IR 05000387/2007004: Difference between revisions

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{{Adams|number = ML073190338}}
{{Adams
| number = ML073190338
| issue date = 11/14/2007
| title = IR 05000387-07-004, 05000388-07-004; 07/01/2007 - 09/30/2007; Susquehanna Steam Electric Station, Units 1 and 2; Routine Integrated Report
| author name = Krohn P G
| author affiliation = NRC/RGN-I/DRP/PB4
| addressee name = McKinney B T
| addressee affiliation = PPL Susquehanna, LLC
| docket = 05000387, 05000388
| license number = NPF-014, NPF-022
| contact person = krohn pg
| document report number = IR-07-004
| document type = Inspection Report, Letter
| page count = 25
}}


{{IR-Nav| site = 05000387 | year = 2007 | report number = 004 }}
{{IR-Nav| site = 05000387 | year = 2007 | report number = 004 }}


=Text=
=Text=
{{#Wiki_filter:
{{#Wiki_filter:UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION I475 ALLENDALE ROADKING OF PRUSSIA, PENNSYLVANIA 19406-1415 November 14, 2007Mr. Britt T. M c KinneySenior Vice President, and Chief Nuclear Officer PPL Susquehanna, LLC 769 Salem Boulevard - NUCSB3 Berwick, PA 18603-0467
[[Issue date::November 14, 2007]]


Mr. Britt T. McKinneySenior Vice President, and Chief Nuclear Officer PPL Susquehanna, LLC 769 Salem Boulevard - NUCSB3 Berwick, PA 18603-0467
SUBJECT: SUSQUEHANNA STEAM ELECTRIC STATION - NRC INTEGRATEDINSPECTION REPORT 05000387/2007004 AND 05000388/2007004Dear Mr. M cKinney:On September 30, 2007, the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completedan inspection at your Susquehanna Steam Electric Station Units 1 and 2. The enclosed integrated inspection report documents the inspection results, which were discussed on October 12, 2007, with you and other members of your staff.This inspection examined activities conducted under your license as they relate to safety andcompliance with the Commission's rules and regulations and with the conditions of your license.
 
SUBJECT: SUSQUEHANNA STEAM ELECTRIC STATION - NRC INTEGRATEDINSPECTION REPORT 05000387/2007004 AND 05000388/2007004
 
==Dear Mr. McKinney:==
On September 30, 2007, the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completedan inspection at your Susquehanna Steam Electric Station Units 1 and 2. The enclosed integrated inspection report documents the inspection results, which were discussed on October 12, 2007, with you and other members of your staff.This inspection examined activities conducted under your license as they relate to safety andcompliance with the Commission's rules and regulations and with the conditions of your license.


The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel.Based on the results of this inspection, no findings of significance were identified.
The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel.Based on the results of this inspection, no findings of significance were identified.
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===Attachment:===
===Attachment:===
Supplemental Informationcc w/encl:C. Gannon, Vice President - Nuclear Operations T. Harpster, General Manager - Site Development and Design R. Paley, General Manager - Plant Support R. Pagodin, General Manager - Nuclear Engineering R. Sgarro, Manager - Nuclear Regulatory Affairs Supervisor, Nuclear Regulatory Affairs M. Crowthers, Supervising Engineer, Nuclear Regulatory Affairs Manager, Quality Assurance L. Ramos, Community Relations Manager, Susquehanna B. Snapp, Esq., Associate General Counsel, PPL Services Corporation Supervisor - Document Control Services R. Osborne, Allegheny Electric Cooperative, Inc.
Supplemental Information B. M cKinney 2cc w/encl:C. Gannon, Vice President - Nuclear Operations T. Harpster, General Manager - Site Development and Design R. Paley, General Manager - Plant Support R. Pagodin, General Manager - Nuclear Engineering R. Sgarro, Manager - Nuclear Regulatory Affairs Supervisor, Nuclear Regulatory Affairs M. Crowthers, Supervising Engineer, Nuclear Regulatory Affairs Manager, Quality Assurance L. Ramos, Community Relations Manager, Susquehanna B. Snapp, Esq., Associate General Counsel, PPL Services Corporation Supervisor - Document Control Services R. Osborne, Allegheny Electric Cooperative, Inc.


D. Allard, Dir, PA Dept of Environmental Protection Board of Supervisors, Salem Township J. Johnsrud, National Energy Committee, Sierra Club E. Epstein, TMI-Alert (TMIA)
D. Allard, Dir, PA Dept of Environmental Protection Board of Supervisors, Salem Township J. Johnsrud, National Energy Committee, Sierra Club E. Epstein, TMI-Alert (TMIA)
J. Powers, Dir, PA Office of Homeland Security R. French, Dir, PA Emergency Management Agency Correspondence Control DeskMr. Britt T. McKinneySenior Vice President, and Chief Nuclear Officer PPL Susquehanna, LLC 769 Salem Boulevard - NUCSB3 Berwick, PA 18603-0467
J. Powers, Dir, PA Office of Homeland Security R. French, Dir, PA Emergency Management Agency Correspondence Control Desk B. M cKinney 3Mr. Britt T. M c Kinney Senior Vice President, and Chief Nuclear Officer
 
PPL Susquehanna, LLC 769 Salem Boulevard - NUCSB3 Berwick, PA 18603-0467


SUBJECT: SUSQUEHANNA STEAM ELECTRIC STATION - NRC INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT05000387/2007004 AND 05000388/2007004
SUBJECT: SUSQUEHANNA STEAM ELECTRIC STATION - NRC INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT05000387/2007004 AND 05000388/2007004Dear Mr. M cKinney:On September 30, 2007, the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at yourSusquehanna Steam Electric Station Units 1 and 2. T he enclosed integrated inspection report documents theinspection results, which were discussed on October 12, 2007, with you and other members of your staff.This inspection examined activities conducted under your license as they relate to safety and compliance with theCommission's rules and regulations and with the conditions of your license. The inspectors reviewed selectedprocedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel.


==Dear Mr. McKinney:==
Based on the results of this inspection, no findings of significance were identified.In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter, its enclosure, and yourresponse (if any), will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from thePublically Available Records (PARS) component of the NRC's document system (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessiblefrom the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/r eading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).
On September 30, 2007, the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at yourSusquehanna Steam Electric Station Units 1 and 2. The enclosed integrated inspection report documents theinspection results, which were discussed on October 12, 2007, with you and other members of your staff.This inspection examined activities conducted under your license as they relate to safety and compliance with theCommission's rules and regulations and with the conditions of your license. The inspectors reviewed selectedprocedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel.Based on the results of this inspection, no findings of significance were identified.In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter, its enclosure, and yourresponse (if any), will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from thePublically Available Records (PARS) component of the NRC's document system (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessiblefrom the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).


Sincerely,Paul G. Krohn, Chief   /RA/Projects Branch 4Division of Reactor ProjectsDocket Nos.50-387; 50-388 License Nos.NPF-14, NPF-22Distribution w/encl:(via e-mail)S. Collins, RAG. West, RI OEDO M. Dapas, DRA J. Lubinski, NRR D. Lew, DRPM. Kowal, NRR J. Clifford, DRPJ. Kim, NRR P. Krohn, DRPR. Guzman, PM, NRR R. Fuhrmeister, DRPJ. Hughey, Backup, NRR F. Jaxheimer, DRP - Sr RI SusquehannaROPreports@nrc.gov (All IRs)P. Finney, DRP - RI Susquehanna Region I Docket Room (with concurrences)
Sincerely,Paul G. Krohn, Chief /RA/Projects Branch 4Division of Reactor ProjectsDocket Nos.50-387; 50-388 License Nos.NPF-14, NPF-22Distribution w/encl:(via e-mail)S. Collins, RAG. West, RI OEDO M. Dapas, DRA J. Lubinski, NRR D. Lew, DRPM. Kowal, NRR J. Clifford, DRPJ. Kim, NRR P. Krohn, DRPR. Guzman, PM, NRR R. Fuhrmeister, DRPJ. Hughey, Backup, NRR F. Jaxheimer, DRP - Sr RI SusquehannaROPreports@nrc.gov (All IRs)P. Finney, DRP - RI Susquehanna Region I Docket Room (with concurrences)
S. Farrell, DRP - OA SusquehannaDOCUMENT NAME: G:\DRP\BRANCH4\Draft Inspection Report for DRP Br 4 for 2007\Draft Br 4 IRs 3rd Qtr2007\Susquehanna 3rd Qtr 2007IR\SSES2007_004rev1.wpdML073190338SUNSI REVIEW COMPLETE: _____pgk_____(Reviewer's Initials)After declaring this document "An Official Agency Record" it will be released to the Public.To receive a copy of this document, indicate in the box: "C" = Copy without attachment/enclosure   "E" = Copy with attachment/enclosure   "N" = No copyOFFICERI/DRP   RI/DRPRl/DRP   NAMEFjaxheimer/PGK forTSetzer/PGKPKrohn/DATE10/19 /0711/ 01/0711 / 14/07OFFICIAL RECORD COPYU.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSIONREGION IDocket Nos.:50-387, 50-388License Nos.:NPF-14, NPF-22 Report No.:05000387/2007004 and 05000388/2007004 Licensee:PPL Susquehanna, LLC Facility:Susquehanna Steam Electric Station, Units 1 and 2 Location:Berwick, Pennsylvania Dates:July 1, 2007 through September 30, 2007 Inspectors:F. Jaxheimer, Senior Resident InspectorP. Finney, Resident Inspector J. Jandovitz, Resident Inspector M. Patel, Reactor Inspector P. Presby, Operations Engineer E. Gray, Senior Reactor Inspector M. Brown, Resident Inspector J. Tifft, Reactor InspectorApproved by:Paul G. Krohn, ChiefReactor Projects Branch 4 Division of Reactor Projects ii
S. Farrell, DRP - OA SusquehannaDOCUMENT NAME: G:\DRP\BRANCH4\Draft Inspection Report for DRP Br 4 for 2007\Draft Br 4 IRs 3 rd Qtr 2007\Susquehanna 3 rd Qtr 2007IR\SSES2007_004rev1.wpdML073190338SUNSI REVIEW COMPLETE: _____pgk_____(Reviewer's Initials)After declaring this document "An Official Agency Record" it will be released to the Public.To receive a copy of this document, indicate in the box:  
" C" = Copy without attachment/enclosure " E" = Copy with attachment/enclosure " N" = No copyOFFICERI/DRP RI/DRPRl/DRP NAMEFjaxheimer/PGK forTSetzer/PGKPKrohn/DATE10/19 /0711/ 01/0711 / 14/07OFFICIAL RECORD COPY B. M cKinney 2 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSIONREGION IDocket Nos.:50-387, 50-388License Nos.:NPF-14, NPF-22 Report No.:05000387/2007004 and 05000388/2007004 Licensee:PPL Susquehanna, LLC Facility:Susquehanna Steam Electric Station, Units 1 and 2 Location:Berwick, Pennsylvania Dates:July 1, 2007 through September 30, 2007 Inspectors:F. Jaxheimer, Senior Resident InspectorP. Finney, Resident Inspector J. Jandovitz, Resident Inspector M. Patel, Reactor Inspector P. Presby, Operations Engineer E. Gray, Senior Reactor Inspector M. Brown, Resident Inspector J. Tifft, Reactor InspectorApproved by:Paul G. Krohn, ChiefReactor Projects Branch 4 Division of Reactor Projects ii


=SUMMARY OF FINDINGS=
=SUMMARY OF FINDINGS=
IR 05000387/2007-004, 05000388/2007-004; 07/01/2007 - 09/30/2007; Susquehanna Steam ElectricStation, Units 1 and 2; Routine Integrated Report.The report covered a 3-month period of inspection by resident inspectors and announced inspectionsby regional reactor inspectors and an operations engineer. The NRC's program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described in NUREG-1649, "Reactor
IR 05000387/2007-004, 05000388/2007-004; 07/01/2007 - 09/30/2007; Susquehanna Steam ElectricStation, Units 1 and 2; Routine Integrated Report.The report covered a 3-month period of inspection by resident inspectors and announced inspectionsby regional reactor inspectors and an operations engineer. The NRC's program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described in NUREG-1649, "Reactor Oversight Process," Revision 4, dated December 2006.A.
Oversight Process," Revision 4, dated December 2006.A.NRC Identified Findings and Self-Revealing FindingsNo findings of significance were identified.
 
