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{{#Wiki_filter:U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGULATORYRevision I June 1996 GUIDEOFFICE OF NUCLEAR REGULATORY RESEARCH REGULATORY GUIDE 1.153 (Draft was issued as DG-1042) CRITERIA FOR SAFETY SYSTEMS
{{#Wiki_filter:U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY  
COMMISSION  
REGULATORY
Revision I June 1996 GUIDE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REGULATORY  
RESEARCH REGULATORY  
GUIDE 1.153 (Draft was issued as DG-1042) CRITERIA FOR SAFETY SYSTEMS  


==A. INTRODUCTION==
==A. INTRODUCTION==
Appendix A, "General Design Criteria for Nuclear Power Plants," to 10 CFR Part 50, "Domestic Licensing of Production and Utilization Facilities," contains, in part, requirements for the design, reliability, qualification, and testability of safety systems. 1 The following General Design Criteria2 are applicable to the power, instrumentation, and control portions of nuclear power plant safety systems.  Criterion 2, "Design Bases for Protection Against Natural Phenomena," requires systems important to safety to be designed to withstand the effects of natural phenomena without loss of capability to perform their safety functions.  0 Criterion 4, "Environmental and Dynamic Effects Design Bases," requires systems important to safety to be designed to accommodate the effects of and to be compatible with the environmental conditions associated with normal operation, maintenance, testing, and postulated accidents.  IThe term "safety systems" is synonymous with "safety-related" systems. The general design criteria cover structures, systems, and components "important to safety." The scope of this guide is, however, limited to "safety systems," which are a subset of "systems important to safety." 2For the full text of the applicable General Design Criteria, see Appendix A to 10 CFR Part 50.USNRC REGULATORY GUIDES Regulatory Guides are issued to describe and make available to the public such information as methods acceptable to the NRC staff for implementIng specific parts of the Commission's regulations, techniques used by the staff In evaluating specific problems or postulated accidents, and data needed by the NRC staff in Its review of applications for permits and licenses. Regulatory guides are not substitutes for regulations, and compliance with them Is not required. Methods and solutions different from those set out in the guides will be acceptable if they provide a basis for the findings requisite to the issuance or continuance of a permit or license by the Commission.  This guide was Issued after consideration of comments received from the public. Comments and suggestions for Improvements in these guides are encouraged at all times, and guides will be revised, as appropriate, to accommodate comments and to reflect new information or experience.* Criterion 5, "Sharing of Structures, Systems, and Components," requires that certain structures, systems, and components important to safety not be shared among nuclear power units unless it can be shown that such sharing will not significantly impair their ability to perform their safety functions.  "* Criterion 10, "Reactor Design," requires protection systems to be designed with margins to ensure that fuel design limits are not exceeded.  "* Criterion 12, "Suppression of Reactor Power Oscillations," requires protection systems to be designed to prevent or detect and suppress power oscillations that can result in conditions exceeding fuel design limits.
Appendix A, "General Design Criteria for Nuclear Power Plants," to 10 CFR Part 50, "Domestic Licens ing of Production and Utilization Facilities," contains, in part, requirements for the design, reliability, qualifi cation, and testability of safety systems. 1 The following General Design Criteria 2 are applicable to the power, instrumentation, and control portions of nuclear power plant safety systems.


* Criterion 13, "Instrumentation and Control," requires that instrumentation be provided to monitor variables and systems over their anticipated ranges for normal operation, anticipated operational occurrences, and accident conditions to assure adequate safety. Appropriate controls must be provided to maintain variables and systems within prescribed operating ranges.  0 Criterion 15, "Reactor Coolant System Design," requires that the reactor coolant system and associated auxiliary, control, and protection systems be designed with sufficient margin to ensure that the design conditions of the reactor coolant pressure boundary are not exceeded during anyWritten comments may be submitted to the Rules Review and Directives Branch, DFIPS, ADM, U. S, Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001.  The guides are issued in the following ten broad divisions: 1. Power Reactors 6. Products 2, Research and Test Reactors 7. Transportation 3. Fuels and Materials Facilities 8. Occupational Health 4. Environmental and Siting 9. Antitrust and Financial Review 5. Materials and Plant Protection 10. General Single copies of regulatory guides may be obtained free of charge by writing the Office of Administration, Attention: Distribution and Services Section, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001; or by fax at (301)415-2260.  Issued guides may also be purchased from the National Technical Information Service on a standing order basis. Details on this service may be obtained by writing NTIS, 5285 Port Royal Road, Springfield, VA 22161.
Criterion  
2, "Design Bases for Protection Against Natural Phenomena," requires systems impor tant to safety to be designed to withstand the ef fects of natural phenomena without loss of capa bility to perform their safety functions.


condition of normal operation, including anticipated operational occurrences.
0 Criterion
4, "Environmental and Dynamic Ef fects Design Bases," requires systems important to safety to be designed to accommodate the ef fects of and to be compatible with the environ mental conditions associated with normal opera tion, maintenance, testing, and postulated accidents.


