IR 05000369/2013007: Difference between revisions

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{{Adams
{{Adams
| number = ML13088A133
| number = ML13192A498
| issue date = 03/27/2013
| issue date = 07/10/2013
| title = IR 05000369-13-007 and 05000370-13-007; 01/28 - 02/01/2013 and 02/11 - 15/2013; McGuire Nuclear Station Units 1 and 2; Fire Protection (Triennial)
| title = IR 05000369-13-007 & 05000370-13-007, 03/27/13, McGuire, Errata Letter Triennial Fire Protection
| author name = King M F
| author name = King M F
| author affiliation = NRC/RGN-II/DRS/EB2
| author affiliation = NRC/RGN-II/DRS/EB2
Line 11: Line 11:
| contact person =  
| contact person =  
| document report number = IR-13-007
| document report number = IR-13-007
| document type = Inspection Report, Letter
| document type = Letter
| page count = 33
| page count = 4
}}
}}


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=Text=
=Text=
{{#Wiki_filter: March 27. 2012 EA-13-050
{{#Wiki_filter:UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION II 245 PEACHTREE CENTER AVENUE NE, SUITE 1200 ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30303-1257 July 10, 2013 Mr. Steven Site Vice President Duke Energy Corporation McGuire Nuclear Station MG01VP/12700 Hagers Ferry Road  
 
Mr. Steven Site Vice President Duke Energy Corporation McGuire Nuclear Station MG01VP/12700 Hagers Ferry Road  


Huntersville, NC 28078
Huntersville, NC 28078


SUBJECT: MCGUIRE NUCLEAR STATION - NRC TRIENNIAL FIRE PROTECTION INSPECTION REPORT 05000369/2013007 & 05000370/2013007 AND EXERCISE OF ENFORCEMENT DISCRETION
SUBJECT: ERRATA LETTER FOR MCGUIRE NUCLEAR STATION- NRC TRIENNIAL FIRE PROTECTION INSPECTION REPORT 05000369/2013007 AND 05000370/2013007


==Dear Mr. Capps:==
==Dear Mr. Capps:==
On February 15, 2013, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at your McGuire Nuclear Station Units 1 and 2. The enclosed inspection report documents the inspection results which were discussed on February 15, 2013, with you and other members of your staff.
On March 27, 2013, the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) issued the subject inspection report for McGuire Nuclear Station Units 1 and 2 (ML13088A133). In reviewing this report, we identified an administrative error regarding the inspection report distribution date. Specifically, on the cover letter, the distribution date March 27, 2012 should be March 27, 2013. Please make the appropriate pen and ink changes in the subject report to reflect this correction.


The inspection examined activities conducted under your license as they relate to safety and compliance with the Commission's rules and regulations and with the conditions of your license.
We apologize for any inconvenience caused by this error.


The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel.
In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter, its enclosure, and your response, if any, will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of NRC's document system (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Website at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).


The enclosed report documents one NRC-identified finding of very low safety significance (Green) that was determined to involve a violation of NRC requirements. The NRC is treating this violation as a non-cited violation (NCV) consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the NRC Enforcement Policy. If you contest the violation or significance of this NCV, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN.: Document Control Desk, Washington DC 20555-
Should you have any questions concerning this letter, please contact me at (404) 997-4511.
001; with copies to the Regional Administrator Region II; the Director, Office of Enforcement, United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001; and the NRC Resident Inspector at the McGuire Nuclear Station.


The enclosed report also documents one noncompliance for which the NRC is exercising
Sincerely,/RA/ Michael F. King, Chief Engineering Branch 2 Division of Reactor Safety Docket Nos.: 50-369, 50-370 License Nos.: NPF-9, NPF-17


enforcement discretion in accordance with Section 9.1 of the NRC Enforcement Policy, "Enforcement Discretion for Certain Fire Protection Issues (10 CFR 50.48)." The noncompliance is associated with your implementation of the requirements and standards of 10 CFR 50, Appendix R, "Fire Protection Program for Nuclear Power Facilities Operating Prior to January 1, 1979." The non-compliance was identified by the licensee, and is a violation of NRC requirements. The inspectors have screened the violation and determined that it warranted enforcement discretion per the Interim Enforcement Policy Regarding Enforcement Discretion for Certain Fire Protection Issues, and Section 11.05(b) of Inspection Manual Chapter 0305 "Operating Reactor Assessment Program.".
cc: (See page 2)  
You are not required to respond to this letter. In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter, its enclosure, and your response, if any, will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of NRC's document system (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Website at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).


Sincerely,/RA/
_________________________ SUNSI REVIEW COMPLETE FORM 665 ATTACHED OFFICE RII:DRS RII:DRS SIGNATURE NAME BRAXTON KING DATE 7/1/2013 7/10/2013 7/ /2013 7/ /2013 7/ /2013 7/ /2013 7/ /2013 E-MAIL COPY? YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO cc: Charles J. Morris III
Michael F. King, Chief Engineering Branch 2


Division of Reactor Safety Docket Nos.: 50-369 & 370 License Nos.: NPF-9, NPF-17
Plant Manager Mc Guire Nuclear Station Duke Energy Corporation Electronic Mail Distribution  
 
===Enclosure:===
Inspection Report 05000369/2013007 and 05000370/2013007
 
===w/Attachment:===
Supplemental Information
 
cc: (See page 3)
 
_________________________ X G SUNSI REVIEW COMPLETE G FORM 665 ATTACHED OFFICE RII:DRS RII:DRS RII:DRS RII:DRS RII:DRP SIGNATURE /RA/ /RA/ /RA/ /RA/ /RA/
NAME JONES BRAXTON DYMEK MONTGOMERYBARTLEY DATE 3/21/2013 3/20/2013 3/21/2013 3/20/2013 3/22/2013 E-MAIL COPY? YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO cc: Charles J. Morris III
 
Plant Manager McGuire Nuclear Station Duke Energy Corporation Electronic Mail Distribution  


Jeffrey J. Nolin  
Jeffrey J. Nolin  
Line 110: Line 92:
Commerce & Natural Resources Electronic Mail Distribution  
Commerce & Natural Resources Electronic Mail Distribution  


Letter to Steven from Michael F. King dated March 27, 2013.
Letter to Steven from Michael King dated July 10, 2013
 
SUBJECT: MCGUIRE NUCLEAR STATION - NRC TRIENNIAL FIRE PROTECTION INSPECTION REPORT 05000369/2013007 & 05000370/2013007 AND EXERCISE OF ENFORCEMENT DISCRETION Distribution:
RIDSNRRDIRS PUBLIC RidsNrrPMMcGuire Resource
 
Enclosure U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION II Docket Nos.: 50-369 & 370
 
License Nos.: NPF-9, NPF-17
 
Report Nos.: 05000369/2013007, 05000370/2013007 Licensee: Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC
 
Facility: McGuire Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2 Location: Huntersville, NC 28078 Dates: January 28 - February 1, 2013 (Week 1) February 11 - 15, 2013 (Week 2)
 
Inspectors: D. Jones, Senior Reactor Engineer (Lead Inspector) P. Braxton, Reactor Inspector J. Dymek, Reactor Inspector J. Montgomery, Reactor Inspector
 
Approved by: Michael F. King, Chief Engineering Branch 2 Division of Reactor Safety
 
Enclosure
 
=SUMMARY OF FINDINGS=
IR 05000369/2013007 and 05000370/2013007; 01/28 - 02/01/2013 and 02/11 - 15/2013; McGuire Nuclear Station Units 1 and 2; Fire Protection (Triennial).
 
This report covers an announced two-week period of inspection by a triennial fire protection team composed of four regional inspectors. One Green non-cited violation (NCV) was identified. The significance of most findings is indicated by their color (Green, White, Yellow, Red) using Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 0609, "Significance Determination Process," (SDP) dated 06/02/11. Findings for which the SDP does not apply may be Green or be assigned a severity level after U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) management review. Cross-cutting aspects are determined using IMC 0310, "Components Within The Cross-Cutting Areas," dated 10/28/11. The NRC's program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described in NUREG-1649, "Reactor Oversight Process," Revision 4, dated December 2006.
 
===A. NRC-Identified and Self-Revealing Findings===
 
===Cornerstone: Mitigating Systems===
: '''Green.'''
An NRC identified Green non-cited violation of McGuire's Selected Licensing Commitment 16.9.5, Fire Rated Assemblies was identified for the licensee's inadequate implementation of modifications that resulted in nonfunctional fire doors.
 
The licensee has entered the finding into the corrective action program as PIP M-13-01454, declared the doors as nonfunctional and implemented fire watches for the fire areas of concern.
 
The licensee's inadequate implementation of fire door modifications that resulted in the failure to meet the requirements of Selected Licensee Commitment 16.9.5, Fire Rated Assemblies, was a performance deficiency. The performance deficiency was more than minor because it adversely affected the Mitigating Systems cornerstone attribute of Protection Against External Events. Specifically, the welding modifications performed on nine fire doors adversely affected their capability to provide the required 3-hours of fire resistance. In accordance with NRC IMC 0609 Appendix F, Part 1; "Fire Protection Significance Determination Process Phase 1 Worksheet" the inspectors determined the finding to be of very low safety significance (Green) because the fire doors would still provide a minimum of 20 minutes fire endurance protection  A cross-cutting aspect was not assigned because the performance deficiency does not reflect current licensee performance.  (Section 1R05.02)
 
===B. Licensee Identified Violations===
 
None
 
=REPORT DETAILS=
 
==REACTOR SAFETY==
Cornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, Barrier Integrity
 
{{a|1R05}}
==1R05 Fire Protection==
 
This report presents the results of a triennial fire protection inspection of the McGuire Nuclear Station Units 1 and 2. The inspection was conducted in accordance with NRC Inspection Procedure (IP) 71111.05T, "Fire Protection (Triennial)," issued October 28, 2011. The objective of the inspection was to review a minimum sample of four risk-significant fire areas to verify implementation of the fire protection program (FPP) and to verify site specific implementation of at least one B.5.b mitigating strategy as well as the storage, maintenance, and testing of B.5.b mitigating equipment. The four fire areas (FAs) were selected after reviewing risk information analyzed by a Senior Reactor Analyst from Region II, as well as previous inspection results, plant walk downs of fire areas, relational characteristics of ignition sources to targets, and location of equipment needed to achieve and maintain safe shutdown (SSD) of the reactor. In selecting the B.5.b mitigating strategy sample, the team reviewed licensee submittal letters, safety evaluation reports, licensee commitments, B.5.b implementing procedures, and previous NRC inspection reports. The IP specifies a minimum sample size of three fire areas and one B.5.b implementing strategy for addressing large fires and explosions. This inspection fulfilled the requirements of the procedure. The specific FAs chosen for review were:
1. FA 5, Unit 1 Train A Diesel Generator Room (Elevation 733.0')
 
===2. FA 16-18, Unit 2 Train A Switchgear & Penetration Room (ETB) (Elevation ===
 
750.0') 
 
===3. FA 20, Unit 2 Cable Room (Elevation 750.0') ===
 
===4. FA Turbine Building 1, 7KV Switchgear Room, (Elevation 760.0') ===
 
The team evaluated the licensee's FPP against applicable requirements, including McGuire Unit 1 and 2 Operating License Condition 2.C.4, "Fire Protection"; Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) Part 50, Appendix R, Sections III.G., J., L. and O; 10 CFR 50.48; commitments to Appendix A of Branch Technical Position (BTP)
Auxiliary and Power Conversion Systems Branch (APCSB) 9.5-1; McGuire Units 1 and 2 Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR); related NRC safety evaluation reports (SERs); Technical Specifications and Selected Licensee Commitments (SLC). The review of the B.5.b mitigating strategies was based on the McGuire B.5.b submittal letters, related NRC SERs, licensee commitments, B.5.b implementing procedures, and previous NRC inspection reports. The team evaluated all areas of this inspection, as documented below, against these requirements. Specific licensing bases documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.
 
