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=PLANT STATUS=
=PLANT STATUS=
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==INSPECTION SCOPES==
==INSPECTION SCOPES==
................................................................................................................ 4
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==REACTOR SAFETY==
==REACTOR SAFETY==
..................................................................................................................... 4
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==OTHER ACTIVITIES - BASELINE==
==OTHER ACTIVITIES - BASELINE==
.............................................................................................. 7
..............................................................................................


==INSPECTION RESULTS==
==INSPECTION RESULTS==
.............................................................................................................. 8
..............................................................................................................


==EXIT MEETINGS AND DEBRIEFS==
==EXIT MEETINGS AND DEBRIEFS==

Revision as of 08:21, 2 November 2019

NRC Integrated Inspection Report 05000346/2018003
ML18291B231
Person / Time
Site: Davis Besse Cleveland Electric icon.png
Issue date: 10/18/2018
From: Jamnes Cameron
NRC/RGN-III
To: Bezilla M
FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Co
References
IR 2018003
Download: ML18291B231 (17)


Text

UNITED STATES ober 18, 2018

SUBJECT:

DAVIS-BESSE NUCLEAR POWER STATIONNRC INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000346/2018003

Dear Mr. Bezilla:

On September 30, 2018, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an integrated inspection at your Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station. On October 3, 2018, the NRC inspectors discussed the results of this inspection with you and other members of your staff. The results of this inspection are documented in the enclosed report.

Based on the results of this inspection, no findings or violations were identified.

This letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be made available for public inspection and copying at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html and at the NRC Public Document Room in accordance with 10 CFR 2.390, Public Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding.

Sincerely,

/RA/

Jamnes L. Cameron, Chief Branch 4 Division of Reactor Projects Docket No. 50-346 License No. NPF-3

Enclosure:

Inspection Report 05000346/2018003

REGION III==

Docket Number: 50-346 License Number: NPF-3 Report Number: 05000346/2018003 Enterprise Identifier: I-2018-003-0023 Licensee: FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Company (FENOC)

Facility: Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station Location: Oak Harbor, OH Dates: July 1 through September 30, 2018 Inspectors: D. Mills, Senior Resident Inspector J. Harvey, Resident Inspector J. Neurauter, Reactor Inspector J. Rutkowski, Project Engineer Approved by: J. Cameron, Chief Branch 4 Division of Reactor Projects Enclosure

SUMMARY

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) continued monitoring licensees performance by conducting an integrated quarterly inspection at Davis-Besse Power Plant in accordance with the Reactor Oversight Process. The Reactor Oversight Process is the NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors. Refer to https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/oversight.html for more information. Findings and violations being considered in the NRCs assessment are summarized in the table below.

List of Findings and Violations No findings or violations were identified.

Additional Tracking Items Type Issue Number Title Report Status Section LER 05000346/2017-002-01 Auxiliary Feed Water Pump 71153 Closed Turbine Bearing Damaged due to Improperly Marked Lubricating Oil Sight Glass

TABLE OF CONTENTS

PLANT STATUS

INSPECTION SCOPES

................................................................................................................

REACTOR SAFETY

.....................................................................................................................

OTHER ACTIVITIES - BASELINE

..............................................................................................

INSPECTION RESULTS

..............................................................................................................

EXIT MEETINGS AND DEBRIEFS

............................................................................................ 10

DOCUMENTS REVIEWED

......................................................................................................... 10

PLANT STATUS

The unit remained at or near full power for the entirety of the inspection period.

On March 28, 2018, FirstEnergy Solutions (FES) / FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Company

(FENOC) verbally notified the Nuclear Regulatory Commission that they intended to shut down

all four of their operating nuclear power plants. Based on that notification, the first to shut down

will be Davis-Besse, by May 31, 2020. On March 31, 2018, FES, FirstEnergy Nuclear

Generation (FENGEN), and FENOC filed for bankruptcy. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission

continues to maintain focus on public health and safety and the protection of the environment.

This will include a continuous evaluation by inspectors to determine whether the licensees

financial condition is impacting safe operation of the plant.

INSPECTION SCOPES

Inspections were conducted using the appropriate portions of the inspection procedures (IPs) in

effect at the beginning of the inspection unless otherwise noted. Currently approved IPs with

their attached revision histories are located on the public website at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-

rm/doc-collections/insp-manual/inspection-procedure/index.html. Samples were declared

complete when the IP requirements most appropriate to the inspection activity were met

consistent with Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 2515, Light-Water Reactor Inspection

Program - Operations Phase. The inspectors performed plant status activities described in

IMC 2515 Appendix D, Plant Status and conducted routine reviews using IP 71152, Problem

Identification and Resolution. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records,

observed activities, and interviewed personnel to assess licensee performance and compliance

with Commission rules and regulations, license conditions, site procedures, and standards.

