Information Notice 2017-06, Battery and Battery Charger Short Circuit Current Contributions to a Fault on the DC Distribution System: Difference between revisions

From kanterella
Jump to navigation Jump to search
(Created page by program invented by StriderTol)
(Created page by program invented by StriderTol)
Line 14: Line 14:
| page count = 4
| page count = 4
}}
}}
{{#Wiki_filter:ML17228A473 UNITED STATES
{{#Wiki_filter:UNITED STATES


NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION


OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION OFFICE OF NEW REACTORS
OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION


WASHINGTON, DC 20555-0001 September 26, 2017
OFFICE OF NEW REACTORS


NRC INFORMATION NOTICE 2017-06: BATTERY AND BATTERY CHARGER
WASHINGTON, DC 20555-0001 September 26, 2017 NRC INFORMATION NOTICE 2017-06: BATTERY AND BATTERY CHARGER


SHORT-CIRCUIT CURRENT CONTRIBUTIONS
SHORT-CIRCUIT CURRENT CONTRIBUTIONS
Line 33: Line 33:
All holders of an operating license or construction permit for a nuclear power reactor under
All holders of an operating license or construction permit for a nuclear power reactor under


Title 10 of the
Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) Part 50, Domestic Licensing of


Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) Part 50, "Domestic Licensing of
Production and Utilization Facilities, except those who have permanently ceased operations
 
Production and Utilization Facilities," except t
 
hose who have permanently ceased operations


and have certified that fuel has been permanently removed from the reactor vessel.
and have certified that fuel has been permanently removed from the reactor vessel.
Line 45: Line 41:
All holders of and applicants for a power reactor early site permit, combined license, standard
All holders of and applicants for a power reactor early site permit, combined license, standard


design approval, or manufacturing license under 10 CFR Part 52, "Licenses, Certifications, and
design approval, or manufacturing license under 10 CFR Part 52, Licenses, Certifications, and


Approvals for Nuclear Power Plants."  All applicants for a standard design certification, including
Approvals for Nuclear Power Plants. All applicants for a standard design certification, including


such applicants after initial issuance of a design certification rule.
such applicants after initial issuance of a design certification rule.
Line 54: Line 50:
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is issuing this information notice (IN) to inform
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is issuing this information notice (IN) to inform


addressees of the results of a recent NRC-led battery testing program. The testing program
addressees of the results of a recent NRC-led battery testing program. The testing program


evaluated the magnitude of direct current (DC) fault current contributions from batteries and
evaluated the magnitude of direct current (DC) fault current contributions from batteries and


battery chargers to a downstream short-circuit
battery chargers to a downstream short-circuit fault on the DC distribution system. The detailed


fault on the DC distribution system.  The detailed
test results, conclusions, and recommendations are provided in NUREG/CR-7229, Testing to
 
test results, conclusions, and recommendations are provided in NUREG/CR-7229, "Testing to


Evaluate Battery and Battery Charger Short-Circuit Current Contributions to a Fault on the DC
Evaluate Battery and Battery Charger Short-Circuit Current Contributions to a Fault on the DC


Distribution System" (Agencywide Docum
Distribution System (Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS)
 
Accession No. ML17039A869). The NRC expects that recipients of this IN will review the
ents Access and Management System (ADAMS)  
Accession No. ML17039A869). The NRC expects that recipients of this IN will review the


information for applicability to their facilities and consider actions, as appropriate, for potential
information for applicability to their facilities and consider actions, as appropriate, for potential


impacts on DC fault studies and other related calculations. The suggestions in this IN are not
impacts on DC fault studies and other related calculations. The suggestions in this IN are not


NRC requirements; therefore, the NRC requires no specific action or written response.
NRC requirements; therefore, the NRC requires no specific action or written response.


==DESCRIPTION OF CIRCUMSTANCES==
==DESCRIPTION OF CIRCUMSTANCES==
On September 6, 2013, the NRC issued IN 2013-17, "Significant Plant Transient Induced by
On September 6, 2013, the NRC issued IN 2013-17, Significant Plant Transient Induced by
 
Safety-Related Direct Current Bus Maintenance at Power" (ADAMS Accession Number


ML13193A009).  It informed addressees of an event involving the loss of one train of the DC
Safety-Related Direct Current Bus Maintenance at Power (ADAMS Accession Number


distribution system in a nuclear power plant.
ML13193A009). It informed addressees of an event involving the loss of one train of the DC


Specifically, both the battery and the battery
distribution system in a nuclear power plant. Specifically, both the battery and the battery


charger on one DC Class 1E power division tripped on overcurrent when a fault occurred in a
charger on one DC Class 1E power division tripped on overcurrent when a fault occurred in a
Line 92: Line 82:
downstream DC panel.
downstream DC panel.


