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{{#Wiki_filter:UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION II 245 PEACHTREE CENTER AVENUE NE, SUITE 1200 ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30303-1257 May 6, 2011 Mr. David A. Heacock President and Chief Nuclear Officer Virginia Electric and Power Company Innsbrook Technical Center 5000 Dominion Boulevard Glen Allen, VA 23060-6711  
{{#Wiki_filter:UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION II 245 PEACHTREE CENTER AVENUE NE, SUITE 1200 ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30303-1257 May 6, 2011 Mr. David A. Heacock President and Chief Nuclear Officer Virginia Electric and Power Company Innsbrook Technical Center 5000 Dominion Boulevard Glen Allen, VA 23060-6711


==SUBJECT:==
==SUBJECT:==
NORTH ANNA POWER STATION - NRC INTEGRATED INSPECTION   REPORT 05000338/2011002 AND 05000339/2011002 - ERRATA  
NORTH ANNA POWER STATION - NRC INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000338/2011002 AND 05000339/2011002 - ERRATA


==Dear Mr. Heacock:==
==Dear Mr. Heacock:==
Line 26: Line 26:
In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter and its enclosure will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of NRC's document system (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html http://www.nrc.gov/NRC/ADAMS/index.html (The Public Electronic Reading Room).
In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter and its enclosure will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of NRC's document system (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html http://www.nrc.gov/NRC/ADAMS/index.html (The Public Electronic Reading Room).
I apologize for any inconvenience this error may have caused. If you have any questions, please contact me at (404) 997-4551.
I apologize for any inconvenience this error may have caused. If you have any questions, please contact me at (404) 997-4551.
Sincerely,       /RA/  
Sincerely,
 
                                              /RA/
Gerald J. McCoy, Chief Reactor Projects Branch 5 Division of Reactor Projects  
Gerald J. McCoy, Chief Reactor Projects Branch 5 Division of Reactor Projects Docket No.: 50-338 and 50-339 License No.: NPF-4 and NPF-7
 
Docket No.: 50-338 and 50-339 License No.: NPF-4 and NPF-7  


==Enclosure:==
==Enclosure:==
As stated  
As stated cc w/encl: (See page2)
 
cc w/encl: (See page2)  
 
_____ML111260625    _____  G  SUNSI REVIEW COMPLETE OFFICE RII:DRP RII:DRP      SIGNATURE JSD /RA/ GJM /RA/      NAME JDodson GMcCoy      DATE 05/06/2011 05/06/2011      E-MAIL COPY?    YES NO  YES NO  YES NO  YES NO  YES NO  YES NO  YES NO VEPCO 3  cc w/encl: Daniel G. Stoddard Senior Vice President Nuclear Operations Virginia Electric and Power Company Electronic Mail Distribution Fred Mladen Director, Station Safety & Licensing Virginia Electric and Power Company Electronic Mail Distribution N. L. Lane Site Vice President North Anna Power Station Virginia Electric & Power Company Electronic Mail Distribution Chris L. Funderburk Director, Nuclear Licensing & Operations Support Virginia Electric and Power Company Electronic Mail Distribution Lillian M. Cuoco, Esq. Senior Counsel Dominion Resources Services, Inc. Electronic Mail Distribution Executive Vice President Old Dominion Electric Cooperative Electronic Mail Distribution Ginger L. Melton Virginia Electric and Power Company Electronic Mail Distribution
 
Attorney General Supreme Court Building 900 East Main Street Richmond, VA  23219 Michael M. Cline Director Virginia Department of Emergency Services Management Electronic Mail Distribution


County Administrator Louisa County P.O. Box 160 Louisa, VA   23093
_____ML111260625      _____            G SUNSI REVIEW COMPLETE OFFICE            RII:DRP        RII:DRP SIGNATURE          JSD /RA/        GJM /RA/
NAME              JDodson        GMcCoy DATE                  05/06/2011      05/06/2011 E-MAIL COPY?        YES        NO  YES        NO YES      NO  YES      NO  YES      NO   YES        NO  YES  NO


