ML15363A374: Difference between revisions
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| number = ML15363A374 | | number = ML15363A374 | ||
| issue date = 10/06/2015 | | issue date = 10/06/2015 | ||
| title = | | title = 3 Internal Events and Internal Flooding PRA and Fire PRA NFPA 805 Record of Review | ||
| author name = Gennardo D J | | author name = Gennardo D J | ||
| author affiliation = NRC/NRR/DRA | | author affiliation = NRC/NRR/DRA | ||
Revision as of 03:40, 7 April 2019
| ML15363A374 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Waterford  |
| Issue date: | 10/06/2015 |
| From: | Gennardo D J NRC/NRR/DRA |
| To: | |
| Gennardo D J | |
| References | |
| Download: ML15363A374 (7) | |
Text
Record of Review Dispositions to Waterford 3 Internal Events PRA Facts and Observations (F&Os) October6,20151Finding/ Suggestion (F&O) ID ACCEPTABLE TO STAFF VIA Review of Plant Disposition (A/B/C)i RAI Response Not Discussed in SE Discussed in SE AS-A7-01 A AS-A7-02 C AS-B3-01 See PRA RAI 44.a. Acceptable to staff because the licensee explains that modeling of accident sequence phenomena was reviewed against the eighteen phenomena identified in WCAP-16679-P - 'Accident Sequence Phenomena Considerations' which are listed by the licensee in the response.
DA-C2-01 A DA-C6-01 See PRA RAI 44.b. DA-C7-01 A DA-C8-01 See PRA RAI 44.c DA-C10-01 See PRA RAI 44.b DA-C12-01 See PRA RAI 44.b DA-C12-02 See PRA RAI 44.b HR-A1-01 A HR-B1-01 A HR-D1-01 A HR-F2-01 A HR-G4-01 See PRA RAI 44.d. Acceptable to staff based on the licensee's explanation that the cited time discrepancy does not impact the updated HRA because the cause-based analysis used was more limiting than the time-based analysis.
HR-G6-01 A HR-H2-01 See PRA RAI 44.e.
IE-A6-01 A IE-C6-01 C IE-C12-01 C IF-B2-01 C Record of Review Dispositions to Waterford 3 Internal Events PRA Facts and Observations (F&Os) October6,20152Finding/ Suggestion (F&O) ID ACCEPTABLE TO STAFF VIA Review of Plant Disposition (A/B/C)i RAI Response Not Discussed in SE Discussed in SE IF-C3c-01 C IF-C7-01 C IF-D5a-01 C IF-D7-01 C IF-D7-02 C IF-E5a-01 C IF-E6-01 C LE-F1b-01 A LE-F3-01 C QU-E4-01 C SC-A5-01 A SC-B1-01 See PRA RAI 44.f SC-B1-02 See PRA RAI 44.g. Acceptable to staff because the licensee explains that a fire in the battery room is assumed to fail all equipment in the room and hydrogen accumulation was not expected to cause a hydrogen explosion that would fail the fire barrier.
SC-B3-01 See PRA RAI 44.i and F&O disposition. Acceptable to staff for the following reasons: 1) The licensee explains in the F&O disposition that MAAP runs have been updated and used to verify and redefine LOCA break sizes, and 2) The licensee explains in the RAI response counter to the implication in the F&O disposition that the Fire PRA does include fire-induced small LOCAs, including spurious opening of the reactor Head vent valves, Pressurizer vent valves, and Letdown line valves.
SC-B3-02 See PRA RAI 44.h. Acceptable to staff because the licensee explains that "load stripping" was intentionally excluded from the Internal and Fire
Record of Review Dispositions to Waterford 3 Internal Events PRA Facts and Observations (F&Os) October6,20153Finding/ Suggestion (F&O) ID ACCEPTABLE TO STAFF VIA Review of Plant Disposition (A/B/C)i RAI Response Not Discussed in SE Discussed in SE Event PRA because it has an insignificant risk reduction impact and because recovery of off-site power is not credited in the Fire PRA.
SC-B5-02 A SC-C1-02 A SC-C3-01 See PRA RAI 44.j SY-A8-01 A SY-A12b-01 See PRA RAI 44.k SY-A12b-02 A SY-A16-01 A SY-A16-02 A SY-A18a-01 A SY-B4-01 A SY-B13-01 See PRA RAI 44.l.
SY-B16-01 A SY-C2-01 C SY-C2-02 See PRA RAI 44.m. Acceptable to staff because the licensee explains the Temporary EDG is not permanently installed or normally on site, therefore, it is not credited in the Internal Events or Fire PRA.