===NRC Identified Findings and Self-Revealing Findings===
No findings of significance were identified.


===B. Licensee-Identified Violations===
===B. Licensee-Identified Violations===
None.
None.


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====a. Inspection Scope====
====a. Inspection Scope====
The inspectors performed partial walkdowns to verify system and component alignment andto identify any discrepancies that would impact system operability. The inspectors verified that selected portions of redundant or backup systems or trains were available while other system components were out of service. The inspectors reviewed selected valve positions, electrical power availability, and the general condition of major system components. The documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment. The walkdowns included the following systems: Common, "B" and "D" emergency diesel generator (EDG) auxiliaries; Unit 1, reactor core isolation cooling (RCIC); Unit 1, residual heat removal (RHR), both divisions; andUnit 2, control rod drive (CRD) including scram discharge volume - components nearpermanent and temporary scaffolding.
The inspectors performed partial walkdowns to verify system and component alignment andto identify any discrepancies that would impact system operability. The inspectors verified that selected portions of redundant or backup systems or trains were available while other system components were out of service. The inspectors reviewed selected valve positions, electrical power availability, and the general condition of major system components. The documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment. The walkdowns included the following systems: Common, "B" and "D" emergency diesel generator (EDG) auxiliaries; Unit 1, reactor core isolation cooling (RCIC);
Unit 1, residual heat removal (RHR), both divisions; andUnit 2, control rod drive (CRD) including scram discharge volume - components nearpermanent and temporary scaffolding.


====b. Findings====
====b. Findings====
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====a. Inspection Scope====
====a. Inspection Scope====
The inspectors conducted one complete system walkdown of the Unit 1 and Unit 2emergency service water (ESW) system to assess the alignment and condition of the mechanical components and piping. The inspectors reviewed the system health report, open condition reports, system operating procedures, and process and instrument diagrams. The  
The inspectors conducted one complete system walkdown of the Unit 1 and Unit 2emergency service water (ESW) system to assess the alignment and condition of the mechanical components and piping. The inspectors reviewed the system health report, open condition reports, system operating procedures, and process and instrument diagrams. The 2Enclosureinspectors evaluated the system's overall condition including a specific look at pipe corrosionwhich included discussions of system corrosion with the cognizant engineer. Units 1 and 2, ESW system condition, alignment, and review of pipe corrosion status,activity report (AR) 895266 and plant component work order (PCWO) 855802.
 
inspectors evaluated the system's overall condition including a specific look at pipe corrosionwhich included discussions of system corrosion with the cognizant engineer. Units 1 and 2, ESW system condition, alignment, and review of pipe corrosion status,activity report (AR) 895266 and plant component work order (PCWO) 855802.


====b. Findings====
====b. Findings====
No findings of significance were identified.1R05Fire Protection (71111.05Q  - 9 Samples).1Fire Protection - Tours
No findings of significance were identified.
{{a|1R05}}
==1R05 Fire Protection==
  (71111.05Q  - 9 Samples).1Fire Protection - Tours


====a. Inspection Scope====
====a. Inspection Scope====
The inspectors reviewed PPL's fire protection program to determine the required fireprotection design features, fire area boundaries, and combustible loading requirements for selected areas. The inspectors walked down those areas to assess PPL's control of transient combustible material and ignition sources, fire detection and suppression capabilities, fire barriers, and any related compensatory measures to assess PPL's fire protection program in those areas. The inspected areas included:Common, standby gas treatment filter area and control room emergency outside airsystem (CREOAS), EP-013-187;Common, "E" emergency diesel generator building, FP-013-236;Common, ESW pump house loop "A" and "B" pump rooms, FP-013-200, 201;Common, emergency diesel generator bay "B", FP-013-192; Common, emergency diesel generator bay "D", FP-013-198;Unit 1, east and west battery rooms, FP-013-168 and FP-013-169;Unit 1, reactor building Division 1, 4.16 kV switchgear room at elevation 749'-1";Unit 1, reactor building containment access area fire area R-1A and fire area 1-4A-S;andUnit 2, east and west battery rooms, FP-013-170 and FP-013-171.
The inspectors reviewed PPL's fire protection program to determine the required fireprotection design features, fire area boundaries, and combustible loading requirements for selected areas. The inspectors walked down those areas to assess PPL's control of transient combustible material and ignition sources, fire detection and suppression capabilities, fire barriers, and any related compensatory measures to assess PPL's fire protection program in those areas. The inspected areas included:Common, standby gas treatment filter area and control room emergency outside airsystem (CREOAS), EP-013-187;Common, "E" emergency diesel generator building, FP-013-236;Common, ESW pump house loop "A" and "B" pump rooms, FP-013-200, 201;Common, emergency diesel generator bay "B", FP-013-192; Common, emergency diesel generator bay "D", FP-013-198;Unit 1, east and west battery rooms, FP-013-168 and FP-013-169;Unit 1, reactor building Division 1, 4.16 kV switchgear room at elevation 749'-1";Unit 1, reactor building containment access area fire area R-1A and fire area 1-4A-S; andUnit 2, east and west battery rooms, FP-013-170 and FP-013-171.


====b. Findings====
====b. Findings====
No findings of significance were identified.1R07Heat Sink Performance   (71111.07B - 2 Samples)1.Biennial Inspection
No findings of significance were identified.
{{a|1R07}}
==1R07 Heat Sink Performance==
  (71111.07B - 2 Samples)1.Biennial Inspection


====a. Inspection Scope====
====a. Inspection Scope====
The inspectors reviewed PPL's programs for maintenance, testing, and monitoring of risksignificant heat exchangers (HXs) to determine whether potential HX deficiencies could mask degraded performance, and to assess the capability of the HXs to perform their design functions. The inspectors assessed whether Susquehanna's HX programs conformed to  
The inspectors reviewed PPL's programs for maintenance, testing, and monitoring of risksignificant heat exchangers (HXs) to determine whether potential HX deficiencies could mask degraded performance, and to assess the capability of the HXs to perform their design functions. The inspectors assessed whether Susquehanna's HX programs conformed to 3EnclosurePPL's commitments to NRC Generic Letter 89-13, "Service Water System Problems AffectingSafety-Related Equipment."  In addition, the inspectors evaluated whether any potential common cause heat sink performance problems could affect multiple HXs in mitigating systems or result in an initiating event. Based on risk significance and prior inspection history, the following HXs were selected:Unit 1, high pressure coolant injection (HPCI) turbine lubricating oil cooler (1E213);
 
andUnit 2, reactor building closed cooling water (RBCCW) heat exchanger (2E201A).The inspectors assessed the external condition of the HXs in the field: reviewed the mostrecent eddy current, inspection and cleaning work results; and reviewed the applicable system heath reports to confirm that results were acceptable and that design basis assumptions for flow rate, plugged tube percentage, and heat transfer capability had been met. Inspectors reviewed the chemical treatment programs for the spray pond (ESW ultimateheat sink) and the cooling tower basin (service water heat sink) to verify that potential bio-fouling mechanisms were being addressed, including on-going treatment and monitoring as specified in the chemistry manual. The review included discussions with chemistry personnel and the ESW and service water system engineer.The inspectors reviewed a sample of condition reports (CRs) related to the selected HXs andservice water system, to verify that PPL was appropriately identifying, characterizing, and correcting problems related to these systems and components. The documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.
PPL's commitments to NRC Generic Letter 89-13, "Service Water System Problems AffectingSafety-Related Equipment."  In addition, the inspectors evaluated whether any potential common cause heat sink performance problems could affect multiple HXs in mitigating systems or result in an initiating event. Based on risk significance and prior inspection history, the following HXs were selected:Unit 1, high pressure coolant injection (HPCI) turbine lubricating oil cooler (1E213);andUnit 2, reactor building closed cooling water (RBCCW) heat exchanger (2E201A).The inspectors assessed the external condition of the HXs in the field: reviewed the mostrecent eddy current, inspection and cleaning work results; and reviewed the applicable system heath reports to confirm that results were acceptable and that design basis assumptions for flow rate, plugged tube percentage, and heat transfer capability had been met. Inspectors reviewed the chemical treatment programs for the spray pond (ESW ultimateheat sink) and the cooling tower basin (service water heat sink) to verify that potential bio-fouling mechanisms were being addressed, including on-going treatment and monitoring as specified in the chemistry manual. The review included discussions with chemistry personnel and the ESW and service water system engineer.The inspectors reviewed a sample of condition reports (CRs) related to the selected HXs andservice water system, to verify that PPL was appropriately identifying, characterizing, and correcting problems related to these systems and components. The documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.


====b. Findings====
====b. Findings====
No findings of significance were identified.1R11Licensed Operator Requalification Program
No findings of significance were identified.
{{a|1R11}}
==1R11 Licensed Operator Requalification Program==


===.1 Resident Inspector Quarterly Review===
===.1 Resident Inspector Quarterly Review===
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No findings of significance were identified.
No findings of significance were identified.


===.2 Review of the Annual Operator License Exams===
4Enclosure.2Review of the Annual Operator License Exams (71111.11B - 1 Sample)
  (71111.11B - 1 Sample)


====a. Inspection Scope====
====a. Inspection Scope====
The following inspection activities were performed using NUREG 1021, Revision 9, "OperatorLicensing Examination Standards for Power Reactors;" Inspection Procedure Attachment 71111.11, "Licensed Operator Requalification Program," Appendix A, "Checklist for Evaluating Facility Testing Material;" and Appendix B, "Suggested Interview Topics." A review was conducted of recent operating history documentation found in inspectionreports, licensee event reports, PPL's corrective action program, and the most recent NRC plant issues matrix (PIM). The inspectors reviewed specific events from PPL's corrective action program to verify that they had been appropriately addressed. The senior resident inspector was consulted for insights regarding licensed operator performance. The inspectors reviewed three reactor operator and three senior reactor operator comprehensive biennial written examinations administered in 2006. In addition, the inspectors reviewed three sets of dynamic simulator exam scenarios (weeks 1, 5 and 6) and two sets of job performance measures (weeks 5 and 6) administered during this current examination cycle to ensure the quality of these examinations met or exceeded the criteria established in the Examination Standards and 10 CFR 55.59.On September 28, 2007, the results of the annual operating tests for 2007 and the writtenexamination for 2006 were reviewed to determine whether pass fail rates were consistent with the guidance of NUREG-1021, Revision 9, "Operator Licensing Examination Standards for Power Reactors."  Examination results were also evaluated against criteria in NRC Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix I, "Operator Requalification Human Performance Significance Determination Process (SDP)."  The inspectors verified the following:*Crew failure rate on the dynamic simulator test was less than 20 percent. (Failure ratewas 6.7 percent);*Individual failure rate on the dynamic simulator test was less than or equal to 20percent.  (Failure rate was 4 percent);*Individual failure rate on the walk-through test job performance measures (JPMs) wasless than or equal to 20 percent.  (Failure rate was 1.3 percent); and*Individual failure rate on the comprehensive biennial written examination was less thanor equal to 20 percent.  (Note: This exam was administered in the 2006 examination cycle and failure rate was zero percent).More than 75 percent of the individuals passed all portions of the exam (94.7 percent of theindividuals passed all portions of the exam).Dynamic simulator exam and JPM administration was observed during the weeks ofSeptember 17 and September 24, 2007. These observations included facility evaluations of crew and individual performance during the dynamic simulator examinations and individualperformance of five JPMs.The remediation plans for a crew/individual's failure were reviewed to assess theeffectiveness of the remedial training.
The following inspection activities were performed using NUREG 1021, Revision 9, "OperatorLicensing Examination Standards for Power Reactors;" Inspection Procedure Attachment 71111.11, "Licensed Operator Requalification Program," Appendix A, "Checklist for Evaluating Facility Testing Material;" and Appendix B, "Suggested Interview Topics." A review was conducted of recent operating history documentation found in inspectionreports, licensee event reports, PPL's corrective action program, and the most recent NRC plant issues matrix (PIM). The inspectors reviewed specific events from PPL's corrective action program to verify that they had been appropriately addressed. The senior resident inspector was consulted for insights regarding licensed operator performance. The inspectors reviewed three reactor operator and three senior reactor operator comprehensive biennial written examinations administered in 2006. In addition, the inspectors reviewed three sets of dynamic simulator exam scenarios (weeks 1, 5 and 6) and two sets of job performance measures (weeks 5 and 6) administered during this current examination cycle to ensure the quality of these examinations met or exceeded the criteria established in the Examination Standards and 10 CFR 55.59.On September 28, 2007, the results of the annual operating tests for 2007 and the writtenexamination for 2006 were reviewed to determine whether pass fail rates were consistent with the guidance of NUREG-1021, Revision 9, "Operator Licensing Examination Standards for Power Reactors."  Examination results were also evaluated against criteria in NRC Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix I, "Operator Requalification Human Performance Significance Determination Process (SDP)."  The inspectors verified the following:*Crew failure rate on the dynamic simulator test was less than 20 percent. (Failure ratewas 6.7 percent);*Individual failure rate on the dynamic simulator test was less than or equal to 20percent.  (Failure rate was 4 percent);*Individual failure rate on the walk-through test job performance measures (JPMs) wasless than or equal to 20 percent.  (Failure rate was 1.3 percent); and*Individual failure rate on the comprehensive biennial written examination was less thanor equal to 20 percent.  (Note: This exam was administered in the 2006 examination cycle and failure rate was zero percent).More than 75 percent of the individuals passed all portions of the exam (94.7 percent of theindividuals passed all portions of the exam).Dynamic simulator exam and JPM administration was observed during the weeks ofSeptember 17 and September 24, 2007. These observations included facility evaluations of crew and individual performance during the dynamic simulator examinations and individualperformance of five JPMs.The remediation plans for a crew/individual's failure were reviewed to assess theeffectiveness of the remedial training.


