 1162713)
      *  RHR Heat Exchanger 3B RHRSW Outlet Valve failed to open (CR 1154210)
      *  Loss of voltage regulator supplying Unit Station Service Transformer 3B Load Tap
          Changer (CR 1163822)
      *  Unit 3 Jet Pump number 12 flow indication elevated and outside of surveillance 3-
          3.4.2.1 curve (CR 1182784)
  b. Findings
      No findings were identified.
1R18 Plant Modifications (71111.18)
      Permanent Plant Modifications
  a. Inspection Scope
      The inspectors verified that the plant modification listed below did not affect the safety
      functions of important safety systems. The inspectors confirmed the modifications did
      not degrade the design bases, licensing bases, and performance capability of risk
      significant structures, systems and components. The inspectors also verified
      modifications performed during plant configurations involving increased risk did not place
      the plant in an unsafe condition. Additionally, the inspectors evaluated whether system
      operability and availability, configuration control, post-installation test activities, and
      changes to documents, such as drawings, procedures, and operator training materials,
      complied with licensee standards and NRC requirements. In addition, the inspectors
      reviewed a sample of related corrective action documents to verify the licensee was
      identifying and correcting any deficiencies associated with modifications. Documents
      reviewed are listed in the attachment. This activity constituted one Plant Modification
      sample as defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.18.
      *  DCN 66071, 4kV and 480V Load Restrictions
 
                                            12
  b. Findings
      No findings were identified.
1R19 Post Maintenance Testing (71111.19)
  a. Inspection Scope
      The inspectors witnessed and reviewed post-maintenance tests (PMT) listed below to
      verify that procedures and test activities confirmed SSC operability and functional
      capability following the described maintenance. The inspectors reviewed the licensees
      completed test procedures to ensure any of the SSC safety function(s) that may have
      been affected were adequately tested, that the acceptance criteria were consistent with
      information in the applicable licensing basis and/or design basis documents. The
      inspectors witnessed and/or reviewed the test data, to verify that test results adequately
      demonstrated restoration of the affected safety function(s). The inspectors verified that
      problems associated with PMTs were identified and entered into the CAP. Documents
      reviewed are listed in the attachment. This activity constituted two Post Maintenance
      Test inspection samples samples as defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.19.
          *    Unit 3 Recirculation Pump start failures CR 1151665
          *    Post maintenance test of the D EDG; WO117886451
  b. Findings
      Introduction. A self-revealing Green finding was identified for the licensees failure to
      provide adequate work instructions for performing maintenance on the discharge
      valves for 3A and 3B Recirculation Pump motors.
      Description. On March 20, 2016 the licensee replaced the Unit 3, A and B, recirculation
      pump discharge valve motors. The work instructions referenced drawing 3-47A370-68-
      10 to set the valve limit switches in conjunction with the motor replacement.
      On March 20, 2016 the licensee commenced the hydrostatic test of the RCS. System
      temperature was approximately 157 degrees. Time to reactor core boiling was just over
      2 hours. Shutdown cooling was operating on the opposite train. Two attempts were
      made to start the 3B Recirculation pump to support the test. Each time the pump tripped
      without an obvious indication or cause.
      At 1:00 a.m. on March 21, 2016, the operators secured Loop II of shutdown cooling to
      allow use of the 3A recirculation pump to perform the hydostatic testing. Unit 3 entered
      TS 3.4.8.B, RHR Shutdown Cooling System - Cold Shutdown, for not having any
      shutdown cooling in service. The licensees intention was to perform the testing and
      restore RCS core flow within the one hour TS allowed outage time. At 1:10 a.m. the 3A
      Recirculation pump was started and then immediately tripped. Loop II of shutdown
      cooling was restored at 1:19 a.m.
      For a total of 19 minutes the Unit 3 reactor had no operating core flow. RCS
      temperature did not increase significantly and did not result in a mode change due to the
      relatively low decay heat and quick response by the operators.
 
                                      13
The licensee discovered drawing 3-47A370-68-10 had erroneous information for setting
the valve limit switches. This resulted in a time delay trip signal being generated to trip
the associated Recirculation pump Variable Frequency Drive (VFD) upon pump start and
discharge valve opening. Following discovery that the drawing 3-47A370-68-10 error
had resulted in an incorrect limit switch setting, a work order was created and performed
to set the limit switches to the proper settings. This restored the pump start design
features.
Station Procedure NPG-SPP-06.3 covered PMT requirements. Steps 3.2.2.3 and
3.2.3.A.1 required that plant operability requirements be considered in determining a
required PMT. Also the procedure cautioned that a Surveillance Instruction may not be
sufficient and that a supplemental PMT may be required in order to test all components
or features affected by the activity. Procedure NPG - SPP 06.9.3, Post Modification
Testing step 2.0.D stated that modification tests must cover other functions and
operations of the systems to ensure that they have not been affected by the repair.
Following completion of the maintenance, no supplemental post maintenance testing
beyond the normal valve stroke surveillances was performed. The normal valve stroke
surveillances did not verify that the limit switch settings would permit recirculation pump
starts and operation.
Analysis. The failure to provide adequate work instructions for maintenance on the Unit
3 recirculation pump discharge valve motors which included appropriate testing as
described in Procedure NPG - SPP 06.9.3 Post Modification Testing, was a
performance deficiency. The performance deficiency was more than minor because it
affected the equipment performance attribute of the Initiating Events Cornerstone and
adversely affected the cornerstone objective to limit the likelihood of events that upset
plant stability and challenge critical safety functions during shutdown operations.
Specifically, two trains of equipment which provide for maintaining flow through the
core during shutdown operations were unintentionally rendered inoperable. The
inspector performed the initial significance determination using NRC Inspection Manual
Chapter 0609, Appendix G, Attachment 3, Shutdown Operations Significance
Determination Process Phase 1 Initial Screening and Characterization of Findings.
The inspectors determined, per Attachment 3, that the finding was of very low safety
significance because (1) RCS time to boil was longer than 2 hours and potential to
reach RHR shutoff head was greater than 10 hours; (2) two diverse trains of RHR
Shutdown cooling, low pressure Core Spray and Control Rod drive pumps were all
available; (3) full credit was given for operator actions as they were actually
demonstrated and all support equipment was available; and (4) containment venting
was always available as the drywell hatch was open for the testing. The licensee
initiated CRs 1151665 and 1151935 to address the inadequate post maintenance work
instructions that resulted in the unexpected trip of the 3A and 3B Recirculation pumps.
This finding had a human performance cross-cutting aspect because the licensee did
not ensure that design documentation was correct and that work packages provided
the proper tests to ensure a functional VFD / Recirculation pump trip logic. [H.7,
Documentation].
Enforcement: This finding does not involve enforcement action because no violation of a
regulatory requirement was identified. Because this finding does not involve a violation
and is of very low safety significance, it is identified as a FIN (FIN 05000296/2016002-
01, Failure to Provide Adequate Maintenance Work Instructions Results in Loss of Core
Flow While Shutdown)
 
                                            14
1R22 Surveillance Testing (71111.22)
  a. Inspection Scope
      The inspectors witnessed portions of, and/or reviewed completed test data for the
      following surveillance tests of risk-significant and/or safety-related systems to verify that
      the tests met technical specification surveillance requirements, UFSAR commitments,
      and in-service testing and licensee procedure requirements. The inspectors review
      confirmed whether the testing effectively demonstrated that the SSCs were operationally
      capable of performing their intended safety functions and fulfilled the intent of the
      associated surveillance requirement. Documents reviewed are listed in the attachment.
      This activity constituted six Surveillance Testing inspection samples: four routine test,
      and two in-service tests as defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.22.
      Routine Surveillance Tests:
      * 3-SI-4.4.A.1, Unit 3 Standby Liquid Control Pump Functional Test
      * Inspection of normally inaccessible 1C RHR heat exchanger service water side for
          fouling per licensee procedure NPG-SPP-09.14
      * 2-SR-3.5.1.6(CS II), Unit 2 Core Spray Flow Rate Loop II
      * 3-SR-3.8.1.7(3C), Diesel Generator 3C 24 Hour Run
      In-service Tests:
      * 1-SR-3.5.3.3, Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) System Rated Flow at Normal
          Operating Pressure
      * 0-SI-4.5.C.1(D SMP), RHRSW Room D Sump Pump Test
  b. Findings
      No findings were identified.
Cornerstone: Emergency Preparedness (EP)
1EP2 Alert and Notification System Evaluation
  a. Inspection Scope
      The inspectors evaluated the adequacy of the licensees methods for testing and
      maintaining the alert and notification system in accordance with NRC Inspection
      Procedure 71114, Attachment 02, Alert and Notification System Evaluation. The
      applicable planning standard, 10 CFR Part 50.47(b)(5), and its related 10 CFR Part 50,
      Appendix E requirements were used as reference criteria. The criteria contained in
      NUREG-0654, Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency
      Response Plans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power Plants, Revision 1,
      were also used as a reference.
      The inspectors reviewed various documents which are listed in the Attachment and
      interviewed personnel responsible for system performance, siren maintenance, and
      siren testing. This inspection activity satisfied one inspection sample for the alert and
      notification system on a biennial basis as defined in Inspection Procedure 71114.02.
 
