ML20236D873: Difference between revisions

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{{Adams
#REDIRECT [[IR 05000312/1987013]]
| number = ML20236D873
| issue date = 07/14/1987
| title = Insp Rept 50-312/87-13 on 870418-0529.Violations Noted. Major Areas Inspected:Areas of Operational Safety Verification,Maint,Surveillance & Followup Items
| author name = Dangelo A, Ivey K, Myers C, Pereira D, Perez G, Qualls P
| author affiliation = NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V)
| addressee name =
| addressee affiliation =
| docket = 05000312
| license number =
| contact person =
| case reference number = TASK-A-26, TASK-OR
| document report number = 50-312-87-13, GL-85-06, GL-85-6, IEIN-85-023, IEIN-85-091, IEIN-85-23, IEIN-85-91, IEIN-86-025, IEIN-86-25, NUDOCS 8707310094
| package number = ML20236D845
| document type = INSPECTION REPORT, NRC-GENERATED, INSPECTION REPORT, UTILITY, TEXT-INSPECTION & AUDIT & I&E CIRCULARS
| page count = 26
}}
See also: [[see also::IR 05000312/1987013]]
 
=Text=
{{#Wiki_filter:- _ _ _ _ _ . - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ ,
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                                  U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
                                                    REGION V
      Report No:    50-312/87-13
      Docket No.    50-312
      License No. DPR-54
      Licensee:    Sacramento Municipal Utility District
                  P. O. Box 15830
                  Sacramento, California 95813
                                                                                                                                                              .
      Facility Name:    Rancho Seco Unit 1
      Inspection at:    Herald, California (Rancho Seco Site)
      Inspection conduct :                  g
      Inspectors:                            /    b      % 7-b-37                        7h[87
                                D'Ange o        entbr Resident Inspector                Date Signed
                      At/I 3[I7
                      C. N f Myers
                                                    rA b
                                                'denf Inspector
                                                                  74 4 7                  74/f7
                                                                                          Date Signed
                                                                                                                                                            i
                                                                                                                                                              1
                        .
                          bf}. Perez
                                          '
                                                    R    S 2 4 -YJ
                                            e ident Inspector
                                                                                          7/6/f7
                                                                                          Date Sig~ned
                          ##/
                      D. Pere
                                    e    AMA                                            [            M                                                      l
                                                                                                                                                              '
                                    a, Regio 1 Inspector                                Date Signed
                      P. Q
                              .
                                  1S, Reg' al Inspector
                                                                                          7)th7
                                                                                          Date Sig'ned
                              49                  a AA ca, 7-/10                          7/N/f7
                      K. I#y, Resident inspector, Palo Verde                            Date' Signed                                                        j
      Accompanying Personnel:          D.,Bax}er,INEL
      Approved By:        N              UL
                      L. (f. Miller,(phief, Reactor Projects Section II
                                                                                          7M)
                                                                                          Date Signed
      Summary:
      Impection between April 18 and May 29, 1987 (Report 50-312/87-13)
      Areas Inspected:    This routine inspection by the Resident Inspectors and by
      Regional Inspectors, involved the areas of operational safety verification,
      maintenance, surveillance, and followup items. During this inspection,
      Inspection Procedures 25573, 30702, 30703, 37701, 37703, 39702, 61726, 62702,
                4 070714
      k [OOhX        05000
                                  '
    G                      p
                      PD
 
- _ - _ _ - _ . __
                  <                                                                                  .
    O                                                                                                l
                                                                                                    :
                                                            -2
                                                                                                    l
                    62703, 71707, 71710, 72701, 90713, 92700, 92701, 92702, 92703, 93702, 92712,
                    and 94703 were used.
                    Results:  In the areas inspected, three violations were identified: Failure
                    to use an approved replacement filter element (Severity Level V), failure to
                    inspect the replacement filter work area for cleanliness (Severity Level V),
                    and failure to use an appropriate liquid penetrant test procedure for a spent
                    fuel pool liner inspection (Severity Level IV).                                I
                                                                                                    i
                                                                                                    ,
                                                                                                    )
                                                                                                    l
                                                                                                    !
_________
                                                                                                  l
 
    <
  .,
l                                                  DETAILS                                  j
                                                                                              i
i
i                                                                                            I
                                                                                              l
      1. Persons Contacted
          a.  Licensee Personnel                                                            l
              C. Andognini, Chief Executive Officer, Nuclear
                                                                                              l
              *W.  Bibb, Deputy Restart Implementation Manager                              !
              G. Coward, Assistant General Manager, Technical and Administrative
                  Services                                                                  l
              *B. Day, Nuclear Plant Manager                                                  i
              J. McColligan, Director, Plant Support                                        i
              J. Vinquist, Acting Licensing Manager                                        !
              D. Army, Nuclear Maintenance Manager
              *B. Croley, Nuclear Plant Manager                                              J
              G. Cranston, Nuclear Engineering Manager
              *J. Grimes, Planning Supervfsor
              W. Kemper, Nuclear Operations Manager
              J. Shetler, Director, Administrative Services
              T. Tucker, Nuclear Operations Superintendent
              L. Fossom, Deputy Implementation Manager                                      I
              *R. Colombo, Regulatory Compliance Superintendent
              *J. Field, Nuclear Technical Support Superintendent                            !
              S. Crunk, Incident Analysis Group Supervisor                                  )
              F. Kellie, Radiation Protection Superintendent
            *15. Knight, Quality Assurance Manager
              C. Stephenson, Senior Regulatory Compliance Engineer
              B. Daniels, Supervisor, Electrical Engineering
              R. Wichert, Instrumentation and Control Maintenance Superintendent            j
              J. Irwin, Supervisor, Instrumentation and Control Maintenance                1
              C. Linkhart, Electrical Maintenance Superintendent                            4
              R. Cherba, Quality Engineering Supervisor                                    j
              T. Shewski, Quality Engineer                                                  i
              J. Robertson, Licensing Engineer
              *F. Hauck, Licensing Engineer
              *R. Lawrence,
              *J. Delezenski, Nuclear Licensing Analyst
              *W. Koepke, Quality Control Manager
          Other licensee employees contacted included technicians, operators,
          mechanics, security and office personnel.
          * Attended the Exit Meeting on May 29, 1987.
          1 Management Analysis Company (MAC) Personnel
      2. Operational Safety Verification
          The inspectors reviewed control room operations which included access
          control, staffing, observation of decay heat removal system alignment,
          and review of control room logs. Discussions with the shift supervisors
          and operators indicated understanding by these personnel of the reasons
          for annunciator indications, abnormal plant conditions and maintenance
                                                    .
                                                              ..                ..    . ..
                    , . _ . . . . . . . . . . .
                                                .
                                                        .                          ..
 
      m
                                                                                              ,
        ;,c                                                                                s
  .-
                                                    2
                                                                                            1
            work in progress. The inspectors also verified, by observation of valve          !
            and switch position indications,:that emergency systems were properly
            aligned for the cold shutdown condition of the facility. This included
            verification of incore; thermocouple operability during a dual train decay
            heat system outage.
            Tours of;the auxiliary, reactor, and turbine buildings, including
            exterior areas, were made to assess equipment conditions and plant
            -conditions. Also the tours were made to assess the effectiveness of
            radiological controls and adherence to regulatory requirements. The
            inspectors ~also observed plant housekeeping and cleanliness, looked for-
            potential fire and safety hazards, and observed security and safeguards
            practices.
            The following activities were followed up by the . inspector:
                                                                                            .
            a.    Loss of S]A inverter causing the loss of Safety Features Activation
                  System (SFAS) channel and Reactor Protection System:(RPS) trip.      No
                  abnormal system response was observed,
            b.    Unexplained wire cutting in the 480 volt west switchgear room on
                  April 27, 1987, affecting SFAS valve SFV-25003, "A" train Borated
                  Water Storage Tank (BWST) suction to High Pressure Injection / Low        1
                  Pressure Injection (HPI/LPI) header. Thfs occurrence'is still under        '
                  review and will be further documented in subsequent inspection
                  reports.
            c.    Dual train decay heat system outage (continuous through. inspection
                  period).
                  In discussions with licensee management, the inspector expressed
I
'
                  concern during the common decay heat system train outage about'the
                  use of the plant 4 KV bus for load testing.. The inspector was,
                  concerned'that the testing might' jeopardize the' availability of both
                  redundant. electrical trains during the common decay heat :,ystem
                  outage.  Licensee representatives explained that adequate isolation
                  and protection was established during the conduct of the testing to      4
                  preclude impact on the reliability of electrical power during the
                  outage.  The inspector concluded this explanation was satisfactory,
            d.    Geological review by NRR consultant of foothills fault region on
l                  May 7, 1987.  No conclusions were reached by the inspector during
                  this review.
            e.    Health Physics Drill on May 7, 1987. During this drill, the
                  inspector observed as many as twenty-six people. in the control _ room;
                  These people were involved with Emergency Feedwater Isolation and-
l-                Control (EFIC) installation, operator requalification testing, and        i
l                  the drill.  The inspector brought to the plant manager's attention        )
l                  that-the amount of people present in the control room needed to be        ~
                  better controlled, and that a. crowded control could make the
                  operators duties of monitoring the plant very difficult.    The plant  j
                  manager agreed with these observations and stated that appropriate
1
                                                                                            j
 
