IR 05000461/2017009: Difference between revisions

From kanterella
Jump to navigation Jump to search
(Created page by program invented by StriderTol)
(Created page by program invented by StriderTol)
Line 1: Line 1:
{{Adams
{{Adams
| number = ML17263A124
| number = ML17226A321
| issue date = 09/18/2017
| issue date = 08/14/2017
| title = Clinton Power Station, Unit 1 - Response to Nuclear Regulatory Commission Inspection Report 05000461/2017009 and Preliminary White Finding, EA-17-098
| title = Clinton Power Station - NRC Inspection Report 05000461/2017009 And Preliminary White Finding
| author name = Stoner T R
| author name = Louden P L
| author affiliation = Exelon Generation Co, LLC
| author affiliation = NRC/RGN-III/DRP
| addressee name =  
| addressee name = Hanson B C
| addressee affiliation = NRC/NRR, NRC/RGN-III
| addressee affiliation = Exelon Generation Co, LLC
| docket = 05000461
| docket = 05000461
| license number = NPF-062
| license number = NPF-062
| contact person =  
| contact person =  
| case reference number = EA-17-098, U-604367
| case reference number = EA-17-098
| document report number = IR 2017009
| document report number = IR 2017009
| document type = Letter, Licensee Response to Notice of Violation
| document type = Inspection Report, Letter
| page count = 601
| page count = 16
}}
}}


Line 19: Line 19:


=Text=
=Text=
{{#Wiki_filter:Exelon Generation Clinton Power Station 8401 Power Road Clinton, IL 61727 U-604367 September 18, 2017 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555-0001 Clinton Power Station, Unit 1 Facility Operating License No. NPF-62 NRC Docket No. 50-461 Subject: Response to Nuclear Regulatory Commission Inspection Report 05000461/2017009 and Preliminary White Finding, EA-17-098 10 CFR 2.201 References: 1. Letter from Patrick L. Louden (NRC) to Bryan C. Hanson (EGC), "Clinton Power Station -NRC Inspection Report 05000461/2017009 and Preliminary White Finding [EA-17-098]," dated August 14, 2017 (ADAMS Accession No. ML 17226A321) 2. Letter from Theodore R. Stoner (EGC) to NRC, "Notification of Intention Regarding Inspection Report 05000461/2017009 and Preliminary White Finding (EA-17-098)," dated August 23, 2017 (ADAMS Accession No. ML 172358156) On August 14, 2017, the NRC issued Inspection Report 05000461/2017009 to Exelon Generation Company, LLC (EGC). The Inspection Report identified a preliminary finding defined as an Apparent Violation (AV) of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion Ill, "Design Control." The AV was classified as self-revealing, low to moderate safety significance (White). The AV is related to the failure to evaluate the change in the actual drop-out relay voltages for the Division 1 Emergency Diesel Generator (EOG) room ventilation fan resulting in the EOG being declared inoperable. The Inspection Report provided EGC the option to attend a Regulatory Conference or submit the EGC position on the finding, in writing, within 40 days of the date of Reference 1. Additionally, the letter required a ten-day response to notify the NRC of the intended response. On August 23, 2017, EGC submitted the required ten-day response to notify the NRC that a 40-day written response would be submitted to provide EGC's position on the finding (Reference 2). The 40-day response is provided in the Attachment, "Exelon Generation Company's Position Concerning the Significance of Apparent Violation EA-17-098."
{{#Wiki_filter:B. August 14, 2017 EA-17-098  


September 18, 2017 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Page2 The Attachment to this letter contains a description and conclusion of the additional analysis performed to evaluate the survivability of equipment in the Division 1 EDG room following a failure of the EDG ventilation fan 1 VD01 CA. The additional analysis is enclosed with this letter. EGG recognizes that a performance deficiency occurred and does not dispute the AV or the assigned cross-cutting aspect. However, after reviewing new information provided herein, EGG has reassessed the safety significance and has concluded that the finding has very low safety significance (Green}. The very low safety significance is based upon additional analysis and factors beyond those initially provided to the NRC for use in assessment of the significance of the issue. EGC performed an evaluation to document reasonable assurance of continued operation of the EOG for 24 hours following a start failure of the EDG ventilation fan. The margins to the survivability limits for critical devices for the bounding case of a. Large Break Loss of Coolant Accident I Loss of Offsite Power with the doors closed (i.e., no operator action} scenario increased from the initial evaluation provided during the inspection period to the enclosed evaluation from 11°F 37°F. The margin was calculated in a manner that addresses uncertainties, and therefore provides "reasonable assurance" of EDG operation for the PRA mission time. With reasonable assurance of operation, EGC reviewed IMC 0609, Appendix A, "The Significance Determination Process (SOP} for Findings at Power," Exhibit 2 and could answer all the questions "No". EGC therefore concludes that the finding's significance meets the definition of having very low safety significance and should be characterized as Green. There are no regulatory commitments contained in this letter. If you have any questions, please contact Mr. Dale A. Shelton, Regulatory Assurance Manager, at (217) 937-2800. Theodore R. Stoner Site Vice President Clinton Power Station
Mr. Bryan Senior VP, Exelon Generation Company, LLC President and CNO, Exelon Nuclear 4300 Winfield Road Warrenville, IL 60555


===Attachment:===
SUBJECT: CLINTON POWER STATION-NRC INSPECTION REPORT 05000461/2017009 AND PRELIMINARY WHITE FINDING
Exelon Generation Company's Position Concerning the Significance of Apparent Violation EA-17-098
 
==Dear Mr. Hanson:==
On August 3, 2017, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at your Clinton Power Station, Unit 1. The inspectors presented the results of this inspection during an exit meeting with Mr. B. Kapellas and other members of your staff. The results of this inspection are documented in the enclosed report. The enclosed inspection report documents a self-revealed finding with an associated apparent violation that the NRC has preliminarily determined to be White, with low to moderate safety significance of Title 10 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, "Design Control" and an associated Technical Specification (TS) violation of TS 3.8.1, "AC Sources-Operating." This finding involved the licensee's failure to evaluate the change in the actual drop out voltages for replacement relays associated with the Division 1 Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) Room Vent Fan, which was a component subject to the requirements of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B. The change in drop out voltages prevented the fan from operating during an under voltage condition, resulting in the Division 1 EDG being unable to perform its intended safety function and becoming inoperable. We assessed the significance of the finding using the significance determination process (SDP) and readily available information. We are considering escalated enforcement for the apparent violation consistent with the NRC's Enforcement Policy, which can be found at http://www.nrc.gov/about-nrc/regulatory/enforcement/enforce-pol.html. Because we have not made a final determination, no notice of violation is being issued at this time. Please be aware that further NRC review may prompt us to modify the number and characterization of the apparent violation(s). This finding does not represent an immediate safety concern based upon the licensee's actions to restore the Division 1 EDG room vent fan to the original design and declaring the Division 1 EDG operable.
 
We intend to issue our final significance determination and enforcement decision, in writing, within 90 days from the date of this letter. The NRC's SDP is designed to encourage an open dialogue between your staff and the NRC; however, neither the dialogue nor the written information you provide should affect the timeliness of the staff's final determination. Before the NRC makes a final decision on this matter, you may choose to communicate your position on the facts and assumptions used to arrive at the finding and assess its significance by either; (1) attending and presenting at a Regulatory Conference, or (2) submitting your position in writing. The focus of a Regulatory Conference is to discuss the significance of the finding. Written responses should reference the inspection report number and enforcement action number associated with this letter in the subject line. Your written response should be sent to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Center, Washington, DC 20555-0001, with a copy to Ms. Karla Stoedter, Chief, Branch 1, Division of Reactor Projects, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Region III, 2443 Warrenville Road, Lisle, IL 60532. If you request a Regulatory Conference, it should be held within 40 days of the receipt of this letter. Please provide information you would like us to consider or discuss with you at least 10 days prior to any scheduled conference. If a Regulatory Conference is held, it will be open for public observation. If you decide to submit only a written response, such submittal should be sent to the NRC within 40 days of your receipt of this letter. If you choose not to request a Regulatory Conference or to submit a written response, you will not be allowed to appeal the NRC's final significance determination. Please contact Ms. Karla Stoedter at 630-829-9731, and in writing, within 10 days from the issue date of this letter to notify the NRC of your intentions. If we have not heard from you within 10 days, we will continue with our significance determination and enforcement decision. The final resolution of this matter will be conveyed in separate correspondence. This letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be made available for public inspections and copying at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html and at the NRC Public Document room in accordance with 10 CFR 2.930, "Public Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding."
 
Sincerely,/RA Julio F. Lara Acting for/ Patrick L. Louden, Director Division of Reactor Projects
 
Docket No. 50-461 License No. NPF-62


===Enclosure:===
===Enclosure:===
EC 620632, Evaluate Survivability of Equipment in the Division 1 Diesel Generator Room Due to Failure of EDG Ventilation Fan 1VD01CA cc: Regional Administrator -NRC Region Ill Ms. Karla Stoedter, Chief, Branch 1, Division of Reactor Projects -NRC Region Ill NRC Project Manager, NRR -Clinton Power Station NRC Senior Resident Inspector-Clinton Power Station Attachment Exelon Generation Company's Position Concerning the Significance of Apparent Violation EA-17 -098 1.0 OVERVIEW Attachment Exelon Generation Company's Position Concerning the Significance of Apparent Violation EA-17-098 NRC Inspection Report 05000461/2017009 documented a finding that has preliminarily been determined to be White, a finding with low to moderate safety significance, with an associated apparent violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix 8, Criterion Ill, "Design Control," and Technical Specification (TS) 3.8.1, "AC Sources-Operating." This finding is associated with the failure to evaluate the change in the actual drop out voltages for replacement relays associated with the Division 1 Emergency Diesel Generator (EOG) room ventilation fan. Specifically, Engineering Changes (EC) 330624 and 366624 failed to evaluate the change in the actual relay drop out voltages on the operation of the Division 1 EOG room ventilation fan circuitry prior to replacing the X2 and X3 relays on May 18, 2016 and January 2008, respectively. The failure to properly evaluate the effects of the drop out voltages for both relays prevented the room ventilation fan from operating during an under-voltage condition, resulting in the Division 1 EOG being inoperable from May 18, 2016 to March 11, 2017, a period greater than allowed by the limiting condition for operation completion time provided in TS 3.8.1. During this inspection, Exelon Generation Company, LLC (EGC) provided the inspectors with a copy of EC 619834, "Evaluate Survivability of Equipment in the Division 1 Diesel Generator Room Due to Failure of EOG Ventilation Fan 1VD01 CA." The purpose of this evaluation was to demonstrate that the Clinton Power Station (CPS) Division 1 EOG would operate successfully during the 24-hour PRA mission time, as described in the NRC Risk Assessment of Operational Events Handbook (RASP), without the fan operating. The inspectors reviewed EC 619834 and concluded that EGC had not provided a reasonable basis to show the EOG would have been able to perform its function for the PRA mission time. Specifically, panel internal temperature would have reached approximately 240&deg;F, a point where some of the key components would have been susceptible to failure. EGC subsequently reviewed the NRC's Inspection Report and performed additional analysis and is providing clarification and additional information associated with the facts and assumptions used to assess the significance of the finding. This additional information provides the basis for EGC's position that this finding is consistent with a finding of very low safety significance (i.e., Green). 2.0 EGC'S POSITION ON NRC INSPECTION REPORT CONCLUSIONS The NRC Inspection Report provides two statements associated with EC 619834 for which EGC is providing clarification and additional analysis to demonstrate that the Division 1 EOG would have performed its safety function during the 24-hour PRA mission time without the EDG room ventilation fan running. The two statements are: Page 1of4 Attachment Exelon Generation Company's Position Concerning the Significance of Apparent Violation EA-17-098 "The [NRG] inspectors reviewed Evaluation 619834 and concluded that the licensee had not provided a reasonable basis to show the EOG would have been able to perform its function for the PRA mission time. Specifically, panel internal temperature would have reached approximately 240&deg;F, a point where some of the key components would have been susceptible to failure. Based upon this conclusion, the inspectors continued with the significance determination." "The potential to recover room cooling by opening doors to the diesel generator rooms was added to the base model. NRG staff reviewed the licensee's technical analysis [EC 619834] which included room heat-up calculations and component testing and concluded that if operators opened doors to the room within 30 minutes after diesel generator start and ventilation fan failure there was adequate justification to conc.lude the diesel generator mission would be met." The additional analysis performed refined the GOTHIC model to increase the accuracy of the analysis and reclassified some components as not needed for the EOG to continue to function (i.e., Critical). EGC's position is that the additional analysis provides reasonable assurance the EOG would have continued to operate for the 24-hour PRA mission time without ventilation fan operation and without opening the rollup door and the personnel door. Note that the limiting component's temperature margin for the case where the operators opened the doors within 30 minutes under EC 619834 is 35&deg;F. The limiting component's temperature margin obtained in the additional analysis (without doors open), EC 620632, is 37&deg;F. 3.0 COMPARISON OF EC 619834 TO EC 620632 LIMITING TEMPERATURE MARGINS EC 619834 provided the bases for the NRC's determination that key components would have been susceptible to failure. In the NRC Inspection Report, it states that panel internal temperature could reach 240&deg;F, a point where some of the key components would have been susceptible to failure. EGC reviewed EC 619834 and determined that the panel where this temperature could be reached is panel 1 DG01 JA with a resulting internal temperature of 244 &deg;F. Table 4.3.1, "Critical Devices," of EC 619834 provided the listing of the critical devices (category 1, 2 and 4) that were evaluated along with a summary of the basis for EOG continued functionality under the bounding scenario. In panel 1 DG01JA there were two critical devices, both of which were transformers. EC 619834 indicates that these devices will function at a temperature 13&deg;F above the temperature determined in the analysis for that panel (i.e., 13&deg;F margin). However, in EC 619834 the components with the minimum temperature margin of 11&deg;F are located on 1 DG01 KA. The re-analysis, provided in the Enclosure (i.e., EC 620632), increases the temperature margin forthe critical components in panel 1DG01JA from 13&deg;F to 41&deg;F. The re-analyzed limiting components continue to be located on 1 DG01 KA; their temperature margin was increased from 11&deg;F to 37&deg;F. Page 2of4 Attachment Exelon Generation Company's Position Concerning the Significance of Apparent Violation EA-17-098 Thus, the re-analysis performed in EC 620632 at least triples the temperature margin of the critical components located in 1 DG01JA and on 1 DG01 KA from that of EC 619834 for the bounding case Loss of Coolant Accident I Loss of Offsite Power (LOCA/LOOP) -Doors Closed case. 4.0 REFINEMENT OF THE GOTHIC ANALYSIS EGG developed an engineering report that evaluates the impact of refining the GOTHIC Model used in EC 619834 to develop a more realistic best-estimate prediction of temperatures within the Division 1 EDG room in order to determine more accurate equipment survivability margin. EGG determined that EC 619834 contained accumulated conservatism in the GOTHIC v. 8.2 model that biased the peak panel temperatures. EGG then re-evaluated the room temperatures by refining the GOTHIC analysis as described below: 1. The revised analysis used the generator heat load consistent with vendor provided information in lieu of 137%. 2. The panels within the room were modeled as enclosures (i.e., control volumes with thermal conductors and flow paths) to determine internal temperatures in lieu of using the maximum temperature the panel experiences on the hottest portion (e.g., the top). 3. Credit for air gaps (e.g., gaps around doors, penetrations to the outside, and other penetrations) to the outdoors were modelled. 4. The engine combustion air inlet piping was credited as a heat sink. 5. The GOTHIC model was re-benchmarked to align to the test data more closely. 6. Outdoor air was modeled using a diurnal cycle and using a more representative peak daytime temperature during the exposure period. 7. For the air flow split associated with the tank room exhaust fan (1VD02CA), a more realistic air flow split was utilized. When the model was refined and two of the limiting critical component's temperature limits were reevaluated, the resulting minimum component survivability temperature margin is 37&deg;F. 5.0 EQUIPMENT SURVIVABILITY LIMITS REVIEW The Equipment Survivability List provided in EC 619834 identified equipment that is critical for the proper functioning of the Division I EOG during its 24-hour PRA mission time. Under EC 620632 the critical component's survivability temperature limits were reevaluated. As identified on EC 620632 Table, "Margin to Survivability of Critical Components," the generator (G-1 ), exciter (G-2), and engine mounted governors (A9/A9a) survivability temperature limits were increased. The generator and exciter are the most limiting components for exposed elevated temperatures. The increase in their survivability temperature limits aided in the increased margin of 37&deg;F. Page 3of4 Attachment Exelon Generation Company's Position Concerning the Significance of Apparent Violation EA-17-098 6.0 ADDITIONAL RISK INSIGHTS As discussed in EC 620632, temperatures above -175&deg;F are not reached in the Doors Closed scenario until almost 20 hours into the event. During the LOOP-Doors Closed scenario, room temperatures remain less than 175&deg;F during the 24-hour mission time. This provides additional time for: 1. Restoring functionality to the ventilation fan (and thus restoring cooling to the EOG room). This is very likely, given that highly skilled personnel will be onsite, a simple drawing review would identify the problem, given the chattering relay, and that restoration requires no more than the removal of control power fuses and manual fan breaker closure. 2. Opening area doors or providing alternate cooling (fans located in doorways, etc.). This "defense in depth" situation provides multiple opportunities for success and provides additional confidence that the EOG would have operated for the PRA mission time. 7.0 CONCLUSIONS: The analysis (EC 620632) evaluated the impact of refining the GOTHIC model for the purpose of generating a more realistic best-estimate prediction of temperatures within the Division 1 EOG room in order to determine equipment survivability margin. The refined analysis resulted in reduced room temperatures and along with increased equipment survivability limits resulted in an increased survivability margin for the limiting critical device(s) for the LOCA/LOOP -Doors Closed case from 11&deg;F to 37&deg;F. As described in the Enclosure, the GOTHIC analysis is still judged to be biased slightly in the conservative direction and the uncertainty in the analysis is judged to be less than 5&deg;F. This uncertainty is small relative to the bounding margin to the survivability limits of 37&deg;F noted above. EC 620632 demonstrates that there is reasonable assurance that sufficient margin exists between the environmental temperatures and the equipment survivability limits for the critical components associated with maintaining the EOG functional for the PRA mission time. As a result, using NRC's IMC 0609, Appendix A, Exhibit 2, this issue should be characterized as Green. Therefore, after consideration of this new information, the appropriate classification for the AV should be changed from White to Green. Page 4 of 4 Enclosure EC 620632, Evaluate Survivability of Equipment in the Division 1 Diesel Generator Room Due to Failure of EOG Ventilation Fan 1VD01CA Clinton Power Station EC 620632 RIO CLINTON POWER STATION Engineering Change EC 620632 EVALUATION EVALUATE SURVIVABILITY OF EQUIPMENT IN THE DIVISION DIESEL GENERATOR ROOM DUE TO FAILURE OF EOG VENTILATION FAN 1VD01CA HU CODE HIGH-3-2 RE: Eric Halverson Clinton Power Station EC 620632 RIO SUMMARY Page 23 of23 July, 2017 Testing was completed in accordance with the test specification as outlined in Section 4.0 ofthis report. The occurrences of any anomalies are also included in Section EC 620632, Att. 1, Pg. 107 of 267 REPORT NO.: REP*424*00B*RP1 REVISION: 03 PAGE 81OF818 A. f: *--Report No.: FAI/17-0612 Relay Drop Out Testing of GE CR120BD04341 and Agastat E7012PD004 Relays for Clinton Power Station Revision 1 Project No.: KCI-Clinton-Relay Submitted to: KC/ Downers Grove, Illinois Prepared by: Alfredo Garcia Reviewed by: William E. Berger September, 2017 EC 620632, Att. 1, Pg. 108 of 267 TABLE OF CONTENTS REPORT NO.: REP*424-008-RP1 REVISION: 03 PAGE 82 OF 818 LIST OF FIGURES ........................................................................................................................ 3 LIST OF TABLES .......................................................................................................................... 4 1.0 Background ............................................................................................................................ 10 2.0 Purpose .................................................................................................................................. 11 3.0 Test Specimens ...................................................................................................................... 12 4.0 Test Procedure ....................................................................................................................... 13 4.1 Test Setup ..................................................................................................................... 13 5.0 Test Results ........................................................................................................................... 14 5.1 Receipt Inspection ........................................................................................................ 14 5.2 Baseline Functional Test .............................................................................................. 15 5.3 Circuit Operation Testing ..................................................................*.......................... 16 6.0 Conclusion ............................................................................................................................. 18 EC 620632, Att. 1, Pg. 109 of 267 LIST OF FIGURES REPORT NO.: REP-424*008-RP1 REVISION: 03 PAGE 83 OF 818 Figure 4-1 Mounted Test Specimens ...................................................................................... 13 EC 620632, Att. 1, Pg. 110 of 267 REPORT NO.: REP-424-008-RP1 REVISION: 03 PAGE B4 OF B18 LIST OF TABLES Table 3-1 Test Specimens ..................................................................................................... 12 Table 5-1 Baseline Test Results ............................................................................................ 16 EC 620632, Att. 1, Pg. 111 of 267 FAJ/17-0612 Rev. 1 REPORT NO.: REP*424-008-RP1 REVISION: 03 PAGE 85 OF 818 PagY:. 5 of 18 September, 2017 CALCULATION NOTE COVER SHEET *-----* --*--SECTION TO BE COMPLETED BY AUTIIOR(S): -*---------Cale-Note Number: FAf/17-0612 Revision Number: 1 --------Title: Relay Drop Out Testing of GE CR120BD04341 and Aga<>tat F.70 I 2PD004 Relays for Clinton Power Station -----i Project Number ProjcctiSubject: Relay Testing or Shop Order: KCI-Clintun-Rclay --*---***---Purpose: Perform relay drop out testing on GE CR120BD04341 andAgastat E7012PD004 relays Methods of Analysis*: Tc:-1ting -----Acceptance Criteria*: NIA ---***-----Results Summary: Rev.1 Removed proprietat1' statements from report per customer request. Does this document contain Proprietary Infom1ation? (Yes/No, if Yes whose infonnation is it?) No *Can be N/A and/or a referc:nce lo this information in the Design Analysis can be provided. References of Resulting Reports, Letters, or Memoranda (Optional) Author(s): Completion Date: Kame (Print or Type) -e/f'brr''. Responsibility: (M1v1/DD/YYYY) Alfredo Garcia ALL {)?__ / / L( L:JDC::j . . Y I 7 ----------*-*--, --*----------'*----.. -----! SECTION TO BE co:rvIPLETED BY VERIFIER(S): -------* Verifier(s): Approval Date: I Name (Print or T)pc) s;;ze: Responsibility: (tvi.M/DD/YYYY) William .E. Berger dJ!f!,,_,-:i:: r/ ALL cYth7' /2&deg;1/ ____ , --/ r----Each verifier signature confinns they have completed a separate 3-Pass Verification Checklist. --*-**-'"-----**----.-*-------SECTION TO BE CO:MPLETED BY EDflORIAL REVIEWER: -* -**--*--Reviewer(s) Name: Final PDF Approval Date: (.Print or Type) Signature: Check*: (MM/DD/YYYY) "\Villiam E. Berger Gt a 9' /;v /z.012 D 7 z *At lca"t one individual (verifier, editorial reviewer, or manager) is responsible for an editorial review of the final, signed off version of the PDF. That responsibility is delegated here (by check box), and by their signature the delegate accepts and ! --* --: ! i a?kil._owled&estheir responsibility to perform this final review step. ----' ] ! SECTION TO BB COMPLETED BY RESPONSIBLE MANAGER:: -----**" ' Manager Name: Approval Date: (Print or Type) (MM/DD/YYYY) Brenda T .orenz o c; lJlf_L.Joi 7 "*----C.,-(_ . ') I i Responsibilities of ai1thors/veritiers are documented !ill Independence of verification is confim1ed 121 EC 620632, Att. 1, Pg. 112 of 267 Ftl.l/17-0612 .R.ev. l REPORT NO.: REP-424-008-RP1 REVISION: 03 PAGE 86 OF 818 3-PASS VERIFICATION CHECKLIST P{{ge 6 of l 8 2017 Verifier Name: \ViUiam E. Date: a 9 .;, Lf" I Z..c.>i 7 {MVl/llONYYY) Document Kumher & Rev.: FAVl 7-0612 Rev.1 Metho<l(s) of VerifJcatio:-i; (ottach pages as tieedcd) Des[gtt Re\fieW D Jndcpcndcr.t Review ur AlLcnw.ic Calculatiom Method 0 Other{5pecify) 3NPass Verification Topic First Palls Were the genera.I theme. sccpc of do.:.;.ume:::i.t and scope of review clear? Do the references al)pear to be documented corr.xtly? Is there enough informati::,i-1: present to e:isure 1hc: referenced documt,'nl is ret:-ievable? (Include FA.I QAR 1m:nber for F."1 documents.) I If a;Jplicabk. do the acceptance criteria seem appropriate'? : the tedwical content of tl1e ca1colatio11 note make sense from a qm[i.UJ.tive standpoint an(l arc appropriate methods *Jsed? Thh*rl Pnss Do the rnsulLs a:-id wnGlusiumJ ma::t the acccptauci:: critcrill'? Do the results <'lml conc::lm;iom make sense and support purpose o: the ca:culatior.. note? ; Ilas the teclm.ical content of the documenL v-t:ri3.ed in adequate dct11il? Exa:nples of = kch.n;.cal conten.t incluC:e inputs, models, techniques, out.put, hand cak:*..11ations, results, tables, plots, units of measUl'e, etc. Does tlte calculat!on n;:ite prll\'i<lt: :>uffo:it::nl in a conc.:ise manner? Note that st:fficient detail i.s enough infomi.ation such thnl a qualifie:d person -could *mderstand the i mmlysis and replicate the rcsnlts without consultation. wieh the author. Arc propriccary mark.i:;igs in place, m ap;:m::ipriate? If applicable, are the references acctmiw? If applir.::<.iblli, do the references to other documents point 1o the falcsL rcvfoiun? (f vot, arc the r:;:asons documented? Are the references 1-etrievable? Are code 1wmes s;ielled correctly? If applicable, are num:::rals included. iu the official code name as apprnpriate? ; Has the documentation for which llio verifier is responsible been read word-for-word? Yes D D Testlng D T D D D D D D D D D D D D N/A D EC 620632, Att. 1, Pg. 113 of 267 FAI/17-0612 Rev. 1 EDITORIAL REVIEW CHECKLIST REPORT NO.: REP-424-008-RP1 REVISION: 03 PAGE 87 OF 818 Pagr 7of18 September, 2017 Reviewer Name: William E. Berger Document Number: FAV17-0612 Rev.l Date: t?C( b.t/ Lk1 1 (:rvfrvrroD/YYYY) -1. Proofread the document for general fonnat, readability, punctuation, and grammar. Are these acceptable lo you? 2. Is the documentation legible, reproducible and in a form suitable for archiving as a Quality Record? (This includes confirming the .pdf and .doc files are identical in content.) 3. Are all the pages sequentially numbered and are the document number and revision number listed on each page? 4. Is the Record of Revision page filled in correctly including Revision, Date, and Description of Revisions, if applicable? 5. Are the page numbers in the Table of Contents provided and correct? 6 . .?\re Acronyms defined in the document (either individually or on a separate page)? 7. Are Figures labeled consistently and do they include units of measure? 8. Are the units of measure clearly identified and used throughout? 9. Do all cross references to tables, figures, references, and sections point to an object of the gi vcn type? 10 . .1\re symbols (e.g., Greek letters) used correctly? 11. Is sufficient infom1ation (including FAI QAR number for FAT documents) provided for all "References" to facilitate their retrieval including documents not maintained as quality records, or has a copy been provided in an Appendix to the rep01t? 12. Are all Reterences listed referred lo in the text and vice versa? 13. Ts the content of the Appendices consistent with what the document states it is? Body of Cale Notes 14. Is all information in the cover page header block completed appropriately? 15. Are the responsibilities of the aulhor(s) and verifier(s) clearly documented? (e.g. by page numbers, section numbers, etc.) 16. Is the report revision number on each page? 17. A.re Tables labeled consistently and do they include units of measure? 18. Is background infomiation and purpose of the calculation clearly stated in the appropriate section? 19. If applicable, have the limits of applicability been listed? 20. If applicable, are open items identi tied? 21. Are the Acceptance Criteria listed in the appropriate section (if applicable)? 22. Does the Cale Note include a discussion on tJ1c methodology used? 23. If applicable, arc references lo the utility, plant, unit, and cycle correct with respect to spelling and consistency of use? Yes &l &1 IXJ lYJ D [lJ D D ,El D [YJ D D D D It! No NIA D D D D D D D D D D D D D D D D rn D J8J D D D D D D D D D D D D D D D D [3l' D @ D D psi D DI EC 620632, Att. 1, Pg. 114 of 267 FA1i17-0612 Rev. I REPORT NO.: REP-424-008-RP1 REVISION: 03 PAGE BB OF 818 Pa[:&#xa5; 8of18 Sr!ptember. 2017 Yes No N/A Body of Document 24. Is the Summary/Conclusion consistent with the purpose stated and consistent wilh Lh.: results se.ction? Computer Runs 25. Are the computer codes used clearly identified and is all required information included (per D F3-8.3-1, Attachment 1) included? 26. lf applicable, are all electronic files !isled in the clcctronfoally attached file listing? D 27. If applicable, does the electronically allached file listing appropriately reference the codes D used? Checklists 28. Has the verifier initialed one or more of the Verification Methods of review in the Verification Method Checklist? 1 29. Has the verifier provided an explanation of the method of review in the Verification Method Checklist? 30. Is an explanation or justification for any "NO" responses on the 3-Paiis Methodology Checklist(s) presented? 31. Are Author's responses provided to Additional Verifier Comments or noted as not required'? * D 32. Is the software name, version number, and system state(s) where the software was created D or validated provided? (or, is a reference for the software validation provided?) 33. If results are based on code development or modifications, is a source code listing or D reference tu a controlled location of the source code included? Alternately, if results are hased on available &sect;Oftware is Lhc software in a controlled location? 34. Doel'l the software output include the date of execution? (This could be in the form of a table D or an output file header.) 35. Does the software input include a description of what is being analyzed? (In the body of the D report or description header in the input file text.) Editorial Reviewer Comments (if needed): D D D D D D D D D D D D D D D D EC 620632, Att. 1, Pg. 115 of 267 REPORT NO.: REP-424-008-RP1 REVISION: 03 PAGE 89 OF 818 RECORD OF REVISIONS Rev. Date CAP AL Issue ID Revision Description (Month, Year) (If Applicable) 0 June,2017 Original issue. 1 September, Removed Proprietary statements from report per customer 2017 reques EC 620632, Att. 1, Pg. 116 of 267 1.0 Background REPORT NO.: REP-424-008-RP1 REVISION: 03 PAGE 810 OF 818 The 480V Bus IA sequencing control circuit relay logic for the 480 V Bus IA sequencing circuit recently demonstrated latent relay race for the VD fans. As the design does not provide stored DC relay energy to be dissipated, the logic is dependent on the relay parameters (i.e., coil inductance, coil time constant, drop out voltage and core air gap). The success of the logic sequence is limited by the drop out times of the two relays (GE CRI20BD0434I and Agastat E70I2PD004) and their drift of coil parameters over time. In this specific case, the relay parameters supported the logic sequence in the past before replacement of equivalent relays that may have introduced tolerances and a mismatch between the relay parameters that are causing a race in the logic sequence. [Test Specification #424-008-TSPI Rev.00]
Inspection Report 05000461/2017009 cc: Distribution via LISTSERV
EC 620632, Att. 1, Pg. 117 of 267 2.0 Purpose REPORT NO.: REP-424*008-RP1 REVISION: 03 PAGE 811 OF 818 The purpose of this test report is to document relay drop out time testing of GE CR120BD04341 and Agastat E7012PD004 relays per test specification number 424-008-TSPl Rev.00. Testing consisted of measuring electrical properties including drop out time of the relays under various test condition EC 620632, Att. 1, Pg. 118 of 267 REPORT NO.: REP-424-008-RP1 REVISION: 03 PAGE 812 OF 818 3.0 Test Specimens The equipment under test (BUT) included the following test specimens: Table 3-1 Test Specimens ,,:. ... : ,, EUT#l GE CR120BD04341 EUT#2 GE CR120BD04341 EUT#3 Agastat E7012PD004 Relay Relay Time Delay Relay EC 620632, Att. 1, Pg. 119 of 267 4.0 Test Procedure REPORT NO.: REP-424-008-RP1 REVISION: 03 PAGE 813 OF 818 The test sequence and test procedure are defined in Section 4.0 of KCI Test Specification Number 424-008-TSPl Rev.00. The test specification is archived in the Fauske Quality Assurance Archive under QAR number 5.178 along with this test report. 4.1 Test Setup During testing, the relays were mounted horizontally on a panel to simulate plant orientation. A photograph of the test setup can be found in Figure 4-1 below. The relays were wired consistent with the circuit configuration found in Section 4.3 of the test specification. Figure 4-1 Mounted Test Specimens 4.2 Test Instrumentation The following instrumentation was used during testing: Instrument Description Serial Number Calibration Due Date Chroma AC Power Supply 616040003355 11118/17 Agilent LCR Meter MY54150107 4/3/18 Fluke 45 8865045 1/30/18 Fluke 87V 20890147 11/17/17 EC 620632, Att. 1, Pg. 120 of 267 5.0 Test Results 5.1 Receipt Inspection REPORT NO.: REP-424-008-RP1 REVISION: 03 PAGE B14 OF B18 A receipt inspection was performed on all 3 EUTs upon arrival to the test facility. The EUTs were shipped from the Clinton Station and were brand new components. The receipt inspection was performed in accordance with Fauske & Associates Level 3 procedure F3-9.7-1 Visual Inspection. The receipt inspections demonstrated that the test specimens were not damaged during shipping and were in normal physical condition prior to the start of testing. No evidence of degradation, discoloration, or cracking was found during the inspection. The manufacturer and model numbers were identified and documented. Laboratory identifiers were assigned to the test specimens consistent with Table 3-1. This means that EUT #1 was assigned to one of the two available GE relays, EUT #2 was assigned to the second available GE relay while EUT#3 was assigned to the Agastat relay. Photographs of the test specimens were taken during the inspection. Photographs of the receipt inspection are found below. Figure 5-1 GE CR120BD04341 (1 of2) Receipt Inspection Photos-Side Views EC 620632, Att. 1, Pg. 121 of 267 REPORT NO.: REP-424-008-RP1 REVISION: 03 PAGE 815 OF 818 Figure 5-2 GE CR120BD04341 (2 of2) Receipt Inspection Photos-Top and Bottom Views Figure 5-3 Agastat E7012PD004 Receipt Inspection Photos 5.2 Baseline Functional Test Baseline tests were performed in accordance with section 4.2 of the KCI test specification number 424-008-TSPl. The baseline functional test results are summarized in Table 5-1 below. During pick-up voltage testing EUT #2 demonstrated abnormally high pick-up voltage values EC 620632, Att. 1, Pg. 122 of 267 REPORT NO.: REP-424-008-RP1 REVISION: 03 PAGE 816 OF 818 through two attempts. On the third pick-up voltage test attempt, EUT #2 failed to operate. The relay was allowed to cool but was not able to operate again. KCI was notified of this anomaly. EUT #2 was not utilized for the remainder of testing. BUT #1 and BUT #3 completed baseline functional testing without issues. Table 5-1 Baseline Test Results Test Coil Coil Pick-Up Coil Drop-Out Drop-Out Resistance Inductance Voltage Current Voltage Specimen (kO) (H) (V) (m.A) (V) Time(ms) EUT#l 6.0 15.2 74.1 20.1 8.9 141.6 EUT#2 5.9 15.3 NIA NIA NIA NIA BUT#3 1.8 10.4 77 66.3 20.3 64.1 5.3 Circuit Operation Testing A test circuit was built in accordance with the drawing in Section 4.3 of KCI Test Specification Number 424-008-TSPl Rev.00 utilizing BUT #1 and BUT #3. The relay circuit logic reproduced the Clinton Power Station logic sequence issue when energized and tested. Meaning, EUT #1 did not drop out after the 10 second time delay on BUT #3 occurred. The relay circuit logic sequence was unsuccessful each time the circuit was energized. Follow up tests were performed on the relay circuit. The tests consisted of 1) taking relay coil current measurements on both EUT #1 and BUT #3 during circuit operation and 2) measuring EUT #3 contact opening time. Coil current measurements were taken for both relays during the relay logic sequence. The minimum coil current measured for BUT # 1 was 16 mA. The expected minimum amount of coil current required for the relay to drop out was 1.4 mA. The minimum coil current observed for EUT #3 was 56 mA. The expected minimum amount of coil current required for the relay to drop out was 10.8 mA. These high coil current values suggest that the relay circuit design does not provide the stored energy in the relays to be properly dissipated. This delay in energy dissipation is long enough to allow the circuit logic to reset and initiate another 10 second time delay on BUT #3. Since BUT #1 did not drop out, the normally closed contact of BUT #3 was tested to observe if the contact would actually open even though both BUT #1 and BUT #3 were not dropping out. The contact opening time tests were performed on a normally closed contact on BUT #3. A 5 VDC signal was placed across one of the normally closed contacts on BUT #3. The testing demonstrated that, after the 10 second time delay of BUT #3, the normally closed contact on BUT #3 would open for 25 milliseconds and return to its normally closed state. This means that despite the fact that BUT #3 does not drop out, the relay's normally closed contacts still operated EC 620632, Att. 1, Pg. 123 of 267 REPORT NO.: REP-424-008-RP1 REVISION: 03 PAGE 817 OF 818 as expected. Therefore, the operation of EUT #3's contacts is a mechanical action and not a result of the relay dropping out. 5.4 Manual Relay When EUT #1 is energized, the tip of the plunger moves outward. Manually pressing the plunger in an attempt to de-energize the relay required considerable force and was difficult to execute. Removal of the "+" wire to the 3 contact on EUT #3, the half coil wire connected to contact 4 on EUT #1, or the"-" wire to the EUT #1 coil would result in de-energizing EUT #1. 5.5 Thermal Due to the relay circuit logic being unsuccessful at the onset of testing, thermal aging was not performed on the EUT EC 620632, Att. 1, Pg. 124 of 267 6.0 Conclusion REPORT NO.: REP-424-008-RP1 REVISION: 03 PAGE 818 OF 818 When energized, the relay circuit logic tested in this report was not successful and reproduced the Clinton Power Station issue each time. Further tests demonstrated that both EUT #1 and EUT #3 do not drop out upon completion of the logic sequence due to the design not allowing the stored energy in the relays to be dissipated. EUT #3 mechanically operates its normally open/normally closed contacts after the 10 second time delay for 25 milliseconds before the relay resets back to its normally closed state due to the relay's inability to drop out. EUT #1 does not drop out within the 25 millisecond window due to the amount of coil current keeping the relay energized and allows the relay circuit to rese EC 620632, Att. 1, Pg. 125 of 267 REPORT NO.: REP-424-008-RP1 REVISION: 03 I PAGE C1 OF C1 EC 620632, Att. 1, Pg. 126 of 267 It is not unusual for power generating systems to operate below rated speed during periods of warm-up or prime mover maintenance. If the resulting underfrequency condition persists, damage may result to the electrical system as the SR voltage regulator attempts to maintain rated generator output voltage. The Basler UFOV250A and UFOV260A are designed to protect the generating system against sustained low speed operation by reducing regulator output and, thereby, generator voltage. By adding the optional overvoltage circuit breaker, the regulator system can be protected against overvoltage conditions. DESCRIPTION The UFOV250A and UFOV260A prevent the voltage regulator from maintaining rated generator voltage when generator frequency decreases more than 4 to 7 Hertz below nominal value. When the underfrequency circuit assumes control, the reduction in generator output is proportional to the degree of the underfrequency condition. When the frequency returns to nominal, the output of the SR regulator is automatically increased, thereby increasing generator output to nominal. To provide overvoltage protection, a circuit breaker is added to trip when the applied voltage exceeds a predetermined, adjustable value (125%-150% of nominal). The circuit breaker contacts are nected in series with the voltage regulator power input lines so that the SR regulator AC power (terminals 3 and 4) is removed when the breaker trips. FEATURES * Designed for use with Basler SR-A, SR-F, and SR-H families of voltage regulators. * Protects generator, voltage regulator, and associated equipment against underfrequency/overvoltage* conditions. * Models for both 50 and 60 Hz operation. * Operates on NEMA standard voltages to 600VAC. * Overvoltage trip adjust. * Compact, reliable, economical. * Mechanically rugged. * CSA certified. * Overvollage protecbon provided when companion clrc.u1t breaker is used. REPORT NO.: REP-424-008-RP1 REVISION: 03 PAGE 01OF04 UFOV250A/260A UNDERFREQUENCY/ OVERVOLTAGE PROTECTIVE MODULES Class 200 Equipment SPECIFICATIONS Page 2 ORDERING Page 2 OUTLINE DRAWINGS Page 3 INTERCONNECT DIAGRAM Page4 &sect;.Basler Electric SPD-5 2-93 P. D. BOX 269 HIGHLAND, IUINOIS, U.S.A. 62249 PHONE 611-&S.-23-41 FAX 618-i5HJ51 EC 620632, Att. 1, Pg. 127 of 267 UFOV250A/260A REPORT NO.: REP-424-008-RP1 REVISION: 03 PAGE 02 OF 04 SPECIFICATIONS INPUT POWER: Voltage 120,208,240,416,480 or 600 Frequency Model UFOV 250, 50 Hertz Model UFOV 260, 60 Hertz Phase Single 100-. =I--!IO'I UNDERFREQUENCY OPERATIONAL THRESHOLD: 4 to 7 Hz below nominal. -w. UNDERFREQUENCY OPERATIONAL PARAMETERS: See Figure 2. OVERVOLTAGE ADJUST LIMITS: 125-150% of nominal. CIRCUIT BREAKER CONTACT RATING: P/N 05390 -50 amp@ 480 VAC P/N 05391 -50 amp@ 250 VAC AMBIENT OPERATING TEMPERATURE: -40&deg;C to+ 70&deg;C (-40&deg;F to +158&deg;F). SHOCK: 15 Gs in any plane. DIMENSIONS: See Figures 3 and 4. FINISH: Dark brown, lusterless. textured, baked enamel. WEIGHT: 10 pounds net; 12 pounds shipping. -i !L 10'. Mt. &sect;----r-+-' lO ClM**.:ci> *1110.ocr 110111 If the generator Is operated at less than rated speed. regulator output current to the exciter field is reduced and generator output voltage is proportionately decreased. The graph indicates the percentage of generator output voltage that will be obtained for a specific reduction in frequency. As an example. if a 60 Hz generator is operating at 50 Hz, generator output voltage will be between 82% and 95% of nominal. The "spread' in the envelope (shaded area) is a function of operational temperature and normal tolerance 1n components. *Data applies to part numbers 9104100100 (UFOV 260A) and 9105100101 (UFOV 250A). Similar units of design (Part numbers 9040000100 and 9040000104) were also identified with Model Numbers UFOV260/250. Those units have an underfrequency operational threshold of 10 Hz below nominal. For further information regarding such units, contact the factory. Figure 1 -Underfrequency Operational Parameters HOW TO ORDER Refer to the following chart to determine your requirements. When using any of these And desiring In a 60 Hertz In a 50 Hertz Basler voltage this protection power system, power system, regulators ORDER ORDER SR4A Underfreauencv onlv Model UFOV 260A orotective module Model UFOV 250A orotective module SR8A Model UFOV 260A protective module Model UFOV 250A protective module SR4F AND AND SR8F Underfrequency and P/N 05390 circuit breaker PIN 05390 circuit breaker SR32A Overvoltage (single pole) (single pole) SR32H OR OR SR63H P/N 05391 circuit breaker P/N 05391 circuit breaker SR125H (double pole)' (double pole)' *select the double pole breaker if (1) terminal A. on the SR-A regulator is utilized; or (2) if terminal FO on the SR-F and SR-H regulator is utilized. 2 I * .j "' .... ;;;;; EC 620632, Att. 1, Pg. 128 of 267 REPORT NO.: REP-424-008-RP1 REVISION: 03 PAGE D3 OF D4 U FOV250A/260A (\Ml (let.I --*126 ------<t> -u;oo ------1' MJI. (\401 t 5.100 ----'"1 ('Ml) 4.000 oov uoo llMI uu (t) PO. -, U60 (U} C.000 (1021 1&00 (1$6) &#xa9; I <.:* l:J76 AEP-. 0> ;;-H r;*1 e I * OIOO ("I RU. Figure 2 -UFOV 250/260 Outline Drawing / t.tif 141) M7. -----1.IZG *-*.316 -----(16el (IU) uoo -U&O ----'""1 ('MO) IW.I I (i) 0 r I I I I I U76 (34) 1111. ' -Lfl.: {'.:j *'t-( l.175 IUI 'd2-c]o.M r pl I '1111. 0600 IUI / 4 1,ma. IO.H -* 0.nl (0) CIA. RU. / \.11'6 !"" (C1) ' flfU. *. 30' -.....__ _ _. l'Tllll' ll llQTATiiD :10 Figure 3 -Circuit Breaker Outline Drawing All drawings and data subject to change without notice. 3 I * EC 620632, Att. 1, Pg. 129 of 267 U FOV250A/260A REPORT NO.: REP-424-008-RP1 REVISION: 03 PAGE D4 OF D4 INTERCONNECTION DIAGRAM II a II ............. , -* D * Figure 4 -Typical Interconnection for UFOV AND SR4A/SR8A Voltage Regulator *Refer to instruction manual for proper interconnection of UFOV 250/260 with SR-F, SR-H, and SR-32A voltage regulator. SAMPLE SPECIFICATION A device is required to protect the power generating system against underfrequency and overvoltage conditions. The unit shall have the capability of ing regulator output when generator frequency creases 4 to 7 Hertz below nominal. When the frequency returns to its nominal value the regulator output shall automatically increase to provide adequate field current for nominal generator output voltage. The device shall automatically open a circuit breaker controlling power input to the voltage regulator if generator output voltage exceeds 140% of nominal. The module must be capable of 240 VAC, 60 Hertz tion. Environmentally, the device shall be capable of satisfactory operation in the temperature range of -40&deg;C to+ 70&deg;C (-40&deg;F to +158&deg;F). The device shall be a Basler Model UFOV260A Underfrequency/Overvoltage Protective Module with P/ N 05390 Circuit Breaker. &sect;Basler Electric ROUTE 143, BOX 269. HIGHLAND. ILLINOIS U.S.A. 62249 P.A.E. Les Pins, 67319 Wasselonne Cedex FRANCE PHONE 618-654-2341 FAX 618-654-2351 PHONE (33-3-88) 87-1010 FAX (33-3-88) http://wwwbasler.com, info@basler.com t
 