                                            15
  b. Findings
      No findings were identified.
1EP3 Emergency Response Organization Staffing and Augmentation System
  a. Inspection Scope
      The inspectors reviewed the licensees Emergency Response Organization (ERO)
      augmentation staffing requirements and process for notifying the ERO to ensure the
      readiness of key staff for responding to an event and timely facility activation. The
      qualification records of key position ERO personnel were reviewed to ensure all ERO
      qualifications were current. A sample of problems identified from augmentation drills or
      system tests performed since the last inspection was reviewed to assess the
      effectiveness of corrective actions.
      The inspection was conducted in accordance with NRC Inspection Procedure 71114,
      Attachment 03, Emergency Response Organization Staffing and Augmentation System.
      The applicable planning standard, 10 CFR 50.47(b)(2), and its related 10 CFR 50,
      Appendix E requirements were used as reference criteria.
      The inspectors reviewed various documents which are listed in the Attachment. This
      inspection activity satisfied one inspection sample for the ERO staffing and
      augmentation system on a biennial basis as defined in Inspection Procedure 71114.03.
  b. Findings
      No findings were identified.
1EP4 Emergency Action Level and Emergency Plan Changes
  a. Inspection Scope
      Since the last NRC inspection of this program area, two changes were made to the
      Radiological Emergency Plan and one change was made to the Emergency Action
      Levels, along with changes to several implementing procedures. The licensee
      determined that, in accordance with 10 CFR 50.54(q), the Plan continued to meet the
      requirements of 10 CFR 50.47(b) and Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50. The inspectors
      reviewed these changes to evaluate for potential reductions in the effectiveness of the
      Plan. However, this review was not documented in a Safety Evaluation Report and does
      not constitute formal NRC approval of the changes. Therefore, these changes remain
      subject to future NRC inspection in their entirety.
      The inspection was conducted in accordance with NRC Inspection Procedure 71114,
      Attachment 04, Emergency Action Level and Emergency Plan Changes. The applicable
      planning standards of 10 CFR 50.47(b), and its related requirements in 10 CFR 50,
      Appendix E were used as reference criteria.
      The inspectors reviewed various documents that are listed in the Attachment to this
      report. This inspection activity satisfied one inspection sample for the emergency action
 
                                            16
      level and emergency plan changes on an annual basis as defined in Inspection
      Procedure 71114.04.
  b. Findings
      No findings were identified.
1EP5 Maintenance of Emergency Preparedness
  a. Inspection Scope
      The inspectors reviewed the corrective actions identified through the Emergency
      Preparedness program to determine the significance of the issues, the completeness
      and effectiveness of corrective actions, and to determine if issues were recurring. The
      licensees post-event after action reports, self-assessments, and audits were reviewed to
      assess the licensees ability to be self-critical, thus avoiding complacency and
      degradation of their emergency preparedness program. Inspectors reviewed the
      licensees 10 CFR 50.54(q) change process, personnel training, and selected
      screenings and evaluations to assess adequacy. The inspectors toured facilities and
      reviewed equipment and facility maintenance records to assess licensees adequacy in
      maintaining them. The inspectors evaluated the capabilities of selected radiation
      monitoring instrumentation to adequately support Emergency Action Level (EAL)
      declarations.
      The inspection was conducted in accordance with NRC Inspection Procedure 71114,
      Attachment 05, Maintenance of Emergency Preparedness. The applicable planning
      standards, related 10 CFR 50, Appendix E requirements, and 10 CFR 50.54(q) and (t)
      were used as reference criteria.
      The inspectors reviewed various documents which are listed in the Attachment. This
      inspection activity satisfied one inspection sample for the maintenance of emergency
      preparedness on a biennial basis as defined in Inspection Procedure 71114.05.
  b. Findings
      Introduction: The inspectors identified a Green non-cited violation (NCV) of 10 CFR
      50.54(q)(2), for the licensees failure to declare a Notification of Unusual Event (NOUE)
      within 15 minutes of entry conditions being met. Specifically, on April 6, 2016, at 3:05
      pm, Browns Ferry Unit 3 main control room (MCR) operators received a high-high
      radiation alarm on the main steam lines (MSL) that met Emergency Action Level (EAL)
      1.4-U for declaring a NOUE.
      Description: At 3:05 pm on April 6, 2016, the Browns Ferry Unit 3 MCR received a high-
      high alarm on MSL Radiation Monitor 3-RA-90-135C. At 3:26 pm, the MCR operators
      reduced power to 91% in accordance with (IAW) their annunciator response procedure.
      The power reduction reduced the radiation levels from above 1700 mR/hr to
      approximately 1200 mR/hr, which cleared the alarm. The licensee subsequently
      investigated the cause of the MSL high radiation alarm and determined that it was
      attributed to an oil leak from the 3B reactor feed pump that made its way into the pumps
      seal water lines. The licensee also determined that the oil coated the condensate
 
                                      17
demineralizers which caused a chemical reaction that resulted in the production of
elevated levels of radioactive isotopes Nitrogen-13 and Nitrogen-16.
The annunciator response procedure lists the alarm for the MSL high-high as 3-times
(3X) background, but there was not an efficient mechanism for the control room staff to
verify the set-point and confirm the alarm conditions. The licensees Emergency Plan
Implementing Procedure (EPIP)-1, Emergency Classification Procedure Event
Classification Matrix, Section 3.1 [3] states, in part: if alarms are indeterminate and
the existence cannot be reasonably discounted, the condition is considered authentic
and the Shift Emergency Director (SED) should follow the indications provided.
Contrary to the above, since the initial indications were met at 3:05 pm, the SED should
have declared the NOUE prior to 3:20 pm. It was not until the senior resident inspector
challenged the operators that the licensee decided to investigate further and concluded,
several days after the event, that the operators indeed should have declared a NOUE.
Analysis: The failure to declare a NOUE when an EAL entry criteria had been met as
described in Emergency Plan Implementing Procedure (EPIP)-1, was considered a
performance deficiency. This finding is more than minor because it was associated with
the Emergency Preparedness cornerstone attribute of Emergency Response
Organization Performance, and adversely affected the cornerstone objective of ensuring
that a licensee is capable of implementing adequate measures to protect the health and
safety of the public in the event of a radiological emergency. Specifically, on April 6,
2016, personnel did not declare a NOUE within 15 minutes of initial indications that EAL
1.4-U had been exceeded. The performance deficiency is associated with the
Emergency Classification Planning Standard and is considered a Risk Significant
Planning Standard (RSPS). The failure to declare a NOUE when directed by the EAL
Matrix is considered a lost or degraded RSPS in accordance with Section 4 of Inspection
Manual Chapter (IMC) 0609, Appendix B. Section 4.3.e of IMC 0609, Appendix B,
provides the significance determination for a Failure to Implement, and the
performance deficiency was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green).
The finding was associated with a cross-cutting aspect in the Procedure Adherence
component of the Human Performance area because individuals did not follow
processes, procedures and work instructions that would have led them to declare in a
timely manner [H.8].
Enforcement: Title 10 CFR 50.54(q)(2) requires that a holder of a nuclear power reactor
operating license under this part, shall follow and maintain the effectiveness of an
emergency plan that meets the requirements of 10 CFR 50.47(b). Title 10 CFR
50.47(b)(4) requires a standard emergency classification and action level scheme, the
bases of which include facility system and effluent parameters, is in use by the nuclear
facility licensee, and state and local response plans call for reliance on information
provided by facility licensees for determinations of minimum initial offsite response
measures. Contrary to the above, on April 6, 2016, the licensee failed to implement an
emergency plan that met the standards in Title 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4) when they did not
declare a NOUE within 15 minutes as described by their EAL scheme. Specifically, the
licensee failed to declare a NOUE when conditions were met. Corrective actions
included entering the issue into their CAP as CR 1159943, formally evaluating the
decision-making process used during the event, and clarifying responsibilities for
Declaration, Classification and Notification. Because this violation was of very low safety
significance and was entered into the CAP, this violation is being treated as an NCV
 
                                            18
      consistent with Section 2.3.2.a of the NRC Enforcement Policy. (NCV
      05000296/2016002-02, Failure to Declare Notification of Unusual Event)
1EP6 Drill Evaluation (IP 71114.06)
  a. Inspection Scope
      The inspectors observed an Emergency Planning (EP) Radiological Emergency Plan
      (REP) training drill that contributed to the licensees Drill/Exercise Performance (DEP)
      and ERO performance indicator (PI) measures on May 11, 2016. This drill was intended
      to identify any licensee weaknesses and deficiencies in classification, notification, dose
      assessment and protective action recommendation (PAR) development activities. The
      inspectors observed emergency response operations in the Simulated Control Room
      and the Technical Support Center, to verify that event classification and notifications
      were done in accordance with EPIP-1, Emergency Classification Procedure, and
      licensee conformance with other applicable Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures.
      The inspectors attended the post-drill critiques to compare any inspector-observed
      weaknesses with those identified by the licensee in order to verify whether the licensee
      was properly identifying EP related issues and entering them in to the CAP, as
      appropriate. Documents reviewed are listed in the attachment. This activity constituted
      one Drill Evaluation sample as defined in Inspection Procedure 71114.06.
  b. Findings
      No findings were identified.
2.    RADIATION SAFETY
2RS6 Radioactive Gaseous and Liquid Effluent Treatment (IP 71124.06)
  a. Inspection Scope:
      Radioactive Effluent Processing Systems The inspectors walked-down selected
      components of the gaseous and liquid radioactive waste (radwaste) processing and
      effluent discharge systems. To the extent practical, the inspectors observed and
      evaluated the material condition of in-place waste processing equipment for indications
      of degradation or leakage that could constitute a possible release pathway to the
      environment. Inspected components included floor drain tanks, waste monitor tanks,
      radiation monitoring systems, and associated piping and valves. The inspectors
      interviewed licensee staff regarding equipment configuration and effluent monitor
      operation. The inspectors also walked down and reviewed surveillance test records for
      three trains of standby-gas treatment filters.
      Effluent Monitoring and Discharge The inspectors observed the collection and
      processing of gaseous effluent samples from the Main Stack system. Technician
      proficiency in collecting, processing, and preparing the applicable release permits was
      evaluated. The inspectors reviewed recent liquid and gaseous release permits including
      pre-release sampling results, effluent monitor alarm setpoints, and public dose
      calculations. For the Main Stack Wide-Range Noble Gas Monitor and the Unit 1 Plant
      Vent Exhaust Radiation Monitor, the inspectors reviewed calibration and functional test
      records and evaluated traceability of radioactive calibration sources to National Institute
 