  _ _ _ -
          I
-                                                    3
                    steps will be taken to prevent this type of overcrowding from        j
                    occurring in the future.                                              l
            3. Monthly Maintenance Observation
              Maintenance activities for the systems and components listed below were    .
              observed and reviewed to ascertain that they were conducted in accordance  l
              with approved procedures, regulatory guides, industry codes or standards,  i
              and the Technical Specifications (TSs).
              The following items were considered during this review: The limiting        I
              conditions for operation were met while components or systems were          j
              removed from service; approvals were obtained prior to initiating the      j
              work; activities were accomplished using approved procedures and were      {
              inspected as applicable; functional testing or calibration was performed    j
              prior to returning components or systems to service; activities were        j
              accomplished by qualified personnel; radiological controls were            j
              implemented; and fire prevention controls were implemented.                j
                                                                                          i
              a.    Transamerica Delaval Diesel (TDI) Load Testing
                                                                                          ]
                    On May 6, 1987, the inspector observed a brace on the "A" and "B"
                    TDI diesel generators. . Licensee personnel explained that the brace
                    had been temporarily added during acceptance testing to reduce
                    unacceptable turbocharger vibration during TDI operation. However,
                    the analysis of the effect of the brace on the turbocharger during
                    operation could not be retrieved by the licensee or the vendor
                    during this inspection.                                              j
                    The inspector was concerned that acceptance testing was being          I
                    conducted without the diesel generators being in their_ final
                    configuration prior to turnover to operations. Furthermore, the
                    inspector questioned the licensee as to the deportability of the      l
                    turbocharger vibration problem under 10 CFR 21. The licensee          I
                    acknowledged the inspector's concerns and indicated that both issues
                    would be addressed in the evaluation of the permanent brace to be
                    installed prior to turnover to operations.
              b.    QCI-12 Prioritization Review
                    As part of the licensee's Performance Improvement Program, QCI-12,
                    entitled Plant Performance and Management Improvement Program, was
                    established to investigate, validate, approve, implement and close
                    recommendations for performance improvement. As part of the
                    validation phase, the Recommendation, Review and Resolution Board
                    (RRRB) forwards validated recommendations for specific systems to
                    the Systems Engineer to determine its priority using the following-
                    criteria:
                            Priority 1 - Restart
                            Actions to be initiated and' completed prior to restart on
                            completion of the Restart Test Program to,
                                                                                          -
 
                                                                                      ___ _ __-_ _ _ _
    r
  s-
                                            4
                    (1) assure plant remains in' post-trip window,
                    (2) assure compliance with TSs, and
                    (3) minimize the need for operator' action outside the control                                              i
                          room within the'first,10 minutes of an event.
                    Priority 2 - Near Term
                    Actions to be promptly initiated but not necessarily completed                                              [
                    prior to restart to,
                                                                                                                                  l
                    (1) enhance ability to remain in post-trip window,
                  .(2) reduce reactor trips,                                                                                  )
                                                                                                                                s
                    (3) reduce challenges to safety systems,                                                                    I
                    (4) produce near-term programmatic benefits.
                                                                                                                                f
                    Priority 3 - Long Term
                    Actions not to be initiated prior to restart to,
                    (1) improve reliability,
                    (2) improve availability,
                    (3) major programmatic enhancements.
                                                                                                                                i
      The Pe~ ormance Analysis Group (PAG) reviews, and approves the
      priority for scheduled implementation of each item.
                                                                                                                                i
      The Implementation Group assigns a Work Request priority designator                                                      i
      of "006" for Work Requests to be completed prior to restart and
      "000" for non-restart Work Requests. All Priority 1 items resulting
      from the QCI-12 process are designated as 006 Work Requests. Work
      requests written subsequent to the QCI-12 process are evaluated by
      Implementation to establish the restart priority.
      The inspector reviewed the status of the current backlog of
      corrective maintenance Work Requests (CMWRs) to determine the
      prioritization criteria.which the licensee established for working
      off the backlog prior to restart.                      The inspector found that a total
      of approximately 4000 work requests were currently open including
      not only individual deficiencies requiring corrective maintenance,
f      but also associated support activities, preventative maintenance,
      modifications and general facility work activities.                      Of the 4000
      Work Requests, the licensee. estimated that 2000 Work Requests were
      corrective maintenance activities, with 1150 ~ of them prioritized for
      completion prior to restart. The licensee currently reviews the
      remaining 850 non priority Work Requests for performance within the
      clearance boundary. established for scheduled priority work and
i      includes the feasible non priority Work Requests within the work
l      schedule.
      The inspector determined that the licensec wes unable to
      specifically identify which non priority Work Requests would not be
      completed prior to restart.          Furthermore, the criteria for selection
      of non priority work requests for work off prior to restart was not
        - _ - - _          _-    _.        _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _    . _ _ _ - -      ._                  _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
 
                                                                                        _ - _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _            . _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
                                                                                      '
                                                                            a
                  s                                                                                                                                              5
                                                                                                proceduralized with either the licensee's QCI-12 process or AP.3.
                                                                                                                                                                                      '
                                                                                                As a result, the inspector was unable to evaluate the
                                                                                                appropriateness of the non-restart Work Request backlog.
                                                                                                The inspector brought these weaknesses to the attention of licensee
                                                                                              management who acknowledged the need for additional clarification                    !
                                                                                                and . identification of the CMWRs backlog.                                          j
                                                                                                This issue will be addressed in future inspections of the licensee's
                                                                                              maintenance activities prior to restart.
                                                                                                                                                                                    I
                                                                                    c.          Concentrated Boric Acid Storage Tank (CBAST)
                                                                                                                                                                                    i
                                                                                              On April 22, 1987, the inspectors were informed of the draining of                  !'
                                                                                                19,000 gallons of liquid from the CBAST. The leakage appears to
                                                                                                have occurred from the drain of the CBAST filter which had been                      ,
                                                                                                connected by temporary plastic tubing to the floor drain near the
                                                                                                filter.                The floor drain drained into the radwaste sump and the
                                                                                              water from the sump was then pumped to the spent regenerative tank.
                                                                                              The inspector reviewed the auxiliary operators' logs for the period
                                                                                                of April 13, 1987, to April 21, 1987, for the CBAST level.                  The
                                                                                                inspector identified missing information on the CBAST level for one
                                                                                                shift on April 13, 1987, and one shift of April 21, 1987, and could
                                                                                                not locate the entire log for the day of April 17, 1987.                  It was
                                                                                                identified that the CBAST level on April 16, 1987 was 11.48 ft on
                                                                                                the first entry and 11.44 ft on the last of the three entries.                  No
                                                                                                information was available for April 17, 1987, and on the first entry
                                                                                                for April' 18, 1987, the CBAST level had dropped to 11.00 ft. The
                                                                                                level continued to drop until April 22, 1987,.when Operations had a
                                                                                                drain valve, BWS-056, closed and stopped the apparent leak pathway.
                                                                                                For a period of approximately five days the operations staff was
                                                                                                apparently unaware of the draining of.the CBAST, even though the                    ,
                                                                                                staff had taken, on each shift, recordings of the CBAST level.                  It {
                                                                                              was evident that the CBAST level recordings were'not being compared
                                                                                                to previous readings, expected values, and were not trended.
                                                                                              The inspector's investigation into the draining of water from the
                                                                                              CBAST tank did not identify whether or not there was a continuous
                                                                                              draining of water from the CBAST tank through the CBAST filter drain                  <
                                                                                                into the radwaste system. However, the licensee did identify the                    {'
                                                                                              CBAST draining problem from the trending of the liquid waste sump
                                                                                              pump operating times. The licensee has begun an Incident Analysis
                                                                                              Group (IAG) investigation of the incident. The licensee committed
                                                                                              to make the inspector aware of their findings and the inspector will
                                                                                                review the licensee's corrective actions during the followup of the
                                                                                                violations discussed below.
                                                                                              The licensee identified that the only work performed on the CBAST                      i
                                                                                              during this period was a CBAST filter replacement and the                              {
                                                                                                installation of a temporary cleanup demineralized. In reviewing the                  j
                                                                                              Work Request for these two items, two apparent violations of work
                                                                                              control procedures were identified:
                                                                                                                                                                                      !
                                                                                                                                                                                      !
                                                                                                                                                                                      !
                                                                                                                                                                                      !
_ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ - _ - - - - _ _ _ _ - - - - - _ - _ - _ _
 