-EC 620632, Att. 1, Pg. 130 of 267 REPORT NO.: REP-424-008-RP1 REVISION: 03 I PAGE E1 OF E4 SR4A, SR6A, SRBA, SR9A, SR32A Static Voltage Regulators SR_A voltage regulators are applicable to any size or type of alternator/exciter system. FEATURES * Output voltage ratings of 32, 63, and 125 VDC available. * 1 /2% regulation. * Fast regulator response. * No electrolytic capacitors. * For use with brush or brushless rotary exciters or as a shunt type static exciter. * Available for either 50/60 or 400 Hz operation. * Single or three phase sensing available. * Paralleling provisions. * Adjustable stability circuit. * Available with any of three time constants. * Designed to withstand severe shock and vibration. * Complete line of accessories available. * CSA certified. ADDITIONAL INFORMATION INSTRUCTION MANUAL Request Publication 9017700990 (SR4 and 8), 9017700991 (SR6 and 9), 9075000990 (SR32) &sect;.Basler Electric DESCRIPTION and SPECIFICATIONS page 2 ACCESSORIES, INTER-CONNECTS and OUTLINE page 3 ORDERING page 4 ROUTE 143, BOX 269 HIGHLAND, ILLINOIS 62249, U.S.A. PHONE 618*654-2341 FAX 618-654-2351 SA-2 1-97
=SUMMARY=
-..., ! EC 620632, Att. 1, Pg. 131 of 267 SR_A VOLTAGE REGULATORS REPORT NO.: REP-424-008-RP1 REVISION: 03 PAGE E2 OF E4 DESCRIPTION As more sophisticated power consuming devices become available, electrical energy sources must velop greater and more precise power capabilities to satisfy their demands. Ideally suited for alternator systems of larger size and for more precise regulation requirements. the Basler SR_A series of regulators has been proven on all types of power systems throughout the world. Over 25,000 SR_As are meeting the requiments of emergency, "no-break", peaking and ous power systems every day. The Basler SR_A tors are an outstanding value in performance, reliability, and cost. Basler SR_A regulators are available with 7 ampere continuous capability for 50/60 Hz or 400 Hz generator applications having either a 63 or 125 volt field, or with 20 ampere continuous capability for 50/60 Hz ing systems with 32 VDC fields. Complete ratings, outline dimensions, and typical interconnections are included in this bulletin. Paralleling provisions and three phase sensing are optional and become an integral part of the regulator when specified at the time of order placement. A complete line of accessory devices complements the SR_A regulators for 50/60 Hz installations. Many of these same accessories are available for 400 Hz machines. A list of accessory devices for SR_A regulators is included in this bulletin. SPECIFICATIONS PARALLEL FIELD MAX. POWER INPUT (1) OUTPUT RATING SENSING (2) COMPENSATION RESISTANCE WEIGHT MODEL Max. 1 Minute Max. Freq. Continuous Max. Forcing Volts VA Burden Amps VA Min. Max. Net Volts Hz VA (3) (Input) Burden Ohms Ohms Lbs. Volts Amps Volts Amps Per phase SR4A 120 50/60 840 63 7 90 10 10 5 25 9 400 12.S SR6A 120 400 840 63 7 90 tO NEMA STD. 10 5 25 9 400 12.5 SRBA 240 50/60 1600 125 7 180 10 120/208/ 240/416/ 10 5 25 18 400 12.S SR9A 240 400 1680 125 7 180 10 480/600 10 5 25 18 400 12.S SR32A 60 50/60 1200 32 20 45 28 10 5 25 \.6 400 \8 NOTES. 1. If correct voltage is no1 available to< power inpul, a s.;tabie Power lransf00J1er must be sele<:ted. (Seo Power Isolation rran*former BUiietin). 3. Wien regulator is operated al less than maximum output. power isolation ttansfOffiler rating can De determined by multiplying lnpul volU by OC outpul currenl. 2. Sensing voltage may be single or t/lfee phase. TABLE 1 REGULATION ACCURACY: Less than +/-1/2% over full range of alternator loading. REGULA TOR RESPONSE: Less than 17 milliseconds. REGULA TOR DRIFT: Less than +/-1/2% per 104&deg;F (40&deg;C) ambient tempeture change. REGULA TOR SENSING: Both single and three phase sensing are available (See Table 2). VOLTAGE ADJUST RANGE: Minimum +/-10% of nominal voltage. FINISH: Dark brown, lusterless, textured, baked enamel. AMBIENT OPERA TING TEMPERATURE: From -67&deg;F (-55&deg;C) to +158&deg;F (+70&deg;C) without ing. 2 STORAGE TEMPERATURE RANGE: From -85&deg;F (-65&deg;C) to +212&deg;F (+100&deg;C) with no degradation of components. PARALLEL COMPENSATION: 5A@25 VA, droop adjustable to approximately 5%. POWER DISSIPATION: Less than 60 Watts at continuous rating, less than 170 Watts in the SR32. SHOCK: Withstands up to 15 Gs. VIBRATION: Withstands up to 5 Gs at 260 Hz. WEIGHT: See Table 1. Shipping Lbs. 14 14 14 14 20 EC 620632, Att. 1, Pg. 132 of 267 REPORT NO.: REP-424-008-RP1 REVISION: 03 PAGE E3 OF E4 SR_A VOLTAGE REGULATORS ACCESSORIES *POWER ISOLATION TRANSFORMERS *EXCITATION SUPPORT SYSTEM (Series Boost Option) * UNDERFREQUENCY/OVERVOL TAGE PROTECTION *VAR/POWER FACTOR CONTROLLER, SCP 250 *CURRENTTRANSFORMERS * MANUAL VOLTAGE CONTROL * MOTOR OPERA TED CONTROL DIMENSIONS l SR4A,6A T SR32A SR8A,9A A 11.50 13.00 @ B 8.41 8.53 c 4.19 7.25 D 10.81 12.31 E 5.00 --m 5.00 F .34 .34 G 1.70 1.77 .265 DIA. MTG. HOLE, * PLACES B ------e 1-+-------D .-------A--------.i Figure 1 -Outline Drawing (SR_A Regulator) SENSING VOLTAGE 'NOT INCLUDED IN SR32A FIELD POWER AUTO OFF o MANUAL POWER PARAU.a INPUT COMPENSATION 4 BRUSH TYPE EXCITER figure 2 -Typical Interconnection Diagram (For operation with brush-type rotary exciter) SENSING VOLTAGE FIELD POWER E1 E2 E3 H F* *NOT INCLUDED IN SR32A PARAU.E1. COllPENSATlOll NOTE: All dimensions are In Inches (m*IWmeters). All drawings and data subject to change wilhoul notice BRUSHLfSS EXCITER Figure 3 -Typical Interconnection Diagram (For operation with brushless rotary exciter) 3 EC 620632, Att. 1, Pg. 133 of 267 SR_A VOLTAGE REGULATORS REPORT NO.: REP-424-008-RP1 REVISION: 03 PAGE E4 OF E4 SAMPLE SPECIFICATION The voltage regulator shall be a static type, equipped with a silicon diode and thyristor (SCR) power stage to control the exciter field current as required to maintain a constant and stable generator output voltage within +/- %% of nominal for all steady state loads from no load to full load. A 5% variation in frequency and the effects of field heating shall not affect the unit's regulation performance. The regulator shall have (single) (three) phase sensing with the sensing circuit isolated from the power stage. Stability and voltage range adjustments shall be mounted on the regulator circuit board. The voltage reference shall be obtained from a zener diode of low thermal coefficient for stability over a wide operating temperature range. leling provisions, if necessary, shall be an integral part of the regulator and shall be isolated from the sensing voltage input in such a way as to permit reactive load compensation by eitherthe reactive droop or the reactive differential (cross-current) method. The voltage regulator shall be a Basler Electric Company type SR_A, or approved equal. HOW TO ORDER Specify model and description: Basler Model SR_A-Voltage regulator. The model number of the SR_A regulator is a combination of letters and numbers indicating the features which are included in a particular regulator. The following style chart represents the standard product offering. These models are available with a 3-day standard lead time, subject to total order demand and parts availability . A) &.irtac:e moUl"lled .___ _ __.I [K]-l:fil [fil D [fil 0 D ---, 2)PaJai191 ptOVisions'w'ittl ed1ustable 1bde viMfltHl$10f 16} Selec1at.ll* 3 phase unsing with Facioo COMectOfl 3) Vollago Adiust Rh.ostt.l supplied separately ""'itn fegulatOt l A) fOf us* on a* bn.lSIMYJ)e and most brut>Mu exciters on generat0f'$ rated ove.r El fOf bnJstiess exciler (pft'natly oci g..ieretors r1ted 1 SiOkW or Mn) or whh al rotary OKC!terl t$R32A) The following styles are available on a special order basis. The lead time is 8 weeks. 4 A) No relay 8) !Mid-up rolay C)HotmotiCJlliy aea!edreb.y ---i 2) Voll>!l* 1'dj\nt rheoout il\'{9rnalfy 3} Voltage Adju11 Rheottat separatety rog<U.lor 4) Vottage Adjust rhlOStat 1n1erna1tv lnstah<S Wilh loci<lng shaft l A) Fat use on all brush-type and most bru:shiess exCittrS on generators ra.1od <Wer 150kW B) FOf UM as stalk: exciter (SRA. a. and 32) C) For UH wth f0t&#xa5;Y 8Jl'.Citer tSR61111d!I) OJ For \I.Se u stoatk excaor (SR6and9) E) For vu with brushloss excl1er (primarily on gonetatots rared 1SOl<W 0t d.n lill rotary oxcitclrt (SR32A) &sect;Basler Electric ROUTE 143, BOX 269, HIGHLAND, ILLINOIS U.S.A. 62249 P.A.E. Les Pins, 67319 Wasselonne Cedex FRANCE PHONE 618-654-2341 FAX 618-654-2351 PHONE (33-3-88) 87-1010 FAX (33-3-88) 87-0808 http://www.basler.com. info@basler.com I I i r EC 620632, Att. 1, Pg. 134 of 267 From: To: Subject: Date:
Inspection Report 05000461/2017009; 03/07/2017 - 08/03/2017; Clinton Power Station; Unit 1, Operability Determinations and Functionality Assessments. The enclosed inspection report documents a finding that has preliminarily been determined to be White, a finding with low to moderate safety significance, that may require additional 
 
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) inspections, regulatory actions, and oversight, with an associated violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, "Design Control," and Technical Specification (TS) 3.8.1, "AC Sources-Operating." The significance of inspection findings is indicated by their color (i.e., greater than Green or Green, White, Yellow, Red) and determined using Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 0609, "Significance Determination Process," dated April 29, 2015. Cross-cutting aspects are determined using IMC 0310, "Aspects Within the Cross-Cutting Areas," dated December 4, 2014. All violations of NRC requirements are dispositioned in accordance with the NRC's Enforcement Policy, dated November 1, 2016. The NRC's program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described in NUREG-1649, "Reactor Oversight Process," dated July 2016.
 
===NRC-Identified===
and Self-Revealed Findings
 
===Cornerstone: Mitigating Systems Preliminary ===
: '''White.'''
A self-revealed finding preliminarily determined to be of low to moderate safety significance, and an associated apparent violation of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, "Design Control," was identified on March 9, 2017, for the licensee's failure to implement measures for the selection and review for suitability of application replacement relays for the Division 1 Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) Room Vent Fan, which were components subject to the requirements of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B. Specifically, Engineering Changes 330624 and 366624 failed to evaluate the change in the actual drop out voltages for replacement relays on the associated fan circuitry, and instead, introduced new relays into the circuit that resulted in the failure of the fan to operate during an under voltage condition. This rendered the Division 1 EDG inoperable for a time longer than its technical specification allowed outage time, which was a violation of Technical Specification 3.8.1, "AC Sources-Operating."  The licensee entered this issue into the corrective action program as action request (AR) 03982792. Corrective actions for this issue included restoring the circuit to allow the ventilation fan to operate and returning the emergency diesel generator to an operable condition.
 
The inspectors determined that the licensee's failure to verify the suitability of the replacement relays for the Division 1 EDG room vent fan was contrary to the requirements of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III and a performance deficiency which was within the licensee's ability to foresee and correct. The performance deficiency was determined to be more than minor because it was associated with the design control attribute of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of the systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, the failure to verify the suitability of the replacement relays prior to installation in the Division 1 EDG room vent fan circuitry resulted in the inoperability and unavailability of the Division 1 EDG from May 18, 2016 to March 11, 2017, when one of the unsuitable relays was replaced. Using IMC 0609, Appendix A, "Significance Determination Process for 3 Findings At-Power," dated June 19, 2012, a Significance and Enforcement Review Panel preliminarily determined the finding to be of low to moderate safety significance. The inspectors determined that this finding affected the cross-cutting area of human performance in the aspect of challenge the unknown, where individuals stop when faced with uncertain conditions. Risks are evaluated and managed before proceeding.
 