Michael Crist Plant Manager North Anna Power Station Virginia Electric & Power Company Electronic Mail Distribution  
VEPCO                                    3 cc w/encl:                                County Administrator Daniel G. Stoddard                        Louisa County Senior Vice President                      P.O. Box 160 Nuclear Operations                        Louisa, VA 23093 Virginia Electric and Power Company Electronic Mail Distribution              Michael Crist Plant Manager Fred Mladen                                North Anna Power Station Director, Station Safety & Licensing      Virginia Electric & Power Company Virginia Electric and Power Company        Electronic Mail Distribution Electronic Mail Distribution N. L. Lane Site Vice President North Anna Power Station Virginia Electric & Power Company Electronic Mail Distribution Chris L. Funderburk Director, Nuclear Licensing & Operations Support Virginia Electric and Power Company Electronic Mail Distribution Lillian M. Cuoco, Esq.
Senior Counsel Dominion Resources Services, Inc.
Electronic Mail Distribution Executive Vice President Old Dominion Electric Cooperative Electronic Mail Distribution Ginger L. Melton Virginia Electric and Power Company Electronic Mail Distribution Attorney General Supreme Court Building 900 East Main Street Richmond, VA 23219 Michael M. Cline Director Virginia Department of Emergency Services Management Electronic Mail Distribution


VEPCO 3 Letter to David A. Heacock from Gerald J. McCoy dated May 6, 2011  
VEPCO                                     3 Letter to David A. Heacock from Gerald J. McCoy dated May 6, 2011


==SUBJECT:==
==SUBJECT:==
NORTH ANNA POWER STATION - NRC INTEGRATED INSPECTION   REPORT 05000338/2011002 AND 05000339/2011002 - ERRATA  
NORTH ANNA POWER STATION - NRC INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000338/2011002 AND 05000339/2011002 - ERRATA Distribution w/encl:
C. Evans, RII L. Douglas, RII OE Mail RIDSNRRDIRS PUBLIC RidsNrrPMNorthAnna Resource


Distribution w/encl
7 pump) was in operation; and (4) verified that level alarm circuits were set appropriately to ensure that the cables would not be submerged.
: C. Evans, RII L. Douglas, RII OE Mail RIDSNRRDIRS PUBLIC RidsNrrPMNorthAnna Resource 7 Enclosure pump) was in operation; and (4) verified that level alarm circuits were set appropriately to ensure that the cables would not be submerged.
* 01-BLD-MBAR-5MH03
* 01-BLD-MBAR-5MH03
* 01-BLD-MBAR-5MH04
* 01-BLD-MBAR-5MH04
Line 57: Line 52:
* 01-BLD-MBAR-50MH-4
* 01-BLD-MBAR-50MH-4
: b. Findings No findings were identified.
: b. Findings No findings were identified.
1R11 Licensed Operator Requalification Program Operating Experience Smart Sample (OpESS) FY 2010-02 "Sample Selections for Reviewing Licensed Operator Examinations and Training Conducted on the Plant-Reference Simulator
1R11 Licensed Operator Requalification Program Operating Experience Smart Sample (OpESS) FY 2010-02 Sample Selections for Reviewing Licensed Operator Examinations and Training Conducted on the Plant-Reference Simulator
"    a. Inspection Scope The inspectors observed an operator requalification complex situation simulator scenario which involved a loss of main condenser vacuum, failure of the control rods to move in automatic, secondary system transients induced by multiple failures of heater drain pumps, a failure of the reactor to trip on a manual attempt, control rod failure, shaft failure of a motor driven AFW pump, loss of an emergency 4160V bus and respective EDG, and a faulted steam generator.  
: a. Inspection Scope The inspectors observed an operator requalification complex situation simulator scenario which involved a loss of main condenser vacuum, failure of the control rods to move in automatic, secondary system transients induced by multiple failures of heater drain pumps, a failure of the reactor to trip on a manual attempt, control rod failure, shaft failure of a motor driven AFW pump, loss of an emergency 4160V bus and respective EDG, and a faulted steam generator.
 