                                            19
      of Standards and Technology (NIST) standards. The inspectors also evaluated the
      licensees capability to collect high-range post-accident effluent samples from these
      monitoring systems. The inspectors reviewed and discussed with licensee staff the
      methodology for determining vent and stack flow rates and compared current vent flows
      to design values in the Offsite Dose Calculation Manual (ODCM).
      The inspectors reviewed the 2014 and 2015 Annual Radioactive Effluent Release
      Reports to evaluate reported doses to the public, review any anomalous events, and
      review ODCM changes. The inspectors also reviewed compensatory sampling data for
      time periods when selected radiation monitors were out of service. The inspectors
      reviewed the results of interlaboratory cross-checks for laboratory instruments used to
      analyze effluent samples. The inspectors also reviewed licensee effluent source term
      characterizations and changes to effluent release points. In addition, the inspectors
      evaluated recent land use census results
      Problem Identification and Resolution The inspectors reviewed and discussed selected
      Corrective Action Program (CAP) documents associated with gaseous and liquid effluent
      processing and release activities. The inspectors evaluated the licensees ability to
      identify and resolve the issues. The inspectors also reviewed recent self-assessment
      results.
      Inspection Criteria Radwaste system operation and effluent processing activities were
      evaluated against requirements and guidance documented in the following: 10 CFR Part
      20; 10 CFR Part 50 Appendix I; Technical Specifications (TS) Section 5; ODCM;
      Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) Section 9; Regulatory Guide (RG) 1.21,
      Measuring, Evaluating, and Reporting Radioactivity in Solid Wastes and Releases of
      Radioactive Materials in Liquid and Gaseous Effluents from Light-Water-Cooled Nuclear
      Power Plants; RG 1.109, Calculation of Annual Doses to Man from Routine Releases
      of Reactor Effluents for the Purpose of Evaluating Compliance with 10 CFR Part 50
      Appendix I; and approved licensee procedures. Documents reviewed during the
      inspection are listed in the report Attachment.
      This inspectors completed the required six samples as defined in Inspection Procedure
      71124.06.
  b. Findings
      No findings were identified.
2RS7 Radiological Environmental Monitoring Program (REMP) (IP 71124.07)
  a. Inspection Scope
      REMP Implementation The inspectors reviewed the 2015 and 2014 Annual
      Environmental Operating Reports and the 2015 Annual Radioactive Effluent Release
      Report. Selected environmental measurements were reviewed for consistency with
      licensee effluent data, evaluated for radionuclide concentration trends, and compared
      with detection level sensitivity requirements as described in the ODCM. The inspectors
      assessed the licensees response to any missed or anomalous environmental samples.
      The inspectors also reviewed the results of interlaboratory cross-checks for laboratory
 
                                        20
  instruments used to analyze environmental samples. Any changes to the ODCM, Land
  Use Census, or environmental program processes were discussed with licensee staff.
  The inspectors observed routine collection of airborne particulate and iodine samples at
  selected locations as required by the licensees ODCM. The inspectors noted the
  material condition of the continuous air samplers and environmental dosimeters. The
  inspectors also reviewed calibration and maintenance records for the environmental
  sampling equipment.
  Meteorological Monitoring Program The inspectors observed the physical condition of
  the meteorological tower and its instrumentation and discussed equipment operability
  and maintenance history with licensee staff. The inspectors evaluated transmission of
  locally generated meteorological data to other licensee groups such as emergency
  operations personnel and main control room operators. Calibration records for the
  meteorological measurements of wind speed, wind direction, and temperature were
  reviewed. The inspectors also reviewed meteorological measurement data recovery for
  2014 and 2015.
  Ground Water Protection The inspectors reviewed the licensees continued
  implementation of the industrys Ground Water Protection Initiative (Nuclear Energy
  Institute (NEI) 07-07) and discussed any changes to the program. The inspectors
  discussed program guidance for dealing with spills, leaks, and unexpected discharges
  with licensee staff and reviewed recent monitoring well results and any voluntary
  communications. The inspectors also reviewed recent entries into the 10 CFR 50.75(g)
  decommissioning file. The inspectors reviewed and discussed the licensees program
  for monitoring of structures, systems, and components with the potential to release
  radioactive material to the environment. Potential effluent release points due to onsite
  surface water bodies were also evaluated.
  Problem Identification and Resolution The inspectors reviewed CAP documents in the
  areas of radiological environmental monitoring, meteorological tower maintenance, and
  groundwater protection. The inspectors evaluated the licensees ability to identify and
  resolve the issues. The inspectors also reviewed recent self-assessment results.
  Inspection Criteria The inspectors evaluated REMP implementation, meteorological
  monitoring, and groundwater protection against the requirements and guidance
  contained in: 10 CFR Part 20; Appendices E and I to 10 CFR Part 50; TS Section 5.0;
  ODCM; UFSAR Chapter 2; RG 4.15, Quality Assurance for Radiological Monitoring
  Programs (Normal Operation) - Effluent Streams and the Environment; Branch Technical
  Position, An Acceptable Radiological Environmental Monitoring Program - 1979; RG
  1.23, Meteorological Monitoring Programs for Nuclear Power Plants, Rev. 1; NEI 07-
  07, Industry Groundwater Protection Initiative - Final Guidance Document; and
  approved licensee procedures. Documents reviewed during the inspection are listed in
  the report Attachment.
  This inspectors completed the required three samples as defined in Inspection
  Procedure 71124.07.
b. Findings
  No findings were identified.
 
                                            21
4.    OTHER ACTIVITIES
4OA1 Performance Indicator (PI) Verification
  .1  Cornerstone: Mitigating Systems
    a. Inspection Scope
      The inspectors reviewed the licensees procedures and methods for compiling and
      reporting the following PIs. The inspectors examined the licensees PI data for the
      specific PIs listed below for the second quarter of 2015 through the first quarter of 2016.
      The inspectors reviewed the licensees data and graphical representations as reported
      to the NRC to verify that the data was correctly reported. The inspectors validated this
      data against relevant licensee records (e.g., CRs, Daily Operator Logs, Plan of the Day,
      Licensee Event Reports, etc.), and assessed any reported problems regarding
      implementation of the PI program. The inspectors verified that the PI data was
      appropriately captured, calculated correctly, and discrepancies resolved. The inspectors
      used the Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) 99-02, Regulatory Assessment Performance
      Indicator Guideline, to ensure that industry reporting guidelines were appropriately
      applied. This activity constituted six PI inspection samples, as defined in Inspection
      Procedure 71151.
      *    Unit 1, 2, and 3 Mitigating Systems Performance Index (MSPI) for High Pressure
            Injection System (HPCI)
      *    Unit 1, 2, and 3 MSPI for Heat Removal System (RCIC)
    b. Findings
      No findings were identified.
  .2  Cornerstone: Emergency Preparedness
    a. Inspection Scope
      The inspectors sampled licensee submittals relative to the PIs listed below for the period
      October 1, 2015, through March 31, 2016. To verify the accuracy of the PI data reported
      during that period, PI definitions and guidance contained in NEI 99-02, Regulatory
      Assessment Performance Indicator Guideline, Revision 7, was used to confirm the
      reporting basis for each data element.
      Emergency Preparedness Cornerstone
      *    Drill/Exercise Performance (DEP)
      *    Emergency Response Organization (ERO) Readiness
      *    Alert and Notification System (ANS) Reliability
      For the specified review period, the inspectors examined data reported to the NRC,
      procedural guidance for reporting PI information, and records used by the licensee to
      identify potential PI occurrences. The inspectors verified the accuracy of the PI for ERO
      drill and exercise performance through review of a sample of drill and event records.
 
                                            22
      The inspectors reviewed selected training records to verify the accuracy of the PI for
      ERO drill participation for personnel assigned to key positions in the ERO. The
      inspectors verified the accuracy of the PI for alert and notification system reliability
      through review of a sample of the licensees records of periodic system tests. The
      inspectors also interviewed the licensee personnel who were responsible for collecting
      and evaluating the PI data. Licensee procedures, records, and other documents
      reviewed within this inspection area are listed in the Attachment. This inspection
      satisfied three inspection samples for PI verification on an annual basis as defined in
      Inspection Procedure 71151.
  b. Findings
      No findings were identified.
.3  Cornerstone: Public Radiation Safety
  a. Inspection Scope
      The inspectors reviewed the Radiological Control Effluent Release Occurrences PI
      results for the Public Radiation Safety Cornerstone from May 2015 through May 2016.
      For the assessment period, the inspectors reviewed cumulative and projected doses to
      the public contained in liquid and gaseous release calculations and condition reports
      related to Radiological Effluent Technical Specifications/ODCM issues. Documents
      reviewed during the inspection are listed in the report Attachment. This inspection
      satisfied one inspection sample for PI verification as defined in Inspection Procedure
      71151.
  b. Findings
      No findings were identified.
4OA2 Problem Identification and Resolution of Problems (71152)
.1  Review of items entered into the Corrective Action Program:
  a. Inspection Scope
      As required by Inspection Procedure 71152, Identification and Resolution of Problems,
      and in order to help identify repetitive equipment failures or specific human performance
      issues for follow-up, the inspectors performed a daily screening of items entered into the
      licensees CAP. This review was accomplished by reviewing daily CR reports, and
      periodically attending Management Review Committee (MRC) and Plant Screening
      Committee (PSC) meetings.
  b. Findings
      No findings were identified.
.2  Focused Annual Sample Review #1 - Potential Part 21 condition for Masterpact circuit
      breakers failing to close:
 