REACTOR SAFETY

71111.04Equipment Alignment

Partial Walkdown (4 Samples)

The inspectors evaluated system configurations during partial walkdowns of the following

systems/trains:

(1) Decay heat train 1 while decay heat train 2 was out of service for preventive

maintenance during the week ending July 14, 2018;

(2) Emergency diesel generator 1 while emergency diesel generator 2 was out of service for

planned testing during the week ending August 11, 2018;

(3) Containment spray train 2 while the train 1 borated water storage tank suction valve was

out of service for planned testing during the week ending August 25, 2018; and

(4) Component cooling water (CCW) train 1 and CCW ventilation train 1 while CCW 2

ventilation was out of service for planned maintenance during the week ending

September 1, 2018.

71111.05AQFire Protection Annual/Quarterly

Quarterly Inspection (4 Samples)

The inspectors evaluated fire protection program implementation in the following selected

areas:

(1) Emergency diesel generator 1 and emergency diesel generator fuel oil tank 1 (fire

area K) during the week ending July 7, 2018;

(2) Low voltage switchgear room 1 and battery room A (fire area Y) during the week ending

August 4, 2018;

(3) Pipe tunnel and equipment and pipe chase, rooms 100 and 101 (fire area B),

Emergency core cooling system (ECCS) pump room 1-1 (fire area AB), and ECCS

pump room 1-2 (fire area A) during the week ending August 11, 2018; and

(4) Mechanical penetration room 2 passage, room 227 (fire area G) during the week ending

September 1, 2018.

Annual Inspection (1 Sample)

The inspectors evaluated a fire brigade drill conducted in the diesel fire pump area, room 51

(fire area BE) during the week ending September 15, 2018.

71111.06Flood Protection Measures

Internal Flooding (Partial Sample)

The inspectors evaluated internal flooding mitigation protections in the intake structure

service water pump room beginning the week of August 26, 2018. This constituted a partial

sample.

71111.11Licensed Operator Requalification Program and Licensed Operator Performance

Operator Requalification (1 Sample)

The inspectors observed and evaluated licensed operator requalification simulator

scenario on August 22, 2018.

Operator Performance (1 Sample)

The inspectors observed and evaluated licensee response to a high radiation alarm from

a spent fuel pool area radiation element on September 10, 2018.

71111.12Maintenance Effectiveness

Routine Maintenance Effectiveness (2 Samples)

The inspectors evaluated the effectiveness of routine maintenance activities associated

with the following equipment and/or safety significant functions:

(1) Emergency ventilation system train 1 and associated damper control repair during the

week ending July 28, 2018; and

(2) Motor driven feedwater pump maintenance and sight glass verification during the week

ending September 8, 2018.

71111.13Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control (4 Samples)

The inspectors evaluated the risk assessments for the following planned and emergent

work activities:

(1) Station blackout diesel generator out of service for planned maintenance during the

week ending July 14, 2018;

(2) Steam leak from moisture separator reheater first stage reheat drain tank 2 drain to high

pressure feedwater heater 2-5 check valve during the week ending July 21, 2018;

(3) Emergent work associated with turbine generator voltage regulator, control room receipt

of 16-2-B voltage regulator fault alarm with exciter alarms that cannot be reset during

the week ending August 18, 2018; and

(4) Planned maintenance on MV5095, component cooling water line 1 discharge isolation

valve, during the week ending August 25, 2018.

71111.15Operability Determinations and Functionality Assessments (5 Samples)

The inspectors evaluated the following operability determinations and functionality

assessments:

(1) High pressure injection valve leaking, CR-2018-06127, during the week ending

July 21, 2018;

(2) Incore detector string 5, level 1-7 self-powered neuron detectors (SPND) and

background detector, and incore detector string 30, level 1 SPND non-functional,

CR-2018-02927, CR-2018-06386 during the week ending July 21, 2018;

(3) Emergency ventilation system train 1 post maintenance test failure, CR-2018-06706,

during the week ending August 4, 2018;

(4) Core spray pump 2 inboard bearing rotation, CR-2018-06812, during the week ending

August 11, 2018; and

(5) Component cooling water pump 1 inboard bearing leakage trending, CR-2018-07014,

during the week ending August 11, 2018.