              - _ _ -.                .--            -                _
                                                                                            .. . _ . - _ _ _ _
.,    .
      a
'-
                      >                                  6
                                                                                                                  !
                                                                                                                  l
                          Work Request #125548, "CBAST Filter F-711," directed work to change
                          out the filter element from.the CBAST filter.. The filter.is
                          identified as a Quality Assurance (QA) Class.1 piece of equipment
                          and the Work Request form was marked QA Class 1.
                          10 CFR 50 Appendix B, Criterion VIII, " Identification and Control.                  ~!
                          of Materials, Parts, and Components,"' states, in part:. " Measures.
                          shall be established for the identification'and control of-                          '
                                                                                                                ,
                          materials, parts, and components....These. identification and control                  '
                          measures shall be designed to prevent the use of incorrect or
          -              defective material, parts, and components."
                          In addition, QA Procedure 6, Revision 3, "QC Inspection," states, in
                          part: ." Class 1, EQ and commercial grade items shall-be released-
                          from the warehouse only if they have 'SMUD ACCEPT l tag unless    _
                                                                                                                ,
                          otherwise exempted per paragraph 5.6."'. Paragraph.5.6 states that
                                                                    -
                                                                                                                j
                          the Quality Manager shall issue a list of items which are exempt                        i
                          from the "SMUD ACCEPT" tag policy.
                          AP.605, Revision 12, " General Warehousing," states, in part 3.5.2.1:                  i
                          "Any item released from the warehouse for Class.l.and EQ use. shall                    j
                          have a SMUD Accept Tag (shown in QAP-16) installed by QC. Note:                        i
                          " Exempt Items, as determined by QA, are excluded from this
                                                                                                                  '
                          requirement."
                          On April 9,1987, under Work Request #125548, the replacement filter                      l
                          element was issued out of the warehouse without.a SMUD ACCEPT tag.                      l
                          After the filter element had been issued, it appears licensee
                          discussions occurred on whether it was acceptable to install the
                        . filter element, without the SMUD ACCEPT. tag, into the CBAST filter
                          housing. The work request' continuation form for Work
                          Request #125548 documents a telecon from a maintenance engineer
                          authorizing to "...use a filter element not Green Tagged for CBAST
                          filter per telecon 4/11/87."
                                                                                    '
                          Administrative procedure, AP.605, " General Warehous'ing," Revision 3,                  i
                          Section 3.5.5, " Items Without SMUD ACCEPT Tag and Not Inspected                        ]
                          Using RIDR (Receipt Inspection Data' Report)," states, in part:                          1
                          " Procurement Engineer shall prepare a RIDR..-..The Item shall'then be
                          receipt inspected....If the: item is acceptable, QC shall put SMUD
                          ACCEPT Tag on the item....If the item is unacceptable, QC shall                          q
                          place a Hold Tag (in accordance with QAP-16) on all items inspected                      ;
                          on the RIDR. Warehouse is responsible to keep the item'in
                          quarantine until the item is. removed from Rancho:Seco or until means
                          are established to segregate the' items from those designated'for                        i
                          Class 1 or EQ use...."
                          QA procedure, QAP.17, " Nonconforming Material Control," Revision 5,
                          Section 4.4, " Conditional Release," states, ~1n part: "An item
                          identified as nonconforming by NCR may be conditionally released for-
                          installation and testing, provided it is stipulated that the item-
                          may not be put in service prior to closure of the NCR."
    .
            .
                                                                                                              m
 
                                                                                                                                                            ?
                                                                              I
                    ,
                                                                                                                        7
                                                                                      Contrary to the above, on April 9, 1987, under Work Request #125548,
                                                                                      replacement filter element (stock code number #005617) was issued
                                                                                      without a SMUD ACCEPT tag and on April 11, 1987, the replacement
                                                                                      filter element, stock code #005617 for the CBAST filter F-711 was
                                                                                      installed without the appropriate SMUD ACCEPT tag, a RIOR or an NCR.
                                                                                      This is an apparent violation (87-13-01).
                                                                                      The inspector also observed Technical Specifications Section 6.8,-  !
                                                                                      " Procedures," requires, in part: " Written procedures shal be
                                                                                      established, implemented and maintained covering the acti' 't e3
                                                                                      referenced below:
                                                                                      "a.    The applicable procedures recommended in Appendix "A' af
l                                                                                            Regulatory Guide 1.33, November 1972."
                                                                                      Regulatory Guide 1.33, November 1972 requires, in part: "(.
l                                                                                      Procedures for Performing Maintenance. 1. Maintenance whnh can
                                                                                      affect the performance of safety-related equipment should be          .
                                                                                      properly preplanned and performed in accordance with written        j
                                                                                      procedures."                                                          l
                                                                                                                                                            l
                                                                                      In addition, Plant Maintenance procedure M.114, " Maintenance          '
                                                                                      Cleanliness Control," Section 3.0, " Limitations and Precautions,"
                                                                                      require, in part that:    "3.1 This procedure shall be used when
                                                                                      opening any portion of the following systems...BWS (Borated Water      )
                                                                                      System)....Use of this procedure is not required for activities such
I                                                                                      as replacing filter elements...provided that the component and area
l                                                                                      cleanliness and the replacement part/ parts cleanliness as detailed
l                                                                                      by the Cognizant Engineer is verified by an authorized Inspector's
                                                                                      signature on the Work Request."                                        i
                                                                                      Contrary to the above, Work Request #125548 was written for
                                                                                      replacement of a filter element in the BWS system and the additional
                                                                                      provisions of procedure M.114 were not implemented which required
                                                                                      inspections for area cleanliness and an authorized inspector's
                                                                                      signature on the Work Request.      This is an apparent violation
                                                                                      (87-13-02).
                                                                                    d. Control of Maintenance Tools, Wooden Support
                                                                                      On April 13, 1987, the inspector identified a wooden support bracing
                                                                                      the nitrogen supply line to the Condensate Storage Tank. No
                                                                                      markings or tags existed on the support and no apparent work was
                                                                                      observed in progress.
                                                                                      The inspector brought the support to the attention of various
                                                                                      licensee managers and requested an explanation of why the support
                                                                                      was installed and what administrative controls were associated with
                                                                                      it.    No licensee representatives were able to clearly explain the
                                                                                      origin of the support. The support was later removed.
                                                                                      After further inspection, the inspector located a Work Request
                                                                                      #119506 which replaced a nitrogen supply pressure regulator on the
                                                                                      nitrogen line. This work was performed on March 5, 1987. Licensee
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ - _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
 
    _ _ - - _    ._                                          -    _    . _ _ _ _    ._ _ _ _ . . _ .          __ _
              5
                                                                                                                      i
    '
                                                  8                                                                  i
                    personnel stated that on this job, the maintenance crew placed the
                    support under the nitrogen line during the work activity and did not
                    remove the support when the work was completed.            The job was
                    inspected by the licensee on March 6, 1987, and that inspection also                              '
                    failed to identify the support for removal. The inspector discussed
                    the principle that if the work required the installation of                                      i
                    temporary supports, the work control package should have a method to
                    identify the items for removal after the job is completed.                          Licensee
                    representatives acknowledged these comments at the Exit Interview.
                    The inspector also identified some drawing discrepancies in the
                    isometric drawing 35890-2-HE for the nitrogen supply line. These
                    discrepancies made it difficult to correctly delineate the Class 1
                    and Class 2 portions of the piping line. However, the Master
                    Equipment List (MEL) did correctly identify the quality                                            j
                    classification.  The licensee committed to clarify the plant
                    drawing.                                                                                          !
                e.  Nondestructive Testing Records Review (Spent Fuel Pool)
                    The inspector reviewed work associated with the licensee's
                    examination of welds of the spent fuel pool liner.            This work was                      i
                    part of the licensee's effort to locate and identify areas of                                      1
                    leakage in the spent fuel pool liner,                                                              j
                    Work Request #131557 was written for Mechanical Maintenance to
                    " support QC for the PT (liquid penetrant test) of the spent fuel                                    l
                    pool liner welds above the water level." The Work Request was                                      1
                    written for the equipment identification of SFC-3, meaning spent                                    {
                    fuel cooling system, Quality Class 3. However, the inspector
                    identified that the liner was actually classified as QA Class 1 as
                    denoted on SMUD Drawing C-613.    The liner was not identified on the
                    licensee's MEL which is normally referred to by the licensee for
                    equipment identification and classification.
                                                                                                                        l
                    A liquid penetrant test (LPT) was performed by the licensee on
                                                                                                                        '
                    March 26, 1987, on accessible welds of the spent fuel pool liner.
                    Work Request #131557 was written only for craft support of the LPT
                    and not to control the test.
                    The inspector noted that the licensee procedure, NDEI #8, " Liquid
                    Penetrant Examination Requirements," established the' method and
                    criteria for liquid penetrant examinations.      However, no work
                    control document was written that referenced the NDEI #8 procedure
                    or that referenced the qualitative or quantitative criteria to be
                    used for the LPT process.
                    10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion IX, " Control of Special Processes,"
                    states, in part:    " Measures shall be established to assure that
                    special processes, including ... nondestructive testing, are
                    controlled and accomplished by qualified personnel using qualified
                    procedures in accordance with applicable codes, standards,
                    specifications, criteria, and other special requirements."
\
  .
 