                                            23
  a. Inspection Scope
      The inspectors conducted a review of the status of the licensees analysis for a potential
      Part 21 condition for Masterpact circuit breakers that have a continuous closed signal
      applied. In circuits with a continuous closed signal applied when the breaker is closed, a
      breaker anti-pump latch can become lodged against the close coil plunger. The purpose
      of the anti-pump latch is to protect the breaker from excessive rapid opening and closing
      from conflicting signals. With the anti-pump latch lodged in this fashion, the breaker may
      fail to close when required. The inspectors verified that the licensee was evaluating
      whether this potential Part 21 condition applied. Documents reviewed are listed in the
      attachment. This activity constituted one focused annual inspection sample as defined
      in IP 71152.
  b. Findings
      No findings were identified.
.3    Focused Annual Sample Review #2 - Control of contractor oversight for large projects
      and refueling outage work:
  a. Inspection Scope
      The inspectors conducted a review of the licensee program and guidance related to
      ensuring contractors work quality. Specifically, the inspectors reviewed the training,
      planning and qualification requirements for the NFPA 0805, Refueling activities, Dry
      Cask activities and MOV work activities. Guidance was contained in corporate
      procedure NPG-SPP-07.7, NPG CTS Role and Oversight of Supplemental Personnel.
      Documents reviewed are listed in the attachment. This activity constituted one focused
      annual inspection sample as defined in IP 71152.
  b. Findings
      No findings were identified.
.4    Semi-annual Trend Review
  a. Inspection Scope
      As required by Inspection Procedure 71152, the inspectors performed a review of the
      licensees CAP and other associated programs and documents to identify trends that
      could indicate the existence of a more significant safety issue. The inspectors review
      was focused on repetitive equipment issues, but also included licensee trending efforts
      and licensee human performance results. The inspectors review nominally considered
      the six-month period of January through June 2016. The inspectors reviewed licensee
      trend reports and the Integrated Trend Reports from December 1, 2015, to June 1, 2016,
      in order to determine the existence of any adverse trends that the licensee may not have
      previously identified. This inspection constituted one Semi-annual Trend Review
      inspection sample. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.
 
                                          24
b. Observations and Findings
  The licensee had identified trends and appropriately addressed them in their CAP.
  The inspectors observed that the licensee had performed a detailed review. The
  licensee routinely reviewed cause codes, involved organizations, key words, and
  system links to identify potential trends in their data. The inspectors compared the
  licensee process results with the results of the inspectors daily screening. Trends
  that have been identified by the inspectors and reported to the licensee were
  appropriately entered into the licensees trending program.
      Noteworthy Licensee identified trends included:
  * Increasing onsite Tritium trend (CR 1138969)
  * Trend in Radiation Protection posting errors (1162617)
  * Adverse Trend in Reactor Feed Pump failures (1167376)
      Noteworthy NRC identified degrading trends included:
  * Seasonal readiness preparations not ensuring all necessary equipment operating
      reliably for anticipated cold or hot weather
  * Adverse trend in Control room and Shutdown Board room chillers failures
  * Adverse trend in reporting component failures and events to the NRC
  One violation was identified:
  Failure to Report a Condition that Could Have Prevented Fulfillment of a Safety Function
  Introduction: An NRC identified Severity Level IV NCV of 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v) and 10
  CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v) was identified for the licensee's failure to notify the NRC within 8
  hours and submit a LER within 60 days of discovery of a condition that could have
  prevented the fulfillment of a safety function. Specifically, the licensee failed to notify the
  NRC that the High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) system had been rendered
  inoperable due to an equipment failure.
  Description: On March 17, 2016 the licensee conducted planned maintenance on the
  Unit 2 HPCI system to replace the valve packing material in the steam admission valve.
  The maintenance required the system to be depressurized and be taken out of service,
  which made the system inoperable. After the valve packing was installed, the licensee
  performed diagnostic testing of the motor operated valve on March 18, which required
  stroking of the valve. The diagnostic tests were completed satisfactorily and HPCI was
  returned to service on March 19 at 7:38 a.m. A final operability surveillance stroke time
  test per 2-SR-3.6.1.3.5(HPCI) was to be performed prior to declaring the system
  operable. When operators attempted to perform the surveillance at 10:24 a.m., the
  valve would not open. The inability of the valve to open would prevent steam from being
  admitted to the HPCI turbine, which would have rendered the system inoperable.
  Troubleshooting later revealed that the breaker thermal overloads had tripped and also
  that a breaker contactor in the valve closing circuit had become hot enough to fuse its
  contacts together, which prevented the valve from opening. The cause of the equipment
  failure was determined to be due to excessive valve stroking during the earlier diagnostic
  testing.
 
                                              25
        On March 22, 2015, the inspectors identified to the operations Shift Manager that the
        valve failure met the three conditions listed in section 3.2.7 of NUREG-1022 which
        described when an 8 hour and 60 day report per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v) and 10 CFR
        50.73(a)(2)(v) are required. Specifically, the inspectors identified that the discovery of
        the unexpected breaker failure was a condition that would have resulted in the single-
        train HPCI system being declared inoperable. On March 24, CR 1153334 was
        generated to evaluate the reportability of the condition; however, the licensees
        evaluation incorrectly determined that the condition was not reportable.
        Analysis: The inspectors determined the failure to notify the NRC within 8 hours and
        submit a LER within 60 days of discovery of a condition that could have prevented the
        fulfillment of a safety function, was a performance deficiency. Specifically, the licensee
        failed to notify the NRC that the HPCI system had been rendered inoperable due to an
        equipment failure. The licensees failure to provide the required notifications constitutes
        a traditional enforcement violation because it impacts the NRC's ability to carry out its
        regulatory function. The traditional enforcement violation was determined to be Severity
        Level IV because it matched example 6.9.d.9 of the NRC Enforcement Policy. Because
        the violation is a traditional enforcement violation, no cross-cutting aspect was assigned.
        Enforcement: 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v) and 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), require, in part, that
        licensees shall notify the NRC within 8 hours and submit a LER within 60 days of
        discovery of any event or condition that at the time of discovery could have prevented
        the fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systems that are needed to: (A) Shut
        down the reactor and maintain it in a safe shutdown condition; (B) Remove residual
        heat; (C) Control the release of radioactive material; or (D) Mitigate the consequences of
        an accident. Contrary to the above, the licensee failed to notify the NRC within 8 hours
        on March 19, 2016 and report by May 18, 2016 when they discovered the High Pressure
        Coolant Injection (HPCI) system had been rendered inoperable due to an equipment
        failure which met the reporting requirements of 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v) and 10 CFR
        50.73(a)(2)(v). As an immediate corrective action, the licensee entered the violation into
        the licensee's corrective action program as CR 1185268. This violation is being treated
        as an NCV consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy. (NCV
        05000260/2016002-03, Failure to Report a Condition that Could Have Prevented
        Fulfillment of a Safety Function)
4OA3 Follow-up of Events and Notices of Enforcement Discretion (71153)
  .1  (Closed) Licensee Event Report (LER) 05000260/2015-002-01 High Pressure Coolant
      Injection System Inoperable due to Manual Isolation of Steam Leak
    a. Inspection Scope
      The inspectors had previously inspected the September 16, 2015 manual isolation of the
      Unit 2 High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) system due to a leak on the steam
      admission valve. This inspection is documented in the Browns Ferry Inspection Report
      number 2016-01 (ML16134A224). This LER was a revision based on information
      provided to and inspected by the NRC based on updated licensee analysis of this
      incident. The inspectors reviewed this LER revision.
 
                                            26
  b. Findings
      The enforcement aspects of this event are discussed in Browns Ferry Inspection Report
      number 2016-01 (ML16134A224). No new violations were identified in this LER. This
      LER is closed.
.2  (Closed) LER 050000296/2016-001-00 Inoperable Residual Heat Removal Pump Results
      in Condition Prohibited by Technical Specifications and Safety System Functional Failure
  a. Inspection Scope
      On January 19, 2016 it was discovered that the 3A RHR pump motor breaker transfer
      switch (MBTS) had malfunctioned which prevented the pump from being capable of
      automatically initiating and also from being manually started from the main control room.
      This loss of capability rendered the pump inoperable. An evaluation determined that the
      pump was inoperable for approximately eleven days from January 9, 2016 until January
      20, 2016, which exceeded the TS Required Action times of TS LCO 3.5.1. The capability
      to start the pump manually from the local breaker was considered to be available during
      this timeframe. The cause of the MBTS failure was binding in the ball detent and position
      sprocket mechanism which prevented the switch from satisfactorily latching and making
      good electrical contact while in the NORMAL position. The switch had been installed
      greater than its twenty-one year service life and had no preventive maintenance
      performed because the vendor manual guidance cautioned against the use of any
      lubricants and/or cleaning agents in any form. During the time of the 3A RHR Pump
      MBTS failure, the 3B and 3D RHR pumps were also inoperable for 48 minutes on
      January 14, 2016, which resulted in a RHR Safety System Functional Failure.
  b. Findings
      No findings were identified. This LER is closed.
4OA5 Other Activities
.1    Operation of an Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation (ISFSI) (IP 60855.1)
  a. Inspection Scope
      The inspectors reviewed changes made to the ISFSI programs and procedures, including
      associated 10 CFR 72.48, Changes, Tests, and Experiments, screens and evaluations
      to verify that changes made were consistent with the license or certificate of compliance.
      The inspectors reviewed records to verify that the licensee recorded and maintained the
      location of each fuel assembly placed in the ISFSI. The inspectors verified, by direct
      observation that the licensee performed fuel cask loading in a safe manner and in
      compliance with approved procedures. Documents reviewed are listed in the attachment.
      This activity constituted one semi-annual Operation of an ISFSI inspection sample, as
      defined in Inspection Procedure 60855.1.
  b. Findings
      No findings were identified.
 