Specifically, a questioning attitude was not used to understand the consequence of the differences in relay features resulting with installing a relay that was incompatible with the current design.  [H.11] (Section 1R15)4
 
=REPORT DETAILS=
 
==REACTOR SAFETY==
 
===Cornerstone:===
Mitigating Systems
{{a|1R15}}
==1R15 Operability Determinations and Functionality Assessments==
{{IP sample|IP=IP 71111.15}}
===.1 Operability Evaluations===
 
====a. Inspection Scope====
The inspectors reviewed the following issue:
* 1AP11E427X2-41A Making a loud clicking sound (AR 03982792) The inspectors selected this potential operability issue based on the risk significance of the associated components and systems. The inspectors evaluated the technical adequacy of the evaluation to ensure that Technical Specifications (TS) operability was properly justified and the subject component or system remained available such that no unrecognized increase in risk occurred. The inspectors compared the operability and design criteria in the appropriate sections of the TS and Updated Safety Analysis Report (USAR) to the licensee's evaluation to determine whether the components or systems were operable. Where compensatory measures were required to maintain operability, the inspectors determined whether the measures in place would function as intended and were properly controlled. The inspectors determined, where appropriate, compliance with bounding limitations associated with the evaluations. Additionally, the inspectors reviewed corrective action documents initiated to verify that the licensee was identifying and correcting any deficiencies associated with operability evaluations. This operability inspection constituted one sample as defined in IP 71111.15-05.
 
====b. Findings====
Failure to Evaluate Replacement Relays for Suitability
 
=====Introduction.=====
A self-revealing, preliminary White finding associated with an Apparent Violation (AV) of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, "Design Control," and an associated violation of TS 3.8.1 was identified for the licensee's failure to implement measures for the selection and review for suitability of application replacement relays for the Division 1 Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) Room Vent Fan, which were components subject to the requirements of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B. Specifically, Engineering Changes 330624 and 366624 failed to evaluate the change in the actual drop out voltages for replacement relays and introduced new relays into the system, preventing the fan from operating during an under voltage condition and rendering the Division 1 EDG inoperable from  May 18, 2016 to March 11, 2017.  
 
=====Description.=====
On March 7, 2017, an equipment operator heard a clicking noise coming from Unit Substation 1A while performing rounds. The operator notified the control room operators and documented the issue in AR 03982792. Upon investigation, the licensee 5 determined the noise was coming from relay 427X2-41A (commonly called the X2 relay). Relay 427X2-41A is an Agastat time delay relay that provides a signal to reset the load shed and resequencing circuit for the Division 1 EDG room vent fan. Further troubleshooting determined that the relay was cycling every ten seconds. With the relay cycling, the room vent fan could not start automatically nor be started locally.
 
On March 9, 2017, the licensee declared the Division 1 EDG inoperable since the vent fan was required to support EDG operation. Additional troubleshooting determined that the X2 relay was cycling because of a relay coordination issue between the X2 relay and circuit seal in relay 427X3-41A (commonly called the X3 relay). The licensee determined that the audible clicking noise likely began on February 24, 2017, when a grid disturbance resulted in a power loss to the emergency reserve auxiliary transformer that was supplying power to the Division 1 safety bus and Unit Substation 1A. However, the clicking noise was not immediately recognized. Under a normal loss of voltage or under-voltage condition, the X2 and the X3 relays should have de-energized, allowing the circuit to reset and start the room vent fan. In this specific case, the coordination issue prevented both relays from dropping out as required. This resulted in the circuit being unable to reset and allow the fan to start. The inspectors reviewed the design change history associated with the replacement of safety-related relays and found that the license issued engineering change (EC) 330624 in 2002. The scope of this EC was to evaluate and authorize alternative replacement motor control center (MCC) control units and associated components for safety-related 480V alternating current and 125V direct current MCCs located in mild environments.
 
This EC also evaluated the use of General Electric (GE) CR120BD relays for suitability in the plant, but it did not evaluate the use of the GE relays in specific plant locations or components. In January 2008, the licensee implemented a design change to replace X3 relays in the plant (which at the time were Gould J13 relays) with GE CR120BD relays due to obsolescence of the Gould J13 relays. Engineering Change 366624 was issued to allow replacing the Gould J13 relays with GE CR120BD control relays in Unit Substations 1A and 1B. In addition to the X3 relay replacement described above, the licensee also replaced the X2 relay in December 2011 and on May 16, 2016. However, variations in the drop out voltages of both relays and the associated impact that these variations could have on the proper operation of both relays was not evaluated nor understood until after the clicking noise was heard in March 2017. Specifically, the inspectors found that EC 366624 failed to evaluate the use of GE CR120BD relays for suitability in the load shed and resequencing circuit for the Division 1 EDG room vent fan but instead used an item equivalency evaluation which simply stated that the authorization and qualification of the relay was completed under EC 330624. The inspectors questioned the licensee to determine how EC 330624 evaluated the GE CR210BD relay for suitability of application in the Division 1 EDG room vent fan circuit since the EC only provided the following general statements with regards to the relays:
* These replacement units will retain the functionality of the electrical circuit and all associated electrical characteristics to maintain the existing licensing and design basis; 6
* The replacement equipment will have no adverse effect on the operation of the AC or DC systems; and
* The replacement GE CR120BD 125V relays are equivalent to the  Gould J13 125V relays. The electrical characteristics of the existing and replacement relays are shown in attached Table 5 [of the EC] [emphasis added].
 
The inspectors reviewed Table 5 of EC 330624 and found that it simply listed the characteristics of the Gould J13 and the GE CR120BD relays and provided no evaluation or justification for any characteristics that were not exactly the same such as the relay drop out voltages. Therefore, the inspectors determined that EC 330624 only looked at replacing individual relays and did not the evaluate whether the GE CR120BD relay's operating characteristics, including drop out voltage, would operate/coordinate properly when placed in a circuit that contained an additional relay such as the X2 Agastat relay. The licensee performed a root cause evaluation for this issue and concluded that the Division 1 EDG room vent fan failed to operate properly due to personnel not understanding the design basis of the Division 1 EDG room vent fan circuit specific to relay coordination and not understanding the impact the relay coordination had on the operation of the fan during the EC process. The report further stated that having a full understanding of the technical and licensing bases for safety related structures, systems, and components and fully evaluating any changes to these bases was fundamental to design control. In this case, avoidance of a relay coordination condition is fundamental to electrical design. Both EC 330624 and EC 366624 assumed that only a relay independent actuation function evaluation was required rather than an evaluation of the combination of relays for this timing circuit. As a result, replacement of the Gould J13 relay with a GE 120BD relay in January 2008 created a relay coordination condition where the Division 1 EDG room vent fan circuit's sequence of operation was adversely affected due to variations in the relays' electrical characteristics. However, this adverse interaction did not become apparent until after the under-voltage condition occurred on February 24, 2017. To correct the immediate relay coordination issue, the X3 relay was replaced with a Gould J13 relay, the load shed and resequencing circuit was tested satisfactorily, and the licensee declared the Division 1 EDG operable on March 11, 2017.  
 
=====Analysis.=====
Title 10 of the CFR, Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, "Design Control," requires, in part, that measures be established for the selection and review for suitability of application of materials, parts, equipment, and processes that are essential to the safety-related functions of the structures, systems and components. The inspectors determined that the licensee's failure to verify the suitability of the replacement relays for the Division 1 EDG room vent fan was contrary to the requirements of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, and a performance deficiency. Specifically, the licensee failed to evaluate the change in the actual drop out voltages for replacement relays associated with the Division 1 EDG room vent fan, and, as a result, failed to recognize that installation of a GE CR120BD relay in conjunction with the Agastat time delay relay was not a suitable modification of the Division 1 EDG room vent fan circuitry. The performance deficiency was determined to be more than minor in accordance with IMC 0612, "Power Reactor Inspection Reports," Appendix B, "Issue Screening," dated September 7, 2012, because it was associated with the design control attribute of the 7 Mitigating Systems cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of the systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, the installation of unsuitable relays in the Division 1 EDG room vent fan circuit resulted in the inoperability and unavailability of the Division 1 EDG due to the inability of the room vent fan to start during under-voltage or loss of voltage conditions.
 
During this inspection, the licensee provided the inspectors with a copy of Evaluation 619834, "Evaluate Survivability of Equipment in the Division 1 Diesel Generator Room Due to Failure of EDG Ventilation Fan 1VD01CA."  The purpose of this evaluation was to demonstrate that the Division 1 EDG would operate successfully for the mission time provided in the licensee's probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) without the fan operating.
 
The inspectors reviewed Evaluation 619834 and concluded that the licensee had not provided a reasonable basis to show the EDG would have been able to perform its function for the PRA mission time. Specifically, panel internal temperature would have reached approximately 240&deg;F, a point where some of the key components would have been susceptible to failure. Based upon this conclusion, the inspectors continued with the significance determination. The inspectors determined the finding could be evaluated using the SDP in accordance with IMC 0609, "Significance Determination Process," Attachment 4, "Initial Characterization of Findings," dated October 7, 2016 and Appendix A, "The Significance Determination Process for Findings at Power," Exhibit 2, "Mitigating Systems Screening Questions," dated June 19, 2012. The finding represented an actual loss of system safety function of the Division 1 EDG for greater than its Technical Specification 3.8.1, Condition B.4, allowed outage time of 14 days. Therefore, a detailed risk evaluation was performed in accordance with IMC 0609, Appendix A. A Region III Senior Reactor Analyst (SRA) performed a detailed risk evaluation using the Standard Plant Analysis Risk (SPAR) model, Version 8.50, for Clinton Power Station.
 
The following changes were made to the base model prior to performing the detailed risk evaluation.
* Room cooling was assumed to be required for diesel generator success. This assumption is based on the current Clinton PRA model of record. Basic events for fans and dampers that are needed for room cooling of Division 1, 2, and 3 diesel generators were added to the SPAR model, along with the appropriate failure probabilities, including common cause failure probabilities. A common cause component group for Division 1, 2, and 3 ventilation fans was defined.
* The potential to recover room cooling by opening doors to the diesel generator rooms was added to the base model. NRC staff reviewed the licensee's technical analysis which included room heat-up calculations and component testing and concluded that if operators opened doors to the room within 30 minutes after diesel generator start and ventilation fan failure there was adequate justification to conclude the diesel generator mission would be met.
* The human error probability for the failure to recover room cooling was estimated using the SPAR Human Reliability Analysis Method (SPAR-H). The SRA 8 determined that the performance shaping factor that would be a performance driver was high stress. The human error probability estimate for the failure to recover room cooling was 2.2E-2. This estimate is consistent with the detailed risk evaluation for a similar finding on the EDG fan supply damper documented in NRC Integrated Inspection Report 05000461/2012004.
* To account for the fact that a diesel generator would not fail immediately upon room cooling failure, the offsite power non-recovery probabilities that are in the baseline model were modified if the failure of the diesel generator occurred because of the loss of room cooling. Two additional hours were assumed to be available for offsite power recovery. For example, the value of the basic event for 4 hour offsite power non-recovery became a 6 hour offsite power non-recovery.
* For loss of offsite power sequences in which Division 1 and 2 emergency power fails but the high pressure core spray system is operating, offsite power recovery is assumed to be required within 20 hours or containment venting is required. The degraded plant condition was modeled as follows:
* The basic event representing the Division 1 diesel generator room cooling fan failure to start was set to "True" to model the fan failure as a result of the performance deficiency.
* The exposure time for the degraded condition was approximately 10 months. The exposure period started when the relay was replaced on May 18, 2016 and ended when the relay was again replaced and the diesel generator fan was returned to service on March 11, 2017. Using the assumptions as stated above, the internal events change in core damage frequency (CDF) estimate was approximately 2.5E-6/yr, which represents a finding of low to moderate safety significance (White). The dominant core damage sequence was a loss of offsite power event, failure of the Division 1, 2, and 3 diesel generators, and the failure to recover power before battery depletion. For the external event risk contribution, the SRA evaluated seismic and fire risk. The SPAR model was used to estimate the contribution from seismic events. The fire risk contribution was evaluated in a manner similar to a previous SDP evaluation for a service water pump failure that was documented in NRC Integrated Inspection Report 05000461/2015001. That evaluation used fire-induced loss of offsite power frequencies that were documented in a response to a request for additional information (RAI) for a license amendment request to extend EDG allowed outage times dated March 22, 2001.