===.01 Protection of Safe Shutdown Capabilities===
 
====a. Inspection Scope====
For the selected FAs, the inspectors performed physical walk-downs to observe:  (1) the material condition of fire protection systems and equipment; (2) the storage of permanent and transient combustibles; (3) the proximity of fire hazards to cables relied upon for SSD; and (4) the licensee's implementation of procedures and processes for limiting fire hazards, housekeeping practices, and compensatory measures for inoperable or degraded fire protection systems and credited fire barriers. The specific documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.
 
Methodology The team evaluated the potential for fires, the combustible fire load characteristics, and the potential fire severity exposure for the selected FAs. The team reviewed Design Basis Document (DBD) MCS-1465-00-00-0008; the UFSAR applicable SERs; and plant administrative procedures that (1) established and implemented controls and practices to prevent fires and (2) controlled ignition sources and the storage of permanent and transient combustible materials. These evaluations were performed to ensure that the objectives established by the NRC approved FPP were satisfied and to ensure that the licensee had properly characterized in-situ combustible fire loads and limited transient fire hazards in a manner consistent with the plant administrative and FPP procedures.
 
For each of the selected FAs the team reviewed the fire hazards analysis, SSD analyses and supporting drawings and documentation to verify whether the shutdown methodology had properly identified and protected the components necessary to achieve and maintain SSD conditions for equipment in the FAs selected for review.
 
Operational Implementation The inspectors reviewed applicable sections of abnormal and emergency procedures, to verify that the shutdown methodology properly identified the systems and components necessary to achieve and maintain SSD conditions. The inspectors performed a walk-through of abnormal procedure steps to verify implementation and human factors adequacy of the procedures. The inspectors verified that licensee personnel credited for procedure implementation had procedures available, were trained on implementation, and were available in the event a fire occurred. The inspectors also reviewed selected operator actions to verify that the operators could reasonably be expected to perform the specific actions within the time required to maintain plant parameters within specified limits.
 
====b. Findings====
No findings were identified.
 
===.02 Passive Fire Protection===
 
====a. Inspection Scope====
For the selected FAs, the inspectors verified the adequacy of fire barrier walls, ceilings, floors, mechanical and electrical penetration seals, fire doors, and fire dampers. The inspectors walked down accessible portions of the selected FAs to observe material condition of the passive barriers and to identify degradation or nonconformances. The inspectors compared the installed configurations to the approved construction details and supporting fire endurance test data to assure that the respective fire barriers met the
 
requirements of 10CFR50, Appendix R, Se ction III.G and Appendix A to BTP APCSB 9.5-1. In addition, the inspectors reviewed licensing bases documentation to verify that passive fire protection features met license commitments. A sample of completed surveillance and maintenance procedures for selected fire doors, fire dampers, and penetration seals were reviewed to ensure that these passive fire barriers were being properly inspected and maintained. Specific barriers reviewed are listed in the
.
 
====b. Findings====
 
=====Introduction:=====
An NRC identified Green non-cited violation (NCV) of McGuire Nuclear Station Unit 1 and Unit 2 Selected Licensing Commitment 16.9.5, Fire Rated Assemblies, was identified for the licensee's inadequate implementation of modifications that resulted in nonfunctional fire doors.
 
=====Description:=====
The team identified nine fire doors, associated with risk significant areas such as the control room and battery rooms, that had been modified in the 1980's and 90's by the licensee. Seven of the fire doors (705B, 706B, 925B, 925C, 925D, 926, 928)were modified with welded angle brackets to permanently prevent the doors from being opened. The other two fire doors (PD5 and PD6) were modified by welding metal brackets to the doors that supported an "I" beam that was used to provide an additional security barrier. These modifications were performed in 1985 and 1995 under modification packages MG-11709 and MGMM-6884. The doors were procured as three-hour assemblies as required by the licensee's commitment in SER Supplement 2, Part 2, Section IV.3.A, dated March 1, 1979, which states, in part, that "fire doors of proper fire rating have been provided."
 
All nine doors were labeled by Underwriters Laboratory (UL) meaning that the manufacturer received certification of the doors through specified testing. Field modifications beyond the scope of prescriptive allowances by the labeling agency or manufacturer typically result in the decertification of the fire door. Metal plates and brackets found welded to the outer skin of the doors and door frames could create localized thermal stresses under actual fire conditions which would result in warping, twisting or tearing of the doors as they attempt to expand. These failure mechanisms would potentially allow the passage of excessive smoke and heat. The inspectors determined that the licensee's modification packages were inadequate because they (1) lacked a detailed discussion on the effects of welding a fire rated assembly, and (2) did not include an evaluation or concurrence from the manufacturer or UL. Additionally, the team noted that NFPA (National Fire Protection Association) 80, "Fire Doors and Other Opening Protectives" required that when fire doors are no longer used for ingress and egress, that the opening shall be filled with construction equivalent to that of a wall. This requirement was based upon the fact that as long as a door is used for ingress and egress, the storage of combustible materials in close proximity was not possible. Once the door was permanently secured, combustible materials could be placed on either side thus allowing a pathway for fires to communicate between fire zones. For these reasons, the inspectors concluded that the licensee lacked reasonable assurance that the three-hour ratings of the doors were maintained. The licensee entered the finding into the corrective action program as PIP (Problem Identification Report) M-13-01454, declared the doors as nonfunctional and implemented fire watches for the fire areas of concern.
 
=====Analysis:=====
The licensee's inadequate implementation of fire door modifications that resulted in the failure to meet the requirements of Selected Licensee Commitment 16.9.5, Fire Rated Assemblies, was a performance deficiency. The performance
 
deficiency was more than minor because it adversely affected the Mitigating Systems cornerstone attribute of Protection Against External Events and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, the welding modifications performed on nine fire doors adversely affected their capability to provide the required 3-hours of fire resistance. In accordance with NRC IMC 0609 Appendix F, Part 1, "Fire Protection SDP Phase 1 Worksheet," the inspectors determined the finding to be of very low safety significance (Green) because the fire doors would still provide a minimum of 20 minutes fire endurance protection; and the fixed fire ignition sources, and combustible or flammable materials, were positioned such that the degraded fire doors would not have been subject to direct flame impingement.
 
A cross-cutting aspect was not assigned because the performance deficiency does not reflect current licensee performance.
 
=====Enforcement:=====
McGuire Nuclear Station Unit 1 and Unit 2 Operating License Condition 2.C. (4), Fire Protection Program states in part that, Duke Energy shall implement and maintain in effect all provisions of the approved fire protection program as described in the UFSAR for the facility and as approved in the NRC SER (NUREG-0422) and associated supplements. SER Supplement 2, Part 2, Section IV.3.A dated March 1, 1979 stated, in part, that "fire doors of proper fire rating have been provided."  SLC 16.9.5, Fire Rated Assemblies, states, in part, that fire doors in a fire rated assembly shall be operable at all times. For an inoperable fire door, SLC 16.9.5 required, in part, that (1) a continuous fire watch be established; or (2) verify fire detectors on at least one side of the door and establish a fire watch patrol; or (3) complete an evaluation as permitted by NRC RIS (Regulatory Issues Summary) 2005-07 to institute required action(s).
 
Contrary to the above, since 1995, nine fire doors in rated fire assemblies were inoperable and the licensee failed to implement the required actions described above. Specifically, the doors are inoperable because the licensee performed welding modifications that resulted in a lack of reasonable assurance that the fire doors maintained their UL qualification. Because this finding is of very low safety significance and because it was entered into the licensee's corrective action program as PIP M-13-01454, this violation is being treated as an NCV, consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the NRC Enforcement Policy. NCV 05000369 and 05000370/2013007-01, Modifications Result in Nonfunctional Fire Doors.
 
===.03 Active Fire Suppression===
 
====a. Inspection Scope====
For the selected FA's, the inspectors performed in-plant observations to verify the material condition and operational lineup of the fire water intake structure; the electric motor driven fire pumps; the fire protection water supply distribution piping including sprinklers, manual fire hose, and standpipe systems; and installed fire extinguishers.
 
The inspectors reviewed engineering drawings and specifications to verify that the as-built configuration of fire suppression equipment was adequately maintained. Internal standpipe and hose stations, and heat and smoke detection systems were reviewed against specifications, drawings and engineering calculations to verify that the fire detection and suppression methods were appropriate for the types of fire hazards that existed in the FAs. The inspectors also verified that the suppression equipment met applicable NFPA Standard(s). The inspectors reviewed completed surveillance testing and maintenance procedures to verify that the equipment was adequately maintained.
 
The inspectors reviewed fire fighting pre-plans to verify that the strategies were adequate. The inspectors observed the fire brigade staging and dress out areas to assess the condition of fire fighting and smoke control equipment. In addition, the inspectors verified the capabilities of the fire brigade by reviewing staffing, qualification and training records. The "Letters of Agreement" with off-site emergency responders were reviewed to verify the availability of additional resources to combat fires. Fire hose stations and permanently installed fire extinguishers that were inspected are listed in the
 
attachment.
 
====b. Findings====
No findings were identified.
 
===.04 Protection from Damage from Fire Suppression Activities===
 
====a. Inspection Scope====
The inspectors evaluated whether manual water-based fire fighting activities or heat and smoke migration from fires within the selected FAs could adversely affect equipment credited for SSD, inhibit access to alternate shutdown equipment, or adversely affect local operator actions required for SSD. The inspectors reviewed McGuire Nuclear Station evaluations addressing concerns identified in Information Notice 1998-31, "Fire Protection System Design Deficiencies and Common Mode Flooding of Emergency Core Cooling System Rooms at Washington Nuclear Project Unit 2."  Fire Strategies (pre-fire plans); fire brigade training procedures; heating, ventilating and air conditioning (HVAC) drawings; and abnormal procedures for fires were also reviewed to verify that inter-area migration of water or the ventilation of heat and smoke were addressed and would not
 
adversely affect SSD equipment or the performance of operator manual actions.
 
====b. Findings====
No findings were identified.
 
