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{{#Wiki_filter:UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION II 245 PEACHTREE CENTER AVENUE, SUITE 1200 ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30303-1257
{{#Wiki_filter:UNITED STATES
                April 19, 2010 EA-09-321  
                                NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
                                              REGION II
                              245 PEACHTREE CENTER AVENUE, SUITE 1200
                                    ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30303-1257
                                          April 19, 2010
EA-09-321
Mr. Mano Nazar
Executive Vice President and
  Chief Nuclear Officer
Florida Power & Light Company
P.O. Box 14000
Juno Beach, FL 33408-0420
SUBJECT:        FINAL SIGNIFICANCE DETERMINATION OF A YELLOW FINDING AND
                NOTICE OF VIOLATION (NRC COMPONENT DESIGN BASES INSPECTION
                REPORT 05000335/2010007 AND 05000389/2010007), ST. LUCIE NUCLEAR
                PLANT
Dear Mr. Nazar:
The purpose of this letter is to provide you with the disposition and final significance
determination of the two preliminary Greater than Green findings discussed in NRC Inspection
Report No. 05000335/2009006 and 05000389/2009006, dated January 19, 2010,
(ML100210081). The two preliminary findings were related to air intrusion into the Component
Cooling Water (CCW) system that occurred in October 2008, and involved (1) the failure of a
non-safety system that could result in a common cause failure of both trains of the CCW
system, contrary to 10 CFR 50 Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control, and (2) the failure to
identify and correct a condition adverse to quality involving the source of the air in-leakage into
the CCW system, contrary to 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, Corrective Action. The
NRCs Inspection Report identified two apparent violations corresponding to the two preliminary
findings.
At your request, a Regulatory Conference was held on February 19, 2010, to discuss your views
on these issues. During the conference, your staff described the circumstances surrounding the
October 2008 event, Florida Power and Light Companys (FPLs) assessment of the
significance of the two preliminary findings, its root cause evaluation, and the corrective actions
taken. FPL highlighted several differences between its risk assessment and the NRCs
preliminary risk assessment as documented in our inspection report of January 19, 2010. At the
conference, FPL contested the preliminary finding and apparent violation involving 10 CFR 50,
Appendix B, Criterion III. In summary, FPL concluded that when St. Lucie Unit 1 was licensed,
the facility was not required to incorporate a single failure design capability for a non-safety
system. As such, FPL concluded that a violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, did not
occur. Regarding the second preliminary finding involving the failure to identify and correct the
source of air in-leakage into the CCW system, FPL concluded that the significance of the finding
should be characterized as Green. FPL did not contest the validity of the corresponding
10 CFR 50 Appendix B, Criterion XVI violation.


Mr. Mano Nazar Executive Vice President and    Chief Nuclear Officer Florida Power & Light Company
FPL                                            2
P.O. Box 14000 Juno Beach, FL 33408-0420
Regarding the preliminary finding involving 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, the NRC
SUBJECT: FINAL SIGNIFICANCE DETERMINATION OF A YELLOW FINDING AND NOTICE OF VIOLATION (NRC COMPONENT DESIGN BASES INSPECTION
considered the information provided by FPL at the conference, and reviewed available
REPORT 05000335/2010007 AND 05000389/2010007), ST. LUCIE NUCLEAR
information to determine the applicability of design control regulations to St. Lucie Unit 1. This
PLANT  Dear Mr. Nazar:
included a review of the requirements at the time St. Lucie Unit 1 was originally licensed, the
The purpose of this letter is to provide you with the disposition and final significance determination of the two preliminary Greater than Green findings discussed in NRC Inspection
Safety Evaluation Report issued by the NRC following the review of St. Lucie Unit 1 design, the
Report No. 05000335/2009006 and 05000389/2009006, dated January 19, 2010, (ML100210081).  The two preliminary findings were related to air intrusion into the Component Cooling Water (CCW) system that occurred in October 2008, and involved (1) the failure of a non-safety system that could result in a common cause failure of both trains of the CCW system, contrary to 10 CFR 50 Appendix B, Criterion III, "Design Control", and (2) the failure to
Final Safety Analysis Report, and the single failure analysis associated with the CCW system.
identify and correct a condition adverse to quality involving the source of the air in-leakage into the CCW system, contrary to 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, "Corrective Action".  The NRC's Inspection Report identified two apparent violations corresponding to the two preliminary findings.
Based on the review, the NRC determined that the Unit 1 CCW system met the design
requirements at the time of licensing and at the time of the October 2008 air intrusion event.
At your request, a Regulatory Conference was held on February 19, 2010, to discuss your views on these issues.  During the conference, your staff described the circumstances surrounding the October 2008 event, Florida Power and Light Company's (FPL's) assessment of the significance of the two preliminary findings, its root cause evaluation, and the corrective actions taken.  FPL highlighted several differences between its risk assessment and the NRC's
Therefore, this issue does not represent a performance deficiency, and accordingly, a violation
preliminary risk assessment as documented in our inspection report of January 19, 2010.  At the conference, FPL contested the preliminary finding and apparent violation involving 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion III.  In summary, FPL concluded that when St. Lucie Unit 1 was licensed, the facility was not required to incorporate a single failure design capability for a non-safety system.  As such, FPL concluded that a violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, did not occur.  Regarding the second preliminary finding involving the failure to identify and correct the source of air in-leakage into the CCW system, FPL concluded that the significance of the finding should be characterized as Green.  FPL did not contest the validity of the corresponding  10 CFR 50 Appendix B, Criterion XVI violation. 
of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion III did not occur. Accordingly, Apparent Violation
FPL 2      Regarding the preliminary finding involving 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, the NRC considered the information provided by FPL at the conference, and reviewed available information to determine the applicability of design control regulations to St. Lucie Unit 1. This included a review of the requirements at the time St. Lucie Unit 1 was originally licensed, the Safety Evaluation Report issued by the NRC following the review of St. Lucie Unit 1 design, the Final Safety Analysis Report, and the single failure analysis associated with the CCW system. Based on the review, the NRC determined that the Unit 1 CCW system met the design requirements at the time of licensing and at the time of the October 2008 air intrusion event.
05000335, 389/2009006-05, Failure to Translate Design Basis Specifications to Prevent Single
Therefore, this issue does not represent a performance deficiency, and accordingly, a violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion III did not occur. Accordingly, Apparent Violation 05000335, 389/2009006-05, "Failure to Translate Design Basis Specifications to Prevent Single Failure of CCW" is considered closed.  
Failure of CCW is considered closed.
After considering the information developed during the inspection and information provided by FPL during and after the conference, the NRC has concluded that the finding involving the  
After considering the information developed during the inspection and information provided by
failure to identify and correct the source of the air in-leakage into the CCW system is characterized as Yellow, i.e., a finding of substantial significance with regard to safety, which will require additional NRC inspections. The bases for the NRC's significance determination of this finding, and the differences in the licensee's characterization of the findings, are discussed in Enclosure 2.  
FPL during and after the conference, the NRC has concluded that the finding involving the
failure to identify and correct the source of the air in-leakage into the CCW system is
characterized as Yellow, i.e., a finding of substantial significance with regard to safety, which will
require additional NRC inspections. The bases for the NRCs significance determination of this
finding, and the differences in the licensees characterization of the findings, are discussed in
Enclosure 2.
You have 30 calendar days from the date of this letter to appeal the staff=s significance
determination for the Yellow finding. Such appeals will be considered to have merit only if they
meet the criteria given in NRC Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Attachment 2.
The NRC also has determined that the failure to identify and correct the source of the air in-
leakage into the CCW system is a violation of 10 CFR 50 Appendix B, Criterion XVI, as cited in
the enclosed Notice of Violation (Notice). The circumstances surrounding the violation were
described in detail in NRC Inspection Report No. 05000335/2009006 and 05000389/2009006,
dated January 19, 2010 (ML100210081). In accordance with the NRC Enforcement Policy, the
Notice is considered escalated enforcement action because it is associated with a Yellow
finding.
For administrative purposes, this letter is issued as a separate NRC Inspection Report,
No. 05000335/2010007 and 05000389/2010007. Apparent Violation 05000335, 389/2009006-
06, related to the CCW air intrusion event, is now Violation 05000335/2009006-06, Failure to
Identify and Correct a Condition Adverse to Quality. This violation was determined to have a
cross-cutting aspect in the area of Human Performance, Decision Making, specifically H.1(a).
Because plant performance for this issue has been determined to be beyond the licensee
response band of the NRC Action Matrix, we will use the Action Matrix to determine the most
appropriate NRC response for this event. We will notify you, by separate correspondence, of
that determination.
The NRC has concluded that information regarding the reason for the violation, the corrective
actions taken and planned to correct the violation and prevent recurrence and the date when full
compliance will be achieved is already adequately addressed on the docket in the St. Lucie


