IR 05000285/1986031: Difference between revisions

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{{Adams
{{Adams
| number = ML20212Q951
| number = ML20207T152
| issue date = 01/16/1987
| issue date = 03/18/1987
| title = Insp Rept 50-285/86-31 on 861117-21.Violations Noted: Inadequate Radiological Emergency Response Training
| title = Ack Receipt of Informing NRC of Steps Taken to Correct Violations Noted in Insp Rept 50-285/86-31. Implementation of Corrective Actions Will Be Reviewed During Future Insp to Determine That Full Compliance Achieved
| author name = Terc N, Yandell L
| author name = Gagliardo J
| author affiliation = NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV)
| author affiliation = NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV)
| addressee name =  
| addressee name = Andrews R
| addressee affiliation =  
| addressee affiliation = OMAHA PUBLIC POWER DISTRICT
| docket = 05000285
| docket = 05000285
| license number =  
| license number =  
| contact person =  
| contact person =  
| document report number = 50-285-86-31, NUDOCS 8702020428
| document report number = NUDOCS 8703230256
| package number = ML20212Q939
| title reference date = 02-18-1987
| document type = INSPECTION REPORT, NRC-GENERATED, INSPECTION REPORT, UTILITY, TEXT-INSPECTION & AUDIT & I&E CIRCULARS
| document type = CORRESPONDENCE-LETTERS, NRC TO UTILITY, OUTGOING CORRESPONDENCE
| page count = 6
| page count = 2
}}
}}


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=Text=
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APPENulX B U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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NRC Inspection Report:
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50-285/86-31 License:
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DPR-40 Docket: 50-285 Licensee: Omaha Public Power District 1623 Harney Street Omaha, Nebraska 68102 Facility Name:
Fort Calhoun Station Inspection At:
Fort Calhoun, Nebraska Inspection Conducted: November 17-21, 1986
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l//b!O Inspector:
h N'.'M.~Terc, Emergency Preparedness Analyst Date Emergency Preparedness and Safeguards Programs Section Contractor:
G. W. Bethke, Comex Approved:
) //S!M L. A. Yandell, Chief, Emergency Preparedness Date'
and Safeguards Programs Section Inspection Summary Inspection Conducted November 17-21, 1986 (Report 50-285/86-31)
Areas Inspected: Routine, unannounced inspection of the licensees emergency preparedness program including: changes to the program, knowledge and performance of duties, audits, and public information program.


Results: Within the four areas inspected, one violation was identified (inadequate training of personnel; paragraph 5).
8702020428 870122 ~
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In Reply Refer To:
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MAR 181987
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R. L. Andrews, Division Manager-
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. Gentlemen:
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Thank you for your letter of February 18,, 1987, in response to our letter
.and Notice of Violation dated January 22, 1987. We have reviewed your reply and find it responsive to the concerns raised in our Notice of Violation. We will review the implementation of-your corrective actions during a future U
inspection to determine that full compliance has been achieved and will be maintained.


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Sincerely,
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W. G. Gates, Manager Fort Calhoun Station P. O. Box 399
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Fort Calhoun, Nebraska 68023
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Harry H. Voigt, Esq.


DETAILS 1.
LeBoeuf, Lamb, Leiby & MacRae 1333 New Hampshire Avenue, NW Washington, D. C.


OPPD Personnel Contacted W. Anderson, Shift Supervisor J. Biggs, Shift Chemistry Technician G. Chatfield, Shift Supervisor
20036 Kansas Radiation Control Program Director Nebraska Radiation Control Program Director b c: (see next page)
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Christensen, Health Physicist M. Christensen, Instructor M. Core, Supervisor Maintenance J. Fluehr, Supervisor, Site Training
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*F. Franco, Manager, Radiation Health and Emergency
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*W. Gates, Plant Manager M. Gautier, Manager, Media Relations and Publications G. Hammond, Shift Chemistry Technician
,
*R. Jaworski, Manager, Technical Section
.
*L. Kusek, Supervisor, Operations K. Morris, Division Manager, Quality Assurance and Regulatory Affairs
,_
*D. Munderloh, Senior Engineer D. Pettit, Manager, Public Information
*A. Richard, Manager, Quality Assurance
*G. Roach, Supervisor, Chemistry and Radiation Protection
*S. Sehers, Emergency Plan Coordinator H. Sterba, Division Manager, Corporate Communication
* Denotes those individuals who attended the exit interview.