* Criterion 17, "Electric Power Systems," requires electric power systems to be provided to permit functioning of structures, systems, and components important to safety. Criterion 18, "Inspection and Testing of Electric Power Systems," requires that electric power systems important to safety be designed to permit periodic inspection and testing of such systems for operability and functional performance. "* Criterion 20, "Protection System Functions," requires a protection system to sense accident conditions and initiate operation of systems important to safety to ensure that acceptable fuel design limits are not exceeded. "* Criterion 21, "Protection System Reliability and Testability," requires the protection system to be designed with high functional reliability and inservice testability. This criterion also requires redundancy and independence sufficient to provide protection against single failures and loss of redundancy, except where justified, in the event equipment is removed for service. On-line testing is required. 0-- Criterion 22, "Protection System Independence," requires that the effects of natural phenomena, normal operation, maintenance, testing, and postulated accident conditions on redundant channels not result in loss of the protection function. Functional diversity or diversity in component design and principles of operation must be used to the extent practical to prevent loss of the protection function.  " Criterion 23, "Protection System Failure Modes," requires that the protection system be designed to fail into a safe state or into a state demonstrated to be acceptable on some other defined basis if conditions such as disconnection of the system, loss of energy, or postulated adverse environments are experienced. "* Criterion 24, "Separation of Protection and Control Systems," requires separation of protection and control systems to the extent that failure of any single control system component or channel, or failure or removal from service of any single protection system component or channel that is common to the control and protection systems, leaves intact a system satisfying all reliability, redundancy, and independence requirements of the protection system. Interconnection of the protection and control systems is to be limited to ensure that safety is not significantly impaired."* Criterion 25, "Protection System Requirements for Reactivity Control Malfunctions," requires that the protection system be designed to ensure that specified acceptable fuel design limits will not be exceeded for any single malfunction of the reactivity control systems. "* Criterion 29, "Protection Against Anticipated Operational Occurrences," requires that protection and reactivity control systems be designed to be highly reliable in accomplishing their safety functions in the event of anticipated operational occurrences. "* Criteria 34, "Residual Heat Removal"; 35, "Emergency Core Cooling"; 38, "Containment Heat Removal"; 41, "Containment Atmosphere Cleanup"; and 44, "Cooling Water," require suitable redundancy, interconnections, and isolation capabilities to ensure that, for onsite and for offsite electric power system operation, the safety function can be accomplished. "* Criteria 37, "Testing of Emergency Core Cooling System"; 40, "Testing of Containment Heat Removal System"; 43, "Testing of Containment Atmosphere Cleanup Systems"; and 46, "Testing of Cooling Water System," require designs to permit periodic functional testing of these systems, the operability and performance of the active components of the system, and the operability of each of these systems as a whole, including the full operational sequence that brings each system into operation. "* Criterion 54, "Piping Systems Penetrating Containment," requires redundancy, reliability, and performance capabilities that reflect the importance to safety of isolating these systems. Capability for periodic testing is also required. In addition, 10 CFR 50.55a, "Codes and Standards," requires in paragraph (h) that protection systems meet the requirements set forth in IEEE Std 2791971 (ANSI N42.7-1972), "Criteria for Protection Systems for Nuclear Power Generating Stations."3 Further, 10 CFR 50.49, "Environmental Qualification of Electric Equipment Important to Safety for Nuclear Power Plants," requires that a program be established for qualifying safety-related electric equipment, nonsafety-related electric equipment whose failure under postulated environmental conditions could prevent satisfactory accomplishment of its safety functions, and certain post-accident monitoring equipment. This guide describes a method acceptable to the NRC staff for complying with the Commission's regula3Copies may be obtained from the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Service Center, 445 Hoes Lane, Piscataway, NJ 08855.1.153-2 tions with respect to the design, reliability, qualification, and testability of the power, instrumentation, and control portions of safety systems of nuclear plants.  The Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards has been consulted concerning this guide and has concurred in the regulatory position. The information collections mentioned in this regulatory guide are covered by the requirements of 10 CFR Part 50, which were approved by the Office of Management and Budget, approval number 31500011. The NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, a collection of information unless it displays a currently valid OMB control number.
IThe term "safety systems" is synonymous with "safety-related" systems. The general design criteria cover structures, systems, and components "important to safety." The scope of this guide is, however, limited to "safety systems," which are a subset of "systems important to safety." 2 For the full text of the applicable General Design Criteria, see Appendix A to 10 CFR Part 5
 