The inspectors observed crew performance in terms of communications; ability to prioritize failures in order to take timely and proper actions; prioritizing, interpreting, and verifying alarms; correct use and implementation of procedures, including the alarm response procedures; timely control board operation and manipulation, including high-risk operator actions; and oversight and direction provided by the shift supervisor, including the ability to identify and implement appropriate TS actions. The inspectors observed the post training critique to determine that weaknesses or improvement areas revealed by the training were captured by the instructor and reviewed with the operators.
The inspectors observed crew performance in terms of communications; ability to prioritize failures in order to take timely and proper actions; prioritizing, interpreting, and verifying alarms; correct use and implementation of procedures, including the alarm response procedures; timely control board operation and manipulation, including high-risk operator actions; and oversight and direction provided by the shift supervisor, including the ability to identify and implement appropriate TS actions. The inspectors observed the post training critique to determine that weaknesses or improvement areas revealed by the training were captured by the instructor and reviewed with the operators.
: b. Findings No findings were identified.
: b. Findings No findings were identified.
1R12 Maintenance Effectiveness
1R12 Maintenance Effectiveness
: a. Inspection Scope For the three equipment issues listed below, the inspectors evaluated the effectiveness of the respective licensee's preventive and corrective maintenance. The inspectors performed walkdowns of the accessible portions of the systems, performed in-office  
: a. Inspection Scope For the three equipment issues listed below, the inspectors evaluated the effectiveness of the respective licensee's preventive and corrective maintenance. The inspectors performed walkdowns of the accessible portions of the systems, performed in-office Enclosure


8 Enclosure reviews of procedures and evaluations, and held discussions with licensee staff. The inspectors compared the licensee's actions with the requirements of the Maintenance Rule (10 CFR 50.65), and licensee procedure ER-AA-MRL-10, "Maintenance Rule Program," Revision 4.
8 reviews of procedures and evaluations, and held discussions with licensee staff. The inspectors compared the licensees actions with the requirements of the Maintenance Rule (10 CFR 50.65), and licensee procedure ER-AA-MRL-10, Maintenance Rule Program, Revision 4.
* MRE 013094, "Annnunciator J-C4 received for 2-RS-P-2A seal head tank low level"
* MRE 013094, Annnunciator J-C4 received for 2-RS-P-2A seal head tank low level
* MRE 013005, "MRE to engineering to address unanalyzed scaffolding in 1-CH-P-1A"
* MRE 013005, MRE to engineering to address unanalyzed scaffolding in 1-CH-P-1A
* MRE 013051, "MRE to engineering for tool left in 1-EP-BKR-BYB after last PM"
* MRE 013051, MRE to engineering for tool left in 1-EP-BKR-BYB after last PM
: b. Findings The enforcement aspects for scaffolding in the 1-CH-P-1A room are discussed in section 4OA2.2 of this report.
: b. Findings The enforcement aspects for scaffolding in the 1-CH-P-1A room are discussed in section 4OA2.2 of this report.
1R13 Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control
1R13 Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control
: a. Inspection Scope The inspectors evaluated, as appropriate, the four activities listed below for the following: (1) effectiveness of the risk assessments performed before maintenance activities were conducted; (2) management of risk; (3) upon identification of an unforeseen situation, necessary steps were taken to plan and control the resulting emergent work activities; and (4) maintenance risk assessments and emergent work problems were adequately identified and resolved. The inspectors verified that the licensee was in compliance with the requirements of 10 CFR 50.65 (a)(4) and the data output from the licensee's safety monitor associated with the risk profile of Units 1 and 2.
: a. Inspection Scope The inspectors evaluated, as appropriate, the four activities listed below for the following:
(1) effectiveness of the risk assessments performed before maintenance activities were conducted; (2) management of risk; (3) upon identification of an unforeseen situation, necessary steps were taken to plan and control the resulting emergent work activities; and (4) maintenance risk assessments and emergent work problems were adequately identified and resolved. The inspectors verified that the licensee was in compliance with the requirements of 10 CFR 50.65 (a)(4) and the data output from the licensees safety monitor associated with the risk profile of Units 1 and 2.
* Emergent down power on Unit 2 for main turbine condenser waterbox tube leaks
* Emergent down power on Unit 2 for main turbine condenser waterbox tube leaks
* Emergent work on Unit 2 '2H' EDG to replace breaker for pre-lube pump
* Emergent work on Unit 2 '2H' EDG to replace breaker for pre-lube pump
* Emergent work on 2-RS-P-2A due to low seal head tank level
* Emergent work on 2-RS-P-2A due to low seal head tank level
* Entry into 0-AP-41, "Severe Weather Condition," Revision 52, on February 28, 2011 due to issuance of a tornado watch
* Entry into 0-AP-41, Severe Weather Condition, Revision 52, on February 28, 2011 due to issuance of a tornado watch
: b. Findings No findings were identified.
: b. Findings No findings were identified.
1R15 Operability Evaluations
1R15 Operability Evaluations
: a. Inspection Scope The inspectors reviewed five operability evaluations, listed below, affecting risk-significant mitigating systems, to assess, as appropriate: (1) the technical adequacy of the evaluations; (2) whether continued system operability was warranted; (3) whether other existing degraded conditions were considered as compensating measures; (4) whether the compensatory measures, if involved, were in place, would work as intended, and were appropriately controlled; and (5) where continued operability was considered 7 Enclosure pump) was in operation; and (4) verified that level alarm circuits were set appropriately to ensure that the cables would not be submerged.
: a. Inspection Scope The inspectors reviewed five operability evaluations, listed below, affecting risk-significant mitigating systems, to assess, as appropriate: (1) the technical adequacy of the evaluations; (2) whether continued system operability was warranted; (3) whether other existing degraded conditions were considered as compensating measures; (4) whether the compensatory measures, if involved, were in place, would work as intended, and were appropriately controlled; and (5) where continued operability was considered Enclosure
 