                                              27
.2    Failure to Meet the Deadline for Voluntary Reporting of Elevated Groundwater Tritium
a. Inspection Scope
    During performance of Inspection Procedure 71124.07, Radiological Environmental
    Monitoring Program (REMP), the inspectors noted that on April 26, 2016, the licensee
    had detected elevated tritium levels of 36,444 pCi/L in groundwater monitoring well MW-
    01. Per NEI 07-07, this result exceeded the voluntary reporting threshold of 20,000 pCi/L
    for groundwater that is or could be used as drinking water. This sample result should
    have triggered a voluntary report to State and Local officials by close-of-business on April
    27, 2016. However, no report was made until June 20, 2016 (Event Number: 52025),
    when groundwater well MW-08 also exceeded 20,000 pCi/L (22,400 pCi/L). This
    represents a deviation from the industrys Groundwater Protection Initiative as described
    by NEI 07-07, Objective 2.2, Voluntary Communication.
b. Findings
    No findings were identified.
.3    Follow-up On Alternative Dispute Resolution Confirmatory Orders (IP 92702)
  a. Inspection Scope
    The NRC staff performed this follow up inspection in accordance with IP 92702 for
    selected commitments in Confirmatory Order (ML14121A551) issued on May 1, 2014,
    following an alternate dispute resolution (ADR) session on April 3, 2014, to disposition
    two related traditional enforcement apparent violations; 1) Inaccurate Information
    Provided Concerning Onsite Emergency Response Organization Staffing Requirements
    and 2) Inappropriate Amendment of License.
    The inspection objectives were to verify the licensees implementation of commitments
    contained in the Order to provide assurance that (as appropriate):
      *    adequate corrective actions have been implemented for the traditional enforcement
          violations;
      *    the root causes of these enforcement actions have been identified;
      *    that generic implications have been addressed;
      *    that the licensee's programs and practices have been appropriately enhanced to
          prevent recurrence.
    The following commitments were reviewed and closed:
    *    b.i.6 TVA will implement, via an independent entity, an effectiveness review of the
                  corrective actions completed to date with regard to the 10 CFR 50.9 and 10
                  CFR 50.90 Root Cause Analyses.
    *    b.ii.4 TVA will perform a detailed review of all procedures revised prior to August 15,
                  2014, during the Procedure Upgrade Project to ensure that the licensing basis
                  information required by the revised SPP-01.1 and SPP-01.2 is identified. This
                  review will include all licensing, administrative and governance procedures.
 
                                        28
            The revised procedures will institutionalize the licensing review process and
            provide sustainability from that point forward in the Procedure Upgrade Project.
  *  b.ii.5 TVA will complete training of BFN Engineering, Licensing and licensed
            Operators regarding the scope and hierarchy of licensing basis documents,
            lessons learned from circumstances associated with EA-14-005, and the
            associated change process. The training material will be available for NRC
            review
  *  b.ii.6 Through December 31, 2014, changes to BFN licensing commitments will be
            reviewed and approved by a second site licensing engineer in addition to
            review and approval by site licensing. The focus of this additional review will be
            to ensure that the correct regulatory change process(es) has/have been used.
            This action will be discontinued upon completion of the training encompassed
            in item 5 above.
  *  b.ii.7 TVA will review a sample of facility changes, based on plant risk and
            complexity, that have occurred from 2004 to May 2014, to determine whether
            these changes have been appropriately incorporated into the licensing basis
            documents. TVAs method of selecting facility changes to be sampled will be
            provided to the NRC by July 15, 2014. Any identified discrepancies will be
            dispositioned through the corrective action process. The results of this review
            will be made available to the NRC.
  *  b.ii.8 TVA will review a sample of BFN facility changes, based on plant risk and
            complexity, accomplished within the last 3 years and processed outside of the
            10 CFR 50.59 process to determine whether these changes have been
            appropriately incorporated into the licensing basis documents. TVAs method of
            selecting facility changes to be sampled will be provided to the NRC by July 15,
            2014. Any identified discrepancies will be dispositioned through the corrective
            action process. The results of this review will be made available to the NRC.
  *  b.ii.9 TVA will make a presentation to the 1) Regulatory Issue Working Group and 2)
            the Regulating Utility Group regarding the circumstances of the violations
            discussed above and the importance of leadership attention to the effective
            management of the current licensing basis and complete and accurate
            communications with the NRC. The presentation will be made available to the
            NRC in advance.
      The inspectors reviewed the licensees RCAs associated with the violations in
      addition to other evaluations conducted in support of and as a result of the RCA.
      The inspectors reviewed corrective actions that were taken and implemented to
      address the identified causes. The inspectors verified that corrective actions
      planned and implemented were appropriate to address the causes and prevent
      recurrence and were consistent with the requirements of the Order.
b. Findings and Observations
  No findings were identified.
 
                                          29
4OA6 Meetings, Including Exit
.1    Exit Meeting Summary
      On July 15, 2016, the resident inspectors presented the quarterly inspection results to Mr.
      Kevin Bronson, Sr. Site Vice President, and other members of the licensees staff, who
      acknowledged the findings. The inspectors verified that all proprietary information was
      returned to the licensee.
ATTACHMENT: SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION
 
                              SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION
                                  KEY POINTS OF CONTACT
Licensee
S. Bono, Site Vice President
L. Hughes, General Plant Manager
J. Paul, Nuclear Site Licensing Manager
M. McAndrew, Manager of Operations
L. Slizewski, Superintendent of Operations
M. Kirschenheiter, Assistant Director for Site Engineering
B. L. McCoy, Spent Fuel Storage Program Manager
M. Oliver, Licensing Engineer
E. Bates, Licensing Engineer
D. Drummonds, Program Engineer
L. Crutcher, Component Engineer
M. Lawson, Radiation Protection Manager
J. Smith, System Engineer
P. Campbell, System Engineer
J. Kulisek, EP Manager
K. Skinner, System Engineer
L. Holland, System Engineer
D. Jackson, System Engineer
D. Ford, System Engineer
J. Addison, Manager of Drills and Exercises
M. Clark, Emergency Preparedness Specialist
J. Garner, Site Licensing
W. Lee, Corporate Emergency Preparedness Director
J. Parshall, EP Program Planning and Implementation Manager
T. Scott, Site Quality Assurance Manager
P. Summers, Plant Support Director
S. Taubuki, Emergency Preparedness Specialist
B. Tidwell, Emergency Preparedness Manager
C. Vaughn, Operations Training Manager
C. Hensley, Chemistry Manager
B. Calkin, Site Licensing
                                                            Attachment
 
                  LIST OF ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED AND DISCUSSED
Opened and Closed
05000296/2016002-01            FIN        Failure to Provide Adequate Maintenance
                                            Results in Loss of Core Flow While
                                            Shutdown (Section 1R19)
05000296/2016002-02            NCV        Failure to Declare Notification of Unusual
                                            Event (1EP5)
05000260/2016002-03            NCV        Failure to Report a Condition that Could
                                          Have Prevented Fulfillment of a Safety
                                          Function (Section 4OA2.4)
Closed
05000260/2015-002-01            LER        High Pressure Coolant Injection System
                                          Inoperable due to Manual Isolation of Steam
                                          Leak (Section 4OA3.1)
05000296/2016-001-00            LER        Inoperable Residual Heat Removal Pump
                                          Results in Condition Prohibited by Technical
                                          Specifications and Safety System
                                          Functional Failure (Section 4OA3.2)
05000259, 260, 296- 00          ORD        05/01/2014 Confirmatory Order Action b.i.6
                                          (Section 4OA5.3)
05000259, 260, 296- 00          ORD        05/01/2014 Confirmatory Order Action b.ii.4
                                          (Section 4OA5.3)
05000259, 260, 296- 00          ORD        05/01/2014 Confirmatory Order Action b.ii.5
                                          (Section 4OA5.3)
05000259, 260, 296- 00          ORD        05/01/2014 Confirmatory Order Action b.ii.6
                                          (Section 4OA5.3)
05000259, 260, 296- 00          ORD        05/01/2014 Confirmatory Order Action b.ii.7
                                          (Section 4OA5.3)
05000259, 260, 296- 00          ORD        05/01/2014 Confirmatory Order Action b.ii.8
                                          (Section 4OA5.3)
05000259, 260, 296- 00          ORD        05/01/2014 Confirmatory Order Action b.ii.9
                                          (Section 4OA5.3)
 
                              LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED
Section 1R01: Adverse Weather Protection
Procedures:
0-AOI-57-1E, Grid Instability
0-GOI-200-3, Hot Weather Operations
NPG-SPP-7.1.7, Station Seasonal Readiness
TRO-EA-SOP-30.405, Nuclear Offsite Power Requirements
TRO-TO-SPP-30.128, Superseded
Other Documents:
CR 1170536
Section 1R04: Equipment Alignment
Procedures:
0-GOI-300-5, Environmentally Qualified Doors, Rev 13
Drawings:
0-47E225-137, Harsh Environmental Data, Rev 5
2-47E814-1 Flow Diagram Core Spray System, Rev 55
1-47-E836-1-1 Unit 1 Flow diagram for raw service water and high pressure fire protection
system, Rev 4
Other Documents:
Calculation ND-Q2999-970011, Reactor Building Environmental Analysis for High Energy Line
Brakes, Rev 3
Calculation R14920914110, Flooding in the Reactor Building Due to Breaks in the RWCU
System, Revision 4
VSDS Standard May Survey Report, Survey # M-20160311-24, B RWCU Pump Room,
March 11, 2016
VSDS Standard May Survey Report, Survey # M-20160518-23, A RWCU Pump Room,
May 18, 2016
CR 1161329 CR 1161330            CR 1168380      CR 1168949              CR 1169591
CR 1174095 CR 1175745
Section 1R05: Fire Protection
Procedures:
NPG-SPP 18.4.7 Control of Transient Combustibles, Rev 5
Other Documents:
Fire Protection Report Volume 1, Rev 20
Fire Protection Report Volume 2, Rev 52
Fire Protection Report Volume 2, Rev 53
NFPA 0805 Fire Protection Report Manual
Section 1R06: Flood Protection Measures
NDN-000-999-2007-0031, IF - BFN Probabilistic Risk Assessment - Internal Flooding Analysis,
Rev 0
NDQ0999920076 Flooding in the Reactor Building Due to Breaks in the RWCU System, Rev 4
CR 1144474
 