You have 30 calendar days from the date of this letter to appeal the staff
FPL                                           3
=s significance determination for the Yellow finding.  Such appeals will be considered to have merit only if they
Meeting Summary, dated February 26, 2010 (ML100601170). Therefore, you are not required
meet the criteria given in NRC Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Attachment 2.
to respond to this letter unless the description therein does not accurately reflect your corrective
The NRC also has determined that the failure to identify and correct the source of the air in-leakage into the CCW system is a violation of 10 CFR 50 Appendix B, Criterion XVI, as cited in the enclosed Notice of Violation (Notice).  The circumstances surrounding the violation were described in detail in NRC Inspection Report No. 05000335/2009006 and 05000389/2009006,
actions or your position. However, you are required to submit a written statement or explanation
dated January 19, 2010 (ML100210081).  In accordance with the NRC Enforcement Policy, the Notice is considered escalated enforcement action because it is associated with a Yellow finding.  For administrative purposes, this letter is issued as a separate NRC Inspection Report,
pursuant to 10 CFR 2.201 if the description therein does not accurately reflect your corrective
No. 05000335/2010007 and 05000389/2010007.  Apparent Violation 05000335, 389/2009006-06, related to the CCW air intrusion event, is now Violation 05000335/2009006-06, "Failure to Identify and Correct a Condition Adverse to Quality."  This violation was determined to have a cross-cutting aspect in the area of Human Performance, Decision Making, specifically H.1(a). 
actions or your position. In that case, please follow the instructions specified in the Notice of
Violation, Enclosure 1.
Because plant performance for this issue has been determined to be beyond the licensee response band of the NRC Action Matrix, we will use the Action Matrix to determine the most appropriate NRC response for this event.  We will notify you, by separate correspondence, of that determination.
In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter,
Enclosures 1 and 2, and your response, if any, will be made available electronically for public
The NRC has concluded that information regarding the reason for the violation, the corrective actions taken and planned to correct the violation and prevent recurrence and the date when full compliance will be achieved is already adequately addressed on the docket in the "St. Lucie 
inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the NRC=s document system (ADAMS),
FPL 3     Meeting Summary," dated February 26, 2010 (ML100601170). Therefore, you are not required to respond to this letter unless the description therein does not accurately reflect your corrective actions or your position. However, you are required to submit a written statement or explanation pursuant to 10 CFR 2.201 if the description therein does not accurately reflect your corrective  
accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html. To the extent
actions or your position. In that case, please follow the instructions specified in the Notice of Violation, Enclosure 1.  
possible, your response, if any, should not include any personal privacy, proprietary, or
In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter, Enclosures 1 and 2, and your response, if any, will be made available electronically for public  
safeguards information so that it can be made available to the Public without redaction. If
inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the NRC
personal privacy or proprietary information is necessary to provide an acceptable response,
=s document system (ADAMS), accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html. To the extent possible, your response, if any, should not include any personal privacy, proprietary, or safeguards information so that it can be made available to the Public without redaction. If  
please provide a bracketed copy of your response that identifies the information that should be
personal privacy or proprietary information is necessary to provide an acceptable response, please provide a bracketed copy of your response that identifies the information that should be protected and a redacted copy of your response that deletes such information. If you request withholding of such information, you must specifically identify the portions of your response that you seek to have withheld and provide in detail the bases for your claim of withholding (e.g.,  
protected and a redacted copy of your response that deletes such information. If you request
explain why the disclosure of information will create an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy or provide the information required by 10 CFR 2.390(b) to support a request for withholding confidential commercial or financial information). The NRC also includes significant enforcement actions on its Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/enforcement/actions/).   Sincerely,
withholding of such information, you must specifically identify the portions of your response that
            /RA/  
you seek to have withheld and provide in detail the bases for your claim of withholding (e.g.,
        Luis A. Reyes   Regional Administrator  
explain why the disclosure of information will create an unwarranted invasion of personal
  Docket Nos.: 50-335, 50-389 License Nos.: DPR-67 and NPF-16  
privacy or provide the information required by 10 CFR 2.390(b) to support a request for
withholding confidential commercial or financial information). The NRC also includes significant
Enclosures: 1. Notice of Violation         2. NRC Bases for Final Significance Determination
enforcement actions on its Web site at
cc w/encls: (See page 4)
http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/enforcement/actions/).
                                              Sincerely,
                                              /RA/
                                              Luis A. Reyes
                                              Regional Administrator
Docket Nos.: 50-335, 50-389
License Nos.: DPR-67 and NPF-16
Enclosures: 1. Notice of Violation
              2. NRC Bases for Final Significance Determination
cc w/encls: (See page 4)


_________________________ 
G  SUNSI REVIEW COMPLETE OFFICE RII:ORA RII:DRS RII:DRS RII:DRS RII:DRP RII:DRS RII:ORA SIGNATURE RA RA RA VIA EMAIL RA RA RA NAME CEvans WRogers BDesai KKennedy LWert JLubinski VMcCree DATE 4/7/2010 4/5/2010 3/31/2010 4/14/2010 4/14/20104/      /20104/13/20104/      /20104/15/2010 E-MAIL COPY?    YES NO  YES NO    YES N
O  YES NO  YES NO  YES NO  YES NO OFFICE OE NRR      SIGNATURE email Email      NAME RZimmerman MCUNNINGHAM      DATE 4/14/2010 4/8/2010 4/      /2010 4/      /2010 4/      /2010 4/      /2010 4/      /2010 E-MAIL COPY?    YES NO  YES NO    YES N
O  YES NO  YES NO  YES NO  YES NO 
FPL 4    cc w/encl: Richard L. Anderson Site Vice President St. Lucie Nuclear Plant
Electronic Mail Distribution
Robert J. Hughes Plant General Manager St. Lucie Nuclear Plant
Electronic Mail Distribution
Gene St. Pierre Vice President, Fleet Support Florida Power & Light Company Electronic Mail Distribution
Ronnie Lingle Operations Manager St. Lucie Nuclear Plant Electronic Mail Distribution
Eric Katzman Licensing Manager St. Lucie Nuclear Plant Electronic Mail Distribution
Abdy Khanpour Vice President Engineering Support Florida Power and Light Company P.O. Box 14000
Juno Beach, FL  33408-0420
Larry Nicholson Director Licensing
Florida Power & Light Company Electronic Mail Distribution
Alison Brown Nuclear Licensing Florida Power & Light Company Electronic Mail Distribution