7 pump) was in operation; and (4) verified that level alarm circuits were set appropriately to ensure that the cables would not be submerged.
* 01-BLD-MBAR-5MH03
* 01-BLD-MBAR-5MH03
* 01-BLD-MBAR-5MH04
* 01-BLD-MBAR-5MH04
Line 84: Line 81:
* 01-BLD-MBAR-50MH-4
* 01-BLD-MBAR-50MH-4
: b. Findings No findings were identified.
: b. Findings No findings were identified.
1R11 Licensed Operator Requalification Program Operating Experience Smart Sample (OpESS) FY 2010-02 "Sample Selections for Reviewing Licensed Operator Examinations and Training Conducted on the Plant-Reference Simulator
1R11 Licensed Operator Requalification Program Operating Experience Smart Sample (OpESS) FY 2010-02 Sample Selections for Reviewing Licensed Operator Examinations and Training Conducted on the Plant-Reference Simulator
"    a. Inspection Scope The inspectors observed an operator requalification complex situation simulator scenario which involved a loss of main condenser vacuum, failure of the control rods to move in automatic, secondary system transients induced by multiple failures of heater drain pumps, a failure of the reactor to trip on a manual attempt, control rod failure, shaft failure of a motor driven AFW pump, loss of an emergency 4160V bus and respective EDG, and a faulted steam generator.
: a. Inspection Scope The inspectors observed an operator requalification complex situation simulator scenario which involved a loss of main condenser vacuum, failure of the control rods to move in automatic, secondary system transients induced by multiple failures of heater drain pumps, a failure of the reactor to trip on a manual attempt, control rod failure, shaft failure of a motor driven AFW pump, loss of an emergency 4160V bus and respective EDG, and a faulted steam generator.
The inspectors observed crew performance in terms of communications; ability to prioritize failures in order to take timely and proper actions; prioritizing, interpreting, and verifying alarms; correct use and implementation of procedures, including the alarm response procedures; timely control board operation and manipulation, including high-risk operator actions; and oversight and direction provided by the shift supervisor, including the ability to identify and implement appropriate TS actions. The inspectors observed the post training critique to determine that weaknesses or improvement areas revealed by the training were captured by the instructor and reviewed with the operators.
The inspectors observed crew performance in terms of communications; ability to prioritize failures in order to take timely and proper actions; prioritizing, interpreting, and verifying alarms; correct use and implementation of procedures, including the alarm response procedures; timely control board operation and manipulation, including high-risk operator actions; and oversight and direction provided by the shift supervisor, including the ability to identify and implement appropriate TS actions. The inspectors observed the post training critique to determine that weaknesses or improvement areas revealed by the training were captured by the instructor and reviewed with the operators.
: b. Findings No findings were identified.
: b. Findings No findings were identified.
1R12 Maintenance Effectiveness
1R12 Maintenance Effectiveness
: a. Inspection Scope For the two equipment issues listed below, the inspectors evaluated the effectiveness of the respective licensee's preventive and corrective maintenance. The inspectors performed walkdowns of the accessible portions of the systems, performed in-office 8 Enclosure reviews of procedures and evaluations, and held discussions with licensee staff. The inspectors compared the licensee's actions with the requirements of the Maintenance Rule (10 CFR 50.65), and licensee procedure ER-AA-MRL-10, "Maintenance Rule Program," Revision 4.
: a. Inspection Scope For the two equipment issues listed below, the inspectors evaluated the effectiveness of the respective licensee's preventive and corrective maintenance. The inspectors performed walkdowns of the accessible portions of the systems, performed in-office Enclosure
* MRE 013094, "Annunciator J-C4 received for 2-RS-P-2A seal head tank low level"
 