                                                                          -_ .__ - _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ - - _ _
    1
  -
                                              9
                QA Policy Section IX, Revision 0, " Control of Special Process,"                            l
                states in part:  " Appropriate procedural methods shall be prescribed                      !
                and implemented to assure tnat special processes, equipment and                            !
                personnel are controlled and accomplished by qualified personnel and                        l
                procedures."                                                                                '
                Contrary to the above, the liquid penetrant test, a special process,
                performed on the Spent Fuel Pool Liner was not controlled by a work
                document or procedure which included the appropriate quantitative or
                qualitative acceptance criteria for determining that important
                activities have been satisfactorily accomplished or other special                          i
                requirements.  This is an apparent violation (87-13-03).                                  l
                                                                                                            1
                The inspector also reviewed QA Surveillance #859 which stated in the
                summary section that the PT examination of the liner was performed
                per NDEI #8, "for information only." The inspector observed that
                the weld would have been rejected if the NDEI #8 acceptance criteria
                had been applied. However, the QA surveillance concluded that the
                process was performed "in an acceptable manner." The inspector
                brought to the attention of the licensee the need to be more
                thorough in their surveillance.                                                            ,
                                                                                                            i
      4. Monthly Surveillance Observation                                                                  j
                                                                                                            j
        Technical Specification (TS) required surveillance tests were observed                            )
        and reviewed to ascertain that they were conducted in accordance with
        these requirements.
        Tle following items were considered during this review: Testing was in
        accordance with adequate procedures; test instrumentation was calibrated;
        liaiting conditions for operation were met; removal and restoration of
        the. affected components were accomplished; test results confirmed with TS
        and orocedure requirements and were reviewed by personnel other than the
        individual directing the test; the reactor operator, technician or
        engineer performing the test recorded the data and the data were in
        agreement with observations made by the inspector, and that any
        deficiencies identified during the testing were properly reviewed and
        resolved by appropriate management personnel.
        Portions of the following tests were observed by the inspectors and D.
        Baxter, NRC consultant:
        STP-1057 8 - Component Cooling Water Performance Test
        STP-1009 A - New Diesel Generator GEA2 Engine Integrated System
                          Phase 2 Testing
        The following test outlines were reviewed by D. Baxter, NRC consultant,
        and the inspectors:
        STP.1064 A,B,C        Waste Water Disposal System Operational Test
        RT-RCS-002            Refueling Outage RCP Failure (Undercurrent) Relay
                                  Test
        STP.983                Plant Phone Appendix R Upgrade
i
                                                                                                          a
 
    __
                                                                                                                      .,
        I
    '
                                                                              10                                      ;
                                          STP.433              Post Accident Sampling System RCS Sample Functional      ,
                                                                  Test                                                i
                                          SP-485A/SP-485B      Refueling Interval Control Room / Technical Support
                                                                  Center Essential Filtering System Train "A"/ Train
                                                                  "B" Surveillance
                                          STP.10338            DHS Pump P-261B Performance
                                          STP.1033A            DHS Pump P-261A Performance
                                          STP.1065 Rev 1      Flow Path Verification of the Waste Water System
                                                                  Piping Modifications                                  j
                                          STP.984-            UHF Radio Modification
                                          STP.1020            Main Feed Pump Protection Test                            i
                                          STP.666              EFIC Cold Functional Test                                  l
                                          STP.778              Integrated Control System Functional Test                  {
                                                                                                                        1
                                          Special Test Procedures                                                        I
                                                                                                                          l
                                          The following STPs were reviewed by the ir.Jpectors and D. Baxter, NRC        l
                                          consultant:                                                                  j
                                          STP.1074A Rev 1      Demonstration of Alternate Decay Heat Removal Methods
l                                          STP.977              4160 VAC Bus 4A Isolation Control Switch Test
                                          STP.978              4160 VAC Bus 4A2 Isolation Control Switch Test            l
                                          STP.792              "A" HPI Pump Lube Oil Modification Test                    I
                                          STP.432              Post Accident Sampling System Gaseous Functional Test      i
                                          STP.787A            SFAS Analog Channel "A" Module Removal Interlock          l
l                                                                Verification                                              l
                                          STP.1071            Post Tie-In Functional Test of the Diesel Driven Air        l
                                                                  Compressor with a Gradual Loss of IAS
                                          STP.979              480 VAC Bus 3A2 Isolation Control Switch Test
                                          STP.980              4160 VAC Bus 4A2 Load Shedding Isolation Control          !
                                                                  Switch Test
                                          STP.1075            Diesel Driven Air Compressor Fire Suppression Sys.
                                                                  Functional Test
                                          STP.981              4160 VAC Bus 4A Load Shedding Isolation Control.
                                                                  Switch Test
                                          STP.1049            HV-26007 Differential Pressure Stroke Test
                                          STP.1050            HV-26008 Differential Pressure Stroke Test
l                                          STP.1027            Auxiliary Feedwater System SRS to AFW Suction Flow
l                                                                  Test
i                                          STP.970              Diesel Generator (G-886A) Synchronization Check Relay
                                                                  Functional Test
                                          STP.1032            Nuclear Service Cooling Water (NSCW) Component Flow
                                                                  Verification
                                          STP.7878            SFAS Analog Channel "B" Module Removal Interlock          ,
                                                                  Verification                                          !
                                          STP.787C            SFAS Analog Channel "C" Module Removal Interlock
                                                                  Verification
                                          STP.1040            Turbine Bypass Valve Cold Functional Test
                                          STP.790              RPS Module Removal Interlock Verification
                                          No violations or. deviations from NRC requirements were identified.
  ,
l
      _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ -
 
    '
                                                                                        i
  .. .\
*
                                                11                                      ,
        5. Review of Problem Statement Prioritization (0 pen)                          '!
          Action Plan Prioritization Review
          The inspector reviewed the licensee's " Action Plan for Performance
          Improvement" and the System Status Report (SSR) for the Nuclear Service      1
          Cooling Water System and sampled approximately thirty problem statements
          contained within those documents for acceptability as a post-restart
                                                                                        '
          item. The inspector's criteria for acceptability as a post-restart item
          was whether all regulatory requirements related to the item would be met
          even if the item were not performed prior to restart.
          The Action Plan used three priorities for classification of items. The
          priorities were implemented as follows: Priority 1 is a restart item,
          Priority 2 is a near-term item, and Priority 3 is a long-term item. The
          licensee has committed in the Action plan to complete all Priority 1          j
          items prior to restart.    The inspector reviewed various Priority 2 and 3
          items identified in the licensee's Action Plan and SSR.                      '
          a.    The licensee had difficulty in providing a package that encompassed    !'
                the item. For example:
                (1) Some items had no QCI-12 reference number, (4B.9.2.3,
                      4B.12.2.1, 4B.12.3.1, 4C.1.f.1.d)
                                                                                        ,
                (2) Some of the QCI-12 referenced items provided by the licensee
                      for the Action Plan items did not correlate.    (4B.12.3.3 was
                      not applicable to QCI-12 #20.04.52, 4C.2.a.1.c.3 was not            i
                      applicable to 15.0426.A.)
                (3) Some of the Action Plan items appeared to involve many QCI-12
                      items as references. (4.B.2.3.1 was referenced to QCI-12 #(S)
                      20.0112, 20.0127, 20.0351, 20.0393, 20.0411, 21.0050.C,            l
                      21.0082, 21.0089, 21.0182, 26.0688, and 26.0689.)                  !
                      These problems made it difficult to audit the priority
                      classifications, and to determine what actions will eventually
                      be needed to close the item,
          b.    The inspector reviewed Action Plan Item #4c.12.2.1, titled:
                " Engineering is to review design philosophy for suction valve
                interlocks and alarms on critical pumps and identify appropriate
                modifications, QCI-12 #15.0070," a Priority 1 item. The inspector
                concluded this item was properly prioritized.
                This item, however, contained an apparent typographical' error in
                that the PAG minutes of 86-047 had assigned a priority of 2 but the
                QCI Tracking System improperly recorded the priority for this item
                .as 1. This discrepancy had already been identified by the licensee
                and corrected on the data base.                                          l
                The inspector's concern with the typographical error is that within
                the licensee's tracking system, identified problem statements are
                grouped together based on problem subject.    In this review, Item
                                                                                      w
 
