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| issue date = 03/31/2006
| issue date = 03/31/2006
| title = EA-06-022, LaSalle County Station, Unit 2, Notice of Violation, IR 05000374-06-101, NRC Office of Investigations Report No. 3-2005-007
| title = EA-06-022, LaSalle County Station, Unit 2, Notice of Violation, IR 05000374-06-101, NRC Office of Investigations Report No. 3-2005-007
| author name = Caldwell J L
| author name = Caldwell J
| author affiliation = NRC/RGN-III/ORA
| author affiliation = NRC/RGN-III/ORA
| addressee name = Crane C M
| addressee name = Crane C
| addressee affiliation = Exelon Generation Co, LLC, Exelon Nuclear
| addressee affiliation = Exelon Generation Co, LLC, Exelon Nuclear
| docket = 05000374
| docket = 05000374
Line 19: Line 19:


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=Text=
{{#Wiki_filter:
{{#Wiki_filter:March 31, 2006EA-06-022 Mr. Christopher M. CranePresident and Chief Nuclear Officer Exelon Nuclear Exelon Generation Company, LLC 4300 Winfield Road Warrenville, IL 60555SUBJECT:LASALLE COUNTY STATION UNIT 2 - NOTICE OF VIOLATION(NRC INSPECTION REPORT NO. 05000374/2006010 AND NRC OFFICEOF INVESTIGATIONS REPORT NO. 3-2005-007)
[[Issue date::March 31, 2006]]
 
EA-06-022 Mr. Christopher M. CranePresident and Chief Nuclear Officer Exelon Nuclear Exelon Generation Company, LLC 4300 Winfield Road Warrenville, IL 60555
 
SUBJECT: LASALLE COUNTY STATION UNIT 2 - NOTICE OF VIOLATION(NRC INSPECTION REPORT NO. 05000374/2006010 AND NRC OFFICEOF INVESTIGATIONS REPORT NO. 3-2005-007)


==Dear Mr. Crane:==
==Dear Mr. Crane:==
Line 31: Line 26:
In a letter dated February 27, 2006, you provided a response to the apparent violation.Based on the information developed during the OI investigation and the information provided inyour February 27, 2006 letter, the NRC has determined that a violation of NRC requirementsoccurred. The violation is cited in the enclosed Notice of Violation (Notice), and the circumstances surrounding the violation are described in the Summary of Investigation which was transmitted to you on January 27, 2006. On February 13, 2005, a contractor pipefitter foreman and two contractor pipefitters entered a posted HRA in the Unit 2 condenser pit to conduct repairs to a sprinkler head and did not sign the required HRA radiation work permit (RWP) or receive the required briefing by radiation protection technicians (RPT) for work in a HRA. The HRA was properly posted and barricaded with a fence gate and with a swing gate to preclude inadvertent entry. A radiation protection technician identified the inappropriate actionsby the contractor pipefitter foreman and contractor pipefitters which were an apparent violation of Technical Specification 5.4.1.a and Exelon Procedure RP-AA-460, Revision 4.
In a letter dated February 27, 2006, you provided a response to the apparent violation.Based on the information developed during the OI investigation and the information provided inyour February 27, 2006 letter, the NRC has determined that a violation of NRC requirementsoccurred. The violation is cited in the enclosed Notice of Violation (Notice), and the circumstances surrounding the violation are described in the Summary of Investigation which was transmitted to you on January 27, 2006. On February 13, 2005, a contractor pipefitter foreman and two contractor pipefitters entered a posted HRA in the Unit 2 condenser pit to conduct repairs to a sprinkler head and did not sign the required HRA radiation work permit (RWP) or receive the required briefing by radiation protection technicians (RPT) for work in a HRA. The HRA was properly posted and barricaded with a fence gate and with a swing gate to preclude inadvertent entry. A radiation protection technician identified the inappropriate actionsby the contractor pipefitter foreman and contractor pipefitters which were an apparent violation of Technical Specification 5.4.1.a and Exelon Procedure RP-AA-460, Revision 4.