SY-C3-01 A iA:TheNRCstafffindsthatthedispositionoftheF&OasdescribedbythelicenseeintheLARprovidesconfidencethattheissuesraisedbytheF&Ohavebeenaddressedand,ifneeded,thePRAhasbeenmodified,andthereforetheresolutionoftheF&Oisacceptableforthisapplication.B:TheNRCstafffindsthatthedispositionoftheF&OasdescribedbythelicenseeintheLARandfurtherclarifiedduringtheauditprovidesconfidencethattheissuesraisedbytheF&Ohavebeenaddressedand,ifneeded,thePRAhasbeenmodified,andthereforetheresolutionoftheF&Oisacceptableforthisapplication.C:TheNRCstafffindsthattheresolutionoftheF&O,asdescribedbythelicenseeintheLAR,wouldhaveanegligibleeffectontheevaluationsreliedupontosupportfireriskevaluationsandhasnoimpactontheconclusionsoftheriskassessmentandthereforetheresolutionoftheF&Oisacceptableforthisapplication.ExamplesofsuchF&Osmaybesuggestions,aswellasthoseF&Osthatdon'taffectthefirePRA.Documentationissuesmayfallintothiscategoryaswell.
Record of Review Dispositions to Waterford 3 FIRE PRA Facts and Observations (F&Os) and Supporting Requirements (SRs) Not Met or Met at Capability Category (CC) I October06,20151Finding/ Suggestion (F&O) ID 1 ACCEPTABLE TO STAFF VIA Review of Plant Disposition (A/B/C)2 RAI Response Not Discussed in SE Discussed in SE CS-A3-01 A CS-B1-01 A ES-A2-01 A ES-A3-02 See PRA RAI 45.a. Acceptable to staff because the licensee explained that an evaluation was performed of fire impact on cables (including DC cables) that could prevent tripping the Reactor Coolant Pumps (RCPs )
ES-B1-01 See PRA RAI 45.b. Acceptable to staff because the licensee explained that a systematic evaluation was performed to ensure all risk important components were included in the Fire PRA from the following sources: (1) the Internal Events PRA, (2) the Safe Shutdown Equipment List, (3) components identified by the Multiple Spurious Action (MSO) expert panel, and (4) components whose spurious actuation could cause unwanted operator actions.
ES-B2-01 A ES-C1-01 A FQ-A3-01 See PRA RAI 45.c FQ-B1-01 See PRA RAI 45.d FQ-D1-02 See PRA RAI 45.e. Acceptable to staff because the licensee explained that re-quantification of the updated Fire PRA included a reasonableness review of LERF results and an update of the associated documentation.
FQ-E1-01 See PRA RAI 45.e. Acceptable to staff because the licensee explained that re-quantification of the updated Fire PRA included a reasonableness review of CDF and LERF results and
Record of Review Dispositions to Waterford 3 FIRE PRA Facts and Observations (F&Os) and Supporting Requirements (SRs) Not Met or Met at Capability Category (CC) I October06,20152Finding/ Suggestion (F&O) ID 1 ACCEPTABLE TO STAFF VIA Review of Plant Disposition (A/B/C)2 RAI Response Not Discussed in SE Discussed in SE an update of the associated documentation.
FQ-E1-02 See PRA RAI 45.e. Acceptable to staff because the licensee explained that re-quantification of the updated Fire PRA included a quantitative uncertainty evaluation for both CDF and LERF and an update of the associated documentation.
FSS-B2-01 See PRA RAI 07 and PRA RAI S04 FSS-D7-01 PRA RAI 45.f FSS-E3-01 A FSS-H10-01 A HRA-A2-01 See PRA RAI 45.g. Acceptable to staff because the licensee explained that basic event RHFPUMPOFP did not appear in any cutset with a screening applied, so no detailed calculation was performed for it.
HRA-A4-01 See PRA RAI 45.g. Acceptable to staff because the licensee explained that operator interviews and simulator and control room observations were added to the documentation.