                                          4
Section 1R11: Licensed Operator Requalification
Unit 2 Simulator Exercise Guide (SEG) OPL173S060, Security Event Response and Control
Room Abandonment, Revision 16
Unit 2 SEG OPL 173S414, Fire Safe Shutdown Procedures, Rev 1
Section 1R12: Maintenance Effectiveness
CR 1110412 CR 1133110 CR 1182208
Email from Maintenance Rule Coordinator about scoping requirements for Recirculation pumps
Level 2 Evaluation for CR 1110412
Maintenance Rule (a)(1) evaluation and reliability plan for Unit 3 ATWS - RPT failures (Function
068-B)
Maintenance Rule (a)(1) evaluation for U1,2,3 CR 105 Contactors
Maintenance Rule (a)(1) evaluation for U3 Function 075-B
Maintenance Rule (a)(1) plan for U1,2,3 CR 105 Contactors
Section 1R13: Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control
Procedures:
0-AOI-100-7, Severe Weather, Rev 36
NPG-SPP-07.3.4 Protected Equipment, Rev. 2
NPG-SPP-09.11.1 Equipment Out of Service Management, Rev. 10
Other Documents:
eSOMS Narrative Logs dated April 1, April 19, May 9 and May 18, and June 21, 2016
eSOMS Action Tracking Status for Units 1, 2 and 3 on April 1, April 19, May 9, May 18, and
June 21, 2016
Browns Ferry Unit 1, 2, and 3 Equipment Out Of Service Report dated April 1, April 19, May 9,
May 18, and June 21, 2016
Section 1R15: Operability Evaluations
Procedures:
0-OI-57A, Switchyard and 4160V AC Electrical System, Rev 157
NPG-SPP-22.302 Corrective Action Program Screening and Oversight, Rev 1
Drawings:
1-47E858-1 Units 1 & 0 Flow Diagram RHR Service Water System, Rev 72
Other Documents:
B31.1 USA Standard Code for Pressure Piping, 1967 Edition
DCN 51565 Installation of Electronic Voltage Regulator for Load Tap Changer motors
DCN 66071, 4kV and 480V Load Restrictions
EACE for CR 1154210
EDQ0-057-2004-0026, AC and DC Load Limitations for Units 1, 2, and 3 Operating, Rev 23
EDQ0057920034, 4.16kV and 480V Busload, Voltage Drop and Short Circuit Calculation, Rev
101
Equipment Apparent Cause Evaluation (EACE) for CR 1102016, Rev 0, 1 and 2
Fire Protection Report Volume 1, Rev 20
Fire Protection Report Volume 2, Rev 52
Fire Pump Surveillance data results from August 2008 until November 1, 2015
FSAR, Appendix O License Renewal Programs, Rev 26
 
                                          5
MDQ002320100019, RHRSW System Hydraulic Analysis for Units 1, 2, & 3 Heat Exchangers,
Rev 2
NDQ0999940013, Reliability Analysis of the Pre-Accident and Common Accident Signal Logic
for BFN Units 1, 2 and 3, Rev 9
UFSAR Section 8.4, Normal Auxiliary Power System
CR 1102016 CR 1102418 CR 1154210 CR 1162713 CR 1163252 CR 1163822
CR 1165160 CR 1165168 PER 46252 PER 828936 CR 1178002
Past Operability Evaluation for CR 1165168
WO 03-001714-000
MDQ0000262016000558, Minimum Wall Thickness for HPFP Yard Main Fire Loop, Rev 0
Section 1R18: Plant Modifications
CR 1165519
DCN 66071, 4kV and 480V Load Restrictions
Probalistic Safety Assessment on Blocking Automatic Transfers to the Second Offsite Source
Prompt Determination of Operability for PER 994066
UFSAR Section 8.4, Normal Auxiliary Power System
Section 1R19: Post Maintenance Testing
Procedures:
0-SR-3.8.1.1(D) Diesel Generator D Monthly Operability Test
3-OI-68, Reactor Recirculation System
NPG-SPP-06.3, Pre-Post-Maintenance Testing, revision 0001
NPG-SPP-06.9.3, Post Modification Testing, revision 0006
Other Documents:
CR 1151665, VFD-068-3112, Variable Frequency Drive tripped when 3B Recirculation Pump
started.
CR 1151935, Recirculation Pump 3B MOV rotor 4 was not set prior to LS-3 opening
G-50, Torque and Limit Switch Settings for Motor Operated Valves, revision 0008
Minor Maintenance WO 117684570
Operator logs for March 20, 2016
Technical Specification 3.4.8.B
Technical Specification Bases SR 3.5.1.5
Section 1R22: Surveillance Testing
Procedures:
0-SI-4.5.C.1(D SMP), RHRSW Room D Sump Pump Test
1-SR-3.5.3.3, RCIC System Rated Flow at Normal Operating Pressure
2-SR-3.5.1.6(CS II), Unit 2 Core Spray Flow Rate Loop II
3-SR-3.8.1.7(3C), Diesel Generator 3C 24 Hour Run
3-SI-4.4.A.1, Unit 3 SLC Pump Functional Test, Rev 57
Other Documents:
Heat Exchanger Visual Inspection and Evaluation form per NPG-SPP-09.14-1 of 1C RHR Heat
Exchanger dated May 4, 2016.
WO 116797629 for CS 2-SR-3.5.1.6(CS II)
WO 116798894 for 3-SR-3.8.1.7(3C)
WO 117378609 for 0-SI-4.5.C.1(D SMP)
 
                                            6
WO 117378627 for RCIC SR-3.5.3.3
Section 1EP2: Alert and Notification System Evaluation
Procedures:
EPDP-8, Emergency Preparedness Quality Assurance, Rev. 4
EPDP-10, Facilitation of the Alert and Notification System and Notification Tests, Rev. 6
EPDP-14, Evaluation of Changes to Alert and Notification Systems (ANS), Rev. 0
EPDP-17, NPG Emergency Plan Effectiveness Review (10 CFR 50.54(q)), Rev. 5
EPFS-9, Inspection, Service, and Maintenance of the Prompt Notification System (PNS) at
Browns Ferry, Sequoyah, and Watts Bar Nuclear Plants, Rev. 9
NPG-SPP-18.3.5, Equipment Important to Emergency Response, Rev. 4
Other Documents:
Documentation of Quarterly siren maintenance for 2nd quarter 2014 to 1st quarter 2016
Documentation of bi-weekly siren tests and maintenance for 2nd quarter 2014 to 1st quarter 2016
Siren Annual Maintenance records: 2014 to 2015
508, Electromechanical Siren Installation and Operating Instructions, Rev. 12/11
2015 & 2016 Browns Ferry Emergency Planning Calendar mailer to members of the public in
the 10-mile EPZ
CR 973613 CR 1008361 CR 1134691 CR 1134696 CR 1149293 CR 1160115
CR 1168226
Section 1EP3: Emergency Response Organization Staffing and Augmentation System
Procedures:
EPDP-3, Emergency Plan Exercises and Preparedness Drills, Rev. 13
EPIP-2, Notification of Unusual Event, Rev. 36
EPIP-6, Activation and Operation of the Technical Support Center (TSC), Rev. 37
EPIP-7, Activation and Operation of the Operations Support Center (OSC), Rev. 33
TRN-30, REP Training, Rev. 32
Other Documents:
Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant On-Shift Staffing Analysis Report, dated 12/10/12
Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant NEI 12-01 Phase 2 Extended Loss of Power ERO Staffing Analysis
Report, Rev. 0, dated 1/23/15
Exercise Report Browns Ferry Augmentation Drill, dated 12/4/14
Exercise Report Browns Ferry Augmentation Drill, dated 5/11/15
Exercise Report Browns Ferry Augmentation Drill, dated 5/15/15
Selected Qualification Records for Key Position ERO Personnel
Various EP staff and ERO member training records
CR 963870 CR 1018295 CR 1018296 CR 1018297 CR 1044179 CR 1136856
CR 1158631
Section 1EP4: Emergency Action Level and Emergency Plan Changes
Procedures:
NP-REP Radiological Emergency Plan, Rev. 105 & 106
NP-REP Radiological Emergency Plan App. A, Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant, Rev. 105 & 106
EPDP-3, Alert, Rev. 37
EPDP-17, NPG Emergency Plan Effectiveness Review [10 CFR 50.54(q)], Rev. 5
EPIP-1, Emergency Classification Procedure, Rev. 52 & 53
 