===0. USNRC REGULATORY ===
GUIDES Regulatory Guides are issued to describe and make available to the public such information as methods acceptable to the NRC staff for implement Ing specific parts of the Commission's regulations, techniques used by the staff In evaluating specific problems or postulated accidents, and data needed by the NRC staff in Its review of applications for permits and licenses.
 
Regulatory guides are not substitutes for regulations, and com pliance with them Is not required.
 
Methods and solutions different from those set out in the guides will be acceptable if they provide a basis for the findings requisite to the issuance or continuance of a permit or license by the Commission.
 
This guide was Issued after consideration of comments received from the public. Comments and suggestions for Improvements in these guides are encouraged at all times, and guides will be revised, as appropriate, to accommodate comments and to reflect new information or experience.
 
* Criterion
5, "Sharing of Structures, Systems, and Components," requires that certain structures, systems, and components important to safety not be shared among nuclear power units unless it can be shown that such sharing will not signifi cantly impair their ability to perform their safety functions.
 
"* Criterion
10, "Reactor Design," requires protec tion systems to be designed with margins to en sure that fuel design limits are not exceeded.
 
"* Criterion
12, "Suppression of Reactor Power Os cillations," requires protection systems to be de signed to prevent or detect and suppress power oscillations that can result in conditions exceed ing fuel design limits.
 
* Criterion
13, "Instrumentation and Control," re quires that instrumentation be provided to moni tor variables and systems over their anticipated ranges for normal operation, anticipated opera tional occurrences, and accident conditions to assure adequate safety. Appropriate controls must be provided to maintain variables and sys tems within prescribed operating ranges.  0 Criterion
15, "Reactor Coolant System Design," requires that the reactor coolant system and as sociated auxiliary, control, and protection sys tems be designed with sufficient margin to ensure that the design conditions of the reactor coolant pressure boundary are not exceeded during any Written comments may be submitted to the Rules Review and Directives Branch, DFIPS, ADM, U. S, Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washing ton, DC 20555-0001.
 
The guides are issued in the following ten broad divisions:
1. Power Reactors 6. Products 2, Research and Test Reactors
 
===7. Transportation ===
3. Fuels and Materials Facilities
8. Occupational Health 4. Environmental and Siting 9. Antitrust and Financial Review 5. Materials and Plant Protection
10. General Single copies of regulatory guides may be obtained free of charge by writ ing the Office of Administration, Attention:
Distribution and Services Section, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001;
or by fax at (301)415-2260.
 
Issued guides may also be purchased from the National Technical Infor mation Service on a standing order basis. Details on this service may be obtained by writing NTIS, 5285 Port Royal Road, Springfield, VA 22161.
 
condition of normal operation, including antici pated operational occurrences.
 
* Criterion  
17, "Electric Power Systems," requires electric power systems to be provided to permit functioning of structures, systems, and compo nents important to safet
 
====y. Criterion ====
18, "Inspection and Testing of Electric Power Systems," requires that electric power sys tems important to safety be designed to permit periodic inspection and testing of such systems for operability and functional performance.
 
"* Criterion  
20, "Protection System Functions," re quires a protection system to sense accident con ditions and initiate operation of systems impor tant to safety to ensure that acceptable fuel design limits are not exceeded.
 
"* Criterion  
21, "Protection System Reliability and Testability," requires the protection system to be designed with high functional reliability and in service testability.
 
This criterion also requires re dundancy and independence sufficient to pro vide protection against single failures and loss of redundancy, except where justified, in the event equipment is removed for service. On-line testing is required.
 
0-- Criterion  
22, "Protection System Indepen dence," requires that the effects of natural phe nomena, normal operation, maintenance, test ing, and postulated accident conditions on redundant channels not result in loss of the pro tection function.
 
Functional diversity or diversity in component design and principles of operation must be used to the extent practical to prevent loss of the protection function.  " Criterion  
23, "Protection System Failure Modes," requires that the protection system be designed to fail into a safe state or into a state demonstrated to be acceptable on some other defined basis if conditions such as disconnection of the system, loss of energy, or postulated ad verse environments are experienced.
 