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License Actions On Previous Inspection Findings (Closed) Deviation (285/8516-04): The NRC inspector determined that Procedure EPIP-OSC-2 was changed and that Attachment 1, " Nuclear Power Plant Incident Initial Report to Offsite Government Agencies," now constitutes the only notification form used during emergencies.
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This new form provides technical information in a manner that is useful to offsite authorities. The licensee's performance during the 1986 exercise and t'he walkthroughs conducted during this inspection demonstrated that the procedure reflected actual notification practices.
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This item is closed.
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(Closed) Violation (285/8519-01): The NRC inspector verified that Procedures EPIP-OSC-2, EPIP-OSC-14, and EPIP-EOF-6 were revised and now provide efficient means for performing initial dose assessment and notifications.
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In addition, the inspector verified by means of walkthroughs that the shift chemists, shift technical advisors, and senior reactor operators had received additional training in this area This item is closed.
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(Closed) Violation (285/8519-02): The NRC inspector noted that, in addition to the improvements described under violation 285/8519-01, the l[... -.. - - -..
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J. E. Gagliardo, Chief Reactor Projects Branch U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region IV 611 Ryan Plaza Drive, Suite 1000 Arlington, TX 76011 Reference:
Docket No. 50-285 Gentlemen:
SUBJECT:
Inspection Report 86-31 The subject inspection report, dated January 22, 1987, identified one (1)
;
violation concerning the training of personnel assigned to the Emergency l
Response Organization.


licensee conducted several drills with various scenarios requiring shift health physics technicians to ascertain habitability conditions in the control room and to make recommendations to the shift supervisor. This item is closed.
Please find attached the Omaha Public Power l
District's response to this violation.


(Closed) Violation (285/8519-03):
.
The NRC inspectcr determined that the Safety Audit and Review Committee (SARC) conducted an internal audit in SARC Audit No. 2-86 from April to May 1986, in which the independent reviewers adequately evaluated and documented interfaces with state and local governments. This item is closed.


(Closed) Deviation (285/8519-04):
Sincerely, G..i b
The NRC inspector determined that retraining is being accomplished within a 12-month cycle.
l R. L. Andrews Division Manager Nuclear Production RLA:bjb c:
LeBoeuf, Lamb, Leiby & MacRae 1333 New Hampshire Avenue, N.W.


In addition, the NRC inspector noted that the site emergency planning staff is in charge of maintaining emergency response training schedules and records, and that a dedi ated microcomputer is being used for this purpose.
Washington, D.C.


This item is closed.
20036 Mr. A. C. Thadani, Project Director Mr. W. A. Paulson, HRC Project Manager Mr. P. H. Harrell, NRC Senior Resident Inspector Mr. R. D. Martin, Regional Administrator f
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Changes to the Emergency Preparedness Program The NRC inspector verified that changes to the-emergency plan and implementing procedures were reviewed by licensee management and were in compliance with 10 CFR 50.54(q).
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ATTACHMENT
In addition, the NRC inspector noted that prccedures had been changed to reflect actual practices (e.g.,
-
notification procedures).
,
 
During an NRC inspection conducted on November 17-21, 1986, a violation of
The NRC inspector reviewed a sample of previous inspection findings to ascertain whether responsibilities for the resolution had been assigned, the items had been followed up, and adequate corrective actions had been taken. The NRC inspector noted that the licensee had taken all actions necessary to adequately correct three violations and one deviation described in NRC Inspection Report 50-285/85-19.
.
 
NRC requirements was identified. The violation involved inadequate train-ing for personnel assigned to the emergency response organization.
No violations or deviations were identified.
 