HRA-C1-01 PRA RAI 45.h, PRA RAI 13, and PRA RAI S07 HRA-D1-01 A HRA-E1-01 PRA RAI 45.h, PRA RAI 13, and PRA RAI S07 IGN-A10-01 A
Record of Review Dispositions to Waterford 3 FIRE PRA Facts and Observations (F&Os) and Supporting Requirements (SRs) Not Met or Met at Capability Category (CC) I October06,20153Finding/ Suggestion (F&O) ID 1 ACCEPTABLE TO STAFF VIA Review of Plant Disposition (A/B/C)2 RAI Response Not Discussed in SE Discussed in SE PP-A1-01 A PP-B7-01 A UNC-A1-01 FSS-H1-01 FSS-H1-02 See PRA RAI 16 and PRA RAI S08 FSS-H2-01 See PRA RAI 15 FSS-H3-01 See FM RAI S04.a FSS-H9-01 A QLS-A2-01 A QLS-A4-01
A QLS-A4-01 C QLS-A4-01 A FSS-C1-01 C FSS-C2-01 C FSS-C3-01 C FSS-H5-01 A ES-C2-01 PRA RAI 45.h, PRA RAI 13, and PRA RAI S07 FQ-C1-01 PRA RAI S07 and PRA S10 HRA-A4-01 A FSS-F2-01 A Record of Review Dispositions to Waterford 3 FIRE PRA Facts and Observations (F&Os) and Supporting Requirements (SRs) Not Met or Met at Capability Category (CC) I October06,201541Tableincludes:1)F&OsprovidedinTableV 1oftheLARSupplementlistingallFindingfromtheoriginalNovember2010full scopepeerreviewandsubsequentSeptember2012andMay2013focusedscopepeerreviewswiththeexceptionofFindingsassociatedwithSRsdeterminedonlytomeetCapabilityCategoryI,and2)F&OsprovidedinTableV 2oftheLARSupplementwhichlistsallFindingsfromthefull scopeandfocused scopepeerreviewsforSRsdeterminedonlybemetatCapabilityCategoryI.2A:TheNRCstafffindsthatthedispositionoftheF&OasdescribedbythelicenseeintheLARprovidesconfidencethattheissuesraisedbytheF&Ohavebeenaddressedand,ifneeded,thePRAhasbeenmodified,andthereforetheresolutionoftheF&Oisacceptableforthisapplication.B:TheNRCstafffindsthatthedispositionoftheF&OasdescribedbythelicenseeintheLARandfurtherclarifiedduringtheauditprovidesconfidencethattheissuesraisedbytheF&Ohavebeenaddressedand,ifneeded,thePRAhasbeenmodified,andthereforetheresolutionoftheF&Oisacceptableforthisapplication.C:TheNRCstafffindsthattheresolutionoftheF&O,asdescribedbythelicenseeintheLAR,wouldhaveanegligibleeffectontheevaluationsreliedupontosupportfireriskevaluationsandhasnoimpactontheconclusionsoftheriskassessmentandthereforetheresolutionoftheF&Oisacceptableforthisapplication.ExamplesofsuchF&Osmaybesuggestions,aswellasthoseF&Osthatdon'taffectthefirePRA.Documentationissuesmayfallintothiscategoryaswell.
Record of Review Dispositions to Waterford 3 Internal Events PRA Facts and Observations (F&Os) October6,20151Finding/ Suggestion (F&O) ID ACCEPTABLE TO STAFF VIA Review of Plant Disposition (A/B/C)i RAI Response Not Discussed in SE Discussed in SE AS-A7-01 A AS-A7-02 C AS-B3-01 See PRA RAI 44.a. Acceptable to staff because the licensee explains that modeling of accident sequence phenomena was reviewed against the eighteen phenomena identified in WCAP-16679-P - 'Accident Sequence Phenomena Considerations' which are listed by the licensee in the response.
DA-C2-01 A DA-C6-01 See PRA RAI 44.b. DA-C7-01 A DA-C8-01 See PRA RAI 44.c DA-C10-01 See PRA RAI 44.b DA-C12-01 See PRA RAI 44.b DA-C12-02 See PRA RAI 44.b HR-A1-01 A HR-B1-01 A HR-D1-01 A HR-F2-01 A HR-G4-01 See PRA RAI 44.d. Acceptable to staff based on the licensee's explanation that the cited time discrepancy does not impact the updated HRA because the cause-based analysis used was more limiting than the time-based analysis.
HR-G6-01 A HR-H2-01 See PRA RAI 44.e.
IE-A6-01 A IE-C6-01 C IE-C12-01 C IF-B2-01 C Record of Review Dispositions to Waterford 3 Internal Events PRA Facts and Observations (F&Os) October6,20152Finding/ Suggestion (F&O) ID ACCEPTABLE TO STAFF VIA Review of Plant Disposition (A/B/C)i RAI Response Not Discussed in SE Discussed in SE IF-C3c-01 C IF-C7-01 C IF-D5a-01 C IF-D7-01 C IF-D7-02 C IF-E5a-01 C IF-E6-01 C LE-F1b-01 A LE-F3-01 C QU-E4-01 C SC-A5-01 A SC-B1-01 See PRA RAI 44.f SC-B1-02 See PRA RAI 44.g. Acceptable to staff because the licensee explains that a fire in the battery room is assumed to fail all equipment in the room and hydrogen accumulation was not expected to cause a hydrogen explosion that would fail the fire barrier.
