IR 05000313/1986013

Insp Repts 50-313/86-13 & 50-368/86-13 on 860401-30. Violation Noted:Inadequate Maint Procedure for HPSI Pump

ML20198D132
Person / Time
Site:	Arkansas Nuclear
Issue date:	05/15/1986
From:	Craig Harbuck, Hunter D, Johnson W NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV)
To:
Shared Package
ML20198D124	List: ML20198D120 ML20198D126 ML20198D132
References
50-313-86-13, 50-368-86-13, NUDOCS 8605230160
Download: ML20198D132 (9)

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APPENDIX B U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION IV

NRC Inspection Report: 50-313/86-13 Licenses: DPR-51 50-368/86-13 NPF-6 Dockets: 50-313 50-368 Licensee: Arkansas Power & Light Company (AP&L) ,

P. O. Box 551 Little Rock, Arkansas 72203 .

Facility'Name: Arkansas Nuclear One (ANO), Units 1 and 2

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. Inspection At: ANO Site, Russellville, Arkansas Inspection Conducted: April 1-30, 1986

Inspectors: /l// - S///84 _

R. D. J son, Senior' Resident Date Reacto Inspector (pars. 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8)

b W C. C. Harbuck, Resident Reactor 3/C/2b Date Inspector (pars. 3, 4, 5)

Approved: 1 M/S ,W D. R. Hunter, Chief, Project Date

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Section B, Reactor Project Branch 8605230160 860519 PDR ADOCK 05000313 G PDR. . .

_2-Inspection Summary Inspection Conducted April 1-30, 1986 (Report 50-313/86-13)

Areas Inspected: Routine, unannounced inspection including operational safety verification, maintenance, surveillance, followup on IE Bulletins, followup on IE Information Notices, and followup on licensee's response to selected safety issue Results: Within the six areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identifie Inspection Sumary Inspection Conducted April 1-30, 1986 (Report 50-368/86-13)

Areas Inspected: Routine, unannounced inspection including operational safety verification, maintenance, surveillance, followup on IE Bulletins, followup on IE Information Notices, followup on licensee's response to selected safety issues, and followup on Licensee Event Report Results: Within the seven areas inspected, one apparent violation was identified (inadequate maintenance procedure, paragraph 5).

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-3-DETAILS Persons Contacted

• J. Levine, Director of Site Nuclear Operations R. Ashcraf t, Electrical Maintenance Supervisor B. Baker, Operations Manager M. Bolanis, Health Physics Superintendent

• P. Campbell, Licensing Engineer H. Carpenter, I&C Supervisor A. Cox, Operations Technical Support Supervisor

• E. Ewing, General Manager, Technical Support G. Fiser, Radiochemistry Supervisor B. Garrison, Operations Technical Support L. Gulick, Unit 2 Operations Superintendent C. Halbert, Mechanical Engineering Supervisor

• D. Howard, Special Projects Manager H. Hollis, Security Coordinator D. Horton, Quality Assurance Manager

• L. Humphrey, General Manager, Nuclear Quality D. Johnson, Licensing Engineer H. Jones, Field Construction Manager R. Loyd, Operations Technical Support

• D. Lomax, Licensing Supervisor J. McWilliams, Unit 1 Operations Supervisor

• J. Orlicek, Field Engineering Supervisor V. Pettus, Mechanical Maintenance Superintendent

• S. Quenuz, General Manager, Plant Operations

• D. Provencher, Quality Engineering Supervisor P. Rogers, Plant Licensing Engineer

• L. Schempp, Nuclear Quality Control Manager C. Taylor, Operations Technical Support Supervisor B. Terwilliger, Operations Assessment Supervisor R. Tucker, Electrical Maintenance Superintendent D. Wagner, Health Physics Supervisor R. Wewers, Work Control Center Manager G. Wrightam, I&C Supervisor S. Yancy, Mechanical Maintenance Supervisor C. Zimmerman, Operations Technical Support

• Present at exit intervie The inspectors also contacted other plant personnel, including operators,

technicians, and administrative personnel.

I Licensee Event Report (LER) Followup (Unit 2)

Through direct observation, discussions with licensee personnel, and review of records, the following event reports were reviewed to determine L

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-4-that reportability requirements were fulfilled, immediate corrective action was accomplished, and corrective action to prevent recurrence has been accomplished in accordance with Technical Specification Reactor trip - loss of condenser vacuum 85-025-00 Failure to perform control element assembly calculator (CEAC) surveillance test LER 85-023 reported a reactor trip which resulted from loss of vacuum in the main condenser when one circulating water pump was secured and circulating water flow through the main condenser was lost due to the idle circulating water pump's discharge valve failing to close. The NRC inspector reviewed Report of Abnormal Condition (RAC) 2-85288 and Job Orders (J0s) 703621 and 589. These J0s were issued to repair the control valve which failed to close and to stake and lockwire the set screw holding the motor shaft mechanical key on the other circulating water pump discharge valve. We have no further questions of this matter at this tim LER 85-05 reported a failure to perform a surveillance test within the required time. The NRC inspector reviewed RAC 2-85303 and the records of training sessions conducted to ensure that maintenance groups understand the surveillance scheduling system and the meaning of the critical completion date. We have no further questions of this matter at this tim No violations or deviations were identifie . Operational Safety Verification (Units 1 and 2)