===The event demonstrated that the fault impact on t===
The event demonstrated that the fault impact on the DC distribution system at a nuclear power
he DC distribution system at a nuclear power
 
plant can have a significant impact, as described in IN 2013-17. While the cause of the battery


plant can have a significant impact, as described in IN 2013-17.  While the cause of the battery trip was well understood by the NRC staff, the cause of the battery charger trip was not clear.
ML17228A473 trip was well understood by the NRC staff, the cause of the battery charger trip was not clear.


The NRC staff assumed that the cause of the battery charger trip could have been because of
The NRC staff assumed that the cause of the battery charger trip could have been because of


the initial higher fault current contribution by the battery charger to the downstream fault, whether connected in parallel with the battery or not. However, this configuration was
the initial higher fault current contribution by the battery charger to the downstream fault, whether connected in parallel with the battery or not. However, this configuration was


inconsistent with the language provided in the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers'
inconsistent with the language provided in the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers
(IEEE) Standard (Std) 946-2004, "IEEE Recommended Practice for the Design of DC Auxiliary


Power Systems for Generating Stations," Subclause 7.9.2, which states, "When the battery
(IEEE) Standard (Std) 946-2004, IEEE Recommended Practice for the Design of DC Auxiliary


charger is connected in parallel with the battery , the battery capacitance will prevent the battery
Power Systems for Generating Stations, Subclause 7.9.2, which states, When the battery


charger contribution from rising instantaneously.  Therefore, the maximum current that a
charger is connected in parallel with the battery, the battery capacitance will prevent the battery


charger will deliver on short circuit will not typi
charger contribution from rising instantaneously. Therefore, the maximum current that a


cally exceed 150 [percent] of the charger full load
charger will deliver on short circuit will not typically exceed 150 [percent] of the charger full load


ampere rating. Instantaneous battery charger current rise should only become a concern during
ampere rating. Instantaneous battery charger current rise should only become a concern during


periods when the battery is disconnected."  Therefore, the Office of Nuclear Regulatory
periods when the battery is disconnected. Therefore, the Office of Nuclear Regulatory


Research (RES) collaborated from 2014 through 2016 in a battery testing program with
Research (RES) collaborated from 2014 through 2016 in a battery testing program with


Brookhaven National Laboratory (BNL) to validate the assumptions. The purpose of the testing
Brookhaven National Laboratory (BNL) to validate the assumptions. The purpose of the testing


program was to determine if the battery and battery charger current contributions to the fault on
program was to determine if the battery and battery charger current contributions to the fault on
Line 132: Line 122:
One of the methods potentially used at nuclear power plants to estimate the short-circuit current
One of the methods potentially used at nuclear power plants to estimate the short-circuit current


contributions is described in IEEE Std 946-2004. The use of this standard neglects the initial
contributions is described in IEEE Std 946-2004. The use of this standard neglects the initial


fault current contribution from the charger. The
fault current contribution from the charger. The DC system overcurrent protective device sizing


DC system overcurrent protective device sizing
selection and/or coordination setting could result in a fault not being isolated as intended. This
 
selection and/or coordination setting could result in a fault not being isolated as intended. This


can lead to undesirable system responses to a fault on the DC distribution system.
can lead to undesirable system responses to a fault on the DC distribution system.


==BACKGROUND==
==BACKGROUND==
The DC power system provides power for Class 1E equipment such as breaker control, plant


===The DC power system provides power for Class 1E===
instrumentation and control, monitoring, lighting (main control room and remote shutdown area),
equipment such as breaker control, plant
and other functions. The battery supplies the load without interruption should the battery
 
instrumentation and control, monitoring, lighting (main control room and remote shutdown area),  
and other functions. The battery supplies the load without interruption should the battery


charger or associated preferred alternating current source fail.
charger or associated preferred alternating current source fail.


Criterion 21, "Protection System Reliability and Testability," of Appendix A, "General Design
Criterion 21, Protection System Reliability and Testability, of Appendix A, General Design


Criteria for Nuclear Power Plants," to 10 CFR 50, "Domestic Licensing of Production and
Criteria for Nuclear Power Plants, to 10 CFR 50, Domestic Licensing of Production and


Utilization Facilities," states, "The protection system shall be designed for high functional
Utilization Facilities, states, The protection system shall be designed for high functional


reliability and inservice testability commensurate with the safety functions to be performed." 
reliability and inservice testability commensurate with the safety functions to be performed.