71111.19Post Maintenance Testing (7 Samples)

The inspectors evaluated the following post maintenance tests:

(1) Station blackout diesel generator following performance of 2, 4, and 10 year preventive

maintenance work during the week ending July 14, 2018;

(2) Containment personnel hatch local leak rate testing following containment entry on

July 17, 2018;

(3) Containment spray train 2 following scheduled maintenance during the week ending

August 4, 2018;

(4) Containment isolation valve 5010D, containment air sample isolation valve, during the

week ending August 11, 2018;

(5) Component cooling water pump and heat exchanger 3 following scheduled maintenance

during the week ending August 18, 2018;

(6) Decay heat pump 1 following scheduled maintenance during the week ending

August 25, 2018; and

(7) Motor driven feedwater pump following scheduled maintenance during the week ending

September 8, 2018.

71111.22Surveillance Testing

The inspectors evaluated the following surveillance tests:

Routine (3 Samples)

(1) Remote shutdown, post-accident monitoring instrumentation monthly channel check,

DB-SC-03180, during the week ending July 7, 2018;

(2) Reactor coolant system leakage beginning the week ending June 30, 2018; and

(3) Emergency diesel generator 2 monthly surveillance test, DB-SC-03071, during the

week ending July 14, 2018.

In-Service (3 Samples)

(1) Service water pump 1 quarterly test, DB-PF-03071, during the week ending

August 18, 2018;

(2) Auxiliary feed pump 1 quarterly test during the week ending August 18, 2018; and

(3) Service water pump 2 comprehensive test, DB-PF-03226, during the week ending

July 14, 2018.

71114.06Drill Evaluation

Emergency Planning Drill (1 Sample)

The inspectors evaluated a licensee Emergency Response Organization emergency

preparedness drill on September 25, 2018.

OTHER ACTIVITIES - BASELINE

71151Performance Indicator Verification (3 Samples)

The inspectors verified licensee performance indicators submittals listed below:

(1) MS08: Heat Removal Systems1 Sample (October 1, 2017 - June 30, 2018);

(2) MS09: Residual Heat Removal Systems1 Sample (October 1, 2017 - June 30, 2018);

and

(3) MS10: Cooling Water Support Systems1 Sample (October 1, 2017 - June 30, 2018).

71152Problem Identification and Resolution

Semiannual Trend Review (2 Samples)

The inspectors reviewed the licensees documentation of repetitive or closely related issues

to identify a potential adverse trend related to the following issues:

(1) Service water piping damage due to microbiologically influenced corrosion (MIC) / lack

of MIC monitoring program, CR-2018-00844; and

(2) Switch failures due to 125V direct current (DC) relay issues.

Annual Follow-Up of Selected Issues (1 Sample)

The inspectors reviewed the licensees implementation of its corrective action program

related to the following issues:

(1) DB-SC-03180 remote shutdown, post-accident monitoring instrumentation monthly

channel check, CR-2012-10942, Attachment 5.

71153Follow-Up of Events and Notices of Enforcement Discretion

Licensee Event Reports (1 Sample)

The inspectors evaluated the following licensee event reports which can be accessed at

https://lersearch.inl.gov/LERSearchCriteria.aspx:

(1) Licensee Event Report (LER) 05000346/2017-002-01, Auxiliary Feed Water Pump

Turbine Bearing Damaged due to Improperly Marked Lubricating Oil Sight Glass.

The original LER was closed in NRC Integrated Inspection Report 05000346/2017004

(ML18045A076).

INSPECTION RESULTS

71152Problem Identification and Resolution

ObservationMicrobiologically Influenced 71152Semiannual Trend

Corrosion Trend Review

By monitoring licensee corrective action reports (CRs) for 2017 and 2018, the inspectors

noted an increase in piping through-wall leaks due to what appeared to be microbiologically

influenced corrosion (MIC). The inspectors reviewed a sample of CRs for through-wall piping

pinhole leaks where the flaw type and location indicated the possibility of microbiologically

influenced corrosion, including CR-2017-03523, CR-2017-08068, CR-2018-00938, and

CR-2018-00844, to determine if there was an adverse trend in piping pinhole leaks due to

MIC. The inspectors also reviewed a licensee self-assessment of water chemistry control and

the service water system health reports.

The inspectors reviewed a licensee assessment of the MIC program (SA-NA-2018-1031)

that identified a gap from June 2015 through August 2017, during a period when samples to

determine presence of MIC were not taken due to lack of trained staff. The inspectors

reviewed the licensees corrective actions which included training additional staff to take

samples for MIC testing, and reviewed a sample of recent laboratory reports for MIC testing.

