ML20236R825: Difference between revisions

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{{Adams
#REDIRECT [[IR 05000440/1998011]]
| number = ML20236R825
| issue date = 07/16/1998
| title = Insp Rept 50-440/98-11 on 980518-22.Violations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Adequacy of Licensee Programs,Procedures, Training,Equipment & Supporting Documentation for Maint of medium-voltage & low-voltage Power Circuit Breakers
| author name =
| author affiliation = NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
| addressee name =
| addressee affiliation =
| docket = 05000440
| license number =
| contact person =
| document report number = 50-440-98-11, NUDOCS 9807220299
| package number = ML20236R805
| document type = INSPECTION REPORT, NRC-GENERATED, TEXT-INSPECTION & AUDIT & I&E CIRCULARS
| page count = 22
}}
See also: [[see also::IR 05000440/1998011]]
 
=Text=
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                                U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
                                                REGION lil
                      Docket No:          50-440
                      License No:        NPF-58
                      Report No:          50-440/98011(DRS)
                      Licensee:          Centerior Service Company
                      Facility:          Perry Nuclear Power Plant
                      Location:          P. O. Box 97, A200
      ,
                                          Perry,OH 44081
                      Dates:              May 18 - 22,1998
                      inspectors:        Z. Falevits, Reactor Engineer, Team Leader, Rlll
                                          S. Alexander, Reactor Engineer, NRR
                                          A. Pal, Electrical Engineer, NRR
                                          T. Tella, Reactor Engineer, Rill
[                    Approved by:        Ronald N. Gardner, Chief,
                                          Engineering Specialists Branch 2
                                          Division of Reactor Safety
                                                                                          .
l-
l
l
!
o
            9907220299 980716
  ,
            PDR  ADOCK 05000440
            0                PDR
{
l.
 
  .        .                  -    _
                                                -    - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ - - _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ -
1
      .
                                                                                                                  "
    .
          .
                                                  EXECUTIVE SUMMARY                                              !
                                                Per:y Nuclear Power Plant
                                        . NRC Inspection Report 50-440/98'111(DRS).
          A team insoection was conducted using the guidance of Temporary instruction (TI) 2515/137,              !
        . Revision 1, " Inspection of Medium-Voltage and Low-Voltage Power Circuit Breakers." issued            I
          March 1998. The purpose of this inspection was to verify the adequacy of licensae programs,            l
          procedures, training, equipment and supporting documentation for the mainte'1ance of                    l
          medium-voltage and low-voltage power circuit breakers. The inspection team was comprised of            I
          Region lil and Headquarters personnel. The following observations were made.
        7        Calculatic.a PRDC-0007, " Voltage Drop of DC Control Circuits," dated May 18,1998,
                  lacked rigor in terms of design inputs and conclusions. In addition, design control            l
;                measures were ineffective in that design reviews failed to identify these deficiencies. A
                  safety assessment, performed during the inspection, was acceptable to support an                i
                  interim operability determination. The licensee indicated that a long term resolution
                  would be developed to conservatively demonstrate on a continuing basis that the DC
                  system could perform its intended function. A violation was cited. (Section E2.1)
          e      The licensee initiated aggressive corrective action to address NRC concems identified in
                  1994 relative to inadequate breaker maintenance. Subsequently, in 1995/1996 all AC              !
                  power circuit breakers were refurbished. However, most safety related DC bruakers              :
                  had not yet been refurbished despite their age and the observed hardened grease in              !
                  most of the ABB low voltage breakers. The licensee committed to accelerate the                  i
                  refurbishment plan for the DC breakers. (Section M2.1)
          e      The preventive maintenance procedures for the low-voltage power circuit breakers                i
                  reviewed were generally of a type appropriate to the circumstances and included                !
                  appropriate qualitative and quantitative acceptance criteria. However, various errors          !
                were identified in test reports reviewed for solid state trip devices. Similar errors were  .
                                                                                                                -l
                  identified by the licensee as a result of the team's request to review additional test
                  reports. The instantaneous trip function of circuit breaker EF1804 was tested for
                  instantaneous pickup at 2270 amps instead of the upper limit of 2160 amps. A violation          l
                  was cited. (Section M3.1)
,
          o      The licensee was using an unevaluated cleaner on the 5 kV and 15 kV medium power
'
                  circuit breakers. The maintenance procedures specified an ammonia-based glass
                  cleaner to clean the breaker's electrical components. The licensee used "Windex Glass
                  Cleaner" which was not an evaluated cleaner. (Section M3.2)
          e      The team concluded that lack of training on the Gels contributed to the inadequate
                  implementation of the test procedures and considered this a weakness. (Section M5.1)
                                                                                                                  l
                                                                                                                  l
                                                                                                        2
                                                                                                                  l
._
 
      - - _ - _ - _ - _ _ _                                    _ - - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - - _ - _ _ . -
      .
  ..                ,
    .
                    e        There was very good evaluation and disposition of NRC, vendor, INPO, and other
                              industry experience information. The operating experience reviews (OER) program
                            ' procedures were generally comprehensive and workable and the OER database was
                              complete with respect to circuit breaker information identified beforehand by the team.
                              The individual OER evaluations were generally thorough and the resolution of issues
                              expressed in NRC generic communications, operating experience reports, Part 21
                              reports and vendor letters was very good. This area was considered a strength.
                              (Sections M6.1)
                    e        Treatment of medium and low-voltage power circuit breakers under the Maintenance
                              Rule was satisfactory. (Section M6.3)
                    e-        No specific audits or self assessments were performed in the areas of breaker
                              maintenance or operations. This area was considered a weakness. (Section M7.1)
                    e        The implementation of the vendor manual control and vendor interface program in the
                              past was not effective. The program was suffering from inadequate involvement by
                              equipment-knowledgeable staff, insufficiently aggressive or tenacious follow up with
                              uncooperative vendors, and out-of-date vendor contact information. The latest version
                              of the vendor manual control and vendor interface program shou'd improve the state of
                              switchgear vendor manuals. This area was considered a weakness. (Sections M8.1)
                    e        No documented breaker failures were recorded that could be directly attributed to
                              breaker problems after the licensee refurbished all AC breakers in 1995/1996. The
                              team noted that since breakers had been swapped between switchgear cubicles and
                              breaker serial numbers were not being consistently recorded on work orders, the
                              repetitive breaker failure data could not be easily obtained. The team also noted that
                              the licensee had not yet established a program for trending breaker repeat failures and
                              routine maintenance deficiencies. (Sections M8.2)
                                                                                                                                                                  I
                                                                                                                                                                  ,
                                                                                                                      3
                                                                                                                                                                  l
w
 