The inspectors interviewed instructors, training and operations management personnel, andlicensed operators for feedback regarding the implementation of the licensed operator requalification program to ensure the requalification program was meeting their needs and responsive to their noted deficiencies and recommended changes. In addition, plant modifications were reviewed to ensure that they were adequately addressed in the Requalification Training Program.For the site-specific simulator, the inspectors observed simulator performance during theconduct of the examinations. Simulator performance and fidelity were reviewed for conformance to the reference plant control room. Inspectors interviewed simulator staff regarding current status of hardware and software modifications and open deficiencies. A sample of completed American National Standards Institute (ANSI) ANSI/ANS-3.5-1985 simulator tests were reviewed to verify adherence with the standard and to confirm model fidelity. These sampled tests included normal operations, steady state, malfunction, transient, and deficiency resolution validation. The documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.A sample of records for requalification training attendance, program feedback, reporting, andmedical examinations were reviewed for compliance with license conditions, including NRC regulations.
5EnclosureThe inspectors interviewed instructors, training and operations management personnel, andlicensed operators for feedback regarding the implementation of the licensed operator requalification program to ensure the requalification program was meeting their needs and responsive to their noted deficiencies and recommended changes. In addition, plant modifications were reviewed to ensure that they were adequately addressed in the Requalification Training Program.For the site-specific simulator, the inspectors observed simulator performance during theconduct of the examinations. Simulator performance and fidelity were reviewed for conformance to the reference plant control room. Inspectors interviewed simulator staff regarding current status of hardware and software modifications and open deficiencies. A sample of completed American National Standards Institute (ANSI) ANSI/ANS-3.5-1985 simulator tests were reviewed to verify adherence with the standard and to confirm model fidelity. These sampled tests included normal operations, steady state, malfunction, transient, and deficiency resolution validation. The documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.A sample of records for requalification training attendance, program feedback, reporting, andmedical examinations were reviewed for compliance with license conditions, including NRC regulations.


====b. Findings====
====b. Findings====
No findings of significance were identified. 1R12Maintenance Effectiveness (71111.12Q - 4 Samples)
No findings of significance were identified.
{{a|1R12}}
==1R12 Maintenance Effectiveness==
  (71111.12Q - 4 Samples)


====a. Inspection Scope====
====a. Inspection Scope====
The inspectors evaluated PPL's work practices and corrective actions for selected structures,systems and components (SSC) issues to assess the effectiveness of PPL's maintenance activities. The inspectors reviewed the performance history of those SSCs and assessed PPL's extent-of-condition determinations for those issues with potential common cause or generic implications to evaluate the adequacy of PPL's corrective actions. The inspectors reviewed PPL's problem identification and resolution actions for these issues to evaluate whether PPL had appropriately monitored, evaluated, and dispositioned the issues in accordance with PPL procedures and the requirements of 10 CFR 50.65, "Requirements for Monitoring the Effectiveness of Maintenance."  In addition, the inspectors reviewed selected SSC classification, performance criteria and goals, and PPL's corrective actions that were taken or planned to determine whether the actions were reasonable and appropriate. In addition, the inspectors performed field walkdowns and interviewed PPL staff to determine whether the identified actions were appropriate and to verify that known performance problems were included and evaluated in accordance with the PPL Maintenance Rule program and the corrective action process. The documents reviewed are listed in the
The inspectors evaluated PPL's work practices and corrective actions for selected structures,systems and components (SSC) issues to assess the effectiveness of PPL's maintenance activities. The inspectors reviewed the performance history of those SSCs and assessed PPL's extent-of-condition determinations for those issues with potential common cause or generic implications to evaluate the adequacy of PPL's corrective actions. The inspectors reviewed PPL's problem identification and resolution actions for these issues to evaluate whether PPL had appropriately monitored, evaluated, and dispositioned the issues in accordance with PPL procedures and the requirements of 10 CFR 50.65, "Requirements for Monitoring the Effectiveness of Maintenance."  In addition, the inspectors reviewed selected SSC classification, performance criteria and goals, and PPL's corrective actions that were taken or planned to determine whether the actions were reasonable and appropriate. In addition, the inspectors performed field walkdowns and interviewed PPL staff to determine whether the identified actions were appropriate and to verify that known performance problems were included and evaluated in accordance with the PPL Maintenance Rule program and the corrective action process. The documents reviewed are listed in the
 
. The following issues were reviewed:Common, "B" emergency diesel generator kilovars (KVAR) fluctuations;Units 1 and 2, emergency diesel generator inaccessible underground power cablemonitoring per PPL response to Generic Letter 2007-001, "Inaccessible or Underground Power, Cable Failures that Disable Accident Mitigation Systems or Cause Plant Transients";
. The following issues were reviewed:Common, "B" emergency diesel generator kilovars (KVAR) fluctuations;Units 1 and 2, emergency diesel generator inaccessible underground power cablemonitoring per PPL response to Generic Letter 2007-001, "Inaccessible or Underground Power, Cable Failures that Disable Accident Mitigation Systems or Cause Plant Transients";  
6EnclosureUnit 1, control cell friction with four inoperable control rods following testing onSeptember 9, 2007; andUnit 2, rod control system issues within the reactor manual control system.
 
Unit 1, control cell friction with four inoperable control rods following testing onSeptember 9, 2007; andUnit 2, rod control system issues within the reactor manual control system.


====b. Findings====
====b. Findings====
No findings of significance were identified.1R13Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control (71111.13 - 6 Samples)
No findings of significance were identified.
{{a|1R13}}
==1R13 Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control==
  (71111.13 - 6 Samples)


====a. Inspection Scope====
====a. Inspection Scope====
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====b. Findings====
====b. Findings====
No findings of significance were identified.1R15Operability Evaluations (71111.15 - 5 Samples)
No findings of significance were identified.
{{a|1R15}}
==1R15 Operability Evaluations==
  (71111.15 - 5 Samples)


====a. Inspection Scope====
====a. Inspection Scope====
The inspectors reviewed operability determinations that were selected based on risk insightsto assess the adequacy of the evaluations, the use and control of compensatory measures,  
The inspectors reviewed operability determinations that were selected based on risk insightsto assess the adequacy of the evaluations, the use and control of compensatory measures, 7Enclosureand compliance with the Technical Specifications. In addition, the inspectors reviewedselected operability determinations to verify that the determinations were performed in accordance with NDAP-QA-0703, "Operability Assessments."  The inspectors used the Technical Specifications, Technical Requirements Manual, Updated Final Safety AnalysisReport (UFSAR), and associated Design Basis Documents as references during these reviews. The issues reviewed included:Common, standby gas treatment start, CR 889683;Common, refuel floor rad monitor setpoint calculation errors, CR 895253; Unit 1, flange bolting on reactor vessel hood spray line; Unit 1, RHR scaffolding deficiencies - clearances and tie off points, CR 892152;Unit 2, local power range monitor (LPRM) module reset and bypass of average powerrange monitor (APRM) #1; and
 
and compliance with the Technical Specifications. In addition, the inspectors reviewedselected operability determinations to verify that the determinations were performed in accordance with NDAP-QA-0703, "Operability Assessments."  The inspectors used the Technical Specifications, Technical Requirements Manual, Updated Final Safety AnalysisReport (UFSAR), and associated Design Basis Documents as references during these reviews. The issues reviewed included:Common, standby gas treatment start, CR 889683;Common, refuel floor rad monitor setpoint calculation errors, CR 895253; Unit 1, flange bolting on reactor vessel hood spray line; Unit 1, RHR scaffolding deficiencies - clearances and tie off points, CR 892152;Unit 2, local power range monitor (LPRM) module reset and bypass of average powerrange monitor (APRM) #1; and


====b. Findings====
====b. Findings====
No findings of significance were identified.1R19Post-Maintenance Testing (71111.19 - 7 Samples)
No findings of significance were identified.
{{a|1R19}}
==1R19 Post-Maintenance Testing==
  (71111.19 - 7 Samples)


====a. Inspection Scope====
====a. Inspection Scope====
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====b. Findings====
====b. Findings====
No findings of significance were identified.1R22Surveillance Testing (71111.22 - 5 Samples)
No findings of significance were identified.
{{a|1R22}}
==1R22 Surveillance Testing==
  (71111.22 - 5 Samples)


====a. Inspection Scope====
====a. Inspection Scope====
The inspectors observed portions of selected surveillance test activities in the control roomand in the field and reviewed test data results. The inspectors compared the test results to the established acceptance criteria and the applicable Technical Specification or TechnicalRequirements Manual operability and surveillance requirements to evaluate whether the systems were capable of performing their intended safety functions. The documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment. The sampled surveillance tests included:Common, "D" EDG 24 hour endurance run/load rejects;Common, control structure ventilation system operability testing, SO-030-00 andSE-030-002;Unit 1, quarterly RHR system flow verification, Division 1, SO-149-A02;Unit 1, In-Service Test (IST) and inspection of "B" core spray check valve,152F036B; andUnit 2, drywell leakage calculation SO-200-006, Revision 45.
8EnclosureThe inspectors observed portions of selected surveillance test activities in the control roomand in the field and reviewed test data results. The inspectors compared the test results to the established acceptance criteria and the applicable Technical Specification or TechnicalRequirements Manual operability and surveillance requirements to evaluate whether the systems were capable of performing their intended safety functions. The documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment. The sampled surveillance tests included:Common, "D" EDG 24 hour endurance run/load rejects;Common, control structure ventilation system operability testing, SO-030-00 andSE-030-002;Unit 1, quarterly RHR system flow verification, Division 1, SO-149-A02;Unit 1, In-Service Test (IST) and inspection of "B" core spray check valve,152F036B; andUnit 2, drywell leakage calculation SO-200-006, Revision 45.