  Mitch S. Ross Vice President and Associate General  
_________________________                        G SUNSI REVIEW COMPLETE
Counsel Florida Power & Light Company  
OFFICE              RII:ORA          RII:DRS          RII:DRS        RII:DRS          RII:DRP        RII:DRS        RII:ORA
Electronic Mail Distribution  
SIGNATURE          RA              RA              RA              VIA EMAIL        RA              RA              RA
  Marjan Mashhadi Senior Attorney Florida Power & Light Company Electronic Mail Distribution  
NAME                CEvans          WRogers          BDesai          KKennedy        LWert          JLubinski      VMcCree
DATE                    4/7/2010        4/5/2010      3/31/2010        4/14/2010      4/14/20104/    4/13/20104/      4/15/2010
E-MAIL COPY?          YES        NO  YES          NO  YES        NO YES          NO  YES/2010 NO    YES/2010 NO    YES          NO
OFFICE              OE              NRR
SIGNATURE          email            Email
NAME                RZimmerman      MCUNNINGHAM
DATE                    4/14/2010        4/8/2010      4/    /2010      4/    /2010      4/  /2010      4/  /2010      4/    /2010
E-MAIL COPY?          YES        NO  YES          NO  YES        NO YES          NO  YES        NO  YES        NO YES          NO
       
FPL                                  4
cc w/encl:                            Marjan Mashhadi
Richard L. Anderson                    Senior Attorney
Site Vice President                    Florida Power & Light Company
St. Lucie Nuclear Plant                Electronic Mail Distribution
Electronic Mail Distribution
                                      William A. Passetti
Robert J. Hughes                      Chief
Plant General Manager                  Florida Bureau of Radiation Control
St. Lucie Nuclear Plant                Department of Health
Electronic Mail Distribution          Electronic Mail Distribution
Gene St. Pierre                        Ruben D. Almaguer
Vice President, Fleet Support          Director
Florida Power & Light Company          Division of Emergency Preparedness
Electronic Mail Distribution          Department of Community Affairs
                                      Electronic Mail Distribution
Ronnie Lingle
Operations Manager                    J. Kammel
St. Lucie Nuclear Plant                Radiological Emergency Planning
Electronic Mail Distribution          Administrator
                                      Department of Public Safety
Eric Katzman                          Electronic Mail Distribution
Licensing Manager
St. Lucie Nuclear Plant                Mano Nazar
Electronic Mail Distribution          Executive Vice President and Chief Nuclear
                                      Officer
Abdy Khanpour                          Florida Power & Light Company
Vice President                        P. O. Box 14000
Engineering Support                    Juno Beach, FL 33408
Florida Power and Light Company
P.O. Box 14000                        (Vacant)
Juno Beach, FL 33408-0420              Vice President
                                      Nuclear Plant Support
Larry Nicholson                        Florida Power & Light Company
Director                              Electronic Mail Distribution
Licensing
Florida Power & Light Company          Seth B. Dunston
Electronic Mail Distribution          Training Manager
                                      St. Lucie Nuclear Plant
Alison Brown                          Electronic Mail Distribution
Nuclear Licensing
Florida Power & Light Company          Faye Outlaw
Electronic Mail Distribution          County Administrator
                                      St. Lucie County
Mitch S. Ross                         Electronic Mail Distribution
Vice President and Associate General
Counsel                               Jack Southard
Florida Power & Light Company         Director
Electronic Mail Distribution           Public Safety Department
                                      St. Lucie County
                                      Electronic Mail Distribution


William A. Passetti Chief Florida Bureau of Radiation Control Department of Health
FPL                                      5
Electronic Mail Distribution
Letter to Mano Nazar from Luis A. Reyes dated April xx, 2010
Ruben D. Almaguer Director Division of Emergency Preparedness Department of Community Affairs Electronic Mail Distribution
SUBJECT:        FINAL SIGNIFICANCE DETERMINATION FOR A YELLOW FINDING AND
                NOTICE OF VIOLATION (NRC COMPONENT DESIGN BASES INSPECTION
                REPORT 05000335/2010007 AND 05000389/2010007), ST. LUCIE NUCLEAR
                PLANT
Distribution w/encls:
C. Evans, RII
L. Slack, RII
OE Mail
RIDSNRRDIRS
PUBLIC
RidsNrrPMStLucie Resource
R. Borchardt, OEDO
R. Zimmerman, OE
E. Julian, SECY
B. Keeling, OCA
Enforcement Coordinators, RI, RIII, RIV
E. Hayden, OPA
C. McCrary, OI
H. Bell, OIG
E. Leeds, NRR
M. Ashley, NRR
B. Mozafari, NRR
C. Scott, OGC
D. Decker, OCA
G. Gulla, OE
J. Circle, NRR
L. Reyes, RII
V. McCree, RII
K. Kennedy, RII
J. Lubinski, RII
L. Wert, RII
B. Desai, RII
M. Sykes, RII
R. Nease, RII
W. Rogers, RII
S. Sparks, RII


J. Kammel Radiological Emergency Planning Administrator Department of Public Safety
                                        NOTICE OF VIOLATION
Electronic Mail Distribution
Florida Power and Light                                                         Docket No. 50-335
Mano Nazar Executive Vice President and Chief Nuclear Officer
St. Lucie Nuclear Plant                                                         DPR-67
Florida Power & Light Company P. O. Box 14000 Juno Beach, FL  33408
Unit 1                                                                          EA-09-321
(Vacant)
During an inspection completed by the NRC on December 10, 2009, a violation of NRC
Vice President Nuclear Plant Support Florida Power & Light Company Electronic Mail Distribution
requirements was identified. The circumstances surrounding the violation were described in
detail in NRC Inspection Report No. 05000335/2009006 and 05000389/2009006, dated January
Seth B. Dunston Training Manager St. Lucie Nuclear Plant Electronic Mail Distribution
19, 2010 (ML100210081). In accordance with the NRC Enforcement Policy, the violation is
Faye Outlaw County Administrator
listed below:
St. Lucie County Electronic Mail Distribution
          10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, Corrective Action, states that measures shall
Jack Southard Director
          be established to assure that conditions adverse to quality, such as deficiencies,
Public Safety Department St. Lucie County Electronic Mail Distribution 
          deviations, and non-conformances are promptly identified and corrected. In the case of
FPL 5    Letter to Mano Nazar from Luis A. Reyes dated April xx, 2010
          significant conditions adverse to quality, the measures shall assure that the cause of the
SUBJECT: FINAL SIGNIFICANCE DETERMINATION FOR A YELLOW FINDING AND NOTICE OF VIOLATION (NRC COMPONENT DESIGN BASES INSPECTION
          condition is determined and corrective action taken to preclude repetition.
REPORT 05000335/2010007 AND 05000389/2010007), ST. LUCIE NUCLEAR
          Contrary to the above, the licensee failed to identify and correct a significant condition
PLANT  Distribution w/encls
          adverse to quality affecting the Component Cooling Water (CCW) system. Specifically,
: C. Evans, RII
          in October 2008, air intrusion from the containment instrument air (IA) system into the
L. Slack, RII  OE Mail  RIDSNRRDIRS PUBLIC RidsNrrPMStLucie Resource R. Borchardt, OEDO R. Zimmerman, OE
          CCW system occurred which affected both redundant trains of the CCW system. The
E. Julian, SECY B. Keeling, OCA Enforcement Coordinators, RI, RIII, RIV E. Hayden, OPA C. McCrary, OI
          troubleshooting and subsequent corrective actions that were implemented by the
H. Bell, OIG E. Leeds, NRR M. Ashley, NRR B. Mozafari, NRR C. Scott, OGC
          licensee failed to identify the source of the air in-leakage and ensure that the CCW
D. Decker, OCA G. Gulla, OE J. Circle, NRR L. Reyes, RII V. McCree, RII
          system remained capable of delivering adequate cooling to essential equipment used to
K. Kennedy, RII J. Lubinski, RII L. Wert, RII B. Desai, RII M. Sykes, RII
          mitigate design bases accidents. In addition, the corrective actions failed to preclude a
R. Nease, RII W. Rogers, RII S. Sparks, RII
          similar air intrusion event into the CCW system in November 2009.
 