* MRE 013051, "MRE to engineering for tool left in 1-EP-BKR-BYB after last PM"
8 reviews of procedures and evaluations, and held discussions with licensee staff. The inspectors compared the licensees actions with the requirements of the Maintenance Rule (10 CFR 50.65), and licensee procedure ER-AA-MRL-10, Maintenance Rule Program, Revision 4.
* MRE 013094, Annunciator J-C4 received for 2-RS-P-2A seal head tank low level
* MRE 013051, MRE to engineering for tool left in 1-EP-BKR-BYB after last PM
: b. Findings No findings were identified.
: b. Findings No findings were identified.
1R13 Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control
1R13 Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control
: a. Inspection Scope The inspectors evaluated, as appropriate, the four activities listed below for the following: (1) effectiveness of the risk assessments performed before maintenance activities were conducted; (2) management of risk; (3) upon identification of an unforeseen situation, necessary steps were taken to plan and control the resulting emergent work activities; and (4) maintenance risk assessments and emergent work problems were adequately identified and resolved. The inspectors verified that the licensee was in compliance with the requirements of 10 CFR 50.65 (a)(4) and the data output from the licensee's safety monitor associated with the risk profile of Units 1 and 2.
: a. Inspection Scope The inspectors evaluated, as appropriate, the four activities listed below for the following:
(1) effectiveness of the risk assessments performed before maintenance activities were conducted; (2) management of risk; (3) upon identification of an unforeseen situation, necessary steps were taken to plan and control the resulting emergent work activities; and (4) maintenance risk assessments and emergent work problems were adequately identified and resolved. The inspectors verified that the licensee was in compliance with the requirements of 10 CFR 50.65 (a)(4) and the data output from the licensees safety monitor associated with the risk profile of Units 1 and 2.
* Emergent down power on Unit 2 for main turbine condenser waterbox tube leaks
* Emergent down power on Unit 2 for main turbine condenser waterbox tube leaks
* Emergent work on Unit 2 '2H' EDG to replace breaker for pre-lube pump
* Emergent work on Unit 2 '2H' EDG to replace breaker for pre-lube pump
* Emergent work on 2-RS-P-2A due to low seal head tank level
* Emergent work on 2-RS-P-2A due to low seal head tank level
* Entry into 0-AP-41, "Severe Weather Condition," Revision 52, on February 28, 2011 due to issuance of a tornado watch
* Entry into 0-AP-41, Severe Weather Condition, Revision 52, on February 28, 2011 due to issuance of a tornado watch
: c. Findings No findings were identified.
: c. Findings No findings were identified.
1R15 Operability Evaluations
1R15 Operability Evaluations
: a. Inspection Scope The inspectors reviewed five operability evaluations, listed below, affecting risk-significant mitigating systems, to assess, as appropriate: (1) the technical adequacy of the evaluations; (2) whether continued system operability was warranted; (3) whether other existing degraded conditions were considered as compensating measures; (4) whether the compensatory measures, if involved, were in place, would work as intended, and were appropriately controlled; and (5) where continued operability was considered}}
: a. Inspection Scope The inspectors reviewed five operability evaluations, listed below, affecting risk-significant mitigating systems, to assess, as appropriate: (1) the technical adequacy of the evaluations; (2) whether continued system operability was warranted; (3) whether other existing degraded conditions were considered as compensating measures; (4) whether the compensatory measures, if involved, were in place, would work as intended, and were appropriately controlled; and (5) where continued operability was considered Enclosure}}