"* Criterion  
24, "Separation of Protection and Con trol Systems," requires separation of protection and control systems to the extent that failure of any single control system component or channel, or failure or removal from service of any single protection system component or channel that is common to the control and protection systems, leaves intact a system satisfying all reliability, re dundancy, and independence requirements of the protection system. Interconnection of the protection and control systems is to be limited to ensure that safety is not significantly impaired."* Criterion  
25, "Protection System Requirements for Reactivity Control Malfunctions," requires that the protection system be designed to ensure that specified acceptable fuel design limits will not be exceeded for any single malfunction of the reactivity control systems.
 
"* Criterion  
29, "Protection Against Anticipated Operational Occurrences," requires that protec tion and reactivity control systems be designed to be highly reliable in accomplishing their safety functions in the event of anticipated operational occurrences.
 
"* Criteria 34, "Residual Heat Removal";  
35, "Emergency Core Cooling";  
38, "Containment Heat Removal";  
41, "Containment Atmosphere Cleanup";  
and 44, "Cooling Water," require suitable redundancy, interconnections, and iso lation capabilities to ensure that, for onsite and for offsite electric power system operation, the safety function can be accomplished.
 
"* Criteria 37, "Testing of Emergency Core Cooling System"; 40, "Testing of Containment Heat Re moval System"; 43, "Testing of Containment At mosphere Cleanup Systems";  
and 46, "Testing of Cooling Water System," require designs to permit periodic functional testing of these sys tems, the operability and performance of the ac tive components of the system, and the operabil ity of each of these systems as a whole, including the full operational sequence that brings each system into operation.
 
"* Criterion  
54, "Piping Systems Penetrating Con tainment," requires redundancy, reliability, and performance capabilities that reflect the impor tance to safety of isolating these systems. Capa bility for periodic testing is also required.
 
In addition, 10 CFR 50.55a, "Codes and Stan dards," requires in paragraph (h) that protection sys tems meet the requirements set forth in IEEE Std 279 1971 (ANSI N42.7-1972), "Criteria for Protection Systems for Nuclear Power Generating Stations." 3 Further, 10 CFR 50.49, "Environmental Qualifi cation of Electric Equipment Important to Safety for Nuclear Power Plants," requires that a program be es tablished for qualifying safety-related electric equip ment, nonsafety-related electric equipment whose fail ure under postulated environmental conditions could prevent satisfactory accomplishment of its safety functions, and certain post-accident monitoring equipment.
 
This guide describes a method acceptable to the NRC staff for complying with the Commission's regula 3 Copies may be obtained from the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Service Center, 445 Hoes Lane, Piscat away, NJ 08855.1.153-2 tions with respect to the design, reliability, qualifica tion, and testability of the power, instrumentation, and control portions of safety systems of nuclear plants.  The Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards has been consulted concerning this guide and has con curred in the regulatory position.
 
The information collections mentioned in this reg ulatory guide are covered by the requirements of 10 CFR Part 50, which were approved by the Office of Management and Budget, approval number 3150 0011. The NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, a collection of information unless it displays a currently valid OMB control number.


==B. DISCUSSION==
==B. DISCUSSION==
IEEE Std. 603-1991, "Criteria for Safety Systems for Nuclear Power Generating Stations,"'3 was prepared by the Safety Systems Working Group SC 6.3 of the IEEE Nuclear Power Engineering Committee, and it was approved by the IEEE Standards Board on June 27, 1991. A correction sheet was issued on January 30, 1995.  IEEE Std. 603-1991 establishes minimum functional and design requirements for the power, instrumentation, and control portions of safety systems for nuclear power plants.  Section 1.2 of IEEE Std. 603-1991 references IEEE/ANS 7.4.3.2-1982. Revision 1 to Regulatory Guide 1.152, "Criteria for Digital Computers in Safety Systems of Nuclear Power Plants," endorses the 1993 version, IEEE Std. 7-4.3.2-1993, "Standard Criteria for Digital Computers in Safety Systems of Nuclear Power Generating Stations." Thus, Revision I to Regulatory Guide 1.152 constitutes an acceptable method of meeting the regulatory requirements for digital computers. It should be noted that Section 5.8.1 of IEEE Std.  603-1991 references IEEE Std. 497-1981, "IEEE Standard Criteria for Accident Monitoring Instrumentation for Nuclear Power Generating Stations." In this area, Revision 3 of Regulatory Guide 1.97, "Instrumentation for Light-Water-Cooled Nuclear Power Plants To Assess Plant and Environs Conditions Dur-ing and Following an Accident," provides an acceptable method to meet the regulations for accident monitoring instrumentation.
IEEE Std. 603-1991, "Criteria for Safety Systems for Nuclear Power Generating Stations,"'
3 was pre pared by the Safety Systems Working Group SC 6.3 of the IEEE Nuclear Power Engineering Committee, and it was approved by the IEEE Standards Board on June 27, 1991. A correction sheet was issued on Jan uary 30, 1995.  IEEE Std. 603-1991 establishes minimum func tional and design requirements for the power, instru mentation, and control portions of safety systems for nuclear power plants.  Section 1.2 of IEEE Std. 603-1991 references IEEE/ANS 7.4.3.2-1982.
 