===.05 Alternative Shutdown Capability===
 
====a. Inspection Scope====
Methodology The licensee credited an alternative shutdown capability for a postulated fire in FA 20 (Unit 2 Cable Room). The inspectors reviewed UFSAR Section 9.5.1, the McGuire FPP, and corresponding abnormal procedures to ensure that appropriate controls provided reasonable assurance that alternative shutdown equipment remained operable, available, and accessible when required. In cases where local operator manual actions (OMA) were credited in lieu of cable protection of SSD components, the inspectors performed a walk-through of the procedures to verify that the OMAs were feasible. The inspectors reviewed applicable process and instrumentation diagrams to gain an understanding of credited equipment's flow path and function. The inspectors reviewed applicable licensee calculations to ensure the alternative shutdown methodology properly identified systems and components to achieve and maintain safe-shutdown for the FAs selected for review. Reviews also included verification that alternative shutdown could be accomplished with or without offsite power.
 
The team reviewed procedures, work orders and completed surveillances to verify that the alternative shutdown transfer capability was periodically tested. Additionally, the team reviewed electrical schematics and one line diagrams to ensure that the transfer of safe shutdown control functions to the alternate shutdown facility included sufficient instrumentation to safely shutdown the reactor. This review also included verification that shutdown from outside the MCR could be performed both with and without the availability of offsite power.
 
Operational Implementation The inspectors reviewed procedure AP-24, "Loss of Plant Control Due to Fire or Sabotage", to verify the adequacy of this procedure to mitigate a fire in the Unit 2 Cable Room. The inspectors reviewed selected training materials for licensed and non-licensed operators to verify that training reinforced the shutdown methodology that is utilized in the FPP and abnormal procedures for FA 20. The inspectors also reviewed shift turnover logs and shift manning to verify that personnel required for SSD using alternative shutdown systems and procedures were available onsite, exclusive of those assigned as fire brigade members.
 
The inspectors performed a walk-through of procedure steps with operations personnel to assess the implementation and human factors adequacy of the procedures and shutdown strategy to evaluate the ambient conditions, difficulty and operator familiarization associated with each OMA. The inspectors reviewed the systems and components credited for use during this shutdown method to verify that they would remain free from fire damage. The inspectors reviewed selected operator actions to verify that the operators could reasonably be expected to perform the specific actions within the time required to maintain plant parameters within specified limits.
 
====b. Findings====
No findings were identified.
 
===.06 Circuit Analyses===
 
====a. Inspection Scope====
The team reviewed the licensee's Appendix R design basis documentation, calculations, drawings, wiring diagrams, and applicable McGuire circuit breaker coordination curves for selected safe shutdown components to verify that fire damage to electrical circuits associated with the post-fire safe shutdown capability would not adversely affect achieving safe shutdown.
 
====b. Findings====
No findings were identified.
 
===.07 Communications===
 
====a. Inspection Scope====
The team reviewed the adequacy of the communication system to support plant personnel in the performance of alternative safe shutdown functions and fire brigade duties. The team verified that portable radios and fixed emergency communications systems were available, adequate, and operable for the performance of the designated activities. The team reviewed that the electrical power supplies and cable routing for the
 
wall mounted phone system would allow them to remain functional following a fire in the selected fire areas. Additionally the team verified that a fire would not affect communication equipment such as antennas, repeaters and transmitters.
 
====b. Findings====
No findings were identified.
 
===.08 Emergency Lighting===
 
====a. Inspection Scope====
The inspectors reviewed maintenance and design aspects of the fixed 8-hour battery pack emergency lighting units (ELUs) required by the licensee's approved FPP and 10 CFR 50 Appendix R, Section III.J. The inspectors performed plant walkdowns of the post-fire SSD procedures for the selected FAs to observe the placement and coverage area of the ELUs throughout the selected FAs. The inspectors also evaluated the adequacy of the ELUs to illuminate access and egress pathways, and any equipment requiring local operation and/or instrumentation monitoring for post-fire SSD. The inspectors reviewed preventive maintenance procedures and completed surveillance tests to verify that adequate surveillance testing was in place. Additionally, the inspectors reviewed completed 8-hour discharge test records to verify the adequacy of the licensee's three year battery replacement schedule. The team validated that the emergency lighting system was scoped into the licensee's Maintenance Rule Program.
 
====b. Findings====
No findings were identified.
 
09. Cold Shutdown Repairs
 
====a. Inspection Scope====
The inspectors reviewed the McGuire FPP and abnormal procedures to verify that the licensee identified repairs needed to reach and maintain cold shutdown and had dedicated repair procedures, equipment, and materials to accomplish these repairs after a fire event, assuming no offsite power was available. The inspectors verified that the fire damage repair procedures were current, adequate, and that repair parts and equipment were being stored and maintained onsite. The inspectors viewed the containers where cold shutdown fire damage repair equipment and tools were stored to examine the material condition of the tools and equipment. The inspectors reviewed licensee inventory records to verify that repair parts and equipment were maintained in accordance with the applicable attachments in electrical preventive maintenance procedures. The inspectors reviewed the inventory inspection work order records and compared them to the equipment and tool lists to verify that all required replacement parts and equipment were being accounted for and were available for use.
 
====b. Findings====
No findings were identified.
 
===.10 Compensatory Measures===
 
====a. Inspection Scope====
The team reviewed the administrative controls for out-of-service, degraded and/or inoperable fire protection features (e.g. detection and suppression systems and passive fire barriers) as well as hot work from cutting, welding and grinding activities. The inspectors also reviewed the operator compensatory actions log (dated January 29, 2013) and the fire protection system impairment log (dated February 13, 2013) to identify and verify the adequacy of FPP interim compensatory measures. The team observed performance of a fire protection roving fire watch activity in the Unit 2 Cable Spreading Room (FA 20) and Unit 2 Train A Switchgear Room & Penetration Room (FA 16-18) and compared hourly watch sign-in sheets against badge access transaction reports for credited access doors used for egress through the fire areas. Fire watch personnel were interviewed for familiarity with job requirements.
 
====b. Findings====
No findings were identified.
 
===.11 Review and Documentation of Fire Protection Program Changes===
 
====a. Inspection scope====
The inspectors reviewed six modifications associated with the FPP to verify that changes were in accordance with the fire protection license condition and had no adverse affect on the ability to achieve SSD.
 
====b. Findings====
No findings were identified
 
===.12 Control of Combustibles and Ignition Sources===
 
====a. Inspection Scope====
The inspectors conducted walkdowns of numerous plant areas that were important to reactor safety, including the selected FAs, to verify the licensee's implementation of fire protection requirements as described in procedures NSD 313, Control of Transient Fire Loads; NSD 314, Hot Work Authorization and Portable Heater Control; and NSD 316, Fire Protection Impairment and Surveillance. The inspectors verified that the licensee had properly evaluated transient fire hazards, controlled hot-work activities, and maintained general housekeeping consistent with administrative control procedures and the fire hazards analysis. For the selected FAs, the inspectors evaluated the potential for fires and explosions, and potential fire severity. There were no hot work activities ongoing during the inspection so direct observations of hot work related activities could not be performed.
 
====b. Findings====
No findings were identified.
 
===.13 B.5.b Inspection Activities===
 
====a. Inspection Scope====
The team reviewed procedures to verify the adequacy of procedural guidance for the manual depressurization of the steam generators and use of portable pump strategy.
 
The team performed walkdowns to verify the feasibility of implementing the guidance provided in the procedures; and to verify that the apparatus required by the procedure, to include communication equipment, was adequately staged. The team reviewed records to verify that personnel were appropriately trained; and to verify that appropriate preventive maintenance was performed on a recurring bases. The team reviewed a calculation to verify that the minimum required flow for the strategy was achievable.
 
====b. Findings====
No findings were identified.
 
==OTHER ACTIVITIES==
{{a|4OA2}}
==4OA2 Identification and Resolution of Problems==
 
====a. Inspection Scope====
The inspectors reviewed recent independent audits and evaluations to verify that the licensee was performing appropriate assessments of the FPP. In addition, a sample of fire protection nonconformances were reviewed to verify that deficiencies were identified, entered into, and resolved by the licensee's corrective action program. The problem identification reports (PIP) were reviewed with regard to the adequacy of the evaluation, appropriateness of the proposed corrective actions, and the timeliness of implementing the corrective actions.
 
====b. Findings====
No findings were identified.
 
{{a|4OA3}}
==4OA3 Follow-Up of Events and Notices of Enforcement Discretion==
 
===.01 (Closed) Licensee Event Repor===
 
t (LER) 05000369/2012-001-00: Appendix R Non-Compliance Could Have Potentially Affected Cold Shutdown (EA-13-050)
 
====a. Inspection Scope====
On May 17, 2012, the licensee submitted an LER documenting the identification of circuits that, if impacted by fire, could result in damage of the steam generator (SG)power operated relief valve (PORV) block valves. This potential cable damage could also result in valve damage. This inadequacy could prevent operators from achieving and maintaining cold shutdown (CSD) of the plant in the case of a postulated fire. The inspectors performed a detailed review of the information related to the LER. The
 
inspectors reviewed documents, performed walk-downs, and discussed the LER with plant personnel to gain an understanding of the operation of SG PORV block valves during a postulated fire event. The inspectors assessed the licensee's compensatory measures and corrective actions to determine if they were adequate.
 
The following finding was identified by the licensee and is a violation of NRC requirements. This finding has been screened and determined to warrant enforcement discretion per the Interim Enforcement Policy Regarding Enforcement Discretion for Certain Fire Protection Issues (10 CFR 50.48).
 
====b. Findings====
 
=====Introduction:=====
A licensee-identified non-compliance with the Units 1 & 2 McGuire Operating License Conditions 2.C.(4), "Fire Protection Program," was identified for the failure to provide fire protection features capable of limiting fire damage such that systems necessary to achieve and maintain cold shutdown could be repaired within 72 hours. Specifically, the licensee discovered that a postulated fire could cause damage to SG PORV block valves, and the valves would be unable to be repaired within 72 hours.
 
=====Description:=====
During circuit analysis review in support of the NFPA 805 transition, the licensee discovered that a fire in the Units 1 & 2 Train A Switchgear and Penetration Rooms (FAs 15-17 and 16-18) could cause hot shorts that would result in the spurious operation of the block valves for the SG PORVs. In addition to causing spurious valve operation, these shorts could potentially bypass the valves' limit/torque switches. These switches provide the valves' signal to stop, bypassing these switches would possibly result in motor burnout, gear box damage, and internal valve damage. This failure mechanism is discussed in NRC Information Notice (IN) 92-18, "Potential for Loss of Remote Shutdown Capability During a Control Room Fire."
 
To achieve and maintain hot standby after a fire event, the SG PORVs or block valves are required to remain closed to prevent an uncontrolled cooldown of the reactor coolant system (RCS). The inspectors determined that the SG PORVs would be available and able to perform their hot standby function for a fire in FAs 15-17 and 16-18.
 
For cold shutdown, operators modulate the SG PORVs to accomplish a controlled plant cooldown. This evolution requires the block valves to be open. The hot shorts described above could result in the inability to, remotely or locally, open the valves. Because these valves are unisolable, they would not be repaired in a timely manner to support requirements for achieving cold shutdown conditions during fire events.
 
The licensee determined that these conditions were caused by a latent Appendix R design deficiency in the electrical circuits for the Unit 1 and Unit 2 SG PORV block valves. Upon discovery, the licensee implemented compensatory measures, in the form of roving fire watches for the affected areas.
 