The NRC inspectors observed control room operations, reviewed applicable logs, and conducted discussions with control room operators. The inspectors verified the operability of selected emergency systems, reviewed tagout records, verified proper return to service of affected components, and ensured that maintenance requests had been initiated for equipment in need of maintenance. The inspectors made spot checks to verify that the physical security plan was being implemented in accordance with the station security plan. The inspectors verified implementation of radiation protection controls during observation of plant activitie The NRC inspectors toured accessible areas of the units to observe plant equipment conditions, including potential fire hazards, fluid leaks, and excessive vibration. The inspectors also observed plant housekeeping and cleanliness conditions during the tour The NRC inspectors walked down the accessible portions of the Unit 1 reactor building spray system. The walkdown was performed using Procedure 1104.05, " Reactor Building Spray System Operation,"

Attachment ' A', Revision 17, and Drawings M-232,11-236, and M-23 .

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-5-These reviews and observations were conducted to verify that selected facility operations were in conformance with the requirements established under Technical Specifications,10 CFR, and administrative procedure No violations or deviations were identifie . ~ Monthly Surveillance Observation (Units 1 and 2)

The NRC inspector observed that the Technical Specification required surveillance testing on the number one diesel generator for Unit 2, (Procedure 2104.36, Supplement 1) and verified that testing was performed in accordance with adequate procedures, test instrumentation was calibrated, limiting conditions for operation were met, removal and restoration of the affected components were accomplished, test results conformed with Technical Specifications and procedure requirements, test results were reviewed by personnel other than the individual dirceting the test, and any deficiencies identified during the testing were properly reviewed and resolved by appropriate management personne The inspector also witnessed the following test activities:

. Station Battery Pilot Cell tests (procedure 1307.16) (JO 710850).

. Station Battery Pilot Cell tests (procedure 2307.16) (JO 710851).

. Part of sodium hydroxide pump 'B' (2P-136B) monthly test (procedure 2104.05, Supplement 5).

. Post-maintenance test of 2P89C, the 'C' high pressure safety injection pump (procedure 2104.39).

. Part of monthly test of plant protection system, channel 'D'

(procedure 2304.40).

. Part of fire detection instrument operability testing (procedure 1307.12).

No violations or deviations were identifie . Monthly Maintenance Observation (Units 1 and 2)

Station maintenance activities of safety-related systems and components listed below were observed to ascertain that they were conducted in accordance with approved procedures, Regulatory Guides, and industry codes or standards; and in conformance with Technical Specification The following items were considered during this review: the limiting conditions for operation were met while components or systnms were removed from service; approvals were obtained prior to initiating the work; activities were accomplished using approved procedures and were inspected as applicable; functional testing and/or calibrations were performed prior

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6-to returning components or systems to service; quality control records were maintained; activities were accomplished by qualified personnel; parts and materials used were properly certified; radiological controls were implemented; and fire prevention controls were implemente Work requests were reviewed to determine status of outstanding jobs and to

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ensure that priority is assigned to safety-related equipment maintenance

which may affect system performance.

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The following maintenance activities were observed:

4 . Replacement and repair of Unit 1 'B' reactor coolant pump (P328)

underpower relay (JO 711065) (Procedures 1403.159 and 1403.126).

. Replacement of reduction gear assembly for Unit 2 'B' charging pump (2P36B) (JO 709842, Procedure 2402.32).

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. Seal repair for Unit 2 'C' high pressure safety injection (HPSI) pump (2P89C) (JO 710873, Procedure 2402.36).

. Service water pump 2P4C motor preventive maintenance (JO 526487).

Job Order 710873 was issued to replace the stuffing box extension gasket

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to repair a small leak at the 'C' high pressure safety injection pump

outboard flange. The 2402.36, Revision 2, entitled, grocedure used for 2P89 High Pressure Safety Injection Pump this job was Maintenance." The scope of this procedure included complete disassembly, inspection, and reassembly of the pump and its sub-conponents. Since the only work needed at this time was to replace the stuffing box extension gasket on the outboard end of the pump, many of the procedure steps were l not necessary. The procedure allowed for partial performance, with the other sections being marked "N/A" (not applicable) per the instructions of the cognizant supervisor.

) During the observation of this maintenance effort, the NRC inspector noted several discrepancies as outlined below:

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. The copy of the procedure used at the job site did not have the steps which were not to be performed marked "N/A." The lead craftsman appeared to have a good understanding of which steps should be

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performed, but there were occasional delays due to confusion on which steps were to be delete . Prerequisite 6.1 required that baseline vibration data be recorded on a form attached to the procedure. This was not don ,

. The service water cooling lines to the seal and bearing must be removed prior to thrust bearing removal. These lines were not specifically mentioned in a procedural step. There was only a ncte 3 stating, " Disconnect auxiliary piping and wiring as necessary for the particular disassembly to be performed." A step near the end of the

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o-7-procedures stated, " Reconnect auxiliary piping . . . ." The craftsman had to initiate a Plant Engineering Action Request to obtain the desired torque values for the flange bolts involve . The mechanical seal has two eccentric washers which must be rotated into the shaft sleeve groove prior to mechanical seal removal. The procedural steps and the attached figure indicated only one eccentric washe . The procedure provided torque values for pump components during reassembly, but only the final torque value was given. The number of passes desired and the intermediate torque values were not provide The craftsman determined the number of passes and the intermediate torque values based on his training and experienc . The procedure, with certain steps marked "N/A", does not provide a step for reinstallation of the shims (Part number 2578). These shims were apparently installed following step 7.16.2. At this point there was a note stating, "0mit shims (257B) at this time."