Revision 1 to Regulatory Guide 1.152, "Criteria for Digital Computers in Safety Systems of Nuclear Power Plants," endorses the 1993 version, IEEE Std. 7-4.3.2-1993, "Standard Criteria for Digital Computers in Safety Systems of Nuclear Power Generating Stations." Thus, Revision I to Regu latory Guide 1.152 constitutes an acceptable method of meeting the regulatory requirements for digital computers.
 
It should be noted that Section 5.8.1 of IEEE Std.  603-1991 references IEEE Std. 497-1981, "IEEE Standard Criteria for Accident Monitoring Instrumen tation for Nuclear Power Generating Stations." In this area, Revision 3 of Regulatory Guide 1.97, "Instru mentation for Light-Water-Cooled Nuclear Power Plants To Assess Plant and Environs Conditions Dur-ing and Following an Accident," provides an accept able method to meet the regulations for accident moni toring instrumentation.
 
C. REGULATORY
POSITION Conformance with the requirements of IEEE Std.  603-1991, "Criteria for Safety Systems for Nuclear Power Generating Stations" (including the correction sheet dated January 30, 1995), provides a method ac ceptable to the NRC staff for satisfying the Commis sion's regulations with respect to the design, reliability, qualification, and testability of the power, instrumenta tion, and control portions of the safety systems of nu clear power plants.  Section 3 of IEEE Std. 603-1991 references sev eral industry codes and standards.
 
If a referenced stan dard has been incorporated separately into the Com mission's regulations, licensees and applicants must comply with that standard as set forth in the regulation.


==C. REGULATORY POSITION==
If the referenced standard has been endorsed in a reg ulatory guide, the standard constitutes a method ac ceptable to the NRC staff of meeting a regulatory re quirement as described in the regulatory guide. If a referenced standard has been neither incorporated into the Commission's regulations nor endorsed in a regulatory guide, licensees and applicants may consid er and use the information in the referenced standard if appropriately justified, consistent with current regu latory practice.
Conformance with the requirements of IEEE Std.  603-1991, "Criteria for Safety Systems for Nuclear Power Generating Stations" (including the correction sheet dated January 30, 1995), provides a method acceptable to the NRC staff for satisfying the Commission's regulations with respect to the design, reliability, qualification, and testability of the power, instrumentation, and control portions of the safety systems of nuclear power plants.  Section 3 of IEEE Std. 603-1991 references several industry codes and standards. If a referenced standard has been incorporated separately into the Commission's regulations, licensees and applicants must comply with that standard as set forth in the regulation.  If the referenced standard has been endorsed in a regulatory guide, the standard constitutes a method acceptable to the NRC staff of meeting a regulatory requirement as described in the regulatory guide. If a referenced standard has been neither incorporated into the Commission's regulations nor endorsed in a regulatory guide, licensees and applicants may consider and use the information in the referenced standard if appropriately justified, consistent with current regulatory practice.


==D. IMPLEMENTATION==
==D. IMPLEMENTATION==
The purpose of this section is to provide information to applicants and licensees regarding the NRC staff's plans for using this guide.  Except in those cases in which an applicant or licensee proposes an acceptable alternative method for complying with specified portions of the Commission's regulations, the methods described in this guide will be used in the evaluation of submittals in connection with applications for construction permits and operating licenses. It will also be used to evaluate submittals from operating reactor licensees who voluntarily propose to initiate system modifications if there is a clear nexus between the proposed modifications and this guidance.VALUE/IMPACT STATEMENT A draft Value/Impact Statement was published with the draft of this guide, Task DG-1042, when it was published for public comment in November 1995.  No changes were necessary, so a separate value/impact statement for this final guide has not been prepared. A copy of the draft Value/Impact Statement is available for inspection or copying for a fee in the Commission's Public Document Room at 2120 L Street NW., Washington, DC, under Task DG-1042.1.153-3 UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON, DC 20555-0001FIRST CLASS MAIL POSTAGE AND FEES PAID USNRC PERMIT NO. G-67OFFICIAL BUSINESS PENALTY FOR PRIVATE USE, $300  
The purpose of this section is to provide informa tion to applicants and licensees regarding the NRC staff's plans for using this guide.  Except in those cases in which an applicant or li censee proposes an acceptable alternative method for complying with specified portions of the Commission's regulations, the methods described in this guide will be used in the evaluation of submittals in connection with applications for construction permits and operating li censes. It will also be used to evaluate submittals from operating reactor licensees who voluntarily propose to initiate system modifications if there is a clear nexus between the proposed modifications and this guidance.VALUE/IMPACT  
}}
STATEMENT  
A draft Value/Impact Statement was published with the draft of this guide, Task DG-1042, when it was published for public comment in November 1995.  No changes were necessary, so a separate value/impact statement for this final guide has not been prepared.
 