C. Crane-2-
C. Crane-2-1The previous enforcement actions referenced by the licensee were: (1) EA-00-057 at DuaneArnold Energy Center, (2) EA-00-075 at the Braidwood Station, and (3) EA-03-153 at the BeaverValley Power Station.Your root cause investigation report identified the following two root causes for the event:(1) communications between the work group and access control point personnel were unclear and led to a misunderstanding of the work location; and (2) contrary to known rules, the individuals believed permission had been granted to proceed to the work area regardless of radiological postings. Training had been provided to the work group at the beginning of the outage which included HRA access requirements using a scenario similar to this event. All three individuals acknowledged being in attendance at the training. Therefore, the actions of the contractor pipefitter foreman and two contractor pipefitters are considered a willful violationrepresenting careless disregard of NRC requirements, and the violation has been categorizedin accordance with the NRC Enforcement Policy at Severity Level III.
1The previous enforcement actions referenced by the licensee were: (1) EA-00-057 at DuaneArnold Energy Center, (2) EA-00-075 at the Braidwood Station, and (3) EA-03-153 at the BeaverValley Power Station.Your root cause investigation report identified the following two root causes for the event:(1) communications between the work group and access control point personnel were unclear and led to a misunderstanding of the work location; and (2) contrary to known rules, the individuals believed permission had been granted to proceed to the work area regardless of radiological postings. Training had been provided to the work group at the beginning of the outage which included HRA access requirements using a scenario similar to this event. All three individuals acknowledged being in attendance at the training. Therefore, the actions of the contractor pipefitter foreman and two contractor pipefitters are considered a willful violationrepresenting careless disregard of NRC requirements, and the violation has been categorizedin accordance with the NRC Enforcement Policy at Severity Level III.