          This violation is associated with a Yellow Significance Determination Process finding for
Enclosure 1  NOTICE OF VIOLATION
          Unit 1 in the Initiating Events cornerstone.
Florida Power and Light        Docket No. 50-335 St. Lucie Nuclear Plant      DPR-67  Unit 1         EA-09-321
The NRC has concluded that information regarding the reason for the violation, the corrective
actions taken and planned to correct the violation and prevent recurrence and the date when full
compliance will be achieved is already adequately addressed on the docket in the St. Lucie
Meeting Summary, dated February 26, 2010 (ML100601170). Therefore, you are not required
to respond to this letter unless the description therein does not accurately reflect your corrective
actions or your position. However, you are required to submit a written statement or explanation
pursuant to 10 CFR 2.201 if the description therein does not accurately reflect your corrective
actions or your position. In that case, or if you choose to respond, clearly mark your response
as a "Reply to a Notice of Violation," include the EA number, and send it to the U.S. Nuclear
Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001 with a
copy to the Regional Administrator, Region II, and a copy to the NRC Resident Inspector at the
facility that is the subject of this Notice, within 30 days of the date of the letter transmitting this
Notice of Violation (Notice).
                                                                                            Enclosure 1


During an inspection completed by the NRC on December 10, 2009, a violation of NRC requirements was identified. The circumstances surrounding the violation were described in detail in NRC Inspection Report No. 05000335/2009006 and 05000389/2009006, dated January 19, 2010 (ML100210081). In accordance with the NRC Enforcement Policy, the violation is
NOV                                            2
listed below:
If you choose to respond, your response will be made available electronically for public
10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, "Corrective Action," states that measures shall be established to assure that conditions adverse to quality, such as deficiencies, deviations, and non-conformances are promptly identified and corrected. In the case of significant conditions adverse to quality, the measures shall assure that the cause of the condition is determined and corrective action taken to preclude repetition.
inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the NRC=s document system (ADAMS),
accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html. Therefore, to
the extent possible, the response should not include any personal privacy, proprietary, or
safeguards information so that it can be made available to the Public without redaction. If
personal privacy or proprietary information is necessary to provide an acceptable response,
then please provide a bracketed copy of your response that identifies the information that
should be protected and a redacted copy of your response that deletes such information. If you
request withholding of such material, you must specifically identify the portions of your response
that you seek to have withheld and provide in detail the bases for your claim of withholding (e.g.,
explain why the disclosure of information will create an unwarranted invasion of personal
privacy or provide the information required by 10 CFR 2.390(b) to support a request for
withholding confidential commercial or financial information). If safeguards information is
necessary to provide an acceptable response, please provide the level of protection described
in 10 CFR 73.21.
If you contest this enforcement action, you should also provide a copy of your response, with
the basis for your denial, to the Director, Office of Enforcement, United States Nuclear
Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001.
In accordance with 10 CFR 19.11, you may be required to post this Notice within two working
days.
Dated this 19th day of April 2010.
                                                                                      Enclosure 1


Contrary to the above, the licensee failed to identify and correct a significant condition adverse to quality affecting the Component Cooling Water (CCW) system. Specifically, in October 2008, air intrusion from the containment instrument air (IA) system into the CCW system occurred which affected both redundant trains of the CCW system. The
EA-09-321
troubleshooting and subsequent corrective actions that were implemented by the licensee failed to identify the source of the air in-leakage and ensure that the CCW system remained capable of delivering adequate cooling to essential equipment used to mitigate design bases accidents. In addition, the corrective actions failed to preclude a similar air intrusion event into the CCW system in November 2009.  
                        NRC Bases for Final Significance Determination
On February 19, 2010, the NRC held a regulatory conference with representatives of FPL, St.
Lucie Nuclear Plant, to discuss two preliminary Greater than Green inspection findings
documented in NRC Inspection Report 05000335, 389/2009006 (ML100210081). These
findings concerned issues associated with an October 8, 2008, air intrusion event from the Unit
1 containment instrument air system into the CCW system.
At the regulatory conference, FPL highlighted their assumptions in determining the risk
associated with the air intrusion event as Green. These assumptions differed in some instances
with those used by the NRC in the preliminary significance determination. In determining the
final significance, NRC considered FPL assumptions and factored them into the significance
determination process when appropriate. A number of FPLs assumptions were fully accepted
and integrated into the NRC final significance determination. These assumptions included: the
most probable outcome of air intrusion into the CCW system would be operators terminating the
event by isolating the air intrusion source; the dominant accident sequence was operators failing
to stop the air intrusion prior to CCW failure followed by operators failing to trip the reactor
coolant pumps (RCPs) upon a loss of CCW; and, operators would follow established
procedures to the best of their abilities. Also, based upon FPLs input, the final NRC
significance determination assumed that operators had time to stop the air intrusion before
CCW system failure.
There were several differences between NRC and FPL in NRCs final significance
determination. The paragraphs below provide a summary of the differences and the bases for
the NRCs final significance determination.
FPL assumed that due to the preponderance of alarms available to the operators, it was highly
likely that the operators would trip the reactor and stop the RCPs before CCW system failure
would occur. The NRC did not consider these actions in the preliminary significance
determination. However, based upon FPLs input, it was included in the final significance
determination. The NRC recognized that available alarms would indicate irregular flow in the
CCW system and that some of these alarms would direct operators to stop the RCPs and trip
the reactor. However, the NRC assumed that the collective set of alarms and indications would
provide for competing actions to trip the CCW pumps and/or trip the RCPs. Further, some of
the alarms would occur either after CCW failure or at imminent failure. Therefore, assigning a
probability to the actions to trip the reactor and stopping the RCPs prior to CCW failure as highly
likely was not used. Instead, as an assumption for the final significance determination, a less
likely probability than assumed by FPL was assigned by the NRC. Specifically, the NRC
assigned a 50/50 probability that operators would trip the reactor and stop the RCPs prior to
CCW failure in the final significance determination as compared to FPL, which did not present
specific numbers at the conference but, indicated a significantly high probability for operators
succeeding in this action.
                                                                                          Enclosure 2