4.
 
Licensee Audit Program The NRC inspector reviewed Administrative Procedure DAS-EP-1, " Emergency Preparedness Test Program," the SARC Charter, internal audit schedules, audit plans, and SARC independent reviews of emergency preparedness for the year 1986.
 
In addition, interviews were held with the SARC chairman.
 
The N'tC inspector noted that although the audit for the year 1986 was adequate, a more systematic approach could be used to ensure that each objective outlined in the audit plan has a corresponding set of questions in such a manner that each objective can be clearly verified. The licensee agreed that in the next audit of emergency preparedness, a greater effort will be made to ensure that questions address all the objectives of the audit plan in a more systematic manner.


No violations or deviations were identifie e.,
In accordance with the " General Statement of Policy and Procedure for NRC Enforcement Actions," 10 CFR Part 2, Appendix C (1986), the violation is listed below:
Violation
,
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Inadeauate Trainina of Personnel 10 CFR 50.54(q) requires that licensees authorized to operate a nuclear power reactor follow and maintain in effect emergency plans which meet the standards in 10 CFR 50.47(b) and in Appendix E.


5.
10 CFR 50.47(b)(15) requires that radiological emergency response training be provided to those who may be called to assist in an
.
emergency.


Personnel Knowledge and Performance (Training)
10 CFR 50, Appendix E, paragraph IV.F requires, in part, that employ-
The NRC inspector reviewed sections of the Radiological Emergency Response Plan (RERP) for Fort Calhoun Station, the RERP Implementing Procedures, Technical Specifications, the Station Training Manual (STM), the Emergency Plan Training tianual (EPTM), and previous NRC inspection reports.
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ees of the licensee be trained to ensure that they are familiar with
'
their specific emergency response duties.


In addition, the NRC inspector reviewed training records, and conducted interviews and walkthroughs with on-shift emergency response personnel including:
Contrary to the above, the NRC inspector determined during emergency preparedness walkthroughs and training interviews that radiological emergency. response training had not been provided adequately as evi-denced by the following examples:
shift supervisors, reactor operators, shift technical advisors, and chemistry technicians.
1.


Two walkthroughs involving two different shift operating staffs and lasting approximately 2 hours each were conducted in the control room.
One of two shift supervisors failed to notify the NRC that a station blackout was in progress, as required by 10 CFR 50.72(b)
(iii) and by Section E(1.1) of the Radiological Response Emer-gency Plan (RERP) for Fort Calhoun Station.


Additionally, training interviews were held with two chemistry technicians and two site directors to ascertain their proficiency under simulated-
2.
' j emergency conditions.


During these walkthroughs and interviews, the NRC inspector observed the following:
The two shift supervisors and two site direc. tors interviewed failed to demonstrate a basic understanding of the design, oper-ation, capabilities and emergency uses of the post accident sampling system (e.g., ability to perform in situ versus grab sample analysis).
a.


One of two shift supervisors failed to notify the NRC that a simulated station blackout was in progress, as required by 10 CFR 50.72(b)(iii)
3.
and by Section E (1.1) of the Radiological Response Emergency Plan (RERP) for Fort Calhoun Station, which states that the NRC will be notified within 1 hour of the declared emergency per Standing order R-11.
 
b.
 
The two shift supervisors and two site directors interviewed failed to demonstrate a basic understanding of the design, operation, capabilities, and eme.rgency uses of the post accident sampling system (e.g., ability to perform insitu versus grab sample analysis).
 
c.


The two shift supervisors and two site directors interviewed failed to demonstrate a basic understanding of those aspects of meteorology (e.g., difference between stable and unstable conditions) that would have a major impact on the effects of a radioactive release and on their decisions pertaining to protective action recommendations.
The two shift supervisors and two site directors interviewed failed to demonstrate a basic understanding of those aspects of meteorology (e.g., difference between stable and unstable conditions) that would have a major impact on the effects of a radioactive release and on their decisions pertaining to protective action recommendations.


d.
4.