SC-B3-01 See PRA RAI 44.i and F&O disposition. Acceptable to staff for the following reasons: 1) The licensee explains in the F&O disposition that MAAP runs have been updated and used to verify and redefine LOCA break sizes, and 2) The licensee explains in the RAI response counter to the implication in the F&O disposition that the Fire PRA does include fire-induced small LOCAs, including spurious opening of the reactor Head vent valves, Pressurizer vent valves, and Letdown line valves.
SC-B3-02 See PRA RAI 44.h. Acceptable to staff because the licensee explains that "load stripping" was intentionally excluded from the Internal and Fire
Record of Review Dispositions to Waterford 3 Internal Events PRA Facts and Observations (F&Os) October6,20153Finding/ Suggestion (F&O) ID ACCEPTABLE TO STAFF VIA Review of Plant Disposition (A/B/C)i RAI Response Not Discussed in SE Discussed in SE Event PRA because it has an insignificant risk reduction impact and because recovery of off-site power is not credited in the Fire PRA.
SC-B5-02 A SC-C1-02 A SC-C3-01 See PRA RAI 44.j SY-A8-01 A SY-A12b-01 See PRA RAI 44.k SY-A12b-02 A SY-A16-01 A SY-A16-02 A SY-A18a-01 A SY-B4-01 A SY-B13-01 See PRA RAI 44.l.
SY-B16-01 A SY-C2-01 C SY-C2-02 See PRA RAI 44.m. Acceptable to staff because the licensee explains the Temporary EDG is not permanently installed or normally on site, therefore, it is not credited in the Internal Events or Fire PRA.
SY-C3-01 A iA:TheNRCstafffindsthatthedispositionoftheF&OasdescribedbythelicenseeintheLARprovidesconfidencethattheissuesraisedbytheF&Ohavebeenaddressedand,ifneeded,thePRAhasbeenmodified,andthereforetheresolutionoftheF&Oisacceptableforthisapplication.B:TheNRCstafffindsthatthedispositionoftheF&OasdescribedbythelicenseeintheLARandfurtherclarifiedduringtheauditprovidesconfidencethattheissuesraisedbytheF&Ohavebeenaddressedand,ifneeded,thePRAhasbeenmodified,andthereforetheresolutionoftheF&Oisacceptableforthisapplication.C:TheNRCstafffindsthattheresolutionoftheF&O,asdescribedbythelicenseeintheLAR,wouldhaveanegligibleeffectontheevaluationsreliedupontosupportfireriskevaluationsandhasnoimpactontheconclusionsoftheriskassessmentandthereforetheresolutionoftheF&Oisacceptableforthisapplication.ExamplesofsuchF&Osmaybesuggestions,aswellasthoseF&Osthatdon'taffectthefirePRA.Documentationissuesmayfallintothiscategoryaswell.
Record of Review Dispositions to Waterford 3 FIRE PRA Facts and Observations (F&Os) and Supporting Requirements (SRs) Not Met or Met at Capability Category (CC) I October06,20151Finding/ Suggestion (F&O) ID 1 ACCEPTABLE TO STAFF VIA Review of Plant Disposition (A/B/C)2 RAI Response Not Discussed in SE Discussed in SE CS-A3-01 A CS-B1-01 A ES-A2-01 A ES-A3-02 See PRA RAI 45.a. Acceptable to staff because the licensee explained that an evaluation was performed of fire impact on cables (including DC cables) that could prevent tripping the Reactor Coolant Pumps (RCPs )
ES-B1-01 See PRA RAI 45.b. Acceptable to staff because the licensee explained that a systematic evaluation was performed to ensure all risk important components were included in the Fire PRA from the following sources: (1) the Internal Events PRA, (2) the Safe Shutdown Equipment List, (3) components identified by the Multiple Spurious Action (MSO) expert panel, and (4) components whose spurious actuation could cause unwanted operator actions.
ES-B2-01 A ES-C1-01 A FQ-A3-01 See PRA RAI 45.c FQ-B1-01 See PRA RAI 45.d FQ-D1-02 See PRA RAI 45.e. Acceptable to staff because the licensee explained that re-quantification of the updated Fire PRA included a reasonableness review of LERF results and an update of the associated documentation.