This violation is associated with a Yellow Significance Determination Process finding for Unit 1 in the Initiating Events cornerstone.
EA-09-321                                     2
The NRC has concluded that information regarding the reason for the violation, the corrective
According to FPLs calculations, the conditional core damage probability associated with the air
actions taken and planned to correct the violation and prevent recurrence and the date when full compliance will be achieved is already adequately addressed on the docket in the "St. Lucie Meeting Summary," dated February 26, 2010 (ML100601170).  Therefore, you are not required to respond to this letter unless the description therein does not accurately reflect your corrective actions or your position.  However, you are required to submit a written statement or explanation
intrusion event, based upon the latest plant specific PRA and the NRCs SPAR model, varied
pursuant to 10 CFR 2.201 if the description therein does not accurately reflect your corrective actions or your position.  In that case, or if you choose to respond, clearly mark your response as a "Reply to a Notice of Violation," include the EA number, and send it to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN:  Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001 with a copy to the Regional Administrator, Region II, and a copy to the NRC Resident Inspector at the facility that is the subject of this Notice, within 30 days of the date of the letter transmitting this Notice of Violation (Notice). 
between 1E-4 & 6E-4. The NRC used the latest available information regarding the RCP seals,
NOV 2  Enclosure 1  If you choose to respond, your response will be made available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the NRC
the procedures associated with the RCPs, and operator training in updating the NRCs SPAR
=s document system (ADAMS), accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html.  Therefore, to the extent possible, the response should not include any personal privacy, proprietary, or safeguards information so that it can be made available to the Public without redaction.  If personal privacy or proprietary information is necessary to provide an acceptable response, then please provide a bracketed copy of your response that identifies the information that should be protected and a redacted copy of your response that deletes such information.  If you
model of St. Lucie. Further, the NRC, in contrast to FPL, used an 8 hour versus 24 hour
request withholding of such material, you must specifically identify the portions of your response that you seek to have withheld and provide in detail the bases for your claim of withholding (e.g., explain why the disclosure of information will create an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy or provide the information required by 10 CFR 2.390(b) to support a request for withholding confidential commercial or financial information).  If safeguards information is
exposure time for RCP seal failure in the final conditional core damage probability calculation to
necessary to provide an acceptable response, please provide the level of protection described in 10 CFR 73.21.
account for a standard reactor shutdown.
If you contest this enforcement action, you should also provide a copy of your response, with the basis for your denial, to the Director, Office of Enforcement, United States Nuclear
As a result, the NRC determined that the conditional core damage probability associated with
Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001. 
this event was 5.6E-4. Although the NRC applied a different methodology, this numerical result
In accordance with 10 CFR 19.11, you may be required to post this Notice within two working days. 
was consistent with the licensees input and had no affect on the final significance
Dated this 19
determination.
th day of April 2010. 
FPL did not present specific numbers but assumed that the probability of operators failing to
Enclosure 2  EA-09-321
recognize and mitigate the air intrusion before CCW pump failure was two to three orders of
NRC Bases for Final Significance Determination
magnitude less than 1E-1, the number assigned by the NRC, in the preliminary significance
  On February 19, 2010, the NRC held a regulatory conference with representatives of FPL, St.
determination.
Lucie Nuclear Plant, to discuss two preliminary Greater than Green inspection findings documented in NRC Inspection Report 05000335, 389/2009006 (ML100210081).  These findings concerned issues associated with an October 8, 2008, air intrusion event from the Unit 1 containment instrument air system into the CCW system. 
The failure probability used by the NRC for the final significance determination, like FPL,
 
included a dependency, since different crews would be involved in the recognition and
At the regulatory conference, FPL highlighted their assumptions in determining the risk associated with the air intrusion event as Green.  These assumptions differed in some instances with those used by the NRC in the preliminary significance determination.  In determining the final significance, NRC considered FPL assumptions and factored them into the significance determination process when appropriate.  A number of FPL's assumptions were fully accepted and integrated into the NRC final significance determination.  These assumptions included: the
mitigation of the air intrusion event. The NRC used a standard Human Reliability Assessment
most probable outcome of air intrusion into the CCW system would be operators terminating the event by isolating the air intrusion source; the dominant accident sequence was operators failing to stop the air intrusion prior to CCW failure followed by operators failing to trip the reactor coolant pumps (RCPs) upon a loss of CCW; and, operators would follow established procedures to the best of their abilities.  Also, based upon FPL's input, the final NRC
(HRA) protocol in determining the assumption for this operator failure probability in the final
significance determination assumed that operators had time to stop the air intrusion before CCW system failure. 
significance determination. Like FPL, the performance shaping factors used in the final HRA
There were several differences between NRC and FPL in NRC's final significance determination.  The paragraphs below provide a summary of the differences and the bases for
included 24 hours for operators to recognize and mitigate air intrusion before CCW failure.
the NRC's final significance determination. 
However, NRC differed from FPL in the performance shaping factor contributions due to the fact
FPL assumed that due to the preponderance of alarms available to the operators, it was highly likely that the operators would trip the reactor and stop the RCPs before CCW system failure would occur.  The NRC did not consider these actions in the preliminary significance
that no specific procedure existed to direct operators in diagnosing air intrusion into the CCW
determination.  However, based upon FPL's input, it was included in the final significance determination.  The NRC recognized that available alarms would indicate irregular flow in the CCW system and that some of these alarms would direct operators to stop the RCPs and trip the reactor.  However, the NRC assumed that the collective set of alarms and indications would provide for competing actions to trip the CCW pumps and/or trip the RCPs.  Further, some of
system, the high level of complexity associated with diagnosing the source of air intrusion, and
the alarms would occur either after CCW failure or at imminent failure.  Therefore, assigning a probability to the actions to trip the reactor and stopping the RCPs prior to CCW failure as highly likely was not used.  Instead, as an assumption for the final significance determination, a less likely probability than assumed by FPL was assigned by the NRC.  Specifically, the NRC assigned a 50/50 probability that operators would trip the reactor and stop the RCPs prior to CCW failure in the final significance determination as compared to FPL, which did not present specific numbers at the conference but, indicated a significantly high probability for operators
limited operator training/experience associated with CCW events of this nature. In its final
succeeding in this action. 
significance determination, the NRC, after factoring in all the performance shaping factors, used
EA-09-321 2  
6.58 E-2 as the probability that operators would not stop the air intrusion into the CCW system
Enclosure 2  According to FPL's calculations, the conditional core damage probability associated with the air intrusion event, based upon the latest plant specific PRA and the NRC's SPAR model, varied between 1E-4 & 6E-4. The NRC used the latest available information regarding the RCP seals, the procedures associated with the RCPs, and operator training in updating the NRC's SPAR  
prior to pump failure. While FPL did not present specific numbers, their assumptions differed by
model of St. Lucie. Further, the NRC, in contrast to FPL, used an 8 hour versus 24 hour exposure time for RCP seal failure in the final conditional core damage probability calculation to account for a standard reactor shutdown.  
approximately two to three magnitudes from the NRC. This difference in performance shaping
As a result, the NRC determined that the conditional core damage probability associated with  
factor assumptions was effectively the most significant difference between the NRC and FPL in
this event was 5.6E-4. Although the NRC applied a different methodology, this numerical result was consistent with the licensee's input and had no affect on the final significance determination.
determining the final significance associated with the event.
FPL did not present specific numbers but assumed that the probability of operators failing to recognize and mitigate the air intrusion before CCW pump failure was two to three orders of magnitude less than 1E-1, the number assigned by the NRC, in the preliminary significance  
In conclusion, FPL determined, based on best-estimate assumptions, that the delta core
determination.  
damage frequency (CDF) increase was less than 1E-6. The NRC did not agree with FPLs
The failure probability used by the NRC for the final significance determination, like FPL, included a dependency, since different crews would be involved in the recognition and mitigation of the air intrusion event. The NRC used a standard Human Reliability Assessment  
determination of delta CDF being less than 1E-6. Even after factoring in numerous FPL
(HRA) protocol in determining the assumption for this operator failure probability in the final significance determination.   Like FPL, the performance shaping factors used in the final HRA included 24 hours for operators to recognize and mitigate air intrusion before CCW failure. However, NRC differed from FPL in the performance shaping factor contributions due to the fact that no specific procedure existed to direct operators in diagnosing air intrusion into the CCW  
assumptions, NRC determined the delta CDF for the CCW air intrusion performance deficiency
system, the high level of complexity associated with diagnosing the source of air intrusion, and limited operator training/experience associated with CCW events of this nature. In its final significance determination, the NRC, after factoring in all the performance shaping factors, used 6.58 E-2 as the probability that operators would not stop the air intrusion into the CCW system prior to pump failure. While FPL did not present specific numbers, their assumptions differed by  
to be approximately 2E-5. With this delta CDF being greater than 1E-5, the performance
approximately two to three magnitudes from the NRC. This difference in performance shaping factor assumptions was effectively the most significant difference between the NRC and FPL in determining the final significance associated with the event.  
deficiency was classified as Yellow.
In conclusion, FPL determined, based on best-estimate assumptions, that the delta core  
                                                                                        Enclosure 2
damage frequency (CDF) increase was less than 1E-6. The NRC did not agree with FPL's determination of delta CDF being less than 1E-6. Even after factoring in numerous FPL assumptions, NRC determined the delta CDF for the CCW air intrusion performance deficiency to be approximately 2E-5. With this delta CDF being greater than 1E-5, the performance deficiency was classified as Yellow.
}}
}}