One of two shift supervisors incorrectly understood that the containment atmosphere monitoring system discharged to the auxiliary building.
One of two shift supervisors incorrectly understood that the containment atmosphere monitoring system discharged to the auxiliary buildin, -
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e.
One of two shift supervisors failed to demonstrate an understand-ing of the differences between site area and general emergency classifications and was not aware of the requirement to-make protective action recommendations at a general emergency declaration.


One of two shift supervisors failed to demonstrate an understanding.
6.


of the differences between site area and general emergency classifications and was not aware of the requirement to make protective action recommendations at a general emergency declaration.
One of two shift supervisors failed to relate challenges to fail-
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ure of fission product barriers to emergency classifications.


f.
7.


One of two shift supervisors failed to relate challenges to failure of fission product barriers to emergency classifications.
One of two shift supervisors exhibited a general weakness in the knowledge and performance of his emergency preparedness dui.ies, in that a number of forceful prompts from the shift technical advisor and senior reactor operator were needed in order for him to make classification and notification decisions.


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One of two shift supervisors exhibited a general weakness in the j
knowledge and performance of his emergency preparedness duties, in
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Both chemistry technicians failed to demonstrate a knowledge of the order of severity of the different levels of emergency class-ification (e.g., failed to name them and confused the order of severity).-
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e that a number of forceful prompts from the shift technical advisor I
and senior, reactor operator were needed in order for him to make classification and notification decisions.


h.
One chemistry technician could not find an alternate procedure in OI-PAP-8 to estimate the magnitude and consequences of offsite radioactive releases. The other technician had ~ difficulty in
'
finding the procedure. Neither was able to perform dose pro-jections when given the situation.sf failed process monitors.


Both chemistry technicians failed to demonstrate a knowledge of the i
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order of severity of the different levels of emergency classification (e.g., failed to name them, and confused the order of severity).
This is a Severity Level IV violation.
:


1.
(Supplement VII.D)
,
(285/8631-01).


One chemistry technician could not find an alternate procedure in j
OPPD's Response The Reason for the Violation if Admitted OPPD personnel have been involved in training programs and testing procedures which were developed based on NUREG 0654, 10 CFR 50 and reasonable training requirements. All personnel must pass an appro-priate test for their respective positions prior to approval for an
OI-PAP-8 to estimate the magnitude and consequences of offsite radioactive releases. The other technician had difficulty in finding
,
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the procedure.
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emergency response organization.


Neither was able to perform dose projections when given the situation of failed process monitors.
Employees interviewed by the NRC had I
received this training. The NRC interviews have disclosed a weakness in the retention of the subject materials as taught and tested, and
'
the individuals ability to retain and recall this information.


(This is contrary to the intent of Section E (3.0) of the 'lERP which states in part that personnel resources allow for continuing monitoring and assessment of
OPPD intends to improve emergency preparedness training by administering
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abnormal radioloaical conditions.)
'
more difficult tests and conducting more difficult drills to prevent repetition of this violation.


j These examples of inadequate training are an apparent violation against l
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10 CFR 50.54(q), which requires that licensees follow and maintain in i
The Corrective Steps Which Have Been Taken and the Results Achieved
effect emergency plans according to certain standards, specifically
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those in 10 CFR 50.47(b)(15) which requires that radiological emergency
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response training be provided to those who may be called to assist an l
emergency and 10 CFR 50, Appendix E, paragraph IV.F which requires that i
training be provided "to ensure that employees of the licensee are familiar i
with their specific emergency rMponse duties...," (285/8631-01).
I The NRC inspector noted that both operating shifts were able to promptly l
classify the events and notify offsite authorities and the NRC. This was
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a noted improvement from previous inspections.
All current shift chemistry / radiation protection technicians have been retrained in emergency classification levels by distribution of a training information hotline on October 8, 1986.


In addition, the NRC
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to use a new dose assessment procedure for making initial calculations j
under nor. mal conditions, that is, when all process radiation monitors are


cperating properly.
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The shift supervisor who performed poorly during the walkthough and
[,
training interviews was removed from his position on the shift.