In your letter dated February 27, 2006, you acknowledged that a willful violation occurred,presented information indicating that the violation should be categorized at Severity Level IV,and indicated that you believed that the violation met the NRC criteria to be categorized as anon-cited violation (NCV). Specifically, you contend that the foreman was a low-level individualand should not be considered a licensee official as defined in Section IV.A of the Enforcement Policy. You also referenced three previous NRC enforcement actions 1 involving a first-linesupervisor willfully causing an NRC licensee to be in violation of regulatory requirements whereeach prior action was individually categorized at Severity Level IV.In making our decision, we considered the foreman a licensee official. We determined that theforeman was responsible for the actions of himself and the contractor employees and that the foreman failed to ensure that both he and the two pipefitters complied with the radiationprotection procedures associated with entry into an HRA. The willful violation c annot beconsidered an isolated act of an employee since three employees, one of whom was a foreman, were involved in the violation. Additionally, although there may have not been a lackof management oversight, there was a lack of first line supervision by the foreman. Regarding the three prior enforcement cases referenced in your letter, we determined that each of the cases involved the willful actions of a supervisor; however, none caused other individuals toviolate licensee procedures. After reviewing the information presented in your letter dated February 27, 2006, and the Enforcement Policy, we concluded that you did not provide asufficient basis for the NRC to re-categorize the violation at Severity Level IV or as an NCV. Therefore, this willful violation is appropriately categorized in accordance with the EnforcementPolicy at Severity Level III.In accordance with the Enforcement Policy, a base civil penalty in the amount of $65,000 wasconsidered for this Severity Level III violation. Because this was a willful violation, the NRCconsidered whether credit was warranted for Identification and Corrective Action in accordancewith the civil penalty assessment process in Section VI.C.2 of the Enforcement Policy. Credit was warranted for the Identification civil penalty adjustment factor because a radiationprotection technician identified the violation. Credit was also warranted for the CorrectiveAction adjustment factor for corrective measures that included terminating the employment of C. Crane-3-the two pipefitters and the foreman, using Radiation Worker Pocket Data Sheets, using abriefing checklist for HRA entries, increasing supervisor and management oversight of radiation area/HRA field communications, and reinforcing standards and expectations by improving training and procedures. Additionally, Exelon plans to conduct a review of the implementation and effectiveness of its and Venture's corrective actions covered in the Confirmatory Order dated November 22, 2005. The LaSalle Plant Manager and Site Vice President also plan to meet with contract leadership prior to the next two refueling outages to establish personnel expectations in following radiological work requirements.Therefore, to encourage prompt identification and comprehensive correction of the violation,I have been authorized, after consultation with the Director, Office of Enforcement, not to propose a civil penalty in this case. However, significant violations in the future could result in a civil penalty.The NRC has concluded that information regarding the reason for the violation, the correctiveactions taken and planned to correct the violation and prevent recurrence, and the date whenfull compliance was achieved is already adequately addressed on the docket in your letter dated February 27, 2006. Therefore, you are not required to respond to this letter unless the description therein does not accurately reflect your corrective actions or your position. In that case, or if you choose to provide additional information, you should follow the instructions specified in the enclosed Notice.If you disagree with this enforcement action, the NRC would normally offer you the opportunityto request alternate dispute resolution (ADR) with the NRC as a part of our pilot program forresolving issues involving apparent willful violations. However, the topic of unauthorized HRAentries was recently the subject of a successful ADR mediation between the NRC and ExelonNuclear for a previous violation (reference LaSalle EA-04-170). (NOTE: This ADR mediationtook place after the occurrence of the current violation (EA-06-022)). Therefore, afterconsultation with the Director, Office of Enforcement, the NRC believes we have each had ample opportunity to share our views and interests on this issue and that further use of ADR is unnecessary. If you have any additional information or views contrary to the above, we would consider your request for ADR.If you have any questions, please contact Steven Orth, Health Physics Team Leader, at630-829-9827.In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of thisletter, its enclosure, and your response (if you choose to provide one) will be madeavailable electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the NRC's document system (ADAMS), accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html. To the extent possible, your response (if C. Crane-4-you choose to provide one) should not include any personal privacy, proprietary, orsafeguards information so that it can be made available to the Public without redaction. The NRC also includes significant enforcement actions on its Web site at www.nrc.gov; selectWhat We Do , Enforcement , then Significant Enforcement Actions
In your letter dated February 27, 2006, you acknowledged that a willful violation occurred,presented information indicating that the violation should be categorized at Severity Level IV,and indicated that you believed that the violation met the NRC criteria to be categorized as anon-cited violation (NCV). Specifically, you contend that the foreman was a low-level individualand should not be considered a licensee official as defined in Section IV.A of the Enforcement Policy. You also referenced three previous NRC enforcement actions 1 involving a first-linesupervisor willfully causing an NRC licensee to be in violation of regulatory requirements whereeach prior action was individually categorized at Severity Level IV.In making our decision, we considered the foreman a licensee official. We determined that theforeman was responsible for the actions of himself and the contractor employees and that the foreman failed to ensure that both he and the two pipefitters complied with the radiationprotection procedures associated with entry into an HRA. The willful violation c annot beconsidered an isolated act of an employee since three employees, one of whom was a foreman, were involved in the violation. Additionally, although there may have not been a lackof management oversight, there was a lack of first line supervision by the foreman. Regarding the three prior enforcement cases referenced in your letter, we determined that each of the cases involved the willful actions of a supervisor; however, none caused other individuals toviolate licensee procedures. After reviewing the information presented in your letter dated February 27, 2006, and the Enforcement Policy, we concluded that you did not provide asufficient basis for the NRC to re-categorize the violation at Severity Level IV or as an NCV. Therefore, this willful violation is appropriately categorized in accordance with the EnforcementPolicy at Severity Level III.In accordance with the Enforcement Policy, a base civil penalty in the amount of $65,000 wasconsidered for this Severity Level III violation. Because this was a willful violation, the NRCconsidered whether credit was warranted for Identification and Corrective Action in accordancewith the civil penalty assessment process in Section VI.C.2 of the Enforcement Policy. Credit was warranted for the Identification civil penalty adjustment factor because a radiationprotection technician identified the violation. Credit was also warranted for the CorrectiveAction adjustment factor for corrective measures that included terminating the employment of C. Crane-3-the two pipefitters and the foreman, using Radiation Worker Pocket Data Sheets, using abriefing checklist for HRA entries, increasing supervisor and management oversight of radiation area/HRA field communications, and reinforcing standards and expectations by improving training and procedures. Additionally, Exelon plans to conduct a review of the implementation and effectiveness of its and Venture's corrective actions covered in the Confirmatory Order dated November 22, 2005. The LaSalle Plant Manager and Site Vice President also plan to meet with contract leadership prior to the next two refueling outages to establish personnel expectations in following radiological work requirements.Therefore, to encourage prompt identification and comprehensive correction of the violation,I have been authorized, after consultation with the Director, Office of Enforcement, not to propose a civil penalty in this case. However, significant violations in the future could result in a civil penalty.The NRC has concluded that information regarding the reason for the violation, the correctiveactions taken and planned to correct the violation and prevent recurrence, and the date whenfull compliance was achieved is already adequately addressed on the docket in your letter dated February 27, 2006. Therefore, you are not required to respond to this letter unless the description therein does not accurately reflect your corrective actions or your position. In that case, or if you choose to provide additional information, you should follow the instructions specified in the enclosed Notice.If you disagree with this enforcement action, the NRC would normally offer you the opportunityto request alternate dispute resolution (ADR) with the NRC as a part of our pilot program forresolving issues involving apparent willful violations. However, the topic of unauthorized HRAentries was recently the subject of a successful ADR mediation between the NRC and ExelonNuclear for a previous violation (reference LaSalle EA-04-170). (NOTE: This ADR mediationtook place after the occurrence of the current violation (EA-06-022)). Therefore, afterconsultation with the Director, Office of Enforcement, the NRC believes we have each had ample opportunity to share our views and interests on this issue and that further use of ADR is unnecessary. If you have any additional information or views contrary to the above, we would consider your request for ADR.If you have any questions, please contact Steven Orth, Health Physics Team Leader, at630-829-9827.In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of thisletter, its enclosure, and your response (if you choose to provide one) will be madeavailable electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the NRC's document system (ADAMS), accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html. To the extent possible, your response (if C. Crane-4-you choose to provide one) should not include any personal privacy, proprietary, orsafeguards information so that it can be made available to the Public without redaction. The NRC also includes significant enforcement actions on its Web site at www.nrc.gov; selectWhat We Do , Enforcement , then Significant Enforcement Actions
.
.