Revision as of 00:04, 13 November 2019

Inspection Report 2011002 Errata
ML111260625
Person / Time
Site: North Anna  Dominion icon.png
Issue date: 05/06/2011
From: Gerald Mccoy
NRC/RGN-II/DRP/RPB5
To: Heacock D
Virginia Electric & Power Co (VEPCO)
References
IR-11-002
Download: ML111260625 (8)


Text

UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION II 245 PEACHTREE CENTER AVENUE NE, SUITE 1200 ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30303-1257 May 6, 2011 Mr. David A. Heacock President and Chief Nuclear Officer Virginia Electric and Power Company Innsbrook Technical Center 5000 Dominion Boulevard Glen Allen, VA 23060-6711

SUBJECT:

NORTH ANNA POWER STATION - NRC INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000338/2011002 AND 05000339/2011002 - ERRATA

Dear Mr. Heacock:

On May 2, 2011, the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) issued the subject integrated inspection report for the North Anna Power Station Units 1 and 2, ADAMS accession ML111220520. In reviewing the report, it was noted that under Maintenance Effectiveness (section 1R12) we inadvertently stated three instead of two equipment issues, inadvertently included evaluation of MRE 013005 as being completed, and incorrectly referenced enforcement aspects in the findings section. Accordingly, we are providing the revised pages.

In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter and its enclosure will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of NRC's document system (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html http://www.nrc.gov/NRC/ADAMS/index.html (The Public Electronic Reading Room).

I apologize for any inconvenience this error may have caused. If you have any questions, please contact me at (404) 997-4551.

Sincerely,

/RA/

Gerald J. McCoy, Chief Reactor Projects Branch 5 Division of Reactor Projects Docket No.: 50-338 and 50-339 License No.: NPF-4 and NPF-7

Enclosure:

As stated cc w/encl: (See page2)

_____ML111260625 _____ G SUNSI REVIEW COMPLETE OFFICE RII:DRP RII:DRP SIGNATURE JSD /RA/ GJM /RA/

NAME JDodson GMcCoy DATE 05/06/2011 05/06/2011 E-MAIL COPY? YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO

VEPCO 3 cc w/encl: County Administrator Daniel G. Stoddard Louisa County Senior Vice President P.O. Box 160 Nuclear Operations Louisa, VA 23093 Virginia Electric and Power Company Electronic Mail Distribution Michael Crist Plant Manager Fred Mladen North Anna Power Station Director, Station Safety & Licensing Virginia Electric & Power Company Virginia Electric and Power Company Electronic Mail Distribution Electronic Mail Distribution N. L. Lane Site Vice President North Anna Power Station Virginia Electric & Power Company Electronic Mail Distribution Chris L. Funderburk Director, Nuclear Licensing & Operations Support Virginia Electric and Power Company Electronic Mail Distribution Lillian M. Cuoco, Esq.

Senior Counsel Dominion Resources Services, Inc.