                                                                        _
                                                                            . _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
                                                                                                            1
  -
      .                                                                                                    \
    .
                                                                                                            I
                                            II. Maintenance
      M2    Maintenance and Materiel Condition of Facilities and Equipment
      M2.1 Low Voltage Breaker Maintenance
        a.  Insoection Scooe
            The team reviewed the licensee's maintenance and refurbishment program for low
            voltage breakers.                                                                              l
        b.  Observations and Findings                                                                      ,
            The team noted that a violation (Perry report 50-440/94006) had been issued by NRC in
            1994 for inadequate and untimely corrective actions to address the grease hardening
            concems in ABB breakers. Grease hardening in ABB breakers was a known problem
            since at least 1989, when a 10CFR Part 21 Notice was issued. The team also noted
            that most of the breakers refurbished by the licensee during 1995 indicated severe
            hardening of grease and several other problems. All the safety related AC low voltage
            breakers (except the spares) had been refurbished and appeared to be in good working
            condition. However, there were twelve safety related DC breakers in Unit 1 and eight
            safety related DC breakers in Unit 2 yet to be refurbished.
            The team noted that the DC ABB breakers were approximately 20 years old and the
            vendor recommended complete refurbishment of these breakers, at intervals to not
            exceed a maximum of 10 years. Further, four DC breakers refurbished recently also
            exhibited hardened grease. In view of these facts, the team was concerned about the
            condition of the remaining DC breakers in service.
            In response to this concem, the licensee informed the team that the refurbishment
            schedule for the DC breakers would be accelerated and that the safety related DC
            breakers would be refurbished by September 30,1999. The previous completion date
            was April 17,2001 for safety related ABB K-Line DC breakers.
        c.  Conclusion
            The team determined that corrective actions, taken to address the concems noted by
            the NRC with the AC breakers in 1994, were effective. However, the team was
            concerned that the safety related DC breakers had not yet been refurbished in view of
            their age and the observed hardened grease in most of the ABB low voltage breakers.
                                                    4
                                                                                                            i
L
 
  _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ - _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ - _ - _ _ - _ _                                _ - _  _____    _          __ _            __        -_
                                                                              .
                                      -
                                                                                .
                                                                .
                                                                                -M3    Maintenance Procedures and Documentation
  -
                                                                                M3.1 Review of Maintenance Procedures for Low-voltage Power Circuit Breakers
l                                                                                  a.  Insoection Scone
l'                                                                                    The team reviewed the preventive maintenance procedures for the low-voltage power
                                                                                      circuit breakers. The procedures were compared to the maintenance section of the
                                                                                      manufacturer's instruction manuals and to the recommendations in Electric Power
                                                                                      Research Institute (EPRI) Nuclear Maintenance Applications Center (NMAC) Publication
l                                                                                      NP-7410, Volume I, " Low-voltage Circuit Breaker Maintenance," Part 1," ABB K-Line.
                                                                                      The procedures were reviewed in light of the team's knowledge of good industry practice
                                                                                      - for breaker maintenance, as well as specific guidance in Tl 2515/137. These
                                                                                      documents and concepts provided a framework for assessing the quality of the
                                                                                      - maintenance procedures. The ultimate acceptance criterion applied by the team was
                                                                                      that the procedures were of a type appropriate to the circumstances and included
                                                                                      appropriate qualitative and quantitative acceptance criteria.
                                                                                      The team reviewed the following low-voltage circuit breakers procedures:
L                                                                                      .
                                                                                                General Electric Instruction (GEI)-0009, ABB Low-Voltage Power Circuit Breaker
                                                                                                Types K-600 & K-600s Through L-3000 & K-3000s Mainter'ance, Revision 4.
                                                                                      .
                                                                                                gel-0124, Types SS-3, SS-4, and SS-5 Solid State Trip Devices Testing and
                                                                                                Calibration Using Multi-Amp CB-8160 Test set, Revision 4.
                                                                                      .
                                                                                                gel-0102, Maintenance and Calibration of Gould/ITE Solid State Trip Cue'ces
                                                                                                                                                                        ,
l                                                                                              Type (SS-3, SS-4, SS-5), Revision 2.
;                                                                                      .
                                                                                                gel-0115, Maintenance and Calibration of DC Over current Trip Device Type
l
'
                                                                                                OD-3 and OD-4, Revision 2.
                                                                                      *        gel-0012, Cleaning of Electrical Equipment, Revision 2.
                                                                                  b.  Observations and Findings
                                                                                      The team observed that the maintenance procedures were clear, detailed, incorporated
                                                                                      sign-offs on individual steps by craft persons and overall by approver and supervisor.
                                                                                      Data sheets provided a good record of the results of all measurements made and
                                                                                      breaker condition at time of maintenance.
                                                                                                                                                                              l
                                                                                      The preventive maintenance procedures reviewed were generally of a type appropriate
                                                                                      to the circumstances and included appropriate qualitative and quantitative acceptance
                                                                                      criteria. Breaker maintenance was done at a five year frequency. However, some
,                                                                                      breakers depending on operating experience, might be maintained at three years
i                                                                                      frequency.
                                                                                      (1)      The team reviewed procedure gel-0009, Revision 4, in detail, and made the
                                                                                                following observations:
L
                                                                                                                                5
L
f
L
 
  - - _ - __                    _ _ - __ - - ______.
                .
    -
                  .
            .
.                          .                    The procedure included the maintenance and testing recommendations
                                                from the manufacturer's instruction book and the NMAC K-line
                                                Maintenance Guide. In addition, the procedure had been revised to
                                        ' include industry experience.
                          .                    The breaker closing and tripping operation at 90 Vdc were included in the
                                                procedure. However, the vendor maaual recommended a minimum
                                                voltage for tripping of 70 Vdc. Also, the verification at 90 Vdc was not
                                                performed on all breakers. The team was informed that the closing and
                                                tripping operations at the minimum and maximum operating volhnes
                                                were performed at the service center during refurbishment. (Operating
                                                breakers below the minimum control voltage that might be expected -
                                                under the worst-case design basis condition and operation for tim
                                        - particular breaker provided some assurance of opening or closing
                                                operability at those voltages.) Opening and closing breakers electrically
                                                at the minimum and maximum rated voltage for the device of concem
                                                (i.e., trip coils, closing solenoids, closing spring release coils, and closing
                                                spring charging motors) provided qualitative indication that there was
              e                                some margin to degraded mechanical condition of the breaker for-
                                                diagnostic screening purposes.
                    (2)  The team reviewed procedures gel-0102 and 0124 for testing and calibration of -
                          solid state trip devices on K-line breakers and identifed that the limits for the
                          solid state trip device long and short time delays were not in agreement with the
                          vendor manual recommendations. The time delays are tabulated below:
                          Lona Time Delav (seconds) Vendor Manual Data                                    Perry Procedure Data
                          Min.                                                    8 - 12                8 - 12
                          int.                                                    20 - 32                19 - 32
                          Max.                                                    60 - 98                57 - 98
                          Short Time Delav (seconds)
                          Min.                                                    0.08 - 0.17-            0.08 - 0.17
                          Int.                                                    0.20 - 0.32            0.20 - 0.32
                          Max.                                                    0.35 - 0.50            0.35 - 0.50
                          CR 98-1148 was written to address this cormem.
                    (3)  Additionally, the team reviewed a sample of actual testing using these
                          procedures a'x! identified that the instantaneous trip function of circuit breaker
                          EF1804 used for emergency closed cooling pump motor 1P42C001 A was
                          inadequate. The team reviewed a data sheet from work order R93-683, dated
                        . November 14,1994, and identified that the electrician who determined the test
                          current values, based on data provided by engineering, made several errors in
                          computing the test current values which were used during performance of the
                                                                              6
 