Sincerely,/RA by G. Grant Acting for/James L. CaldwellRegional AdministratorLicense No. NPF-18
Sincerely,
 
/RA by G. Grant Acting for/James L. CaldwellRegional AdministratorLicense No. NPF-18Enclosure: Notice of Violation cc w/encl:Site Vice President - LaSalle County StationLaSalle County Station Plant Manager Regulatory Assurance Manager - LaSalle County Station Chief Operating Officer Senior Vice President - Nuclear Services Senior Vice President - Mid-West Regional Operating Group Vice President - Mid-West Operations Support Vice President - Licensing and Regulatory Affairs Director Licensing - Mid-West Regional Operating Group Manager Licensing - Clinton and LaSalleSenior Counsel, Nuclear, Mid-West Regional Operating Group Document Control Desk - Licensing Assistant Attorney General Illinois Department of Nuclear Safety State Liaison Officer Chairman, Illinois Commerce Commission
===Enclosure:===
Notice of Violation cc w/encl:Site Vice President - LaSalle County StationLaSalle County Station Plant Manager Regulatory Assurance Manager - LaSalle County Station Chief Operating Officer Senior Vice President - Nuclear Services Senior Vice President - Mid-West Regional Operating Group Vice President - Mid-West Operations Support Vice President - Licensing and Regulatory Affairs Director Licensing - Mid-West Regional Operating Group Manager Licensing - Clinton and LaSalleSenior Counsel, Nuclear, Mid-West Regional Operating Group Document Control Desk - Licensing Assistant Attorney General Illinois Department of Nuclear Safety State Liaison Officer Chairman, Illinois Commerce Commission
}}
}}

Revision as of 20:56, 13 July 2019

EA-06-022, LaSalle County Station, Unit 2, Notice of Violation, IR 05000374-06-101, NRC Office of Investigations Report No. 3-2005-007
ML060930485
Person / Time
Site: LaSalle Constellation icon.png
Issue date: 03/31/2006
From: Caldwell J
Region 3 Administrator
To: Crane C
Exelon Generation Co, Exelon Nuclear
References
3-2005-007, EA-06-022, IA-06-005, IA-06-006, IA-96-004, IR-06-010 EA-06-022
Download: ML060930485 (7)