Proper fault current calculations and protective device setttings on the DC system are important
Proper fault current calculations and protective device setttings on the DC system are important
Line 167: Line 153:


==DISCUSSION==
==DISCUSSION==
Reliability of the Class 1E DC power system is important in a nuclear power plant. The DC
Reliability of the Class 1E DC power system is important in a nuclear power plant. The DC


power system is designed so that no single failu
power system is designed so that no single failure of an electrical panel, battery, or battery
 
re of an electrical panel, battery, or battery


charger will result in a condition that will prevent the safe shutdown of the plant.
charger will result in a condition that will prevent the safe shutdown of the plant.
Line 177: Line 161:
During the battery testing program, BNL performed various short-circuit tests that simulated fault
During the battery testing program, BNL performed various short-circuit tests that simulated fault


conditions on a DC distribution system typical within a nuclear power plant. More specifically, two types of battery chargers were considered, a silicon controlled rectifier (SCR)-type and a
conditions on a DC distribution system typical within a nuclear power plant. More specifically, two types of battery chargers were considered, a silicon controlled rectifier (SCR)-type and a


controlled ferroresonant (CF) transformer-type, connected individually and in parallel with three
controlled ferroresonant (CF) transformer-type, connected individually and in parallel with three


Class 1E vented lead-acid batteries from different vendors. The three nuclear-qualified batteries from three different vendors are repres
Class 1E vented lead-acid batteries from different vendors. The three nuclear-qualified batteries from three different vendors are representative of battery models used in more than 75 percent of the nuclear power plants currently in the United States. The SCR and CF battery
 
entative of battery models used in more than 75 percent of the nuclear power plants currently in the United States. The SCR and CF battery


chargers represent about 90 percent of the battery charger designs used in nuclear power
chargers represent about 90 percent of the battery charger designs used in nuclear power
Line 191: Line 173:
The testing validated that the initial fault current contribution to a downstream fault from a
The testing validated that the initial fault current contribution to a downstream fault from a


battery charger (specifically the SCR-type chargers vs. the CF-type) is much higher-in the
battery charger (specifically the SCR-type chargers vs. the CF-type) is much higherin the


range of 7 to 10 times the charger full load ampere rating-during the first 100 milliseconds than
range of 7 to 10 times the charger full load ampere ratingduring the first 100 milliseconds than


what is currently stated as 150 percent in IEEE Std 946-2004. The test results indicated that
what is currently stated as 150 percent in IEEE Std 946-2004. The test results indicated that


the initial short circuit contribution from the charger is not limited when connected in parallel with
the initial short circuit contribution from the charger is not limited when connected in parallel with


the battery. The SCR-type charger contributed more to the fault current due to the longer
the battery. The SCR-type charger contributed more to the fault current due to the longer


response time of its current limiting circuit than the CF-type. The initial higher short circuit
response time of its current limiting circuit than the CF-type. The initial higher short circuit


current contribution from the battery charger could impact the coordination of protective device
current contribution from the battery charger could impact the coordination of protective device


settings on the battery charger and downstream devices. If IEEE Std 946-2004 was utilized to
settings on the battery charger and downstream devices. If IEEE Std 946-2004 was utilized to


estimate short circuit current contributions in
estimate short circuit current contributions in DC distribution systems, licensees should consider
 
DC distribution systems, licensees should consider


performing a comprehensive review of the entire DC system protection coordination and
performing a comprehensive review of the entire DC system protection coordination and
Line 215: Line 195:
assumptions of battery and charger short circuit currents that were used to select their
assumptions of battery and charger short circuit currents that were used to select their


protection fault interruption ratings and setpoints. Specifically, licensees are encouraged to
protection fault interruption ratings and setpoints. Specifically, licensees are encouraged to


review their fault current calculations, make any necessary revision to size, and coordinate the
review their fault current calculations, make any necessary revision to size, and coordinate the
Line 223: Line 203:
Additionally, there are efforts currently underway by the IEEE 946 Working Group to consider
Additionally, there are efforts currently underway by the IEEE 946 Working Group to consider


appropriate revisions to the standard. The NRC staff that are involved in IEEE Standard 946  
appropriate revisions to the standard. The NRC staff that are involved in IEEE Standard 946 have communicated to the working group the test results, conclusions, and recommendations
 
have communicated to the working group the test results, conclusions, and recommendations


provided in NUREG/CR 7229.
provided in NUREG/CR 7229.