    .
      .
                                                                                                          )
  '
                test. First, the electrician applied the long-time trip pickup multiplica, tion factor    !
                (1.1) in addition to the instantaneous trip multiplication factor (12) to the trip unit's
                nominal full-load current value of 150 amperes, yielding a nominal instantaneous
                trip pickup value of 1980 amperes (150x12x1.1) instead of the correct value of
                1800. amperes (150x12). Second, the electrician applied a previously used field
                test tolerance of 15 percent to his incorrectly computed instantaneous pick up
                value of 1980 amperes instead of the *20 percent tolerance prescribed in the
                revision of the procedure in effect at the time. This yielded a minimum
                instantaneous trip test current value of 1683 amperes (1980x0.85) instead of the
                correct value of 1440 amperes (1800x0.8) and an upper test limit of
                2277 amperes (1980x1.15)instead of the correct value of 2160 amperes
                (1800x1.2).
              . The electrician tested the trip device for no-pickup at 1685 amps (lower limit) and
                instantaneous pickup at 2270 amps (upper limit). Because the trip function was
                tested at a value higher than the maximum allowable trip current (and tripped at
                that level, but not below it), the test did not provide assurance that the breaker
                would trip at current levels within the allowable band. This potentially impacted
                circuit coordination and circuit protection. The fact that the breaker did not trip
                when tested at a current level within 15 percent of the lower limit was actually
                conservative (although not in accordance with the current procedure), indicating
                that this breaker was not likely to tilp prematurely. The team determined that the
                errors made in the test report were not identified by the reviewer / approver that
                signed off the test report. Other completed tests with similar errors were
                identified as a result of the team's request to review additional completed tests.
                The team considered the as left instantanooto trip test current of circuit breaker
                EF1B04 to be inadequate.
                Criterion XI, " Test Control," of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, requires, in part, that
                components be tested in accordance with written test procedures that .
                incorporate the requirements and acceptance limits of applicable design
                documents. The failure to ensure that testing of circuit breaker EF1804 was in
                accordance with design requirements is considered an example of a violation of
                Criterion XI (50-440/98011-01(DRS)).
                Condition report (CR) 98-1140 was written to address this concem and an
                operability evaluation was performed. The operability evaluation determined that
                the circuit pivw. tion and coordination would not be affected and the tested value
                would not degrade the safety function of systems, structures or components.
                The team agreed with the conclusion of the operability evaluation.
        (4).  In response to the team's concem about the use of 20 percent tolerance for
                instantaneous pickup inriend of 15 percent as indicated in the vendor manual,
                the licensee provided an ABB letter dated September 22,1992. The team noted
                that the ABB letter indicated a 10 percent tolerance according to ANSI
                C37.17-1979 for long time pickup and longer waiting timr= between tests. These
L.              were not included in the plant procedures gel 0102 and 0124. CR 98-1166 was
                                                    7
L
 
    ____________                                                                                _                    -
                                                                                                                          -_ ._
l
t                .
  -
                  .
      .
                                              -          t
                                  . written to address this finding. This item was considered unresolved pending                !
                                    licensee completed corrective action following clarification from the vendor of use
                                  ' of the 15 percent tolerance for long time trip during single phase primary injection
                                    testing and the vendor recommended cooling periods between short time and
                                    instantaneous tests. (50-440/98011-02(DRS)).
                    c.  Conclusions
                          The preventive maintenance procedures reviewed were generally of a type appropriate
l                        to the circumstances and included appropriate qualitative and quantitative acmptance
                          criteria. However, the team identified various errors in test reports for solid state trip
                          devices. Similar errors were identified by the licensee as a result of the team's request
                          to review additional test reports. As a result of the noted test errors, the team identified
                          that the instantaneous trip function of circuit breaker EF1B04 was tested for -
                          instantaneous pickup at 2270 amps instead of the upper limit of 2160 amps. The
                          breaker was subsequently evaluated and the evaluation determined that circuit
                          protection and coordination would not be affected.
                  M3.2 Review of I nhriu. tion and Cleaners used Durina Mahtenance of Power Circuit
                          Breakers
                    a.  Inspection Scope
                          The team reviewed preventive maintenance procedures used to perform maintenance
                          activities on the power circuit breakers. The team focused on lubrication requirements -
                                                                      .
                          delineated in the procedure and compared them to vendor recommended and approved
                          lubricants and cleaners.
                    b.  Observations and Findings
                          Generic Electric Instruction, gel-0135, "ABB Power Breakers 5 KV Types 5HK250 and
                          5HK350 Maintenance," Revision 0, dated March 25,1994, section 4.2, item 9 specified
                          that a~mmonia-based glass cleaner, or equivalent SC 1152404 Chemical Permit 284 was
                          an acceptable cleaner for 5 KV breakers. Section 5.4.4b stated, " Wipe the outside of
                          the arc chute with a clean cloth and a mild ammonia-based glass cleaner," Similarly,
                          gel-0136, "ABB Power Breakers 15 KV Types 5HK1000 Maintenance," Revision 0,
                          dated March 25,' 1994, section 4.2, item 10 also specified that ammonia-based glass
                          cleaner, or equivalent was an acceptable cleaner for 15 KV breakers. The team noted
                          that Chemical Permit 284 was issued on June 6,1996, for use of "Windex Glass
                          Cleaner" which contained butoxyethanol and isopropyl alcohol; however, the permit did
                          not allow use of this cleaner specifically on breaker components. The team determined
                          that the use of "Windex Glass Cleaner" was not approved by the breaker manufacturer.
                          ABB manual MS3.2.1.9-1D used, in part, for maintenance and surveillance of
                          medium-voltage breakers type 5HK250 and 350 stated in section 1.a that the
                        '
                          recommended lubricants for breaker mechanisms was Anderol 757 and for electrical
                          contacts, NO-OX-lD. The manual further stated that, "use of other lubricants risks
                                                                        8
_
 