A copy of the draft Value/Impact Statement is available for inspection or copying for a fee in the Commission's Public Document Room at 2120 L Street NW., Washington, DC, under Task DG-1042.1.153-3 UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY  
COMMISSION  
WASHINGTON, DC 20555-0001 FIRST CLASS MAIL POSTAGE AND FEES PAID USNRC PERMIT NO. G-67 OFFICIAL BUSINESS PENALTY FOR PRIVATE USE, $300}}


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Revision as of 17:05, 31 August 2018

(Draft Issued as DG-1042) Revision 1, Criteria for Safety Systems
ML003740022
Person / Time
Issue date: 06/30/1996
From:
Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research
To:
References
RG-1.153 Rev 1
Download: ML003740022 (4)


U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY

COMMISSION

REGULATORY

Revision I June 1996 GUIDE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REGULATORY

RESEARCH REGULATORY

GUIDE 1.153 (Draft was issued as DG-1042) CRITERIA FOR SAFETY SYSTEMS

A. INTRODUCTION

Appendix A, "General Design Criteria for Nuclear Power Plants," to 10 CFR Part 50, "Domestic Licens ing of Production and Utilization Facilities," contains, in part, requirements for the design, reliability, qualifi cation, and testability of safety systems. 1 The following General Design Criteria 2 are applicable to the power, instrumentation, and control portions of nuclear power plant safety systems.

Criterion

2, "Design Bases for Protection Against Natural Phenomena," requires systems impor tant to safety to be designed to withstand the ef fects of natural phenomena without loss of capa bility to perform their safety functions.

0 Criterion

4, "Environmental and Dynamic Ef fects Design Bases," requires systems important to safety to be designed to accommodate the ef fects of and to be compatible with the environ mental conditions associated with normal opera tion, maintenance, testing, and postulated accidents.

IThe term "safety systems" is synonymous with "safety-related" systems. The general design criteria cover structures, systems, and components "important to safety." The scope of this guide is, however, limited to "safety systems," which are a subset of "systems important to safety." 2 For the full text of the applicable General Design Criteria, see Appendix A to 10 CFR Part 5

0. USNRC REGULATORY

GUIDES Regulatory Guides are issued to describe and make available to the public such information as methods acceptable to the NRC staff for implement Ing specific parts of the Commission's regulations, techniques used by the staff In evaluating specific problems or postulated accidents, and data needed by the NRC staff in Its review of applications for permits and licenses.

Regulatory guides are not substitutes for regulations, and com pliance with them Is not required.

Methods and solutions different from those set out in the guides will be acceptable if they provide a basis for the findings requisite to the issuance or continuance of a permit or license by the Commission.

This guide was Issued after consideration of comments received from the public. Comments and suggestions for Improvements in these guides are encouraged at all times, and guides will be revised, as appropriate, to accommodate comments and to reflect new information or experience.

  • Criterion

5, "Sharing of Structures, Systems, and Components," requires that certain structures, systems, and components important to safety not be shared among nuclear power units unless it can be shown that such sharing will not signifi cantly impair their ability to perform their safety functions.

"* Criterion

10, "Reactor Design," requires protec tion systems to be designed with margins to en sure that fuel design limits are not exceeded.

"* Criterion

12, "Suppression of Reactor Power Os cillations," requires protection systems to be de signed to prevent or detect and suppress power oscillations that can result in conditions exceed ing fuel design limits.