==CONTACT==
==CONTACT==
S Please direct any questions about this matter to the technical contact(s) listed below or the
S
 
Please direct any questions about this matter to the technical contact(s) listed below or the


appropriate RES or Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) project manager.
appropriate RES or Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) project manager.


/ra/ (Gregory T. Bowman for)   /ra/ (Paul G. Krohn for)  
/ra/ (Gregory T. Bowman for)                             /ra/ (Paul G. Krohn for)
Louise Lund, Director     Timothy J. McGinty, Director Division of Policy and Rulemaking    Division of Construction Inspection
Louise Lund, Director                                   Timothy J. McGinty, Director


Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation     and Operational Programs
Division of Policy and Rulemaking                        Division of Construction Inspection
 
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation                       and Operational Programs


Office of New Reactors
Office of New Reactors
Line 244: Line 226:
Liliana Ramadan, RES/DE
Liliana Ramadan, RES/DE


301-415-2463 E-mail:
301-415-2463 E-mail: Liliana.Ramadan@nrc.gov
Liliana.Ramadan@nrc.gov


Vijay Goel, NRR/DE
Vijay Goel, NRR/DE


301-415-3730  
301-415-3730
  E-mail:  
                      E-mail: Vijay.Goel@nrc.gov
Vijay.Goel@nrc.gov
 
Note: NRC generic communications may be found on the NRC public Web site, https://www.nrc.gov, under NRC Library, Document Collections.
 
ML17228A473; *concurred via email  TAC No. MG0062 OFFICE  TECH EDITOR*        RES/DE/ICEEB/TL*      RES/DE/ICEEB/TL*    RES/DE/ICEEB/BC* NRR/DE/EEOB/BC*
                                                                                        JQuichocho
 
NAME    JDougherty          LRamadan              KMiller              TKoshy
 
(w/comments)
DATE    9/07/17            9/07/17                9/07/17              9/8/17          9/10/17 NRR/DE/EENB/BC
 
OFFICE                      NRO/DCIP/QVIB1/BC*    NRR/DE/D*            RES/DE/D*        NRR/DPR/PGCB/PM


Note:  NRC generic communications may be found on the NRC public Web site, https://www.nrc.gov , under "NRC Library," "Document Collections."
(Acting)*
        TMartinez-Navedo                          JLubinski


ML17228A473; *concurred via email      TAC No. MG0062 OFFICE TECH EDITOR* RES/DE/ICEEB/TL* RES/DE/ICEEB/TL* RES/DE/ICEEB/BC* NRR/DE/EEOB/BC* NAME JDougherty LRamadan KMiller TKoshy
NAME                       TJackson                                    BThomas          TMensah


JQuichocho (w/comments) DATE 9/07/17  
(w/comments)                               (w/comment)
9/07/17 9/07/17  
DATE   9/11/17             9/07/17               9/18/17             9/15/17         9/19/17 NRR/DPR/PGCB/BC
9/8/17 9/10/17 OFFICE NRR/DE/EENB/BC (Acting)*
NRO/DCIP/QVIB1/BC* NRR/DE/D*
RES/DE/D* NRR/DPR/PGCB/PM


NAME TMartinez-Navedo (w/comments) TJackson JLubinski (w/comment) BThomas TMensah DATE 9/11/17 9/07/17
OFFICE NRR/DPR/PGCB/LA*                           NRO/DCIP/D           NRR/DPR/D
9/18/17 9/15/
17 9/19/17 OFFICE NRR/DPR/PGCB/LA*  
NRR/DPR/PGCB/BC (Acting)* NRO/DCIP/D NRR/DPR/D NAME ELee AGarmoe TMcGinty (PKrohn


for) LLund (GBowman
(Acting)*
                                                  TMcGinty (PKrohn    LLund (GBowman


for) DATE 9/20/17  
===NAME    ELee                AGarmoe===
9/20/17 9/21/
                                                  for)                for)
17 9/26/17}}
DATE   9/20/17             9/20/17               9/21/17             9/26/17}}


{{Information notice-Nav}}
{{Information notice-Nav}}

Revision as of 21:12, 29 October 2019

Battery and Battery Charger Short Circuit Current Contributions to a Fault on the DC Distribution System
ML17228A473
Person / Time
Issue date: 09/26/2017
From: Louise Lund, Mcginty T
Division of Construction Inspection and Operational Programs, Division of Policy and Rulemaking
To:
Mensah, T.M., NRR/DPR 415-3610
References
IN-17-006
Download: ML17228A473 (4)
v • d • e