I
c
'
        .
  -
          .
    .
                                                    incompatibility with original materials or unproven performance." In addition, ITE Gould
                                                    instructions, IB-8.2.7-2, issue H "5 KV power circuit breakers type 5HK75,5HK150,
                                                    5HK250 and 5HK350, " stated in section 5.12 " Lubrication" that, "if grease should
                                                    become contaminated or parts are replaced, lubrication should be done with NO-OX-ID
                                                    or Anerol as applicable. Use of other greases have not been proved by test and are not
                                                    recommended."
l                                                  The licensee could not provide the team with an engineering evaluation that concluded
l                                                  that use of the "Windex Glass Cleaner" to clean the breaker arc chutes was acceptable.
!
                                                    The licensee informed the team that the use of Windex would be discontinued, the
                                                    procedures would be revised to match the vendor manual and an acceptable product
                                                    would be used. The licensee, however, did not issue a condition report, to determine
                                                    the effect this cleaner had on the breakers it was used on, until questioned by the NRC.
                                                    The team was concemed since use of unapproved sprays in the nuchar industry on
                                                    safety related breakers has resulted in breaker operational problems.
                                                  The licensee was evaluating the acceptability of the use of "Windex Glass Cleaner" to
                                                    clean safety related electrical breaker components. This issue is considered unresolved
                                                    pending licensee evaluation results. (50-440/98011-03(DRS)).
                                                                                                                                              ,
            c.                                      Conclusions
                                                  The team concluded that the licensee was using an unevaluated cleaner on the 5 KV
                                                    and 15 KV medium power circuit breakers. The maintenance pror*d:r,c5 specified are
                                                    ammonia-based glass cleaner to clean the breaker's electrical components. The
                                                    licensee used "Windex Glass Cleaner," which was not evaluated for this application and
                                                  was not an approved cleaner by the vendor.
          ' M3.3 . Review of Medium Voltaos Breaker Testino
            a.                                      Inspachon Scope
                                                  The team reviewed licensee's maintenance procedures for medium and low voltage
                                                    breakers to verify adequacy of testing.
            b.                                    Observations and Findings
                                                  The team noted that procedure gel-135, Revision 0, "ABB Power Circuit Breakers 5 kV
                                                    Types 5HK 250 and 5HK 350 Maintenance," Section 5.6.2, specified bumishing the
                                                    main contact surfaces with a fine Scotch-Brite or bumishing stone, prior to measuring
                                            ~ the contact resistances to compare with values (60 micro-ohms) specified in Table 1
                                                    (Section 5.8.1) of the procedure. The team was concemed that the as-found contact
                                                    resistances were not measured, prior to cleaning and bumishing, and prior to severci
                                          . closing operations and thus the as-found data was lost and could not be trended.
                                                                                                9
      -        _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - - _ _ - _ - - _ _ _ _ _ _
 
-  -_-    _ -                                            _ _ _ _ _ _ - - .. . _ _ . . .. _.            ..  ..          ..    .
          .
              .
        .
                                                          The team noted that ABB vendor manual for HK type Breakers (186.2.1.7D) specified a
                                                          maximum contact resistance as 40 micro-ohms for optimum performance. The vendor
                                                          manual specified that the main and arcing contacts be dressed with a fine file if the
                                                          contact resistance (and the milli-volt drop) exceeded 150 percent of the specified value.
                                                          The vendor manual also stated that the contact pressures be adjusted, if these values
                                                          were still over 150 percent of specified values, after the contacts were dressed.
                                                          However, the procedure specified only one contact resistance of 150 percent (60
                                                          micro-ohms) as the acceptance criteria instead of the twa step process specified in the
                                                          vendor manual. The licensee's maintenance procedure also specified several breaker
                                                          closing operations prior to meastfg 2 wotact resistances.
                                                          The licensee's methodology which did not take as found data and include provisions for
                                                          assuring that prerequisites (i.e. measuring contact resistances prior to cleaning and
                                                          bumishing) wete met was a concem since this data could be evaluated and trended by
                                                          engineering to determine if changes were needed to the maintenance frequency.
                c.                                      Conclusions
                                                          The team was concerned that the as-fou'nd contact resistances were not measured,
                                                          prior to cleaning and bumishing, and prior to several closing operations and thus the
                                                          as-found data was lost and could not be trended. Procedure, gel-135, Revision 0, did
                                                          not include provisions for measuring the contact resistances (and milli-volt drops) of
                                                          breakers prior to cleaning and bumishing these contact surfaces.
                M5                                      Maintenance Staff Training and Qualifications
                M5.1 Training in Breaker Maintenance
                      a.                                Inspection Scope
                                                          The team reviewed the licensee's program, procedures and lesson plans for training
                                                          maintenance personnel in electrical breaker maintenance.
                      b.                                Observations and Findinas
                                                          The team selected three electricians to review their training in detail. The electrical
                                                          training coordinator and the selected electricians were interviewed. The training was
                                                          acceptable overall. However, the team noted that training was given to the electricians
                                                          on administrative procedures and on new Gels, but no training was given on the
                                                          subsequent revisions to the Gels. The team noted that gel-0124, " Types SS-3, SS-4
                                                          and SS-5 Solid State Devices Testing," Revision 4, changed the acceptance criteria for
  '
                                                          instantaneous pickup from 15 percent variation toi20 percent. The team noted that
i
'
                                                          eight procedure instruction changes were issued to this procedure since it was revised
                                                          in June 1998. The team noted that during the testing of solid state devices using
                                                          gel-0124, the electricians made several errors (as mentioned in Section M3.1.b(3)). It
                                                                                                      10
L _ _ __        _ - _ _ _ - _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ - __                                      -  ---  . _ -    -  .-_-
 
      .
        .
    ,
                appeared that some engineering functions were delegated to the electricians. The team
                - determined that lack of adequate training on these procedure revisions could have
                contributed to the errors made by the electricians in implementing these procedures.
                The team also noted that Section 5.1.5 of Perry's quality assurance (QA) plan stated, in
                part, that training was not required for revisions to instructions. This might have
                contributed to inadequate training.
            c.  Conclusion
                The team concluded that lack of training on the revisions to Gels contributed to the
                inadequate implementation of the test procedures, and considered this a weakness.
          M6    Maintenance Organization and Administration
          M6.1 Evaluation of Ocaratina Exoerience Reoort (OER) Prociem and ImO smentation
            a.  Inspection Scope-
                The team reviewed procedures for obtaining, tracking, reviewing, disseminating, and
                dispositioning industry operating experience information, including information from the
                NRC, The Institute for Nuclear Power Operations (INPO), other licensees and vendors.
                The team reviewed a printout of the Perry OER computer database entries pertaining to
                circuit breakers in general, comparing the plant information to the team predetermined
                list. Finally, the team reviewed the files for selected OER items including NRC
                information notices (IHs) pertaining to medium-voltage circuit breakers in general and
                Perry's ABB HK and GE Power-Vac type breakers in particular.
            b_  Observations and Findinos
                Review of NRC generic communications indicated that there were ten ins that were
                either generically or specifically applicable to Perry ABB medium-voltage Type HK circuit
                breakers. In most cases (only one exception identified), the review by OER personnel
                for applicability of the information to Perry was thorough. With only two exceptions
                among the selected items reviewed, the dispositions of the information were complete,
                appropriate and timely. For example, IN 83-84, dealing with problems with puffer
                pistons in ABB HK breakers was appropriately determined to be applicable to Perry
                equipment. Although the team did not verify that all affected breakers were immediately
                  inspected for the reported problem, the licensee had incorporated instructions for
                inspecting for the problem on a routins basis into HK breaker preventive maintenance
                  procedures.
                The exception to appropriate determination of applicability involved the licensee's review
,,              of IN 80-13 and GE riuclear anergy (NE) service information letter (SIL) 155 regarding
L                GE SBM type switches. The information notice, SIL 155 and several service advice
                  letters (SALs) from the GE product department that manufactured the switches,
                  reported problems with age induced cracking of the contact cam followers that were
                                                            11
  n
 