Using this procedure they were prompt in supporting
The shift supervisors and chemistry technicians presently manning the operation shift at Fort Calhoun Station satisfy the training and per.-
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the operating staff so that they in turn were able to make timely
formance requirements established by OPPD documents.
.
i notifications of offsite authorities.


No other violations and no deviations were found.
The Corrective Steos Which Will be Taken to Avoid Further Violations The shift supervisor who performed poorly during the walkthrough and training interviews will be retrained in the " Licensing Operator Train-ing" program prior to being allowed to resume' shift supervisor duties.
 
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6.


Public Notification Program i
The shift supervisors and site directors interviewed will be given supplemental training concerning the subjects of post accident sam-pling system and meteorology, and all shift supervisors and site directors will receive additional training to these topics during their annual requalification training.
The NRC inspector reviewed the publication issued by the licensee to I
describe emergency planning information to the public within the Emergency Flanning Zone (EPZ). The inspector noted that this publication had the
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form of a yearly brochure, contained the information required, and that it i
was distributed annually. The inspector verified that the materials were i
being reviewed annually. The brochure contained methods and times i
required for public notifications, a list of local broadcast stations that will be used for dissemination of information during an emergency, and protective actions planned if an emergency occurred.


I
During the 1987 annual training cycle for shift supervisors and site directors, the following training items identified by the NRC in-
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spector as weak will be reviewed with the proper emergency actions stressed:
1.


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NRC notification 2.
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The NRC inspector also noted that the description of the effects of-radiation used in the brochure was scanty and very general in nature.
Post accident sampling system capabilities 3.


The licensee agreed that in the future they would review and make necessary revisions to this portion of the brochure.
Basic meteorological knowledge 4.


The NRC inspector vdrified that the licensee used other means of information dissemination aimed at the transient population. These consisted of distributing the same brochures to hotels, restaurants, and the like. In addition, the NRC inspector verified that points of contact were provided by the licensee for the public to acquire a,dditional information.
Containment atmosphere monitoring 5.


No violations or deviations were identified.
Protective Action recommendations for Site Area and General Emergency classifications 6.


7.
Emergency classification related to loss of fission product barriers 7.


Exit Interview The exit interview was conducted on November 21, 1986, with licensee representatives.
Basic emergency preparedness duties During the 1987 annual training cycle for shift chemistry / radiation protection technicians, the basis for the four emergency classifica-tions will be stressed.


The senior NRC resident inspector, Mr. Phillip H. Harrell was in attendance.
For an improved alternate method to estimate the magnitude and effects of offsite radioactive releases when monitor indication is not available, Operating Instruction 01-PAP-8, Post Acci-dent Procedures, is currently under revision. Shift C/RP technicians are scheduled for training on this procedure after its approval by the Plan Review Committee and prior to formal issuance. Training for items 1,2,3,4 and 6 are being accomplished by the Training Department; items 5,7,8 and 9 are provided in the annual training cycle of the Emergency Planning Group.


Mr. Nemen M. Terc, Emergency Preparedness Specialist, summarized the findings and observations. The NRC inspector identi#ied one violation (paragraph 5 of this report) and ~ closed five open items from previous inspections.
The Date When Full Comoliance will be Achieved Based upon the above review and training programs, OPPD believes these personnel have sufficient ability to perform their emergency duties and OPPD is now in compliance with 10CFR50 requirements. ~However, the improved procedures and annual training described above will be accom-plished by the end of the annual training cycle on December 31, 1987.


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Revision as of 19:07, 6 December 2024

Ack Receipt of Informing NRC of Steps Taken to Correct Violations Noted in Insp Rept 50-285/86-31. Implementation of Corrective Actions Will Be Reviewed During Future Insp to Determine That Full Compliance Achieved
ML20207T152
Person / Time
Site: Fort Calhoun Omaha Public Power District icon.png
Issue date: 03/18/1987
From: Gagliardo J
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV)
To: Andrews R
OMAHA PUBLIC POWER DISTRICT
References
NUDOCS 8703230256
Download: ML20207T152 (2)


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In Reply Refer To:

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i Docket:

50-285/86-31'

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MAR 181987

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-Omaha Public Power District?