  • Criterion

13, "Instrumentation and Control," re quires that instrumentation be provided to moni tor variables and systems over their anticipated ranges for normal operation, anticipated opera tional occurrences, and accident conditions to assure adequate safety. Appropriate controls must be provided to maintain variables and sys tems within prescribed operating ranges. 0 Criterion

15, "Reactor Coolant System Design," requires that the reactor coolant system and as sociated auxiliary, control, and protection sys tems be designed with sufficient margin to ensure that the design conditions of the reactor coolant pressure boundary are not exceeded during any Written comments may be submitted to the Rules Review and Directives Branch, DFIPS, ADM, U. S, Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washing ton, DC 20555-0001.

The guides are issued in the following ten broad divisions:

1. Power Reactors 6. Products 2, Research and Test Reactors

7. Transportation

3. Fuels and Materials Facilities

8. Occupational Health 4. Environmental and Siting 9. Antitrust and Financial Review 5. Materials and Plant Protection

10. General Single copies of regulatory guides may be obtained free of charge by writ ing the Office of Administration, Attention:

Distribution and Services Section, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001;

or by fax at (301)415-2260.

Issued guides may also be purchased from the National Technical Infor mation Service on a standing order basis. Details on this service may be obtained by writing NTIS, 5285 Port Royal Road, Springfield, VA 22161.

condition of normal operation, including antici pated operational occurrences.

  • Criterion

17, "Electric Power Systems," requires electric power systems to be provided to permit functioning of structures, systems, and compo nents important to safet

y. Criterion

18, "Inspection and Testing of Electric Power Systems," requires that electric power sys tems important to safety be designed to permit periodic inspection and testing of such systems for operability and functional performance.

"* Criterion

20, "Protection System Functions," re quires a protection system to sense accident con ditions and initiate operation of systems impor tant to safety to ensure that acceptable fuel design limits are not exceeded.

"* Criterion

21, "Protection System Reliability and Testability," requires the protection system to be designed with high functional reliability and in service testability.

This criterion also requires re dundancy and independence sufficient to pro vide protection against single failures and loss of redundancy, except where justified, in the event equipment is removed for service. On-line testing is required.

0-- Criterion

22, "Protection System Indepen dence," requires that the effects of natural phe nomena, normal operation, maintenance, test ing, and postulated accident conditions on redundant channels not result in loss of the pro tection function.

Functional diversity or diversity in component design and principles of operation must be used to the extent practical to prevent loss of the protection function. " Criterion

23, "Protection System Failure Modes," requires that the protection system be designed to fail into a safe state or into a state demonstrated to be acceptable on some other defined basis if conditions such as disconnection of the system, loss of energy, or postulated ad verse environments are experienced.

"* Criterion

24, "Separation of Protection and Con trol Systems," requires separation of protection and control systems to the extent that failure of any single control system component or channel, or failure or removal from service of any single protection system component or channel that is common to the control and protection systems, leaves intact a system satisfying all reliability, re dundancy, and independence requirements of the protection system. Interconnection of the protection and control systems is to be limited to ensure that safety is not significantly impaired."* Criterion

25, "Protection System Requirements for Reactivity Control Malfunctions," requires that the protection system be designed to ensure that specified acceptable fuel design limits will not be exceeded for any single malfunction of the reactivity control systems.

"* Criterion

29, "Protection Against Anticipated Operational Occurrences," requires that protec tion and reactivity control systems be designed to be highly reliable in accomplishing their safety functions in the event of anticipated operational occurrences.

"* Criteria 34, "Residual Heat Removal";

35, "Emergency Core Cooling";

38, "Containment Heat Removal";

41, "Containment Atmosphere Cleanup";

and 44, "Cooling Water," require suitable redundancy, interconnections, and iso lation capabilities to ensure that, for onsite and for offsite electric power system operation, the safety function can be accomplished.

"* Criteria 37, "Testing of Emergency Core Cooling System"; 40, "Testing of Containment Heat Re moval System"; 43, "Testing of Containment At mosphere Cleanup Systems";

and 46, "Testing of Cooling Water System," require designs to permit periodic functional testing of these sys tems, the operability and performance of the ac tive components of the system, and the operabil ity of each of these systems as a whole, including the full operational sequence that brings each system into operation.

"* Criterion

54, "Piping Systems Penetrating Con tainment," requires redundancy, reliability, and performance capabilities that reflect the impor tance to safety of isolating these systems. Capa bility for periodic testing is also required.

In addition, 10 CFR 50.55a, "Codes and Stan dards," requires in paragraph (h) that protection sys tems meet the requirements set forth in IEEE Std 279 1971 (ANSI N42.7-1972), "Criteria for Protection Systems for Nuclear Power Generating Stations." 3 Further, 10 CFR 50.49, "Environmental Qualifi cation of Electric Equipment Important to Safety for Nuclear Power Plants," requires that a program be es tablished for qualifying safety-related electric equip ment, nonsafety-related electric equipment whose fail ure under postulated environmental conditions could prevent satisfactory accomplishment of its safety functions, and certain post-accident monitoring equipment.