Electronic Mail Distribution Executive Vice President Old Dominion Electric Cooperative Electronic Mail Distribution Ginger L. Melton Virginia Electric and Power Company Electronic Mail Distribution Attorney General Supreme Court Building 900 East Main Street Richmond, VA 23219 Michael M. Cline Director Virginia Department of Emergency Services Management Electronic Mail Distribution

VEPCO 3 Letter to David A. Heacock from Gerald J. McCoy dated May 6, 2011

SUBJECT:

NORTH ANNA POWER STATION - NRC INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000338/2011002 AND 05000339/2011002 - ERRATA Distribution w/encl:

C. Evans, RII L. Douglas, RII OE Mail RIDSNRRDIRS PUBLIC RidsNrrPMNorthAnna Resource

7 pump) was in operation; and (4) verified that level alarm circuits were set appropriately to ensure that the cables would not be submerged.

  • 01-BLD-MBAR-5MH03
  • 01-BLD-MBAR-5MH04
  • 01-BLD-MBAR-50MH-3
  • 01-BLD-MBAR-50MH-4
b. Findings No findings were identified.

1R11 Licensed Operator Requalification Program Operating Experience Smart Sample (OpESS) FY 2010-02 Sample Selections for Reviewing Licensed Operator Examinations and Training Conducted on the Plant-Reference Simulator

a. Inspection Scope The inspectors observed an operator requalification complex situation simulator scenario which involved a loss of main condenser vacuum, failure of the control rods to move in automatic, secondary system transients induced by multiple failures of heater drain pumps, a failure of the reactor to trip on a manual attempt, control rod failure, shaft failure of a motor driven AFW pump, loss of an emergency 4160V bus and respective EDG, and a faulted steam generator.

The inspectors observed crew performance in terms of communications; ability to prioritize failures in order to take timely and proper actions; prioritizing, interpreting, and verifying alarms; correct use and implementation of procedures, including the alarm response procedures; timely control board operation and manipulation, including high-risk operator actions; and oversight and direction provided by the shift supervisor, including the ability to identify and implement appropriate TS actions. The inspectors observed the post training critique to determine that weaknesses or improvement areas revealed by the training were captured by the instructor and reviewed with the operators.

b. Findings No findings were identified.

1R12 Maintenance Effectiveness

a. Inspection Scope For the three equipment issues listed below, the inspectors evaluated the effectiveness of the respective licensee's preventive and corrective maintenance. The inspectors performed walkdowns of the accessible portions of the systems, performed in-office Enclosure

8 reviews of procedures and evaluations, and held discussions with licensee staff. The inspectors compared the licensees actions with the requirements of the Maintenance Rule (10 CFR 50.65), and licensee procedure ER-AA-MRL-10, Maintenance Rule Program, Revision 4.

  • MRE 013094, Annnunciator J-C4 received for 2-RS-P-2A seal head tank low level
  • MRE 013051, MRE to engineering for tool left in 1-EP-BKR-BYB after last PM
b. Findings The enforcement aspects for scaffolding in the 1-CH-P-1A room are discussed in section 4OA2.2 of this report.

1R13 Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control

a. Inspection Scope The inspectors evaluated, as appropriate, the four activities listed below for the following:

(1) effectiveness of the risk assessments performed before maintenance activities were conducted; (2) management of risk; (3) upon identification of an unforeseen situation, necessary steps were taken to plan and control the resulting emergent work activities; and (4) maintenance risk assessments and emergent work problems were adequately identified and resolved. The inspectors verified that the licensee was in compliance with the requirements of 10 CFR 50.65 (a)(4) and the data output from the licensees safety monitor associated with the risk profile of Units 1 and 2.

  • Emergent down power on Unit 2 for main turbine condenser waterbox tube leaks
  • Emergent work on Unit 2 '2H' EDG to replace breaker for pre-lube pump
  • Emergent work on 2-RS-P-2A due to low seal head tank level
  • Entry into 0-AP-41, Severe Weather Condition, Revision 52, on February 28, 2011 due to issuance of a tornado watch
b. Findings No findings were identified.