===Attachments:===
The SRA concluded that any risk contribution from external events would not change the preliminary conclusion on risk significance generated using the internal event risk contribution. Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 0609, Appendix H, "Containment Integrity Significance Determination Process," was used to estimate the change in large early release frequency (LERF) risk contribution. Clinton has a Mark III containment building. The LERF factor for station blackout events with core damage at high pressure is 0.2. This factor was applied to the delta CDF estimate of 2.5E-6/yr. to obtain a delta LERF 9 estimate of 4.9E-7/yr. This risk estimate also supports a White finding. The SRA did not pursue refinement of this value and concluded that the overall significance of the finding should be based on the delta CDF estimate. The inspectors determined that this finding affected the cross-cutting area of human performance in the aspect of challenge the unknown, where individuals stop when faced with uncertain conditions. Risks are evaluated and managed before proceeding.
E!!a....G.i!!s "Anup Behera" FW: Inquirey from Bussmann website Tuesday, May 09, 2017 7:34:00 AM Temperature Perating -Pua! Element.pdf Temperature deratjng -Non dual Element.odf Same curves as before, with a little more detail for the dual element Ella From: FUSETECH@Eaton.com [mailto:FUSETECH@Eaton.com] Sent: Tuesday, May 09, 2017 6:07 AM To: egills@kciconsultants.com Subject: RE: Inquirey from Bussmann website NON is a non-dual element fuse where as FRN-R is a dual element fuse. Attached is the de rating curves for dual and non-dual element fuse. Regards, Saptarshi Roy Sr. Applications Engineer Bussmann Division Eaton 114 Old State Road Ellisville, MO 63021 tel: 636-527-1270 fusetech@eaton.com www.eaton.com/bussmannserjes REPORT NO.: REP-424-008-RP1 REVISION: 03 I PAGE F1 OF F4 EC 620632, Att. 1, Pg. 135 of 267 From: Ella Gills [mailto:egills@kciconsultants.com] Sent: Monday, May 08, 2017 9:25 PM To: FUSETECH Subject: Inquirey from Bussmann website Can you provide derating curves for Bussmann NON and FRN fuses? Thanks, Ella Bruce-Gills KCI Engineering REPORT NO.: REP-424-008-RP1 REVISION: 03 I PAGE F2 OF F4 EC 620632, Att. 1, Pg. 136 of 267 REPORT NO.: REP-424-008-RP1 REVISION: 03 I PAGE F3 OF F4 -760F -40&deg;F -4&deg;F 32&deg;F 68&deg;F 104&deg;F 140&deg;F 176&deg;F 212&deg;F (-60&deg;C) (-40&deg;C) (-20&deg;C) {0&deg;C) (20&deg;C) (40&deg;C) {60&deg;C) (B0&deg;C) (100&deg;C) AMBIENT Ambient Affect Chart for Non-Dual-Element Fuses EC 620632, Att. 1, Pg. 137 of 267 4o I I I &deg;'' drt I._ ** I ...... !\ \ '-' --*--REPORT NO.: REP-424-008-RP1 REVISION: 03 I PAGE F4 OF F4 Tiilq -; -*** -* -, l --**-* jt* -., j* :11:. :i1*1.1j. *1111,' I 11 '111111 ,,,,* .. *. I 11* 1'11 I '. * : . . : . ; .. . * . * . . * * * I . * . , , * 1 : * * tttrl I tj,, I * I , 1 * .: ! i.. 11. I , l 1 * i, I ! . , ,, . 111 *-.... f'.l. .**. ...,..., f-rW* I j-*m''-H+T-H+l+-H+H+H++-H I* ., '1 **1 !' I **1 . * . I** . '.. . . . " ' ,;!. 1111 I 1.1,* ! : 11 ; 111 l''I 1' !11 !1" " : '1 1*, II' I I * I I ' I I ' * I I 1 * ; * * * * " * : * I * I ; ! . I I : * * I I I I:: i(r. JPlffffiiT 11rr >Pi. i1ii[i)n ij 11 ,.;u ,: . 0Fr?1 11 :1*:i J'. t-r ,\.:ta .Q * t :.:f A :riA.! !J;* i1 frit m j+1H ld+rt+'-1 i !i I I. I '!I . I: 11 ! I : i I 1111 I: I " : : I * *1 -* ! I * .. I. I * I I * ! I ! . I : I; 'I 11 1 q ! 11 ! .. : : .'I 11 ! I ; I : I 1,' I I , I* 1: . . *' I I * ' ,t L*I. *. I m* --*tr *-*n *-, .. r. . --* **-* -* ....... "". .. . **--* ***1 "' .. .,. I'" ---* .. --.,,.r .,. I ". : :1 11111 ! lli : .1: iii: . . : ll* I ' . I 1 : *1 * : I *1 *::1 .::* :. .w I '.1*,* i:1 II II . : : : : ' I: . . . . . 11* 1: "1A .. *1 . , *-. i . *-*-* :---. *---.. . . . . 'I . ' ,* " . ! I. I *-T-ri1+-ri-'1: ;HTH' I * ( ! . 'f;' ' . . ' I I l *T! I . . . ' I ; : ' ' : : * I l : I : ' I I' I f I t 1 rr.rW.11tH :**;* !:: -, I . -* ;-* .* * 1*** .... ,*-*:-i :;-; *:1 i;-; .. i1r:* :0:1 ;m-,*: [i'+H+l+l-M++++H+H __ ++++1++-H++H-1 11:1_.tfl111.: *t '. :** .... -:! *, '1* l1::* II f 11* ,.! t 1: l!ji iili 1i . ;1i1 ,,,, lj' Ii jll1' 1p-LI '!'!II.. . -*--. ! I. ,.: ; :*11 '.11 !ijl *Ill . -* , * I 11 . I if , , 11 * I I . 4-j i 11 r -. . . . , 1 , , , , I , * * . , . 1 , , 11 'I *r1* 11'1' "TT 1r1rr ll'i"1iT l'rl 11*1*: . 111111 -. ;-r-* ::,. f!-1*. *1rn-:-:-1** jl* ., ll111Tt'l-n;ll-r"i-'1rt+lti+ 111t+t+MH+t+++++H-lf+H+t_++l_+H++H+t+H 11,; . I' . I : I. . I I .. 'I I:, ; i I 1' I I i : I I -.... : I !: * ' .1 I ' . I I I I ; 11 I , * ! ; '1 I '1" I .. ; I * I * ' f ,. * ' I * I l I *1 . ' . , I -...._ * 'I 1' ' I I I i I I ' t* " I 11 ! i .Ii ! ; ! ! : 1 Jl j I Tl 7111 '.: * 11 i * * '! 1 i: Ii 1: * ! , ! ! * r;e g} : : ".. ';+f11 11i 11!1;' 1: 1*11;: r: if: i! 11 *11111:1'1111r1*i1-1'-" , .. * ...: *1 rr .. t *:!11*1 1 *11*11!l11:1:11; 1111 * 1 I ' I " l I I * ' * * --* * . ' ; * t Ii . I \i Pl -,... I I I . * . I I Ii **:I *11 h1 i *1 ,, . "* 11111, ,,. 11 i 11'1 11111mnn. I '1,,.., , *:. ''! I i . *11* i * 'I '11* . I 11.tt 11 i ! 1I,1 .li .. 1. . I I: _:. . ; _ L .;.. I 1 i!!-I 'J + '. -I. -j . --,, ..:... i l I !i . I : I I LL I l . n T ml rrr. . . . . r.j+ : .,.. . j ir * ! rri 1 * ' I I * . I r ; I i 'I' I ' ! I 1* 1'!11 . ITT l ;-r T 1 I +I it r 11 . ; . . H-t-t-t-1 t-tttt-t+ttt1rtttt1'tt+HH+t+i+t+H . oi 1. . i 11 1 !I' 1 I" .1 ii * 1 1 * ..l : . : II:;. ,1 r Jat tri > ; .. : : : *:. 11 i r , llili.. * * 1 . * 1 1 * I 11 : " 1 . I 1. IJ ! 1 -illil i ! I! I l, i! ; I: I ; ; 1; 4. '1 '!r;] . " I I., 'I;. 11: I 11 I I ' I, I* I Ill '1 il; . . I* ! t; ! ': Fil ff Ml r-t+H-t+t+++H+T-'++Hf+H I ' I I I I * I . I 'I (.1 I I . Ji b '-"*" . . I * I :l..!. . I . I . ! I 111 Tt1' J I *-.* **** ir***; " 11'-* *-;i *** ** * * -:-** 1*rjl **,: j 111..._* 1 1 *, -1n+1H +H++!+H+l+H++m I*: ii:! "I ,:, * * 2' 1 1 .. ,.-,;,: : * * t:iir iz!1* I** :i! -. .* . 1ni.1 * (:llNf IN . Id I IJ 1:11 *:1; !*11 q*: .... z 1: Fr *:i .. ---U9 1 ifa! T 1' 1'! ! 1 Jl" 1111 'it 1111 **1: i 1 1111 1 t i +tth :; *; '. :: I ( . ( .,ti'. 1 :inij* "1'! 1;: i *. ," .... ,-r 1i111 hti !Iii... I * * :-* i 'I '-.: :"' n "": j+-n---il *H+i+t+++++++H-++H+H I I 'ii I . 'I I I I' I'. i.O::... . . } _.;. . I 1 Ji ; ,.!. 'i ; . . I 1 i I I: i I 11 I '"' ; 1 I:; I I :r ...... t "Ii 11 I I'' *11 -r-li--=-l.&.,I ... --.. ., h'6i r--...... 1 t .111rri , '.'11 :111 :.:! i11 '!'111111 . 1111 i:11 i11.,.1TH:,....1iirttttiiJTH-tttt+ffirt+t+l 1I11 . I II I I\ ' t.,. * ' ( t:" I * \ :w L1. '* . " . I I ti .1 I ..... 11 I " * , I I +-'-:-rr **1* .. * ... ,..... ,.. ii-+* * ** *-"!'11: r::* '1t.-*--* -*--r-rr rr:* ....... r1 ,. .....HTiiiii-t11ttttt+tti'H ii : : ! : ! ; i : . . * .. ,.. +.4rn &deg; c ( -ti!P q n * I l : : 1 : ; . : ,I iii i * * ii , ! I 1 * ' ! : ; , ! 11 11 i : 1 ! * 1 ; : .. '..,: 1 " * ! i I I .. IB 1Ii11. ii!: i"' :.J*: . i:1: :11 +-11i:o*f1, w.:111M1111 i'l*i: *1li i111. *, ?11 *1:1 .. *u'lli I! i 111 .&#xb5; . , , .'...:l.i. . * 1&deg;. 't' r . * , 1 * * *, 1 I 1 1 * * , * 111 l . 41., hl+ \... .1 1 1 .. "' '?!f *("+a-q:1)i1 .: 1111T!111 !I 11!11:: if}"F!ll. i !1 "-..1! :llf++, l-H+l+H+H-H-!+H+H+H *f' J 1T :.-111111n llJ.cUU Jilli 111 !gi. 11, +ttt+H+ttt+Hlttl+H-Hfl 1 i1 , 1!:1 !*:I :11; * ;.*I :*1! 1111: i .. * 1*1' ,. io' i I! ii I I 1 I!!* 1!:i ii l':; :_ !1 ;q 111:_ '.:ii 111111 llli :ii 1!1 il'.l!lil_ !l!I U! I I I If 11 !ITf T. rl* 'I f*ji I' 11T ,,,.-':,,, *11* Ii 1!1' I m1 j I 111! ilt I. '11 ,,., I :r ++,it ,H+t++t+H-H+Hm=Httf:t-1+1=1 * 1:: :. iii 11!*. *11:** *1' ***1:!!!,.; 1!*:*!1!:111111 11**:.:11* i;j l;l'i11 .'11:1 . !1,; Ii -111 .. 11 i' ':n' 1111111 :1 ... **;i-;-+H:*l.+ =1* 111* ! Ill* rr 11 * 11* I 11 I 1 111. ,il* 1:1: :'.:' ! 1 i . I I TI I* Hi1 .. ". I' (( I,. I jl I I fl .. 11 o,:l.I I -I I! I I -Ji.I... i I 1 i'T ... *-1-..., .... 11' ' __ , '-T--r*-r--:-1 .. 1-** 11n .,,. ..,.. rn *-,,,. j;ll 1-I : ,j!: *1! ljl! :111 ,,.. .;: I*! 11'11 .1,; :,:. ;ti; !:II I I. 'I 11 p" . , 1*11 1'i 1' *'1* .,J 'I I I 1111 I I *:1 i , !1 I *r:i!* .. '*: , .. ;/.:;i i1ti ,1!. *111:1,1111 '*!I'*
EC 620632, Att. 1, Pg. 138 of 267 REPORT NO.: REP-424-008-RP1 REVISION: 03 I 1 Technical Publication LOR-1 HIGH SPEED MULTI-CONTACT LOCK-OUT RELAYS FOR POWER INDUSTRY APP LI CATIONS e ELECTROSWITCH SWITCHES & RELAYS . UNIT OF ELECTRO SWITCH CORP. 180 King Avenue, Weymouth, Massachusetts 02188 Rlone: 781-3350200 Fax: 781-3.354253 www.dedlUMitdl.oom EC 620632, Att. 1, Pg. 139 of 267 REPORT NO.: REP-424-008-RP1 REVISION: 03 PAGE G2 OF G14 HIGH SPEED MULTI-CONTACT LOCK-OUT RELAYS FOR POWER INDUSTRY APPLICATIONS ELECTROSWITCH Weymouth, Massachusetts ABSTRACT The Series 24 Lock-out Relays are high-speed (as low as eight milliseconds) control relays used primarily as auxiliary relays in applications requiring many contacts (up to 48). The LOR is an electric-trip and manual-reset device. The LORJER is an electric-trip and either manual or electric-reset. The LORJSR is an electric* trip and self-reset device. All units have mechanical position indicator targets. They are qualified to ESC-STD-1000, which includes aging and seismic vibration requirements to ANSI/IEEE 323-1984 and ANSI/IEEE-344-1987 for class IE uses in nuclear power generating stations. The testing also satisfies ANSI/IEEE CJ?.90-1989 and ANSI/IEEE C37.98-1987. INTRODUCTION Lock-out Relays of various types are often used in the electrical power industry. These auxiliary relays are electric-trip, manual or electric-reset control relays for the purpose of tripping and locking out circuit breakers or other devices automatically when a fault or other determined condition exists. Lock-out-relays are generally used in conjunction with protective relays to protect transformers, buses, and rotating machinery in various electrical systems. Fig. l. Series 24 LOR Manual-reset Lock-out Relay Initial Release -September 15, 1977 Revised-January 3, 1980 Added LOR/SR -February I, 1983 Revised-March 15, 1985 Revised-April 15, 1987 Revised-June 1, 1991 Revised-February 15, 1993 Revised-February 10, 1994 Revised -September I, 2012 1 Lock-out Relay applications often require ten or more N.O. and N.C. contacts. The relays can be used to change sequences such as shutting down a faulty pump and then initiating the action to start-up a standby pump or bypassing a faulty circuit by opening and closing breakers. Lock-out-relays are normally latched in the RESET position and trip-out to a TRIP position when commanded. There are then manual-reset, electric-reset, and self-reset versions to get back to the RESET position. Fig. 2. Series 24 LOR/ER Electric-reset Lock-out Relay and LOR/SR Self-reset Lock-out Relay High-speed, rugged, multi-contact units are needed. This paper describes a family of Lock-out relays with up to 48 contacts that operate as quickly as eight milli-seconds and are seismic shockproof. BASIC CIRCUIT OPERATION The control of the Lock-out Relays for operation as a relay requires no special wiring. They only require a N.O. contact (SI) to command the LOR to TRIP and the Electric-reset LORJER needs an additional N.0. contact (S2) to initiate the command for RESET. The choice of SI should take in consideration the burden data of trip coil, LOR/T, since SI will "make"; this current. This circuit is self-interrupting with the LOR contacts so SI need not be concerned with the "break" of the TRIP circuit. On the electric-reset LOR, S2 needs to make only the Kl relay circuit so the burden of the LORJR does not affect S2. Any pilot duty device is acceptable for both Sl and S EC 620632, Att. 1, Pg. 140 of 267 Manual-reset LOR Circuit + __________ Q : LOR I CONTROL PKG I I "---------8 S1 COi'c----1 R i I LOR i ! LOR I __ fl _______ J Fig. 3. Manual-reset LOR Control Circuit Schematic (shown in RESET position) The standard station control bus voltage is used. The LOR, as shown, is in the RESET position. The LOR/T coil form represents the linear solenoid that releases the latch that locks the LOR in the RESET. The mechanical design is described later under THE ELECTRO-MECHANICAL DRIVE. The LOR contacts shown are normally closed in the reset position. They are within the LOR control package. G and B are tie points to connect the LOR to the control circuit. C and F are internal connection points shown for information. To command the Lock-out Relay to TRIP, SI is closed. This completes a circuit across the LOR trigger solenoid, which operates, causing the device to snap to the TRIP position. It locks into this position and remains there indefinitely. When this happens, the LOR contacts open, thereby removing the control circuit from the bus. The unit will stay locked-out in the TRIP position until manually reset. S 1 may be an auxiliary contact -from a breaker, a protective relay, or from another auxiliary device like a relay. The condition of the Lock-out Relay is visible by the handle location and a mechanical target within the nameplate (Black for RESET, Orange for TRIP) Electric-reset LOR/ER Circuit B3 Fig. 4. Electric-reset LOR/ER Control Circuit Schematic (shown in the RESET position) 2 REPORT NO.: REP-424-008-RP1 REVISION: 03 PAGE G3 OF G14 The Electric-reset Lock-out Relay operates from the control bus voltage like the manual-reset version. The LOR/ER, as shown, is in the RESET POSITION. The LOR/T coil form is the same linear solenoid that is used in the manual-reset LOR, and controls the latch that Jocks the LOR/ER in the RESET position. The LOR/R coil form represents the rotary solenoid that is used to reset the LOR/ER electrically. Kl is a relay used to control the rotary solenoid. This enables S2 to be a low level contact. It controls only the Kl relay coil. The Kl contact operates the high current rotary solenoid. TBl, TB2, and TB3 are terminal block connections, and F and H are LOR tie points -all are for connection to the control bus. G, B, and TB4 are internal tie points shown for information only. The command of the LOR/ER to the TRIP position is the same as with the manual-reset LOR which was previously described. When tripped, the NC LOR contact in the LOR/T circuit opens removing LOR/T solenoid from the circuit. When this happens, the LOR NO contact in the Kl relay circuit closes enabling this circuit to be used. To command the LOR/ER to reset, S2 is closed. This completes the circuit to the Kl relay and it operates closing contact Kl. This completes the circuit to the LOR/R rotary solenoid and it indexes to the RESET position. When this happens, the N.O. LOR contact opens. This opens the circuit on the Kl relay coil. The Kl relay drops out, opening contact Kl that opens the rotary solenoid LOR/R circuit. At the same time, the N.C. LOR contact, in the linear solenoid LOR/T circuit, closes, setting up the LOR/ER for the next TRIP command. SI and S2 should be momentary contacts and should not stay closed. If both contacts are closed at the a "pumping" action will result with the LOR/ER mdexmg back and forth between the RESET and TRIP positions. The handle and target indicators are the same on the standard electric-reset LOR/ER as the manual reset LOR. The handle on the high-speed LOR/ER is not an indicator and remains in the vertical position and the target must be manually reset (see page 9). Self-reset LOR/SR Circuits The self-reset Lock-out Relay operates from the control bus voltage like the LOR and LOR/ER. The LOR/SR, as shown in Fig. 5 and 6, is in the RESET position. The LOR/T coil is the same linear solenoid that is used in all LOR's, and controls the trigger that locks the LOR/SR in the RESET position. The LOR/R is the same rotary solenoid used in the LOR/ER and is used to electrically reset the LOR/SR. Kl and K2 are two relays with N.O. contacts used in the control circuit. B-A is a N.O. contact and E-F-G is a form "C" contact --both in the control circuit. F-G is N.C. in the reset position while F-E is N.O. TBl, TB2, TB3, and TB4 are terminal block connection points for the user. RI and R2 make up a bridge circuit on EC 620632, Att. 1, Pg. 141 of 267 both the INSTANTANEOUS RESET and the TIME DELAY RESET units. In addition, the TIME DELAY RESET version has an additional IE-IF normally open (NO) contact to isolate the K2 coil plus the time delay circuit, consisting of RI and C2-C3-C4, which are wired in parallel. DI protects the capacitors from a possible incorrect polarity hookup. The INSTANTANEOUS RESET version of the LOR/SR will reset itself within 80 milliseconds after the fault has cleared itself (SI opens). This circuit is illustrated in Fig. 5. LOR/SR: C:ONTHL PACOOE SUPPUBI Fig. 5. Instantaneous-reset circuit for the Self-reset (shown in RESET position) Lock-out relay The LOR/SR trips in the same manner as the manual-reset LOR. With SI closed (simulating *the commanded or fault condition) B-A contact closes and E-F contact closes. In this manner E-F and A-B are both connected to the (+) bus so the Kl coil sees no voltage difference and cannot operate. Therefore, the LOR/SR will not reset and may remain in the TRIP position indefinitely while the RIR2 bridge draws only enough milliamps to maintain the voltage balance of the bridge and well below the dropout current of any 0.2 amp. target relays that may be part of the circuit. When Sl opens (indicating the fault or pre-determined condition has cleared), the RlR2 bridge becomes unbalanced since the E-F contact, although closed, is in the SI contact circuit. Kl operates, closing contact Kl and K2 operates, closing contact K2 and the rotary solenoid LOR/R operates and indexes to the RESET position completing the cycle. Contacts E-F and A-B then open, dropping out relays Kl and K2 (and their contacts). Contact F-G closes, setting up the LOR/SR for the next command. The TIME DELAY SELF-RESET (shown in RESET position) version of the LOR/SR, illustrated in Fig. 6, operates in the same manner as the instantaneous reset version except the R3-Cl-C2-C3-C4 circuit causes a time delay of from 300 to 600 milliseconds from the time SI opens until the LOR/SR contacts reclose. 3 + LOPJSR COK'mOL PACKAOE SUPPUB1 REPORT NO.: REP-424-008-RP1 REVISION: 03 PAGE G4 OF G14 l Fig.6. Time-delay Self-reset circuit for the LOR/SR Operating Voltage The LOR, LOR/ER, and LOR/SR Lock-out Relays are direct current actuated auxiliary relays. Because they are only actuated for short periods of time and are self-interrupting, they may be subjected to maximum design voltage indefinitely without exceeding the 50&deg;C temperature rise in ambient conditions as high as 55&deg;C. This is using class 105 insulation and the applied thermo-couple method of temperature determination. The Lock-out Relays operate reliably over the full voltage ranges described in ANSI/IEEE C37.90-1989, the "Standard for Relays and Relay Systems Associated with Electric Power Apparatus." These ratings are shown below: COIL A,B c 0, E, G, K F, H TABLE I Coil Operating Range* ;NOMINAL VOLTAGE. 24VOC 48VOC 125 voe 2so voe ; ' NORMAL . VOLTAGE i: RANGE ' ( 19.2 to 28 voe 38.4 to 56 voe 100 to 140 voe 200 to 280 voe *From ANSI/IEEE C 37.90-1989 The trip and reset solenoid coils provide reliable operation over a wide RANGE of operating conditions. Trip coils A, B, C, D, E, and F have substantial overlapping voltage ranges enabling some "custom-fitting" depending on the desired speed versus current burden. Trip coils G and H have controlled threshold voltage levels to insure that the unit will not trip at half-voltage. G and H coils are useful where cummulative stray voltages due to capacitive and other effects might be impressed on the LOR coil causing occasional nuisance trips. The full voltage ranges are shown on Tables II and III. The Threshold Voltage shown is the minimum level that can produce a TRIP operation. This is not a reliable operation and this voltage level should not be normally used. The normal operation should be within the limits of the Operating Range. The Operating Range represents the design limits for reliable operation. Safety factors are included so operation can EC 620632, Att. 1,. Pg.' 142 of 267 occur above and below the indicated range as previously explained. TABLE II Trip Coil Voltage Data '.* THRESHOLD'*. . ; , ! . OPERATING* .. COIL; VaLrAGE *;11; .RANo/E .;} .. ' ; ... . *(."** ;&#xa5;,.I A 24 VDC 6 VDC 10-40VDC B 24 VDC 9 VDC 18 -50 VDC c 48 VDC 12 VDC 24-70 VDC 125VDC 16VDC 30-140VDC D 120 VAC 20 VAC 30-140 VAC E 125 VDC 23 VDC 45-140 VDC 250 VDC 33 VDC 70-280 VDC F 240 VAC 40VAC 60-280 VAC G 125 VDC 70VDC 90-140VOC H 250 VDC 140 VDC 180-280 VDC K 12s voe 16 VDC . 100-1so voe Note: D coil has been tested and approved for use@ 120VAC TABLE III Reset Coil Voltage Data *,*I, ,.. . ; j::: . If/ *1 : ,, .*<.;.; it COIL ' NOMINAL.;:, * : H ,i: ' * [ ': * :\-* ': . . .. " '.t t ;* * A 24 VDC 19.2 to 28 voe c 48 voe . 38.4 to 57.6 voe D 12s voe 100 to 140 voe F 2so voe 200 to 275 voe Coil Burden Data The LOR, LOR/ER, and LOR/SR solenoid coil burden data is outlined in Table IV. As previously explained, the control bus needs to be able to supply the burden detailed in Table IV but does not need to interrupt it -the units are self-interrupting. The reset coil is hard-wired to the control bus so the actuating means (S2 in Fig. 4) is not subjected to the burden (only the Kl coil burden at less than 1 ampere) Sl controlling the trip coil does "make" and carry the trip coil current. 4 ,. ' REPORT NO.: REP-424-008-RP1 REVISION: 03 PAGE GS OF G14 TABLE IV Coil Burden Data i * * TRiP COIL ,*;; ,,,.,-,RESET COIL" '.'**:i: :* COIL.* . ' ., : COIL 'BURDEN * , t t . CIRCUIT CIRCUl.T * . *!'.;OIL * 'cic *' , ':(amps): * * * ' VOLTS . : ; *@RATED;. DC OHMS', i@RATED Of:!MS .. -(, ' ....... . . * VOLTAGE' @2s0c . . . ' . '.' * ', ,: ... A 24 VDC 3.3 7.3 0.7 33.8 B 24VDC 7.7 3.1 ----c 48VDC 13.0 3.7 3.0 15.9 D 125 VDC 27.0 4.6 12.4 10.1 E 125 VDC 50.0 2.5 ----F 250VDC 104.0 2.4 80.6 3.1 G 125 VDC 27.0 4.6 ----H 250VDC 104.0 2.4 ----K 12s voe 27.0 4.6 ----Trip Coil Current -Voltage Characteristics The trip coils may be used over a wide range of voltage levels as previously described. To aid in this selection Fig. 7 graphs the voltage/current characteristics of the trip coils. These values are the same for the manual-reset LOR, the electric-reset LOR/ER, and the self-reset LOR/SR Lock-out Relays. Fig. 7 is used with the Response Time graph of Fig. 8. Target selection data is detailed on Table V and VI and Fig. 9 to 12. 12 LJc*: LOR t1' . CHJ.\.RACTE1RI. TICS OF THE TRIP COILS \ to-< I :I e! '. c ; 0 ! '.1 -u ..... 'jq I l .:. 11 a t --t+' . II 1: '-' . I . <> ,, ::! , ' t 8. ;p'" l i 85 /1 :1 I .i /" 4 J : '* j I v c,0'" i.j.,-,cil 0 i 3 ---I 1/ / I: / coll: f ., --: 2 V! / -* . ;I / --i I 1 -i ,; I : 20 4> eo 801001:nl14> 11101m1200 Z2U402CI02ill0 DC 'VOLT AGE AfPLED TO COIL Fig. 7. Trip Solenoid Coil Burden Data l EC 620632, Att. 1, Pg. 143 of 267 TABLEV LOR Trip Coil Selection for Positive Target Operation LOR TRIP COIL A B c D E G H 1 .... :* ., OPERATING ! , , T * * * 1 .I .* * : \ , "i : DC VOLTS -0.,iA.TARqEJ :: " ; 21\TARGET; 24 A,B,C 48 B, C, D, E 100 D,E,F 125 D, E, F, G D 140 D, E, F D 190 F D 250 F, H D TABLE VI Suggested minimum DC Voltage required for Positive Target Operation with Manual Reset LOR. (Actual values may vary). 12 12 42 90 95 24 40 118 80 95 105 75 105 40 150 70 125 90 180 Response Time -Trip Solenoid 90 Fig. 8 shows the high-speed response of the Lock-out Relays. The values given are total response to close N.O. contacts. The values are for ten deck LOR's and eight deck LOR/ER's and LOR/SR's. There is very little difference in smaller units. The response time of the trip coil of the speed electric-reset Lockout-relays is the same as the reset LOR's. Response Time -Reset Solenoid The reset time of the electric-reset (LOR/ER) Lock-out Relays is generally not an important applications consideration so a graph has not been prepared. The response is approximately fifty milliseconds at rated voltage for all coils. The reset times of the self-reset LOR /SR is described on page 3. 