_
          *
      i
    <
            .
        .
              made of GE's polycarbonate material called Lexan@, used in SBM switches that were
              made between 1972 and 1976. The review focused on switches received through GE
              NE in the NSSS scope of supply and the licensee determined that none of those -
              switches were affected. However, the OER and technical reviewers failed to recognize
              that the switches had been widely used by switchgear original equipment manufacturers
              including ABB. During the review of the ABB HK breaker vendor manuals, the team
              found SBM control switch information and confirmed with the licensee and through the
              walkdowns that the local breaker control switches on the ABB HK breaker cubicles were
              GE SBM types. In response to this finding, the licensee committed to reevaluate the
              applicability of the IN, SIL and SALs pertaining to SBM switches, determine whether any
              of the switches installed or in the warehouse were among the affected date codes or
              showed signs of degradation and to take appropriate corrective action.
                IN 84-46 reported problems with breaker position verification and was determined to be
              generically applicable to Perry. System operating instruction sol-R22 (Revision 4), for
              medium-voltage switchgear and FTI-F0036 (Revision 2), the post maintenance test
              manual indicated that unless the equipment being supplied power by the breaker
                needed to be operated for some other reason (e.g... surveillance, operations, etc.) the
                breaker would typically not be cycled (closed and opened) after being retumed to the
              connected position. If maintenance had been performed on a breaker removed from its          >
                cubicle or even from the connected position to the test or disconnect positions within the
                cubicle, the breaker was functionally tested (closed and opened) in the test position.
              - However, industry experience (including experience with HK breakers) has shown that
              there are various things that can occur when moving a breaker back into the connect
                position (i.e., with primary disconnects connected to the bus) that can lead to loss of the
              ability for the breaker to be closed once reconnected, opened once closed, or the
              closing spring recharged. Should this occur, a safety-related load might be rendered
                inoperable, but this condition remain undetected for an extended period.
              The team discussed the practice of operating the breaker as soon as possible after
                reconnection to the bus (which runs the load equipment if the bus is energized),
                consistent with or as allowed by plant conditions and operations, with the Perry electrical
                maintenance engineer. The engineer agreed that as infrequently as breakers were
                actually disconnected relative to the frequency of routine operation of most load
                equipment, or bus switching operations, that the poct-reconnection retest should not
                unduly tax the equipment. He agreed, therefore, to consider adopting this good
                engineering practice which the team pointed out was generally subscribed to by
                members af the circuit breaker users groups as well as EPRI-NMAC.
                IN 91-78 reported problems with circuit breaker status (closed or open) indication in
              which control power to the breaker closing or spring release coils and trip coils was
                fused separately from power to the status indicating lights. In this situation, if a control
                power fuse blew the indicating lights that were on could remain on and not alert control
                room operators that control power for remote electric or automatic operation of the
              - breakers was no longer available. According to the file, this IN had been correctly
                screened as potentially applicable to Perry and referred to engineering for review. After
I              several iterations of review, the licensee ultimately determined that in all cases, breaker
  ,
                                                          12
 
  - - _ - _ - - _ _ _ - _ _ - - -
                                  .
                                    .
                                        control power and indicating light power had common fuses. However, during the
                                        team's review, it appeared that one of the licensee engineer's questions in an internal
l                                        memorandum had not been adequatdy addressed. In the course of examining the
i                                        affected control and indication schematic drawings, the team discovered a feature of the
l                                        plant design that would require further review. The diagrams revealed that although trip
                                        and closing coils and indicating lights did have common fuses, the red indicating lights
                                        (breaker closed), at least in the control room, were wired in series with the trip coils such
                                        that the control room red light (not necessarily the one on the local panel) not only
                                        indicated that the breaker was closed and tripping power was available, but also that
                                        there was circuit continuity through the trip coil. However, the drawings indicated that
                                        the green indicating lights (breaker open) were not wired in series with the breaker
                                        closing spring release coils. These lights when illuminated would then indicate that the
                                        breaker was open and that closing power was available (common fuse), but would not
                                        confirm continuity through the spring release coil branch circuit. The licensee could not
                                        offer an explanation of why the closing and opening circuits were or should be wired
                                        differently.
                                        The team found the OER program to be very good; however, the following weaknesses
                                        were noted:
                                        .      IN 96-44 and 96-44, Supp.1 were not reviewed adequately for generic impact at
                                                Perry. Procedure PAP - 1607, Rev.1 required generic implication svaluation.
                                                OER review request was reissued to review for generic implication.
                                        -      OMR-387 regarding missing retaining rings was not reviewed adequately.
                                                Documentation indicated only Unit 1 breakers were reviewed for the missing            <
                                                                                                                                      '
                                                retaining rings. In response to the teams concem, OER review request was
                                                reissued to include Unit 2 breakers.
                                        Resolution of NRC generic communications and Part 21 reports on the subject of circuit
                                        breakers was good. As a result of the OER Program, some procedures had bean
                                        modified to incorporate the lessons leamed. For example:
                                        .      As a result of the review of IN 88-75, operating procedures gel-0135 and gel-
                                                0136 were modified to place the breaker control switch in OFF/STOP position in
                                                order to reset the anti-pump seal-in as applicable and allow the breaker to close.
                                                                                                                                      l
                                                                                                                                      l
                                        .      As a result of the review of IN 93-91, the appropriate maintenance procedure          j
                                                was modified to add visual verification to ensure correct positioning of the
                                                auxiliary switch contacts with the breaker racked in and closed.                      ;
                                                                                                                                      i
                                      c. Conclusions.                                                                                  l
                                                                                                                                      j
                                        The team concluded that, in general, there had been very good evaluation and                  3
                                        disposition of NRC, vendor, INPO, and other industry experience information. The OER          {
                                        program procedures were generally comprehensive and workable, the OER database                l
                                        was complete with respect to circuit breaker information identified beforehand by the        ;
                                                                                                                                      !
                                                                                    13                                                !
                                                                                                                                      !
            1                                                                                                                          l
                                                                                                                                      l
_
 