1R15 Operability Evaluations

a. Inspection Scope The inspectors reviewed five operability evaluations, listed below, affecting risk-significant mitigating systems, to assess, as appropriate: (1) the technical adequacy of the evaluations; (2) whether continued system operability was warranted; (3) whether other existing degraded conditions were considered as compensating measures; (4) whether the compensatory measures, if involved, were in place, would work as intended, and were appropriately controlled; and (5) where continued operability was considered Enclosure

7 pump) was in operation; and (4) verified that level alarm circuits were set appropriately to ensure that the cables would not be submerged.

  • 01-BLD-MBAR-5MH03
  • 01-BLD-MBAR-5MH04
  • 01-BLD-MBAR-50MH-3
  • 01-BLD-MBAR-50MH-4
b. Findings No findings were identified.

1R11 Licensed Operator Requalification Program Operating Experience Smart Sample (OpESS) FY 2010-02 Sample Selections for Reviewing Licensed Operator Examinations and Training Conducted on the Plant-Reference Simulator

a. Inspection Scope The inspectors observed an operator requalification complex situation simulator scenario which involved a loss of main condenser vacuum, failure of the control rods to move in automatic, secondary system transients induced by multiple failures of heater drain pumps, a failure of the reactor to trip on a manual attempt, control rod failure, shaft failure of a motor driven AFW pump, loss of an emergency 4160V bus and respective EDG, and a faulted steam generator.

The inspectors observed crew performance in terms of communications; ability to prioritize failures in order to take timely and proper actions; prioritizing, interpreting, and verifying alarms; correct use and implementation of procedures, including the alarm response procedures; timely control board operation and manipulation, including high-risk operator actions; and oversight and direction provided by the shift supervisor, including the ability to identify and implement appropriate TS actions. The inspectors observed the post training critique to determine that weaknesses or improvement areas revealed by the training were captured by the instructor and reviewed with the operators.

b. Findings No findings were identified.

1R12 Maintenance Effectiveness

a. Inspection Scope For the two equipment issues listed below, the inspectors evaluated the effectiveness of the respective licensee's preventive and corrective maintenance. The inspectors performed walkdowns of the accessible portions of the systems, performed in-office Enclosure

8 reviews of procedures and evaluations, and held discussions with licensee staff. The inspectors compared the licensees actions with the requirements of the Maintenance Rule (10 CFR 50.65), and licensee procedure ER-AA-MRL-10, Maintenance Rule Program, Revision 4.

  • MRE 013094, Annunciator J-C4 received for 2-RS-P-2A seal head tank low level
  • MRE 013051, MRE to engineering for tool left in 1-EP-BKR-BYB after last PM
b. Findings No findings were identified.

1R13 Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control

a. Inspection Scope The inspectors evaluated, as appropriate, the four activities listed below for the following:

(1) effectiveness of the risk assessments performed before maintenance activities were conducted; (2) management of risk; (3) upon identification of an unforeseen situation, necessary steps were taken to plan and control the resulting emergent work activities; and (4) maintenance risk assessments and emergent work problems were adequately identified and resolved. The inspectors verified that the licensee was in compliance with the requirements of 10 CFR 50.65 (a)(4) and the data output from the licensees safety monitor associated with the risk profile of Units 1 and 2.

  • Emergent down power on Unit 2 for main turbine condenser waterbox tube leaks
  • Emergent work on Unit 2 '2H' EDG to replace breaker for pre-lube pump
  • Emergent work on 2-RS-P-2A due to low seal head tank level
  • Entry into 0-AP-41, Severe Weather Condition, Revision 52, on February 28, 2011 due to issuance of a tornado watch
c. Findings No findings were identified.

1R15 Operability Evaluations

a. Inspection Scope The inspectors reviewed five operability evaluations, listed below, affecting risk-significant mitigating systems, to assess, as appropriate: (1) the technical adequacy of the evaluations; (2) whether continued system operability was warranted; (3) whether other existing degraded conditions were considered as compensating measures; (4) whether the compensatory measures, if involved, were in place, would work as intended, and were appropriately controlled; and (5) where continued operability was considered Enclosure