Text

March 31, 2006EA-06-022 Mr. Christopher M. CranePresident and Chief Nuclear Officer Exelon Nuclear Exelon Generation Company, LLC 4300 Winfield Road Warrenville, IL 60555SUBJECT:LASALLE COUNTY STATION UNIT 2 - NOTICE OF VIOLATION(NRC INSPECTION REPORT NO. 05000374/2006010 AND NRC OFFICEOF INVESTIGATIONS REPORT NO. 3-2005-007)

Dear Mr. Crane:

This refers to a U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) occupational radiationsafety inspection conducted in February 2005 (NRC Integrated Inspection ReportNo. 05000374/2005002 dated May 10, 2005) and an NRC Office of Investigations (OI)investigation of an event involving an apparent violation of the technical specifications onFebruary 13, 2005, at LaSalle County Station Unit 2. The purpose of the OI investigationwas to determine if a contractor (The Venture) pipefitter foreman and two contractor pipefitters willfully entered a posted high radiation area (HRA) without receiving therequired HRA briefing. The OI investigation was completed on October 27, 2005, and based on the information developed during the investigation, OI substantiated the issue.In a letter dated January 27, 2006, we transmitted the Summary of Investigation associated withOI Report No. 3-2005-007 and provided you the opportunity to address the apparent violation identified during the OI investigation by either attending a predecisional enforcement conference, or submitting a written response before we made our final enforcement decision.

In a letter dated February 27, 2006, you provided a response to the apparent violation.Based on the information developed during the OI investigation and the information provided inyour February 27, 2006 letter, the NRC has determined that a violation of NRC requirementsoccurred. The violation is cited in the enclosed Notice of Violation (Notice), and the circumstances surrounding the violation are described in the Summary of Investigation which was transmitted to you on January 27, 2006. On February 13, 2005, a contractor pipefitter foreman and two contractor pipefitters entered a posted HRA in the Unit 2 condenser pit to conduct repairs to a sprinkler head and did not sign the required HRA radiation work permit (RWP) or receive the required briefing by radiation protection technicians (RPT) for work in a HRA. The HRA was properly posted and barricaded with a fence gate and with a swing gate to preclude inadvertent entry. A radiation protection technician identified the inappropriate actionsby the contractor pipefitter foreman and contractor pipefitters which were an apparent violation of Technical Specification 5.4.1.a and Exelon Procedure RP-AA-460, Revision 4.

C. Crane-2-1The previous enforcement actions referenced by the licensee were: (1) EA-00-057 at DuaneArnold Energy Center, (2) EA-00-075 at the Braidwood Station, and (3) EA-03-153 at the BeaverValley Power Station.Your root cause investigation report identified the following two root causes for the event:(1) communications between the work group and access control point personnel were unclear and led to a misunderstanding of the work location; and (2) contrary to known rules, the individuals believed permission had been granted to proceed to the work area regardless of radiological postings. Training had been provided to the work group at the beginning of the outage which included HRA access requirements using a scenario similar to this event. All three individuals acknowledged being in attendance at the training. Therefore, the actions of the contractor pipefitter foreman and two contractor pipefitters are considered a willful violationrepresenting careless disregard of NRC requirements, and the violation has been categorizedin accordance with the NRC Enforcement Policy at Severity Level III.