=====Analysis:=====
Failure to provide features that are capable of limiting fire damage such that systems necessary to achieve and maintain cold shutdown within 72 hours, in accordance with the NRC approved FPP, was a performance deficiency. This finding is more than minor because it is associated with the reactor safety mitigating system cornerstone attribute of protection against external events (i.e., fire), and affects the cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Using the guidance of IMC 0609, Appendix F, "Fire Protection Significance Determination Process" the inspectors determined that this finding was in the cold shutdown category. The inspectors concluded that the finding was of very low safety significance (Green) because the noncompliance only affected the ability to reach and maintain cold shutdown conditions.
 
Because this issue relates to fire protection, and this non-compliance was identified during the licensee's transition to NFPA 805, this issue is being dispositioned in accordance with Section 9.1, "Enforcement Discretion for Certain Fire Protection Issues (10 CFR 50.48)" of the NRC Enforcement Policy. The inspectors determined that a cross-cutting aspect was not applicable to this non-compliance and that it met the criteria for enforcement discretion in accordance with Section 9.1 of the NRC Enforcement
 
Policy.
 
=====Enforcement:=====
McGuire Operating License condition 2.C.(4) for Units 1 & 2, state, in part, that Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC shall implement and maintain in effect all provisions of the approved fire protection program as approved in the NRC SER (NUREG - 0422) Supplement 5, dated April 1981. SER Supplement 5 stated, in part, that, in a letter dated January 9, 1981, the licensee committed to meet the requirements of 10 CFR 50, Appendix R, Section III.G. 10 CFR 50, Appendix R, Section III.G.1 stated, in part, that fire protection features shall be provided for structures, systems, and components important to safe shutdown. These features shall be capable of limiting fire damage so that systems necessary to achieve and maintain cold shutdown from either the control room or emergency control station(s) can be repaired within 72 hours.
 
Contrary to the above, from initial plant operation through March 22, 2012, the licensee failed to implement all provisions of the McG uire approved FPP in that features were not provided that were capable of limiting fire damage such that systems necessary to achieve and maintain cold shutdown could be repaired within 72 hours. Specifically, the licensee discovered that since initial plant operation, for fires in FA 16-18 and 15-17, circuits for the SG PORV block valves were not adequately protected, and as a result, postulated spurious actuation of the valves could cause valve damage. These valves would be unable to be repaired within 72 hours. The licensee entered this finding into the corrective action program (CR 12-02194) and the licensee has taken appropriate compensatory measures.
 
Because the licensee committed to adopt NFPA 805 and change their fire protection licensing bases to comply with 10 CFR 50.48(c), the NRC is exercising enforcement and reactor oversight process (ROP) discretion for this issue in accordance with the NRC Enforcement Policy, Section 9.1, "Enforcement Discretion for Certain Fire Protection Issues (10 CFR 50.48)" and Inspection Manual Chapter 0305. Specifically, this issue was identified and will be addressed during the licensee's transition to NFPA 805, was entered into the licensee's corrective action program, immediate corrective action and compensatory measures were taken, was not likely to have been previously identified by routine licensee efforts, was not willful, and it was not associated with a finding of high safety significance (i.e., Red). (EA-13-050)
 
{{a|4OA5}}
==4OA5 Other Activities==
 
===.01 (Closed) Unresolved Item (URI) 2003-07-04: Requirements Relative to the Number of Spurious Operations that Must be Postulated===
 
====a. Inspection Scope====
The 2003 Triennial Fire Protection Inspection documented an URI associated with the licensee's procedural guidance associated with mitigating a postulated main control room fire (FA 24) that adversely affected a single pressurizer PORV and the associated pressurizer PORV block valve.
 
Additionally, during the 2006 Triennial Fire Protection Inspection the URI was updated to include concerns with a postulated fire in the motor driven auxiliary feedwater (MDAFW) pump room (FA 2). The issue was associated with the spurious closure of the auxiliary feedwater (AFW) air-operated control valves (1CA36AB and 1CA64AB) during a postulated fire event that would isolate the flow path to the D and A steam generators (SG). The team performed an in-office and on-site review of NRC inspection reports (05000369 & 370/2003007 and 05000369 & 3702006/008), applicable regulatory requirements, fire protection licensing documents, design bases documents, drawings, operating procedures, and NFPA- 805 transit ion documentation. Additionally, the NRC regional inspectors interviewed numerous licensee personnel to determine if a more than minor performance deficiency existed for the URI.
 
====b. Findings====
No findings were identified.
 
URI 2003-07 is closed based on the following discussions:
 
In 2003, the NRC opened URI 2003-007-04 that documented an issue for a postulated fire in the main control room (FA 24) that could result in the spurious opening of a single pressurizer PORV (2NC34A) and its' associated isolation valve (2NC33A). The spurious opening of both valves would result in a breach of the RCS pressure boundary with the possibility of pressurizer level going outside of the indicating range. For this fire scenario, procedures directed operators to close the pressurizer PORV isolation valve within 10 minutes. The NRC's concern was that the licensee's procedures provided no follow-up actions, such as de-energizing the PORV isolation valve, to ensure that it would not spuriously reopen. The 2013 inspection team determined that, for a control room fire, procedure AP-45, "Plant Fire" provided appropriate instructions to isolate all of the PORVs by closing the associated block valves within 10 minutes. Procedure AP 45 directed the performance of procedure AP-24, "Loss of Plant Control Due to Fire or Sabotage" which directed electrical realignments that closed all of the pressurizer PORVs, and aligned control to the Standby Shutdown Facility. The team determined that the proceduralized actions were consistent with the licensee's fire protection
 
requirements and commitments. Additionally, the team noted that the licensee's proceduralized actions were consistent with current regulatory guidance. Specifically, Regulatory Guide 1.189, Fire Protection for Nuclear Power Plants, Section 5.4.1, which states, in part, "The licensee should consider one spurious actuation or signal to occur before control of the plant is achieved through the alternative or dedicated shutdown system for fires in areas that require alternative or dedicated shutdown."
 
In 2006, the triennial fire protection inspection team updated URI 2003-007-04 by documenting an issue for a postulated fire in the Unit 1 motor driven auxiliary feedwater pump room (FA 2). The report discussed multiple fire-induced cable short circuits that
 
could adversely affect AFW air-operated valves (1CA-36AB or 1CA-64AB). The inspectors' concern was that two simultaneous proper polarity direct current short circuits could cause either valve to close, thus isolating AFW flow from the turbine driven AFW pump to either the D or A SG. The 2013 inspection team determined that fire damage to the cables would cause a loss of power to the associated solenoid valves.
 
This loss of power would result in valves 1CA-36AB or 1CA-64AB failing to an open position which is the required position. Therefore, a fire-induced short on the affected cables will not adversely impact SSD.
 
{{a|4OA6}}
==4OA6 Meetings, Including Exit==
 
On February 15, 2012, the inspection team leader presented the preliminary inspection results to Mr. S. Capps and other members of the licensee's staff. The licensee acknowledged the results. The inspectors verified that no proprietary information was retained by the inspectors or documented in this report.
 
=SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION=
 
==KEY POINTS OF CONTACT==
 
===Licensee personnel===
: [[contact::J. Bryant]], Regulatory Affairs Lead
: [[contact::G. Carpenter]], Fire Protection Engineer
: [[contact::D. Houser]], Emergency lighting Engineer
: [[contact::J. Lukowski]], Appendix R/NFPA 805 Engineer
: [[contact::S. Manning]], B.5.b Supervisor
: [[contact::D. Miller]], Fire Suppression Engineer
: [[contact::N. Sayles]], Communications
: [[contact::P. Thompson]], Operations
: [[contact::B. Weaver]], PRA Engineer
 
===NRC personnel===
: [[contact::M. King]], Chief, Engineering Branch 2, Division of Reactor Safety, Region II
: [[contact::J. Zeiler]], Senior Resident Inspector, McGuire Nuclear Station
 
==LIST OF ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED==
 
===Opened and Closed===
: 05000369&370/2013007-01 NCV Modifications Result in Nonfunctional Fire
Doors (Section 1R05.02)   
===Closed===
: [[Closes LER::05000369/LER-2012-001]]-00 LER Appendix R Non-Compliance Could Have Potentially Affected Cold Shutdown
: Modifications Result in Nonfunctional Fire
: Doors (Section 4OA3.01)   
: 05000370/2003-07-04 URI Requirements Relative to the Number of Spurious Operations that Must be Postulated
(Section 4OA5.01)


===Discussed===
SUBJECT: ERRATA LETTER FOR MCGUIRE NUCLEAR STATION- NRC TRIENNIAL FIRE PROTECTION INSPECTION REPORT 05000369/2013007 AND


None 
05000370/2013007 Distribution
: C. Evans, RII EICS L. Douglas, RII EICS RIDSNRRDIRS


==LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED==
PUBLIC RidsNrrPMMcGuire Resource
LIST OF FIRE BARRIER FEATURES INSPECTED (Refer Report Section 1R05.02 and 1R05.03)
: Fire Damper Identification
: Description
: 1-733-42.2-5
: FA 9-11 to
: Fire Door Identification
: Description
: 701C
: FA 9-11 to Stairwell 705B (Welded)
: FA 13 to Battery Room
: 716B (Welded)
: FA 13 to Battery Room
: 801B
: FA 20 to Stairwell
: 801J
: FA 20 to
: FA 19 804
: FA 16-18 to
: FA 16-18 925B (Welded)
: FA 24 to Stairwell
: 25C (Welded)
: FA 24 to Stairwell
: 25D (Welded)
: FA 24 to
: FA 25
: 26 (Welded)
: FA 22 to
: FA 24 928 (Welded)
: FA 23 to
: FA 24 PD5 (Welded)
: FA 22 to MG Set Room
: PD6 (Welded)
: FA 23 to MG Set Room
: 1XCDDFRA (Roll-Up)
: FA 5 to FA 6
: Fire Barrier Penetration Seal Identification
: Description
: 1-733-410.2
: FA 9-11 to 2A 1-750-158.0-2
: FA 16-18 to
: FA 10-12
: 2-750-131.0-1
: FA 20 to
: FA 13
: 1-736-5.1-9
: FA 5 to
: FA 15-17
: 1-736-5.2-2
: FA 5 to
: FA 15-17 1-736-8.1-1
: FA 5 to FA 6
: Wall, Ceiling, Floor Identifications
: Description Unit 1 Diesel Generator Rooms 1A & 1B
: FA 5
: 1ETB/733 Electrical Penetration Room
: FA 9-11
: 2ETA/750 Electrical Penetration Room
: FA 16-18 Service Building Cable Spreading Room
: FA 20 Unit 1 Turbine Building Switchgear Room
: FA U1 TB
: Fire Extinguishers Inspected
: Description
: 9069
: FA 5 9071
: FA 5 9072
: FA 5
: 9075
: FA 5
: 9412
: FA 9-11
: 9414
: FA 9-11
: 9415
: FA 9-11 9826
: FA 9-11 9440
: FA 16-18
: 9441
: FA 16-18
: 9842
: FA 16-18 
: Attachment 9843
: FA 16-18 9845
: FA 16-18
: 9438
: FA 20 9439
: FA 20
: Fire Hose Stations Inspected
: Description
: 1RF 891
: FA 5
: 1RF 892
: FA 5
: 1RF 893
: FA 5 1RF 894
: FA 5 1RF 889
: FA 9-11
: 1RF 890
: FA 9-11
: 1RF 895
: FA 9-11
: 1RF 967
: FA 16-18 1RF 968
: FA 16-18 1RF 969
: FA 16-18
: 1RF 970
: FA 16-18
: 1RF 971
: FA 20
: 1RF 972
: FA 20
: LIST OF COMPONENTS REVIEWED (Refer to Report Sections 1RO5.05- and 1RO5-.06)
: Components Sampled
: 2NV VA0842AC, Standby Makeup Pump Suction Isolation 2NV VA0849AC, Standby Makeup Pump Containment Outside Isolation
: 2CA PU0002, Auxiliary Feedwater Pump 2B
: 2ETB Switchgear
: 2EVDD 125Vdc 1CA-42B, Feed to SG
: LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED
: Audits and Self Assessment Reports
: 10-22, Audit- McGuire Triennial Fire Protection Program 10-13, Audit McGuire Triennial Fire Protection Program
: 2-013, Audit - McGuire Fire Protection
: NRC Triennial 2013 Assessment
: 2011 MNS Fire Brigade Health Report Cable Wiring Diagrams Cable Block Diagram for 2CA PU0002 Cable Block Diagram for 2NV VA0842AC
: Cable Block Diagram for 2NV VA0849AC
: Cable Block Diagram for Radio Equipment Cable Block Diagram for 2CA VA0064AB Cable Block Diagram for 2CA VA0036AB
: Cable Block Diagram for 1CA VA0064AB
: Cable Block Diagram for 1CA VA0036AB
: Cable Block Diagram for 1CA
: VA 0162C Cable Block Diagram for 2CA
: VA 0162C Cable Block Diagram for 1CA
: VA 0161C
: Cable Block Diagram for 2CA VA 0161C
: CALCULATIONS
: MCC-1205.06-00-0046, Rim Pull Requirements for Time Critical Valves, Rev. 4
: MCC-1223.20-00-0016, B.5.b Portable Pump Requirements, Rev. 3
: MCC 1381.05-00-0335, Appendix R Coordination Study, Rev 1
: MCC-1435.00.00-0059, NFPA 805-App R Safe Shutdown Deterministic Analysis, Rev. 2
: MCC-1435.00-00-0022, Fire Prot. Manual Action Feasibility and Reliability Demonstration,
: Rev. 0
: MCC-1435.00-00-0023, NFPA 805 Transition Expert Panel Report for Addressing Potential
: McGuire Multiple Spurious Operations, Rev. 1
: MCC 1435.00-00-0027, NFPA Transition Licensing Action Review
: MCC-1435.00-00-0059-00, NFPA 805 Appendix R Safe Shutdown Deterministic Analysis
: MCC-1435.03-00-0013, Fire Protection Code Deviations, 8/29/2012
: MCC-1435.00-00-0026,
: NFPA-805 Transition Existing Engineering Equivalency Evaluations, 11/23/2010
: MCC-1435.00-00-0027, NFPA 805 Transition Licensing Action Review, 8/31/2010
: MCC-1435.00-00-0031, NFPA 12A Code Conformance Review, Turbine Drive Auxiliary Feed Pump Room, 5/25/2010
: MCC-1435.00-00-0033, NFPA 20 Code Conformance Review, 5/25/2010
: MCS-1435.00-00-0003, Design Specification for Mechanical and Electrical Penetration Fire Flood and Pressure Seals, Rev.6
: MCC-1535.00-00-0115, Risk Evaluation of McGuire Fire Issues
: MCC-1535.00-00-0160, Fire PRA Evaluation of Steam Generator PORV Block Cables in Fire
: Areas 16-18 and 15-17, Rev. 0
: MCS-1184.00-1 Specification for McGuire 1-2 Rolling Doors, 6/29/1972
: MCS-1465.00-00-0008, Design Basis Specification for Fire Protection, Rev. 13
: MCS-1465.00-00.0008, Design Basis Specification for Fire Protection, Rev. 14
: MCS-1465.00-00-0022, Design Basis Specification for the Appendix R Safe Shutdown Analysis,
: Rev. 13 
: Attachment
: MCS-1465.00-00-0022, Design Basis Specification for the Appendix R Safe Shutdown Analysis,
: Rev. 14
: EDM-101, Engineering Calculations/Analyses, Rev. 17
: EDM-601, Engineering Change Manual, Rev. 19
: Completed Procedures/ Surveillances/ Work Orders
: WO 01784420-01, PM 1ECPPARX1, Perform Inspection Unit 1 RX PA System, dated 10/18/08
: WO 01956849-01, PM 1ECPPARX1, Perform Inspection Unit 1 RX PA System, dated 9/28/11
: WO 01909654-01, PM 1ECPPAUnit 1, Perform Inspection Unit 1 PA System, dated 12/1/10
: WO 01813353-01, PM 1ECPPAUnit 1, Perform Inspection Unit 1 PA System, dated 2/25/09
: WO 01840421-01, PM 2ECPPARX2, Perform Inspection Unit 2 RX PA System, dated 10/11/09
: WO 01924533-01, PM 2ECPPARX2, Perform Inspection Unit 2 RX PA System, dated 10/30/12
: WO 01909654-01, PM 2ECPPAUnit 2, Perform Inspection Unit 2 PA System, dated 2/2/11
: WO 01909654-01, PM 2ECPPAUnit 2, Perform Inspection Unit 2 PA System, dated 7/1/09
: WO 01080119, Fire Hose and Fire Hydrant Inspection, February 08, 2013
: WO 02051614, Roll-up Fire Door Test, January 28, 2013
: WO 02076651, Test Fire Zone 37H and 50H, January 28, 2013
: WO 02076651, Test Fire Zone 70H, January 29, 2013
: WO 01960534-02, SSS Emergency lighting Battery Discharge Test, dated 6/30/11
: WO 02052333-01, PT 2ELDLPXXX1: Test Emergency Lighting Unit 2, dated 1/22/13
: WO 01981680-01, PT 2ELDLPXXX1: Test Emergency Lighting Unit 2, dated 10/17/11
: WO 01882848-01, PT 2ELDLPXXX1: Test Emergency Lighting Unit 2, dated 1/20/10
: WO 01760001-25, MD100745 Addition of Emergency Lighting (Batts 35-48) dated 3/3/08
: WO 01859190-01, PT 1ELDLPXXX1: Emergency Lighting Unit 1 & SSF, dated 8/27/09
: WO 02032676-01, PM 2CF-151 Lube Stem, dated 10/12/12
: WO 02032677-01, PM 2CF-153 Lube Stem, dated 10/8/12
: WO 02016208-01, SG Tempering Flow Check Valve Testing, dated 9/15/12
: PT/0/A/4200/002, Standby Shutdown Facility Operability Test, dated 12/13/12
: PT/0/A/4200/002, Standby Shutdown Facility Operability Test, dated 1/12/13 PT/1/A/4200/041, Unit 1 SSF System Integrated Test, dated 4/11/07 PT/2/A/4200/041, Unit 2 SSF System Integrated Test, dated 8/25/06
: PT/1/A/4200/041, Unit 1 SSF System Integrated Test, dated 6/22/98
: PT/0/A/4400/010 A, Main Fire Pump A, 4/16/2012
: PT/0/A/4600/112, Exterior/Interior Fire Equipment Inspection, 1/04/2013 PT/0/A/4400/022, Godwin Portable Pump Quarterly, dated 12/14/12 PT/0/A/4600/112, Exterior/Interior Fire Equipment Inspection, dated 1/07/13
: Design Basis Documents
: MCS-1223.SS-00-001, Design Basis Specification for the Standby Shutdown System, Rev. 29
: MCS-0115.00-EPC-0001, Design Basis Spec. for the 4.16KV Essential Auxiliary Power, Rev. 13
: MCS-1465.00-00-0022, Design Basis Spec. for Appendix R Safe Shutdown Analysis, Rev. 13
: MCS-1465.00-00-008, Design Basis Specification for Fire Protection, Rev. 14
: DRAWINGS
: MCCD-1702-02.00, One Line Diagram 4160V Essential Auxiliary Power System, Rev. 13
: MCCE-215-00.24, Elementary Diagram 4160 V Switchgear 2ETB Unit #6, Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Motor #2B - Part 1, Rev. 13
: MCCE-215-00.24-01, Elementary Diagram 4160 V Switchgear 2ETB Unit #6 , Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Motor #2B - Part 3, Rev. 7
: Attachment
: MCCE-215-00.24-03, Elementary Diagram 4160 V Switchgear 2ETB Unit #6 , Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Motor #2B - Part 4, Rev. 1
: MCCE-215-00.24-02, Elementary Diagram 4160 V Switchgear 2ETB Unit #6 , Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Motor #2B - Part 2, Rev. 5
: MCEE-212-00.29-01, Elementary Diagram Standby Shutdown Facility Transfer Scheme, Rev. 5
: MC-1315-01.04-100, Diesel Generator Building Unit 1- Fire, Flood, & HVAC Boundaries General Arrangement, Elevation 736+6, Rev. 7
: MC-1315-01.04-101, Diesel Generator Building Unit 1- Fire, Flood, & HVAC Boundaries General Arrangement, Elevation 736+6, Rev. 0
: MC-1203-02.0A, Diesel Generator Building Unit 1- General Arrangement Floor Plan, Elevation
: 764+8, Rev. 29
: MC-1204-4-A, Auxiliary Building Unit 1 & 2 Gen. Arrangement, Floor Elevation 750+0, Rev. 23
: MC-1204-5-A, Auxiliary Building Unit 1 & 2 General Arrangement, Switchgear Room Plans, Floor Elevation 750+0 , Rev. 22
: MC-1315-01.05-005, Auxiliary Building - Fire, Flood, & HVAC Boundaries General Arrangement, Switchgear Room Plans, Elevation 750+0, Rev. 2
: MC-1315-01.05-105, Auxiliary Building Unit 2- Fire, Flood, & HVAC Boundaries General Arrangement, Elevation 750+0, Rev. 1
: MCEE-0147-32.00, Elementary Diagram Auxiliary Feedwater System (CA), DC Motor Operated Valve 1CA0161C, Rev. 4
: MC-1831-01.01, Communications Plant Telephone & Intercom System, Rev. 0
: MC-1831-02.01, Communications Telephone & PA Systems Telephone Directory, Rev. 0
: MC-1908-07.00, Electrical Equipment Layout Auxiliary Building Mounting Details, Rev. 8
: MC-1888-01.00, Auxiliary Building Unit 1 Station Grounding Plan, Elevation 767 +0, Rev. 55
: MC-1831-11.00, Communications PA & Telephone Systems Roof Plan, Rev. 15
: MC-1831-07.00, Communications- PA & Telephone Systems Auxiliary Building Elevation 733+0, Reactor Building Elevation 738+ 3, Turbine Building Elevation 739+0, Rev. 34
: MC-1831-01.00, Comm. Plant Telephone & Intercom Systems Details & Sections, Rev. 13
: MC-1831-09.00, Communications PA & telephone Systems
: Auxiliary Building Elevation 733+0 & 767 + 0, Reactor Building Elevation 767+0, Turbine Building Elevation 760+6, Rev. 63
: MC-1705-02.00, One Line Diagram 125VDC-240/120VAC Auxiliary Control Power, Rev. 141
: MCFD-1554-01.00, Flow Diagram of Chemical and Volume Control System (NV), Rev. 9
: MCFD-1554-01.01, Flow Diagram of Chemical and Volume Control System (NV), Rev. 10
: MCFD-1554-01.02, Flow Diagram of Chemical and Volume Control System (NV), Rev. 12
: MCFD-1554-01.03, Flow Diagram of Chemical and Volume Control System (NV), Rev. 3
: MCFD-1554-02.00, Flow Diagram of Chemical and Volume Control System (NV), Rev. 17
: MCFD-1554-02.01, Flow Diagram of Chemical and Volume Control System (NV), Rev. 6
: MCFD-1554-03.00, Flow Diagram of Chemical and Volume Control System (NV), Rev. 16