====b. Findings====
====b. Findings====
No findings of significance were identified.1R23Temporary Plant Modifications (71111.23 - 1 Sample)
No findings of significance were identified.
{{a|1R23}}
==1R23 Temporary Plant Modifications==
  (71111.23 - 1 Sample)


====a. Inspection Scope====
====a. Inspection Scope====
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====a. Inspection Scope====
====a. Inspection Scope====
The inspectors conducted this inspection to assess:  *Training quality and conduct; *Emergency plan procedure implementation;
9EnclosureThe inspectors conducted this inspection to assess:  *Training quality and conduct; *Emergency plan procedure implementation;
*Facility and equipment readiness;  
*Facility and equipment readiness;  
*Personnel performance in drills and exercises;  
*Personnel performance in drills and exercises;  
Line 151: Line 183:


This inspection activity represented one sample. The documents reviewed are listed in the
This inspection activity represented one sample. The documents reviewed are listed in the
.
.


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The inspectors reviewed PPL's performance indicator (PI) data for the period of July 2006through July 2007 to determine whether the PI data was accurate and complete. The inspectors examined selected samples of PI data, PI data summary reports, and other plant records. The inspectors compared the PI data against the guidance contained in Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) 99-02, "Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator Guideline."
The inspectors reviewed PPL's performance indicator (PI) data for the period of July 2006through July 2007 to determine whether the PI data was accurate and complete. The inspectors examined selected samples of PI data, PI data summary reports, and other plant records. The inspectors compared the PI data against the guidance contained in Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) 99-02, "Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator Guideline."


The documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment. The following performance indicators were included in this review.Initiating Event Performance IndicatorsUnits 1 & 2 Unplanned Scrams per 7000 Critical Hours (IE01)Units 1 & 2 Unplanned Power Changes per 7000 Critical Hours (IE03) Barrier Integrity Performance Indicators  
The documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment. The following performance indicators were included in this review.Initiating Event Performance IndicatorsUnits 1 & 2 Unplanned Scrams per 7000 Critical Hours (IE01)Units 1 & 2 Unplanned Power Changes per 7000 Critical Hours (IE03) Barrier Integrity Performance Indicators 10EnclosureUnits 1 & 2 RCS Activity (BI01)Units 1 & 2 RCS Identified Leak Rate (BI02)
 
Units 1 & 2 RCS Activity (BI01)Units 1 & 2 RCS Identified Leak Rate (BI02)


====b. Findings====
====b. Findings====
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====b. Findings and Observations====
====b. Findings and Observations====
No findings of significance were identified. The failure mechanism of the TOC switches wasadequately understood and corrective actions were appropriate. PPL adequately tracked the TOC switch issues and incorporated the issues into the overall system health.
11EnclosureNo findings of significance were identified. The failure mechanism of the TOC switches wasadequately understood and corrective actions were appropriate. PPL adequately tracked the TOC switch issues and incorporated the issues into the overall system health.


However, the inspectors noted that while the issues were adequately identified and tracked, PPL did not accurately prioritize the details of the long term corrective action plan. While the specific over-travel issues were fixed, procedures updated, and the old style TOC switches that failed were replaced with new style switches; there was a delay in completing long term corrective actions due to the lower priority the tasks were assigned. Inspectors observed that corrective actions were adequate to meet regulatory requirements (10 CFR 50 Appendix B), however, the lower priority of some long term corrective actions was unexpected given the number of examples and the known extent of the problem.
However, the inspectors noted that while the issues were adequately identified and tracked, PPL did not accurately prioritize the details of the long term corrective action plan. While the specific over-travel issues were fixed, procedures updated, and the old style TOC switches that failed were replaced with new style switches; there was a delay in completing long term corrective actions due to the lower priority the tasks were assigned. Inspectors observed that corrective actions were adequate to meet regulatory requirements (10 CFR 50 Appendix B), however, the lower priority of some long term corrective actions was unexpected given the number of examples and the known extent of the problem.


4OA3Event Followup  (71153 - 3 Samples).1(Closed) Licensee Event Report (LER) 05000387/2006-006-00, Automatic Scram Due toMain Generator Lockout On November 25, 2006, the Unit 1 reactor automatically scrammed from 100 percent poweras a result of a turbine trip which was in response to a main generator lockout. The main generator automatic voltage regulation circuitry did not respond correctly to changes to the offsite grid which resulted in a loss of generator field and subsequent unit shutdown. All control rods inserted and all safety systems responded as designed in response to the reactor scram. This LER, including the determination of cause, was reviewed by inspectors.
4OA3Event Followup  (71153 -
3 Samples).1(Closed) Licensee Event Report (LER) 05000387/2006-006-00, Automatic Scram Due toMain Generator Lockout On November 25, 2006, the Unit 1 reactor automatically scrammed from 100 percent poweras a result of a turbine trip which was in response to a main generator lockout. The main generator automatic voltage regulation circuitry did not respond correctly to changes to the offsite grid which resulted in a loss of generator field and subsequent unit shutdown. All control rods inserted and all safety systems responded as designed in response to the reactor scram. This LER, including the determination of cause, was reviewed by inspectors.


Corrective actions were evaluated against the contributing causes including the PPL identified cause of a lack of sufficient, in-house understanding of the automatic voltage regulator dynamic response and design. The auto-voltage regulator issues were previously inspected under an annual PI&R sample as documented in inspection report 05000387/2007003, Section 4OA2.3.
Corrective actions were evaluated against the contributing causes including the PPL identified cause of a lack of sufficient, in-house understanding of the automatic voltage regulator dynamic response and design. The auto-voltage regulator issues were previously inspected under an annual PI&R sample as documented in inspection report 05000387/2007003, Section 4OA2.3.
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This condition report and associated level 2 cause determination has the specific action to change the procedure definition of a mispositioned rod so as to follow the BWR Owner's group definition. These issues were not considered to be more than minor because there was no effect on mitigating system reliability and the reactor remained within all analyzed core power distribution assumptions.
This condition report and associated level 2 cause determination has the specific action to change the procedure definition of a mispositioned rod so as to follow the BWR Owner's group definition. These issues were not considered to be more than minor because there was no effect on mitigating system reliability and the reactor remained within all analyzed core power distribution assumptions.


The documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment. No findings of significance wereidentified.
12EnclosureThe documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment. No findings of significance wereidentified.


===.3 Start of Both Trains of Standby Gas Treatment System (SGTS)On Friday, July 20, 2007, both fans of the SGTS started automatically and several alarmswere received.===
===.3 Start of Both Trains of Standby Gas Treatment System (SGTS)On Friday, July 20, 2007, both fans of the SGTS started automatically and several alarmswere received.===
Shortly after starting, both fans of SGTS stopped automatically and additional alarms were received. Recognizing that two trains of inoperable SGTS would put Susquehanna in a dual-unit, four-hour Technical Specification (TS) required shutdown, the resident inspectors responded to the site to perform followup inspection, including an assessment of PPL's operability and reportability determination. PPL's initial investigation revealed that this event was caused by work related to theongoing CREOAS intake modification. Workers were applying a plastic template (for determining bolt hole measurements) over the outside air inlet opening when the template was sucked into and against the intake opening. The workers then immediately removed the template. The field workers reported that they did not realize this outside air inlet was a common inlet for normal control structure ventilation, CREOAS, and SGTS. Inspectors observed PPL's response to the event including a work stoppage for all work onthe associated ductwork modification, the declaration of the SGTS and CREOAS equipment as protected equipment, and the installation of appropriate protective equipment postings. Inspectors reviewed the engineering evaluation which concluded that the plant systems responded as designed for this condition.Inspectors observed that problems in work control (work planning) and coordination ofeffected work groups appeared to be a cause of this event. Inspectors found through inspection that the availability of SGTS and CREOAS were not affected. The documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment. No findings of significance were identified. 4OA6Meetings, Including ExitOn October 12, 2007, the resident inspectors presented the inspection results to Mr. C.Gannon, Vice President - Nuclear Operations, and other members of his staff. The inspectors confirmed that proprietary information was not provided or examined during the inspection.4OA7Licensee-Identified ViolationsNone.ATTACHMENT:   
Shortly after starting, both fans of SGTS stopped automatically and additional alarms were received. Recognizing that two trains of inoperable SGTS would put Susquehanna in a dual-unit, four-hour Technical Specification (TS) required shutdown, the resident inspectors responded to the site to perform followup inspection, including an assessment of PPL's operability and reportability determination. PPL's initial investigation revealed that this event was caused by work related to theongoing CREOAS intake modification. Workers were applying a plastic template (for determining bolt hole measurements) over the outside air inlet opening when the template was sucked into and against the intake opening. The workers then immediately removed the template. The field workers reported that they did not realize this outside air inlet was a common inlet for normal control structure ventilation, CREOAS, and SGTS. Inspectors observed PPL's response to the event including a work stoppage for all work onthe associated ductwork modification, the declaration of the SGTS and CREOAS equipment as protected equipment, and the installation of appropriate protective equipment postings. Inspectors reviewed the engineering evaluation which concluded that the plant systems responded as designed for this condition.Inspectors observed that problems in work control (work planning) and coordination ofeffected work groups appeared to be a cause of this event. Inspectors found through inspection that the availability of SGTS and CREOAS were not affected. The documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment. No findings of significance were identified. 4OA6Meetings, Including ExitOn October 12, 2007, the resident inspectors presented the inspection results to Mr. C.Gannon, Vice President - Nuclear Operations, and other members of his staff. The inspectors confirmed that proprietary information was not provided or examined during the inspection.4OA7Licensee-Identified Violations None.ATTACHMENT:   


=SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION=
=SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION=
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: [[contact::J. Wolfer]], Senior Chemist
: [[contact::J. Wolfer]], Senior Chemist
==LIST OF ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED==
==LIST OF ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED==
OpenedNoneOpened and ClosedNone
Opened NoneOpened and  
===Closed===
: None


===Closed===
===Closed===
: [[Closes LER::05000387/LER-2006-006]]-00LERAutomatic Scram Due to Main Generator Lockout (Section 4OA3.1)
: None
 
==LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED==
==LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED==
(Not Referenced in the Report)
(Not Referenced in the Report)
Line 245: Line 278:
==Section 1R07: Heat Sink PerformanceProceduresH-1004, Heat exchanger/Condenser Inspection and Condition Assessment, Revision 6H-1019, Inspection Program for Pipe Corrosion and Degradation, Revision 2==
==Section 1R07: Heat Sink PerformanceProceduresH-1004, Heat exchanger/Condenser Inspection and Condition Assessment, Revision 6H-1019, Inspection Program for Pipe Corrosion and Degradation, Revision 2==
: M-1453, Heat Exchanger Tube Plugging, Revision 6Design Basis Documents and Generic Letter 89-13 Program DocumentsDesign Basis Document (DBD) - 004, High Pressure Coolant Injection, Revision 4Design Basis Document (DBD) - 004.003, Resolution to Open Item DBD004.003, Heat Rejectionfrom HPCI, Revision 0Design Basis Document (DBD) - 004.003, Resolution to Open Item DBD004.004, Heat Rejectionfrom HPCI Turbine, Revision 0Generic Letter 89-13, "Service Water Problems Affecting Safety Related Equipment," July 18, 1989
: M-1453, Heat Exchanger Tube Plugging, Revision 6Design Basis Documents and Generic Letter 89-13 Program DocumentsDesign Basis Document (DBD) - 004, High Pressure Coolant Injection, Revision 4Design Basis Document (DBD) - 004.003, Resolution to Open Item DBD004.003, Heat Rejectionfrom HPCI, Revision 0Design Basis Document (DBD) - 004.003, Resolution to Open Item DBD004.004, Heat Rejectionfrom HPCI Turbine, Revision 0Generic Letter 89-13, "Service Water Problems Affecting Safety Related Equipment," July 18, 1989
: PPL responses to Generic Letter (GL) 89-13, dated Feb. 23, 1990, through Feb. 12, 1997System Health ReportsService Water System, 1st Quarter 2007Heat Exchangers Program/Components Health Report, 1st Quarter 2007Work OrdersWork Order (WO)
: PPL responses to Generic Letter (GL) 89-13, dated Feb. 23, 1990, through Feb. 12, 1997System Health ReportsService Water System, 1
st Quarter 2007Heat Exchangers Program/Components Health Report, 1
st Quarter 2007Work OrdersWork Order (WO)
: 796271, RBCCW HX Clean, Inspect and Repair, June 25, 2007Work Authorization (WA) P02837, HPCI Lube Oil Cooler Clean and Inspect, September 1990MiscellaneousEddy Current Testing Final Report, SSES 2E201A, July 2003Instruction Manual M-1, Instructions for Installing and Operating Whitlock Heat ExchangersCondition Reports702856,
: 796271, RBCCW HX Clean, Inspect and Repair, June 25, 2007Work Authorization (WA) P02837, HPCI Lube Oil Cooler Clean and Inspect, September 1990MiscellaneousEddy Current Testing Final Report, SSES 2E201A, July 2003Instruction Manual M-1, Instructions for Installing and Operating Whitlock Heat ExchangersCondition Reports702856,
: 704354,
: 704354,
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: 878929,
: 878929,
: 878935,
: 878935,
: 881004, and8810094OA3:
: 881004, and
: 8810094OA3:
: Event Follow-upNDAP-QA-0737, reactor oversight process ROP performance indicatorsSC-176-102, Unit 1 primary coolant specific activity - dose equivalent I-131
: Event Follow-upNDAP-QA-0737, reactor oversight process ROP performance indicatorsSC-176-102, Unit 1 primary coolant specific activity - dose equivalent I-131
: SC-276-102, Unit 2 primary coolant specific activity - dose equivalent I-131
: SC-276-102, Unit 2 primary coolant specific activity - dose equivalent I-131
Line 343: Line 379:
==LIST OF ACRONYMS==
==LIST OF ACRONYMS==
ANSIAmerican National Standards InstituteAPRMAverage Power Range Monitor
ANSIAmerican National Standards InstituteAPRMAverage Power Range Monitor
: [[ARA]] [[ctivity Report]]
ARActivity Report
: [[CA]] [[]]
CAPCorrective Action Program
: [[PC]] [[orrective Action Program]]
CFRCode of Federal Regulations
: [[CF]] [[]]
CRCondition Report
RCode of Federal Regulations
CRDControl Rod Drive
: [[CRC]] [[ondition Report]]
CREOASControl Room Emergency Outside Air System
: [[CR]] [[]]
DBDDesign Basis Document
: [[DC]] [[ontrol Rod Drive]]
EDGEmergency Diesel Generator
: [[CREOA]] [[]]
EROEmergency Response Organization
: [[SC]] [[ontrol Room Emergency Outside Air System]]
ESSEngineering Safeguard System
: [[DB]] [[]]
ESWEmergency Service Water
: [[DD]] [[esign Basis Document]]
GLGeneric Letter
: [[ED]] [[]]
HPCIHigh Pressure Coolant Injection
: [[GE]] [[mergency Diesel Generator]]
: [[ER]] [[]]
: [[OE]] [[mergency Response Organization]]
: [[ES]] [[]]
: [[SE]] [[ngineering Safeguard System]]
: [[ES]] [[]]
WEmergency Service Water
: [[GLG]] [[eneric Letter]]
: [[HPC]] [[]]
IHigh Pressure Coolant Injection
HXHeat Exchanger
HXHeat Exchanger
: [[IPI]] [[nspection Procedure]]
IPInspection Procedure
: [[IS]] [[]]
ISTIn-Service Test
: [[TI]] [[n-Service Test]]
JPMJob Performance Measure
: [[JP]] [[]]
MJob Performance Measure
kVKilovolts
kVKilovolts
: [[KVA]] [[]]
KVARKilovars
: [[RK]] [[ilovars]]
LERLicensee Event Report
: [[LE]] [[]]
LPRMLocal Power Range Monitor
: [[RL]] [[icensee Event Report]]
MSIVMain Steam Isolation Valve
: [[LPR]] [[]]
NDAPNuclear Department Administrative Procedure
: [[ML]] [[ocal Power Range Monitor]]
NEINuclear Energy Institute
: [[MSI]] [[]]
NRCNuclear Regulatory Commission
: [[VM]] [[ain Steam Isolation Valve]]
NUMARCNuclear Utilities Management and Resources Council
: [[NDA]] [[]]
OAOther Activities
: [[PN]] [[uclear Department Administrative Procedure]]
PARProtective Action Recommendation
: [[NE]] [[]]
PCWOPlant Component Work Order
: [[IN]] [[uclear Energy Institute]]
: [[NR]] [[]]
: [[CN]] [[uclear Regulatory Commission]]
: [[NUMAR]] [[]]
CNuclear Utilities Management and Resources Council
: [[OAO]] [[ther Activities]]
: [[PA]] [[]]
: [[RP]] [[rotective Action Recommendation]]
: [[PCW]] [[]]
OPlant Component Work Order
A-6AttachmentPIPerformance IndicatorPI&RProblem Identification and Resolution
A-6AttachmentPIPerformance IndicatorPI&RProblem Identification and Resolution
: [[PI]] [[]]
: [[PIMP]] [[lant issues Matrix]]
: [[MP]] [[lant issues Matrix]]
: [[PPLPPL]] [[Susquehanna,]]
: [[PPLPPL]] [[Susquehanna,]]
: [[LLC]] [[]]
LLC
: [[RBCC]] [[]]
RBCCWReactor Building Closed Cooling Water
: [[WR]] [[eactor Building Closed Cooling Water]]
RCICReactor Core Isolation Cooling
: [[RCI]] [[]]
RCSReactor Coolant System
: [[CR]] [[eactor Core Isolation Cooling]]
RGRegulatory Guide
: [[RC]] [[]]
RHRResidual Heat Removal
SReactor Coolant System
RHRSWResidual Heat Removal Service Water
: [[RGR]] [[egulatory Guide]]
RLWORelease Work Order
: [[RH]] [[]]
RPSReactor Protection System
: [[RR]] [[esidual Heat Removal]]
RTPRated Thermal Power
: [[RHRS]] [[]]
SBOStation Blackout
: [[WR]] [[esidual Heat Removal Service Water]]
SDPSignificant Determination Process
: [[RLW]] [[]]
SGTSStandby Gas Treatment System
: [[OR]] [[elease Work Order]]
SJAESteam Jet Air Ejector
: [[RP]] [[]]
SSCStructures, Systems and Components
: [[SR]] [[eactor Protection System]]
SSESSusquehanna Steam Electric Station
: [[RT]] [[]]
TMODTemporary Modification
: [[PR]] [[ated Thermal Power]]
TOCTruck Operated Cell
: [[SB]] [[]]
TSTechnical Specifications
: [[OS]] [[tation Blackout]]
TSCTechnical Support Center
: [[SD]] [[]]
UFSARUpdated Final Safety Analysis Report
: [[PS]] [[ignificant Determination Process]]
: [[SGT]] [[]]
: [[SS]] [[tandby Gas Treatment System]]
: [[SJA]] [[]]
: [[ES]] [[team Jet Air Ejector]]
: [[SS]] [[]]
: [[CS]] [[tructures, Systems and Components]]
: [[SSE]] [[]]
: [[SS]] [[usquehanna Steam Electric Station]]
: [[TMO]] [[]]
: [[DT]] [[emporary Modification]]
: [[TO]] [[]]
CTruck Operated Cell
: [[TST]] [[echnical Specifications]]
: [[TS]] [[]]
: [[CT]] [[echnical Support Center]]
: [[UFSA]] [[]]
RUpdated Final Safety Analysis Report
WAWork Authorization
WAWork Authorization
: [[WOW]] [[ork Order]]
: [[WOW]] [[ork Order]]
}}
}}

Revision as of 20:08, 21 October 2018

IR 05000387-07-004, 05000388-07-004; 07/01/2007 - 09/30/2007; Susquehanna Steam Electric Station, Units 1 and 2; Routine Integrated Report
ML073190338
Person / Time
Site: Susquehanna  Talen Energy icon.png
Issue date: 11/14/2007
From: Krohn P G
Reactor Projects Region 1 Branch 4
To: McKinney B T
Susquehanna
krohn pg
References
IR-07-004
Download: ML073190338 (25)


Text

UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION I475 ALLENDALE ROADKING OF PRUSSIA, PENNSYLVANIA 19406-1415 November 14, 2007Mr. Britt T. M c KinneySenior Vice President, and Chief Nuclear Officer PPL Susquehanna, LLC 769 Salem Boulevard - NUCSB3 Berwick, PA 18603-0467

SUBJECT: SUSQUEHANNA STEAM ELECTRIC STATION - NRC INTEGRATEDINSPECTION REPORT 05000387/2007004 AND 05000388/2007004Dear Mr. M cKinney:On September 30, 2007, the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completedan inspection at your Susquehanna Steam Electric Station Units 1 and 2. The enclosed integrated inspection report documents the inspection results, which were discussed on October 12, 2007, with you and other members of your staff.This inspection examined activities conducted under your license as they relate to safety andcompliance with the Commission's rules and regulations and with the conditions of your license.

The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel.Based on the results of this inspection, no findings of significance were identified.

In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter, itsenclosure, and your response (if any), will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the Publically Available Records (PARS) component of the NRC's document system (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).

Sincerely,/RA/Paul G. Krohn, ChiefProjects Branch 4 Division of Reactor ProjectsDocket Nos.50-387; 50-388License Nos.NPF-14, NPF-22

Enclosures:

Inspection Report 05000387/2007004 and 05000388/2007004

Attachment:

Supplemental Information B. M cKinney 2cc w/encl:C. Gannon, Vice President - Nuclear Operations T. Harpster, General Manager - Site Development and Design R. Paley, General Manager - Plant Support R. Pagodin, General Manager - Nuclear Engineering R. Sgarro, Manager - Nuclear Regulatory Affairs Supervisor, Nuclear Regulatory Affairs M. Crowthers, Supervising Engineer, Nuclear Regulatory Affairs Manager, Quality Assurance L. Ramos, Community Relations Manager, Susquehanna B. Snapp, Esq., Associate General Counsel, PPL Services Corporation Supervisor - Document Control Services R. Osborne, Allegheny Electric Cooperative, Inc.

D. Allard, Dir, PA Dept of Environmental Protection Board of Supervisors, Salem Township J. Johnsrud, National Energy Committee, Sierra Club E. Epstein, TMI-Alert (TMIA)

J. Powers, Dir, PA Office of Homeland Security R. French, Dir, PA Emergency Management Agency Correspondence Control Desk B. M cKinney 3Mr. Britt T. M c Kinney Senior Vice President, and Chief Nuclear Officer

PPL Susquehanna, LLC 769 Salem Boulevard - NUCSB3 Berwick, PA 18603-0467

SUBJECT: SUSQUEHANNA STEAM ELECTRIC STATION - NRC INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT05000387/2007004 AND 05000388/2007004Dear Mr. M cKinney:On September 30, 2007, the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at yourSusquehanna Steam Electric Station Units 1 and 2. T he enclosed integrated inspection report documents theinspection results, which were discussed on October 12, 2007, with you and other members of your staff.This inspection examined activities conducted under your license as they relate to safety and compliance with theCommission's rules and regulations and with the conditions of your license. The inspectors reviewed selectedprocedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel.

Based on the results of this inspection, no findings of significance were identified.In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter, its enclosure, and yourresponse (if any), will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from thePublically Available Records (PARS) component of the NRC's document system (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessiblefrom the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/r eading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).

