ML13144A161

Co-Signer Testimony in Support of 10 CFR 2.206 Submitted by Beyond Nuclear, Et Al, March 21, 2013 to Immediately Suspend the Operating Licenses of GE BWR Units Using Mark I and Mark II Containments

ML13144A161
Person / Time
Site:	Dresden, Quad Cities, LaSalle
Issue date:	05/02/2013
From:	Kraft D Nuclear Energy Information Service
To:	Borchardt R NRC/EDO
Lamb J
References
2.206
Download: ML13144A161 (5)

Text

Nuclear Energy Information Service Illinois Nuclear Power Watchdog since 1981 Office and Mail: 3411 W. Diversey Avenue, #16, Chicago, IL 60647-1245 (773)342-7650 www.neis.org neis@neis.org May 2, 2013 Mr. James Borchardt Executive Director for Operations U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555-0001 By email: Hearing.Docket@nrc.gov RE:

CO-SIGNER TESTIMONY IN SUPPORT OF 10 CFR 2.206 SUBMITTED BY BEYOND NUCLEAR, ET AL, MARCH 21, 2013 TO IMMEDIATELY SUSPEND THE OPERATING LICENSES OF GE BWR UNITS USING MARK I AND MARK-II CONTAINMENTS Submitted by David A. Kraft, Director, NEIS Nuclear Energy Information Service (NEIS) is a 32-year old safe-energy, anti-nuclear environmental organization based on Chicago, Illinois. We submit the following testimony in support of the 2.206 Petition calling for the closure of GE boiling water reactors using Mark-I and Mark-II containments.

NEIS has monitored the activities of Illinois nuclear utilities and federal and state regulators since 1981. Illinois is the most nuclear-reliant state in the U.S., with 11 operating and 3 closed reactors. Within our borders sit >8,600 tons of spent reactor fuel -- the largest standing amount of high-level radioactive wastes (HLRW) of any state. After observing the questionable, inconsistent and at times lackadaisical historic operation and regulation of these reactors, we are extremely concerned about the protection, safety and health of the people and environment in light of the continuing developments surrounding the Fukushima nuclear disaster in Japan; and NRCs sluggish, imprudent and unwise decision making regarding implementing prudent lessons-learned corrective actions at U.S. reactors.

In light of the Fukushima disaster, NRCs inadequate treatment and partial denial of issues in our previous conjoint 2.206 petition (ML11104A058) of April 2011, and NRCs recent decision to overrule the advice of its own technical staff and further delay prudent installation of filtered hardened vents at Fukushima-type reactors in the U.S., we express grave concerns about the safety of continued operation of the four Mark-I BWRs at Dresden and Quad Cities, and the two Mark-II BWRs at La Salle station listed in this Petition, and request acceptance of the contentions in this Petition and closure of these reactors.

In addition to the contentions we raised in the 2.206 petition of April 2011 (ML11104A058), and which we attach at the end of this submittal for reference, we submit several new contentions for consideration as the additional basis for our request:

NEW CONTENTIONS:

1.) INCLUSION OF THE TWO LA SALLE MARK-II REACTORS IN PETITION FOR CLOSURE:

As stated by our co-petitioners at Beyond Nuclear, NEIS agrees with the assessment of Beyond Nuclear that the Mark-1 and Mark-II containments are in violation of the General Design Criteria 16 The two Exelon La Salle reactors are of Mark-II containment design Exelon is planning a significant power uprate for the La Salle reactors which could take place at the end of this decade. Such uprates historically have been associated with unplanned and unforeseen incidents which could compromise reactor safety, such as occurred at Quad Cities after its large power uprate.

