05000275/FIN-2013003-04: Difference between revisions
Jump to navigation
Jump to search
StriderTol (talk | contribs) (Created page by program invented by StriderTol) |
StriderTol (talk | contribs) (Created page by program invented by StriderTol) |
||
| Line 12: | Line 12: | ||
| identified by = Licensee | | identified by = Licensee | ||
| Inspection procedure = | | Inspection procedure = | ||
| Inspector = C Osterholtz, D Strickland, L Micewski, N O, | | Inspector = C Osterholtz, D Strickland, L Micewski, N O'Keefe, T Farina, T Hipschman | ||
| CCA = N/A for ROP | | CCA = N/A for ROP | ||
| INPO aspect = | | INPO aspect = | ||
| description = The licensee identified a violation of Technical Specification 3.0.4 involving a transition from Mode 4 to Mode 3 with the turbine-driven auxiliary feedwater pump 1-1 inoperable, which was discovered when it failed the post-maintenance testing. The identified violation was entered into the corrective action program as Notification 505491007. The violation is more than minor because it is associated the mitigating systems cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Using Manual Chapter 0609, Attachment A, The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings At-Power, the violation was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green) because the finding was not a design or qualification deficiency, did not result in the loss of operability or functionality of a single train for greater than the technical specification outage time, did not represent an actual loss of safety function, and was not potentially risk significant due to a seismic, flooding, or severe weather event. | | description = The licensee identified a violation of Technical Specification 3.0.4 involving a transition from Mode 4 to Mode 3 with the turbine-driven auxiliary feedwater pump 1-1 inoperable, which was discovered when it failed the post-maintenance testing. The identified violation was entered into the corrective action program as Notification 505491007. The violation is more than minor because it is associated the mitigating systems cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Using Manual Chapter 0609, Attachment A, The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings At-Power, the violation was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green) because the finding was not a design or qualification deficiency, did not result in the loss of operability or functionality of a single train for greater than the technical specification outage time, did not represent an actual loss of safety function, and was not potentially risk significant due to a seismic, flooding, or severe weather event. | ||
}} | }} | ||
Revision as of 23:19, 21 February 2018
| Site: | Diablo Canyon  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000275/2013003 Section 4OA7 |
| Date counted | Jun 30, 2013 (2013Q2) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
| Identified by: | Licensee-identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | |
| Inspectors (proximate) | C Osterholtz D Strickland L Micewski N O'Keefe T Farina T Hipschman |
| Violation of: | Technical Specification |
| INPO aspect | |
| ' | |