Sincerely,Paul G. Krohn, Chief /RA/Projects Branch 4Division of Reactor ProjectsDocket Nos.50-387; 50-388 License Nos.NPF-14, NPF-22Distribution w/encl:(via e-mail)S. Collins, RAG. West, RI OEDO M. Dapas, DRA J. Lubinski, NRR D. Lew, DRPM. Kowal, NRR J. Clifford, DRPJ. Kim, NRR P. Krohn, DRPR. Guzman, PM, NRR R. Fuhrmeister, DRPJ. Hughey, Backup, NRR F. Jaxheimer, DRP - Sr RI SusquehannaROPreports@nrc.gov (All IRs)P. Finney, DRP - RI Susquehanna Region I Docket Room (with concurrences)

S. Farrell, DRP - OA SusquehannaDOCUMENT NAME: G:\DRP\BRANCH4\Draft Inspection Report for DRP Br 4 for 2007\Draft Br 4 IRs 3 rd Qtr 2007\Susquehanna 3 rd Qtr 2007IR\SSES2007_004rev1.wpdML073190338SUNSI REVIEW COMPLETE: _____pgk_____(Reviewer's Initials)After declaring this document "An Official Agency Record" it will be released to the Public.To receive a copy of this document, indicate in the box:

" C" = Copy without attachment/enclosure " E" = Copy with attachment/enclosure " N" = No copyOFFICERI/DRP RI/DRPRl/DRP NAMEFjaxheimer/PGK forTSetzer/PGKPKrohn/DATE10/19 /0711/ 01/0711 / 14/07OFFICIAL RECORD COPY B. M cKinney 2 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSIONREGION IDocket Nos.:50-387, 50-388License Nos.:NPF-14, NPF-22 Report No.:05000387/2007004 and 05000388/2007004 Licensee:PPL Susquehanna, LLC Facility:Susquehanna Steam Electric Station, Units 1 and 2 Location:Berwick, Pennsylvania Dates:July 1, 2007 through September 30, 2007 Inspectors:F. Jaxheimer, Senior Resident InspectorP. Finney, Resident Inspector J. Jandovitz, Resident Inspector M. Patel, Reactor Inspector P. Presby, Operations Engineer E. Gray, Senior Reactor Inspector M. Brown, Resident Inspector J. Tifft, Reactor InspectorApproved by:Paul G. Krohn, ChiefReactor Projects Branch 4 Division of Reactor Projects ii

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

IR 05000387/2007-004, 05000388/2007-004; 07/01/2007 - 09/30/2007; Susquehanna Steam ElectricStation, Units 1 and 2; Routine Integrated Report.The report covered a 3-month period of inspection by resident inspectors and announced inspectionsby regional reactor inspectors and an operations engineer. The NRC's program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described in NUREG-1649, "Reactor Oversight Process," Revision 4, dated December 2006.A.

NRC Identified Findings and Self-Revealing Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

B. Licensee-Identified Violations

None.

Enclosure

REPORT DETAILS

Summary of Plant StatusSusquehanna Steam Electric Station (SSES) Unit 1 began the inspection period at full rated thermalpower (RTP) and operated at or near full power, except for a planned power reduction to perform a control rod sequence exchange on July 14, 2007, and planned reductions to test and assess control cell friction issues on August 12 and September 9, 2007.Unit 2 began the inspection period at full RTP and operated at or near full power, except for aplanned power reduction to 80 percent RTP to perform control rod scram time testing and a control rod sequence exchange on August 26, 2007. The reactor was returned to full power after approximately 17 hours1.967593e-4 days <br />0.00472 hours <br />2.810847e-5 weeks <br />6.4685e-6 months <br /> of reduced power operation.1.REACTOR SAFETYCornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, and Barrier Integrity1R04Equipment Alignment (71111.04 - 4 Samples).1Partial Walkdown

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors performed partial walkdowns to verify system and component alignment andto identify any discrepancies that would impact system operability. The inspectors verified that selected portions of redundant or backup systems or trains were available while other system components were out of service. The inspectors reviewed selected valve positions, electrical power availability, and the general condition of major system components. The documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment. The walkdowns included the following systems: Common, "B" and "D" emergency diesel generator (EDG) auxiliaries; Unit 1, reactor core isolation cooling (RCIC);

Unit 1, residual heat removal (RHR), both divisions; andUnit 2, control rod drive (CRD) including scram discharge volume - components nearpermanent and temporary scaffolding.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified..2Complete Walkdown

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors conducted one complete system walkdown of the Unit 1 and Unit 2emergency service water (ESW) system to assess the alignment and condition of the mechanical components and piping. The inspectors reviewed the system health report, open condition reports, system operating procedures, and process and instrument diagrams. The 2Enclosureinspectors evaluated the system's overall condition including a specific look at pipe corrosionwhich included discussions of system corrosion with the cognizant engineer. Units 1 and 2, ESW system condition, alignment, and review of pipe corrosion status,activity report (AR) 895266 and plant component work order (PCWO) 855802.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R05 Fire Protection

(71111.05Q - 9 Samples).1Fire Protection - Tours

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed PPL's fire protection program to determine the required fireprotection design features, fire area boundaries, and combustible loading requirements for selected areas. The inspectors walked down those areas to assess PPL's control of transient combustible material and ignition sources, fire detection and suppression capabilities, fire barriers, and any related compensatory measures to assess PPL's fire protection program in those areas. The inspected areas included:Common, standby gas treatment filter area and control room emergency outside airsystem (CREOAS), EP-013-187;Common, "E" emergency diesel generator building, FP-013-236;Common, ESW pump house loop "A" and "B" pump rooms, FP-013-200, 201;Common, emergency diesel generator bay "B", FP-013-192; Common, emergency diesel generator bay "D", FP-013-198;Unit 1, east and west battery rooms, FP-013-168 and FP-013-169;Unit 1, reactor building Division 1, 4.16 kV switchgear room at elevation 749'-1";Unit 1, reactor building containment access area fire area R-1A and fire area 1-4A-S; andUnit 2, east and west battery rooms, FP-013-170 and FP-013-171.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R07 Heat Sink Performance

(71111.07B - 2 Samples)1.Biennial Inspection

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed PPL's programs for maintenance, testing, and monitoring of risksignificant heat exchangers (HXs) to determine whether potential HX deficiencies could mask degraded performance, and to assess the capability of the HXs to perform their design functions. The inspectors assessed whether Susquehanna's HX programs conformed to 3EnclosurePPL's commitments to NRC Generic Letter 89-13, "Service Water System Problems AffectingSafety-Related Equipment." In addition, the inspectors evaluated whether any potential common cause heat sink performance problems could affect multiple HXs in mitigating systems or result in an initiating event. Based on risk significance and prior inspection history, the following HXs were selected:Unit 1, high pressure coolant injection (HPCI) turbine lubricating oil cooler (1E213);

andUnit 2, reactor building closed cooling water (RBCCW) heat exchanger (2E201A).The inspectors assessed the external condition of the HXs in the field: reviewed the mostrecent eddy current, inspection and cleaning work results; and reviewed the applicable system heath reports to confirm that results were acceptable and that design basis assumptions for flow rate, plugged tube percentage, and heat transfer capability had been met. Inspectors reviewed the chemical treatment programs for the spray pond (ESW ultimateheat sink) and the cooling tower basin (service water heat sink) to verify that potential bio-fouling mechanisms were being addressed, including on-going treatment and monitoring as specified in the chemistry manual. The review included discussions with chemistry personnel and the ESW and service water system engineer.The inspectors reviewed a sample of condition reports (CRs) related to the selected HXs andservice water system, to verify that PPL was appropriately identifying, characterizing, and correcting problems related to these systems and components. The documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R11 Licensed Operator Requalification Program

.1 Resident Inspector Quarterly Review

(71111.11Q - 1 Sample)

a. Inspection Scope

On August 16, 2007, the inspectors observed licensed operator simulator training duringroutine operator requalification training. The inspectors compared their observations to Technical Specifications, emergency plan implementation, and the use of system operating procedures. The inspectors also evaluated PPL's critique of the operators' performance to identify discrepancies and deficiencies in operator training. The documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment. The following training was observed:Scenario numbered OP002-07-06-09C - simulation of a series of electrical andmechanical problems including implementation of the plant Emergency Plan.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

4Enclosure.2Review of the Annual Operator License Exams (71111.11B - 1 Sample)

a. Inspection Scope

The following inspection activities were performed using NUREG 1021, Revision 9, "OperatorLicensing Examination Standards for Power Reactors;" Inspection Procedure Attachment 71111.11, "Licensed Operator Requalification Program," Appendix A, "Checklist for Evaluating Facility Testing Material;" and Appendix B, "Suggested Interview Topics." A review was conducted of recent operating history documentation found in inspectionreports, licensee event reports, PPL's corrective action program, and the most recent NRC plant issues matrix (PIM). The inspectors reviewed specific events from PPL's corrective action program to verify that they had been appropriately addressed. The senior resident inspector was consulted for insights regarding licensed operator performance. The inspectors reviewed three reactor operator and three senior reactor operator comprehensive biennial written examinations administered in 2006. In addition, the inspectors reviewed three sets of dynamic simulator exam scenarios (weeks 1, 5 and 6) and two sets of job performance measures (weeks 5 and 6) administered during this current examination cycle to ensure the quality of these examinations met or exceeded the criteria established in the Examination Standards and 10 CFR 55.59.On September 28, 2007, the results of the annual operating tests for 2007 and the writtenexamination for 2006 were reviewed to determine whether pass fail rates were consistent with the guidance of NUREG-1021, Revision 9, "Operator Licensing Examination Standards for Power Reactors." Examination results were also evaluated against criteria in NRC Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix I, "Operator Requalification Human Performance Significance Determination Process (SDP)." The inspectors verified the following:*Crew failure rate on the dynamic simulator test was less than 20 percent. (Failure ratewas 6.7 percent);*Individual failure rate on the dynamic simulator test was less than or equal to 20percent. (Failure rate was 4 percent);*Individual failure rate on the walk-through test job performance measures (JPMs) wasless than or equal to 20 percent. (Failure rate was 1.3 percent); and*Individual failure rate on the comprehensive biennial written examination was less thanor equal to 20 percent. (Note: This exam was administered in the 2006 examination cycle and failure rate was zero percent).More than 75 percent of the individuals passed all portions of the exam (94.7 percent of theindividuals passed all portions of the exam).Dynamic simulator exam and JPM administration was observed during the weeks ofSeptember 17 and September 24, 2007. These observations included facility evaluations of crew and individual performance during the dynamic simulator examinations and individualperformance of five JPMs.The remediation plans for a crew/individual's failure were reviewed to assess theeffectiveness of the remedial training.

5EnclosureThe inspectors interviewed instructors, training and operations management personnel, andlicensed operators for feedback regarding the implementation of the licensed operator requalification program to ensure the requalification program was meeting their needs and responsive to their noted deficiencies and recommended changes. In addition, plant modifications were reviewed to ensure that they were adequately addressed in the Requalification Training Program.For the site-specific simulator, the inspectors observed simulator performance during theconduct of the examinations. Simulator performance and fidelity were reviewed for conformance to the reference plant control room. Inspectors interviewed simulator staff regarding current status of hardware and software modifications and open deficiencies. A sample of completed American National Standards Institute (ANSI) ANSI/ANS-3.5-1985 simulator tests were reviewed to verify adherence with the standard and to confirm model fidelity. These sampled tests included normal operations, steady state, malfunction, transient, and deficiency resolution validation. The documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.A sample of records for requalification training attendance, program feedback, reporting, andmedical examinations were reviewed for compliance with license conditions, including NRC regulations.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R12 Maintenance Effectiveness

(71111.12Q - 4 Samples)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors evaluated PPL's work practices and corrective actions for selected structures,systems and components (SSC) issues to assess the effectiveness of PPL's maintenance activities. The inspectors reviewed the performance history of those SSCs and assessed PPL's extent-of-condition determinations for those issues with potential common cause or generic implications to evaluate the adequacy of PPL's corrective actions. The inspectors reviewed PPL's problem identification and resolution actions for these issues to evaluate whether PPL had appropriately monitored, evaluated, and dispositioned the issues in accordance with PPL procedures and the requirements of 10 CFR 50.65, "Requirements for Monitoring the Effectiveness of Maintenance." In addition, the inspectors reviewed selected SSC classification, performance criteria and goals, and PPL's corrective actions that were taken or planned to determine whether the actions were reasonable and appropriate. In addition, the inspectors performed field walkdowns and interviewed PPL staff to determine whether the identified actions were appropriate and to verify that known performance problems were included and evaluated in accordance with the PPL Maintenance Rule program and the corrective action process. The documents reviewed are listed in the

. The following issues were reviewed:Common, "B" emergency diesel generator kilovars (KVAR) fluctuations;Units 1 and 2, emergency diesel generator inaccessible underground power cablemonitoring per PPL response to Generic Letter 2007-001, "Inaccessible or Underground Power, Cable Failures that Disable Accident Mitigation Systems or Cause Plant Transients";

6EnclosureUnit 1, control cell friction with four inoperable control rods following testing onSeptember 9, 2007; andUnit 2, rod control system issues within the reactor manual control system.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R13 Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control

(71111.13 - 6 Samples)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the assessment and management of selected maintenance activitiesto evaluate the effectiveness of PPL's risk management for planned and emergent work. The inspectors compared the risk assessments and risk management actions to the requirements of 10 CFR Part 50.65(a)(4) and the recommendations of Nuclear Utilities Management and Resources Council (NUMARC) 93-01, "Assessment of Risk Resulting from Performance of Maintenance Activities," Section 11. The inspectors evaluated the selected activities to determine whether risk assessments were performed when required and appropriate risk management actions were identified.The inspectors reviewed scheduled and emergent work activities with licensed operators andwork-coordination personnel to evaluate whether risk management action threshold levels were correctly identified. In addition, the inspectors compared the assessed risk configuration to the actual plant conditions and any in-progress evolutions or external events to evaluatewhether the assessment was accurate, complete, and appropriate for the emergent work activities. The inspectors performed control room and field walkdowns to verify that the compensatory measures identified by the risk assessments were appropriately performed.