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R. L. Andrews, Division Manager-

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Nuclear Production 1623 Harney Street

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. Gentlemen:

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Thank you for your letter of February 18,, 1987, in response to our letter

.and Notice of Violation dated January 22, 1987. We have reviewed your reply and find it responsive to the concerns raised in our Notice of Violation. We will review the implementation of-your corrective actions during a future U

inspection to determine that full compliance has been achieved and will be maintained.

Sincerely,

%fnal s,a.,e y

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A E. nAu.~

f J. E. Gagliardo, Chief c

Reactor' Projects Branch s

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W. G. Gates, Manager Fort Calhoun Station P. O. Box 399

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Fort Calhoun, Nebraska 68023

.

Harry H. Voigt, Esq.

LeBoeuf, Lamb, Leiby & MacRae 1333 New Hampshire Avenue, NW Washington, D. C.

20036 Kansas Radiation Control Program Director Nebraska Radiation Control Program Director b c: (see next page)

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J. E. Gagliardo, Chief Reactor Projects Branch U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region IV 611 Ryan Plaza Drive, Suite 1000 Arlington, TX 76011 Reference:

Docket No. 50-285 Gentlemen:

SUBJECT:

Inspection Report 86-31 The subject inspection report, dated January 22, 1987, identified one (1)

violation concerning the training of personnel assigned to the Emergency l

Response Organization.

Please find attached the Omaha Public Power l

District's response to this violation.

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Sincerely, G..i b

l R. L. Andrews Division Manager Nuclear Production RLA:bjb c:

LeBoeuf, Lamb, Leiby & MacRae 1333 New Hampshire Avenue, N.W.

Washington, D.C.

20036 Mr. A. C. Thadani, Project Director Mr. W. A. Paulson, HRC Project Manager Mr. P. H. Harrell, NRC Senior Resident Inspector Mr. R. D. Martin, Regional Administrator f

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ATTACHMENT

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During an NRC inspection conducted on November 17-21, 1986, a violation of

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NRC requirements was identified. The violation involved inadequate train-ing for personnel assigned to the emergency response organization.

In accordance with the " General Statement of Policy and Procedure for NRC Enforcement Actions," 10 CFR Part 2, Appendix C (1986), the violation is listed below:

Violation

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Inadeauate Trainina of Personnel 10 CFR 50.54(q) requires that licensees authorized to operate a nuclear power reactor follow and maintain in effect emergency plans which meet the standards in 10 CFR 50.47(b) and in Appendix E.

10 CFR 50.47(b)(15) requires that radiological emergency response training be provided to those who may be called to assist in an

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emergency.

10 CFR 50, Appendix E, paragraph IV.F requires, in part, that employ-

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ees of the licensee be trained to ensure that they are familiar with

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their specific emergency response duties.

Contrary to the above, the NRC inspector determined during emergency preparedness walkthroughs and training interviews that radiological emergency. response training had not been provided adequately as evi-denced by the following examples:

1.

One of two shift supervisors failed to notify the NRC that a station blackout was in progress, as required by 10 CFR 50.72(b)

(iii) and by Section E(1.1) of the Radiological Response Emer-gency Plan (RERP) for Fort Calhoun Station.

2.

The two shift supervisors and two site direc. tors interviewed failed to demonstrate a basic understanding of the design, oper-ation, capabilities and emergency uses of the post accident sampling system (e.g., ability to perform in situ versus grab sample analysis).

3.

The two shift supervisors and two site directors interviewed failed to demonstrate a basic understanding of those aspects of meteorology (e.g., difference between stable and unstable conditions) that would have a major impact on the effects of a radioactive release and on their decisions pertaining to protective action recommendations.

4.