The inspectors also reviewed licensees monitoring of water chemistry and addition of

chemicals that mitigate formation of MIC.

The inspectors discussed the increased incidence of pinhole leaks with a chemistry

department specialist and the service water system engineer. Specifically, the inspectors

discussed the interaction between the chemistry department and system engineering with

respect to MIC identification, trending, and resulting corrective actions. Licensee staff noted

that pinhole leaks can be caused by other mechanisms other than MIC, such as cavitation

and galvanic corrosion. The inspectors determined that the chemistry department has

procedures in place to take MIC samples for laboratory testing when piping with pinhole

degradation is replaced to verify if degradation is due to MIC.

The inspectors reviewed a sample of system health reports for the service water system and

found that MIC-like piping degradation is noted and tracked. However, as noted above, a

laboratory test is required to verify if degradation is due to MIC. The inspectors verified that

the licensee is tracking corrective actions to replace degraded piping.

In addition, the inspectors reviewed a sample of the licensees prompt operability

determinations (POD) for identified piping through wall leaks. The inspectors verified by

documentation reviews applicability and compliance to ASME code case N-513-3

(and N-513-4). The inspectors also verified that licensee corrective actions to repair the

piping leaks were scheduled to be completed by the next refueling outage.

The inspectors reviewed licensee trending of repair to service water strainer blowdown piping

due to piping through wall leakage. In CR-2018-0764, the licensee used history of piping

replacement to periodically replace the service water strainer blowdown piping prior to

formation of a piping through wall pinhole leak. The inspectors noted that the CR attributed

the pinhole leakage due to cavitation and not due to MIC as described in the POD as a

MIC-like degradation mechanism. The CR also included industry guidance to identify

degradation due to cavitation. During discussions with licensee engineering staff, the

inspectors were able to visually examine a sample of removed strainer blowdown piping and

noted that the piping degradation was similar to industry guidance for cavitation.

Finally, the inspectors met with the licensees Supervisor of Engineering Programs, the

Inservice Inspection Program Owner, and the Aging Management Coordinator. As a result,

the inspectors were able to verify that the aging aspect identified pinhole piping leaks was

considered in the licensees CRs. Specifically, the CR prompts for an aging management

evaluation request.

In conclusion, the licensee identified a period where MIC samples could not be taken and

has corrected the concern. The licensee resumed sampling and has procedures to take

opportunistic MIC samples, but there was not sufficient data that identified a presence of MIC

to conclude an adverse trend in piping through wall leaks due to MIC. During the period

where MIC samples were not taken, the licensee adequately evaluated the identified pinhole

leaks and repaired the leaks in a timely manner. No findings or violations were identified by

the inspectors.

Observation125 Vdc Relay Failures 71152Semi Annual Trend Review

The inspectors identified a potential long-term trend related to Barton switch failures in safety

and non-safety related systems. Specifically, the inspectors reviewed CR-2018-06706

CV 5000A and CV 5000B failed to operate during EVS [emergency ventilation system] train 1

monthly test. The failure was due to a faulted 125 Vdc relay internal to a pressure differential

indicating switch. The inspectors noted the switch and the internal relay were classified as

non-critical components and therefore not required to be replaced at a specified frequency.

Additionally, the inspectors noted the vendor recommended 110 Vdc, plus or minus

percent, be supplied to relay. However, the voltage measured in field identified a

voltage at the coil of 133 Vdc. The licensee generated an engineering change package,

18-0188-001, to add a voltage dropping resistor in the circuit to reduce the voltage at the

relay coil.

The inspectors broadened the time period for the condition report review and identified

several additional instances in which 125 Vdc relays classified as non-critical components

failed, as documented in CR-2016-06353, CR-2013-10064, and CR-2004-04088, with

multiple change packages detailing the installation of a voltage dropping resistor documented

in ECR 04-0299-00 and 13-0475-001.

Although the inspectors did not identify a requirement for the incorporation of vendor

recommendations for the operating voltage of the relays, they questioned the licensee as to

whether a potential adverse trend existed. The inspectors also noted the potential for

additional relay failures, as many of the relays were operating above the vendor

recommended voltage and were not yet replaced because they were classified as non-critical

components.

The licensee generated CR-2018-07274, Adverse trend BARTON switch relay failures,

in response to the inspectors observations. The licensee assessed the currently installed

relays, which resulted in the determination to install an additional 12 voltage dropping

resistors and replace the associated relays, as applicable. No findings or violations were

identified by the inspectors.