UNITED STATES

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION

OFFICE OF NEW REACTORS

WASHINGTON, DC 20555-0001 September 26, 2017 NRC INFORMATION NOTICE 2017-06: BATTERY AND BATTERY CHARGER

SHORT-CIRCUIT CURRENT CONTRIBUTIONS

TO A FAULT ON THE DIRECT CURRENT

DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM

ADDRESSEES

All holders of an operating license or construction permit for a nuclear power reactor under

Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) Part 50, Domestic Licensing of

Production and Utilization Facilities, except those who have permanently ceased operations

and have certified that fuel has been permanently removed from the reactor vessel.

All holders of and applicants for a power reactor early site permit, combined license, standard

design approval, or manufacturing license under 10 CFR Part 52, Licenses, Certifications, and

Approvals for Nuclear Power Plants. All applicants for a standard design certification, including

such applicants after initial issuance of a design certification rule.

PURPOSE

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is issuing this information notice (IN) to inform

addressees of the results of a recent NRC-led battery testing program. The testing program

evaluated the magnitude of direct current (DC) fault current contributions from batteries and

battery chargers to a downstream short-circuit fault on the DC distribution system. The detailed

test results, conclusions, and recommendations are provided in NUREG/CR-7229, Testing to

Evaluate Battery and Battery Charger Short-Circuit Current Contributions to a Fault on the DC

Distribution System (Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS)

Accession No. ML17039A869). The NRC expects that recipients of this IN will review the

information for applicability to their facilities and consider actions, as appropriate, for potential

impacts on DC fault studies and other related calculations. The suggestions in this IN are not

NRC requirements; therefore, the NRC requires no specific action or written response.

DESCRIPTION OF CIRCUMSTANCES

On September 6, 2013, the NRC issued IN 2013-17, Significant Plant Transient Induced by

Safety-Related Direct Current Bus Maintenance at Power (ADAMS Accession Number

ML13193A009). It informed addressees of an event involving the loss of one train of the DC

distribution system in a nuclear power plant. Specifically, both the battery and the battery

charger on one DC Class 1E power division tripped on overcurrent when a fault occurred in a

downstream DC panel.

The event demonstrated that the fault impact on the DC distribution system at a nuclear power

plant can have a significant impact, as described in IN 2013-17. While the cause of the battery

ML17228A473 trip was well understood by the NRC staff, the cause of the battery charger trip was not clear.

The NRC staff assumed that the cause of the battery charger trip could have been because of

the initial higher fault current contribution by the battery charger to the downstream fault, whether connected in parallel with the battery or not. However, this configuration was

inconsistent with the language provided in the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers

(IEEE) Standard (Std) 946-2004, IEEE Recommended Practice for the Design of DC Auxiliary

Power Systems for Generating Stations, Subclause 7.9.2, which states, When the battery

charger is connected in parallel with the battery, the battery capacitance will prevent the battery

charger contribution from rising instantaneously. Therefore, the maximum current that a

charger will deliver on short circuit will not typically exceed 150 [percent] of the charger full load

ampere rating. Instantaneous battery charger current rise should only become a concern during

periods when the battery is disconnected. Therefore, the Office of Nuclear Regulatory

Research (RES) collaborated from 2014 through 2016 in a battery testing program with

Brookhaven National Laboratory (BNL) to validate the assumptions. The purpose of the testing

program was to determine if the battery and battery charger current contributions to the fault on

the DC distribution circuit would be different when connected individually or when connected in

parallel, which could impact the DC system device coordination.

In February 2017, the testing results were documented and published in NUREG/CR-7229.

One of the methods potentially used at nuclear power plants to estimate the short-circuit current

contributions is described in IEEE Std 946-2004. The use of this standard neglects the initial

fault current contribution from the charger. The DC system overcurrent protective device sizing

selection and/or coordination setting could result in a fault not being isolated as intended. This

can lead to undesirable system responses to a fault on the DC distribution system.

BACKGROUND

The DC power system provides power for Class 1E equipment such as breaker control, plant

instrumentation and control, monitoring, lighting (main control room and remote shutdown area),

and other functions. The battery supplies the load without interruption should the battery

charger or associated preferred alternating current source fail.

Criterion 21, Protection System Reliability and Testability, of Appendix A, General Design

Criteria for Nuclear Power Plants, to 10 CFR 50, Domestic Licensing of Production and

Utilization Facilities, states, The protection system shall be designed for high functional

reliability and inservice testability commensurate with the safety functions to be performed.