Revision as of 19:44, 13 November 2019

IR 05000335-10-007 & 05000389-10-007 for St. Lucie, Final Significance Determination of Yellow Finding & Notice of Violation
ML101090509
Person / Time
Site: Saint Lucie  NextEra Energy icon.png
Issue date: 04/19/2010
From: Reyes L
Region 2 Administrator
To: Nazar M
Florida Power & Light Co
References
EA-09-321, IR-10-007 IR-10-007
Download: ML101090509 (10)
v • d • e


See also: IR 05000335/2010007

Text

UNITED STATES

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION II

245 PEACHTREE CENTER AVENUE, SUITE 1200

ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30303-1257

April 19, 2010

EA-09-321

Mr. Mano Nazar

Executive Vice President and

Chief Nuclear Officer

Florida Power & Light Company

P.O. Box 14000

Juno Beach, FL 33408-0420

SUBJECT: FINAL SIGNIFICANCE DETERMINATION OF A YELLOW FINDING AND

NOTICE OF VIOLATION (NRC COMPONENT DESIGN BASES INSPECTION

REPORT 05000335/2010007 AND 05000389/2010007), ST. LUCIE NUCLEAR

PLANT

Dear Mr. Nazar:

The purpose of this letter is to provide you with the disposition and final significance

determination of the two preliminary Greater than Green findings discussed in NRC Inspection

Report No. 05000335/2009006 and 05000389/2009006, dated January 19, 2010,

(ML100210081). The two preliminary findings were related to air intrusion into the Component

Cooling Water (CCW) system that occurred in October 2008, and involved (1) the failure of a

non-safety system that could result in a common cause failure of both trains of the CCW

system, contrary to 10 CFR 50 Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control, and (2) the failure to

identify and correct a condition adverse to quality involving the source of the air in-leakage into

the CCW system, contrary to 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, Corrective Action. The

NRCs Inspection Report identified two apparent violations corresponding to the two preliminary

findings.

At your request, a Regulatory Conference was held on February 19, 2010, to discuss your views

on these issues. During the conference, your staff described the circumstances surrounding the

October 2008 event, Florida Power and Light Companys (FPLs) assessment of the

significance of the two preliminary findings, its root cause evaluation, and the corrective actions

taken. FPL highlighted several differences between its risk assessment and the NRCs

preliminary risk assessment as documented in our inspection report of January 19, 2010. At the

conference, FPL contested the preliminary finding and apparent violation involving 10 CFR 50,

Appendix B, Criterion III. In summary, FPL concluded that when St. Lucie Unit 1 was licensed,

the facility was not required to incorporate a single failure design capability for a non-safety

system. As such, FPL concluded that a violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, did not

occur. Regarding the second preliminary finding involving the failure to identify and correct the

source of air in-leakage into the CCW system, FPL concluded that the significance of the finding

should be characterized as Green. FPL did not contest the validity of the corresponding

10 CFR 50 Appendix B, Criterion XVI violation.

FPL 2

Regarding the preliminary finding involving 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, the NRC

considered the information provided by FPL at the conference, and reviewed available

information to determine the applicability of design control regulations to St. Lucie Unit 1. This

included a review of the requirements at the time St. Lucie Unit 1 was originally licensed, the

Safety Evaluation Report issued by the NRC following the review of St. Lucie Unit 1 design, the

Final Safety Analysis Report, and the single failure analysis associated with the CCW system.

Based on the review, the NRC determined that the Unit 1 CCW system met the design

requirements at the time of licensing and at the time of the October 2008 air intrusion event.

Therefore, this issue does not represent a performance deficiency, and accordingly, a violation

of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion III did not occur. Accordingly, Apparent Violation

05000335, 389/2009006-05, Failure to Translate Design Basis Specifications to Prevent Single

Failure of CCW is considered closed.

After considering the information developed during the inspection and information provided by

FPL during and after the conference, the NRC has concluded that the finding involving the

failure to identify and correct the source of the air in-leakage into the CCW system is

characterized as Yellow, i.e., a finding of substantial significance with regard to safety, which will

require additional NRC inspections. The bases for the NRCs significance determination of this

finding, and the differences in the licensees characterization of the findings, are discussed in

Enclosure 2.

You have 30 calendar days from the date of this letter to appeal the staff=s significance

determination for the Yellow finding. Such appeals will be considered to have merit only if they

meet the criteria given in NRC Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Attachment 2.

The NRC also has determined that the failure to identify and correct the source of the air in-

leakage into the CCW system is a violation of 10 CFR 50 Appendix B, Criterion XVI, as cited in

the enclosed Notice of Violation (Notice). The circumstances surrounding the violation were

described in detail in NRC Inspection Report No. 05000335/2009006 and 05000389/2009006,

dated January 19, 2010 (ML100210081). In accordance with the NRC Enforcement Policy, the

Notice is considered escalated enforcement action because it is associated with a Yellow

finding.

For administrative purposes, this letter is issued as a separate NRC Inspection Report,

No. 05000335/2010007 and 05000389/2010007. Apparent Violation 05000335, 389/2009006-

06, related to the CCW air intrusion event, is now Violation 05000335/2009006-06, Failure to

Identify and Correct a Condition Adverse to Quality. This violation was determined to have a

cross-cutting aspect in the area of Human Performance, Decision Making, specifically H.1(a).