.' '
                                      12
                                                                                !
        #15.0070 (discussed above), which is called a " Valid Item," is the
        lead item of the group which also includes the following items: #'s
        15.0071, 15.0072 and 16.0002.B which are called " Valid Covered        l
        Item." The tracking system would then track the group of items
        (15.0070, 15.0071, 15.0072 and 16.0002.B) by the Valid Item,
        #15.0070, i.e., these items were " covered" by Item 15.0070.
        All of these items dealt with the loss of the makeup pump during the
        December 16, 1985 event when water supply was secced, and with
        assuring uninterrupted water supply to the makeup pump.
        The inspector noted that, in this case, when the lead item of the        1
        group was changed from Priority 1 to 2, when the typographic error
        was identified and corrected, all other items associated with the      .
        lead item were similarly changed (in effect). The lead item, which      )
        was now a Priority 2 became a post-restart item along with its            j
        associated higher priority items.    When these grouped items are
        recalled from the tracking system, the lead item which is a Priority
        2 would not be required to be completed prior to restart.    The
        associated items involved here were all classified as Priority 1.
        The licensee had identified this anomaly concurrently with the
        inspector and has discussed the need for a program to review and          i
        correct errors which may exist in the QCI-12 Tracking System. The
        licensee stated at the May 29, 1987 exit meeting that this program,
        called the True Up Program, was in the process of being implemented.
        The inspector will continue to monitor the program.
    c. The inspector reviewed Action Plan item 4.B.10.2.2, " Implement
                                                              .
                                                                                  l
        Vendor Data Program, enhancements identified to achieve the program    j
        objectives (Priority 2) QCI-12 #21.0267," and referenced QCI-12 item
        (21.0267). The inspector first found that 21.0267 was a Priority 3
        item even though the Action Plan item was listed as Priority 2.    The
        licensee was unable to identify the cause for this inequality.            ;
                                                                                )
        The licensee's input for QCI-12 #21.0267 consisted of various            1
        licensee personnel interviews, during the interview process of the
        QCI-12 programs. A review of the interviews indicated an
        insufficient vendor material control program which could possibly        !
        provide inappropriate information for maintenance and surveillance
        procedures and therefore potentially affect the operability of
        various plant components and systems.                                    )
        The licensee was requested to provide their justification for
        determining that this item does not have to be completed prior to
        restart.                                                                  I
    d. In discussions with the licensee, the inspector identified that
        there remain approximately 850 items that have been identified but
        have not gone through the PAG review process. Of these there were
        approximately 100 proposed Priority 1 items. The inspector
        determined that the licensee had not yet developed a process that
        would enable a valid Priority 1 item to be included in the written
                                                                                J
 
                -_ _ - -        _ - _ .        _ _ _ _ . _- _.      - _ _ .
                                                                                                                        !
:I
      ''
              , g
          . _ , .                                                                                                    '!
  . .o                                                                13
                                                                                                                      8
                                        system status reports which'are used for, among.other uses, the
                                        development of the' system functional tests.
                                        Nuclear Service Cooling Water System (NSCW) Status Report Review.
                                        The inspector noted that the NSCW system status report. identified-
                                        eight problems, of which one was to.be corrected prior to restart,              ,
                                        one was determined invalid, one was' considered a Priority 2 item and
                                        the remaining five were Priority 3.          The item that was determined to  i
                                        be Priority 1 entailed fifteen Work Requests that were to be
                                        completed prior to startup.          The Priority 2 item dealt with three
                                      Work Requests identified on the open Work Request list that were
                                        considered Priority 2, and one Priority 3 item dealt with fourteen
                                        Priority 3 Work Requests. The priority classification of Work
                                        Requests is reviewed in Section 3 of this report.          The remaining
                                        Priority 3 items appeared to be appropriately classified.
                                        The inspector was concerned that NCR 5-3709 (dispositioned in 1984)
                                        had not been closed and had been classified as Priority 3 (long-term
                                        resolution). .The inspector questioned a QA representative who
                                        agreed to determine why the NCR had not been closed. This will be'
                                        inspected in a-future inspection.
                          6. NRC Open Items
                            Deviations
                            86-07-10 (Closed) " Control Cable Shielding Not Protected At Underground
                            End"
                            The remaining issue for closeout of this deviation was a licensee
                            reinspection walkdown and rework, as necessary, of suspect cables
                            identified by the Bechtel Power Corporation. The licensee's Quality
                            Control (QC) and Electrical Maintenance personnel completed walkdowns.of
                            the 188 cables identified by Bechtel and discovered nine instances where
                            ground shield terminations were uninsulated. The licensee initiated work
                            requests to rework the terminations and expected completion within.a
                            month. Based on the licensee's walkdowns and initiation of corrective
                            actions, this item is closed.          86-07-10
                            Enforcement Items
                            83-34-03 (Closed) " Failure to Follow Abnormal Tag Procedure"
                            This violation was for the improper closeout of two abnormal tags. In
                            response, the licensee reinstructed maintenance personnel on the                        .I
                            requirements of AP.26 " Abnormal Tag Procedure" and verified the status.of
                            all abnormal tags existing at'that time.                Subsequently, the' licensee
                            revised AP.26 to include monthly reviews by responsible departments to
                            ensure the up-to-date status of all abnormal tags. .The inspector
                            reviewed AP.26 and, on 'a sample basis, abnormal tag reports, monthly
                            review reports, and abnormal tags in.the field.                The inspector concluded.
                            that this item was resolved and closed.
 
, _ _      _ _-                                                  _ _ _ - _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
  'r
      v. n
        .
                                                                                                !
                                                  la
                                                                                                l
                                                                                                1
                                                                                                I
                However, the inspector noted that there were 133. abnormal tags issued for-    1  '
                over one year that were still in use and that'some had been issued as far
                back as 1982.    At the exit meeting, the inspector raised this concern to.    :
                the licensee and questioned the' temporary nature of. the tags. The
                licensee responded that they have improved the abnormal tag procedure to
                include supervisory reviews of the tags and are currently in the process        1
                of reviewing the. outstanding tags with a goal of significantly reducing        i
                the number of tags by restart.
                86-30-05 (Closed) " Failure to Maintain Radiograph Records"
                The. licensee used a radiograph taken for "Information Only" as a basis        l
                for. determining Decay Heat Removal (DHR) pipe thickness and did not            ;
                retain these records as required by their 0A program.                          !
                As a result of.this occurrence, the licensee revised Nuclear Engineering
                Procedure, NEP 4106, section 5.2, to add.the requirement that all input-
                          .
                data for engineering calculations be from approved district procedures
                and that documents stamped "Information Only" shall not be used in
                developing calculations. This procedural change should prevent a
                recurrence of this problem as the approved procedures'would ensure that
                required data be retained. This item is. closed.
                86-30-06 (Closed) " Improper Method of Determining Pipe Thickness"
                The licensee agreed that the method of radiography that they used to
                determine the DHR pipe thickness was.not proper and stated in a letter to
                the NRC dated November'26, 1986 that in the future they would use only,
                approved.and qualified procedures employing ASME accepted-techniques for
                the determination of pipe wall thickness. The licensee also reviewed 200
                of 3659 NCRs written during the past 5 years to determine if a radiograph
                had been used to determine pipe adequacy.    No additional examples were
                found.  This item is closed.
                Followup Items
                85-04-02 (0 pen) " Licensee Review and Verification of Past Commitments and
                Design Implementation"
                                                                                                ]
                                                                                                !
                This item was previously reviewed in IE report number 50-312/86-38. The
                                                                                            .
  ,
                remaining open issue was the implementation of a' procedure to identify
                and assure completion of all prior commitments made by the licensee.
                The licensee was in the process of creating a Commitment Management
                Program which included a procedure to followup on past commitments.
                Completion of the procedure was scheduled for July 1987. This item will
                remain open pending NRC review of the completed procedure.
                85-36-01 (Closed) " Fire Protection Administrative Procedures"-
                The licensee,.in August of 1985 for the'10 CFR 50, Appendix R inspection,'
                had available copies of revised fire protection' program administrative-
                procedures which had not completed the review process. The-. inspector          ;
                noted that these procedures had not been approved on January 16, 1986.        -]
                                                                                              j
                                                                                                J
                                                                                                l
-                                                                                              1
 