Proper fault current calculations and protective device setttings on the DC system are important

so that a fault can be isolated as close to the location of the fault as possible, thereby

minimizing the impact on plant operations and safety.

DISCUSSION

Reliability of the Class 1E DC power system is important in a nuclear power plant. The DC

power system is designed so that no single failure of an electrical panel, battery, or battery

charger will result in a condition that will prevent the safe shutdown of the plant.

During the battery testing program, BNL performed various short-circuit tests that simulated fault

conditions on a DC distribution system typical within a nuclear power plant. More specifically, two types of battery chargers were considered, a silicon controlled rectifier (SCR)-type and a

controlled ferroresonant (CF) transformer-type, connected individually and in parallel with three

Class 1E vented lead-acid batteries from different vendors. The three nuclear-qualified batteries from three different vendors are representative of battery models used in more than 75 percent of the nuclear power plants currently in the United States. The SCR and CF battery

chargers represent about 90 percent of the battery charger designs used in nuclear power

plants currently in the United States.

The testing validated that the initial fault current contribution to a downstream fault from a

battery charger (specifically the SCR-type chargers vs. the CF-type) is much higherin the

range of 7 to 10 times the charger full load ampere ratingduring the first 100 milliseconds than

what is currently stated as 150 percent in IEEE Std 946-2004. The test results indicated that

the initial short circuit contribution from the charger is not limited when connected in parallel with

the battery. The SCR-type charger contributed more to the fault current due to the longer

response time of its current limiting circuit than the CF-type. The initial higher short circuit

current contribution from the battery charger could impact the coordination of protective device

settings on the battery charger and downstream devices. If IEEE Std 946-2004 was utilized to

estimate short circuit current contributions in DC distribution systems, licensees should consider

performing a comprehensive review of the entire DC system protection coordination and

assumptions of battery and charger short circuit currents that were used to select their

protection fault interruption ratings and setpoints. Specifically, licensees are encouraged to

review their fault current calculations, make any necessary revision to size, and coordinate the

protective device settings based on the new information documented in NUREG/CR-7229.

Additionally, there are efforts currently underway by the IEEE 946 Working Group to consider

appropriate revisions to the standard. The NRC staff that are involved in IEEE Standard 946 have communicated to the working group the test results, conclusions, and recommendations

provided in NUREG/CR 7229.

CONTACT

S

Please direct any questions about this matter to the technical contact(s) listed below or the

appropriate RES or Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) project manager.

/ra/ (Gregory T. Bowman for) /ra/ (Paul G. Krohn for)

Louise Lund, Director Timothy J. McGinty, Director

Division of Policy and Rulemaking Division of Construction Inspection

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation and Operational Programs

Office of New Reactors

Technical Contact:

Liliana Ramadan, RES/DE

301-415-2463 E-mail: Liliana.Ramadan@nrc.gov

Vijay Goel, NRR/DE

301-415-3730

E-mail: Vijay.Goel@nrc.gov

Note: NRC generic communications may be found on the NRC public Web site, https://www.nrc.gov, under NRC Library, Document Collections.

ML17228A473; *concurred via email TAC No. MG0062 OFFICE TECH EDITOR* RES/DE/ICEEB/TL* RES/DE/ICEEB/TL* RES/DE/ICEEB/BC* NRR/DE/EEOB/BC*

JQuichocho

NAME JDougherty LRamadan KMiller TKoshy

(w/comments)

DATE 9/07/17 9/07/17 9/07/17 9/8/17 9/10/17 NRR/DE/EENB/BC

OFFICE NRO/DCIP/QVIB1/BC* NRR/DE/D* RES/DE/D* NRR/DPR/PGCB/PM

(Acting)*

TMartinez-Navedo JLubinski

NAME TJackson BThomas TMensah

(w/comments) (w/comment)

DATE 9/11/17 9/07/17 9/18/17 9/15/17 9/19/17 NRR/DPR/PGCB/BC

OFFICE NRR/DPR/PGCB/LA* NRO/DCIP/D NRR/DPR/D

(Acting)*

TMcGinty (PKrohn LLund (GBowman

NAME ELee AGarmoe

for) for)

DATE 9/20/17 9/20/17 9/21/17 9/26/17


Retrieved from "https://kanterella.com/w/index.php?title=Information_Notice_2017-06,_Battery_and_Battery_Charger_Short_Circuit_Current_Contributions_to_a_Fault_on_the_DC_Distribution_System&oldid=2002490"