ObservationRemote Shutdown, Post Accident 71152-Annual Sample Review

Monitoring Instrumentation Monthly Channel Check

The inspectors reviewed the licensees implementation of DB-SC-03180; Remote Shutdown,

Post Accident Monitoring (PAM) Instrumentation Monthly Channel Check; Revision 14;

The inspectors reviewed the licensees implementation of DB-SC-03180, Attachment 5

Evaluating CTMT [Containment] Wide Range Level Indications, which addressed

CR-2012-10942, LI4595 Containment Building Wide Range Level Reads 0.000 F

T.

SpecificallyProperty "Contact" (as page type) with input value "T.</br></br>Specifically" contains invalid characters or is incomplete and therefore can cause unexpected results during a query or annotation process., the inspectors reviewed the licensees corrective action to incorporate

into DB-SC-03180, which provides additional guidance for performing the PAM

wide range level instrumentation channel checks. Additionally, the inspectors reviewed the

current technical justification for the operability of the post-accident monitor wide range level

indication reading 0 FT instead of the expected elevation of 538 FT in the current conditions.

No findings or violations were identified by the inspectors.

EXIT MEETINGS AND DEBRIEFS

The inspectors confirmed that proprietary information was controlled to protect from public

disclosure. No proprietary information was documented in this report.

  • On October 3, 2018, the inspectors presented the quarterly integrated inspection results to

Mr. M. Bezilla and other members of the licensee staff.

DOCUMENTS REVIEWED

71111.04Equipment Alignment

- C-ME-016.04-041; Evaluation of Temperature Increase of CCW System; Revision 1

- C-NSA-016.04-004; CCW Pump Inspection Requirements; Revision 1

- CR-2017-08936; BACC Lower CS Pump 2 Suction Flange; 08/29/2017

- CR-2017-10246; EDG Air Receiver 1-1 was Found with High Pressure; 10/06/2017

- CR-2018-05405; Water Leaking into EDG Room 1 Through Wall; 06/10/2018

- DB-OP-06013; Containment Spray; Revision 26

- DB-OP-06262; Valve Lineup Checklist for CCW Pump 3; Revision 39

- DB-OP-06316; EDG 1; Revision 59

- DB-OP-06513; CCW Pump Room Train 1 Ventilation System Startup; Revision 28

- Drawing 0S-041A-SH-1; Emergency Diesel Generator Systems; Revision 34

- Drawing M-034; Emergency Core Cooling System Containment Spray and Core Flooding

Systems; Revision 71

71111.05AQFire Protection Annual/Quarterly

- DB-ME-04100; Emergency Lighting System Test; Revision 16

- DB-ME-09323; Emergency Lighting System Preventive Maintenance; Revision 4

- Drawing E-930A; Emergency Battery Pack Location and Lamp Direction; Revision 7

- Drill 3-3-09/12-18-1; DFP Room Electrical Fire; 09/12/2018

- PFP-AB-227; Passage Room 227 Fire Area G; Revision 4

- PFP-AB-429; Low Voltage Switchgear Room E-Bus Room 429 Fire Area Y; Revision 4

- PFP-AB-429B; Battery Room A, Room 429B Fire Area Y; Revision 4

- PFP-IS-51; Diesel Fire Pump Area Room 51 Fire Area BE; Revision 3

- PFP-AB-105; ECCS Pump Room 1-1 Room 105 Fire Area AB; Revision 8

- PFP-AB-318; Diesel Generator 1-1 Room, Rooms 318 and 318UL Fire Area K; Revision 7

- PFP-AB-321A; Diesel Fuel Oil Day Tank 1-1 Room, Room 321A Fire Area K; Revision 4

71111.06Flood Protection Measures

- CR-2018-07867; Maintenance Rule; 09/04/2018

- CR-G201-2001-0009; Barrier Penetration Inspections; 01/03/2001

- DB-FP-04038; Ten Percent Penetration Seal Visual Inspection; Revision 9

- DBRM-DBDE-002; Penetration Seal Inspection Population; Revision 2

- DB-SC-03218; Quarterly Functional Test of RE 4598BA, Station Vent Normal Range Radiation

Monitor; Revision 24

- Drawing M-16; Piping Tunnel and Intake Structure; Revision 5

- NOP-ER-3004; FENOC Maintenance Rule Program; Revision 4

- NORM-ER-3208; Penetrations and Barriers; Revision 1

- RA-EP-02880; Internal Flooding; Revision 4

71111.11Licensed Operator Requalification Program and Licensed Operator Performance