5 REPORT NO.: REP-424-008-RP1 REVISION: 03 Targets used with Lock-out Relays All the Lock-out Relays have a mechanical target as part of the nameplate -Black for RESET and Orange for TRIP. This indicates the condition of the LOR. The target resets when the LOR resets (with the exception of the high-speed trip electric-reset LOR/ER and self-reset LOR/SR where the memory target is manually reset). The addition of the optional LIGHTED NAMEPLATE to the LOR provides local and SCAD A verification of trip coil integrity. It also provides local LED indication of the presence of a continuing trip signal to the LOR, which alerts the operator not to reset a manual LOR into a fault. The lighted nameplate has two LEDs. The right LED is controlled by the circuit that detects an Incoming trip signal to the LOR. If such a signal is present, then the right LED is lit. This is important since it warns the operator not to attempt to reset the LOR with a trip signal present, which can damage the LOR trip coil. The left LED is controlled by the circuit that monitors the LOR trip coil. When the trip coil is intact and the LOR is in the normal RESET position, this LED is lit. The same trip coil monitor circuit controls the SCADA output of the lighted nameplate. If the trip coil should open for any reason, then the SCADA output closes. The SCADA output also closes if power to the LOR is lost and when the LOR is in the TRIP position. External targets may also be used in conjunction with the LOR's to show the condition of the devices that are being controlled. The most common 0.2A targets operate satisfactorily with an LOR. The 0.6A targets are also generally satisfactory. 2A targets need special attention. Selection of LOR trip coils are shown in Table V with minimum required DC voltages for position target operation shown on Table VI. 2A targets are generally slow acting. The response time of the LOR's is generally too fast for them to respond. From Tables V and VI, it is seen that only trip coil D will respond and only at 118VDC or more. In order to use 2A targets at lower voltages, suggested circuits have been developed. The standard circuit with no additional circuitry is shown on Fig. 9 for comparison. Figs. 10 to 12 are shown as suggested solutions. Table VI shows the minimum voltages to apply with these circuits to get position 2A target operation. These circuits were developed using target relays with coil characteristics shown on Table VII. TABLE VII ' Target Relay Coil Characteristics : TESTS BASED "'.< ; , TARGET c;o1L CHARACTE.RISTICS I . -* :''l2A:,. I Coil Resistance (ohms) 8.15 0.71 0.195 Pull-In Current (amps) 0.15 0.45 1.75 EC 620632, Att. 1, Pg. 144 of 267' + .----------LOR! I CONTROL PKG I i _________ _ Target relay coil ----------, LOR Interrupter contacts LOR trip coil LOR interrupter contacts ----------.i Fig. 9 typical LOR trip circuit with target relay coil in series with LOR coil + Fig. 10 LOR trip circuit with resistor (Rp) in Parallel with LOR trip coil (not supplied with LOR -see Table VI for recommended Values) + LOR interrupter contact LOR interrupter contact Target relay coil C1 Fig. 11. LOR trip circuit with RC network --is momentarily connected with LOR coil increasing current in 2A target. Cl discharges through RI when. LOR is reset. See Table VI for recommended values of Cl. . Requires special LOR. Contact Factory. + Target relay coil Rs LOR interrupter contacts LOR trip coll LOR interrupter contacts Fig. 12. LOR trip circuit with series resistor (Rs) chosen to reduce trip coil wattage. Value-chosen to obtain 5 amperes for 5 milliseconds or longer through target relay coil. See Table VI for reconunended values. 6 Transient Protection REPORT NO.: REP-424-008-RP1 REVISION: 03 The LOR, LOR/ER, and LOR/SR Lock-out Relays are designed and tested to operate reliably in a normal power industry environment. This includes being subjected to transients on the control bus up to 5kV. Since the LOR is normally isolated from the Bus, it will experience transients only if they occur in the operating mode. This precludes the possibility of a detrimental, accumulating effect over the life of the unit. As such, no transient prote&#xa2;tion is needed. Because of the nature of the operation of the solenoid coils, the LOR does generate transients that may be of interest to the user. These transients are less than 2kV and generally in the 1.5kV to 1.8kV range. In systems consisting of components that meet IEEE Std. C37.90.l these transients will not cause any issues. BASIC RELAY CONTACTS The LOR, LOR/ER, and LOR/SR Lock-out Relay contacts operate on the original, reliable principle of knife switches --double sided, double-wiping, spring wiper blades closing on both sides of a terminal. To provide a closed contact, two tenninals are bridged or shunted. Fig. 13 shows this contacting arrangement. Fig. 13. Double-sided, double-wiping knife-type Contact configuration. Contact Materials The wiper blades are made from a phosphor-bronze alloy that combines superior spring qualities with good electrical conductivity. This material and blade design has been proven by extensive laboratory testing as well as more than thirty years of field u.se and experience. Initially used in rugged naval ship applications, it is also used in industrial applications such as railroad locomotives and earth moving equipment. It has been used for more than forty years . in power industry applications, as well. The blade assembly is shockproof and virtually bounce-proof This makes it ideal for high-speed, make, quick-break devices like the LOR, LOR/ER, and LOR/SR. j EC 620632, Att. 1, Pg. 145 of 267 The blades are formed, assembled, and riveted nearly closed. The gap is machine adjusted to provide a uniform high pressure. The gap does not change with time and use. Normal use tends to improve the contact surfaces due to the rubbing action. This provides a burnishing as well as cleaning action. The contact surface conductivity is enhanced by a silver overlay stripe that lasts the life of the unit. This ensures a good contact, even in those cases where the LOR, LOR/ER, and LOR/SR are not operated for long periods of time. The terminals are made of electrically and mentally compatible copper material with a silver overlay stripe at the contact area plus an overall silver plate to ensure a good, durable contact surface for customer wiring purposes. Similarly, the terminal screws are made from silver-plated brass. Number of Decks Available Table VIII shows the maximum number of decks and contacts available for reliable operation: TABLE VIII MAXIMUM DECKS AVAILABLE *' " ! MAXIMUM .LOR TYPE i ; : : it ' 1 ' 'DECKs *::-1 CONTACTS LOR 12 48 LOR/ER HI SPEED TRIP 10 40 LOR/ER STD SPEED TRIP 8 32 LOR/SR INST ANT RESET 8 32 LOR/SR TIME DELAY RESET 7 28 Contact Deck Arrangement ** The blade and terminal configuration enables the use of multi-contacts in the same deck, and simple stacking procedures enable the fabrication of many independent contacts in one relay. Specifically, two NO contacts and two NC contacts are provided in each deck, and up to twelve decks can be stacked, resulting in a relay with up to 48 contacts (24 N.O. and 24 N.C.). The deck arrangement is illustrated in Fig. 14. The contacts operate reliably, using every contact and terminal illustrated. For good practice, however, it is suggested that polarized voltages having opposite polarity should not be used on adjacent contacts. This is because of the remote possibility of flasho.ver during transition between adjacent contacts ** especially at the higher DC ratings, or in highly inductive circuits. 7 REPORT NO.: RI EP-424-008-RP1 . , REVISION: 03 I PAGE GB OF G14 Fig. 14. Basic LOR Deck Layout The illustration of Fig. 14 is for tl;ie first deck. For deck units the second digit of the terminal number is the same as shown but the first digit changes to denote the deck number. As an example, terminal 82 is in the eighth deck, directly under terminal 12 and used together with terminal 88. Contact Charts The previous illustration shows how the LOR's are constructed and is shown as information for the user. Traditional contact charts are normally used, as shown on Fig. 15. ! POS. "' tu CONTACTS c.. (/) 0 a:: w I-a:: 1101Hl--013 x 11201Hl--018 x 1501Hl--017 x 1 601 H 1--0 1 4 x 2101H1--0 23 x 2 2201 H 1--0 28 x 2501 H l--0 27 x -..._ 2601 H l--0 24 x x Fig. 15. LOR, LOR/ER, and LOR/SR Lock-out relay Chart Contact Ratings The LOR, LOR/ER, and LOR/SR Lock-out relays have been tested to many different circuit conditions. The interrupting ratings are based on 10,000 operations of life, using suddenly applied and removed rated voltage, with no extensive burning of contacts. Inductive ratings are based on tests and using standard inductance L/R=0.04 for DC and cos6=0.4 for AC. Short-time and cpntinuous ratings are based on temperature rise in contact members and supporting parts not exceeding so0c above ambien EC 620632, Att. 1, Pg. 146 of 267 REPORT NO.: REP-424-008-RP1 REVISION: 03 I PAGE G9 OF G14 24-------------i--------1__,.1----------,----,__,, ....... __ .._,__24 2:3 22 !o 21 Io Q *N ,_ :20 c is 119 .o 'LI.I iCI> * 17 16 15 14 113 12 lo 11 1* 110 0 0 LI.I 9 (:I) I :::; :I :9 I I -l I -f I i i i I I I I : I I I I i I ! I I I I, I ! I I I '1\ I I I I i I I I l 1\ '\I I I ' '1* '.._ i ' : .., I 1 *.. ri.. '-f 1! ....,__.,._ __ ......,,....__ C:OJL Ill --+-11 I 'I\.. ,... 11 i -..--*"-' L01 RISR 11' I"\ "&deg;' l)f..._ """' -1 ! I'"-.. I. !COIL f" 14 1--t--+-' "--11--..,....-f"-COIL C. .1\. iE . , ' r-ILOR/!rn -COllL A I LOR/ER '\ \ c OtlL 0 [ 11 lO R/SR -----LOR/ER------,-LOR/SR I'\* lOFVER ' -13 I LOR/SR \ I .,,,..,,........., __ LOR/SR ir.-' ___ I I I : ... I \ COil.i< *"\_ 12 I I .,i \I I I"" -111:1:1 I ' I I \ '\I I I :FQlil H +---++-" ...,* lt---fi---il---1"+-11 .....,,...\-+t-.... \'H----+---+-uo R .,, ! 1 0 l, ..... -* t-=t--t-c 0 IL ""'. [ LO A: ' -I 1t \ I \_' * _ \ \ 10 20 3(J "'&deg; Ci() >COIL F -lOR . w "'&deg; 00 80 100 12'0 3 "'&deg; 160 1:130 200 720 24(1; :200 300 OCVOLTS Fig. 8. LOR/ER and LOR/SR Lock-out Relay response times (l 0 deck LOR, 8 deck LOR/ER or LOR/SR For LOR/ER ot LOR'SR's, use LOR response times. .j I 7 7 EC 620632, Att. 1, Pg. 147 of 267 Allowable Variation From Rated Voltage The relay contacts are not sensitive to normal variations in voltage. The interrupting capacity is important as indicated in Table IX. Variations of plus and minus twenty percent in rated voltage need not be considered as long as the interrupting current is not exceeded. TABLE IX Contact Ratings for Series 24 LOR, LOR/ER, and LOR/SR Lock-out Relays dHo' *RiT; i i i ,, ' CONTACT .l * :**r: *\"I; '. ', '': 'COr-!TINUOUS * CIRCUIT .r INQUCTIVE;*f:! .. ; ' * . I . .* . "1R/\TING*' *'--! " .. ' VOLTS SINGLE; *. * I S0INGLE' '.*:i\! ! ' .. *:' !/, 3 (amps)' t coNTAcr :c6NrAcT *rt ; M ! . . : 125 voe 3 1 60 30 250 voe 2 1/2 60 30 120 VAC 20 15 60 30 240 VAC 15 5 60 30 480VAC 10 5 60 30 600 VAC 6 5 60 30 *The making ability for 125VDC circuit breaker coils is 95A-125VDC, Short-time is for 1 minute. THE ELECTROMECHANICAL DRIVE The switch portion of the Lock-out Relay is the field proven Series 24 Instrument and Control Switch. In this application, it is a two-position device -TRIP and RESET. There is a powerful coil spring mechanism to drive it from the RESET* position to the TRIP position. The device is held in the RESET position by a latch and locking mechanism. This is released by a small linear solenoid for electric tripping. The LOR is manually reset by rotating the handle against the coil springs. The LOR/ER is either manually reset or electrically reset utilizing a separate rotary solenoid mechanism. The LOR/SR is self-resetting when the tripping condition has been removed. These mechanisms are described below. The TRIP Mechanism (Patent #3649793) Industry requirements for Lock-out Relays include: *high-speed *seismic shock-proof *multiple contacts To get the multi-contact feature and maintain positive and rugged action, heavy spring action is required. This requires a locking mechanism to hold back a spring wind-up of forty-inch pounds of torque. To get high-speed release, a solenoid is needed. Ordinarily, a large solenoid is required to do this. Large solenoids are inherently slow so a small linear solenoid is used to release the latch. By nature, small linear solenoids do not develop much force, so a mechanical advantage is needed. 8 REPORT NO.: REP-424-008-RP1 REVISION: 03 The trigger mechanism was invented to provide the mechanical advantage. One pound of force from the linear solenoid releases the latch that locks the device against forty inch pounds of torque. The trigger' uses the principle of coincident radii of two rollers -one cannot roll without the other. The two rollers are shown in Fig. 16. large roller segment of large roller Fig. 16. Relationship of two rollers with coincident radii The relationship of roller sizes is to get the mechanical advantage needed. Since only a small part of the larger roller is needed, a segment was cut out to reduce size and inertia. Fig. 17 shows the small roller, roller segment, and their relationships with the linear solenoid and the relay operating shaft. As shown, the trip mechanism is in the RESET position. This was done by rotating the handle and relay shaft (1) clockwise against the relay shaft stop pin (2). When the roller ann (3) and the small roller ( 4) clear the large roller segment (5), the retaining spring (6) positions the large segment (5) against the stop pin (7). The handle and shaft (1) is now_ released, allowing the roller arm (3) to spring return until the small roller (4) comes to rest on the farge roller segment (5) When the two rollers contact, the mechanical force generated acts along coincident radii (common centerline). Neither roller can rotate; the LOR is locked and reset. Fig. 17. LOR TRIP Mechanism EC 620632, Att. 1, Pg. 148 of 267 To initiate a TRlP action the linear solenoid (8) is actuated. The solenoid push rod (9) provides a one pound release force to the large roller segment (5) moving it by the release distance (IO). When this happens, the roller arm (3) is free to rotate counterdockwise to the TRIP position where an internal stop mechanism stops the rotation. The RESET Mechanism The manual reset LOR is reset by manually turning the relay handle clockwise to the RESET position where it locks in. The electric-reset LOR/ER is either manually reset the same way or . electrically reset using the solenoid circuit previously described. The LOR/SR resets with a solenoid circuit similar to the LOR/ER. The HIGH-SPEED-TRlP Electric-reset Mechanism The high-speed TRIP electric-reset or self-reset out Relay has two features used to accomplish a reliable tripping action in less than eight milliseconds: I. The rotary solenoid is disengaged from the relay shaft after it is used to electrically reset the device. This reduces the drag on the relay shaft enabling the speed TRIP. The handle always resets in the vertical position. Therefore, it is not used as a position indicator. It is used only to reset the LOR/ER or LOR/SR manually. The Target is the position indication. 2. The mechanical target indexes to TRIP (Orange) when the LOR/ER or LOR/SR trips but does not reset (to Black) when the LOR.ER or LOR/SR is electrically reset. The target is reset manually with a lever on the face of the nameplate. This enables a station operator to observe and record the fact that the LOR/ER or LOR/SR did TRlP -a much less expensive method than using recorders. VERlFICATION TESTING The Series 24 LOR, LOR/ER, and LOR/SR out Relays have been tested to many different service conditions to insure that they will operate satisfactorily as general devices --special use. For power industry applications the testing is performed in accordance with the following standards: ANSI/IEEE-323-1984 Oualifving Class IE Equipment (or Nuclear Power Generating Stations ANSI/IEEE-344-1987 Recommended Practices for Seismic Qualification of Class IE Equipment for Nuclear Power Generating Stations ANSI/IEEE C37.90-1989 Relays and Relay $vstems Associated with Electric Power Aoparotus ANSI/IEEE C37 .98-1987 Seismic Testing o(Relays 9 REPORT NO.: REP-424-008-RP1 REVISION: 03 PAGE G11 OF G14 The testing is performed in accordance with ESC-STD-1000 -General Specifications for Rotary Sw_itches and Auxiliary Relays for Utility Applications including IE Equipment Requirements for Nuclear Power Generating Stations. The tests include ratings evaluation tests, aging tests to simulate forty years operating life, and seismic tests. Aging Tests Aging tests are run in accordance with ANSI/IEEE 323-1984 and ESC-STD-1000 and consist of the following (run in sequence): I. Visual and mechanical examination 2. Circuit configuration 3. Dielectric Withstanding Vo 1 tage-2200VRMS 4. Insulation resistance -100 megohms minimum at 500 VDC 5. Contact resistance -10 milliohms maximum at rated current 6. Radiation aging-10 megarads (107) 7. Elevated temperature -120 hours at 80&deg;C 8. Elevated humidity -96 hours at 95% RH 9. Temperature rise (contacts)-50&deg;C maximum 10. Aging -10,000 cycles at 20A-120VAC and 3A-125VDC (both resistive) 11. Seismic vibration -ZP A= Sg 12. After test measurements (in order)-items 3,4,5,9,2,1 Details on the background of these tests, plus the methods and procedures are outlined in ESC-STD-1000. Seismic Tests The Series 24 LOR, LOR/ER, and LOR/SR Lock-out Relays are subjected to fragility testing in a seismic environment after aging to an accelerated life estimated to be forty years. This sequence is outlined under Aging Tests. The seismic tests are in accordance with ANSI/IEEE 344-1987 and ANSI/IEEE C37.98-1987. The tests are performed in accordance with ESC-STD-1000. Broadband repeatable multi-frequency input motions are used. The Fragility Response Spectrum (FRS) envelopes the Standard Response Spectrum (SRS) shown in Fig. 18, using a biaxial input motion. The "g" rating of the Lock-out Relays are defined as the ZP A (zero period acceleration). The "g" rating, then, is Sg. The Series 24 LOR and LOR/ER are tested in the normal RESET position, the TRlP position, and during transition from RESET to TRlP. The LOR/SR is tested in the RESET positio EC 620632, Att. 1, Pg. 149 of 267 REPORT NO.: REP-424-008-RP1 REVISION: 03 I 2 I ' ' n I .......__1-.---;i_........ 4 M z ._i -lll'--A-&.4.-16 Hz +'-ii 12.5 -I .'-. l: i : 1: tti, 0 -+-+-4-1 ZP A-5 g -1--IL-: r-. H1 4 1---1---J* -+--1--1--i -j-.j-.,+l-1-1+---J,_I -i--33Hz ! i I 3 -4--i,l..JI., +11-1---1,!--l--r--r---r--r-++-H-r--+--li-1 -t+-l,HHH-IH1 H I ' ! I I i I I I ' I I I , -i -I ! 1 at 5qr, Damping Fig. 18. Multi-frequency Broadband Standard Response Spectrum (SRS) ! ;! 10 EC 620632, Att. 1, Pg. 150 of 267 REPORT NO.: REP-424-008-RP1 REVISION: 03 HOW TO ORDER LOCK-OUT RELAYS 1. Select desired trip-coil from data on pages 4 and 6. 2. Select reset coil voltage from chart below. 3. Choose appropriate catalog number below. PAGE 4 .i ,, 4. Units are supplied with engraved nameplate (code l 7C-2L22) unless otherwise specified. 5. For other than standard relays shown below (or for your own documentation purposes) complete DESIGN GUIDE (shown on pages 12, 13, 14). MANUAL-RESET LOR EC. K*s. -'i' . * ., .* . *. > '*1'** :*1 ! .. '. ;. 'piTALOG NUMBERS w. lt.h TR.IP COILS D * * .. ** ***1t**** ""' ** * '**!. ... :1t "*/co1L:C:' ti <:con:o ;,; ;'COILE .. COILG f' ;** * (COILH) DECKS 3 5 8 3 5 8 3 5 8 3 5 8 3 ' 7803A 78036 7803C 78030 7803E 7803F 7803G 7803H 7805H 7808H 7810H 7803K 7805K 7808K 7810K 5 8 10 7805A 7808A 7810A 78056 7808B 78106 7805C 7808C 7810C 78050 78080 78100 7805E 7808E 7810E 7805F 780BF 7810F 7805G 7808G 7810G STANDARD TRIP ELECTRIC-RESET LOR/ER RESET COIL rm:> ' ! ': ' ..** fj, *t ! I -.ylth TRIP. ') li,OlJAGE'. .. ,C\)ILC) f:Ol,LP'. ,c_qlLE. COILF;. CO)LG 24VDC ' 24 voe 24 voe 48 voe 48VDC 48VDC 125 voe 125 voe 125 voe 250 VOC 250VOC 250VOC 7823AA : 7823BA 7825AA 7828AA 7823AC 7825AC 7828AC 7823AD 7825AD 7828AO 7823AF 7825AF 7828AF 78256A 78286A 78236C 78256C 78286C 782360 782560 782860 78236F 78256F 78286F 7823CA 7823DA 7825CA 7828CA 7823CC 7825CC 7828CC 7823CO 7825CO 7828CO 7823CF 7825CF 7828CF 78250A 7828DA 7823DC 7825DC 7828DC 782300 782500 782800 78230F 7825DF 78280F 7823EA 7823FA 7825EA 7828EA 7823EC 7825EC 7828EC 7823ED 7825ED 7828ED 7823EF 7825EF -::* 7828EF 7825FA 7828FA 7823FC 7825FC 7828FC 7823FD 7825FO 7828FO 7823FF 7825FF ,, :-*<f.' 7828FF 7823GD 7825GO 7828GD HIGH-SPEED TRIP,ELECTRIC-RESET LOR/ER *' ; ; l . NUMBERS with TRIP COILS DECKS** .: RESET. COIL* : t 1 : .'. t" f'. l' 5 ' *.. '*.. ' . .. t ('' **:voLTAGE'" t COIL D ,, it' .. *COILE * ,COIL F ... *, .*** .. . . 3 125 voe 783300 7833ED 7833FD 5 125 voe 783500 7835ED 7835FD 8 125 voe 783800 7838ED 7838FD 10 125 voe 784000 7840ED 7840FD 3 . 250 voe 78330F 7833EF 7833FF 5 250VOC 78350F 7835EF 7835FF 8 250 voe 78380F 7838EF 7838FF 10 250 voe 78400F 784DEF 7840FF : '' ' 'i :. ' : ' . 'co11::H--t.Jl'jc:o.1i:K*'**. .... 1.H: .. --i 7823KA 7823HF 7825HF 7828HF 7825KA 7828KA 7823KC 7825KC 7828KC ' 7823KD 7825KD j 7828KD 7823KF 7825KF 7828KF STANDARD TRIP, INSTANT-RESET, SELF-RESET LOR/SR STANDARD TRIP, TIME-DELAY RESET,SELF-RESET LOR/SR DECKS RESET.COIL cATAl.oG w1tti VOLTAGE. " ' COIL q i; COil E;t)/!'ci'oiL F1 ';;'.COIL G okcKt RESET COIL ; CATALOG 11th :rn1_P fOILS . ' . VOLTAGE ; COIL D E '** i 3 125 VDC 784300 . 7843ED. 7843FD 7843GD 3 125 voe 785300 7853ED 7853FO 7853GO 5 125 voe . 784500 7845ED 7845FD 7845GO 5 125 voe 785500 7855ED 7855FD 7855GO 8 12s voe 784800 7848ED 7848FD 7848GO 7 125 voe 785700 7857EO 7857FD 7827GO HIGH-SPEED TRIP, INSTANT RESET.SELF-RESET LOR/SR HIGH-SPEED TRIP, TIME-DELAY RESET, SELF-RESET LOR/SR DECKS. ;t CATAL<;l\J NUM6.ERS with TRIP COILS : ; *I, **: ; . * , * , ._ . ; I *.COIL ll cd1Lio !" * ,, E. * '* Ft l VOL . . . . ( . -' , . . RESEI CATALOG TRIP cold ' dECKS COIL' . :i;*1'.*it* . 1:! ' ' VOLTAGE co1L o ,, '.' * coii. f : ' 3 12s voe 786300 7863EO 7863FD 3 12s voe 787300 7873ED 7873FD 5 125 voe 786500 7865EO 7865FD 5 125 voe 787500 7875ED 7875FO 8 125 voe 786800 7868ED 7868FO 7 125 voe 787700 7877ED 7877FO 11 EC 620632, Att. 1, Pg. 151 of 267 REPORT NO.: REP-424-008-RP1 . REVISION: 03 I ELECTROSW,TCH Check out these other Great Products from the Electroswitch Family! : I '
EC 620632, Att. 1, Pg. 152 of 267 REPORT NO.: REP-424-008-RP1 REVISION: 03 PAGE H1 OF H2 WRIGHT System 1000 Revision 17.0.d Arrhenius File Report Arrhenius Material File Item Description: No Description Provided Material Number: Commercial Name: 338 BELDSOL Generic Name: Manufacturer: POLYURETHANE WITH POL YAMIDE BELDEN Material Classification: Failure Parameter: Activation Energy: Slope: Intercept: Correlation Coefficient: CABLE/WIRE INSULATION DIELECTRIC STRENGTH 1.3582 15,762.64407734 -28.07861890 0.99532304 Material Thickness (in.): NIA Item Description: No Description Provided Material Number: Commercial Name: Generic Name: Manufacturer: Material Classification: Failure Parameter: Activation Energy: Slope: Intercept: Correlation Coefficient: Material Thickness (in.): 340 BELDURE POLYURETHANE BELDEN CABLE/WIRE INSULATION DIELECTRIC STRENGTH 1.3588 15,769.22349815 -27.29389850 0.99999998 NIA Item Description: No Description Provided Material Number: Commercial Name: Generic Name: Manufacturer: Material Classification: Failure Parameter: Activation Energy: Slope: Intercept: Correlation Coefficient: Material Thickness (in.): 06 June 2017 18:30 UTC 551 HUDSOL URETHANE-BIMW-2 POLYURETHANE HUDSON WIRE CO CABLE/WIRE INSULATION DIELECTRIC STRENGTH 1.3540 15,713.65787916 -27.77730440 0.99213304 NIA Temperature Rating: 130C Highest Aging Temp.: 200C Arrhenius Lib. Code No.: 209-83D Arrhenius Page Number: 2 Temperature Rating: 130C Highest Aging Temp.: 200C Arrhenius Lib. Code No.: 327-84C Arrhenius Page Number: 2 Temperature Rating: 130C Highest Aging Temp.: 200C Arrhenius Lib. Code No.: 409-85C Arrhenius Page Number: 2 Page 1of2 I EC 620632, Att. 1, Pg. 153 of 267 REPORT NO.: REP-424-008-RP1 REVISION: 03 I PAGE H2 OF H2 WRIGHT System 1000 Revision 17.0.d Arrhenius File Report References Library Code 209-830 ARRHENIUS PLOTS FOR BELDEN WIRE 327-84C STATISTICAL DATA BELDEN'S BELDURE 409-85C LIFE CURVES FOR VARIOUS POLYMER COATINGS ON 18 AWG WIRE 06 June 2017 18:30 UTC Page 2 of 2 EC 620632, Att. 1, Pg. 154 of REP-424-008-RP1 REVISION: 03 PAGE 11 OF 139 Ella Gills From: Sent: Ella Gills <egills@kciconsultants.com> Tuesday, May 09, 2017 1:56 PM To: 'Anup Behera' Subject: Oh mite Anup, All catalogue/brochure information is on the U-drive in your personal folder. The part number cross reference is as follows: OLD NEW 0151 RJISlOO 0601 LlOOJ25R 0605 LlOOJ150 0701 Ll 75J25R 0902 L225J50R 0959 DOOK50R F523 F55J2K5 1