The selected maintenance activities included:Common, "A" engineering safeguard system (ESS) transformer OX201;Common, orange risk following declaring "E" EDG inoperable, CR 896129;Common, yellow risk during station blackout (SBO) diesel part replacement activities,PCWO 876900 and release work order (RLWO) 893763;Common, "E" EDG/OB565 bus agastat relay replacement, removed control powerfrom "E" EDG and undervoltage protection, CR and RLWO 894084;Unit 1 RCIC out-of-service following failure of pump discharge check valve, CR890913; andUnit 1 steam jet air ejector (SJAE) work 10701A(B).

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R15 Operability Evaluations

(71111.15 - 5 Samples)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed operability determinations that were selected based on risk insightsto assess the adequacy of the evaluations, the use and control of compensatory measures, 7Enclosureand compliance with the Technical Specifications. In addition, the inspectors reviewedselected operability determinations to verify that the determinations were performed in accordance with NDAP-QA-0703, "Operability Assessments." The inspectors used the Technical Specifications, Technical Requirements Manual, Updated Final Safety AnalysisReport (UFSAR), and associated Design Basis Documents as references during these reviews. The issues reviewed included:Common, standby gas treatment start, CR 889683;Common, refuel floor rad monitor setpoint calculation errors, CR 895253; Unit 1, flange bolting on reactor vessel hood spray line; Unit 1, RHR scaffolding deficiencies - clearances and tie off points, CR 892152;Unit 2, local power range monitor (LPRM) module reset and bypass of average powerrange monitor (APRM) #1; and

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R19 Post-Maintenance Testing

(71111.19 - 7 Samples)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors observed portions of post-maintenance testing activities in the field todetermine whether the tests were performed in accordance with the approved procedures.

The inspectors assessed the test adequacy by comparing the test methodology to the scope of maintenance work performed. In addition, the inspectors evaluated acceptance criteria to determine whether the test demonstrated that components satisfied the applicable design and licensing bases and Technical Specification requirements. The inspectors reviewed the recorded test data to determine whether the acceptance criteria were satisfied. The documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment. The post-maintenance testing activities reviewed included:Common, "A" EDG aligned testing following engine overhaul, TP-024-145;Common, standby gas treatment system (SGTS)/CREOAS in service data collection;Unit 1, RCIC flow verification SO-150-002;Unit 1, RHR 1A motor breaker replacement, RTPM 783149;Unit 1, control rod timing test to verify proper insert and withdraw times, TP-055-010,Revision 4; Unit 1, restoration of the "A" main steam supply to the steam jet air ejector tocompensate for a degraded "B" main steam supply pressure, OP-172-001; andUnit 2, 2A residual heat removal service water (RHRSW) re-baseline of referencevalues for comprehensive flow test.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R22 Surveillance Testing

(71111.22 - 5 Samples)

a. Inspection Scope

8EnclosureThe inspectors observed portions of selected surveillance test activities in the control roomand in the field and reviewed test data results. The inspectors compared the test results to the established acceptance criteria and the applicable Technical Specification or TechnicalRequirements Manual operability and surveillance requirements to evaluate whether the systems were capable of performing their intended safety functions. The documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment. The sampled surveillance tests included:Common, "D" EDG 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> endurance run/load rejects;Common, control structure ventilation system operability testing, SO-030-00 andSE-030-002;Unit 1, quarterly RHR system flow verification, Division 1, SO-149-A02;Unit 1, In-Service Test (IST) and inspection of "B" core spray check valve,152F036B; andUnit 2, drywell leakage calculation SO-200-006, Revision 45.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R23 Temporary Plant Modifications

(71111.23 - 1 Sample)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed a temporary modification (TMOD) to determine whether thetemporary change adversely affected system or support system availability, or adversely affected a function important to plant safety. The inspectors reviewed the associated system design bases, including the UFSAR, Technical Specifications, and assessed the adequacy of the safety determination screenings and evaluations. The inspectors also assessed configuration control of the temporary changes by reviewing selected drawings and procedures to verify that appropriate revisions had been made. The inspectors compared the actual installations to the temporary modification documents to determine whether the implemented changes were consistent with the approved documents. The inspectors reviewed selected post installation test results to determine whether the actual impact of the temporary changes had been adequately demonstrated by the test. The documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment. The following temporary modification was included in the review:Unit 1, turbine control and stop valve closure input to the reactor protection system(RPS) - TMOD #EC 866700.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.1EP6Drill Evaluation (71114.06 - 1 Sample)Simulator-based Training Event

a. Inspection Scope

9EnclosureThe inspectors conducted this inspection to assess: *Training quality and conduct; *Emergency plan procedure implementation;

  • Facility and equipment readiness;
  • Personnel performance in drills and exercises;
  • Organizational and management changes; and
  • Communications equipment readiness. On August 7, 2007, the inspectors observed a full scale drill. The primary focus of thisinspection was to verify SSES's critique of classification, notification, and protective action recommendation (PAR) development activities. Selected portions of the drill were observed in the control room simulator and later in the technical support center (TSC). The inspectors observed licensed operator and emergency response organization (ERO)personnel adherence to the Emergency Plan implementing procedures. The ERO personnel responses to simulated degraded plant conditions were inspected to identify weaknesses and deficiencies in classification and notification. The inspectors also observed the transition of responsibility for the ERO from the shift manager in the simulated control room to the TSC. The inspectors observed SSES's critique of the drill to evaluate SSES's identification of weaknesses and deficiencies. The inspectors compared SSES's identified issues against the inspectors' observations to determine whether SSES adequately identified problems and entered them into the corrective action program (CAP).

This inspection activity represented one sample. The documents reviewed are listed in the

.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.4.OTHER ACTIVITIES 4OA1Performance Indicator Verification (71151 - 8 Samples)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed PPL's performance indicator (PI) data for the period of July 2006through July 2007 to determine whether the PI data was accurate and complete. The inspectors examined selected samples of PI data, PI data summary reports, and other plant records. The inspectors compared the PI data against the guidance contained in Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) 99-02, "Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator Guideline."

The documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment. The following performance indicators were included in this review.Initiating Event Performance IndicatorsUnits 1 & 2 Unplanned Scrams per 7000 Critical Hours (IE01)Units 1 & 2 Unplanned Power Changes per 7000 Critical Hours (IE03) Barrier Integrity Performance Indicators 10EnclosureUnits 1 & 2 RCS Activity (BI01)Units 1 & 2 RCS Identified Leak Rate (BI02)

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.4OA2Identification and Resolution of Problems (71152 - 1 Annual Sample).1 Review of Items Entered into the Corrective Action Program

a. Inspection Scope

As required by inspection procedure (IP) 71152, "Identification and Resolution of Problems,"and in order to help identify repetitive equipment failures or specific human performance issues for follow-up, the inspectors performed screening of all items entered into PPL's corrective action program. This was accomplished by reviewing the description of each new action request/condition report and attending daily management meetings. The documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified..2Heat Sink Performance

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed a sample of CRs related to the selected HXs and service watersystem, to verify that PPL was appropriately identifying, characterizing, and correcting problems related to these systems and components. Documents reviewed during the inspection are listed in the Attachment.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified..3 Annual Sample Review

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed PPL's evaluation and corrective actions associated with severaltruck operated cell (TOC) switch failures in 4 kV breakers. The inspectors reviewed condition reports and the associated actions against the requirements of PPL's corrective action program to ensure that the full extent of the issues were identified, appropriate evaluations were performed, and appropriate corrective actions were specified and prioritized. The inspectors interviewed relevant station personnel and reviewed applicable station procedures to ensure that the issues were appropriately addressed.

b. Findings and Observations

11EnclosureNo findings of significance were identified. The failure mechanism of the TOC switches wasadequately understood and corrective actions were appropriate. PPL adequately tracked the TOC switch issues and incorporated the issues into the overall system health.

However, the inspectors noted that while the issues were adequately identified and tracked, PPL did not accurately prioritize the details of the long term corrective action plan. While the specific over-travel issues were fixed, procedures updated, and the old style TOC switches that failed were replaced with new style switches; there was a delay in completing long term corrective actions due to the lower priority the tasks were assigned. Inspectors observed that corrective actions were adequate to meet regulatory requirements (10 CFR 50 Appendix B), however, the lower priority of some long term corrective actions was unexpected given the number of examples and the known extent of the problem.

4OA3Event Followup (71153 -

3 Samples).1(Closed) Licensee Event Report (LER) 05000387/2006-006-00, Automatic Scram Due toMain Generator Lockout On November 25, 2006, the Unit 1 reactor automatically scrammed from 100 percent poweras a result of a turbine trip which was in response to a main generator lockout. The main generator automatic voltage regulation circuitry did not respond correctly to changes to the offsite grid which resulted in a loss of generator field and subsequent unit shutdown. All control rods inserted and all safety systems responded as designed in response to the reactor scram. This LER, including the determination of cause, was reviewed by inspectors.

Corrective actions were evaluated against the contributing causes including the PPL identified cause of a lack of sufficient, in-house understanding of the automatic voltage regulator dynamic response and design. The auto-voltage regulator issues were previously inspected under an annual PI&R sample as documented in inspection report 05000387/2007003, Section 4OA2.3.

This LER was reviewed by the inspectors and no findings of significance were identified. The inspectors found that the issue is properly captured in the PPL corrective action process with actions to address the apparent causes.

The corrective actions for Unit 1 are scheduled for implementation in October, 2007. The documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment. This LER is closed.

.2 Misposition Control Rod During Sequence ExchangeOn July 15, 2007, operators moved a control rod in the wrong direction.

The humanperformance failure was the operator pressing the insert pushbutton instead of the withdraw pushbutton. Residents responded and performed followup inspection of this reactivity control related event. Inspectors observed that for this event the verifier did not prevent the mistake from occurring. Inspectors also performed followup review because PPL staff did not characterize this issue as a mispositioned rod, and the operators did not enter the offnormal procedure for a mispositioned rod. As a result, the inspectors provided PPL management with the observation that the offnormal procedure could be enhanced to define this type of issue as a mispositioned rod. Inspectors reviewed the operator response and the corrective action processing of this issue. This issue was entered into the Corrective Action process (Condition Report #888358).

This condition report and associated level 2 cause determination has the specific action to change the procedure definition of a mispositioned rod so as to follow the BWR Owner's group definition. These issues were not considered to be more than minor because there was no effect on mitigating system reliability and the reactor remained within all analyzed core power distribution assumptions.

12EnclosureThe documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment. No findings of significance wereidentified.

.3 Start of Both Trains of Standby Gas Treatment System (SGTS)On Friday, July 20, 2007, both fans of the SGTS started automatically and several alarmswere received.