This guide describes a method acceptable to the NRC staff for complying with the Commission's regula 3 Copies may be obtained from the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Service Center, 445 Hoes Lane, Piscat away, NJ 08855.1.153-2 tions with respect to the design, reliability, qualifica tion, and testability of the power, instrumentation, and control portions of safety systems of nuclear plants. The Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards has been consulted concerning this guide and has con curred in the regulatory position.

The information collections mentioned in this reg ulatory guide are covered by the requirements of 10 CFR Part 50, which were approved by the Office of Management and Budget, approval number 3150 0011. The NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, a collection of information unless it displays a currently valid OMB control number.

B. DISCUSSION

IEEE Std. 603-1991, "Criteria for Safety Systems for Nuclear Power Generating Stations,"'

3 was pre pared by the Safety Systems Working Group SC 6.3 of the IEEE Nuclear Power Engineering Committee, and it was approved by the IEEE Standards Board on June 27, 1991. A correction sheet was issued on Jan uary 30, 1995. IEEE Std. 603-1991 establishes minimum func tional and design requirements for the power, instru mentation, and control portions of safety systems for nuclear power plants. Section 1.2 of IEEE Std. 603-1991 references IEEE/ANS 7.4.3.2-1982.

Revision 1 to Regulatory Guide 1.152, "Criteria for Digital Computers in Safety Systems of Nuclear Power Plants," endorses the 1993 version, IEEE Std. 7-4.3.2-1993, "Standard Criteria for Digital Computers in Safety Systems of Nuclear Power Generating Stations." Thus, Revision I to Regu latory Guide 1.152 constitutes an acceptable method of meeting the regulatory requirements for digital computers.

It should be noted that Section 5.8.1 of IEEE Std. 603-1991 references IEEE Std. 497-1981, "IEEE Standard Criteria for Accident Monitoring Instrumen tation for Nuclear Power Generating Stations." In this area, Revision 3 of Regulatory Guide 1.97, "Instru mentation for Light-Water-Cooled Nuclear Power Plants To Assess Plant and Environs Conditions Dur-ing and Following an Accident," provides an accept able method to meet the regulations for accident moni toring instrumentation.

C. REGULATORY

POSITION Conformance with the requirements of IEEE Std. 603-1991, "Criteria for Safety Systems for Nuclear Power Generating Stations" (including the correction sheet dated January 30, 1995), provides a method ac ceptable to the NRC staff for satisfying the Commis sion's regulations with respect to the design, reliability, qualification, and testability of the power, instrumenta tion, and control portions of the safety systems of nu clear power plants. Section 3 of IEEE Std. 603-1991 references sev eral industry codes and standards.

If a referenced stan dard has been incorporated separately into the Com mission's regulations, licensees and applicants must comply with that standard as set forth in the regulation.

If the referenced standard has been endorsed in a reg ulatory guide, the standard constitutes a method ac ceptable to the NRC staff of meeting a regulatory re quirement as described in the regulatory guide. If a referenced standard has been neither incorporated into the Commission's regulations nor endorsed in a regulatory guide, licensees and applicants may consid er and use the information in the referenced standard if appropriately justified, consistent with current regu latory practice.

D. IMPLEMENTATION

The purpose of this section is to provide informa tion to applicants and licensees regarding the NRC staff's plans for using this guide. Except in those cases in which an applicant or li censee proposes an acceptable alternative method for complying with specified portions of the Commission's regulations, the methods described in this guide will be used in the evaluation of submittals in connection with applications for construction permits and operating li censes. It will also be used to evaluate submittals from operating reactor licensees who voluntarily propose to initiate system modifications if there is a clear nexus between the proposed modifications and this guidance.VALUE/IMPACT

STATEMENT

A draft Value/Impact Statement was published with the draft of this guide, Task DG-1042, when it was published for public comment in November 1995. No changes were necessary, so a separate value/impact statement for this final guide has not been prepared.

A copy of the draft Value/Impact Statement is available for inspection or copying for a fee in the Commission's Public Document Room at 2120 L Street NW., Washington, DC, under Task DG-1042.1.153-3 UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY

COMMISSION

WASHINGTON, DC 20555-0001 FIRST CLASS MAIL POSTAGE AND FEES PAID USNRC PERMIT NO. G-67 OFFICIAL BUSINESS PENALTY FOR PRIVATE USE, $300