: MCFD-1554-03.01, Flow Diagram of Chemical and Volume Control System (NV), Rev. 23
: MCFD-1554-04.00, Flow Diagram of Chemical and Volume Control System (NV), Rev. 9
: MCFD-1554-05.00, Flow Diagram of Chemical and Volume Control System (NV), Rev. 20
: MCFD-1574-01.00, Flow Diagram of Nuclear Service Water System (RN), Rev. 20
: MCFD-1574-01.01, Flow Diagram of Nuclear Service Water System (RN), Rev. 27
: MCFD-1574-02.00, Flow Diagram of Nuclear Service Water System (RN), Rev. 29
: MCFD-1574-02.01, Flow Diagram of Nuclear Service Water System (RN), Rev. 10
: MCFD-1574-03.00, Flow Diagram of Nuclear Service Water System (RN), Rev. 32
: MCFD-1574-03.01, Flow Diagram of Nuclear Service Water System (RN), Rev. 10
: MCFD-1574-04.00, Flow Diagram of Nuclear Service Water System (RN), Rev. 17
: MCFD-1574-05.00, Flow Diagram of Nuclear Service Water System (RN), Rev. 4
: MCFD-1592-01.00, Flow Diagram of Auxiliary Feedwater System (CA), Rev. 7
: MCFD-1592-01.01, Flow Diagram of Auxiliary Feedwater System (CA), Rev. 24
: MCFD-1592-01.02, Flow Diagram of Auxiliary Feedwater System (CA), Rev. 8
: Attachment
: MCFD-1592-02.00, Flow Diagram of Auxiliary Feedwater System (CA), Rev. 5
: MCFD-1593-01.00, Flow Diagram of Main Steam System (SV), Main Steam Vent to
: Atmosphere (SM), Rev. 19
: MCFD-1593-01.01, Flow Diagram of Main Steam System (SV), Main Steam Vent to
: Atmosphere (SM), Rev. 18
: MCFD-1593-01.03, Flow Diagram of Main Steam System (SV), Main Steam Vent to
: Atmosphere (SM), Rev. 17
: MCFD-2554-01.00, Flow Diagram of Chemical and Volume Control System (NV), Rev. 10
: MCFD-2554-01.01, Flow Diagram of Chemical and Volume Control System (NV), Rev. 10
: MCFD-2554-01.02, Flow Diagram of Chemical and Volume Control System (NV), Rev. 11
: MCFD-2554-01.03, Flow Diagram of Chemical and Volume Control System (NV), Rev. 3
: MCFD-2554-02.00, Flow Diagram of Chemical and Volume Control System (NV), Rev. 19
: MCFD-2554-02.01, Flow Diagram of Chemical and Volume Control System (NV), Rev. 6
: MCFD-2554-03.00, Flow Diagram of Chemical and Volume Control System (NV), Rev. 17
: MCFD-2554-03.01, Flow Diagram of Chemical and Volume Control System (NV), Rev. 25
: MCFD-2554-04.00, Flow Diagram of Chemical and Volume Control System (NV), Rev. 6
: MCFD-2554-05.00, Flow Diagram of Chemical and Volume Control System (NV), Rev. 11
: MCFD-2574-01.01, Flow Diagram of Nuclear Service Water System (RN), Rev. 30
: MCFD-2574-02.00, Flow Diagram of Nuclear Service Water System (RN), Rev. 26
: MCFD-2574-02.01, Flow Diagram of Nuclear Service Water System (RN), Rev. 10
: MCFD-2574-03.00, Flow Diagram of Nuclear Service Water System (RN), Rev. 17
: MCFD-2574-03.01, Flow Diagram of Nuclear Service Water System (RN), Rev. 9
: MCFD-2574-04.00, Flow Diagram of Nuclear Service Water System (RN), Rev. 27
: MCFD-2574-05.00, Flow Diagram of Nuclear Service Water System (RN), Rev. 5
: MCFD-2592-01.00, Flow Diagram of Auxiliary Feedwater System (CA), Rev. 10
: MCFD-2592-01.01, Flow Diagram of Auxiliary Feedwater System (CA), Rev. 22
: MCFD-2592-02.00, Flow Diagram of Auxiliary Feedwater System (CA), Rev. 4
: MCFD-2593-01.00, Flow Diagram of Main Steam System (SV), Main Steam Vent to
: Atmosphere (SM), Rev. 18
: MCFD-2593-01.01, Flow Diagram of Main Steam System (SV), Main Steam Vent to
: Atmosphere (SM), Rev. 21
: MCFD-2593-01.03, Flow Diagram of Main Steam System (SV), Main Steam Vent to
: Atmosphere (SM), Rev. 17
: MCCD-1703-06.10, One Line Diagram 600 VAC E
ssential Motor Control Center 1EMXH1,
: Rev. 3
: MCCD-2700-00.00, Unit 2 Configuration One Line Diagram Unit Essential Power System,
: Rev. 5
: MC-1705-01.00, One Line Diagram 125 VDC/120 VAC
: Vital Instrument & Control Pwr. Sys.,
: Rev. 100
: MCCD-1700-00.00, One Line Diagram, Unit One Configuration Essential Power System,
: Rev. 5
: MCEE-0147-11.00, Elementary Diagram Aux. Feedwater System AFWP "1B" Isolation Valve
: 1CA0042B, Rev. 2
: MCEE-270-05.16, Elementary Diagram Main Steam Vent to Atmosphere System (SV) MS 2D
: Atmos Dump Pwr Oper Relief Isol Vlv. 2SV25, Rev. 1
: MCEE-270-05.15, Elementary Diagram Main Steam Vent to Atmosphere System (SV) MS 2C
: Atmos Dump Pwr Oper Relief Isol Vlv. 2SV26, Rev. 1
: MCEE-270-05.13, Elementary Diagram Main Steam Vent to Atmosphere System (SV) MS 2A
: Atmos Dump Pwr Oper Relief Isol Vlv. 2SV27, Rev. 1
: MCEE-270-05.14, Elementary Diagram Main Steam Vent to Atmosphere System (SV) MS 2B
: Atmos Dump Pwr Oper Relief Isol Vlv. 2SV28, Rev. 2
: MCID-1499-CA.08, Instrument Detail T.D. Aux. FWP Disch. To Steam Gen. Valve Control, Rev. 2
: Attachment
: MC-1384-07.14-01, Fire Plan Auxiliary Building Elevation 733.0' and 736.0', Rev.13
: MC-1384-07.14-02, Fire Plan Auxiliary Building Elevation 733.0' and 736.0', Rev.14
: MC-1384-07.15-01, Fire Plan Auxiliary Building Elevation 750.0', Rev.14
: MC-1384-07.15-02, Fire Plan Auxiliary Building Elevation 750.0', Rev.13
: MC-1418-06.43-01, Piping Layout System RF Plan Elevation 750.0', Rev.10
: MC-1762-01.00-03, Location Diagram Fire Detector System Elevation 733' and 739', Rev. 15
: MC-1762-01.00-03, Location Diagram Fire Detector System Elevation 750' Rev. 15
: MCFD-1599-01.00, Flow Diagram of the Fire Protection System, Rev. 17
: MCFD-1599-01.01, Flow Diagram of the Fire Protection System, Rev. 17
: MCFD-1599-02.00, Flow Diagram of the Fire Protection System, Rev. 23
: MCFD-1599-02.01, Flow Diagram of the Fire Protection System, Rev. 11
: MCFD-1599-02.02, Flow Diagram of the Fire Protection System, Rev. 11
: MCFD-1599-02.03, Flow Diagram of the Fire Protection System, Rev. 7
: MCFD-1599-03.00, Flow Diagram of the Fire Protection System, Rev. 11
: MCFD-1599-03.01, Flow Diagram of the Fire Protection System, Rev. 6
: MCFD-1599-04.00, Flow Diagram of the Fire Protection System, Rev. 3
: MCFD-1599-05.00, Flow Diagram of the Fire Protection System, Rev. 1
: MCFD-2599-04.00, Flow Diagram of the Fire Protection System, Rev. 2
: MCFD-1591-01.00, Flow Diagram of Feedwater System, Rev. 4
: MCFD-1591-01.01, Flow Diagram of Feedwater System, Rev. 22
: Engineering Changes (EC)
: 104730, OWST Project Piping/Pumps/Valves & Controls Replacement, 8/26/2011
: 103857, Install Anti-Hammer Circuit for Valve 1NV842AC, 4/10/2012
: 103930, Change Activator on 2NV-142B, 10/10/2012 98743, Disable Auto-Open Function 1CA161C, 10/12/2011
: 103255, Fire Alarm Control Panel Installation, 2/22/2012
: 95850, Edwards System Technology Fire Detection Installation, 9/21/2011
: 103857, Install an Anti-Hammer Circuit for Valve 1NV 842AC
: 98743,
: MD-101869 - DISABL Auto Open Function 1CA-161C / 1CA-162C Mod
: 103930, Change Actuator on 2NV-142B from NA2 to NA1E
: 104730, OWTS Project Piping/Pumps/Valves and Controls Replacement Fire Protection Pre-Plans and Fire Drill Critiques
: PT/0/B/4600/121, Fire Drill, 1ETA SWGR Air Handling Room, "C" shift, 1/29/2011 PT/0/B/4600/121, Fire Drill, 1ETA SWGR Air Handling Room, "D" shift, 2/10/2011 PT/0/B/4600/121, Fire Drill, 1ETA SWGR Air Handling Room, "A" shift, 2/15/2011 PT/0/B/4600/121, Fire Drill, 1ETA SWGR Air Handling Room, "B" shift, 4/11/2011
: PT/0/B/4600/121, Fire Drill, 1ETA SWGR Air Handling Room, "E" shift, 8/17/2011
: PT/0/B/4600/121, Fire Drill, 2CSR, "B" shift, 7/28/2012
: PT/0/B/4600/121, Fire Drill, 2CSR, "C" shift, 8/12/2012 PT/0/B/4600/121, Fire Drill, 2CSR, "A" shift, 8/31/2012 PT/0/B/4600/121, Fire Drill, 2CSR, "D" shift, 11/07/2012
: PT/0/B/4600/121, Fire Drill, 2CSR, "E" shift, 12/26/2012
: MFDS-005.006, Unit 1 DG Rooms, Rev. 0
: MFDS-009.011, 1ETB / 733 Elec. Pen. Room, Rev. 0
: MFDS-016.018, 2ETA / 750 Elec. Pen. Room, Rev. 0
: MFDS-019.020, Unit 2 750 Aux. Cable Room 801C, Rev. 0
: McGuire Nuclear Station Fire Strategy, Aux. Diesel Generator 1A, Rev. 0
: McGuire Nuclear Station Fire Strategy, Unit 1 733' Electrical Penetration Room, Rev. 0
: McGuire Nuclear Station Fire Strategy, Unit 2 750' Electrical Penetration Room, Rev. 0
: Attachment McGuire Nuclear Station Fire Strategy, Unit 2 Aux Cable Room 801C, Rev.1 
===Procedures===
: AP/2/A/5500/07, Loss of Electrical Power, Enclosure 30, Rev. 30 AP/2/A/5500/07, Loss of Electrical Power, Enclosure 30-Shifting 2ETB Power from Alternate (SATB) to Normal (2ATD), Rev. 30 AP/1/A/5500/07, Loss of Electrical Power, Rev. 31
: AP/1/A/5500/11, Pressurizer Pressure Anomalies, Rev. 11
: AP/2/A/5500/11, Pressurizer Pressure Anomalies, Rev. 12
: AP/1/A/5500/24, Loss of Plant Control Due to Fire or Sabotage, Rev.24 AP/1/A/5500/24, Loss of Plant Control Due to Fire or Sabotage, Rev.29 AP/2/A/5500/24, Loss of Plant Control Due to Fire or Sabotage, Rev. 30 AP/0/A/5500/45, Plant Fire, Rev. 5 AP/0/A/5500/45, Plant Fire, Rev. 13 AP/0/A/5500/45, Plant Fire, Rev. 14
: IP/0/A/3090/023, Fire Damage Control, Rev. 4E OP/O/A/6350/001, Normal Power Checklist, Rev. 54 OP/2/A/6350/005, AC Electrical Operation other Than Normal Lineup, Rev. 36
: OP/0/A/6350/008, Operation of Station Breakers, Rev. 67 OP/0/A/6100/020, Operational Guidelines Following a Fire in Auxiliary Building or Vital Area,
: Rev. 27 OP/0/A/6100/21, Shutdown Outside the Control room following a Fire, Rev. 19 PT/0/B/4350/022, Periodic Inspection of Plant PA System, Rev. 7
: PT/1/A/4200/041, Unit 2 SSF System Integration Test, Rev. 4
: PT/2/A/4200/041, Unit 2 SSF System Integration Test, Rev. 4
: RP/0/A/5700/025, Fire Brigade Response, Rev. 19 RP/0/B/4600/121, Fire Drill, Rev. 05
: EDM-101, Engineering Calculations/Analysis, Rev.17
: EDM-601, Engineering Change Manual, Rev.19
: MP/0/A/7650/122, Inspection of Fire Hose Stations and Hydrant Houses, Rev.10
: NGD-FB-05, Initial Fire Brigade Training: Fire Hose, Nozzles, Appliances and Streams, 7/3/06
: NSD 112, Fire Brigade Organization, Training and Responsibilities, 9/11/12
: NSD 301, Nuclear Station Modifications, 9/30/97
: NSD 313, Control of Transient Fire Loads for McGuire, 12/31/12
: NSD 314, Hot Work Authorization and Portable Heater Control for McGuire, 12/31/12
: NSD 316, Fire Protection Impairment and Surveillance for McGuire, 12/31/12
: NDS 320, Fire Protection Program Change Review Form, 11/15/2011 OP/1/A/6400/002A, Fire Protection System, Rev. 139 OP/0/A/6400/002B, Halon Fire Protection System, Rev. 17
: OP/0/A/6400/002C, Fire Detection System, Rev. 60
: OP/0/A/4600/016B, Halon Fire Detectors Monthly Test, Rev. 20
: OP-MC-JPM-SSRFY:019, Manually Initiate Diesel Generator Halon, Rev.13/01-09-02
: PT/0/A/4250/004, Fire Barrier Inspection, Rev. 33 PT/0/A/4600/032D, Fire Detection System Operational Tests for Aux. Bldg 733 and 750, Rev.3 PT/0/A/4600/112, Exterior/Interior Fire Equipment Inspection, Rev. 8
: PT/0/A/4700/043, SLC Fire Hose Station Valve Operability Test, Rev.5
: PT/0/A/4700/049, SLC Fire Hose Inspection, Rev.4
: PT/0/B/4600/118, Fire Brigade Qualification Verification, Rev.3
: PT/1/A/4400/001N, Halon 1301 System Periodic Test, Rev. 38 PT/0/A/4400/017, Fire Pump A & B Operability Test, Rev. 21
: PT/0/A/4400/017, Fire Pump C Operability Test, Rev.17