Shortly after starting, both fans of SGTS stopped automatically and additional alarms were received. Recognizing that two trains of inoperable SGTS would put Susquehanna in a dual-unit, four-hour Technical Specification (TS) required shutdown, the resident inspectors responded to the site to perform followup inspection, including an assessment of PPL's operability and reportability determination. PPL's initial investigation revealed that this event was caused by work related to theongoing CREOAS intake modification. Workers were applying a plastic template (for determining bolt hole measurements) over the outside air inlet opening when the template was sucked into and against the intake opening. The workers then immediately removed the template. The field workers reported that they did not realize this outside air inlet was a common inlet for normal control structure ventilation, CREOAS, and SGTS. Inspectors observed PPL's response to the event including a work stoppage for all work onthe associated ductwork modification, the declaration of the SGTS and CREOAS equipment as protected equipment, and the installation of appropriate protective equipment postings. Inspectors reviewed the engineering evaluation which concluded that the plant systems responded as designed for this condition.Inspectors observed that problems in work control (work planning) and coordination ofeffected work groups appeared to be a cause of this event. Inspectors found through inspection that the availability of SGTS and CREOAS were not affected. The documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment. No findings of significance were identified. 4OA6Meetings, Including ExitOn October 12, 2007, the resident inspectors presented the inspection results to Mr. C.Gannon, Vice President - Nuclear Operations, and other members of his staff. The inspectors confirmed that proprietary information was not provided or examined during the inspection.4OA7Licensee-Identified Violations None.ATTACHMENT:

SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION

KEY POINTS OF CONTACT

Licensee Personnel

R. Bogar, EDG System Engineer
B. Boesch, Supervisor Operations Instruction
D. Brophy, Acting Site Supervisor
P. Capotosto, Supervising Engineer, Electrical Engineering
R. Centenaro, Senior Engineer, Nuclear Design
C. Dodge, Supervisor Computer Engineering (Simulator)
R. Fry, Operations Shift Manager
C. Hess, Simulator Instructor
M. Jacopetti, Simulator Instructor
J. Jeanguenot, ESW System Engineer
A. Klopp, Component Engineer
E. Miller, Senior Engineer, Regulatory Affairs
F. Negvesky, Senior Engineer, Electrical Breakers Program Engineering
M. Peal, Training Manager
B. Stitt, Supervisor Operations Training
D. Szatkowski, 13.8KV System Engineer
F. Tarselli, Simulator Instructor
T. Walters, Service Water System Engineer
J. Wolfer, Senior Chemist

LIST OF ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED

Opened NoneOpened and

Closed

None

Closed

None

LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED

(Not Referenced in the Report)

Section 1R04: Equipment AlignmentCR 892528,

NRC residents raise questions about physical clearance violation on two scaffolds in Unit 1 RHR pump roomsCL-024-0013, "Diesel Generator "B" Electrical," Revision 15
CL-024-0014, "Diesel Generator "B" Mechanical," Revision 14
CL-024-0017, "Diesel Generator "D" Electrical," Revision 16
A-2AttachmentCL-024-0018, "Diesel Generator "D" Mechanical," Revision 12E-106193, "Plant Design Drawing Diesel Generator Building," Sheets 1-3

Section 1R07: Heat Sink PerformanceProceduresH-1004, Heat exchanger/Condenser Inspection and Condition Assessment, Revision 6H-1019, Inspection Program for Pipe Corrosion and Degradation, Revision 2

M-1453, Heat Exchanger Tube Plugging, Revision 6Design Basis Documents and Generic Letter 89-13 Program DocumentsDesign Basis Document (DBD) - 004, High Pressure Coolant Injection, Revision 4Design Basis Document (DBD) - 004.003, Resolution to Open Item DBD004.003, Heat Rejectionfrom HPCI, Revision 0Design Basis Document (DBD) - 004.003, Resolution to Open Item DBD004.004, Heat Rejectionfrom HPCI Turbine, Revision 0Generic Letter 89-13, "Service Water Problems Affecting Safety Related Equipment," July 18, 1989
PPL responses to Generic Letter (GL) 89-13, dated Feb. 23, 1990, through Feb. 12, 1997System Health ReportsService Water System, 1

st Quarter 2007Heat Exchangers Program/Components Health Report, 1

st Quarter 2007Work OrdersWork Order (WO)

796271, RBCCW HX Clean, Inspect and Repair, June 25, 2007Work Authorization (WA) P02837, HPCI Lube Oil Cooler Clean and Inspect, September 1990MiscellaneousEddy Current Testing Final Report, SSES 2E201A, July 2003Instruction Manual M-1, Instructions for Installing and Operating Whitlock Heat ExchangersCondition Reports702856,
704354,
712005,
721179,
804700,
804720,
896041, 895948

Section 1R11:

Licensed Operator Requalification ProgramSimulator AdminNTP-QA-71.1, "Simulator Testing," Revision 4Simulator Tests (reviewed the most recent test performance):Steady State Test 5501, "30% Power"Steady State Test 5503, "100% Power and One Hour Stability" Transient Test 5301, "Manual Scram"
A-3AttachmentTransient Test 5304, "Simultaneous Trip of All Recirculation Pumps"Transient Test 5309, "Maximum Size Unisolable Main Steam Line Rupture" Normal Operations Test 5103, "Reactor Trip Followed by Recovery to Rated Power" Malfunction Test 5220, "Main Condenser Tube Leak at 1% Severity" Malfunction Test 5233, "Loss of Protective System Channel (Failure to Scram - High Power main steam isolation valves (MSIVs) Open anticipated transient without scram (ATWS))"Malfunction Test 5242, "Inadvertent (Spurious) HPCI Initiation"Simulator Condition ReportsCSPR
756917, "Revise SRM Setpoints Per
EC 644906"CSPR
768455, "Simulator Does Not Fully Model EDG Trip on Low ESW Cooling Flow"
CSPR
837435, "Incorrect Value for Div 2 RPV WR Level LI-14203B"

Section 1R12: Maintenance EffectivenessIOM 749-1, emergency standby

KSV diesel generator, Revision 26SO-024-001B, monthly diesel generator "B" operability test, Revision 1

==Section 1R15: Operability EvaluationsAR

889060, July 18, 2007,==
PCWO
722198 had the incorrect torque value in work packageAR
889683, July 20, 2007, control room received unexpected SGTS "A" and "B" duct inlet pressurealarms

Section 1R19: Post Maintenance TestingTP-030-032, data collection with

CREOAS and SGTS in service, Revision 1PCAF 2007-4425,
EC 793950 data collection with CREOAS and SGTS in service
50.59
SD 00379, provide motive steam to Unit 1, SJAEs from main steam system and auxiliary steam systemOP-172-001, SJAE and offgas system, Revision 34
TP-055-010, CRD stroke timing in Mode 1 or 2, Revision 4
EWR 904247 and AR 904104904104: RHRSW system journal entry 265
SO-216-A04, RHRSW system comprehensive flow verification Division 1, Revision 0
NDAP-QA-0423, station pump and valve testing program, Revision 16
RACT
783149, G0002-09, Support OPS to Install 4 KV BKRS into their cubicle and install and remove seismic restraint brackets.PCWO
893776, When 1A RHR 1P202A Pump Breaker 1A201-02 was racked in, the breaker safetyfloor tripper hung up.PCWO
642088, 1A20102, Perform Receipt Inspection of 4 KV Breaker I.A.W. MT-GE-048
MT-GE-048, Revision 5, Cutler-Hammer type
DHP-VR 4.16 KV Circuit Breaker and Switchgear inspection and maintenance.50.59
SD 00379, "Provide Motive Steam to Unit 1 SJAE's from Main Steam and Auxiliary Steam System."FSAR Sections 1.2.2.8.17, "Auxiliary Steam System" and 10.3.2, "Main Steam System."

Section 1R22: Surveillance TestingSO-149-A02, Revision 13, Quarterly

RHR System Flow Verification Div 1, completed 8/8/07
A-4AttachmentFSAR Section 6.3P&ID M-151
OP-054-001, Emergency Service Water System
SE-024-D01, "D" EDG surveillance Z2152-04, AR 856982856982: SO-200-066, shiftly surveillance operating log, Revision 45

Section 1EP6: Drill Evaluation2007

GREEN Team HP Drill Scenario - 8/7/2007AR
894069, During the 8/7/07 E Plan Drill, the Scenario did not correctly assess the need to use unfiltered inputs in MIDAS dose projection calculations.
As a result, the Scenario expected
PAR was not correct.AR
894086, Operations Coordinator did not update the unaffected unit white board in the TSC.
AR 893911893911 EAL
RU1-2 is difficult to interpret due to the non-standard unit of measure used as an action level.

Section 4OA1: Performance IndicatorsNDAP-QA-0737, reactor oversight process (ROP) performance indicatorsSC-176-102, Unit 1 primary coolant specific activity - dose equivalent

I-131
SC-276-102, Unit 2 primary coolant specific activity - dose equivalent I-131
SO-200-006, shiftly surveillance operating log, Attachments L and M (drywell leakage worksheet/instructions)

Section 4OA2:

Identification and Resolution of ProblemsCondition Reports388219,
811196,
560587,
864760,
617245, and 882278Condition Report Actions409941,
409963,
834604, and 877638
Engineering Work Requests420763,
811738, and 886344
MiscellaneousIOM 211, "Switchgear", Revision 27LER 50-387/2002-003-00
OFR 622048, Revision 0
Station Engineering Trending Report Second Quarter, 2007
System Health Report, 4.16KV System, Units 1 and 2, First Period 2007ProceduresMT-GE-048, "Cutler Hammer Type
DHP-VR 4.16KV Circuit Breaker and Switchgear Inspection andMaintenance", Revision 5NDAP-00-0710, "Station Trending Program", Revision 0
A-5AttachmentNDAP-QA-0702, "Action Request and Condition Report Process", Revision 20OP-000-001, "Breakers", Revision 19
OP-104-001, "4 kV Electrical System", Revision 7Work Orders388221,
438214,
560590,
593960,
617252,
811203,
878897,
878929,
878935,
881004, and
8810094OA3:
Event Follow-upNDAP-QA-0737, reactor oversight process ROP performance indicatorsSC-176-102, Unit 1 primary coolant specific activity - dose equivalent I-131
SC-276-102, Unit 2 primary coolant specific activity - dose equivalent I-131
SO-200-006, shiftly surveillance operating log attachments L & M (drywell leakage worksheet/instructions)AR
888358, July 15, 2007, operator moved rod one notch in wrong direction

LIST OF ACRONYMS

ANSIAmerican National Standards InstituteAPRMAverage Power Range Monitor

ARActivity Report

CAPCorrective Action Program

CFRCode of Federal Regulations

CRCondition Report

CRDControl Rod Drive

CREOASControl Room Emergency Outside Air System

DBDDesign Basis Document

EDGEmergency Diesel Generator

EROEmergency Response Organization

ESSEngineering Safeguard System

ESWEmergency Service Water

GLGeneric Letter

HPCIHigh Pressure Coolant Injection

HXHeat Exchanger

IPInspection Procedure

ISTIn-Service Test

JPMJob Performance Measure

kVKilovolts

KVARKilovars

LERLicensee Event Report

LPRMLocal Power Range Monitor

MSIVMain Steam Isolation Valve

NDAPNuclear Department Administrative Procedure

NEINuclear Energy Institute

NRCNuclear Regulatory Commission

NUMARCNuclear Utilities Management and Resources Council

OAOther Activities

PARProtective Action Recommendation

PCWOPlant Component Work Order

A-6AttachmentPIPerformance IndicatorPI&RProblem Identification and Resolution

PIMP lant issues Matrix
PPLPPL Susquehanna,

LLC

RBCCWReactor Building Closed Cooling Water

RCICReactor Core Isolation Cooling

RCSReactor Coolant System

RGRegulatory Guide

RHRResidual Heat Removal

RHRSWResidual Heat Removal Service Water

RLWORelease Work Order

RPSReactor Protection System

RTPRated Thermal Power

SBOStation Blackout

SDPSignificant Determination Process

SGTSStandby Gas Treatment System

SJAESteam Jet Air Ejector

SSCStructures, Systems and Components

SSESSusquehanna Steam Electric Station

TMODTemporary Modification

TOCTruck Operated Cell

TSTechnical Specifications

TSCTechnical Support Center

UFSARUpdated Final Safety Analysis Report

WAWork Authorization

WOW ork Order