One of two shift supervisors incorrectly understood that the containment atmosphere monitoring system discharged to the auxiliary buildin, -

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5.

One of two shift supervisors failed to demonstrate an understand-ing of the differences between site area and general emergency classifications and was not aware of the requirement to-make protective action recommendations at a general emergency declaration.

6.

One of two shift supervisors failed to relate challenges to fail-

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ure of fission product barriers to emergency classifications.

7.

One of two shift supervisors exhibited a general weakness in the knowledge and performance of his emergency preparedness dui.ies, in that a number of forceful prompts from the shift technical advisor and senior reactor operator were needed in order for him to make classification and notification decisions.

8.

Both chemistry technicians failed to demonstrate a knowledge of the order of severity of the different levels of emergency class-ification (e.g., failed to name them and confused the order of severity).-

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9.

One chemistry technician could not find an alternate procedure in OI-PAP-8 to estimate the magnitude and consequences of offsite radioactive releases. The other technician had ~ difficulty in

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finding the procedure. Neither was able to perform dose pro-jections when given the situation.sf failed process monitors.

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This is a Severity Level IV violation.

(Supplement VII.D)

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(285/8631-01).

OPPD's Response The Reason for the Violation if Admitted OPPD personnel have been involved in training programs and testing procedures which were developed based on NUREG 0654, 10 CFR 50 and reasonable training requirements. All personnel must pass an appro-priate test for their respective positions prior to approval for an

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emergency response organization.

Employees interviewed by the NRC had I

received this training. The NRC interviews have disclosed a weakness in the retention of the subject materials as taught and tested, and

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the individuals ability to retain and recall this information.

OPPD intends to improve emergency preparedness training by administering

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more difficult tests and conducting more difficult drills to prevent repetition of this violation.

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The Corrective Steps Which Have Been Taken and the Results Achieved

All current shift chemistry / radiation protection technicians have been retrained in emergency classification levels by distribution of a training information hotline on October 8, 1986.

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The shift supervisor who performed poorly during the walkthough and

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training interviews was removed from his position on the shift.

The shift supervisors and chemistry technicians presently manning the operation shift at Fort Calhoun Station satisfy the training and per.-

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formance requirements established by OPPD documents.

The Corrective Steos Which Will be Taken to Avoid Further Violations The shift supervisor who performed poorly during the walkthrough and training interviews will be retrained in the " Licensing Operator Train-ing" program prior to being allowed to resume' shift supervisor duties.

The shift supervisors and site directors interviewed will be given supplemental training concerning the subjects of post accident sam-pling system and meteorology, and all shift supervisors and site directors will receive additional training to these topics during their annual requalification training.

During the 1987 annual training cycle for shift supervisors and site directors, the following training items identified by the NRC in-

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spector as weak will be reviewed with the proper emergency actions stressed:

1.

NRC notification 2.

Post accident sampling system capabilities 3.

Basic meteorological knowledge 4.

Containment atmosphere monitoring 5.

Protective Action recommendations for Site Area and General Emergency classifications 6.

Emergency classification related to loss of fission product barriers 7.

Basic emergency preparedness duties During the 1987 annual training cycle for shift chemistry / radiation protection technicians, the basis for the four emergency classifica-tions will be stressed.

For an improved alternate method to estimate the magnitude and effects of offsite radioactive releases when monitor indication is not available, Operating Instruction 01-PAP-8, Post Acci-dent Procedures, is currently under revision. Shift C/RP technicians are scheduled for training on this procedure after its approval by the Plan Review Committee and prior to formal issuance. Training for items 1,2,3,4 and 6 are being accomplished by the Training Department; items 5,7,8 and 9 are provided in the annual training cycle of the Emergency Planning Group.

The Date When Full Comoliance will be Achieved Based upon the above review and training programs, OPPD believes these personnel have sufficient ability to perform their emergency duties and OPPD is now in compliance with 10CFR50 requirements. ~However, the improved procedures and annual training described above will be accom-plished by the end of the annual training cycle on December 31, 1987.

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