- DB-OP-06412; Process and Area Radiation Monitor; Revision 47

- DB-OP-06504; Emergency Ventilation System; Revision 19

- NOP-OP-1002; Conduct of Operations; Revision 12

- RA-EP-02861; Radiological Incidents; Revision 04

71111.12Maintenance Effectiveness

- DBRM-PES-004; System Performance Monitoring; Revision 01

- NOBP-ER-3900; Equipment Reliability Common Definitions and Structure; Revision 10

- NOP-ER-1001; Continuous Equipment Performance Improvement; Revision 6

- NORM-ER-3302; I & C Relays; Revision 4

- WO 200684792; PM 2522 Lube Motor Driven Feedpump Motor MP241

- WO 200739963; Motor Driven Feedpump Motor Inboard Outboard Sight Glass - Intrusive

- WO 200746422; Oil Leak on Motor Driven Feedpump Inboard Pump Bearing

71111.13Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control

- 18-0180-001; Temporary Modification Leak Seal Pivot Pin Cover Gasket Leak for RD48,

MSR First Stage Reheat Drain Tank 2 Drain to High Pressure Feedwater Heater 2-5 Check

Valve; Revision 00

- CR-2018-07174; Control Room Receipt of 16-2-B Voltage Regulator Fault Alarm with Exciter

Alarm that cannot be Reset; 08/13/2018

- DBBP-OPS-0011; Protected Equipment Posting; Revision 13

- Drawing 05-021-SH-1; Component Cooling Water System; Revision 39

- NOP-OP-1007; Risk Management; Revision 27

- NOP-OP-1014; Plant Status Control; Revision 06

- OS-014A; Moisture Separator Reheater Drains System; Revision 20

- WO 200463362; PM 10915 MV 5095 Perform Diagnostic Static Test

71111.15Operability Determinations and Functionality Assessments

- 18-0188-001; Install Resister for PDIS5017 Relay Coil; Revision 0

- CR-2018-01417; Request Evaluation for Past Operability for Long Term Boron Precipitation

Function for Emergency Core Cooling System; 02/17/2018

- CR-2018-01487; Commitment DB-A19820 Appears Not Fully Met by DB-OP-02000

Revision 29; 02/20/2018

- CR-2018-02927-1; Incore String 5, Levels 1-7 SPNDs and Background Detector and Incore

String 30, Level 1 SPND Non-Functional; 03/27/2018

- CR-2018-04599; Hole in EDG #2 Air Intake Silencer; 05/17/2018

- CR-2018-04974; Critical Preventative Orders Removed From Schedule at T-O; 05/29/2018

- CR-2018-05659; As Found Oil Levels for Containment Spray Pump #1 Were Found to be

Lower Than Desired; 06/19/2018

- CR-2018-06127; Received Computer Point Q479 HP Injection Valve Leaking, and P465 HP

Injection Valve in Press During Stroke of HP2A; 07/06/2018

- CR-2018-06706; CV 5000A and CV 5000B Failed to Operate During EVS Train 1 Monthly

Test; 07/27/2018

- CR-2018-06812; Containment Spray Pump 2 Inboard Bearing Housing Rotation; 07/31/2018

- CR-2018-06386; Incore E9 (String 5) Electrical Connection as found Condition

- CR-2018-07014; System Monitoring CCW Pump 1 Inboard Bearing Leakage Trending;

08/07/2018

- CR-2018-07093; Containment Spray Pump #2 Outboard Bearing Constant Oil Leveler No

Level; 08/10/2018

- DB-OP-02000; Attachment 22, Cross Connect LPI Pump Discharge; Revision 30

- Letter from NRC to Toledo Edison, Docket 50-346; Amendment No. 147 to Facility Operating

License No. NPF-3 (TAC No. 75235); 04/13/1990

- Letter from Toledo Edison to NRC, Docket 50-346; License Amendment Application to

Remove Technical Specification Table 3.-2, Containment Isolation Valves (TAC

Number 75235); 12/22/1989

- Letter from Toledo Edison to NRC, Docket 50-346; Revision 11 to the Updated Safety Analysis

Report; 05/31/1990

- NOBP-WM-5014-01; Rework Evaluation DB-PDIS5017; Revision 03

- NOP-OP-1009; Operability Determinations and Functionality Assessments; Revision 06

71111.19Post Maintenance Testing

- C-ME-04.02-00; MDFP Surveillance Test; Revision 1

- C-NSA-016-04-001; CW Allowable Pump Degradation; Revision 01 Addendum A01

- CR-2018-06208; TSH 11133 Found Out of Tolerance; 07/11/2018

- CR-2018-06211; SBODG Batteries Failed Load Test; 07/11/2018

- CR-2018-06212; Tan Delta Test for Cable from AD301 Had Higher than Expected Readings;