2 6 7REPORT NO.: REP-424-008-RP1 CIHMl;E EC 620632, Att. 1, Pg. 156 of REVISION: 03 PAGE 13 OF 139 Cross Reference Manufacturing Company I Old to New Stock Part Numbers e Old No. New No. Old No. New No. Old No. New No. Old No. New No. Old No. New No. Old No. New No. Old No. New No. 1727 B12J350 2302 PFE5KR120 2841 85J6R2 3790 L 12J330 3951 92J750 4126A 91J1K4 4421 93J900 1728 B12J400 2303A PFE5KR140 2842 B5J6R8 3792 L12J390 3952 92J800 4127 91J1K5 4422 93J910 1729 B12J450 2304A PFE5KR160 2843 85J7R5 3794 L12J470 3953 92J820 4128 91J1K6 4423 93J1KO 1730 B12J500 2305A PFE5KR180 2844 B5J8R2 3796 L12J560 3954 92J900 4129 91J1K8 4424 93J1K1 1731 B12J600 2306 PFE5KR250 2845 B5J9R1 3798 L12J680 3955 92J910 4130 91J2KO 4425 93J1K2 1732 812J700 2306A PFE5KR220 2846 B5J10R 3800 L12J820 3956 92J1KO 4131 91J2K2 4426 93J1K3 1733 812J750 2308 PFE5KR330 2847 85J11R 3802 L12J1KO 3957 92J1K1 4132 91J2K4 4426A 93J1K4 1734 812J800 2308A PFE5KR300 2848 85J12R 3804 L12J1K2 3958 92J1K2 4133 91J2K5 4427 93J1K5 1735 B12J900 2309A PFE5KR370 2849 B5J13R 3806 L12J1K5 3959 92J1K3 4134 91J2K7 4428 93J1K6 '1736 . 812J1KO 2310 PFE5KR500 2850 B5J15R 3808 L12J1K8 3960 92J1 K4 4135 91J3KO 4429 93J1K8 1737 B12J1K1 2311 PFE5KR750 2851 B5J16R 3810 L12J2K2 3961 92J1K5 4190 RES7K5 4430 93J2KO 1738 B12J1K2 2312 PFE5K1ROO 2852 B5J18R 3812 L12J2K7 3962 92J1K6 4191 RES10K 4431 93J2K2 1739 B12J1K25 2313 PFE5K1R60 2853 B5J20R 3814 L12J3K3 3963 92J1K8 4192 RES12K5 4432 93J2K4 1740 B12J1K5 2317 PFE5KR600 2854 B5J22R 3816 L12J3K9 3964 92J2KO 4193 RES15K 4433 93J2K5 1741 B12J1 K75 2318 PFE5KR670 2855 B5J24R 3818 L12J4K7 3965 92J2K2 4200 RHS7K5 4434 93J2K7 1742 B12J2KO 2319 PFE5K1R30 2856 B5J27R 3820 L12J5K6 3966 92J2K4 4201 RHS10K 4435 93J3KO 1743 B12J2K25 2331A PFE5K2R20 2857 B5J30R 3822 L12J6K8 3967 92J2K5 4202 RHS15K 4436 93J3K3 1744 B12J2K5 2332A PFE5K2R80 2858 B5J33R 3824 L12J8K2 3968 92J2K7 4203 RHS20K 4436A 93J3K5 1745 .B12J3KO 2333A PFE5K3R50 2859 B5J36R 3826 L12J10K 3969 92J3KO 4204 RHS25K 4437 93J3K6 1746 B12J3K5 2334A PFE5K4R50 2860 B5J39R 3828 L12J12K 4030 91J1RO 4210 RJS15K 4438 93J3K9 1747 B12J4KO 2335A PFE5K5R40 2861 B5J43R 3830 L12J15K 4031 91J1R1 4211 RJS20K 4439 93J4KO 1748 B12J4K5 2336A PFE5K6R80 2862 B5J47R 3832 L12J18K 4032 91J1R2 4212 RJS25K 4440 93J4K3 1749 B12J5KO 2337A PFE5K8R50 2863 B5J51R 3834 L 12J22K 4033 91J1R3 4213 RJS30K 4440A 93J4K5 1750 B12J6KO PFR5K11RO 2864 B5J56R 3836 L 12J27K 4034 91J1R5 4214 RJS40K 4441 93J4K7 1752 B12J7K5 2339 PFR5K13RO 2865 B5J62R 3838 L 12J33K 4035 91J1R6 4215 RJSSOK 4442 93J5KO 1753 B12J8KO 2340 PFR5K17RO 2866 B5J68R 3840 L12J39K 4036 91J1R8 4330 93J1RO 4443 93J5K1 1754 B12J8K5 2341 PFR5K20RO 2867 B5J75R 3842 L12J47K 4037 91J2RO 4331 93J1R1 4444 93J5K6 1754A B12J9KO 2342 PFR5K25RO 2868 B5J82R 3843 L12J51K 4038 91J2R2 4332 93J1R2 4445 93J6KO 1755 B12J10K 2501 C300KR10 2869 B5J91R 3860 92J1RO 4039 91J2R4 4333 93J1R3 4446 93J6K2 1756 B12J11K 2502 C300KR12 2870 B5J100 3861 92J1R1 4041 91J2R7 4334 93J1R5 4447 93J6K8 1757 B12J12K 2503 C300KR16 2871 B5J110 3862 92J1R2 4042 91J3RO 4335 93J1R6 4448 93J7KO 1758 B12J12K5 2504 C300KR20 2872 B5J120 3863 92J1R3 4043 91J3R3 4336 93J1R8 4449 93J7K5 1759 B12J13K5 2505 C300KR25 2873 B5J130 3864 92J1R5 4044 91J3R6 4337 93J2RO 4450 93J8KO 1761 B12J15K 2506 C300KR31 2874 B5J150 3865 92J1R6 4045 91J3R9 4338 93J2R2 4451 93J8K2 1762 B12J16K 2507 C300KR40 2875 B5J160 3866 92J1R8 4046 91J4RO 4339 93J2R4 4452 93J9KO 1763 B12J17K5 2508 C300KR50 2876 B5J180 3867 92J2RO 4047 91J4R3 4341 93J2R7 4453 93J9K1 1764 B12J18K 2509 C300KR63 2877 B5J200 3868 92J2R2 4048 91J4R7 4342 93J3RO 4454 93J10K 1765 B12J20K 2510 C300KR80 2878 B5J220 3869 92J2R4 4049 91J5RO 4343 93J3R3 4530 95J1RO 1766 B12J22K5 2511 C300K1RO 2879 B5J240 3871 92J2R7 4050 91J5R1 4344 93J3R6 4531 95J1A1 1767 B12J25K 2512 C300K1R2 2880 B5J270 3872 92J3RO 4051 91J5R6 4345 93J3R9 4532 95J1R2 1768 B12J30K 2513 C300K1R6 2881 B5J300 3873 92J3R3 4053 91J6R2 4346 93J4RO 4533 95J1R3 1769 B12J35K 2514 C300K2RO 2882 B5J330 3874 92J3R6 4054 91J6R8 4347 93J4R3 4534 95J1R5 1770 B12J40K 2515 C300K2R5 2883 B5J360 3875 92J3R9 4056 91J7R5 4348 93J4R7 4535 95J1R6 1771 B12J45K 2516 C300K3R1 2884 B5J390 3876 92J4RO 4058 91J8R2 4349 93J5RO 4536 95J1R8 1772 B12J50K 2517 C300K4RO 2885 B5J430 3877 92J4R3 4060 91J9R1 4350 93J5R1 4537 95J2RO 1800A B20JR50 2518 C300K5RO 2886 B5J470 3878 92J4R7 4061 91J10R 4351 93J5R6 4538 95J242 1802A B20J1RO 2519 C300K6R3 2887 B5J510 3879 92J5RO 4062 91J11R 4353 93J6R2 4539 95J2R4 18028 B20J2RO 2520 C300K8RO 2888 B5J560 3880 92J5R1 4063 91J12R 4354 93J6R8 4541 95J2R7 1802C B20J3RO 2521 C300K10R 2889 B5J620 3881 92J5R6 4064 91J13R 4356 93J7R5 4542 95J3RO 18020 B20J4RO 2522 C300K12R 2890 B5J680 3883 92J6R2 4065 91J15R 4358 93J8R2 4543 95J3R3 1803 B20J5RO 2523 C300K16R 2891 B5J750 3884 92J6R8 4066 91J16R 4360 93J9R1 4544 95J3R6 1804 B20J10R 2524 C300K20R 2892. B5J820 3886 92J7R5 4067 91J18R 4361 93J10R 4545 95J3R9 1805 B20J25R 2530 C35KR02 2893 B5J910 3888 92J8R2 4068 91J20R 4362 93J11R 4546 95J4RO 1805A B20J40R 2531 C35KR04 2894 B5J1KO 3890 92J9R1 4069 91J22R 4363 93J12R 4547 95J4R3 1806 B20J50R 2532 C35KR06 2895 B5J1K1 3891 92J10R 4070 91J24R 4364 93J13R 4548 95J4R7 1807 B20J75R 2533 C35KR08 2896 B5J1K2 3892 92J11R 4071 91J25R 4365 93J15R 4549 95J5RO 1808 B20J100 2534 C35KR10 2897 B5J1K3 3893 92J12R 4072 91J27R 4366 93J16R 4550 95J5R1 1808A B20J125 2535 C35KR15 2898 B5J1K5 3894 92J13R 4073 91J30R 4367 93J18R 4551 95J5R6 1809 B20J150 2536 C35KR20 2899 B5J1K6 3895 92J15R 4074 91J33R 4368 93J20R 4553 95J6R2 1810 B20J200 2537 C35KR25 2900 B5J1K8 3896 92J16R 4074A 91J35R 4369 93J22R 4554 95J6R8 1811 B20J250 2538 C35KR30 2901 B5J2KO 3897 92J18R 4075 91J36R 4370 93J24R 4556 95J7R5 1812 B20J300 2539 C35KR40 2902 B5J2K2 3898 92J20R 4076 91J39R 4371 93J25R 4558 95J8R2 1813 B20J350 2540 C35KR50 2903 B5J2K4 3899 92J22R 4077 91J40R 4372 93J27R 4560 95J9R1 1814 B20J400 2541 C35KR60 2904 B5J2K7 3900 92J24R 4078 91J43R 4373 93J30R 4561 95J10R 1815 B20J500 2542 C35KR80 2905 B5J3KO 3901 92J25R 4079 91J47R 4374 93J33R 4562 95J11R 1816 B20J650 2543 C35K1RO 2906 BSJ3K3 3902 92J27R 4080 91J50R 4374A 93J35R 4563 95J12R 1817 B20J700 2544 C35K1R25 2907 B5J3K6 3903 92J30R 4081 91J51R 4375 93J36R 4564 95J13R 1818 B20J750 2601 E300KR10 2908 B5J3K9 3904 92J33R 4082 91J56R 4376 93J39R 4565 95J15R 1819 B20J800 2602 E300KR12 2909 B5J4K3 3905 92J35R 4084 91J62R 4377 93J40R 4566 95J16R 1820A B20J900 2603 E300KR16 2910 B5J4K7 3906 92J36R 4085 91J68R 4378 93J43R 4567 95J18R 1821 B20J1KO 2604 E300KR20 2911 B5J5K1 3907 92J39R 4087 91J75R 4379 93J47R 4568 95J20R 1822 B20J1K2 2605 E300KR25 2912 B5J5K6 3908 92J40R 4089 91J82R 4380 93J50R 4569 95J22R 1823 B20J1K25 2606 E300KR31 2913 B5J6K2 3909 92J43R 4091 91J91R 4381 93J51R 4570 95J24R 1824 B20J1K5 2607 E300KR40 2914 B5J6K8 3910 92J47R 4092 91J100 4382 93J56R 4571 95J25R 1825 B20J1K75 2608 E300KR50 2915 B5J7K5 3911 92J50R 4093 91J110 4384 93J62R 4572 95J27R 1827 B20J2KO 2609 E300KR63 2916 B5J8K2 3912 92J51R 4094 91J120 4385 93J68R 4573 95J30R 1828 B20J2K25 2610 E300KR80 2917 B5J9K1 3913 92J56R 4095 91J130 4387 93J75R 4574 95J33R 1830 B20J2K5 2611 E300K1RO 2918 B5J10K 3915 92J62R 4096 91J150 4389 93J82R 4574A 95J35R 1831 B20J2K75 2612 E300K1R2 2919 B5J11K 3916 92J68R 4097 91J160 4391 93J91R 4575 95J36R 1832 B20J3KO 2613 E300K1R6 2920 B5J12K 3918 92J75R 4098 91J180 4392 93J100 4576 95J39R 1833 B20J3K5 E300K2RO 2921 B5J13K 3920 92J82R 4099. 91J200 4393 93J110 4577 95J40R 1834 B20J4KO 2 15 E300K2R5 2922 B5J15K 3922 92J91R 4100 91J220 4394 93J120 4578 95J43R 1835 B20J4K5 2616 E300K3R1 2923 B5J16K 3923 92J100 4101 91J240 4395 93J130 4579 95J47R 1836 B2dJ5KO 2617 E300K4RO 2924 B5J18K 3924 92J110 4102 91J250 4396 93J150 4580 95J50R 1837 B20J6KO 2618 E300K5RO 2925 B5J20K 3925 92J120 4103 91J270 4397 93J160 4581 95J51R 1838 B20J7KO 2619 E300K6R3 3723 L 12JR51 3926 92J130 4104 91J300 4398 93J180 4582 95J56R 1839 B20J7K5 2620 E300K8RO 3730 L12J1RO 3927 92J150 4105 91J330 4399 93J200 4584 95J62R 1840 B20J8KO 2621 E300K10R 3734 L12J1R5 3926 92J160 4105A 91J350 4400 93J220 4585 95J68R 1840A B20J9KO 2622 E300K12R 3738 L12J2R2 3929 92J180 4106 91J360 4401 93J240 4587 95J75R 1841 B20J10K 2623 E300K16R 3742 L12J3R3 3930 92J200 4107 91J390 4402 93J250 4589 95J82R 1842 B20J12K5 2624 E300K20R 3746 L12J4R7 3931 92J220 4108 91J400 4403 93J270 4591 95J91R 1843 B20J15K 2822 B5J1RO 3750 L12J6R8 3932 92J240 4109 91J430 4404 93J300 4592 95J100 1844 B20J20K 2823 B5J1R1 3754 L12J10R 3933 92J250 4109A 91J450 4405 93J330 4593 95J110 1845 B20J25K 2824 B5J1R2 3756 L12J12R 3934 92J270 4110 91J470 4405A 93J350 4594 95J120 1846 B20J30K 2825 B5J1R3 3758 L12J15R 3935 92J300 4111 91J500 4406 93J360 4595 95J130 1847 B20J35K 2826 B5J1R5 3760 L12J18R 3936 92J330 4112 91J510 4407 93J390 4596 95J150 1848 B20J40K 2627. B5J1R6 3762 L 12J22R 3937 92J350 4113 91J560 4408 93J400 4597 95J160 1849 B20J45K 2628 B5J1R8 3764 L12J27R 3938 92J360 4114' 91J600 4409 93J430 4598 95J180 1850 B20J50K 2829 B5J2RO 3766 L12J33R 3939 92J390 4115 91J620 4409A 93J450 4599 95J200 1851 B20J55K 2830 B5J2R2 3768 L12J39R 3940 92J400 4116 91J680 4410 93J470 4600 95J220 1652 B20J60K 2831 B5J2R4 3770 L12J47R 3941 92J430 4117 91J700 4411 93J500 4601 95J240 1853 B20J65K 2832 B5J2R7 3772 L12J56R 3942 92J450 4118 91J750 4412 93J510 4602 95J250 1854 B20J70K 2833 B5J3RO 3774 L12J68R 3943 92J470 4119 91J800 4413 93J560 4603 95J270 1855 B20J75K 2834 B5J3R3 3776 L12J82R 3944 92J500 4120 91J820 4414 93J600 4604 95J300 1856 B20J80K 2835 BSJ3R6 3778 L12J100 3945 92J510 4121 91J900 4415 93J620 4605 95J330 1657 B20J85K 2836 B5J3R9 3780 L12J120 3946 92J560 4122 91J910 4416 93J680 4605A 95J350 1858 B20J90K 2837 B5J4R3 3762 L12J150 3947 92J600 4123 91J1KO 4417 93J700 4606 95J360 1859 B20J95K 2838 B5J4R7 3784 L12J180 3948 92J620 4124 91J1K1 4418 93J750 4607 95J390 1860 B20J100K 2839' B5J5R1 3786 L12J220 3949 92J680 4125 91J1K2 4419 93J800 4608 95J400 230.1. PFE5KR100 . 2840 B5J5R6 3788 L12J270 3950 92J700 4126 91J1K3 4420 93J820 4609 95J430 80 Ohmite Manufacturing Company, 3601 Howard St., Skokie, lflinois 60076, Tel. 708/675-2600, Fax 708/675-1505 EC 62&deg;0632' Att. 1, Pg. 157 of 2 6 7REPORT NO.: REP-424-008-RP1 REVISION: 03 PAGE 14 OF 139 OHMITE Cross Reference Manufacturing Company e Old to New.Stock Part Numbers Old No. New No. Old No. New No. Old NO. New No. Old No. New No. Old No. New No. Old No. New No. 4609A 95J450 4784 90J62R 4921 ACS!KO 5877 ASJ750 F319 F30J1KO L0151 AHL100 4610 95J470 4785 90J68R 4922 ACS1K5 5878 RSJ800 F320 F30J1K5 L0152 AHL125 4611 95J500 4787 90J75R 4923 ACS2K5 5879 RSJ1KO F321 F30J2KO L0153 AHL175 4612 95J510 . 4789 90J82R 4924 ACS3K5 5880 ASJ1K2 F322 F30J2K5 L0154 RHL250 4613 95J5gg 4791 90J91A 4925 AC SS KO 5881 RSJ1K3 F323 F30J3KO L0155 RHL350 4614 95J6 4792 90J100 4948 RCL 10A 5882 R5J1K8 F324 F30J4KO L0156 RHL500 4615 95J6 0 4793 90J110 4949 RCL 15R 5883 RSJ2KO F325 F30J5KO L0157 RHL750 4616 95J680 4794 90J120 4950 ACL25R 5883A R5J2K2 F326 F30J7K5 L0158 RHL1KO 4617 95J700 4795 90J130 4951 RCL35R 5884 RSJ2K5 F327 F30J10K L0159 AHL1K5 4618 95J750 4796 90J150 4952 RCLSOR 5885 RSJ3KO F401 F40J1RO L0160 RHL2K5 4619 95J800 4797 90J160 4953 RCL75A 5885A RSJ3K3 F402 F40J1R5 L0161 RHL3K5 4620 95J820 4798 90J180 4954 RCL!OO 58858 RSJ3K9 F403 F40J2RO L0162 RHLSKO 4621 95J900 4799 90J200 4955 RCL150 5887 RSJ4K7 F404 F40J3RO L4190 REL7K5 4622 95J910 4800 90J220 4956 RCL200 5888 R5JSKO F405 F40J4RO L4191 REL10K 4623 95J1KO 4801 90J240 4957 RCL250 5889 RSJ5K6 F406 F40JSRO L4192 REL12K5 4624 95J1K1 4802 90J250 4958 RCL350 5890 RSJ6K2 F407 F40J7R5 L4193 REL15K 4625 95J1K2 4803 90J270 4959 RCL500 5891 RSJ7K5 F408 F40J10R L4200 RHL7K5 4626 95J1K3 4804 90J300 4960 RCL750 5892 RSJ8K2 F409 F40J25R L4201 AHL10K 4626A 95J1K4 4805 90J330 4961 RCL1KO 5893 R5J9KO F410 F40J40R L4202 AHL15K 4627 95J1K5 4805A 90J350 4962 RCL1K5 5893A RSJ9K1 F411 F40JSOR L4203 RHL20K 4628 95J1K6 4806 90J360 4963 RCL2K5 5894 RSJ10K F412 F40J75R L4204 RHL25K 4629 95J1K8 4807 90J390 4964 RCL3K5 5895 RSJ12K F413 F40J100 W0101 REE1RO 4630 95J2KO 4808 90J400 4965 RC LS KO 5896 RSJ15K F414 F40J150 W0102 REE2RO 4631 95J2K2 4809 90J430 5800 R3J1RO 5897 RSJ20K F415 F40J200 W0102A REE2R5 4632 95J2K4 4809A 90J450 5801 R3J1R5 F101 F10J1RO F416 F40J250 W0103 REE3RO 4633 95J2K5 4810 90J470 5802 . R3J2RO F102 F10J2RO F417 F40J400 W01 OJA AEESRO 4634 95J2K7 4811 90JSOO 5803 R3J2R4 F103 F10JSRO F418 F40J500 W0104 AEE6RO 4635 95J3KO 4812 90J510 5804 A3J3RO F104 F10J7A5 F419 F40J750 W0105 REE8RO 4636 95J3K3 4813 90J560 5805 R3J3R9 F105 F10J10R F420 F40J1KO W0106 REE10R 4636A 95J3K5 4814 90J600 5806 R3JSR1 F106 F10J15R F421 F40J1K5 W0107 REE15A 4637 95J3K6 4815 90J620 5807 R3J7R5 F107 F10J20R F422 F40J2KO W0108 REE25R 4638 95J3K9 4816 90J680 5808 R3J10R F108 F10J25R F423 F40J2K5 W0109 REE35R 4639 95J4KO 4817 90J700 5809 R3J15R F109 F10J30R F424 F40J3KO W0110 REESOR 4640 95J4K3 4818 90J750 5810 R3J20R F110 F10J40R F425 F40J4KO W0111 REE75R 4640A 95J4K5 4819 90J800 5811 R3J30R F111 F10JSOR F426 F40JSKO W0112 AEE100 4641 95J4K7 4820 90J820 5812 R3JSOR F112 F10J75R F427 F40J7K5 W0113 REE125 4642 95JSKO 4821 90J900 5813 R3J56R F113 F10J100 F428 F40J10K W0113A REE150 4643 95JSK1 4822 90J910 5814 R3J68A F114 F10J125 F429 F40J15K W0114 REE175 4644 95JSK6 4823 90J1KO 5815 A3J82R F115 F10J150 F430 F40J20K W0114A REE200 4645 95J6KO 4824 90J1K1 5816 R3J100 F116 F10J200 F431 F40J25K W0115 REE250 4646 95J6K2 4825 90J1K2 5817 R3J120 F117 F10J250 F501 F55J1RO W0116 REE350 4647 95J6K8 4826 90J1K3 5818 R3J150 F118 F10J300 F502 F55J1R5 W0117 REESOO 4648 95J7KO 4826A 90J1K4 5819 R3J200 F119 F10J400 F503 F55J2RO W0118 REE750 4649 95J7K5 4827 90J1K5 5820 R3J250 F120 F10J500 F504 F55J3RO W0119 REE1KO 4650 95J8KO 4828 90J1K6 5821 R3J270 F121 F10J600 FSOS F55J4RO W0120 REE1K5 4651 95J8K2 4829 90J1K8 5822 R3J300 F122 F10J750 F506 FSSJSRO W0121 REE2K5 4652 95J9KO 4830 90J2KO 5823 R3J330 F123 F10J1KO F507 F55J7R5 W0122 REE3K5 4653 95J9K1 4831 90J2K2 5824 R3J390 F124 F10J1K25 F508 F55J10R W0123 REE5KO 4654 95J10K 4832 90J2K4 5825 R3J430 F125 F10J1K5 F509 F55J25A W4190 REE7K5 4655 95J11K 4833 90J2K5 5826 R3J500 F126 F10J1 K75 F510 F55J40R W4191 REE10K 4656 95J12K 4834 90J2K7 5827 R3J560 F127 F10J2KD F511 F55J50R W4192 REE12K5 4657 95J13K 4835 90J3KO 5828 R3J600 F128 F10J2K5 F512 F55J75R W4193 REE15K 4657A 95J14K 4836 90J3K3 5829 R3J620 F129 F10J3KO F513 F55J100 4658 4836A 90J3K5 5830 R3J750 F130 F10J4KO F514 FSSJ150 4659 95J16K 4837 90J3K6 5830A R3J820 F131 F10JSKO F515 F55J200 46598 95J17K 4838 90J3K9 5831 R3J910 F201 F20J1RO F516 F55J250 4660 95J18K 4839 90J4KO 5833 R3J1KO F202 F20J2RO F517 F55J400 4661 95J20K 4840 90J4K3 5834 A3J1K2 F203 F20JSRO F518 F55J500 4662 95J22K 4840A 90J4K5 5835 R3J1K5 F204 F20J10A F519 F55J750 4663 95J24K 4841 90J4K7 5836 R3J1 KB F205 F20J15R F520 F55J1KO 4664 95J25K 4842 90J5KO 5837 R3J2KO F206 F20J25R F521 F55J1K5 4730 90J1AO 4843 90J5K1 5838 R3J2K4 F207 F20J40R F522 F55J2KO 4731 90J1A1 4844 90JSK6 5839 R3J2K7 F208 F20JSOR F523 FSSJ2K5 4732 90J1R2 4845 90J6KO 5840 R3J3KO F209 F20J75R F524 F55J3KO 4733 90J1R3 4846 90J6K2 5841 R3J3K9 F210 F20J100 F525 F55J4KO 4734 90J1R5 4847 90J6K8 5842 R3J4K7 F211 F20J150 F526 FSSJSKO 4735 90J1R6 4848 90J7KO 5843 R3J5KO F212 F20J200 F527 F55J7K5 4736 90J1R8 4849 90J7K5 5844 R3JSK6 F213 F20J250 F528 F55J10K 4737 90J2RO 4850 90J8KO 5845 R3J6K2 F214 F20J300 1'529 F55J15K 4738 90J2R2 4851 90J8K2 5846 R3J6K8 F215 F20J400 FSJO F55J20K 4739 90J2R4 4852 90J9KO 5847 A3J7K5 F216 F20J500 F531 F55J25K 4741 90J2R7 4853 90J9K1 5848 R3J9KO F217 F20J800 F532 FSSJJOK 4742 90J3RO 4854 90J10K 5849 *R3J10K F218 F20J1KO L0101 REL1RO 4743 90J3R3 4855 90J11K 5850 RSJ1AO F219 F20J1K25 L0102 REL2RO 4744 90J3R6 4856 90J12K 5850A RSJ1R5 F220 F20J1K5 L0102A REL2R5 4745 90J3R9 4857 90J13K 5851 RSJ2RO F221 F20J2KO L0103 REL3AO 4746 90J4RO 48576 90J14K 5851A RSJ3RO F222 F20J2K5 L0103A AEL5RO 4747 90J4R3 4858 90J15K 58518 R5J3R9 F223 F20J3KO L0104 REL6RO 4748 90J4R7 4859A 90J16K 5852 RSJSRO F224 F20J3K5 L0105 REL8RO 4749 90J5RO 4859C 90J17K 5852A RSJ5R6 F225 F20J4KO L0106 REL10A 4750 90J5R1 4860 90J18K 5853 RSJ10R F226 F20J5KO L0107 REL15R 4751 90J5R6 4861 90J20K 5854 RSJ15R F227 F20J6KO L0108 AEL25R 4753 90J6R2 4862 90J22K 5855 RSJ18R F228 F20J7K5 L0109 REL35R 4754 90J6R8 4863 90J24K 5856 RSJ20R F229 F20J10K L0110 REL50R 4756 90J7R5 4864 90J25K 5856A R5J22R F230 F20J12KS L0111 AEL75R 4758 90J8R2 4865 90J27K 5857 RSJ25A F231 F20J15K L0112 REL100 4760 90J9R1 4866 90J30K 5858 RSJ30R F232 F20J20K L0113 AEL125 4761 90J10R 4867 90J33K 5859 RSJ40R F233 F20J25K L0113A REL150 4762 90J11A 4867A 90J35K 5860 R5J50R F234 F20J30K L0114 REL 175 4763 90J12R 4868 90J36K 5860A RSJ51R F235 F20J35K L0114A REL200 4764 90J13R 4869 90J39K 58608 RSJ56R F236 F20J40K L0115 REL250 4765 90J15R 4870 90J40K 5861 RSJ68R F237 F20J50K L0116 REL350 4766 90J16A 4871 90J43K 5862 ASJ75R F301 F30J1RO L0117 REL500 90J18R 4871A 90J45K 5863 RSJ82R F302 FJOJ1A5 L0118 REL750 4768 90J20R 4872 90J47K 5864 RSJ100 F303 F30J2RO L0119 AEL1KO 4769 90J22R 4873 90J50K 5865 R5J120 F304 F30J3RO L0120 REL1K5 4770 90J24R 4874 90J51K 5866 RSJ150 F305 F30J5RO L0121 REL2K-5 4n1 90J25R 4908 RCS10R 5867 RSJ160 F306 F30J10A L0122 REL3K5 e 4n2 90J27R 4909 RCS15R 5868 RSJ200 F307 F30J15R L0123 REL5KO 4773 90J30R 4910 RCS25R 5869 R5J220 F308 F30J25R L0140 AHL1RO 4n4 90J33R 4911 RCS35R 5870 RSJ250 F309 F30J40R L0141 RHL2RO 4n4A 90J35R 4912 RCS50R 5870A RSJ270 F310 F30J50R L0142 AHLJRO 4775 90J36R 4913 RCS75R 5871 RSJ300 F311 F30J75A L0143 AHL6RO 4776 90J39R 4914 RCS100 5872 RSJ330 F312 F30J100 L0144 RHLSRO 47n 90J40R 4915 RCS150 5873 RSJ350 F313 F30J150 L0145 AHL10A 4na 90J43R 4916 RCS200 5874 RSJ400 F314 F30J200 L0146 RHL15A 4779 90J47R 4917 ACS250 5875 RSJ500 . F315 F30J250 L0147 AHL25R 4780' 90J50R 4918 RCS350 5875A RSJ510 *F316 F30J400 L0148 RHL35R 4781 . 90J51R '4919 RCS500 58756 RSJ560 F317 F30J500 L0149 AHL50R 4782&deg; 90J56R 4920 RCS750 5876 RSJ600 F318 * F30J750 L0150 -AHL75R
Specifically, a questioning attitude was not used to understand the consequence of the differences in relay features resulting with installing a relay that was incompatible with the current design. [H.11]
. -REPORT * -EC 620632, Att. 1, Pg. 158 of 26 r* REVISION: 03 8 Selecting A Rheostat PAGE 15 OF 139 OHMITE. STEP 1 Determine Resistance and Watts Ohm's Law (a) R = Ell or I = E/R or E = RI Ohm's Law, shown in formula form above, enables determination of the resistance when the required voltage and current are known. When the current and voltage are unknown, or the best values not decided on, at least two of the three terms in Ohm's Law must lie measured in a trial circuit (see Engineering Manual Bulletin 1100). Note that the maximum current to be determined is the current of the load before the rheostat resistance is inserted. On the other hand, the maximum resistance occurs with the minimum current. (b) W = 12R or W = El or W = E2/R Power, in watts, can be determined from the formulas above, which stem from Ohm's Law. Note that the rated wattage of a uniform wound rheostat is calculated using the maximum current and the total rheostat resistance. The Summation Watts are calculated instead for a taper wound rheostat as explained under "Tapered Rheostats;* page 14. Short Cut Method Use an Ohmite Ohm's Law Calculator (convenient slidechart) or use Ohm's Law Chart in the Engineering Manual, Bulletin 1100. Set known values as explained on the Calculator, or Chart, and read the sought for OHMS, WATIS (or other terms). Calculation Method Using the Ohm's Law formulas given above, and explained in greater detail in the Engineering Manual, calculate the unknown values. How to conduct tests when a trial must be made of the actual apparatus is explained in the Manual. STEP 2 Power Rating or Physical Size of Rheostat General: Rheostat watt ratings are based on the condition that the moving contact is set so that all of the winding is in the circuit. This makes the condition the same as that of a fixed resistor (assuming a uniform rheostat winding) and we may then say that a rheostat operated at a constant wattage will attain a steady temperature which is mined largely by the ratio between the size (surface area) and the wattage dissipated. The temperature stabilizes when the sum of the heat loss rates (by radiation, convection and conduction) equals the heat input rate (proportionage). The greater the rheostat area per watt to be dissipated, the the heat loss rate and therefore the lower the temperature rise. Manufacturing Company Free Air Watt Rating In general, for commercial rheostats, the relation of the "Free Air Watt Rating" of vitreous enameled rheostats to the physical size has been set at such a figure that: "When operated at their rated watts the temperature rise of the hottest spot shall not 300&deg;C (540&deg;F) as measured by a thermo-couple, when the temperature of the ing air does not exceed/40&deg;C (104 &deg;F). The temperature is to be measured at the hottest point on the embedding material of a rheostat mounted on a vertical metal panel in free, still air space with at least one foot of clearance to the nearest object, and with unrestricted circulation of air:' This is in accordance with standards of the "National Electrical Manufacturers Association" (NEMA) and the "Underwriters' Laboratories:* Electronic Industries Association (formerly RETMA) standards provide for a maximum attained hot spot temperature of 340&deg;C for rheostats of 100 watts or less and 300&deg;C for rheostats of greater wattage. The reference ambient is 25&deg;C. Military Rheostat Specification MIL-R-22 provides for a maximum hot spot temperature attained (on the exposed winding) of 340&deg;C for rheostats of 100 watts or less and 390&deg;C for larger rheostats. The reference ambient is 25&deg;C. The temperature rise, with all resistance in the circuit, is not directly proportional to the wattage but follows the curves as shown in Fig. 1 and Fig. 2. \ RHEOSTAT LOAO-PEACENT HATED WATTS Fig. 1: Hot spot temperature rise of a rheostat for various specifications. The temperature rise on a tapered rheostat does not exceed the rated maximum, but the location of the hot spot, for each position of the contact, depends on the taper design. In the usual rheostat application, the current is reduced as the resistance is inserted in the circuit and so the operating temperature is much less than the maximum rated temperature. If the maximum current is actually carried as a constant value, the hot spot temperature builds up as the resistance is added and levels off at the maximum rated temperature starting at approximately 30% rotatio f EC 620632 Att 1 Pg 159 f 26'fEPORTNO.: REP-424-008-RP1 ; ' * ' * O REVISION: 03 -\ .... .. I '* Selecting A Rheostat PAGE16&deg;F139 OH MITE ;? i Current Rating When selecting a rheostat for a particular application, it is the current rating, rather than the wattage rating, which directly indicates the usability. For any given wattage size and resistance, the maximum current to be carried through any part of a uniform winding is determined from Ohm's Law, l=v'W/R. The current values for all stock rheostat resistances are given in the stock tables. The minimum current (occurring at maximum resistance) is a factor influencing the rheostat watt size required, as explained under "Tapered Rheostats'.' When a rheostat is connected as a potentiometer, i.e., bridged across the line with the load connected between one end and the moving contact, the minimum current is the "bleeder" current (through the entire winding). The maximum potentiometer current is the sum of the bleeder current and the maximum load current. Tapered Windings A "tapered winding" consists of two or more smoothly joined sections wound with larger wire for the higher current sections. Characteristics of tapered windings are explained fully starting on page 14. Application Modifications of Power Ratings To allow for the differences between the actual service conditions and the "Free Air Watt Rating" it is sound '\ engineering practice to operate the rheostats at modifica-J tions of nominal rating. The details by which such ratings can be estimated are given hereafter. Most thermal calculations, however, involve so many factors which are usually not accurately known, that at best they are ' i _/ only approximations. i -CAii' *AG< CUIW[ fCW'UUoTllll( \111.lllll W'Ot:L1' *ltM a!ZI: 0' JltMCOSTAT INTHISIUNOE. ... t----+---+-----t----< Fig. 2: Hot Spot temperature rise of a typical rheostat versus percentage of winding in circuit. The factors which affect the temperature rise act nearly independently of each other and are summarized as follows: 1. Ambient Temperature: As the maximum permissible operating temperature is a set amount, any increase in the ambient temperature subtracts from the permissible temperature rise and therefore reduces the permissible watt load. 2.