                                                              ______-____
                                                                                      a
y  s'1
W ''                                        15
        The inspector reviewed a sampling o'f the revised fire protection
        administrative procedures consisting of AP.29, AP.63, AP.18, AP. 34A and
        AP.60.  The procedure revisions were all effective in the May - June'
        timeframe of 1986.    The inspector, while reviewing these procedures,
        noted no deviations from the guidelines given in the Standard Review Plan
        (SRP) Section 9.5.1. This item is closed.
        86-13-02 (0 pen) " Lack of Proper Corrective Actions When Identified Valves
        Not on P& ids"
        One'of the corrective actions the licensee performed due to the.
        October 2,1985, cooldown event was .to walkdown sixteen important to
        safety and non-safety-related systems and identify any configuration
        discrepancies;'for instance, valves ~in the as-built systems but not on
        the Piping and Installation Diagrams (P& ids) for'the systems.              ,
        Subsequently, the licensee identified discrepancies which were not found
        during the walkdowns.    This item was initiated to follow the licensee's  ;
        actions in response to the identified discrepancies and. remained open      '
        -pending the licensee's review of the:new discrepancies a more generic
                                                                            ~
        review of the actions taken subsequent to the' sixteen system walkdowns,    i
        and verification that the findings have been incorporated into the          j
        configuration control system.
        In response to this item, the licensee initiated a program to walkdown
        selected important secondary systems for valve inconsistencies. This
        program was defined in procedure AP.73, " System, Print, Valve Lineup
        Verification Program," and included. thirteen of the sixteen systems
        identified.in the October 2, 1985, " Action Plan." Discrepancies'
        identified under this program were documented by nonconformance, reports
        (NCRs) to incorporate the findings into the' configuration control system.
        This program included the depiction of root valves andLinstrument
        isolation valves on the P& ids,-which previously were not included. The-
        licensee utilized the system walkdown effort to' add these. valves. to the
        system' lineups. 'At.the time of this inspection the licensee had
        completed the walkdowns but had not incorporated.all of.the findings into
        the P& ids and procedures.
        The remaining three systems identified in the " Action Plan," but not
        covered by the AP.73 program, were included in a separate system
        verification program to be completed by the licensee. This program is
        defined in procedure AP.93, " System Status and. Investigation Reports,"
        which includes system walkdowns to ensure conformance to design drawings.    .l
        From discussions with licensee personnel, review of controlling
        procedures and associated documentation, and review.of the licensee
        progress to date, the inspector concluded the following:
              The licensee reviewed the discrepancies, involved with this item'and
              completed corrective actions; including revisions to the P& ids;
              The licensee has established programs to ensure that any
              discrepancies, which were not identified during the original sixteen
              system walkdowns, are identified-and incorporated into the
              configuration control system; and
                                                                                      1
 
                                                                              _  ..
  ,i r
*
                                          16
                                                                                        i
              This item will remain open pending verification that the findings
              from the walkdowns have been incorporated into the P& ids and            :
              applicable procedures. The licensee has planned to complete the          l
              AP.73 program prior to restart.                                          ]
                                                                                        !
        Generic Letters                                                                ;
      85-06 (Closed) " Quality Assurance Guidance for ATWS rouipment That is not
        Safety-Related"
      On June 1,1984, the Commission approved publication of a Final Rule,
        10 CFR 50.62, regarding the reduction of risk from anticipated transients      ;
      without scram (AfWS) events for light-water cooler' nuclear power plants.        '
      Section 50.62(d) required that each licensee devo or and submit a
        proposed schedule for meeting the requirements of the rule with 180 days
      after issuance of QA guidance. Scheduled implementation was to be no
        later that the second refueling outage after July 26, 1984. On
        February 24, 1987, the NRC extended the deadline for implementation to
      no later than the third refueling outage after July 26, 1984. This
      Generic Letter (GL) was issued April 16, 1985 to provide the QA guidance
      for non-safety-related equipment encompassed by the rule.
                                                                                        l
      The licensee providad their initial response on September 30, 1985, and          i
      stated that the modifications could be completed by the cycle 9 outage
      which is the third refueling outage after July 26, 1984. This schedule
      was consistent with the new NRC implementation date. The licensee's            !
      design for the ATWS modifications was to be based on the Babcock and            '
      Wilcox (B&W) Owners Group ATWS Standing Committee generic design basis
      which was undergoing NRC review for acceptance. The licensee committed
      to submit the plant specific design description within six months after
      completion of the NRC review.
      The inspector verified that the licensee's review and response to this GL
      was adequate and timely. Therefore, this item is closed.
      Information Notices
      IN-85-23 (Closed) " Inadequate Post Modification and Post Maintenance
      Testing
                                                                                      ,
      The Information Notice addresses inadequate component testing after
      modification or maintenance. As a part of the restart effort, the                ,
      licensee has established the System Review and Test Program. This                l
      program includes a multi-discipline, multi-level review of testing by
      individuals experienced in different aspects of testing. A major              _
      objective of this program is to develop and implement a test program to
      adequately demonstrate system and component functions important to the          -
      safe operation of the plant. This program appears to address the                )
      concerns identified by the Information Notice. This item is closed.              l
      IN-85-91 (Closed) "EDG Load Sequencers"
      The licensee received this Notice and conducted an analysis to determine
      if they were susceptible to the same type concern described in the
                                                                                        !
                                                                                    j
 
  ___
                                                                                      ,
  .,a    i
*
                                                17
                                                                                        I
            Notice, i.e., that a single failure could result in ESF loads being        i
          applied as a single block to the EDG's vice being sequenced onto the        l
          Diesel Bus as designed. This event could cause loss of both EDGs. The
            licensee determined that under some circumstance, this event is possible  {
          at their facility. Upon determining that a design problem existed the
            licensee issued LER 87-08 on February 13, 1987. .This LER identifies the
            problems identified and the solutions proposed by the licensee. Since
            the licensee has completed evaluation of the Notice and corrective
          actions are to be tracked by the LER, this item is closed.
            IN-86-25 (Closed) " Fastener Traceability"
          The Information Notice and Supplement i to the Notice describe
          traceability problems with bolting materials which have been discovered
          at other nuclear power plants. Supplement 1 to the Notice specifically
            identifies a problem with SAE J429 GR 8 and 8.2 bolting. The licensee
          did not discover, during their records search, that they had ever stocked
          these materials. The original Notice discusses the need to conduct
          receipt inspections and to maintain QA traceability records. The          '
          licensee program does this as part of their QA program. This item is
          closed.
          Temporary Instructions
          TI 2500/19 (Closed) " Inspection for Unresolved Safety Issue'A-26,
          Low-Temperature Over Pressure Transient"
          The purpose of this inspection was to verify that the licensee has an      '
          effective mitigation system for the low-temperature overpressure          ,
          transient conditions in accordance with their commitments concerning      !
          Unresolved Safety Issue (USI) A-26.
          The background of USI A-26 is that a technical issue was identified        i
          concerning the safety margin-to-failure for pressurized water reactors
          (PWR) should they be subject to severe pressure transients while at a      1
          relatively low temperature. The majerity of the transients that occurred    '
          were during startup and shutdown operations when the reactor coolant
          system (RCS) was in a water-solid condition (i.e., no steam bubble            l
          present in the pressurizer to act as a surge volume). During such            l
          conditions, the-RCS is susceptible to a rapid increase in system pressure
          through thermal expansion of the RCS water or through injection of water
          into the systems without adequate relief capacity or discharge flow path
          to control the pressure increase.
          Plants receiving an operating license before March 14, 1978, committed to
          design reviews, procedure changes, equipment modifications, operator
          training, and surveillance using a combination of operator personnel and
          automatic equipment.
          The Rancho Seco's Low-Temperature Overpressure (LTOP) system design
          consists of both an active and passive subsystem. The active subsystem
          utilizes the ElectroMatic Operated Valve (EMOV) which provided
          overpressure protection during normal plant operation. The EMOV          1
          actuation circuitry has been modified to provide a second setpoint
      _
                                                                                    u
 
                                                                      - _ _ _ _ - _  . _ _ _ _ - - _ . .
  . * \
*                                                                                                            l
                                            18                                                              1
                                                                                                            I
                                                                                                              l
                                                                                                            )
        (500 psig) that is used during low-temperature operations. The low                                  l
        setpoint is manually enabled at 350 F by positioning a key-operated                                  '
        switch in the Reactor Control Room. An alarm will sound in the Reactor
        Control Room if the reactor coolant pressure falls below 450 psig and the
        key-operated switch is not selected for low-temperature operation. After                            ,
        selection of low-temperature operation, additional alarms will occur if
s      either Seal Injection Flow is greater than 42 gpm or makeup flow is                                ] i
        greater that 135 gpm; if HPI valves are open; and if the EMOV block valve
        HV-21505 is closed.
        The passive subsystem is based on the plant design and operating
        philosophy that precludes the plant from being in a water solid condition                          ,
        (except for system hydro tests). The Rancho Seco RCS always' operates
        with a steam or gas space in the pressurizer; the steam bubble is
        replaced with nitrogen during plant cooldown when system, oressure is
        reduced. The requirements for a maximum pressurizer level provides for a
        sufficient vapor space in the pressurizer to retard the rate of increase
        of RCS pressure, as compared to a water solid system for all mass and
        heat input transients. In this manner, the operator will have time to
        recognize that a pressure transient is in progress and take action to
        mitigate the incident. For the above reasons the pressurizer water level
        will be maintained at or below 220 inches at system pressures above
        100 psig.
        In conjunction with the enablement of LTOP at 350'F and the subsequent
        restriction on pressurizer level, analysis has shown that the HPI system
        is not needed when RCS temperature falls below 350 F. The requirement
        for a maximum makeup tank level limits the mass input available from the
        tank should the makeup valve fail open.
        When the LTOP system is required to be in service, only one of the two
        HPI pumps or the makeup pump will be allowed to operate. Rancho Seco
        normally operates with the makeup pump supplying makeup and seal
        injection by procedure and by TS. However, in the unlikely event
        degradation of the makeup pump should occur while using the the LTOP
        system, it would be necessary to start one of the HPI pumps before
        stopping the makeup pump. However, because the operator is aware of the
        LTOP conditions, it is expecced that this brief transition stage would
        not signtficent?y increase the level of the pressurizer and the
        probability of an overpre',surization incident.
        Separate power supplies are provided for the EMOV circuitry and LTOP                                q
        drains which alert the operator of an overpressurization event so that a                            "
        single power source failure will not disable the EMOV and the LTOP
        alarms. These alarms are high pressurizer level, high-high pressurizer
        level, and high makeup tank water level. The alarms assure that the
        operator is alerted so he can take action to terminate an event even if
        the EMOV is disabled.
        The inspector reviewed the design of Rancht Seco's LTOP system and                                  f
        verified that the system is designed to protect the vessel given a single                            i
        failure in addition to a failure that initiated the pressure transient.                              l
        The LTOP system has separate power supplies which prevents a single power
        source failure from disabling the EMOV and the LTOP alarms. The;LTOP                                3
                                                                        ,          a
                      .m                                                                                  x
 