07/11/2018

- CR-2018-06285; SBDG Ran Unloaded for Greater than 30 Minutes; 07/12/2018

- CR-2018-07188; CVS010D DB-PF-09301; 08/14/2018

- CR-2018-07467; Steps for DB-OP-06012 Not Incorporated for DH Venting Train 1 From

DHS1; 08/23/2018

- Davis-Besse Unit 1 Updated Final Safety Analysis Report; Revision 30

- DB-OP-06334; Station Blackout Diesel Generator Operating Procedure; Revision 25

- DB-PF-03002; Bench Testing First Program Pressure Relief Devices; Revision 8

- DB-PF-03008; Containment Local Leakage Rate Tests; Revision 21

- DB-PF-03074; Component Cooling Water Pump 3 Test; Revision 17

- DB-PF-03272; Post Maintenance Valve Test; Revision 15

- DB-PF-03291; Containment Personnel and Emergency Airlocks Seal Leakage Test;

Revision 14

- Drawing 0-021-SH-1; Operational Schematic Component Cooling Water System; Revision 39

- NEI-94-01; Nuclear Energy Institute Industry Guideline for Implementing Performance-Based

Option of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix J; Revision 0

- WO 200686282; PM5594 V1429 CAL/Replace/Adjust

- WO 200687245; SBODG Monthly Test FA Norm; 07/10/2018

- WO 200691035; Quarterly Test Decay Heat Train 1 Pump and Valve Test; 8/22/18

- WO 200692052; MDFP and Valve Quarterly Test; 09/05/2018

- WO 200708783; PM 0751 MV5010 Inspect CMT H2 Ln 3; 08/08/2018

- WO 200743022; R 4706 DH43 Check Valve DH Pump 1

- WO 200743543; PF3649-001 05.1 4 P-81 Personnel Airlock LLRT; 03/02/2018

- WO 200746422; Oil Leak on MFP Inboard Pump Bearing

71111.22Surveillance Testing

- ALARA Plan 2018-2006; Containment Entry in Modes 1 to Perform Containment Walkdown

Inspections on the Following Floor Elevations 603, 585, 56, OV Room 636 and 653 East Side

on Concrete; Revision 1

- CR-2018-01052; Service Water Pump P3-1 Minimum Design Curve Discrepancies;

2/06/2018

- CR-2018-05854; RCS Integrated Leakage Program Tier III Standard Action Level

Exceedance; 06/26/2018

- CR-2018-06057; RCDT In-Leakage Minimized by Closing SS2 and SS25; 07/03/2018

- DB-OP-01200; Reactor Coolant System Leakage Management; Revision 13

- DB-OP-03013; Containment Daily Inspection and Containment Closeout Inspection;

Revision 10

- DB-PF-03017; Service Water Pump 1 Testing; Revision 23

- DB-SC-03071; EDG 2; Revision 36

- EN-DB-01171; Engineering Implementation of the RCS Integrated Leakage Program;

Revision 03

- WO 200674807; PF3017-001 05.000 P3-1 SW Pump 1 Quarterly; 02/28/2018

- WO 200683205; PF3017-001 05.000 P3-1 SW Pump 1 Quarterly; 05/22/2018

- WO 200684942; REM S/D, Post ACC Change Check Fa Norm; 06/07/2018

- WO 200687262; REM S/D, Post ACC Change Check Fa Norm; 07/04/2018

- WO 200687645; EDG 2 Monthly Test; 07/13/2018

- WO 200690422; PF3017-001 05.000 P3-1 SW Pump 1 Quarterly; 02/13/2018

- WO 200738314; P3-2 Service Water Online Comprehensive Test; 07/13/2018

- WO 200759641; P3-2 Service Water Online Comprehensive Test; 07/03/2018

71114.06Drill Evaluation

- CR-2018-08525; EP Drill - Contamination Control Enhancement for OSC

- Drill Emergency Notification Forms

- September 25 Integrated Drill Scenario

71151Performance Indicator Verification

- Reactor Oversight Program; Mitigating System Performance Index Basis Document, Davis-

Besse Nuclear Power Station; Revision 5

- Unit Log Entries

71152Problem Identification and Resolution

- 18-188-001; Install Resister for PD1S50`7 Relay Coil; Revision 0

- BETA Metallurgical Laboratory M18131; Material Analysis Report: CCW Heat Exchanger #3;