    *
-
      .
  .
              team (and, in fact, included some information of which the team was previously
              unaware). With only one exception identified, the individual OER evaluations were
                typically thorough and looked for the message in the information rather than dismissing j
                some pertinent information on the basis of Perry not having the exact type of equipment
                used as an example in the information. The items selected for detailed review of their
                ultimate disposition that had been determined, in the OER screening process, to be
                applicable to Perry medium-voltage circuit breakers were typically appropriately and
                promptly incorporated in plant procedures or other documents as applicable. This area
              was considered a strength.
        M6.2 - Reviewer and Anorover Raouirement for Comolated Maintenance Activities
        a.    Insoection Scope
              - The team reviewed selected completed maintenance work orders related to breaker          i
                maintenance and testing activities.
        b.    Observations and Findings
                The team noted that some of the work packages were reviewed and approved by the        i
                same individual. The team determined that reviewer and approver responsibilities for
                completed electrical and mechanical maintenance work activities were not clearly
                delineated in administrative procedures but were management ' expectations." In
                contrast, the inspectors noted that instrument and control (l&C) maintenance procedure
                mal-0504 clearly documented in Sections 6.9.2 and 6.9.3 the review and approval sign
                off requirements. The l&C procedure required that the review be performed by the l&C
                supervisor and that the approval be performed by an independent maintenance support
                engineer. The licensee informed the team that the electrical and mechanical reviewer
                and approver requirements will be reexamined and action will be taken to address this
                concem. In addition, the review of completed work orders also revealed inconsistent
                filling of identifying information on all pages. Some required signatures and breaker
                serial numbers were also missing.
        c.    Conclusions
                The team concluded that reviewer and approver responsibilities for completed electrical
                and mechanical maintenance work activities were not clearly delineated in
                administrative procedures. The licensee informed the team that the electrical and
                mechanical reviewer and approver requirements will be reviewed and the concem
                addressed.-
        M6.3 Treatment of Circuit Breakers Under 10 CFR 50.65. The Maintenance Rule
        a.    Inspection Scope
                The team reviewed the licensee's treatment of medium and low-voltage power circuit
                breakers under 10 CFR 50.65, the Maintenance Rule (MR). The team reviewed
                                                            14
 
                          ._  __ _.      ._ - __-_______--_ -__-__-___ - ---- - -                            --
  .
-
    .
                  scoping, classification of breakers according to system or as separate class of
                  components, treatment under 50.65(a)(1), or (a)(2), maintenance preventable
                  functional failures (MPFFs), and use of industry information as required by (a)(3).
      b.          Observations and Findings
                  The team found that there was adequate justification for exclusion of those breakers not
                  included within the scope of 10 CFR 50.65 activities. For in-scope breakers, the scoping
                  bases considered were comprehensive. In general, at Perry, breakers that supplied
                  busses, supplied transformers for lower-voltage systems, and tied busses together were
                  treated as part of the electrical distribution system or subsystem of which they were a
                  part. Breakers that supplied power directly to components of other systems (e.g.,
                  mechanical fluid systems) or to load centers or motor control centers for those systems
                  were generally treated as part of the system to which they supplied power. The licensee
                  did not treat breakers as separate components for (a)(1) performance issues, however,
                  the licensee did elect to include " monitoring" of all safety-related 13.8 kV,4.16 kV and
                  480 Vac breakers under the electrical component group, to enhance the MR (a)(2)
                  performance criteria which were established for train or system functions.
                  The licensee hcd included the failere in 1996 (an unexpected trip on apparent overload
                  documented in PlF 96-2958) of breaker EF1D09 (fuel handling building HVAC supply
                  fan B), in its MR monitoring database. Although the failure was attributed to a
                  manufacturing defect (overcurrent trip unit phase sensor current transformer lead
                  reversal), which was also the subject of NRC IN 98-18, and hence, was not treated as
                  an MPFF per se, the licensee's MR procedure, PAP-1125, Revision 2, called for basing
                  performance criteria on all functional failures. The follow up corrective action described
                in PlF 96-2958 with the vendor to prevent recurrence was satisfactory.
      c.        Conclusions
                Treatment of medium and low-voltage power circuit breakers under the MR was
                satisfactory. In addition, the practice of including safety-related AC breakers in the
                electrical component group to enhance performance criteria and the licensee's proactive
                position in which functional failures attributable to other activities such as operations and
                engineering, in addition to maintenance, formed the basis for performance criteria were
                considered strengths.
    M7.1 Self-Assessments. Audits and Surveillance
      a.        Insoection Scoce
                The team reviewed the licensee's self-assessments, audits and surveillance in the
                areas of low and medium power electrical breakers.
                                                                                                                  I
                                                                                  15
        _ _ _ _
 
L
,
    -
      .
  *
,
,
          'b.  Observations and Findinas
                The team noted that the licensee did not perform specific self-assessments, quality
'
                audits, and surveillance of Perry's breaker maintenance program. One QA audit
                conducted during January 1996 in the area of maintenance did not evaluate breakers
                but included reference to field observations to evaluate the preparation of breakers for
                planned replacement during RF05.
          c.  Conclusion
                The team determined that no specific audits or self-assessments were performed in the
                areas of breaker maintenance or operations. This was considered a weakness.
        M8    Miscellaneous Maintenance issues
        M8.1 Vendor Manuals and Vendor Interface
,
          a.  Inspection Scope:
l            . The team reviewed procedures goveming vendor manuals and other vendor
                information, including periodic recontact to ensure that all pertinent information has been
                received. The team reviewed the binders of approved vendor technical manuals and
                other technical documents compiled by the licensee under its system to determine if
                they were complete and up to date relative to medium- and low-voltage safety-related
                switchgear.
          b.  Findinas and Observations:
I              The program as currently described by the latest revision to the procedures should
                improve the state of vendor manuals for Perry switchgear and better ensure receipt and
!
                appropriate disposition of updates to manuals and other technical information.
                However, the program implementation has not been fully effective, particularly in the
                area of periodic contact of Non-NSSS vendors of key safety-related equipment, in
l.              particular, switchgear. There was evidence that vendors had not been very cooperative
i'
                in this effort in the past, but this fact was recognized by the licensee and documented in
                several CRs, for example in 1992 and again in 1995, the result of which was the present
                vendor manualimprovement program.
                However, the efforts thus far under this initiative to contact vendors and receive timely
                replies has not been effective. The writing of form letters once a year or in intervals of
                several months with no response was clearly not a sufficiently aggressive approach. It
                appeared that the licensee did not always write to the most appropriate vendor locations
                or personnel. The effort suffered from a lack of adequate involvement by equipment-
                knowledgeable personnel and did not comprise tactics that have proven more effective.
                For example, the licensee did not establish the several vendor contacts (at different
                locations) who were currently cognizant of the equipment of interest and familiar with the
                associated technical documentation and conduct detailed comprehensive reconciliations
                                                            16
i
 