===Enclosure:===
=====Enforcement.=====
Enclosure limits the removal of heat by convection currents in the air and by radiation. The walls of the enclosure also introduce a thermal barrier between the air contacting the rheostat and the outside cooling Manufacturing Company air. Hence, size, shape, orientation, amount of ventilating
Title 10 of the CFR, Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, "Design Control," requires


\0. NAI-2007-004 Revision 0 Page B87 ofB156 86 EC 620632, Attachment 2, Page 153 of 254 Clinton Division 1 Diesel Generator Room GOTHIC Uncertainty Evaluation File Comparison: Double entries indicate differences. I Current File: C:\Work\Penley\Clinton\NAl-2007-004_RO\CPS_ 1 A_DG_LoV _LOOP-LOCA_Case_ 10.GTH \Compare File: C:\Work\Penley\Clinton\NAl-2007-004_RO\CPS_ 1 A_DG_LoV _LOOP-LOCA_Case_ 1 Oa.GTH Jul/24/2017 20:59:23 GOTHIC Version 8.2(QA) -Oct 2016 Cell Blockages -Table 2 Volume ls Blockage Coordinates & Dimensions (ft) Angle No. Xl Yl Zl X2 Y2 Z2 X3 Y3 Z3 L (Deg) 1 0. 0. 0. 10. 10. 10. lxx= I= I= I= I= I= I= I= I= I= I= I= >= >= )xxxxxx )xxxxxx )xxxxxx )!.xx. )i!xxxx >= )xxxxxx >= )xxxxxx >= )!.xx. >= )xxxxxx >= >= >= >= )xxxxxx )xxxxxx >= )xxxxxx )!.x.x )xxxxxx )xxxxxx )xxxxxx )xxxxxx )xxxxxx )xxxxxx )xxxxxx )xxxxxx )xxxxxx )xxxxxx \8 \29.479 \11.583 \2.458 \30.479 \14. \8.292 \ \ \ \ \ X-Direction Cell Face Variations Volume ls Cell Blockage Area Hyd. Dia. Loss Drop De-ent. No. No. Porosity FF (ft) Coeff. FF Factor def On 1. 1000000. 0. 0. -lsl 0. le-06 0. 0. ls5 1. 260. 0. 0. lsl 7 0. le-06 0. 0. ls21 1. 260. 0. 0. ls33 0. le-06 0. o. ls37 1. 260. 0. o. ls49 0. le-06 0. o. ls53 1. 260. o. o. ls65 1. 20. 0. 0. I= I= I= I= /xxxxxx:xzxxxx >= >= >= )!ixxxxxxxxxx >= >= \ls21 \6 \l. \ \681.822 \0. \ \0. Z-Direction Cell Face Variations Volume ls Cell Blockage Area Hyd. Dia. Loss Drop De-ent. curb Ht No. No. Porosity FF (ft) Coeff. FF Factor (ft) def On 1. 1000000. 0. 0. lsl 0. le-06 0. 0. 0. ls2 1. 36. 0. 0. 0. ls5 1. 260. 0. 0. 0. lsl? 0. le-06 0. o. o. ls le 1. 36. 0. o. o. ls21 1. 260. 0. 0. 0. ls33 0. le-06 0. 0. 0. ls34 1. 36. o. o. o. ls37 1. 260. o. o. 0. ls49 0. le-06 o. o. 0. lsSO 1. 36. 0. 0. 0. ls53 1. 260. 0. 0. 0. July 25, 2017 9:40 AM EDT Curb Height 0. I= \0. NAI-2007-004 Revision 0 Page B88 ofB156 87 EC 620632, Attachment 2, Page 154 of 254 Clinton Division 1 Diesel Generator Room GOTHIC Uncertainty Evaluation File Comparison: Double entries indicate differences. I Current File: C:\Work\Penley\Clinton\NAl-2007-004_RO\CPS_ 1A_DG_LoV_LOOP-LOCA_Case_1 O.GTH \Compare File: C:\Work\Penley\Clinton\NAl-2007-004_RO\CPS_1A_DG_LoV_LOOP-LOCA_Case_10a.GTH Jul/24/2017 20:59:24 GOTHIC Version 8.2(QA) -Oct 2016 Z-Direction Cell Face Variations (cont.) Volume ls Cell Blockage Area Hyd. Dia. Loss Drop De-ant. curb Ht No. No. Porosity FF (ft) Coeff. FF Factor (ft) /xxxx I= I= /xx I= )xxxx )xx )O* )xxxx )xx )O* XlCCCCCCCICCCC )xxxx )xx )!ixxxxxxxxxx )xxxx )xx )xxxx )xx )!X:xxxxx::xxxxx )xxxx )xx xx )xxxx )xx )xxxx )xx )0 * xxx:iuccxx )xxxx )xx )0. )xxxx )xx )xxxx )xx )0* xxxx )xxxx )xx xxx )xxxx )xx )xxxx )xx xxxx )xxxx )xx )xxxx )xx )0. )xxxx )xx )0* xx=xxx )xxxx )xx )xxxx )xx \ls39 ,, \1. \ \586.'78 \0, \ \0. \0. Volume Variations Volume ls Cell Blockage Volume Hyd. Dia. No. No. Porosity FF (ft) def On 1. 1000000. 1'1 l 0, le-06 1*2 l 1. 36. 1*5 l 1. 260, lsl7 l o. le-06 Isle l 1. 36. la21 l 1. 260. lslJ l o. le-06 ls34 l 1. 36. la37 l 1. 260. ls49 l 0. le-06 lsSO l 1. 36. lsSJ l 1. 260. ls65 l 1. 20. I= /xxxx=x /xxxx I= )xxxx )xxxx )xxxx )xxxx )xxxx )xxxx )xxxx )xxxx )xxxx )!x..xx. )xxxx )ixxxxxx )xxxx )xxxx )ixxxxxx )xxxx )xxxx )ixxxxxx )xxxx )xxxx )ix..xxxx )xxxx \ls27 \7 \1. \ \158.76504 July 25, 2017 9:40 AM EDT NAI-2007-004 Revision 0 Page B89 ofB156 88 L __ _ EC 620632, Attachment 2, Page 155 of 254 Clinton Division 1 Diesel Generator Room GOTHIC Uncertainty Evaluation File Comparison: Double entries indicate differences. I Current File: C:\Work\Penley\Clinton\NAl-2007-004 RO\CPS 1A DG LoV LOOP-LOCA Case 10.GTH \Compare File: C:\Work\Penley\Clinton\NAl-2007-004_RO\CPS_ 1A_DG_LoV _LOOP-LOCA_Case_ 1 Oa.GTH Jul/24/2017 20:59:24 GOTHIC Version 8.2(QA) -Oct 2016 Volume Variations (cont.) Volume la Cell Blockage Volume Hyd.. Dia. No. No. Porosity (ft) />==<= /xxxx I= )ixxxxxx )xxxx )ixxxxxx )xxxx )xxxx \ls39 \8 \1. \ \571.JBSOl Conductor Surface Options -Natural Convection Variables htc * {k/lJ * (A + e*aruc*pruo) Surf Conv Var B FF Nom. FF ' o.59 0.25 /xxxx I= I= ''&deg;"""&deg;"&deg;' );:..,. >= >= )xxxxx >= ,, \0. \ \0.59 \ \O.:ZS Conductor Surface Options -Forced Convection Variablea htc * (k/l) * (A + B*Ra*"C*PrUDJ Surf Opt Conv Var B Conv Var c FF Nom. o.a 0.037 0,037 ' 0.8 /xxxx I= I= );:..,. >= >= >= ,, \0. \ \0.023 \ \0.8 Following table in the Compare File but not in the CUrrene File, Thermal Conductor Type Panel Steel Bdry. Thick Sub-Region (inl (in) regs. 0.02268 0.02592 0.0486 0.0191 0.0191 0.10104 0.11528 0.00648 FF 0.25 I= I= >= >= )xxxxx )xxxxx \ \o.:zs \ conv Var O FF FF 0,333 I= I= >= >= >= >= \ \0.4 \ o. July 25, 2017 9:40 AM EDT NAI-2007-004 Revision 0 Page B90 ofB156 89 EC 620632, Attachment 2, Page 156 of 254 Clinton Division 1 Diesel Generator Room GOTHIC Uncertainty Evaluation File Comparison: Double entries indicate differences. I Current File: C:\Work\Penley\Clinton\NAl-2007-004_RO\CPS_ 1 A_DG_LoV _LOOP-LOCA_ Case_ 1 O.GTH \Compare File: C:\Work\Penley\Clinton\NAl-2007-004_RO\CPS_ 1 A_DG_LoV _LOOP-LOCA_Case_ 1 Oa.GTH Jul/24/2017 20:59:24 GOTHIC Version 8.2(QA) -Oct 2016 Thermal Conductor Type (cont.) , Panel Steel Mat. Bdry. Thick Sub-Heat Region * {in) (inl regs. Factor 10 I l I 0.12176 I 0.00324 I l I 0. Following table in the Compare File but not in the Current File. Function llT Outdoor Air Temperature Ind. Var.: Time (sec) Dep. Var.: Temperature (F) Ind. Var. Dep. Var. Ind. Var. Dep. Var. o. 90. 60. 89.9999191 120. 89.9996764 180. 89.9992718 240. 89. 9987054 300. 89. 9979772 360. 89.9970873 420. 89.9960355 480. 89.994822 540. 89.9934468 600. 89.9919099 660. 89.9902113 720. 89.9883511 780. 89.9863292 840. 89.9841458 900. 89.9818008 960. 89. 9792944 1020. 89. 9766266 1080. 89.9737973 1140. 89.9708068 1200. 89. 9676549 1260. 89. 9643419 1320. 89. 9608677 1380. 89. 9572324 1440. 89.9534361 1500. 89.9494789 1560. 89.9453608 1620. 89.9410819 1680. 89. 9366423 1740. 89. 9320421 1800. 89. 9272813 1860. 89. 9223601 1920. 89.9172786 1980. 89.9120368 2040. 89. 9066348 2100. 89. 9010728 2160. 89.8953509 2220. 89.8894691 2280. 89.8834276 2340. 89.8772265 2400. 89.8708659 2460. 89.8643459 2520. 89. 8576667 2580. 89. 8508284 2640. 89. 8438311 2700. 89. 8366749 2760. 89. 82936 2820. 89. 8218865 2880. 89. 8142546 2940. 89. 8064644 3000. 89.7985161 3060. 89.7904097 3120. 89. 7821455 3180. 89. 7737237 3240. 89.7651443 3300. 89.7564076 3360. 89. 7475137 3420. 89. 7384627 3480. 89. 7292549 3540. 89. 7198905 3600. 89.7103695 3660. 89.7006923 3720. 89.6908588 3780. 89.6808695 3840. 89.6707244 3900. 89.6604238 3960. 89. 6499678 4020. 89. 6393566 4080. 89.6285904 4140. 89.6176695 4200. 89. 6065941 4260. 89 .5953643 4320. 89.5839804 4380. 89.5724426 4440. 89.5607511 4500. 89.5489061 4560. 89.5369079 4620. 89.5247567 4680. 89. 5124527 4740. 89. 4999961 4800. 89 .4873873 4860. 89. 4746264 4920. 89.4617136 4980. 89.4486493 5040. 89.4354336 5100. 89.4220669 5160. 89. 4085493 5220. 89. 3948812 5280. 89. 3810628 5340. 89. 3670943 5400. 89.352976 5460. 89.3387083 5520. 89.3242913 5580. 89.3097253 5640. 89.2950106 5700. 89.2801476 July 25, 2017 '9:40 AM EDT NAI-2007-004 Revision 0 Page B91 ofB156 90 EC 620632, Attachment 2, Page 157 of 254 Clinton Division I Diesel Generator Room GOTHIC Uncertainty Evaluation File Comparison: Double entries indicate differences. I Current File: C:\Work\Penley\Clinton\NAl-2007-004 RO\CPS 1A DG LoV LOOP-LOCA Case 10.GTH \Compare File: C:\Work\Penley\Clinfon\NAl-2007-004_RO\CPS_ 1A_DG_LoV _LOOP-LOCA_Case_ 1 Oa.GTH Jul/24/2017 20:59:24 GOTHIC Version 8.2(QA) -Oct 2016 Ind. Vilr. 57GO. 5880. 6000. G24.0. 6360. 6600. 6720. 684.0. 6960. 7440. 75120. 8520. 864.0. 8760. 9120. 9600. 9960, 10560. 10920. 11040. 1164.0. 11880. 12120. 12240. 12600. 12720. Function (cont.) outdoor Air Temporature Ind. Var.: Time (sec) Dep. Var.: Temperature (F) """* Vilr. Ind. Va.r. Dep. Var. 851.2G513G4. 5820. 89.2499774 5940. 89.219217 851.2036162 851.1719749 6180. 89.155935 89.13974514. 6300. 89.1234183 6420. 89.090321 851.0735555 6540. 89.0566457 89.0395921 6660. 89.0223949 89.005054.5 6780. 88.9875713 6900. 88.9521774 88.9342675 1020. 7140. 88.8796899 7260, 7380. 88.7859221 7500. 88.7667509 88.74744.14 7620. 88.7279939 88.7084088 BB.6886865 88.6688273 7860. BB.6488316 88.6286998 7980. 88.6084323 88.5880295 8100. 88.5674917 88.54681.94. s220. 8340. 88.483999 88.4.627924 8460. 88.4414532 88.3983789 8700. 88.3547791 8820. 88.3106574 88.2884018 8940. 88.266017 88.2435034 9060. 88,2208614 9180, 88.1521693 9300. 88.1290181 88.1057407 9420. 88.0823375 88.058809 9540. 88.0351556 9660. 87.51874.76 9780. 51900. 87.8906384 87.8414877 87.816731 1014.0. 87.7668574 87.6656821 10500. 87.6143883 87.5885665 87.5626288 1074.0. 10980. 87,4.312189 87.4045962 11100. 87.377861 87.3510139 11220. 87.2969861 87.2698063 8"1.2151179 87.159994Z 87.104.4.394 87.0765018 87.0181579 86.9920538 86.9636947 86.8779953 86.82034.95 86. 7913744 124.ZO. 86.7622986 86.7331225 86.5857591 July 25, 2017 9:40 AM EDT NAI-2007-004 Revision 0 Page B92 ofB156 91 EC 620632, Attachment 2, Page 158 of 254 Clinton Division 1 Diesel Generator Room GOTHIC Uncertainty Evaluation File Comparison: Double entries indicate differences. I Current File: C:\Work\Penley\Clinton\NAl-2007-004_RO\CPS_ 1 A_DG_LoV _LOOP-LOCA_ Case_ 1 O.GTH \ Compare File: C:\Work\Penley\Clinton\NAl-2007-004_RO\CPS_ 1 A_DG_LoV _LOOP-LOCA_Case_ 1 Oa.GTH Jul/24/2017 20:59:24 GOTHIC Version B.2(QA) -Oct 2016 Function {cont.) outdoor Air Temperature Ind. Var.: Time (sec) Dep. Var. : Temperature (F) Ind. Var. Dep. Var. Ind. Var. Dep, Var. 86.5559937 86.526132 86.4961746 13020. 13080. 13140. 86.4057341 13200. 13260. 86.344.9725 13320. 86.314453 13380. 86.2838419 13440. 86.2531397 13500. 86.222347 13560. 13620. 86.1604925 l.3680. 13740. 86.0670467 13860. 86.0357234 86.0043137 85.9728183 85.9412378 14100. 14160. 14220. 14280. 85.8140761 85.7820788 14520. 85.6856003 14580. 85.6532806 14640, 85.6208818 14700. 85.5884045 14760. 85.5558495 85.5232172 15000. 85.4248632 15060. 85.3319283 15120. 85.3589193 15180. 85.3258367 15240. 15300. 85.2261548 85.1927847 85.1593443 15540. 15600. 15660. 15720. 85.0248926 15780. 84.9911103 15840. 84.51572615 155100. 84.92334651 155160. 84.8893671 16020. 84.82121.46 84.7870432 16200. l.6260, 84.7185133 16320. 84.684156 16380. 84.64517382 84.6152604 84.5461276 16680. 84.4767627 16740. 84.4419515 16800. 16860. 84.3373583 84.3023705 84.2673293 84.2322355 17160. 17220. 84.1266445 84.0559993 83.9851595 83.9496683 17640. 17700. 83.6999619 83.6641166 18120. 18180. 18240. 83.4482033 83.412084 18540. 83.3759282 18600. 83.3397367 18660. 8).3035102 18720. 83.1946271 18960. 83.0125201 82.9760095 82.9029046 82.8663118 19440. 19500. 82.75638 19800. 19860. July 25, 2017 9:40 AM EDT NAI-2007-004 Revision 0 Page B93 ofB156 92 EC 620632, Attachment 2, Page 159 of 254 Clinton Division 1 Diesel Generator Room GOTHIC Uncertainty Evaluation File Comparison: Double entries indicate differences. I Current File: C:\Work\Penley\Clinton\NAl-2007-004_RO\CPS_ 1 A_DG_LoV _LOOP-LOCA_Case_1 O.GTH \Compare File: C:\Work\Penley\Clinton\NAl-2007-004_RO\CPS_1 A_DG_LoV _LOOP-LOCA_Case_ 1 Oa.GTH Jul/24/2017 20:59:24 GOTHIC Version 8.2(QA) -Oct 2016 Fu.notion (cont.) llT outdoor Air Temperature Ind. Var.: Time (sec) Dep. Var.: Temperature (F) Ind. Var. Dep. Var. Ind. Var. Dep. Var. 19920. 82.5358894 19980. 82.4.990679 20040. 82.3515985 20280. 82.3146889 20400. 20460. 82.2038698 82.1669023 20580. 82.1293222 20Ei40. 82.09293 20700. 82.0559266 20760. 82.0189126 81.9818887 20880. 81.9448556 81.9078141 21000. 81.75166457 21180. 81.7595774 21240. 81.7225041 21420. Bl.6112616 21600. 81.5 21660. 81.4629119 21720. 81.4258244 21780, 81.3887384 22080. 81,2033543 81.1662916 22260. 81.0921859 80.9810874 22560. 80.90707 80.7961302 22860. 80.7222362 80.6484015 23040. 80.6115081 80,5746316 80.4641106 23340. 80.4273088 23400. 80.3905274 23460. 80.3537671 23760. 23820. 80.1336882 80.0970954 23940. 80.0605292 24240. 79.8781235 24300. 79.8417323 79.805372G 79.7327506 24540. 79.5157144 79.4796699 79.4436639 79.3000381 25260. 79 .2642347 25560. 79.0858696 25620. 78.9793966 26100. 78.7677645 26520. 26580. July 25, 2017 9:40 AM EDT NAI-2007-004 Revision 0 Page B94 ofB156 93 EC 620632, Attachment 2, Page 160 of 254 Clinton Division 1 Diesel Generator Room GOTHIC Uncertainty Evaluation File Comparison: Double entries indicate differences. I Current File: C:\Work\Penley\Clinton\NAl-2007-004 RO\CPS 1A DG LoV LOOP-LOCA Case 1 O.GTH \ Compare File: C:\Work\Penley\Clinton\NAl-2007-004_RO\CPS_ 1A_DG_LoV _LOOP-LOCA_Case_ 1 Oa.GTH Jul/24/2017 20:59:24 GOTHIC Version 8.2(QA) -Oct 2016 Ind. Function {cent.) outdoor Air Temperature Ind. Var.; Time {sec) Dep. Var. : Temperature (F) Var. Dep. Var. Ind. Var. 27060. 27120. 78.1787854 27180. 27240. 78.1106329 2736'0. 78.0427385 27420. 27480. 77.9751074 27540. 27600. 77.9077448 27660. 27840. 77.7738452 27900. 27960. 77.7073186 77.6410808 28140. 28260. 28620. 28680. 28800. 77.25 28860. 77.1859239 28980. 29040. 77.1221764 29100. 29220. 29280. 76.9956863 29340. 29400. 76.9329533 29460. 29520. 29580. 29640. 76.8085356 29700. 29760. 76.7468603 29820. 29880. 29940. 30000. 76.6246003 30060. 30120. 76.5640249 30180. 30480. 76.3845723 30540. 30840. 76.2086256 30900. 30960. 76.l5077G7 31020. 31080. 76.0933351 31140. 31200. 16.0363053 31260. 31320. 75.979691-6 31440. 75.9234982 31500. 31560. 31680. 75.8123899 31740. 31800. 31860. 32460. 32640. 75.3856117 32760. 75.183269 33180. 33300. 33420. 33540. 33600. 74.9886222 33660. 74.941191 33960. Dep. Var. 78.2129568 78.1446772 78.0088837 77.9413922 77.8741657 77.7405461 77.6080717 77.5422766 77.3467194 77.2821597 77.2179212 77.1540088 76.9642766 76.901717 76.8395075 76.777653 76.7161581 76.6550275 76.5942659 76.5338778 76.3550011 76.2961531 76.1796505 76.1220047 76.0647685 76.0079462 75.8955606 75.7848821 75.5687811 75.4634243 75.3599063 75.3088468 75.1585123 75.1093616 74.9648444 74.8248061 July 25, 2017 9:40 AM EDT NAI-2007-004 Revision 0 Page B95 ofB156 94 EC 620632, Attachment 2, Page 161 of 254 Clinton Division 1 Diesel Generator Room GOTHIC Uncertainty Evaluation File Comparison: Double entries indicate differences. I Current File: C:\Work\Penley\Clinton\NAl-2007-004_RO\CPS_ 1 A_DG_LoV _LOOP-LOCA_Case_ 1 O.GTH \Compare File: C:\Work\Penley\Clinton\NAl-2007-004_RO\CPS_1 A_DG_LoV _LOOP-LOCA_Case_ 1 Oa.GTH Jul/24/2017 20:59:24 GOTHIC Version 8.2(QA) -Oct 2016 r:unction (cont.) 11T outdoor Air Temperature Ind. Var.: Time {sec) Dep, Var.: Temperature (F) Ind. Var. Dep. Var. Ind. Oep. Var. 34080. 74.8019086 74.7791386 74.7564966 34260. 74.733983 74.71.15982 34380. 74.6893426 74.6672167 34560. 34620. 74.6016212 34680. 74.5585468 74.5372076 34920. 74.4949274 74 .4739871 74.4531806 35100. 74.4325083 74.3915677 74.3713002 74.3511684 74.3311727 35460. 74,3113135 74.2140779 35820. 74.1950455 74 .1761521 35940. 74.1573982 74.1387841 36120. 36240. 74.0657325 36300. 74.0478226 36360. 74 ,0300545 36420. 74.0124287 36540. 73.9776051 36600. 73.!1604079 36660. 73.9433543 73.9264445 36780. 73.909679 73.8765817 73.844065 37080. 37200. 73.7963838 37260. 73.780783 37320. 37440. 73.7348636 37500. 73.7198524 37560. 73. 7049894 37620. 73.6902747 37680. 73.6757087 37740. 73.6612917 37800. 73.647024 73.6189372 37980. 73.6051188 38040. 73.5914507 38100. 73 .5779331 73.5645664 38220. 73.5513507 73.5382864 38400. 38460. 73.4510939 73.4160196 73.4046357 73.3934059 39840. 73.2524863 3!:1900. 73.2435924 73.21785'15 73.20148)!:1 40260. 73.1935356 73.1491716 40680. 73.1423333 40740. 41100. July 25, 2017 9:40 AM EDT NAI-2007-004 Revision 0 Page B96 ofB156 95 EC 620632, Attachment 2, Page 162 of 254 Clinton Division 1 Diesel Generator Room GOTHIC Uncertainty Evaluation File Comparison: Double entries indicate differences. I Current File: C:\Work\Penley\Clinton\NAl-2007-004_RO\CPS_ 1 A_DG_LoV _LOOP-LOCA_ Case_ 10.GTH \Compare File: C:\Work\Penley\Clinton\NAl-2007-004_RO\CPS_1A_DG_LoV_LOOP-LOCA_Case_10a.GTH Jul/24/2017 20:59:24 GOTHIC Version 8.2(QA) -Oct 2016 Function (cont.) UT outdoor Air Temperature Ind. Var.: Time (sec) Dep. Var.: Temperature (Fl Ind. Var. Dep. var. Ind. Var. Dap. Var. 41160. 41220. 73.0727187 73.0679579 41520. 73.0633577 41580. 73.0589181 41640. 73.0546392 41700. 41760. 73.0465639 73.0427676 41880. 73 .0391323 41940. 73.0356581 42000. 42060. 42120. 73.0262027 42180. 73.0207056 7J.01Bl992 42360. 73.0158542 42420. 73.0136708 42480. 42540. 42660. 73.005178 73.0039645 73.0029127 42960. 43020. 73.0003236 43140. 73,0000809 43200. 43260. 73.0003236 73.0007282 43440. 43500. 73.0020228 73.0029127 43620. 73,0033645 73.005178 73.0065532 73.0080901 43860. 73,0097887 73.0116483 43980. 73.0136708 73.0158542 44100. 73,0181992 44.l60. 44280. 73.0262027 44340. 44400. 73.0323451 73.0391.323 73.0427676 44640. 73.0465639 44700. 73.050521.l 73.0589181 73.0633577 45000. 73.0727187 45060. 73.0776399 45120. 73.0879632 73.0:;133652 73.0989272 73.1046491 73.1105309 45600. 73.1291341 45660. 45960. 46020. 73.201.4839 73.2262763 46440. 46500. 46560. 73.2707451 46800. 73.2896305 46860. 46920. 73.3091412 46980. 73.3191305 73.3292756 47160. 47280. 73.3714096 47340. 47460. 47640. 73.4392489 73.4510939 73.4630921 73.4875473 73.5000039 48060. July 25, 2017 9:40 AM EDT NAI-2007-004 Revision 0 Page B97 ofB156 96 EC 620632, Attachment 2, Page 163 of 254 NUMERICAL APPLICATIONS Clinton Division 1 Diesel Generator Room GOTHIC Uncertainty Evaluation File Comparison: Double entries indicate differences. I Current File: C:\Work\Penley\Clinton\NAl-2007-004 RO\CPS 1A DG LoV LOOP-LOCA Case 10.GTH \ Compare File: C:\Work\Penley\Clinton\NAl-2007-004_RO\CPS_ 1A_DG_LoV _LOOP-LOCA_ Case_ 1 Oa.GTH Jul/24/2017 20:59:24 GOTHIC Version 8.2(QA) -Oct 2016 Function (cont.) outdoor Air Temperature Ind. Var.: Time (sec) Dep. Var,: Temperature (F) Ind. var. Dep. Var. Ind. Var. Dep. Var. 48240. 73.5645664 73.5914507 48480, 73.6189372 48600. 73.647024 48960. 73 .7348636 49200, 73.7963838 49560. 73.8930579 49680. 50040. 50160. 50280. 74.101.Sl766 50520. 74.1761521 74.2140779 50760. 74.25255B6 74.2915912 51000, 51120. 51240. 74.411.9705 51600, 51720. 51840. 74.62JJ5S5 51960. 74.66721.67 52080. 74,7115982 52200. 74.7564966 52320. 52440. 74.8478307 52560. 52680. 74.941191 75.0365493 75.0849686 53160. 75.183269 53400. 75.2834935 75.3343179 75.3856ll7 53880. 75.4373712 75.4895924 75.6489861 54480. 75.7574832 75.8123899 75.8677296 55080. 73.5779331 48420, 73.6051188 73.6329057 73,6612917 48780. 73.6902747 48900. 7J. 7198524 49140. 73. 780783 49260. 73.8121313 73.844065 49500. 73.8765817 49620. 73.909679 49860. 73.9776051 49980. 74.0124287 74.0478226 74.0837839 74.1203101 50460. 74.l57J9B2 51540. 51780. 51900. 52140. 52260. 52380. 52620. 53460. 54300. 55260. 74.1950455 74.2332491 74.2720061 74.3511684 74.3915677 74,4325083 74.4739871 74.5585468 74.6016212 74.6452209 74.6893426 74.733983 74.7791386 74.8248061 74.8709819 75.1093616 75,2081459 75.2582587 75.3088468 75.3599063 75."11'1335 75.4634243 75.6759446 75.7301937 75.7848821 75.9515421 76.0079462 76.0647685 July 25, 2017 9:40 AM EDT NAI-2007-004 Revision 0 Page B98 ofB156 97 EC 620632, Attachment 2, Page 164 of 254 Clinton Division 1 Diesel Generator Room GOTHIC Uncertainty Evaluation File Comparison: Double entries indicate differences. I Current File: C:\Work\Penley\Clinton\NAl-2007-004 RO\CPS 1A DG LoV LOOP-LOCA Case 10.GTH \ Compare File: C:\Work\Penley\Clinton\NAl-2007-004_RO\CPS_ 1A_DG_LoV _LOOP-LOCA_ Case_ 1 Oa.GTH Jul/24/2017 20:59:24 GOTHIC Version 8.2(QA) -Oct 2016 Ind. Var. 55440. 55560. 55680, 55800. 56280. 56520. 56640. 56880. 57000. 57120. 57360. 57480. 57600, 57720. 57960. 58080, 58200. 58920. 5!:1160, 59280, 59520. 5.9640. 60960. 61440. 61680. 61800. 61920. 62040. 62280. Function (c:ont.) llT Outdoor Air Temperature Ind. Var.: Time (sec) Dep. Var.: Temperature {Fl Dep. Var. Ind. var. Dep. Var. 76.0933351 76.1220047 76.1507767 55500. 76.1796505 55620. 76.2377014 55740. 76.2961531 76.3255279 76.3550011 76.3845723 76.4142409 56100. 76.5038254 76.5338778 76.5640249 56340. 76.5942659 76.6246003 56580. 76.7161581 76.7468603 56700. 76.777653 56940. 76.9329533 57060. 76.9642766 76.9956863 77.0271817 77.0587622 77.0904273 57420. 77.1540088 57540. 77.2179212 57660. 77 .2821597 77 .3143997 57780. 77. 3467194 77.3791182 57900. 77 .4115955 58020. 77.4767828 58140. 77. 5422766 58260, 77.6080717 77.6410808 77.6741633 58500. 77.7738452 77.8072153 77.8406557 77.8741657 77.9077448 58860. 77. 9413922 58980. 78.0088897 78.ll06329 59220. 78.1446772 78.1787854 78.2129568 78.2471908 59460. 78.2814867 59580. 78.3847396 78.4192767 78.4538724 78.558005 60060. 78.66264.17 78.6976295 60540. 60660. 61020. 79.2284738 61140. 79.2642347 79.3000381 61500. 79.5157144 61740. 79.6240718 61860. 61980. 79.7690451 62100. 79.8417323 62340. July 25, 2017 9:40 AM EDT NAI-2007-004 Revision 0 Page B99 ofB156 98 EC 620632, Attachment 2, Page 165 of 254 Clinton Division 1 Diesel Generator Room GOTHIC Uncertainty Evaluation File Comparison: Double entries indicate differences. I Current File: C:\Work\Penley\Clinton\NAl-2007-004 RO\CPS 1A DG LoV LOOP-LOCA Case 10.GTH \ Compare File: C:\Work\Penley\Clinton\NAl-2007-004_RO\CPS_ 1A_DG_Lo\l _LOOP-LOCA_Case_ 1 Oa.GTH Jul/24/2017 20:59:24 GOTHIC Version 8.2(QA) -Oct 2016 Function (cont.) outdoor Air Temperature Ind. Var.: Time (sac) Dep. Var.: Temperature (F) Ind. var. Dep. Var. Ind. Var. Dep. Var. 62400. 62460. 80.0605292 62520. 62580. 80.1336882 62640. 80.1703071 80.2069512 62760. 80.24362 62820. 80.2803127 62880. 80.3170286 62940. 80.3537671 63000. 80.3905274 80.4273088 63120. 63180. B0.5009321 63240. 80.5377727 63300. 80,5746316 63360. 80.6115081 63420. 80.6484015 80.7222362 80.7Sn762 63660. 80.7!161302 63720. 80,8330!il77 63780. 80.8700778 80.90707 80.9440734 63.960. 64020. Bl,OlBllll 64080. 81.0551444 641.40. 81.0921959 64200. 64260. 81.1662916 81.2033543 81.2404226 64440. 81.2774959 81.314.5735 64.560. 64.620. 81.3887384 64680. 81.4258244 64.74.0. 81.4629119 81.5 81.5370881 64920. 81.5741756 81.6112616 65040. 65100. 81.6854265 65280. 65340. 65400. 65460. 81.9078141 81.9448556 81.9818887 65640. 82.0189126 82.0559266 65760. 82.09293 82.1299222 65880. 82.1669023 6594.0. 82.2038698 66000. 66060. 82.2777638 66120. 82.3146889 66180. 82.3515985 82.38849U 82.4.253684 66360. 66420. 82.4990679 66480. 82.5358894 66540. 82.5726912 66600. 82.6094726 66660. 82.6462329 82.6829714 82.7196873 66840. 82.7930488 82.8663118 672DO. 67260. 83.0854543 83.1218765 83.1582677 83.1946274 67620. 67680. 83.2672494 67740. 83.3035102 678DO. 67860. 68040. 68100. 68160. 83.5563361 83.592303 83.6641166 83.7357653 68520. 68580. 83.8072438 83.842!H7S 83.9496683 68880. 83.9851595 68940. 84.0206034 69000. 69060. 84.1618924 69360. 84.2673293 69420. 84.3023705 July 25, 2017 9:40 AM EDT NAI-2007-004 Revision 0 Page BlOO ofB156 99 EC 620632, Attachment 2, Page 166 of 254 Clinton Division 1 Diesel Generator Room GOTHIC Uncertainty Evaluation File Comparison: Double entries indicate differences. I Current File: C:\Work\Penley\Clinton\NAl-2007-004_RO\CPS_ 1A_DG_LoV_LOOP-LOCA_Case_1 O.GTH \Compare File: C:\Work\Penley\Clinton\NAl-2007-004_RO\CPS_1 A_DG_LoV _LOOP-LOCA_Case_ 1 Oa.GTH Jul/24/2017 20:59:24 GOTHIC Version 8.2(QA) -Oct 2016 Ind. Var. 69480. 69600. 69720. 69840. 69960. 70200, 70320. 71160. 71280, 71760. 72120, 72240. 72360. 72480. 72600. 72960. 73080. 73200. 73320. 73440. 73680. 73800. 74400. 74640. 75360. 75600. 75840. 76080. 76200, 76440. Function {cont.) llT Outdoor Air Temperature Ind. Var.: Time (sec) Dep. Var.: Temperature (F) Dep. Var. Ind. Var. 84.3373583 84.4071712 84.4767627 84.5461276 84.6152604 84.684156 84.7528092 84.8212146 84.8893671 85.0248926 85.0922552 85.2926814 85.3589193 85.4248632 85.5558495 115.75 85.8140761 85.8778236 86.0043137 86.0670467 86.1294318 86.1914644 86.2531397 86.314453 86.4359751 86.4961746 86.6154277 86.6744722 86.8492233 87.1322704 87.1876101 87.2969861 87.3510139 87.'1577288 87.5104076 87.5626288 87,6656821. 87.7165065 87.8661236 69540. 69900. 70020. 70260. 70380. 70500. 70620. 70860. 70980. 11100. 71220. 71340. 71580. 7182 . 72180. 72420. 72540. 72660. 73260. 73380. 73500. 74460. 74940. 75660. 75900, 76020, 76140. 76380. 76500, Dep. Var. 84.3722921 84.441995 84,5114738 84.5807233 84.6497382 84.7185133 84.7870432 84.8553228 84.9233469 85,0586078 85.3258367 85.3919283 85.4577234 85.5232172 85.5884045 85.6532806 85.7178403 85.8459912 85.9095727 86.0357234 86.098283 86.222347 86.28384.19 86.3449725 86.4661222 86.64451989 86.7038469 86.8779953 87.1599942 87.3240554 87.377861 87.5365757 87.5885665 87.6911532 87.8414877 87.8906384 July 25, 2017 9:40 AM EDT NAI-2007-004 RevisionO Page BlOl ofB156 100 L EC 620632, Attachment 2, Page 167 of 254 Clinton Division 1 Diesel Generator Room GOTHIC Uncertainty Evaluation File Comparison: Double entries indicate differences. I Current File: C:\Work\Penley\Clinton\NAl-2007-004 RO\CPS 1A DG LoV LOOP-LOCA Case 10.GTH \Compare File: C:\Work\Penley\Clinton\NAl-2007-004_RO\CPS_ 1A_DG_LoV _LOOP-LOCA_Case_ 1 Oa.GTH Jul/24/2017 20:59:24 GOTHIC Version 8.2(QA) -Oct 2016 Function (cent.) outdoor Air Temperature Ind. Var.: Time (sec) Dep. var. : Temperature (F) Ind. Var. Dep. Var. Ind. Var. 76620. 76680, 88.0113778 76860. 76'920. 76980, 77040. 88.1057407 77100. 77160. 77220. 77280. 77400. 88.2435034 88.2884018 77580. 77640. 88.3327833 7776 . 88.4199819 77940. 78120. 78180. 78240. 88.5468194 78300. 78360. 88.5880295 78600. 88.6'688273 78720. 78780. 78840. 88.7474414 78960. 88.7859221 79080. 79140. 88.8612159 79260. 79380. 88.9342675 7956'0. 88.9699455 79620, 79680. 89.0050545 79800. 79860, 80040. 89.1069421 80100. 80160. 89.1397494 80280. 8034.D. 89.2036162 80520. 89.2346708 80580. 806'40. 80700. 89.2950106' 80880. 80!140. 89.352976 81360. 89.4354.336 81420. 89.4617136 81840, 89.5369079 81900. 89.5607511 89.6065941 82320, 89.6285904 82380. 89.670724.1 82680. 82800. 82860. 89.7292549 83160. 89.7651443 83220. 