05/23/2018

- Chemistry System Trend Meeting Agenda/Minutes; MIC Program; 04/16/2018

- Chemistry System Trend Meeting Agenda/Minutes; MIC, Open Cooling Water & Diesel Fuel;

05/03/2018

- Chemistry System Trend Meeting Agenda/Minutes; MIC, Open Cooling Water & Diesel Fuel;

07/17/2018

- C-NSA-059.01-019; Calculation Computation; Revision 5

- CR-201-06353; CCW Low Flow Computer Point (792) for RCP 1-1 in Low; 05/05/2016

- CR-2012-1092; L149 Containment Building Wide Range Level Reads 0.000 FT; 07/12/2012

- CR-2013-10235; Faulted Relay in FIS 4233, RCP 1-2 CCW Flow Outlet From RCP Seal

Cooler; 07/03/2013

- CR-2017-03523;Corroded Piping Upstream of SW260

- CR-2017-04069; Samples Not Collected in Accordance with NOP-OP-3602, Microbiologically

Influenced Corrosion Monitoring Program

- CR-2017-05701;Emergency Core Cooling System Room Cooler E42-2 Post Job Roll-up

- CR-2017-06707; Turbine Plant Cooling Water Heat Exchanger #3 Piping Has Thickness

Readings Below Specified Minimum Wall Requirements

- CR-2017-08068; SW Pump 1 Strainer Piping Through Wall Leak

- CR-2017-08573; SW Pump 2 Strainer Piping Has Below Minimum Allowable Thickness

Readings

- CR-2017-09881; Water Leaking from Piping/Lagging Near CT916 in SW Tunnel

- CR-2017-F15-3 Service Water Pump #3 Strainer Has Pinhole Leak on Piping Just Below

Discharge Elbow

- CR-2018-00844; CCW Heat Exchanger 1-3 Pinhole Leak

- CR-2018-00938; Additional Wall Thinning Found in SW Piping Upstream of SW260

- CR-2018-01158; POD 2017-03523, Revision 1, Elbow Wall Thinning

- CR-2018-01994; Minimum Through Pipe Wall Thickness Question Piping Tee Upstream of

SW260 AFP 1 SW Supply Isolation Valve

- CR-2018-04549; Chemistry Not Included in Work Order Review

- CR-2018-05764; SW Strainer Blowdown Piping Historical Trending

- CR-2018-06237; External Oversight Question Regarding Operation of L1494 and L19 for

PAMS CTMT Building Level; 07/11/2018

- CR-2018-06436; DB-SC-03221 Failed for Low RE1770A and B Sample Flow; 07/19/2018

- CR-2018-06706; CV 5000A and CV 5000B Failed to Operate During EVS Train 1 Monthly

Test; 07/27/2018

- CR-2018-07274; Adverse Trend Barton Switch Relay Failures; 08/16/2018

- Drawing J-104-SH.1; Containment Vessel Water Level Wide Range (L-4595) Ch. 1; Revision 3

- ECP 13-07-001; Faulted Relay in F14233

- ECR 04-0299-00; Installation and Test Requirements; Revision 00

- NALCO Water Company Report 2356364; Analytical Report: CCW HX #3 TDP; 05/30/2018

- NALCO Water Company Report 2356365; Analytical Report: CCW HX #3 Bottom; 05/30/2018

- SA-BN-2018-1031; Assessment/Benchmarking: Davis-Besse Microbiologically Influenced

Corrosion Program; 05/03/2018

- SW Chemistry Trends; Service Water Chemistry System Health Report; 2018 1st Half

- System Health Report 2017-2; System-09-01-Service Water

- System Health Report 2018-1; System-09-01-Service Water

- WO 200686471; Containment Level Water Channel 1 Calibration FA Norm RFL; 03/08/2018

- WO 200686472; Containment Level Water Channel 2 Calibration FA Norm RFL; 03/08/2018

71153Follow-Up of Events and Notices of Enforcement Discretion

- C-NSA-050.03-028; Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) Minimum Performance; Revision 1

- CR-2018-07246; Loose Hand Wheel Fastener on AF2658A; 08/15/2018

- DB-SP-03151; AFP 1 Quarterly Test; Revision 27

- LER 2017-002-01; Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Turbine Bearing Damaged due to Improperly

Marked Lubricating Oil Sight Glass

- WO 200683237; AFP 1 Quarterly Test; 05/01/2018

- WO 200686498; AFP 1 Response Time Test Fa Norm; 03/23/2018

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