o
      .
  ~
        .
    .
!                                              of all applicable equipment and information. Written responses that were received from
l                                              vendors indicating that the requested information was not available at that location, did
l                                                      ot receive adequate follow up.
l                                              Several switchgear manual binders reviewed did not contain the most recent applicable
''
                                                revisions; although, safety-related circuit breaker manuals had recently been more
                                                completely updated than those for non-safety-related switchgear. For example,
                                                File 162, the binder for safety-related ABB 4160-Vac Type 5HK breakers and associated
                                              equipment contained an outdated renewal parts bulletin. An old version (different
                                                number series, published by one of the previous manufacturing company names, of the
                                                instruction book for the switchgear itself (i.e., cubicles, busses, etc.)) was in the file
                                              whereas the new version (published by ABB) has been out since about 1991.
                                                Revisions 3 and 4, adding manuals for a GE and ITE protective relay, respectively, were
                                                entered incorrectly in that non-safety-related switchboard designators were listed as
                                                applicable instead of the safety-related ones (i.e., % R22 S001 through S005 instead of
                                                % R22 3007,' S006 and S009). In File 160 for safety-related low-voltage ABB K-line
                                                breakers, and K3000 and K4000 breakers, only old versions of the switchgear
                                        ^ instruction books were in the file, in File 424 for the GE Power Vac medium-voltage
                                                breakers, one change was not properly entered. The several binders for non-safety-
                                                related breakers had similar, but more numerous, deficiencies.
            c.                                  Conclusions:
                                              The latest version of the vendor manual control and vendor interface program should
                                                improve the state of switchgear vendor manuals. Implementation in the past was not
                                              always effect!ve, suffering from inadequate involvement by equipment-knowledgeable
                                              staff, insufficiently aggressive follow up with uncooperative vendors, and out-of-date
                                              vendor contact information This area was considered a weakness, but improving.
          M8.2 Review of Breaker Failun History and Trendina Prooram
            a.                                  Insoection Sr2DR:
                                              The team attempted to review data of failures of low and medium-voltage circuit
                                              breakers over the last three years.
            b.                                  Findinas and Observations:
                                              The team requested breaker failure history data; however, the licensee could not easily
                                              retrieve the information and the team could not effectively assess this area. The team
                                              noted that safety related breakers were swapped between switchgear cubicles and
                                          ' breaker serial numbers were not consistently being recorded on work orders, thus the
                                              repetitive breaker failure data could not be easily obtained.' Based on interviews with
                                              engineers and maintenance staff and review of completed maintenance procedures, the
                                              team concluded that no documented breaker failures were recorded that could be
                                              directly attributed to breaker problems after the licensee refurbished all AC breakers in
                                                1995/1996,
                                                                                              17
-_          _ _ _ _ - - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ .                          ___ - -_ ._
 
                                                                                                              i
      *                                                                                                      b
x        .
  . .
                  The team noted that the high pressure core spray pump (HPCS) 1E22C001 breaker
                  failed to close in January 1998 during testing. PIF 98-0125, dated January 26,1998,
                - documented that HPCS pump 1E22C001 failed to start on demand during a surveillance          )
                  when breaker EH1304 failed to close. Troubleshooter g did not identify the cause of this -
                  failure. The breaker closed satisfactorily after it was racked back into the cubicle. The  I
                  as found condition of the breaker was not preserved after the pump failed to start and
                  the breaker was racked out before the engineers could inspect the breaker and record
                  the as found condition in order to determine the root cause. The team also noted that
                  the licensee had not yet established a program for trending breaker repeat failures and
                  routine rnaintenance deficiencies.
            c.    Conclusons
                ' The team concluded that no documented breaker failures were noted that could be            j
                  directly attributed to breaker problems after the licensee refurbished all AC breakers in  <
                  1995/1996. The team determined that, since breakers had been swapped between
                  switchgaar cubicles and breaker serial numbers were not being consistently recorded on      {
                  work orders, the repetitive breaker failure data could not be easily obtained. The team
                  also noted that the licensee had not yet established a program for trending breaker
                  repeat failures and routine maintenance deficiencies.                                      I
                                                    lit. Engineering
          E2    Engineering Support of Facilities and Equipment -
          E2.1  Breaker Control Power issue
            a.    Inspection Scope
                  The team performed an inspection to determine whether breaker operation was assured
                  at minimum operating voltage as specified in the vendor's manual or minimum
                  calculated voltage, whichever is the lowest as stated in TI-2515/137.
            b.    Observation and Findinas
                  Calculation PRDC 0007, " Voltage Drop of DC Control Circuits," Rev. 4, dated May 18,
                  1998,'was reviewed to verify that electrically operated breakers (both medium and
                  low-voltage) were operable at the calculated minimum available voltage at the closing
                  and tripping coils. The design basis of the calculation was loss of offsite power with loss
                  of coolant accident. Since all emergency core cooling systems load breakers would
                  change state within the first minute, the battery terminal voltage at first minute was used
                  in this calculation. However, for a station blackout (SBO) recovery, battery discharge
                - voltage (voltage at the end of four hours which is 105 Vdc) was used for circuits '
                  associated with preferred supply breakers and attemate preferred supply breakers. The
                  calculation indicated available voltage at the closing, tripping, and spring charging
                  circuits for 4 kV and 480 V power circuit breakers was above 90 Vdc. Testing at 90 Vdc
                  was included in the latest revision of both medium and low-voltage power circuit breaker
  s
                                                            18
 