FQ-E1-01 See PRA RAI 45.e. Acceptable to staff because the licensee explained that re-quantification of the updated Fire PRA included a reasonableness review of CDF and LERF results and
Record of Review Dispositions to Waterford 3 FIRE PRA Facts and Observations (F&Os) and Supporting Requirements (SRs) Not Met or Met at Capability Category (CC) I October06,20152Finding/ Suggestion (F&O) ID 1 ACCEPTABLE TO STAFF VIA Review of Plant Disposition (A/B/C)2 RAI Response Not Discussed in SE Discussed in SE an update of the associated documentation.
FQ-E1-02 See PRA RAI 45.e. Acceptable to staff because the licensee explained that re-quantification of the updated Fire PRA included a quantitative uncertainty evaluation for both CDF and LERF and an update of the associated documentation.
FSS-B2-01 See PRA RAI 07 and PRA RAI S04 FSS-D7-01 PRA RAI 45.f FSS-E3-01 A FSS-H10-01 A HRA-A2-01 See PRA RAI 45.g. Acceptable to staff because the licensee explained that basic event RHFPUMPOFP did not appear in any cutset with a screening applied, so no detailed calculation was performed for it.
HRA-A4-01 See PRA RAI 45.g. Acceptable to staff because the licensee explained that operator interviews and simulator and control room observations were added to the documentation.
HRA-C1-01 PRA RAI 45.h, PRA RAI 13, and PRA RAI S07 HRA-D1-01 A HRA-E1-01 PRA RAI 45.h, PRA RAI 13, and PRA RAI S07 IGN-A10-01 A
Record of Review Dispositions to Waterford 3 FIRE PRA Facts and Observations (F&Os) and Supporting Requirements (SRs) Not Met or Met at Capability Category (CC) I October06,20153Finding/ Suggestion (F&O) ID 1 ACCEPTABLE TO STAFF VIA Review of Plant Disposition (A/B/C)2 RAI Response Not Discussed in SE Discussed in SE PP-A1-01 A PP-B7-01 A UNC-A1-01 FSS-H1-01 FSS-H1-02 See PRA RAI 16 and PRA RAI S08 FSS-H2-01 See PRA RAI 15 FSS-H3-01 See FM RAI S04.a FSS-H9-01 A QLS-A2-01 A QLS-A4-01
A QLS-A4-01 C QLS-A4-01 A FSS-C1-01 C FSS-C2-01 C FSS-C3-01 C FSS-H5-01 A ES-C2-01 PRA RAI 45.h, PRA RAI 13, and PRA RAI S07 FQ-C1-01 PRA RAI S07 and PRA S10 HRA-A4-01 A FSS-F2-01 A Record of Review Dispositions to Waterford 3 FIRE PRA Facts and Observations (F&Os) and Supporting Requirements (SRs) Not Met or Met at Capability Category (CC) I October06,201541Tableincludes:1)F&OsprovidedinTableV 1oftheLARSupplementlistingallFindingfromtheoriginalNovember2010full scopepeerreviewandsubsequentSeptember2012andMay2013focusedscopepeerreviewswiththeexceptionofFindingsassociatedwithSRsdeterminedonlytomeetCapabilityCategoryI,and2)F&OsprovidedinTableV 2oftheLARSupplementwhichlistsallFindingsfromthefull scopeandfocused scopepeerreviewsforSRsdeterminedonlybemetatCapabilityCategoryI.2A:TheNRCstafffindsthatthedispositionoftheF&OasdescribedbythelicenseeintheLARprovidesconfidencethattheissuesraisedbytheF&Ohavebeenaddressedand,ifneeded,thePRAhasbeenmodified,andthereforetheresolutionoftheF&Oisacceptableforthisapplication.B:TheNRCstafffindsthatthedispositionoftheF&OasdescribedbythelicenseeintheLARandfurtherclarifiedduringtheauditprovidesconfidencethattheissuesraisedbytheF&Ohavebeenaddressedand,ifneeded,thePRAhasbeenmodified,andthereforetheresolutionoftheF&Oisacceptableforthisapplication.C:TheNRCstafffindsthattheresolutionoftheF&O,asdescribedbythelicenseeintheLAR,wouldhaveanegligibleeffectontheevaluationsreliedupontosupportfireriskevaluationsandhasnoimpactontheconclusionsoftheriskassessmentandthereforetheresolutionoftheF&Oisacceptableforthisapplication.ExamplesofsuchF&Osmaybesuggestions,aswellasthoseF&Osthatdon'taffectthefirePRA.Documentationissuesmayfallintothiscategoryaswell.