Because plant performance for this issue has been determined to be beyond the licensee

response band of the NRC Action Matrix, we will use the Action Matrix to determine the most

appropriate NRC response for this event. We will notify you, by separate correspondence, of

that determination.

The NRC has concluded that information regarding the reason for the violation, the corrective

actions taken and planned to correct the violation and prevent recurrence and the date when full

compliance will be achieved is already adequately addressed on the docket in the St. Lucie

FPL 3

Meeting Summary, dated February 26, 2010 (ML100601170). Therefore, you are not required

to respond to this letter unless the description therein does not accurately reflect your corrective

actions or your position. However, you are required to submit a written statement or explanation

pursuant to 10 CFR 2.201 if the description therein does not accurately reflect your corrective

actions or your position. In that case, please follow the instructions specified in the Notice of

Violation, Enclosure 1.

In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter,

Enclosures 1 and 2, and your response, if any, will be made available electronically for public

inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the NRC=s document system (ADAMS),

accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html. To the extent

possible, your response, if any, should not include any personal privacy, proprietary, or

safeguards information so that it can be made available to the Public without redaction. If

personal privacy or proprietary information is necessary to provide an acceptable response,

please provide a bracketed copy of your response that identifies the information that should be

protected and a redacted copy of your response that deletes such information. If you request

withholding of such information, you must specifically identify the portions of your response that

you seek to have withheld and provide in detail the bases for your claim of withholding (e.g.,

explain why the disclosure of information will create an unwarranted invasion of personal

privacy or provide the information required by 10 CFR 2.390(b) to support a request for

withholding confidential commercial or financial information). The NRC also includes significant

enforcement actions on its Web site at

http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/enforcement/actions/).

Sincerely,

/RA/

Luis A. Reyes

Regional Administrator

Docket Nos.: 50-335, 50-389

License Nos.: DPR-67 and NPF-16

Enclosures: 1. Notice of Violation

2. NRC Bases for Final Significance Determination

cc w/encls: (See page 4)

_________________________ G SUNSI REVIEW COMPLETE

OFFICE RII:ORA RII:DRS RII:DRS RII:DRS RII:DRP RII:DRS RII:ORA

SIGNATURE RA RA RA VIA EMAIL RA RA RA

NAME CEvans WRogers BDesai KKennedy LWert JLubinski VMcCree

DATE 4/7/2010 4/5/2010 3/31/2010 4/14/2010 4/14/20104/ 4/13/20104/ 4/15/2010

E-MAIL COPY? YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES/2010 NO YES/2010 NO YES NO

OFFICE OE NRR

SIGNATURE email Email

NAME RZimmerman MCUNNINGHAM

DATE 4/14/2010 4/8/2010 4/ /2010 4/ /2010 4/ /2010 4/ /2010 4/ /2010

E-MAIL COPY? YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO

FPL 4

cc w/encl: Marjan Mashhadi

Richard L. Anderson Senior Attorney

Site Vice President Florida Power & Light Company

St. Lucie Nuclear Plant Electronic Mail Distribution

Electronic Mail Distribution

William A. Passetti

Robert J. Hughes Chief

Plant General Manager Florida Bureau of Radiation Control

St. Lucie Nuclear Plant Department of Health

Electronic Mail Distribution Electronic Mail Distribution

Gene St. Pierre Ruben D. Almaguer

Vice President, Fleet Support Director

Florida Power & Light Company Division of Emergency Preparedness

Electronic Mail Distribution Department of Community Affairs

Electronic Mail Distribution

Ronnie Lingle

Operations Manager J. Kammel

St. Lucie Nuclear Plant Radiological Emergency Planning

Electronic Mail Distribution Administrator

Department of Public Safety

Eric Katzman Electronic Mail Distribution

Licensing Manager

St. Lucie Nuclear Plant Mano Nazar

Electronic Mail Distribution Executive Vice President and Chief Nuclear

Officer

Abdy Khanpour Florida Power & Light Company

Vice President P. O. Box 14000

Engineering Support Juno Beach, FL 33408

Florida Power and Light Company

P.O. Box 14000 (Vacant)

Juno Beach, FL 33408-0420 Vice President

Nuclear Plant Support

Larry Nicholson Florida Power & Light Company

Director Electronic Mail Distribution

Licensing

Florida Power & Light Company Seth B. Dunston

Electronic Mail Distribution Training Manager

St. Lucie Nuclear Plant

Alison Brown Electronic Mail Distribution

Nuclear Licensing

Florida Power & Light Company Faye Outlaw

Electronic Mail Distribution County Administrator

St. Lucie County

Mitch S. Ross Electronic Mail Distribution

Vice President and Associate General

Counsel Jack Southard

Florida Power & Light Company Director

Electronic Mail Distribution Public Safety Department

St. Lucie County

Electronic Mail Distribution

FPL 5

Letter to Mano Nazar from Luis A. Reyes dated April xx, 2010

SUBJECT: FINAL SIGNIFICANCE DETERMINATION FOR A YELLOW FINDING AND

NOTICE OF VIOLATION (NRC COMPONENT DESIGN BASES INSPECTION

REPORT 05000335/2010007 AND 05000389/2010007), ST. LUCIE NUCLEAR

PLANT

Distribution w/encls:

C. Evans, RII

L. Slack, RII

OE Mail

RIDSNRRDIRS

PUBLIC

RidsNrrPMStLucie Resource

R. Borchardt, OEDO

R. Zimmerman, OE

E. Julian, SECY

B. Keeling, OCA

Enforcement Coordinators, RI, RIII, RIV

E. Hayden, OPA

C. McCrary, OI

H. Bell, OIG

E. Leeds, NRR

M. Ashley, NRR

B. Mozafari, NRR

C. Scott, OGC

D. Decker, OCA

G. Gulla, OE

J. Circle, NRR

L. Reyes, RII

V. McCree, RII

K. Kennedy, RII

J. Lubinski, RII

L. Wert, RII

B. Desai, RII

M. Sykes, RII

R. Nease, RII

W. Rogers, RII

S. Sparks, RII

NOTICE OF VIOLATION

Florida Power and Light Docket No. 50-335

St. Lucie Nuclear Plant DPR-67

Unit 1 EA-09-321

During an inspection completed by the NRC on December 10, 2009, a violation of NRC

requirements was identified. The circumstances surrounding the violation were described in

detail in NRC Inspection Report No. 05000335/2009006 and 05000389/2009006, dated January

19, 2010 (ML100210081). In accordance with the NRC Enforcement Policy, the violation is

listed below:

10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, Corrective Action, states that measures shall

be established to assure that conditions adverse to quality, such as deficiencies,

deviations, and non-conformances are promptly identified and corrected. In the case of

significant conditions adverse to quality, the measures shall assure that the cause of the

condition is determined and corrective action taken to preclude repetition.

Contrary to the above, the licensee failed to identify and correct a significant condition

adverse to quality affecting the Component Cooling Water (CCW) system. Specifically,

in October 2008, air intrusion from the containment instrument air (IA) system into the

CCW system occurred which affected both redundant trains of the CCW system. The

troubleshooting and subsequent corrective actions that were implemented by the

licensee failed to identify the source of the air in-leakage and ensure that the CCW

system remained capable of delivering adequate cooling to essential equipment used to

mitigate design bases accidents. In addition, the corrective actions failed to preclude a

similar air intrusion event into the CCW system in November 2009.