Exelon plans to begin the license renewal process for La Salle 1 and 2 in January-March, 2015 (La Salle-1s license expires 4/17/22; La Salle-2s expires 12/16/23). It is NEIS position that no license renewals should be granting pending final resolution of the hardened filtered vent issues. Since both are in violation of GDC 16 of their current license, no license renewals should be permitted until such time as the reactors are brought into compliance.

th The incidents occurring at the La Salle Station the week of April 24 indicate uneven and unpredictable abilities of La Salle to filter containment releases even under non-emergency situations, let alone what might be experienced during a major LOCA or similarly serious incident.

th Recent severe weather and flooding events experienced the week of La Salles April 24 incident validate the contentions NEIS raised in the 2.206 petition of April 2011. La Salle Station sits near a vulnerable point of the Illinois River, with unusually shallow bottom nearby. Such an area would experience rapid severe flooding events more rapidly than other parts of the Illinois River system, leaving La Salle more vulnerable to flood-related problems, and in shorter periods of time.

2.) LACK OF SAFETY CULTURE AT NRC Since the March 11, 2011 nuclear disaster at Fukushima, and the filing of the April 2011 2.206 petition by Beyond Nuclear, et al, NRC has made much of the issue of safety culture. NRC Chairwoman Allison Macfarlane has lectured extensively internationally on the topic. In a December 2012 public meeting at the Palisades NPP, NRC severely criticized Entergy for its lack of one, and then went on to define what that safety culture was supposed to look like.

According to NRC viewgraphs at the meeting, a Nuclear Safety Culture is the core values and behaviors[that] emphasize safety over competing goals to ensure protection of people and the environment. (emphasis ours)

According to Region III Director Charles Casto at the same meeting, it is also going beyond whats required (emphasis ours)

The question was put by this petitioner to both Mr. Casto at the December 2012 meeting, and to Commissioner William Magwood at a meeting in February 2013 at Palisades that, doesnt this mean that merely meeting regulatory requirements may be necessary, but is not necessarily sufficient as an indicator that safety is being achieved; that NRC regulations are not a ceiling, but a floor benchmark to assess safety and a safety culture; and that merely checking off regulatory requirements met is not an indicator that a safety culture as NRC defines it is in place, since this shows no willingness to go beyond whats required 2

regarding safety, and put safety over competing goals (e.g., cost, meeting only mere regulatory compliance, etc.)? Their replies were not definitive.

As an example of what a real safety culture looks like, just two days ago (April 30, 2013) the FAA cleared the previously grounded Boeing 787 jets for service again, after months of having the planes grounded for safety checks regarding faulty battery designs. NRCs current safety culture attitude would have kept the 787s flying, probably until one crashed or lives were lost through fire.

We contend that, by its own definitions, NRC lacks the very safety culture it purports to demand of the utilities it regulates. Therefore NRC cannot be relied upon to be in a position to guarantee that adequate protection of the public health and safety - as required by its mandate -- can be provided by their oversight at the already demonstrably vulnerable GE BWRs using Mark-I and Mark-II containments.

The NRC 4-1 Commission vote of March 19, 2013 rejecting the immediate installation of filtered vents has boxed this Review Board into an awkward position:

If the Review Board rejects this petition and rules only on a very narrow and literal view of what the regulations require, and keeps the Mark-1 and Mark-2 reactors open, it publicly demonstrates that the NRC has no safety culture in place of the type it publicly espouses; If the Review Board puts safety first before competing goals, and rules to close these reactors, it both rules for adequate protection of the public and demonstrates that NRC is serious about its publicly proclaimed safety culture - in contrast to the four Commissioners who rejected the technical advice of its own staff by voting to delay filtered vent installation.

The NRC safety culture definition it is forcing utilities to follow requires it to close the GE BWRs using Mark-I and Mark-II containments.

PREVIOUS CONTENTIONS FROM THE APRIL 2011 2.206 PETITION (ML11104A058), PERTINENT TO THIS PETITION (LISTED FOR CONVENIENCE):

1.) EXISTING UNCERTAINTIES INVOLVING VERIFIABLE SAFETY OF REACTORS DEMANDS THAT CAUTION BE EXERCISED: Several uncertainties call into question the current safety status of Quad Cities and Dresden, and all other Mark-I containments:

The conclusion of the Petitioners that NRC has not done the proper level of safety analysis in previously granting pre-approvals of the installation of the Mark I containment (Fukushima style reactors) "hardened vent system" as granted in Generic Letter 89-16 (September 1989) under 10 CFR 50.59. We believe that NRC should require all GE Mark I Boiling Water Reactor operators to submit to the formal license amendment process accorded with full public hearing rights.