: Attachment
: PT/0/4600/127, B.5.b Equipment Inventory, Rev. 0 Evaluations by Station Management in the TSC, Volume 2, Book 2 of 3, Rev. 1 
===Miscellaneous Documents===
: AR3010, Organization Chart and Access Report, 1/29/2013 Aurora Pump Factory Acceptance Test for Pump D36271A, 6/26/1973
: Aurora Pump Factory Acceptance Test for Pump D36271B, 6/26/1973
: Aurora Pump Factory Acceptance Test for Pump D36271C, 6/26/1973
: Badge Access Transaction Report for Roving Fire Watch
: 287547, 2/13/2013 Badge Access Transaction Report for Roving Fire Watch
: 325000, 2/13/2013 ETQS2400.0 Attachment 6.6, Training ILT Class Attendance Sheet, 12/22/2012
: Fire Protection System Impairment Log, 2/13/2013
: Kinnear AKBAR Rolling Fire Door Model
: FH-A Service Manual Letter of Agreement between Duke Energy Company and Cornelius VFD, 4/13/2010
: Letter of Agreement between Duke Energy Company and Huntersville FD, 7/28/2010
: MG-11709, Nuclear Station Modification Safety Evaluation for Fire Door Modification, 5/13/1985
: MGMM-6884, Screening Form for 10CFR50.59 for Fire Door Modification, 4/10/1995
: NRC Triennial Fire Protection Inspection Report 05000369/2009007 and 05000370/2009007, June 25, 2009 NRC Triennial Fire Protection Inspection Report 05000369/2006008 and 05000370/2006008, January 29, 2007
: NRC Triennial Fire Protection Inspection Report 50-369/03-07 and 50-370/03-07, July 03, 2003
: OBED 05-039881, Internal Flooding/Spray Down Event of Safety Related Equipment, 8/11/2005 Penetration Seal Data Sheet for Penetration Seal Number 750-158.0-2, 8/23/1999
: Purchase Order A27426, Duke Power Company and W. Fred Casey & Co for Furnish and Delivery of Rolling Doors, 9/27/1972 Summary Report, Three Hour Qualification of Whittaker Electronics Resources Appendix R and
: SI 2400 Silicone Dioxide Insulated Fire Cable, December 1994 Summary Test Report for Appendix R Fire Test,
: ER 98-033, October 29, 1998
: ST2122, Multiple Assigned Job Status Report, 1/29/2013 Underwriters Laboratory Online Certifications Directory,
: VUFZ.EX1394, 10/31/1996 Underwriters Laboratory Fire Door Certificate C28916, September 11, 1973
: Underwriters Laboratory Standard 10B, Fire Test of Door Assemblies Engineering Support Document, Emergency Communications System, Rev. 1A
: IMP-MC-2012-00946, Fire Hemyc Wrap, Cable not Meeting the 1-Hour Fire Resistance Criteria Impairment and Compensatory Measures Form [Selected Fire Areas], dated 01/13/13 NFPA 12A- 1977, Standard on Halon 1301 Extinguishing Systems NFPA 13-1978, Standard for the Installation of Sprinkler Systems
: NFPA 14-1976 Standard for the Installation of Standpipes and Hose Systems
: NFPA 15-1977, Standard for Water Spray Fixed Systems for Fire Protection
: NFPA 20-1978, Standard for the Installation of Centrifugal Fire Pumps NFPA 24-1977, Standard for the Installation of Private Service Mains and their Appurtenances NFPA 72E-1974, Standard on Automatic Fire Detection
: NFPA 80-1977, Fire Doors and Windows
: NFPA 80-2007, Fire Doors and Other Opening Protectives
: NFPA 80-2013, Fire Doors and Other Opening Protectives Technical Manuals and Vendor Information Data Sheet Motorola Digital Two- Way Portable Radios-Mototrbo
: XPR 6550/XPR 6350, dated
: 1/11 Data Sheet Clear Command Helmet Communication System-dated 3/07 
: Attachment Data Sheet Motorola Digital Two- Way Portable Radios-Mototrbo
: XPR 4550/XPR 4580, dated
: 1/11 
: Data Sheet C & D Technologies Tel Series Valve Regulated Lead Acid Battery, dated 04/12
: Licensing Documents Selected Licensing Commitment, 16.9.7, Standby Shutdown System
: NUREG-0422, Safety Evaluation Report Related to the Operation of McGuire Nuclear Station Units 1 and 2, March 1978
: NUREG-0422, Supplement 2, Safety Evaluation Report Related to the Operation of McGuire Nuclear Station Units 1 and 2, March 1979NUREG-0422, Supplement 3, Safety Evaluation Report Related to the Operation of McGuire Nuclear Station Units 1 and 2, May 1980
: NUREG-0422, Supplement 4, Safety Evaluation Report Related to the Operation of McGuire Nuclear Station Units 1 and 2, January 1981
: NUREG-0422, Supplement 5 with Corrections, Safety Evaluation Report Related to the Operation of McGuire Nuclear Station Units 1 and 2, November 1993
: NUREG-0422, Supplement 6, Safety Evaluation Report Related to the Operation of McGuire Nuclear Station Units 1 and 2, February 1983 Selected Licensee Commitment 16.9.7- Standby Shutdown System Letter dated January 5, 1983 regarding responses to several concerns in the draft Safety Evaluation Report for the McGuire Standby Shutdown System Letter dated September 10, 1984 regarding the Standby Shutdown System at McGuire and Catawba Nuclear Station Letter dated December 14, 1982 regarding the McGuire Standby Shutdown System Letter dated August 2, 1984 regarding Fire Protection for Redundant Safe Shutdown Equipment Letter dated September 12, 1984 regarding meeting at Region II office to discuss the Standby Shutdown Facility for McGuire Units 1 and 2, Catawba Unit 1 and Oconee SSF Letter dated May 15, 1989 regarding Fire Protection Deviations for McGuire Unit 1 and 2
: McGuire Nuclear Station, Unit 1 - Request for Deviation from Fire Protection Program Incorporating Requirements of Appendix R to Part 50 of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations, January 13, 2003 NRC Letter dated April 16, 1984 regarding Issuance of Amendment No. 31
: LIST OF PROBLEM IDENTIFICATION REPORTS (PIP) REVIEWED DURING INSPECTION
: M-09-05990, Documentation of Noncompliances with the Appendix R Program Identified as Part of the Reconstitution Project M-03-02311, Evaluate May 2003 Fire Protection Inspection Items M-06-04539, NRC Response (September 26, 2006) to McGuire Letter of Intent to Adopt 10CFR50, Section 50.48 (c) M-12-01086, Swap of 1EMXH-1 to Alternate (SSF) Power Source, along with Associated SSF Controls, is not Periodically Tested M-09-05990, Documentation of Noncompliances with the Appendix R Program Identified as Part of the Reconstitution Project M-02-01708, It has Been Discovered that Pressurizer Ambient Heat Losses are Greater than Calculated in
: OSC-3144, Impacting SSF ASW System Operability (T.S. 3.10.1) and T.S.
: 3.4.9 (Pressurizer) M-05-04859, CNS PIP M-05-6055 on Appendix R Manual Action Rule NRC Public Meeting
: M-12-01020, Review Noncompliances Identified as a Result of the Appendix R Reconstitution and
: NFPA-805 Transition Work for Reportability M-12-02194, Evaluation Identified an Appendix R Noncompliance which has the Potential to Adversely Affect the Ability to Achieve and Maintain a Cold Shutdown on Unit 2 M-02-03265, Columbia Generating Station Water Spill Event Attachment
: M-06-04727, Fire Nozzle 1RF841 is not Rated for Use on Electrical Fires
: M-10-02460, Manual Halon System Release Located Within Fire Hazard Area M-10-04408, Portable Fire Extinguisher Code Deviations M-10-04416, TDAFW Pump Room Halon System Code Deviations
: M-10-04632, Fire Service Main and Appurtenances Code Deviations
: M-10-07639, Unit 2 CSR Water Based Suppression Adverse Effects
: M-12-01098,
: NDS 313-1, Transient Fire Load Approval Forms are not Retained
: M-12-02351, Duct Fire Detector Test Sampling Methodology to Include DP M-1208218, Concrete Hatch Plugs are a Degraded Fire BarrierM-13-00011, Shift Fire Brigade Member not Recorded in LMS M-12-01086, Swap of 1EMXH-1 to Alternate Power Source
: M-12-04539, Issues Noted During Annual #1 and #2 Hale Pump Testing
: M-13-00880, PIP Evaluate Failed Emergency Lights for Maintenance Rule Functional Failure List of PROBLEM IDENTIFICATION REPORTS (PIP) Generated as a Result of this Inspection
: M-13-00359, Relay House Fire protection Power light was not Illuminated M-13-00909, Penetration Seal 2-750-131.0-1, 0.25" Gap in Cable Spreading Room Floor M-13-00912, Evaluate 1ETB SWGR Room MI Cable (two) with Tape as not Impacting 3 Hour Rating M-13-00950, Task for Radio Battery Swaps was Removed from the Operations WCC Routine Task List M-13-00951, Discrepancy in the Nomenclature used on the Radios used at the Plant
: M-13-00980, Evaluate Maint. Rule Functional Failure Criteria for Emergency Lighting M-13-00925,
: MCC-1223.20-00.0016 Contains the Computer Model Output Data but does not Contain the Computer Model Input Data M-13-01021, Fire Strategy for 1A D/G Requires More Detail for Manual Halon Actuation
: M-13-00124, Incomplete Documentation of Fire Brigade Members for July 4, 2010 Day Shift
: M-13-01154, Electrically Rated Fire Hose Nozzle are Required to be provided at Locations where Electrical Equipment or Cabling is Located M-13-01407, Inspection of Repair Kits Identified Electrical Tape was out of Date
: M-13-00414,
: WO 02032676 was Closed without Performing Functional
: M-13-00415,
: WO 02032678 was Closed without Performing Required Scope as Directed 
: M-13-00416,
: WO 02032679 was Closed without Performing Required Scope as Directed
: M-13-00451, App. R DBD Says Wiring and Cabling used for Repairs must be Pre-fitted with Lugs M-13-01454, Fire Doors Modified Without Proper Evaluations
: M-13-01510, Fire Pre-plan Backlog Observations
: M-13-01511, Fire Evaluation Screening Form Might Need to be Improved
: M-13-01513, Evaluate if MRFF Criteria for Part icular Systems/Components are Adequate to Detect Adverse Trends M-13-01514, App R Related conclusions and Basis is not Contained in a Controlled Document
: Attachment
==LIST OF ACRONYMS==
: [[AND]] [[]]
: [[ABBREV]] [[IATIONS]]
: [[APCSB]] [[Auxiliary and Power Conversion Systems Branch]]
: [[AR]] [[Action Request]]
: [[BTP]] [[Branch Technical Position]]
: [[CAP]] [[Corrective Action Program]]
: [[CFR]] [[Code of Federal Regulations]]
: [[DC]] [[Direct Current]]
: [[DSP]] [[Dedicated Shutdown Procedure]]
: [[ELS]] [[Emergency Lighting System]]
: [[FA]] [[Fire Area]]
: [[FHA]] [[Fire Hazards Analysis]]
: [[FPM]] [[Fire Protection manual]]
: [[FPP]] [[Fire Protection Program]]
: [[FZ]] [[Fire Zone]]
: [[HVAC]] [[Heating, Ventilation, and Air Condition]]
: [[IMC]] [[Inspection Manual Chapter]]
: [[IP]] [[]]
: [[NRC]] [[Inspection Procedure]]
: [[LER]] [[Licensee Event Report]]
: [[NUREG]] [[an explanatory document published by the]]
: [[NRC]] [[]]
: [[NCR]] [[Nuclear Condition Report]]
: [[NCV]] [[Non Cited Violation]]
: [[NFPA]] [[National Fire Protection Association]]
: [[NRC]] [[United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission]]
: [[OMA]] [[Operator Manual Actions P&]]
: [[ID]] [[Piping and Instrumentation Diagrams]]
: [[PIP]] [[Problem Identification Report]]
PORV  Power Operated Relief Valve
Rev  Revision
: [[SCBA]] [[Self-Contained Breathing Apparatus]]
: [[SDP]] [[Significance Determination Process]]
: [[SER]] [[Safety Evaluation Report]]
: [[SLC]] [[Selected Licensee Commitments]]
: [[SSC]] [[Systems, Structures and Components]]
: [[SSD]] [[Safe Shutdown UFSAR  Updated Final Safety Analysis Report]]
}}
}}