                                            7
Other Documents:
CECC 2014-050, EPDP-17, Att. 2 Screening Evaluation Form for change of location of JIC,
dated 6/2/15
CECC 2014-050, EPDP-17, Att. 4 Effectiveness Evaluation Form for change of location of JIC,
dated 6/2/15
CECC 2015-026, EPDP-17, Att. 2 Screening Evaluation Form for REP App. A, Rev. 106, dated
7/21/15
CECC 2015-045, EPDP-17, Att. 2 Screening Evaluation Form for removal of JIC Liaison
position from the ERO, dated 10/30/15
CECC 2015-045, EPDP-17, Att. 4 Effectiveness Evaluation Form for removal of JIC Liaison
position from the ERO, dated 10/30/15
CECC 2015-059, EPDP-17, Att. 2 Screening Evaluation Form for changes to the NP-REP
(Generic) Rev. 106, dated 12/4/15
CECC 2015-060, EPDP-17, Att. 2 Screening Evaluation Form for wording changes to NP-REP
(Generic) Rev. 106, dated 12/4/15
CECC 2015-061, EPDP-17, Att. 2 Screening Evaluation Form for addition of EPDP-3,
Emergency Plan Exercises & Preparedness Drills, to Section 16.3 of NP-REP (Generic) Rev.
106, dated 12/4/15
CECC 2016-017, EPDP-17, Attachment 2 Screening Evaluation Form for REP Appendix A,
Rev.107, dated 5/19/16
CECC 2016-018, EPDP-17, Attachment 2 Screening Evaluation Form for REP Appendix A,
Rev.107, dated 5/18/16
BFN-2015-023, EPDP-17, Att. 2 Screening Evaluation Form for EPIP-1 Rev. 52, dated 12/16/16
BFN-2016-026, EPDP-17, Att. 2 Screening Evaluation Form for EPIP-1, Rev. 53, dated 5/19/16
BFN-2016-029, EPDP-17, Att. 2 Screening Evaluation Form for EPIP-1, Rev. 53, dated 5/19/16
BFN-2016-030, EPDP-17, Att. 2 Screening Evaluation Form for EPIP-1, Rev. 53, dated 5/19/16
CR 940284 CR 977864 CR 1067432 CR 1106129 CR 1131140 CR 1132342
CR 1157129 CR 1180166 CR 1180169 CR 1180171
Section 1EP5: Maintenance of Emergency Preparedness
Procedures:
EPDP-1, Procedures, Maps, and Drawings, Rev. 11
EPDP-17, NPG Emergency Plan Effectiveness Review, Rev. 5
EPIP-1, Emergency Classification Procedure, Rev. 53
EPIP-6, Activation and Operation of the Technical Support Center, Rev.37
EPIP-7, Activation and Operation of the Operations Support Center, Rev.33
NPG-SPP-18.3, Emergency Preparedness, Rev. 12
NPG-SPP-18.3.5, Equipment important to Emergency Response, Rev. 4
NPG-SPP-18.3.7, Alternate Facility Activation and Operation, Rev. 2
NPG-SPP-22.300, Corrective Action Program, Rev. 6
NPG-SPP-22.301, Condition Report Initiation, Rev. 6
NPG-SPP-22.302, Corrective Action Program Screening, Rev. 9
NPG-SPP-22.303, Condition Report Actions, Closures, and Approval, Rev. 9
NPG-SPP-22.304, Condition Report Trending, Rev. 4
NPG-SPP-22.305, Level 2 Evaluation, Rev. 6
NPG-SPP-22.306, Level 1 Evaluation, Rev. 6
REP, Radiological Emergency Plan, (Generic Part), Rev. 106
REP, Radiological Emergency Plan, (Appendix A - BFN), Rev. 107
Other Documents:
Annual Review and Approval of ETE Update Levels, dated 12/11/15
 
                                            8
BFN Self-assessment BFN-EP-SSA-15-002, Risk Significant External Inspection
BFN Self-assessment BFN-EP-SSA-16-001, Emergency Responder SCBA Qualification
Verification
BFN Self-assessment BFN-EP-SSA-16-102, Pre-NRC Baseline Inspection
Browns Ferry NOUE Event Report, dated 5/2/16
Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant- Quality Assurance Oversight Report QA-BF-16-010, dated 5/25/16
Drill Report Browns Ferry Off Year Report, dated 8/19/14
Drill Report Browns Ferry Graded Exercise, dated 11/11/15
Drill Report Browns Ferry SAMG Drill, dated 1/27/16
Evacuation Time Estimates for Browns Ferry Nuclear Power Plant Plume Exposure Pathway
Emergency Planning Zone, dated August 2013
Radiological Emergency Plan Effluent Radiation Monitor EAL calculations, dated 1/7/16
Site Audit Report SSA-1501 Radiological Emergency Preparedness Browns Ferry, dated
2/25/15
Various Inventories of Emergency Facilities, Emergency Equipment and Supplies for 1st Quarter
2016
Work Order 115705064, Wide Range Effluent Radiation Monitor System - Mid and High Range
Noble Gas Calibration, dated 5/20/15
Work Order 115869304, Wide Range Effluent Radiation Monitor System - Noble Gas
Calibration, dated 10/29/15
CR 972013 CR 982716 CR 983249 CR 992269 CR 1001273 CR 1018297
CR 1011323 CR 1020921 CR 1081855 CR 1086387 CR 1100545 CR 1101654
CR 1101656 CR 1101697 CR 1101700 CR 1101712 CR 1103755 CR 1111436
CR 1133821 CR 1157129 CR 1163146 CR 1165533
Section 1EP6: Drill Evaluation (IP 71114.06)
CR 1170676 CR 1170953 CR 1170704 CR 1170717 CR 1170719 CR 1170838
CR 1170725 CR 1170740 CR 1170747 CR 1170800 CR 1170802 CR 1170816
CR 1170843
Section 2RS6: Radioactive Gaseous and Liquid Effluent Treatment
Procedures:
Offsite Dose Calculation Manual, Rev. 22 and Rev. 23
CI-710, Liquid Permit Processing, Rev. 21
CI-712, Liquid Monthly Calculations, Rev. 12
CI-714, Particulate and Charcoal Filter Sampling and Analysis, Rev. 41
CI-716, Processing Gaseous Permits from Charcoal/Particulate Filters, Rev. 17
CI-720, Determining Vent Flow, Rev. 16
CI-721, Manual Liquid Release Permit Generation, Rev. 00
0-SI-4.8.A.1-1, Liquid Effluent Permit, Rev. 09
0-SI-4.8.A.5-1, Appendix I Dose Calculations - Liquid Effluents, Rev. 19
0-SI-4.8.B.2-1, Airborne Effluent Analysis - Particulate and Charcoal Filter Analysis, Rev. 42
0-SI-4.8.B.1.a.1, Airborne Effluent Release Rate, Rev. 58
0-SI-4.8.B.2-8, Airborne Effluent Analysis - Stack Noble Gas, Rev. 17
0-SI-4.8.B.3, Appendix I Dose Calculations - Airborne Effluents, Rev. 25
0-SI-4.8.C, Annual 40CFR190 Dose Calculation, Rev. 11
NPG-SPP-22.302, Corrective Action Program Screening, Rev. 9
Other Documents:
Annual Radioactive Effluent Release Report, 2014 and 2015
BFN-VRD-MI07-0030, Microdesigns, Inc., Calibration of the Wide-Range Gaseous Effluent
 
                                            9
Radiation Monitoring System (WRGERMS), 08/31/89
Certificate of Gamma Standard Source, Cs-137 177-29-3, 08/01/86
Certificate of Calibration, Source 22695-135 Ba-133, 02/12/87
Effluent Monitor Out-of-service List, June 2014 - May 2016
WO 115869304, Wide Range Gaseous Effluent Rad Mon Sys - Mid & High Range Noble Gas
Calibration, 11/05/15
WO 114630294, Wide Range Gaseous Effluent Rad Mon Sys - Mid & High Range Noble Gas
Calibration, 12/04/12
WO 115378045, Rx Bldg Vent Exhaust Rad Mon Calibration and Functional Test 1-RM-90-250,
12/16/14
WO 116907681, Rx Bldg Vent Exhaust Rad Mon Calibration and Functional Test 1-RM-90-250,
07/10/15
WO 115528159, RCW Rad Mon (1-RM-90-132D) Calibration and Functional Test, 03/07/14
WO 115433665, RCW Rad Mon (1-RM-90-132D) Calibration and Functional Test, 01/09/15
WO 115755949, Airborne Effluents - Main Stack Mon Sys Calibration, 05/28/15
WO 116986591, Airborne Effluents - Main Stack Mon Sys Calibration, 08/04/15
WO 113150722, SGT Filter Pressure Drop Test & In Place Leak Test - Train A, 11/07/12
WO 115240014, SGT Filter Pressure Drop Test & In Place Leak Test - Train A, 09/26/14
WO 113816413, SGT Filter Pressure Drop Test & In Place Leak Test - Train B, 12/21/12
WO 115756003, SBGTS Iodine Removal Efficiency - Train B, 02/06/15
WO 114313192, SGT Filter Pressure Drop Test & In Place Leak Test - Train C, 03/24/13
WO 115869445, SBGTS Iodine Removal Efficiency - Train C, 05/22/15
WO 116796700, Airborne Effluent Release Rate, 05/07/16
Gaseous Radioactive Waste Release Permit no. 160276.030.016.G
Gaseous Radioactive Waste Release Permit no. 160303.037.020.G
Gaseous Radioactive Waste Release Permit no. 160295.031.016.G
Gaseous Radioactive Waste Release Permit no. 160311.041.021.G
Liquid Radioactive Waste Release Permit no. 150173.004.110.L
Liquid Radioactive Waste Release Permit no. 160001.002.001.L
Results of Radiochemistry Interlaboratory Cross-Check Program, 3rd Quarter 2015 - 1st Quarter
2016
2015 Part 61 CWPS, DAW, RWCU, Thermex Analyses
Special Report for the Bypass of the Gaseous Radwaste Offgas Charcoal Absorbers, 12/23/14
BFN-RP-SSA-16-002, RP Public Radiation Safety Baseline Snapshot Self-Assessment Report,
02/05/16
BFN-CEM-SSA-15-006, Liquid Effluent Monitoring Snapshot Self-Assessment Report, 07/01/15
CR 849316 CR 861975 CR 934551 CR 956279 CR 970739 CR 974829
CR 981336 CR 1012875 CR 1101799 CR 1148656 CR 1153528
Section 2RS7: Radiological Environmental Monitoring Program (REMP)
Procedures:
Offsite Dose Calculation Manual, Rev. 23
CI-420, Collection of Radiological Environmental Monitoring Samples, Rev. 8
CI-421, Well Sampling and Maintenance, Rev. 13
NPG-SPP-05.14, Guide for Communicating Inadvertent Radiological Spills/Leaks to Outside
Agencies, Rev. 4
EPFS-4, Environmental Data Station Meteorological Sensor Exchange, Rev. 20
EPFS-6, Calibration of Environmental Data Station Data Logger and Sonic Channels, Rev. 16
Instruction No. 450.01-005, Calibration of Air Temperature Sensors - Nuclear, Rev. 4
NPG-SPP-22.302, Corrective Action Program Screening, Rev. 9
 