                                                                                                        _ _ _ _ _ _ __
          .. .
        *
                                                                19
                            system is designed to prevent exceeding 10 CFR 50, Appendix G limits for
                            the reactor pressure vessel during plant cooldown or startup, and is not
                            vulnerable to an event that causes a pressure transient and a failure of
                            equipment needed to terminate the transient. The inspector reviewed the
                            licensee's evaluation discussion and correspondence between the licensee
                            and the NRC which finally supported the conclusion that 500 psig was an
                            acceptable setpoint. This conclusion was documented in the NRC letter to
                            the licensee dated February 25, 1985.
                            The inspector reviewed the Administrative Controls and Procedures for the
                            LTOP system and determined the following items:
                            a.    The licensee's procedures allow the plant to be operated only with a
                                    steam or nitrogen blanket in the pressurizer at all times except for
                                  hydrostatic tests. This effectively minimizes the time in a water
                                  solid condition. This is stated in the Operatin
                                    " Pressurizer and Pressurizer Relief Tank System,g in Procedure A.3,
                                  paragraph 3.1.10.
                            b.    The licensee's procedures restrict the number of HPI pumps to no
                                  more than one when the RCS is in the LTOP condition. Operating
                                  Procedure B.4, " Plant Shutdown and Cooldown," paragraph 5.28:
                                  provides RCS overpressure protection by tagging out the HPI pumps
                                  and their associated isolation valves.
                            c.    Licensee operators are alerted since an alarm will sound in the
                                  Control Room if the LTOP system is not enabled or if the PORV
                                  isolation valve is not open when the RCS pressure drops below
                                  500 psig,
                            d.    Amendment 82 to the TSs provides justification that the
                                  plant-installed system is in accordance with the plant license.
                            The inspector reviewed the training and equipment modifications
                            concerning LTOP and determined the following:
                            a.    All operators as of the time of this inspection had received
                                  training concerning LTOP event causes, the operation and maintenance
                                  of the system that investigates the event and the consequences of
                                  inadvertent actuation. The inspector interviewed the instructors,
                                  examined their lesson plans, and interviewed operators. No problems
                                  were discovered.                                                                    !
                            b.    Permanent modifications and procedural changes have been made that
                                  result in a system that provides mitigation for RCS LTOP events. A
                                  permanent second setpoint of 500 psig has been inst lled on the EMOV
                                  Relief Valve, PSV-21511, and procedural changes have been added to
                                  Operations Procedure B.4 to establish RCS overpressure at 350*F and
                                  tag out two out of three HPI pumps, as well as shutting the
                                  isolation valves to the HPI pumps.
                            The inspector reviewed the surveillance activities associated with the
                            LTOP system and determined that the EMOV operability test is to be
                            performed via special procedure SP.90, "Special Frequency LTOP
- _ _ _        _ _ - _ _ - -
 
__                                  _        -. -    .                .  _          _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
                                                                        a
  '
                                          '
      J ',
    '
                                                  20                                                                        1
                                                                                                                                          1
            Operability Test," which was just being issued at this tise of                                                                  '
            inspection. This test will verify EMOV operability prior to cooling the
            RCS below 350 F'per the TSs Table 4.1-2, item 15. . Special procedure
            SP 200.20 provided EMOV position indicator. calibration once each
            refueling interval.
            The inspectors' concluded, based on this review, that Rancho Seco h'as'an
            effective mitigation system for LTOP transient conditions in accordance                                                          l
            with their commitments r.oncerning USI A-26. .TI 2500/19 is closed.
            Part 21
            85-20-P (Closed) "GE AK and AKP Circuit Breakers"
                                                  ,
            The. licensee,:after receiving the Part 21 Report, revised maintenance
            procedure, EM 175, " Control- Rod Drhe Low Voltage Power Circuit-
            Maintenance,".to include steps to check for and remedy the items listed
            in the report beginning in December of 1985. All breakers on site have
            been checked for their defects. This item is closed.
            Licensee Event Report (LER)                ,4
                                                                                                                                              q
            LERs 85-01-L2 and 85-01-L3 (Closed) "H 2 M nitor System Containment
            Isolacion Valves Found Open for 7 Days                                                                            ,
            Revision 3 to this LER identitics that revision 1, which was closed in
            inspection report 50/312/86-38, was misnumbered and should have been
            Revision 2. Therefore,IER 85-01-L2 is closed.                                                                                      .
                                                                                                                                          d
            The inspector reviewed revision 3 and verified that the changes were                                                            j
            non-technical in nature and did not enange the status or significance of                                                        {
            the event. LER 85-01-L3 is qlosed.                                                                                              q
            LERs 85-22-L0 'and 85-22-L1 (Closed) "Open Pressurizer Valve"
            The inspector reviewed licensee Operating Procedure A-11, Revision-21,
            and verified that 1) Personnel are required to verify that enclosure 8.1,
            " Normal Valve Line-11p," is complete prior to sampling, 2) A-11 has been
            rewritten and includes specific valves to be manipulated by operators and                                                          4
            chemists for each sample taken, 3) A-11 now requires the control room to
            log-process sample start and stop' times, and 4) A-11 now 1 requires valves
            to bel returned to their normal position'and the breaker be racked out and
            verified after completion of sampling.
                                      -
                                                              F
                                                                                ,
            The licensee also. issued Special Order 87-1 to remind Operations                                                          -
            personnel of the requirements and importance of logging valve status.
            Licensee Special Order 86-29 was issued tu instruct operators of the
            importance of each shift turning over important evolutions to oncoming.
            crews.
            The licensee has completed their corrective actions to prevent recurrence                                              ,
                                                                                                                                              I
            of this event. The inspector concluded that these correctf ve cetions                                                  '
            adequately addressed this LER. These items are, closed.                                                                  ,
                                                                                                                                              .
                                                            ]                      ,
                                                            ,i                  ,                                                i.
                                                                              (
                                                                            4                                      ,
                                                                                ,
                                                                                                                                                e
                                                        A
L                                                                                                                                          ,'
 
                      4    .
            *
                                                                              21
                                                                                                                      1
                              i
                          f            85-32-01 (Closed), LER 85-22 " Root Cause Analysis"
                                        The inspector reviewed LER 85-22 and revisions 1 and 2. The inspector
                                        then reviewed the root cause evaluation performed by the licensee. The
                                        evaluation appeared adequate to identify the problems which caused the
                                        event and the recommended corrective measures appeared to be adequate to
                                        preclude a recurrence of the event.    This item is closed.
                        o                LERs 85-07-LO, 85-07-L1 and 85-07-L2 (Closed) "41.60 KV Bus Undervoltage
                                          Relay Setpoints
        *
                                        The inspector reviewed the licensee's root cause evaluation for the
                                          improper relay settings. The evaluation appeared to be adequate to
                                        determine the cause of the event. The licensee is making some electrical
                                        circuit modifications to prevent a recurrence of this problem. Included
                                          in these is a modification to supplement existing inverse relay ITE 27
                                        with an in-line backup ITE 27N which is a definite time relay. This            l
                                        modification is being made to provide a second level of protection and
                                                                                                                        '
                                        enhance system reliability. The licensee also determined that the            1
                                          definite time relay will make unnecessary their proposal to increase
                                          surveillance frequency of the ITE 27 relays.
                                        The licensee is tracking this edification on the restart items list and
                                          is requiring that it be completed prior to plant restart.      The
                                        modifications not yet completed are in ECN-R-1045.      This item is closed.
                                          LER 86-14-L1_fClosed) " Decay i; eat Pump Casing Drain Line Eibow Weld Leak"
l
                                          Revision 0 to this LER was cl.osed in Inspection Report 50-312/86-07.    The
                                          inspector reviewed this revision versus the original issuance and            l
                                          verified that there were no significant changes to the event description.
                                        This issuance, however, provided a more detailed analysis of the event
                                        ''and a summary of the failure analysis performed on the event. This
                                          information was reviewed in the closeout of revision 0. LER 86-14-L1 is
i                                        closed.
                                          LER 86-15-LO (Closed) "RM-80 Printed Circuit Board Workmanship"
                                        The licensee reported that during cold shutdown conditions on
                                        September 21, 1985, two trace solder pads were dislodged from a printed
l                                      ' circuit board during repair'of the Radiation Monitor Computer (RM-80)
                                        communication board for radiation monitor R-15050. The glued-on solder
                                        pads were dislodged when they were touched with a hot soldering iron,
                                        Glue attachment of tha solder pads is normal technique in the licensee's
                                        General Atomics (GA) circuit boards and is more heat sensitive than would
                                          be expected with a plated attachment.
                                        This finding was considered a voluntary LER because the pads in question
                                        were used as filler only and were not in any circuit on the board. The
                                    ' licensee issued the LER to notify the NRC and other utilities of the.
                                          potential for glued-on solder pads on GA Radiation Monitor circuit boards
                                          to become detached.    Additionally, the licensee determined that this
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  _ _ _ - _ . _ - _ -.          __ -          -  -_-  _
 
_ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ -
                  '
                        , ( '.
                                                                          22
                                                                                                              -    ,
                                                                                                                  i
                              radiation monitor was not a basic component as defined in 10 CFR Part 21            l'
                              and, therefore, this incident was not reportable pursuant to that Part.
                              The inspector verified that the licensee had addressed the work related              )
                              aspects of this incident.            Instrument and Control (I&C) Technicians were )
                              advised of this problem and training sessions were given to the                      l
                              technicians on the appropriate methods and precautions for soldering                l
                              processes. In addition, the licensee was working on an Electrical                    l
                              Standard methods' document and precautions for this incident were to be
                              added to it. This LER is closed.
                              The inspector noted, however, that the licensee had not been in contact              i
                              with the vendor (GA) about the generic aspects of this item. The                    '
                              inspector was concerned that other GA monitors in use at the plant could            j
                              be basic components as defined by 10 CFR Part 21 and, therefore, this                i
                              item could be reportable. This item remained open pending NRC review of              I
                              its deportability in accordance with 10 CFR Part 21.              (0 pen Item        l
                              87-13-04).
                                                                                                                    I
                              LERs 86-21-L0 (Closed) and 86-21-L1 (0 pen) " Failure to Implement                  l
                              Inservice Testing of Certain Safety-Related Valves"
                              The inspector reviewed this LER and verified that it was issued in a                ;
.
'
                              timely manner and included the required information. Revision 1 was
                              issued, as committed by the licensee, to supplement the original
                              information. The revision included 5 additional valves that were
                              identified during the licensee's corrective actions.              The corrective
                              actions are in progress and the licensee has committed to complete them
                              prior to restart.            The inspector verified that the revision included all
                              information from the original LER and provided the additional information
                              that they committed to provide. Therefore, LER 86-21-L0 is clr .ed.
                              LER 86-21-L1 will remain open to followup on the licensee's corrective
                              action implementation.
                              LER 86-30 (0 pen) " Decay Heat System Isolation During Transformer Switch"
                              The licensee reported that during cold shutdown conditions on
                              December 8, 1986, a loss of the 4A bus power, attendant diesel generator
                              start, and DHS isolation occurred during the transfer of the source
                              transformer. The cause was attributed to a procedure deficiency along
                              with less than adequate job preparation by the performing operator.
                              The inspector noted that the licensee's corrective actions appeared to
                              address the concerns of the LER. However, these actions were not
                              complete at the time of this inspection and only one action was scheduled
                              for completion by restart.            The inspector noted that, in the LER, the
                              licensee comnitted to revise procedure A.58, "4.16 KV Electrical System,"
                              prior to January 17, 1987. At the time of this inspection, the procedure
                              revision was still in draft form.
                              At the exit meeting, the inspector discussed the.importance of meeting
                              commitment dates and noted that this item was similar to events detailed
                              in Inspection Report 50-312/87-11. This item remains open pending the
                              completion of licensee corrective actions and subsequent NRC inspection.
L_._--------_---._.---_--_        . - - - - - _ .--- . - - -
 
    _ _ _ - _ _ - _ .
      g          aT
  *
                                                        23                                    q
                                                                                                l
                                                                                                I
                      Special Reports
                      83-31-X0 ' Closed) "CBAST Boron Concentration"
                      On August 22, 1983, the licensee took a boron sample from the CBAST which
                      exceeded the TS level of 8500 ppm. The plant operators then added        j
                      1750 gallons of demineralized water to the CBAST. The resultant boron    ;
                      concentration was 7914 ppm. It was expected that it would take
l                    3450 gallons of water to lower the concentration to 8000 ppm. Upon
i                    further evaluation the licensee determined that the initial boron
l                    concentration never exceeded 8451 ppm but resulted from inadequate        i
                      mixing, hence the TS limit was not exceeded. In the LER the licensee did
                      identify that there was an excessive amount of time from discovery of the
                      out-of-specification sample until the plant control room operators were  i
                      cognizant of the possible out-of-specification chemistry sample. The      !
                      licensee revised AP.306, Section VIII, to require that chemists report    !
                      immediately to the control room any out-of-specification sample, and when I
                      a TS or process standard out-of-specification condition exists, to        1
                      require an Out-of-Specification Notice be initiated. This action
                      appeared to be adequate to prevent a recurrence of this event. This item
l                    is closed.
l
                      84-03-X0 (Closed) " Defective Switch Jaws"
                      While performing testing of protective and control relays (EM.144), the  )
                      licensee identified five relays, Westinghouse type MG-6 Relay mounted in
                      an FT-22 case, with identically defective switch jaws. The licensee then  ,
                      examined all Flexitest switch installations on site and found a total of  i
                      9 identical defects out of 235 installations. The licensee then            l
                      discussed the problem with the Westinghouse Coral Springs QA Department.
                      Westinghouse revealed that this problem had been previously identified,  l
                      that the cause had been determined and that the problem was related to
                      only those relays with a 1969 production date. The licensee has since      ,
                      replaced all relay, with defective jaws and 1969 production dates. This  !
                      item is closed.
                      84-04-X0 (Closed) "Electromatic Relief Valve Leaking"
                      On August 7,1984, Electromagnetic Relief Valve PSV-21511 had enough seat
                      leakage to cause a Pressurizer Safety Valve Open alarm. RCS pressure at
                      this time was 221 psi. Correspondence with the manufacturer indicated
                      that this leakage could be caused by pilot valve spring fatigue. The
                      licensee replaced the pilot valve springs with springs from the
                      manufacturer which have a higher spring rating and should not leak until
                      RCS pressure drops to about 50 psi. This item is closed.
                      Region V Items
                      RV-E-13 (Closed) " Examine 03erator Reference to Stri) Charts vs. Safety
                      Parameter Display Sy* tem (S)DS) for Steam Generator evel"
                      This item was previously reviewed in IE report numbers 50-312/86-07 and
                      87-08. The remaining open issue was to determine to what extent the SPDS
                      operating manual contained incorrect information. The issue arose from
 
                                                                                                        ,
                                                                                                          l
    ..+\                                                                                                j
  *
                                                                  24                                    1
                                                                                                        l
                            an observation that the SPDS operating manual description of a steam
                            generator levol algorithm was in error.      The licensee received the
                            algorithm from a vendor in 1984 and the description was in error at that      i
                            time. The error was not discovered by the licensee at the time of the        I
                            algorithm implementation.
                            In February, 1987, the licensee notified the vendor of the manual error
                            and initiated a change to be completed as part of other SPDS changes for
                            modifications. At the time of this inspection, the manual change was in      ,
                            draft form pending management reviews. To assure that other errors did        l
                            not exist in the manual, the licensee contracted to have an inciependent
                            verification performed on the manual contents. This review was in
                            progress at the time of the inspection. The licensee has committed to
                            complete the SPDS validation and verification and a detailed acceptance
                            test on the modifications prior to restart.                                  l
                            Based on the licensee's actions and the commitments for verification,
                            this item is closed.
                    7.      Management Changes
                            On May 4, 1987, the SMUD Board announced the replacement of John Ward,      ;
                            Deputy General Manager, Nuclear, by G. Carl Andognini as the Chief            l
                            Executive Officer, Nuclear.                                                  I
                    8.      Exit Meetina
                            The inspector met with licensee representatives (noted in Paragraph 1) at    i
                            various times during the report period and formally on May 29, 1987. The      !
                            scope and findings of the inspection activities described in this report
                            were summarized at the meeting.      Licensee representatives acknowledged
                            the inspector's findings and violations identified.
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E_______._______._____.________.______________________________. _
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