The lessons learned from Fukushima have yet to be identified, let alone actionable, due to the sluggish and at times withholding and deceptive nature of information flow from TEPCO, the Japanese government, and the IAEA. Given what is NOT known or currently verifiable in terms of this international nuclear disaster, the 3

Precautionary Principle argues for caution, as the German Government has insisted upon in the closure of its reactors pending thorough inspection.

When Southwest Airlines learned of fuselage cracks and skin peeling in its fleet of 737 jets this past year, it GROUNDED the jets, pending complete re-inspection, and in many cases repairs. The NRCs current approach to allow reactors with Mark-I containments to continue operating post-Fukushima is akin to Southwest allowing its jets to continue flying until one crashes before taking action to verify safety. This attitude is reprehensible and unacceptable.

2.) ILLINOIS UNIQUE PRECIPITATING EVENTS: While Illinois may not be subjected to tsunamis any time soon, as Exelons John Rowe quipped recently, Illinois has several unique precipitators for potentially catastrophic events that Japan lacks:

OHARE FIELD - the busiest/second-busiest airport in the world is situated outside Chicago. We have calculated normal flight times between OHare and Dresden to be 9 minutes; and to Quad Cities, 28 minutes.

An accidental or intentional airliner crash into the currently unprotected spent fuel pool areas of these reactors has the potential to sever cooling water piping, or institute other dangerous disruptive events at the reactors.

NRCs phlegmatic response after 911 to the issue of airline crashes into reactors and spent fuel pools inspires ZERO confidence that NRC takes this risk seriously. With 11 operating reactors in Illinois, we cannot afford this level of indifference and negligence. We hope this Petition will correct this enormous deficit in NRC imagination.

All operating Illinois reactors are on river flood plains. Given what we are currently witnessing in Missouri and Nebraska, the issue of severe flooding, particularly in an impending global warming/climate disrupted world must be taken seriously. The issue also needs to be RE-examined in light of the fact that climate models for Illinois predict greater amounts of precipitation, but also in more violent but less-frequent events each with greater amounts of precipitation.

Illinois is also prone to tornadoes, the frequency of which is increasing annually.

3.) MARK-I SPENT FUEL POOLS ARE SITED IN A DANGEROUS, POTENTIALLY CATASTROPHIC MANNER:

The Fukushima disaster has exposed the unique vulnerability of the Mark-I design - that the spent fuel pools are located OUTSIDE of sufficiently protective reactor containments, and are sited 5 stories above the ground. These flaws were known and pointed out in the 1970s. Neither NRC nor Congress can repeal the Law of Gravity.

Breakage or blockage of cooling water piping resulting in cooling water interruption or draining of the reactor spent fuel pools opens up the possibility of recreating Fukushima in the U.S. Permitting the continued operation of these reactors without correcting these design defects is tantamount to criminal negligence, after seeing what has occurred in Japan.

4.) POTENTIAL DAMAGES TO ILLINOIS: Illinois is a prime agriculture state. A nuclear accident of any kind here in Illinois opens up the possibility of our state becoming the Belarus or Japan of North America. The potential economic loss to agriculture here would be devastating, as we have seen after the Chornobyl and now the Fukushima nuclear disasters - where nations impose embargoes on agricultural products coming from these nations as a result of the meltdowns.

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CONCLUSION:

For these reasons, and those of our co-petitioners, we request that the NRC accept the contentions of this Petition, and order the closure of the U.S. BWRs using the GE Mark-I and Mark-II containments.

We thank you for the opportunity to present these contentions, and are available to answer questions or engage in further discussion.

Respectfully submitted, David A. Kraft, Director 5