This violation is associated with a Yellow Significance Determination Process finding for

Unit 1 in the Initiating Events cornerstone.

The NRC has concluded that information regarding the reason for the violation, the corrective

actions taken and planned to correct the violation and prevent recurrence and the date when full

compliance will be achieved is already adequately addressed on the docket in the St. Lucie

Meeting Summary, dated February 26, 2010 (ML100601170). Therefore, you are not required

to respond to this letter unless the description therein does not accurately reflect your corrective

actions or your position. However, you are required to submit a written statement or explanation

pursuant to 10 CFR 2.201 if the description therein does not accurately reflect your corrective

actions or your position. In that case, or if you choose to respond, clearly mark your response

as a "Reply to a Notice of Violation," include the EA number, and send it to the U.S. Nuclear

Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001 with a

copy to the Regional Administrator, Region II, and a copy to the NRC Resident Inspector at the

facility that is the subject of this Notice, within 30 days of the date of the letter transmitting this

Notice of Violation (Notice).

Enclosure 1

NOV 2

If you choose to respond, your response will be made available electronically for public

inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the NRC=s document system (ADAMS),

accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html. Therefore, to

the extent possible, the response should not include any personal privacy, proprietary, or

safeguards information so that it can be made available to the Public without redaction. If

personal privacy or proprietary information is necessary to provide an acceptable response,

then please provide a bracketed copy of your response that identifies the information that

should be protected and a redacted copy of your response that deletes such information. If you

request withholding of such material, you must specifically identify the portions of your response

that you seek to have withheld and provide in detail the bases for your claim of withholding (e.g.,

explain why the disclosure of information will create an unwarranted invasion of personal

privacy or provide the information required by 10 CFR 2.390(b) to support a request for

withholding confidential commercial or financial information). If safeguards information is

necessary to provide an acceptable response, please provide the level of protection described

in 10 CFR 73.21.

If you contest this enforcement action, you should also provide a copy of your response, with

the basis for your denial, to the Director, Office of Enforcement, United States Nuclear

Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001.

In accordance with 10 CFR 19.11, you may be required to post this Notice within two working

days.

Dated this 19th day of April 2010.

Enclosure 1

EA-09-321

NRC Bases for Final Significance Determination

On February 19, 2010, the NRC held a regulatory conference with representatives of FPL, St.

Lucie Nuclear Plant, to discuss two preliminary Greater than Green inspection findings

documented in NRC Inspection Report 05000335, 389/2009006 (ML100210081). These

findings concerned issues associated with an October 8, 2008, air intrusion event from the Unit

1 containment instrument air system into the CCW system.

At the regulatory conference, FPL highlighted their assumptions in determining the risk

associated with the air intrusion event as Green. These assumptions differed in some instances

with those used by the NRC in the preliminary significance determination. In determining the

final significance, NRC considered FPL assumptions and factored them into the significance

determination process when appropriate. A number of FPLs assumptions were fully accepted

and integrated into the NRC final significance determination. These assumptions included: the

most probable outcome of air intrusion into the CCW system would be operators terminating the

event by isolating the air intrusion source; the dominant accident sequence was operators failing

to stop the air intrusion prior to CCW failure followed by operators failing to trip the reactor

coolant pumps (RCPs) upon a loss of CCW; and, operators would follow established

procedures to the best of their abilities. Also, based upon FPLs input, the final NRC

significance determination assumed that operators had time to stop the air intrusion before

CCW system failure.

There were several differences between NRC and FPL in NRCs final significance

determination. The paragraphs below provide a summary of the differences and the bases for

the NRCs final significance determination.

FPL assumed that due to the preponderance of alarms available to the operators, it was highly

likely that the operators would trip the reactor and stop the RCPs before CCW system failure

would occur. The NRC did not consider these actions in the preliminary significance

determination. However, based upon FPLs input, it was included in the final significance

determination. The NRC recognized that available alarms would indicate irregular flow in the

CCW system and that some of these alarms would direct operators to stop the RCPs and trip

the reactor. However, the NRC assumed that the collective set of alarms and indications would

provide for competing actions to trip the CCW pumps and/or trip the RCPs. Further, some of

the alarms would occur either after CCW failure or at imminent failure. Therefore, assigning a

probability to the actions to trip the reactor and stopping the RCPs prior to CCW failure as highly

likely was not used. Instead, as an assumption for the final significance determination, a less

likely probability than assumed by FPL was assigned by the NRC. Specifically, the NRC

assigned a 50/50 probability that operators would trip the reactor and stop the RCPs prior to

CCW failure in the final significance determination as compared to FPL, which did not present

specific numbers at the conference but, indicated a significantly high probability for operators

succeeding in this action.

Enclosure 2

EA-09-321 2

According to FPLs calculations, the conditional core damage probability associated with the air

intrusion event, based upon the latest plant specific PRA and the NRCs SPAR model, varied

between 1E-4 & 6E-4. The NRC used the latest available information regarding the RCP seals,

the procedures associated with the RCPs, and operator training in updating the NRCs SPAR

model of St. Lucie. Further, the NRC, in contrast to FPL, used an 8 hour9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> versus 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />

exposure time for RCP seal failure in the final conditional core damage probability calculation to

account for a standard reactor shutdown.

As a result, the NRC determined that the conditional core damage probability associated with

this event was 5.6E-4. Although the NRC applied a different methodology, this numerical result

was consistent with the licensees input and had no affect on the final significance

determination.

FPL did not present specific numbers but assumed that the probability of operators failing to

recognize and mitigate the air intrusion before CCW pump failure was two to three orders of

magnitude less than 1E-1, the number assigned by the NRC, in the preliminary significance

determination.

The failure probability used by the NRC for the final significance determination, like FPL,

included a dependency, since different crews would be involved in the recognition and

mitigation of the air intrusion event. The NRC used a standard Human Reliability Assessment

(HRA) protocol in determining the assumption for this operator failure probability in the final

significance determination. Like FPL, the performance shaping factors used in the final HRA

included 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> for operators to recognize and mitigate air intrusion before CCW failure.

However, NRC differed from FPL in the performance shaping factor contributions due to the fact

that no specific procedure existed to direct operators in diagnosing air intrusion into the CCW

system, the high level of complexity associated with diagnosing the source of air intrusion, and

limited operator training/experience associated with CCW events of this nature. In its final

significance determination, the NRC, after factoring in all the performance shaping factors, used

6.58 E-2 as the probability that operators would not stop the air intrusion into the CCW system

prior to pump failure. While FPL did not present specific numbers, their assumptions differed by

approximately two to three magnitudes from the NRC. This difference in performance shaping

factor assumptions was effectively the most significant difference between the NRC and FPL in

determining the final significance associated with the event.

In conclusion, FPL determined, based on best-estimate assumptions, that the delta core

damage frequency (CDF) increase was less than 1E-6. The NRC did not agree with FPLs

determination of delta CDF being less than 1E-6. Even after factoring in numerous FPL

assumptions, NRC determined the delta CDF for the CCW air intrusion performance deficiency

to be approximately 2E-5. With this delta CDF being greater than 1E-5, the performance

deficiency was classified as Yellow.

Enclosure 2

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