Revision as of 21:29, 18 July 2018

IR 05000369-13-007 & 05000370-13-007, 03/27/13, McGuire, Errata Letter Triennial Fire Protection
ML13192A498
Person / Time
Site: Mcguire, McGuire  Duke Energy icon.png
Issue date: 07/10/2013
From: King M F
NRC/RGN-II/DRS/EB2
To: Capps S D
Duke Energy Corp
References
IR-13-007
Download: ML13192A498 (4)
v • d • e


Text

UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION II 245 PEACHTREE CENTER AVENUE NE, SUITE 1200 ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30303-1257 July 10, 2013 Mr. Steven Site Vice President Duke Energy Corporation McGuire Nuclear Station MG01VP/12700 Hagers Ferry Road

Huntersville, NC 28078

SUBJECT: ERRATA LETTER FOR MCGUIRE NUCLEAR STATION- NRC TRIENNIAL FIRE PROTECTION INSPECTION REPORT 05000369/2013007 AND 05000370/2013007

Dear Mr. Capps:

On March 27, 2013, the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) issued the subject inspection report for McGuire Nuclear Station Units 1 and 2 (ML13088A133). In reviewing this report, we identified an administrative error regarding the inspection report distribution date. Specifically, on the cover letter, the distribution date March 27, 2012 should be March 27, 2013. Please make the appropriate pen and ink changes in the subject report to reflect this correction.

We apologize for any inconvenience caused by this error.

In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter, its enclosure, and your response, if any, will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of NRC's document system (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Website at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).

Should you have any questions concerning this letter, please contact me at (404) 997-4511.

Sincerely,/RA/ Michael F. King, Chief Engineering Branch 2 Division of Reactor Safety Docket Nos.: 50-369, 50-370 License Nos.: NPF-9, NPF-17

cc: (See page 2)

_________________________ SUNSI REVIEW COMPLETE FORM 665 ATTACHED OFFICE RII:DRS RII:DRS SIGNATURE NAME BRAXTON KING DATE 7/1/2013 7/10/2013 7/ /2013 7/ /2013 7/ /2013 7/ /2013 7/ /2013 E-MAIL COPY? YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO cc: Charles J. Morris III

Plant Manager Mc Guire Nuclear Station Duke Energy Corporation Electronic Mail Distribution

Jeffrey J. Nolin

Design Engineering Manager McGuire Nuclear Station Duke Energy Corporation Electronic Mail Distribution

H. Duncan Brewer Organizational Effectiveness Manager McGuire Nuclear Station Duke Energy Corporation Electronic Mail Distribution

Kenneth L. Ashe Regulatory Compliance Manager McGuire Nuclear Station Duke Energy Corporation Electronic Mail Distribution

Kay L. Crane Senior Licensing Specialist McGuire Nuclear Station Duke Energy Corporation Electronic Mail Distribution Joseph Michael Frisco, Jr.

Vice President, Nuclear Design Engineering

General Office Duke Energy Corporation Electronic Mail Distribution M. Christopher Nolan

Director - Regulatory Affairs

General Office Duke Energy Corporation Electronic Mail Distribution

David A. Cummings (acting)

Fleet Regulatory Compliance & Licensing

Manager General Office Duke Energy Corporation Electronic Mail Distribution

Alicia Richardson Licensing Administrative Assistant

General Office Duke Energy Corporation Electronic Mail Distribution

Lara S. Nichols Deputy General Counsel Duke Energy Corporation Electronic Mail Distribution

David A. Cummings Associate General Counsel

General Office Duke Energy Corporation Electronic Mail Distribution

Beth J. Horsley Wholesale Customer Relations Duke Energy Corporation Electronic Mail Distribution

David A. Repka Winston Strawn LLP Electronic Mail Distribution Senior Resident Inspector U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

William B. McGuire Nuclear Station 12700 Hagers Ferry Rd Huntersville, NC 28078

County Manager of Mecklenburg County

720 East Fourth Street

Charlotte, NC 28202

W. Lee Cox, III Section Chief

Radiation Protection Section N.C. Department of Environmental

Commerce & Natural Resources Electronic Mail Distribution

Letter to Steven from Michael King dated July 10, 2013

SUBJECT: ERRATA LETTER FOR MCGUIRE NUCLEAR STATION- NRC TRIENNIAL FIRE PROTECTION INSPECTION REPORT 05000369/2013007 AND

05000370/2013007 Distribution

C. Evans, RII EICS L. Douglas, RII EICS RIDSNRRDIRS

PUBLIC RidsNrrPMMcGuire Resource

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