In your letter dated February 27, 2006, you acknowledged that a willful violation occurred,presented information indicating that the violation should be categorized at Severity Level IV,and indicated that you believed that the violation met the NRC criteria to be categorized as anon-cited violation (NCV). Specifically, you contend that the foreman was a low-level individualand should not be considered a licensee official as defined in Section IV.A of the Enforcement Policy. You also referenced three previous NRC enforcement actions 1 involving a first-linesupervisor willfully causing an NRC licensee to be in violation of regulatory requirements whereeach prior action was individually categorized at Severity Level IV.In making our decision, we considered the foreman a licensee official. We determined that theforeman was responsible for the actions of himself and the contractor employees and that the foreman failed to ensure that both he and the two pipefitters complied with the radiationprotection procedures associated with entry into an HRA. The willful violation c annot beconsidered an isolated act of an employee since three employees, one of whom was a foreman, were involved in the violation. Additionally, although there may have not been a lackof management oversight, there was a lack of first line supervision by the foreman. Regarding the three prior enforcement cases referenced in your letter, we determined that each of the cases involved the willful actions of a supervisor; however, none caused other individuals toviolate licensee procedures. After reviewing the information presented in your letter dated February 27, 2006, and the Enforcement Policy, we concluded that you did not provide asufficient basis for the NRC to re-categorize the violation at Severity Level IV or as an NCV. Therefore, this willful violation is appropriately categorized in accordance with the EnforcementPolicy at Severity Level III.In accordance with the Enforcement Policy, a base civil penalty in the amount of $65,000 wasconsidered for this Severity Level III violation. Because this was a willful violation, the NRCconsidered whether credit was warranted for Identification and Corrective Action in accordancewith the civil penalty assessment process in Section VI.C.2 of the Enforcement Policy. Credit was warranted for the Identification civil penalty adjustment factor because a radiationprotection technician identified the violation. Credit was also warranted for the CorrectiveAction adjustment factor for corrective measures that included terminating the employment of C. Crane-3-the two pipefitters and the foreman, using Radiation Worker Pocket Data Sheets, using abriefing checklist for HRA entries, increasing supervisor and management oversight of radiation area/HRA field communications, and reinforcing standards and expectations by improving training and procedures. Additionally, Exelon plans to conduct a review of the implementation and effectiveness of its and Venture's corrective actions covered in the Confirmatory Order dated November 22, 2005. The LaSalle Plant Manager and Site Vice President also plan to meet with contract leadership prior to the next two refueling outages to establish personnel expectations in following radiological work requirements.Therefore, to encourage prompt identification and comprehensive correction of the violation,I have been authorized, after consultation with the Director, Office of Enforcement, not to propose a civil penalty in this case. However, significant violations in the future could result in a civil penalty.The NRC has concluded that information regarding the reason for the violation, the correctiveactions taken and planned to correct the violation and prevent recurrence, and the date whenfull compliance was achieved is already adequately addressed on the docket in your letter dated February 27, 2006. Therefore, you are not required to respond to this letter unless the description therein does not accurately reflect your corrective actions or your position. In that case, or if you choose to provide additional information, you should follow the instructions specified in the enclosed Notice.If you disagree with this enforcement action, the NRC would normally offer you the opportunityto request alternate dispute resolution (ADR) with the NRC as a part of our pilot program forresolving issues involving apparent willful violations. However, the topic of unauthorized HRAentries was recently the subject of a successful ADR mediation between the NRC and ExelonNuclear for a previous violation (reference LaSalle EA-04-170). (NOTE: This ADR mediationtook place after the occurrence of the current violation (EA-06-022)). Therefore, afterconsultation with the Director, Office of Enforcement, the NRC believes we have each had ample opportunity to share our views and interests on this issue and that further use of ADR is unnecessary. If you have any additional information or views contrary to the above, we would consider your request for ADR.If you have any questions, please contact Steven Orth, Health Physics Team Leader, at630-829-9827.In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of thisletter, its enclosure, and your response (if you choose to provide one) will be madeavailable electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the NRC's document system (ADAMS), accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html. To the extent possible, your response (if C. Crane-4-you choose to provide one) should not include any personal privacy, proprietary, orsafeguards information so that it can be made available to the Public without redaction. The NRC also includes significant enforcement actions on its Web site at www.nrc.gov; selectWhat We Do , Enforcement , then Significant Enforcement Actions

.

Sincerely,

/RA by G. Grant Acting for/James L. CaldwellRegional AdministratorLicense No. NPF-18Enclosure: Notice of Violation cc w/encl:Site Vice President - LaSalle County StationLaSalle County Station Plant Manager Regulatory Assurance Manager - LaSalle County Station Chief Operating Officer Senior Vice President - Nuclear Services Senior Vice President - Mid-West Regional Operating Group Vice President - Mid-West Operations Support Vice President - Licensing and Regulatory Affairs Director Licensing - Mid-West Regional Operating Group Manager Licensing - Clinton and LaSalleSenior Counsel, Nuclear, Mid-West Regional Operating Group Document Control Desk - Licensing Assistant Attorney General Illinois Department of Nuclear Safety State Liaison Officer Chairman, Illinois Commerce Commission