                                          10
Other Documents:
2014 Annual Radiological Environmental Operating Report
2015 Annual Radiological Environmental Operating Report
2015 Annual Radioactive Effluent Report
Meteorological Data Recoverability Report, 2014 - 2015
Risk Ranked Structures, Systems, and Components
Work Order 116690732
Work Order 116795748
Meteorological Monitoring Instrument Report of Calibration, Ultrasonic Wind Sensor B0830001,
9/22/14, 9/17/15
Meteorological Monitoring Instrument Report of Calibration, Ultrasonic Wind Sensor B2310005,
2/12/15, 9/17/15
Meteorological Monitoring Instrument Report of Calibration, Ultrasonic Wind Sensor B4410001,
7/8/15, 10/19/15
Meteorological Monitoring Instrument Report of Calibration, RTD 205498, 8/21/14, 10/1/15
Meteorological Monitoring Instrument Report of Calibration, RTD 205510, 8/21/14, 10/1/15
Meteorological Monitoring Instrument Report of Calibration, RTD 205523, 8/21/14, 10/1/15
Calibration Data Sheets, Radiological Environmental Monitoring Air Sampler Gas Meter Serial
Nos. 1030568, 1030570, 1030580, 1030601, 1030581, 1030569, 1030603; 9/4/14, 8/26/15
Calibration Data Sheets, Radiological Environmental Monitoring Air Sampler Gas Meter Serial
Nos. 1030571, 1040145, 1030582, 14436698, 1030574, 17074896, 1030583; 9/4/14, 8/25/15
Browns Ferry 50.75(g) entries from Jun2 1, 2014 - June 1, 2016
Groundwater Monitoring Well Results, 10/23/15 - 5/27/16
BFN-RP-SSA-16-002, RP Public Radiation Safety Baseline Self-Assessment
BFN-CEM-SSA-15-002, Groundwater Protection Program, NEI 07-07, Self-Assessment
CR 1031186 CR 1066646 CR 1149617 CR 1164659 CR 885869 CR 915148
CR 993178 CR 997291
Section 4OA1: Performance Indicator (PI) Verification
Procedures:
FAQ for NEI 99-02 Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicators as of February 9, 2015
NEI 99-02 Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator Guideline, Rev 7
Unit 1, 2, and 3 MSPI Basis Documents, Rev 17, 16, 15 respectively
Other Documents:
HPCI Maintenance Rule Availability and Reliability data
RCIC Maintenance Rule Availability and Reliability data
Gaseous Radioactive Waste Release Permit no. 160312.030.017.G
Gaseous Radioactive Waste Release Permit no. 160277.031.015.G
Liquid Radioactive Waste Release Permit no. 160001.002.001.L
Semiannual Radioactive Effluent Release Report 2016 - Gaseous Effluents, 05/31/16
Section 4OA2: Identification and Resolution of Problems
Procedures:
NPG SPP 07.3, Work Activity, Risk Management Process, Revision 15
NPG-SPP-03.5, Regulatory Reporting Requirements, Rev 12
NPG-SPP-07.7, NPG CTS Role and Oversight of Supplemental Personnel
NPG-SPP-19.4, Refueling and Steam Generator Alliance Services
NPG-SPP-22.201, Oversight of the Human Performance Program
NUREG 1022, Event Reporting Guidelines: 10 CFR 50.72 and 50.73, Rev 3
 
                                          11
Drawings:
2-45E714-2 Wiring Diagram 250V DC Reactor MOV Board 2A Schematic Diagram, Rev 30
Other Documents:
AZZ Nuclear Technical Bulletin TB-12-007, Revision 0 Masterpact Breakers Fail to Close
NLI-QA-3500 Report of potential 10 CFR Part 21 Condition, Masterpact Replacement Breaker
Fail to Close Operation, Rev 1
River Bend Station Special Inspection Report 05000458/2015010
CR 1142808 CR 1146299 CR 1151321 CR 1153334 CR 1160196 CR 1165557
CR 1185268
Past Operability Evaluation for 1153334
WO 117679885          WO 115366028          WO 1153068            WO 115366078
WO 115372045
Section 4OA3: Event Follow-up
Procedures:
2-POI-74-1, RHR System Piping Flushes, Rev 23
Other Documents:
CR 1126697
EACE for CR 1126697
POE for CR 1126697
Section 4OA5: Other Activities
Procedures:
HPP-2245-100 & 200, BFN Hi-STORM FX/MPC Pre-Operation Inspection, Revision 7
HPP-2245-300, MPC Sealing, Revision 7
HPP-2245-400, MPC Transfer, Revision 5
HPP-2245-500, Hi-STORM FW Site Transportation, Revision 5
MSI 0-079-DCS035, Dry Cask Storage Campaign Guidelines, Revision 17
MSI 0-079-DCS043, Dry Cask Campaign Review Program, Revision 8
OPDP-1 Conduct of Operations Rev. 0031 & 0035
Other Documents:
Current Campaign MPC Loading Maps - MPCFW-021, 022, 023, 024, 025, 026 & 027.
Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation Certificate of Compliance, 72.1014
Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation Manual
Condition Report CR 1058728, Foreign Material found in fuel assemble JLB423
Previous Campaign (July 2015): MPC Loading Maps - MPCFW- 020, 019, 018, 107, 016, -
015, 003, 014, 013, 004, 002, 001.
Special Nuclear Material Inventories for MPC February 23, 2016
Condition Reports: 790109, 896301, 925914, 838977, 838972, 988162, 838977, 935471,
988162, 925914, 838977, 907411, 901307, 863323
115881677 Commitment Completion Form (R20 140718 053).
115881648 Commitment Completion Form (R20 141203 102).
115864926 Commitment Completion Form (R20 140718 052).
115864910 Commitment Completion Form (R20 140825 065).
115864896 Commitment Completion Form (R20 141022 091).
115849901 Commitment Completion Form (R20 160119 001)
 
                                    12
115849821 Commitment Completion Form (R20 150710 100).
115849804 Commitment Completion Form (R20 150213 027).
115849791 Commitment Completion Form (R20 150720 103).
115849754 Commitment Closure Form (R20 151204 110).
115839725 Commitment Completion Form (R20 141003 088).
 
                                  LIST OF ACRONYMS
ADAMS    - Agencywide Document Access and Management System
ADS      - Automatic Depressurization System
ARM      - area radiation monitor
CAD      - containment air dilution
CAP      - corrective action program
CCW      - condenser circulating water
CFR      - Code of Federal Regulations
COC      - certificate of compliance
CR      - condition report
CRD      - control rod drive
CS      - core spray
DCN      - design change notice
EECW    - emergency equipment cooling water
ED        Electronic dosimeter
EDG      - emergency diesel generator
FE      - functional evaluation
FPR      - Fire Protection Report
FSAR    - Final Safety Analysis Report
HRA        High Radiation Area
HPCI    - high pressure coolant injection
IP        Inspection Procedure
IMC      - Inspection Manual Chapter
LHRA      Locked High Radiation Area
LER      - licensee event report
NCV      - non-cited violation
NEI        Nuclear Energy Institute
NIST      National Institute of Standards and Technology
NRC      - U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
NSTS      National Source Tracking System
ODCM    - Off-Site Dose Calculation Manual
OSLD      Optically Stimulated Luminescence Dosimeter
PCM        Personnel Contamination Monitor
PER      - problem evaluation report
PCIV    - primary containment isolation valve
PI      - performance indicator
PM        Portal Monitor
QA        Quality Assurance
Radwaste  Radioactive Waste
RCA        Radiologically Controlled Area
RCE      - Root Cause Evaluation
RCIC    - reactor core isolation cooling
RCW      - Raw Cooling Water
REMP    - Radiological Environmental Monitoring Program
RG      - Regulatory Guide
RHR      - residual heat removal
RHRSW    - residual heat removal service water
RPT        Radiation Protection Technician
RS        Radiation Safety
RTP      - rated thermal power
 
                                    2
RPS  - reactor protection system
RWP  - radiation work permit
SAM    Small Article Monitor
SDP  - significance determination process
SBGT  - standby gas treatment
SLC  - standby liquid control
SNM  - special nuclear material
SR    - service request
SRV  - safety relief valve
SSC  - structure, system, or component
TI    - Temporary Instruction
TIP  - transverse in-core probe
TRM  - Technical Requirements Manual
TS    - Technical Specification(s)
UFSAR - Updated Final Safety Analysis Report
URI  - unresolved item
VHRA    Very High Radiation Area
WO    - work order
}}

Revision as of 15:51, 16 November 2019

Redirect to:

Retrieved from "https://kanterella.com/w/index.php?title=ML16225A208&oldid=2164345"