Through observation of major portions of this maintenance activity and witnessing of the post-maintenance testing, the NRC inspector concluded that the job was satisfactorily performed, but that the procedure was inadequate. This is an apparent violation. (368/8613-01) Followup on IE Bulletins (Units 1 and 2)

The NRC inspector reviewed the licensee's actions taken in response to two IE Bulletins (IEBs) issued to the licensee for information in 1985. No written response was required for these bulletins, so the review included verification that the IEBs were received by the licensee and were reviewed for applicability by appropriate licensee personne I IEB 85-01, entitled " Steam Binding of Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps," was issued on October 29, 1985. A response was not required since licensee corrective action had been previously performed and this action had been verified by the NRC. We have no further questions regarding this matter at this time, IEB 85-02, entitled "Undervoltage Trip Attachments of Westinghouse DB-50 Type Reactor Trip Breakers," was issued on November 5, 1985. Licensee review of this IEB concluded that it was not applicable at Arkansas Nuclear On We have no further questions regarding this matter at this tim No violations or deviations were identifie . Followup on IE Information Notices (Units 1 and 2)

The NRC inspector reviewed the licensee actions taken in response to IE Information Notices (IENs) issued in 1985. The IENs included in this J

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-8-review included 85-51 through 85-101 and the earlier 1985 IENs for which the licensee had not yet completed its review at the time of the last NRC inspection in this area. The review ircluded verification that the notices were received by the licensee, that they were distributed to appropriate personnel for an applicability r? view, and that appropriate corrective actions were taken or schedule The NRC inspector found that the licensee had received the IENs, and that it has a system for distributing the IENs for review and for assignment and tracking of responsive actions. The NRC inspector reviewed the documented ifcensee reviews and responsive actions for a sampling of the completed IENs and found the reviews to be appropriate in scope and depth and the responsive actions to be comprehensiv The licensee has nct completed a review of the following IENs:

85-21 85-84 85-27 85-85 85-28 85-86 85-32 85-87 85-45 85-91 85-53 85-92 85-59 85-94 85-73 85-96 85-74 85-101 As some of these IENs have licensee assigned due dates for review as far back as June or July of 1985, the NRC inspector concluded that the Itcensee should improve its timeliness of IEN revie No violations or deviations were identifie . Followup on Licensee's Response to Selected Safety Issues (Units 1 and 2)

The NRC inspector reviewed licensee actions taken in response to certain safety issues which were discussed in various NRC and industry notice Biofouling of Cooling Water Systems and Heat Exchangers (Units 1 and 2)

The licensee established Procedures 1311.01 and 2311.02, entitl ed,

" Service Water Flow Test" for Unit 1 and Unit 2, respectively. These procedures are performed each refueling outage, using temporary and permanent instrumentation to measure flow through the safety-related heat exchangers served by service water. The flow values obtained are compared to design values to determine whether biofouling has degraded heat exchanger performance. If heat exchanger performance is found to be degraded, the heat exchanger and its associated equipment is declared inoperable and the Technical Specification Limiting Condition for Operation dictates further actions. The i

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-9-licensee has an action plan for periodic inspections of heat exchangers and other portions of the service water system. During the upcoming refueling outages, several heat exchangers and pipe sections in each unit are scheduled for inspection. Periodic flushes are performed on the fire protection system header Natural Circulation Cooldown (Unit 1)

The NRC inspector discussed this issue with operations personnel and reviewed the following procedures:

. 1202.01 Emergency Operating Procedures

. 1203.13 Natural Circulation Cooldown

. 1104.04 Decay Heat Removal System Operations These procedures included guidance in the following areas:

. Determining reactor coolant inventory when pressurizer level is not indicative of reactor coolant inventor . Corrective actions if an abnormal rise in pressurizer level occurs during depressurizatio . Ensuring reactor coolant inventory by maintaining margin to saturatio . Placing pressurizer level control in manual during periods of anomalous pressurizer level indicatio . Securing letdown upon reactor tri . Maximum natural circulation cooldown rate to avoid formation of a steam void in the reactor vessel head are . Conditions to be met prior to restarting reactor coolant pump The NRC inspector concluded that the licensee had provided an appropriate response to each of these two issue No violations or deviations were identifie . Exit Interview The NRC inspectors met with Mr. J. M. Levine, Director, Site Nuclear Operations, and other members of the AP&L staff at the end of this inspection. At this meeting, the inspectors summarized the scope of the inspection and the findings.

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