      ,
        .
    .
          maintenance procedures. However, very few breakers were tested at 90 Vdc at the
          plant. The team was told that all AC breakers were tested at the minimum operating
          voltage during refurbishment at the ABB service center. The voltages used were: (1)
          for 4 kV and 15 kV HK type breakers 90 Vdc for breaker close coil and charging motor
          and 70 Vdc for tripping coil, and (2) for 480V K-line breakers-100 Vdc for closing coil
          and 70 Vdc for tripping coil and 85 Vdc for charging motor. All DC breakers were
          manually operated.
          in reviewing the calculation, the team noted the following concems:
          .      Inverter DC current input was not calculated properly. The inverter was a
                  constant kVA device and current was dependent on the available voltage at its
                  terminals.
          .
                  The battery terminal voltage calculation did not consider the effect of aging factor
                  (1.25), temperature correction factor (1.04), and design margins (1.1).
          .      Non-conservative control circuit lengths were used.
          .
                  The calculation did not address the emergency diesel generator (EDG) output
                  breaker closing coil voltage during SBO recovery (i.e., at the end of SBO
                  duration of 4 hours).
          .      The calculation did not address 13.8 kV breakers trip coil voltage.
          The preliminary recalculation of two circuits (emergency service water pump
          1P45-C0001B and EDG output breaker EH-1102) indicated inat the available voltage at
          closing and trip coils will be below 90 Vdc. As a result, CR 98-1167 was initiated.
          Criterion ill, " Design Control," of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, requires that the design
          basis be correctly translated into specifications, procedures, instructions, or drawings.
          The failure to: (1) properly calculate inverter DC current input, (2) consider the effect of
          aging factor, temperature correction factor and design margins in the calculation, (3) use -
          correct control circuit lengths, (4) address the EDG output breaker voltage during SBO
          recovery and (5) consider the 13.8 kV breakers trip coil voltage is considered a violation
          of Criterion lli(50-440/98011-04(DRS)).
                                                                                                        ,
          Based on the present condition of the divisional batteries, as demonstrated by required
          - service and capacity tests, an initial assessment of affected circuit breakers indicated
          that no immediate operability concems existed. The minimum calculated DC control
          voltage at the circuit breakers was estimated to be 93 Vdc under design basis
  ,
          requirements. The licensee committed to perform a detailed calculation to fully
          substantiate this initial assessment.
i
{
l
                                                      19
I
 
_ _ _ - _ -              _ - _ _ _ _ - _ - _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ - _ - _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ - _ - - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
                ..
            *
                  .
              .
                      c.                            Conclusions
                                                    The team identified that calculation PRDC-0007," Voltage Drop of DC Control Circuits,"
                                                    Revision 4, dated May 18,1998, lacked rigor in terms of design inputs and conclusions.
                                                    In addition, design control measures to provide verification of adequacy of design were
                                                    ineffective in that design reviews failed to identify these deficiencies. Based on review
                                                    of selected calculations, the team was concemed about the adequacy of design basis
                                                    calculations in general. A safety assessment, performed during the inspection in
                                                    response to the team's concems about the voltage calculation, was acceptable to
                                                    support an interim operability determination. The licensee indicated that a long term
                                                    resolution would be developed to conservatively demonstrate on a continuing basis that
                                                    the DC system could perform its intended function. A violation was cited.
                                                                                                                                            V. Manaaernent Meetinos
                    X1                              Exit Meeting Summary
                    On May 22,1998, the inspection results of the team inspection were presented to the licensee
                    at an exit meeting. The i.ansee did not identify any material provided during the inspaction
                    report period as proprietary.
l
                                                                                                                                                      20
 
      ..
  ..      ,
    .
                                        PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED
            Licensee
            N. Bonner, Director, Maintenance /First Energy
            R. Collings, Manager, QA, First Energy /QAS
            L. McGuire, Supervisor, PNMD/MSPU
          : S. Moffitt, Manager, PNED/First Energy
            L. Myers, Site Vice President
            S. Sanford, Compliance Engineer, PNSD/ PAS /CU
            R. Schrauder, Director, PNED, First Energy
            D. Watkins, Maintenance Engineer, PNMD/CEI
            M. Zeal, PES /NSSS, PNED/CEI
.
            NBCL
            J. Clark,' Resident inspector
          ' C. Lipa, Senior Resident inspector
                                              INSPECTION PROCEDURE USED
            Tl 2515/137 Inspection of Medium-Voltage and Low-Voltage Power Circuit Breakers
            IP 40500        Effectiveness of Licensee Controls in Identifying, Resolving and Preventing
                            Problems
                                      ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED,~ AND DISCUSSED
            Opened
            50-440/98011-01        VIO    Inadequate calculated test parameter values and as left
                                            instantaneous trip test current of circuit breaker EF1B04.
            50-440/98011-02        URI - (1) Limits for the solid state trip device long and short time delays
                                            were not in agreement with the vendor's manual
                                            recommendations, (2) use of 20 percent tolerance for
                                            instantaneous pickup instead of 15 percent as indicated in the .
                                            . Vendor Manual, and (3) 10 percent tolerance for long time pickup
                                            and longer waiting time between tests not in procedures.
            50-440/08011-03        URI    Use of an unapproved cleaning agent such as Windex Glass
                                            Cleaner to clean safety related electrical breaker components.
            50-440/98011-04.        VIO ' Failure to: (1) properly calculate inverter de current input (2)
                                            consider the effect of aging factor, temperature correction factor
                                            and design margins in the calculation, (3) use correct control
                                            circuit lengths and additional calculational deficiencies.
                                                              21
 
  _ _ - _ _ . .          . - - - _ _ . _ _ _ _ - _ - _ - - _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ - - - _ - _ - _ _ _ _ - - _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ - - _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ - _ _
                  .                                                                                                                                                                                      ,
    s.-              ,
                ,
                                                                                                                                                                          LIST OF ACRONYMS USED
                        AC                                                                                        Altemate Current
                        CR                                                                                        Condition Report
                        DC                                                                                        Direct Current
                        EDG                                                                                        Emergency Diesel Generators
                      -EPRI                                                                                        Electric Power Research Institute
                        gel                                                                                        Generic Electric Instructions
                        GENE                                                                                      General Electric Nuclear Energy
                        HPCS                                                                                      High Pressure Core Spray
                        l&C                                                                                        Instrumentation and Control
                        IN                                                                                          information Notice
                      -INPO                                                                                        Institute of Nuclear Power Operation
                        kV-                                                                                        Kilo Volts
                        MPFF                                                                                      Maintenance Preventable Functional Failures                                          ,
                        MR                                                                                        Maintenance Rule                                                                      l
                        NMAC                                                                                      Nuclear maintenance Applications Center
                        NRC                                                                                        Nuc' ear Regulatory Commission                                                        !
                        OER                                                                                        Operating Experience Reports
                        QA                                                                                        Quality Assurance
                        SAL                                                                                        Service Advice Letter
                        SBO-                                                                                      Station Blackout                                                                      i
                        SIL                                                                                        Service Information Letter
                        Tl                                                                                        Temporary Instruction                                                                j
                        URI                                                                                        Unresolved item
                                                                                                                                                                                                          '
                        Vdc                                                                                        Voltage in direct current                                                            !
                      ' VIO                                                                                        Violation                                                                            i
                                                                                                                                                                                                          l
                                                                                                                                                                                                          l
l
                                                                                                                                                                                                          i
                                                                                                                                                                                                          i
                                                                                                                                                                                                          l
                                                                                                                                                                                                          l
                                                                                                                                                                                                          i
l
                                                                                                                                                                                    22
                                                                                                                                                                                                          i
                -                                                                                                                                                                              _ _ . .. Y
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