89.8142546 Dep. Var. 87.9393024 87.987476' 88.0351556' 88.0823375 88.1290181 88.1751939 88.2208614 88.266017 88.3106574 88.3547791 88.3983789 88.4414532 88.5260129 88.56'74917 88.6084323 88.6488316' 88.6886'865 88.7:Z79939 88.7667509 88.8049545 88.8426'018 88.8796899 88.9521774 88.9875713 89.0223949 89.0566457 89.090321 89.1234183 89.155935 89.219217 89.2499774 89.3097253 89.3670943 89.4486493 89.5721.4.26 851,6176695 89.6393566 89.GBOB695 89.7006923 89.7384.627 89.7737237 89.7904097 89.8218865 July 25, 2017 9:40 AM EDT NAI-2007-004 Revision 0 Page Bl02 ofB156 101 EC 620632, Attachment 2, Page 168 of 254 Clinton Division 1 Diesel Generator Room GOTHIC Uncertainty Evaluation File Comparison: Double entries indicate differences. I Current File: C:\Work\Penley\Clinton\NAl-2007-004_RO\CPS_ 1A_DG_LoV _LOOP-LOCA_Case_ 1 O.GTH \Compare File: C:\Work\Penley\Clinton\NAl-2007-004_RO\CPS_1 A_DG_LoV _LOOP-LOCA_Case_ 1 Oa.GTH Jul/24/2017 20:59:24 GOTHIC Version 8.2(QA) -Oct 2016 Function (cont.) outdoor Air Temperature Ind. Var.: Time {sec) Dep. Var,; Temperature (F) Ind. Var. Dep. Var. Ind. Var. Dep. Var. 83640, 89.82936 83700. 89.8366749 89,8438311 89.8576667 83940. 89.8643459 84000. 89.8708659 84060. 89.8772265 84120, 89.8834276 84180. 89.8894691 89.8953509 89.9010728 84360, 89.9066346 84480. 89.9172786 84600. 89.9272813 84660. 89.9320421 84720. 89.9366423 84840. 84900. 89.9494789 84960. 89.9534361 89.9572324 85080, 89.9608677 85260. 89.9708068 85320. 89.9766266 85440, 89.9792944 89.9863292 89.9883511 85740. 85860. 89.9934468 esno. e9_994e22 89.9970873 86100. 89,9979772 89.!1987054 86220. 89.9996764 86340, 89.99991.91 86400. 86460. 89.9999191 89.9996764 89.9987054 86700. 86760. 86820, 89.9960355 89.994822 87120. 87180, 89.9863292 89.9841458 87300. 87360. 87480. 89.9737973 87540. 89.9708068 87600. 89.9676549 87660. 89.9643419 89.9608677 89.9366423 89.9172786 88800. 89.8708659 88980, 8916 . 89340, 89.8064644. 89.7.985161 894.60. 89,6908588 90300. 89.6604238 89.6285904 90510. 8!:1.6176695 90600. 89.6065941 90660. July 25, 2017 9:40 AM EDT NAI-2007-004 Revision 0 Page B103 ofB156 102 EC 620632, Attachment 2, Page 169 of 254 Clinton Division 1 Diesel Generator Room GOTHIC Uncertainty Evaluation File Comparison: Double entries indicate differences. I Current File: C:\Work\Penley\Clinton\NAl-2007-004 RO\CPS 1A DG LoV LOOP-LOCA Case 10.GTH \ Compare File: C:\Work\Penley\Clinton\NAl-2007-004_RO\CPS_ 1A_DG_LoV _LOOP-LOCA_ Case_ 1 Oa.GTH Jul/24/2017 20:59:24 GOTHIC Version 8.2(QA) -Oct 2016 Function (cont.) outdoor Air Temperature Ind. Var.: Time (soc) Dep. Var.: Temperature (F) Ind. Var. Dep. Var. Ind. Var. Dep. Var. 30720. B9.SBHB04 901140. BSl.5607511 89.5489061 90.960. 89.5365107!1 89.5247567 851.5124527 !11140. 89.4999.961 91260. 89.4746264 91320. 89.4617136 89 .4486493 89.4354336 89.4220669 91560. 89.4085493 Sll620. 91680. 89.3810626 91740, 89.3670943 89.352976 89.3387083 91920. 92040. 89.2950106 Following table in the compare File but not in the current File. Function Components Control Variable 41C Outdoor Air Temperature: G::il. 0 a0=0. min=i-1. e32 max=l. e32 tfunc Y=G*interp (alXl, tableX2) Gothic_s Variable Coef. Name location Etime I CM I 1.1 Table DCllT 1. Following table in the Compare File but not in the Current File. Function Components Control Variable 42C DG Intake Heat Transfer: G=l. O aO=O. min:::-1, e32 max=l. e32 Yr=G* (aO+alXl+a2X2+ ... +anXn) Gothic_s Name cond_grp_heat (1) Variable location cC70sl Coef. l. Following table in the Compare File but not in the Current File. Thermal Conductor Type 24" Piping Mat. Bdry. Thick Sub-Heat Region (in) (in) regs. Factor 0. 0. 00324 0. 0. 00324 0. 00648 0. 0. 00972 0. 01296 o. 0.02268 0. 02592 0. 0. 0486 0. 05184 0. 0 .10044 0.06864 0. 0 .16908 0.06864 o. 0.23772 0. 04434 0. a. 28206 0. 04434 0. 10 0. 3264 0. 02592 0. Min. Value -le+32 -le+32 Min. Value -le+32 I Max Value le+32 le+32 Max Value le+32 July 25, 2017 9:40 AM EDT NAI-2007-004 Revision 0 Page Bl04 ofB156 103 EC 620632, Attachment 2, Page 170 of 254 Clinton Division I Diesel Generator Room GOTHIC Uncertainty Evaluation File Comparison: Double entries indicate differences. I Current File: C:\Work\Penley\Clinton\NAl-2007-004_RO\CPS_ 1 A_DG_LoV _LOOP-LOCA_Case_ 1 O.GTH \ Compare File: C:\Work\Penley\Clinton\NAl-2007-004_RO\CPS_ 1 A_DG_LoV 1 Oa.GTH Jul/24/2017 20:59:24 GOTHIC Version 8.2(QA) -Oct 2016 Region 11 12 13 Thermal Conductor Type (cont.) Mat. 24n Piping Bdry. (in) 0.35232 0.36528 D.37176 Thick (in) 0.01296 0,00648 D.00324 Sub-Heat regs. Factor 0. 0. Following table in the Compare File but not in the Current File. Thermal Conductor Type 8 3611 Piping Mat. Bdry. Thick Sub-Heat Region # (in) (in) regs. Factor 1 l 0. 0.00324 1 0. 2 1 0. 00324 0.00648 1 0. 3 l 0. 00972 0.01296 1 0. 4 1 0.02268 0. 02592 1 0. 5 1 0. 0486 0. 05184 1 0. 6 1 0 .10044 0. 06864 1 0. 7 1 0 .16908 0. 06864 1 0. 8 1 0. 23772 0. 04434 1 0. 9 1 0. 28206 0. 04434 1 0. 10 1 0. 3264 0. 02592 1 0. 11 1 0. 35232 0.01296 1 0. 12 1 0.36528 0.00648 1 0. 13 1 0.37176 0. 00324 1 0. Following table in the Compare File but not in the current File. # 1 Function Components Control Variable 44C DG Intake That: G=l.0 aO=O. min=-1.e32 max=l.e32 Gothic_s Name sum Y=G* (aO+a1Xl+a2X2+ *** +amen) Variable location cv41C Coef. a Cvval (0) Cvval (OJ cv43C O. 21783386 1. Following table in the Compare File but not in the current File. # Function Components Control Variable 5 OC Local Rho*V*D: G=l.O a0=0. min=-l.e32 max=l.e32 mult Y=>G* (a1Xl*a2X2* ..* *anXn). aO unused Gothic_s Variable Coef. Name location a Rm cV@ Cvval (0) cv49C Dhyd cV@ 1. 1. 1. Min. Value -le+32 -le+32 Min. Value -le+32 -le+32 -le+32 Max Value le+32 le+32 Max Value le+32 le+32 le+32 July 25, 2017 9:40 AM EDT NAI-2007-004 Revision 0 Page BIOS ofBl56 104 EC 620632, Attachment 2, Page 171 of 254 Clinton Division 1 Diesel Generator Room GOTHIC Uncertainty Evaluation File Comparison: Double entries indicate differences. I Current File: C:\Work\Penley\Clinton\NAl-2007-004_RO\CPS_ 1A_DG_LoV _LOOP-LOCA_Case_ 1 O.GTH \Compare File: C:\Work\Penley\Clinton\NAl-2007-004_RO\CPS_ 1 A_DG_LoV _LOOP-LOCA_Case_ 1 Oa.GTH Jul/24/2017 20:59:24 GOTHIC Version 8.2(QA) -Oct 2016 Following table in the Compare File but not in the current File. Function Components Control variable 45C Local Vx**2: G=l.O aO=O. min=-l.e32 max=l.e32 mult Y=G* (a1Xl*a2X2* ... *anXn), ao unused Gothic_s Variable Coef. # Name location a Uccxv I cV@ I 1.1 Uccxv cV@ 1. Following table in the Compare File but not in the current File. Function Components Control Variable 46C Local Vy** 2 : G:ol.O aO=O. min=-1. e32 max::::l. e32 mult Y=G* (a1x1*a2x2* ... *arucn), ao unused Gothic_s Variable Coef. # Name location a I Uccyv I cV@ I 1.1 Uccyv cV@ 1. Following table in the Compare File but not in the current File. Function Components Control Variable 4 7C Local Vz**2: G=l.O aO=O. min=-1. e32 max=l. e32 mult Y=G* (a1Xl*a2X2* ... *anJCn), ao unused Gothic_s Variable Coef. # Name location a I Ucczv I cV@ I 1.1 Ucczv cV@ 1. Following table in the Compare File but not in the current File. Function Components Control Variable 4 BC Local (Vx**2 + Vy**2 + Vz**2): G=l.O aO=:O. min:=:-l.e32 max=l.e32 Y""G* (aO+alXl+a2X2+ ... +arum) Gothic_ s Variable Coef. Name location CVVal (0) cv45C 1. Cvval (O) cv46C 1. Cvval (O) cv47C 1. Following table in the Compare File but not in the current File. Function Components Control Variable 49C Local /vj: G=l a0=.5 min=-l.e32 max:=l.e32 exp Y=G* (aO+a1Xl) "a2X2 or G* (alXl) "ao Gothic_s Name Variable location Coef. Min. Value -le+32 -le+32 Min. Value -le+32 -le+32 Min. Value -le+32 -le+32 Min. Value -le+32 -le+32 -le+32 Min. Value I I I Cvval (0) I cv48C I 1. 1 -le+32 I Max Value le+32 le+32 Max Value le+32 le+32 Max Value le+32 le+32 Max Value le+32 le+32 le+32 Max Value le+32 July 25, 2017 9:40 AM EDT NAI-2007-004 Revision 0 Page B106 ofB156 105 EC 620632, Attachment 2, Page 172 of 254 Clinton Division I Diesel Generator Room GOTHIC Uncertainty Evaluation File Comparison: Double entries indicate differences. I Current File: C:\Work\Penley\Clinton\NAl-2007-004_RO\CPS_ 1 A_DG_LoV _LOOP-LOCA_Case_ 1 O.GTH \Compare File: C:\Work\Penley\Clinton\NAl-2007-004_RO\CPS_ 1 A_DG_LoV _LOOP-LOCA_Case_1 Oa.GTH Jul/24/2017 20:59:24 GOTHIC Version 8.2(QA) -Oct 2016 Following table in the Compare File but not in the Current File. Function Components Control Variable SlC Local Re: G=l. O aO=O. min=-1. e32 max=l. e32 div Y=G* (aO+a2X2) I (alXl) Gothic_s Variable Coef. Min. Max # Name location a Value Value Visv I cV I 1.1 -le+32 I le+32 Cvval (0) cvsoc 1. -le+32 le+32 Following table in the Compare File but not in the Current File. Function Components Control Variable 52C Local cp*mu: G=l. 0 aO=O. min=-l .e32 max=l .e32 mult Y=G* (a1Xl*a2X2* ... *anJCn), ao unused Gothic_s Variable Coef. Min. Max # Name location a Value Value Cpv I cV I 1.1 -le+32 I le+32 Viscv cV 1. -le+32 le+32 Following table in the Compare File but not in the current File. Function Components Control Variable 53C Local Pr: G::::l.O aO=O. min=-l.e32 max=l.e32 div Y=G* (aO+a2X2) I (alXl) Gothic_s Variable Coef. Min. Max # Name location a Value Value Condv I cV I 1.1 -le+32 I le+32 Cvval (O) cv52C 1. -le+32 le+32 Following table in the Compare File but not in the Current File. Function Components Control Variable 54.C Re**l/2: G=l.O aO::::O.S min=-l.e32 max=l.e32 exp Y::::G* (aO+alXl) "a2X2 or G* (alXl) "ao Gothic_s Variable Coef. Min. Max # Name location a Value Value 11 Cvval (0) I cvSlC I 1. I -le+32 I le+32 Following table in the Compare File but not in the Current File. Function Components Control Variable SSC Pr**l/3: G::::l.O a0=0.333 min=-l.e32 max=l.e32 exp Y=G* (aO+alXl) '"'a2X2 or G* (alXl) '"'ao Gothic_s Variable Coef. Min. Max # Name location a Value Value 11 Cvval (O) I cv53C I 1. I -le+32 I le+32 July 25, 2017 9:40 AM EDT NAI-2007-004 Revision 0 Page BI07 ofB156 106 EC 620632, Attachment 2, Page 173 of 254 Clinton Division 1 Diesel Generator Room GOTHIC Uncertainty Evaluation File Comparison: Double entries indicate differences. I Current File: C:\Work\Penley\Clinton\NAl-2007-004 RO\CPS 1A DG LoV LOOP-LOCA Case 10.GTH \Compare File: C:\Work\Penley\Clinton\NAl-2007-004_RO\CPS_ 1A_DG_LoV _LOOP-LOCA_Case_ 1 Oa.GTH Jul/24/2017 20:59:24 GOTHIC Version 8.2(QA) -Oct 2016 Following table in the Compare File but not in the current File. Function Components Control variable 56C 0. 62*Re** (1/2) *Pr** (1/3): G=O. 62 aO::iO. mini:i-1. e32 max=l.e32 mult Y=G* (a1x1*a2x2* *** *arum), ao unused Gothic_s variable Coef. Min. Max # Name location a Value Value CVVal (OJ I cv54C I 1.1 -le+32 I le+32 CVVal (OJ cv55C 1. -le+32 le+32 Following table in the Compare File but not in the Current File. Function Components Control Variable 57C (0 .4/PrJ ** (2/3J' G=O. 54288 aO=-. 667 rnin=-1. e32 max=l .e32 exp Y=G* (aO+alXl) ""a2X2 or G* (alXl) "ao Gothic_s Variable Coef. Min. Max ff Name location a Value Value 1[ CVVal (OJ I cv53C I 1. I -le+32 I le+32 Following table in the Compare File but not in the Current File. Function Components Control Variable SBC (l+(0.4/Pr)**(2/3)]**(1/4): G=l.0 aO=l min=-l.e32 max=l.e32 exp Y=G* (aO+a1Xl) '"'a2X2 or G* (alXl) "ao Gothic_s Variable Coef. Min. Max ff Name location a Value Value CVVal (OJ I cv57C I 1.1 -le+32 I le+32 One cM 0 .25 -le+32 le+32 Following table in the Compare File but not in the current File. Function Components Control Variable 60C (Re/282000) ** (S/B): G= .. 625 a0=0. 000392 min,,,-1. e32 max,,,,1.e32 exp y.,,a* (aO+alXl) '"'a2x2 or G* (alXl) '"'ao Gothic_s Variable Coef. Min. Max # Name location a Value Value 1[ Cvval (0) I cvSlC I 1. I -le+32 I le+32 Following table in the Compare File but not in the current File. Function Components Control Variable 61C [l+ (Re/282000) ** (5/8)] ** (4/5): G"'l. O aO=l min=-l .e32 max=l.e32 exp Y=G* (aO+alXl) "'a2X2 or G* (alXl) "'ao Gothic_s Variable Coef. Min. Max # Name location a Value Value CVVal (OJ I cv60C I 1.1 -le+32 I le+32 One cM 0. 8 -le+32 le+32 July 25, 2017 9:40 AM EDT NAI-2007-004 Revision 0 Page Bl08 ofB156 107 EC 620632, Attachment 2, Page 174 of 254 Clinton Division 1 Diesel Generator Room GOTHIC Uncertainty Evaluation File Comparison: Double entries indicate differences. I Current File: C:\Work\Penley\Clinton\NAl-2007-004_RO\CPS_ 1A_DG_LoV_LOOP-LOCA_Case_1 O.GTH \Compare File: C:\Work\Penley\Clinton\NAl-2007-004_RO\CPS_ 1 A_DG_LoV _LOOP-LOCA_Case_ 1 Oa.GTH Jul/24/2017 20:59:24 GOTHIC Version 8.2(QA) -Oct 2016 Following table in the Compare File but not in the Current File. Function Components Control Variable 62C 0 .62*Re** (1/2) *Pr** (1/3) / [1+ (0 .4/Pr) ** (2/3)] ** (1/4) * [l+ (Re/282000) mult Y=G* (a1Xl*a2X2* **. *anxn). ao unused Gothic_s Variable Coef. # Name location a Cvval (O) I cv59C I 1.1 Cvval (0) cv61C 1. Following table in the Compare File but not in the current File. Function Components Control Variable 59C O. 62*Re** (1/2) *Pr** (1/3) I [l+ (0. 4/Pr) ** (2/3)] ** (1/4) : G=l.O aO::O. m div Y=G* (aO+a2X2) I (alXl) Gothic_s variable Coef. # Name location a Cvval (O) I cvsec I 1.1 Cvval (0) cv56C 1. Following table in the Compare File but not in the Current File. # FUnction Components Control Variable 63C Local Nu: G=l.O a0=0.3 min=-l.e32 max=l.e32 Gothic_s Name Y=G* (aO+a1Xl+a2X2+ ... +anXn) Variable location Coef. Min. Value -le+32 -le+32 Min. Value -le+32 -le+32 Min. Value I I Cvval (0) I cv62C I 1. 1 -le+32 I Following table in the Compare File but not in the current File. Function Components Control Variable 43C DG Intake Heat Transfer+ Delay: G=l.0 a0=-5 min=-l.e32 max::::il.e32 if (a1Xl+a0<0 alXl+aO=O alXl+aO>O) y,,,Ga2X2 Y=Ga3X3 y,,,Ga4X4 Gothic_ s Variable coef. # Name location Etime cM 1. One cM o. One cM o. Cvval (0) cv42C 1. Following table in the Compare File but not in the current File. Data File: 2 File Name: Case_loa_Panel_Temperatures. csv File Type: TIME Parameter Start Time Time Increment End Time Description Value UNUSED UNUSED UNUSED Reference X, Y, Z Min. Value -le+32 -le+32 -le+32 -le+32 Max Value le+32 le+32 Max Value le+32 le+32 Max Value le+32 Max Value le+32 le+32 le+32 le+32 July 25, 2017 9:40 AM EDT NAI-2007-004 Revision 0 Page B109 ofB156 108 EC 620632, Attachment 2, Page 175 of 254 NUMERICAL APPLICATIONS File Comparison: Double entries indicate differences. Clinton Division 1 Diesel Generator Room GOTHIC Uncertainty Evaluation I Current File: C:\Work\Penley\Clinton\NAl-2007-004_RO\CPS_ 1 A_DG_LoV _LOOP-LOCA_Case_ 10.GTH \Compare File: C:\Work\Penley\Clinton\NAl-2007-004_RO\CPS_1A_DG_LoV_LOOP-LOCA_Case_ 1 Oa.GTH Jul/24/2017 20:59:24 GOTHIC Version 8.2(QA) -Oct 2016 Data File: 2 (cont.) File Name: Case_loa_Panel_Temperatures .csv File Type: TIME Parameter Description Value Reference X,Y,Z Volume UNUSED 0,0,0 Item 1 TV14 Item 2 TV15 Item 3 TV16 Item 4 TV17 Item S TV18 Item 6 TV1* Item 7 TV20 July 25, 2017 9:40 AM EDT NAI-2007-004 Revision 0 Page BllO ofB156 109 EC 620632, Attachment 2, Page 176 of 254 File Comparison: Double entries indicate differences. Clinton Division 1 Diesel Generator Room GOTHIC Uncertainty Evaluation I Current File: C:\Work\Penley\Clinton\NAl-2007-004_RO\CPS_ 1 A_DG_LoV _LOOP-LOCA_Case_ 1 Oa.GTH \Compare File: C:\Work\Penley\Clinton\NAl-2007-004_RO\CPS_ 1 A_DG_LoV _LOOP-LOCA_Case_ 1 Ob.GTH Jul/24/2017 20:59 :25 GOTHIC Version 8.2(QA) -Oct 2016 Data Files File Inter-# Name Type palate l I /CPS_lA_DG_LoV_LOOP-LOCA_C***_lOa.cav I TIME I YES )CPS 1A DG LoV LOOP-LOCA C5so 10b.cl!lv 2 Case lU11. Paner Temperatures, Csv TIME YES \Case:=1ob:=Panel= Temperatures, csv Conductor Surface Options -Table 1 Surf Opt # l 2 3 4 5 6 7 B 9 Ind. Heat Transfer Nominal Description Option Value FF Wall Direct Ceiling Side Direct Floor Side Direct DG Warm Temper Sp Temp l. lT DG Hot Temperat Sp Temp l. 2T HTC Sp Conv /6.15 \5.8 Herz Cyl for DG Direct DG Intake Sp Ambie DG Intake HTC Sp Conv Var. 0. 120. 240. 360. 480. 600. 720. 840. 960. 1080. 1200. 1320. 1440. 1560. 1680. 1800. 1920. 2520. 3120. 3720. 4320. 4920. le+06 Function 2T DG Hot Temp Ind. Var.: Time (sec) Dep. Var. : Temperature Dep. Var. Ind. Var. BO. 60. /350. 180. )375. 650. 300. )696 .428571 700. 420. )750. 700. 540. )750. 700. 660. )750. 700. 780. )750. 700. 900. )750. 700. 1020. )750. 700. 1140. )750. 700. 1260. )750. 700. 1380. )750. 700. 1500. )750. 700. 1620. )750. 700. 1740. )750. 700. 1860. )750. 700. 2220. )750. 700. 2820. )750. 700. 3420 *. )750. 700. 4020. )750. 700. 4620. )750. 700. 21600. )750. 700. \750. l. 44 4. 752 Dep. Var. /200. )214.285714 500. )535. 714285 700. )750. 700. )750. 700. )750. 700. )750. 700. )750. 700. )750. 700. )750. 700. )750. 700. )750. 700. )750. 700. )750 *. 700. )750. 700. )750. 700. )750. 700. )750. 700. )750. 700. )750. 700. )750. 700. )750. 700. \750, Cnd/ Sp Nat Cnv Cnd Cnv Cnv Opt Opt HTC Opt DLM-FM VERT SURF DLM-FM FACE DOWN DLM-FM FACE UP DLM-FM HORZ CYL 9 July 25, 2017 9:40 AM EDT Output Detail Files Level I SINGLE I FULL SINGLE FULL For Cnv Opt USER DEF USER DEF USER DEF USER DEF I NAI-2007-004 Revision 0 Page Bll l ofB156 Format Option 110 EC 620632, Attachment 2, Page 177 of 254 NUMERICAL Clinton Division 1 Diesel Generator Room GOTHIC Uncertainty Evaluation File Comparison: Double entries indicate differences. I Current File: C:\Work\Penley\Clinton\NAl-2007-004_RO\CPS_1A_DG_LoV _LOOP-LOCA_Case_1 Oa.GTH \Compare File: C:\Work\Penley\Clinton\NAl-2007-004_RO\CPS_ 1 A_DG_LoV _LOOP-LOCA_Case_ 1 Ob.GTH Jul/24/2017 20:59:25 GOTHIC Version 8.2(QA) -Oct 2016 Function lT DG Warm Temp Ind. Var.: Time (sec) Dep. Var.: Temperature Ind. Var. Dep. Var. Ind. Var. Dep. Var. 0. 80. 60. /151. )153. 6'33720 120. /16'2. 180. 172. )164. 825581 )175. 240. 172. 300. 172. )175. )175. 360. 172. 420. 172. )175. )175. 480. 172. 540. 172. )175. )175. 600. 172. 660. 172. )175. )175. 720. 172. 780. 172. )175. )175. 840. 172. 900. 172. )175. )175. 960. 172. 1020. 172. )175. )175. 1080. 172. 1140. 172. )175. )175. 1200. 172. 1260. 172. )175. )175. 1320. 172. 1380. 172. )175. )175. 1440. 172. 1500. 172. )175. )175. 1560. 172. 1620. 172. )175. )175. 1680. 172. 1740. 172. )175. )175. 1800. 172. 1860. 172. )175. )175. 1920. 172. 2220. 172. )175. )175. 2520. 172. 2820. 172. )175. )175. 3120. 172. 3420. 172. )175. )175. 3720. 172. 4020. 172. )175. )175. 4320. 172. 4620. 172. )175. )175. 4920. 172. 21600. 172. )175. \175. 1000000. 172. \175. July 25, 2017 9:40 AM EDT NAI-2007-004 Revision o* Page Bl 12 ofB156 111 EC 620632, Attachment 2, Page 178 of 254 NUMERICAL APPLICATIONS Clinton Division 1 Diesel Generator Room GOTHIC Uncertainty Evaluation File Comparison: Double entries indicate differences. I Current File: C:\Work\Penley\Clinton\NAl-2007-004_RO\CPS_ 1 A_DG_LoV _LOOP-LOCA_Case_ 1 Oa.GTH \Compare File: C:\Work\Penley\Clinton\NAl-2007-004_RO\CPS_ 1 A_DG_LoV _LOOP-LOCA_Case_ 1 Oc.GTH Jul/24/2017 20:59:26 GOTHIC Version B.2(QA) -Oct 2016 Data Files File Inter-Output Detail # Name Type polate Files Level 1 I /CPS lA DG LoV LOOP-LOCA Caoe 10a. cov I TIME I YES I SINGLE I FULL )CPS -lA -DG-LoV-LOOP-LOCA -Case -lOc. csv 2 Case llJ11. P!lileI Temperatures. Csv TIME YES SINGLE FULL \Casa::::ioc::::Pa.nel::::Temperaturas. csv Conductor Surface Options -Table 1 Surf Heat Cnd/ Sp Nat For Opt Transfer Nominal Cnv Cnd Cnv Cnv Cnv # Description Option Value FF Opt Opt HTC Opt Opt 1 Wall Direct DLM-FM VERT SURF USER DEF 2 Ceiling Side Direct DLM-FM FACE DOWN USER DEF 3 Floor Side Direct DLM-FM FACE UP USER DEF 4 DG Warm Temper Sp Temp 1. lT 5 DG Hot Tempera t Sp Temp 1. 2T 6 HTC Sp Conv /6.15 \6.8 7 Herz Cyl for DG Direct DLM-FM HORZ CYL USER DEF 8 DG Intake Sp Ambie 1. 44 9 9 DG Intake HTC Sp Conv 4. 752 July 25, 2017 AM EDT I NAI-2007-004 Revision 0 PageB113 ofB156 Format Option 112 EC 620632, Attachment 2, Page 179 of 254 NUMERICAL APPLICATIONS File Comparison: Double entries indicate differences. Clinton Division 1 Diesel Generator Room GOTHIC Uncertainty Evaluation I Current File: C:\Work\Penley\Clinton\NAl-2007-004_RO\CPS_ 1 A_DG_LoV _LOOP-LOCA_Case_ 1 Oa.GTH \Compare File: C:\Work\Penley\Clinton\NAl-2007-004_RO\CPS_ 1 A_DG_LoV _LOOP-LOCA_Case_ 1 Od.GTH Jul/24/2017 20:59:27 GOTHIC Version 8.2(QA) -Oct 2016 Data Files File Inter-# Name Type palate 1 I /CPS lA DG LoV LOOP-LOCA Caae 10a.oav I TIME I YES )CPS -lA-DG-LoV-LOOP-LOCA-Case -lOd.csv 2 Case ltJa Paner TemporatUros. Csv TIME YES csv Conductor Surface Options -Table 1 Surf Heat Opt Transfer # Description Option 1 Wall Direct 2 Ceiling Side Direct 3 Floor Side Direct 4 DG Warm Temper Sp Temp 5 DG Hot Temperat Sp Temp 6 HTC Sp Conv 7 Herz cyl for DG Direct B DG Intake Sp Ambie 9 DG Intake HTC Sp Conv Run Options Option Restart Option Start Time (sec) Parallel Processes Preprocessor Multithreading Revaporization Fraction Maximum Mist Density (lbm/ft3) Drop Diam. From Mist (in} Minimum HT Coeff. (B/h-ft2-F) Reference Pressure (psia) Maximum Pressure (psia) Forced Ent. Drop Diam. (in) Vapor Phase Head Correction Kinetic Energy Vapor Phase Liquid Phase Drop Phase Force Equilibrium Drop-Liq. Conversion QA Logging Debug Output Level Debug Starting Time Step Debug Time Step Frequency Restart Dump on CPU Interval (sec) Pressure Initialization Iteration Pressure Initialization Convergenc Solver Command Line Options Cnd/ Nominal Cnv Value FF Opt 1. lT 1. 2T /6.15 \5.6 1. 44 4. 752 Setting /3 \2 NONE 0.0 YES DEFAULT DEFAULT DEFAULT 0. 0 IGNORE DEFAULT DEFAULT INCLUDE IGNORE INCLUDE INCLUDE INCLUDE IGNORE INCLUDE OFF 0 0 1 3600. 1. Oe-6 Sp Nat Cnd Cnv Cnv Opt HTC Opt DLM-FM VERT SURF DLM-FM FACE DOWN DLM-FM FACE UP DLM-FM HORZ CYL 9 July 25, 2017 9:40 AM EDT Output Detail Files Level I SINGLE I FULL SINGLE FULL For Cnv Opt USER DEF USER DEF USER DEF USER DEF I NAI-2007-004 Revision 0 Page B114 ofB156 Format Option 113 EC 620632, Attachment 2, Page 180 of 254 Clinton Division I Diesel Generator Room GOTHIC Uncertainty Evaluation File Comparison: Double entries indicate differences. I Current File: C:\Work\Penley\Clinton\NAl-2007-004_RO\CPS_ 1 A_DG_LoV _LOOP-LOCA_Case_ 1 Oa.GTH \ Compare File: C:\Work\Penley\Clinton\NAl-2007-004_RO\CPS_ 1 A_DG_LoV _LOOP-LOCA_ Case_ 1 Od.GTH Jul/24/2017 20:59:27 GOTHIC Version 8.2(QA) -Oct 2016 Ind. Var. 0. 120. 240. 360. 480. 600. 720. 840. 960. 1080. 1200. 1320. 1440. 1560. 1680. 1800. 1920. 2520. 3120. 3720. 4320. 4920. le+06 Ind. Var. 0. 120. 240. 360. 480. 600. 720. 840. 960. 1080. 1200. 1320. 1440. 1560. 166 . 1920. 2520. 3120. 3720. 4320. 4920. 1000000. Function 2T DG Hot Temp Ind. Var. : Time (sec) Dep. Var. : Temperature Dep. Var. Ind. Var. 80. 60. /350. 180. )"'* 650. 300. )742,857142 700. 420. )BOO. 700, 540. )BOO. 700. 660. )Boo. 700. 780. )BOO. 700. 900. )BOO. 700. 1020. )"'* 700. 1140. )"'* 700, 1260. )BOO. 700. 1380. )'"* 700. 1500. )BOO. 700. 1620. )'"* 700. 1740. )*oo. 700. 1860. )"'* 700. 2220. )'"* 700. 2820. )"'* 700. 3420. )"'* 700. 4020. )'"* 700. 4620. )'"* 700. 21600. )'&deg;'* 700. \BOO. Function lT DG Warm Temp Ind. Var.: Time (sec) Dep. Var. : Temperature Dep. Var. Ind. Var. 80. 60. /162. 180. )164.825581 172. 300. )175. 172. 420. )175. 172. 540. )175. 172. 660. )175. 172. 780. )175. 172. 900. )175. 172. 1020. )175. 172. 1140. )175. 172. 1260. )175. 172. 1380. )175. 172. 1500. )175. 172. 1620. )175. 172. 1740. )175. 172. 1860. )175. 172. 2220. )175. 172. 2820. )175. 172. 3420. )175. 172. 4020. )175. 172. 4620. )175. 172. 21600. )175. 172. \175. Dep. Var. /200. )228.571428 SOD. )571. 42 8571 700. )BOO. 700. )Boo. 700. )Boo. 700. )"'* 700. )BOO. 100. )BOO. 700. )"'* 700. )"'* 700. )BOO. 700. )'"* 700. )'"* 700. )'"* 700. )'"* 700. )'"* 700, )'"* 700. )'"* 700. )"'* 700. )"'* 700, )"'* 700. \800. Dep. Var. /151. )153.633720 172. )175. 172. )175. 172. )175. 172. )175. 172. )175. 172. )175. 172. )175. 172. )175. 172. )175. 172. )175. 172. )175. 172. )175. 172. )175. 172. )175. 172. )175. 172. )175. 172. )175. 172. )175. 172. )175. 172. )175. 172. \175. July 25, 2017 9:40 AM EDT NAI-2007-004 Revision 0 Page BllS ofB156 114 EC 620632, Attachment 2, Page 181 of 254 File Comparison: Double entries indicate differences. Clinton Division 1 Diesel Generator Room GOTHIC Uncertainty Evaluation I Current File: C:\Work\Penley\Clinton\NAl-2007-004_RO\CPS_ 1 A_DG_LoV _LOOP-TRANS_ Case_ 12.GTH \ Compare File: C:\Work\Penley\Clinton\NAl-2007-004_RO\CPS_ 1 A_DG_ LoV _LOOP-TRANS_ Case_ 12a.GTH Jul/24/2017 20:59:29 GOTHIC Version 8.2(QA) -Oct 2016 Volume Initial Conditions Total Vapor Liquid Relative Liquid Liq. Vapor Liquid Vol Pressure Temp. Temp. Humidity Volume Comp. Tracer Tracer (psia) (F) (F) (%) Fract. Set Set Set def 14 .3 78. 78. 90. 0. NONE NONE NONE ls 14. 3 78. 78. 90. 0. NONE NONE NONE 2S 14.30335 78. 78. 90. 0. NONE NONE NONE 3s 14. 31195 110. 110. 90. 0. NONE NONE NONE 4s 14.28805 78. 78. 90. 0. NONE NONE NONE 14. 3 78. 78. 90. 0. NONE NONE NONE 14.28805 78. 78. 90. 0. NONE NONE NONE 14. 3 78. 78. 90. o. NONE NONE NONE 14. 31195 78. 78. 90. 0. NONE NONE NONE 14.28805 78. 78. 90. 0. NONE NONE NONE 10 14. 28805 78. 78. 90. 0. NONE NONE NONE lls 14 .3 /'JG. /'J6. /40. 0. NONE NONE NONE )*** )'** )*** 12 14 .3 ... . .. 40. 0. NONE NONE NONE \'JO. \'JO. \50. 13 14.28805 78. 78. 90. 0. NONE NONE NONE Graphs Graph Curve Number # Title l 2 3 4 5 0 M&.E Imbalance EM EE l Benchmark Heat Rate Comparison cvlC DC4T 2 Benchmark Exhaust! /Inlet Tempe TVlslOS DCST TV12 DC6T 3 Div 1 DG Room Upper SubVolume TVlslOS TVls106 TV1s107 TV1s102 TVlsl03 4 Div l DG Room Doors to Hall TV1s41 TVls42 TV1s43 TV1s44 5 Div 1 to Hallway Pressure PR1s44 PR4sl24 PR12 PR9 PRlO 6 DG Room Temeprature TV1s39 TVlsB TVlsll TVlslOS 7 Fan Room and Outside Air Tempe TV? TV1ls2 TV12 8 Fan Flow Rate LV7L LV6L 9 24hr Benchmark T TVlslOS DCST 10 24hr Benchmark Heat cvlC DC4T 11 DG Room T v Benchmark 1 TVls47 /TVle40 DC7T DCBT \TV1s39 12 DG Room T v Benchmark 2 TVls35 DC9T DClOT TVls37 13 Hallway, 762', & 712' TV4s124 TV9 TVlO 14 Wall Temperature for the Small TA3s2 15 Atmospheric Pressure PRllsl PRlls2 PR1ls3 16 Atmospheric BC Flow Rates FVlO FVll 17 Recirculation Mass Flow FV23 FV24 18 Leakage Flow Rate FV28 FV29 19 Hallway Door Flow Rates FV15 FV14 FV16 FV17 20 Relative Humidity Above the Ai RHlsBS RH1s86 RH1s87 21 Temperature Above the Air Comp TV1s85 TVls86 TVlsB7 22 Divl DG Panel Temperatures TV1s43 TVls40 TVls39 TVlsS TVls37 23 Components of Averages TVlsS TVlsB TVlsll TVls40 TVls43 24 Panel 1PL12JA Temperatures TV1sl4 TVlslS TVls30 TV1s31 I 25 Panel 1PL12JA Temperatures TV1s46 TV1s47 TVls62 TV1s63 )TV14 \TV14 26 Panels 1PL92JA/1PL93JA Tempera TVls12 I I \TVlS \TVJ.6 27 Panel lDGOlJA Temperatures TVls7 TVlsB TVls23 TV1s24 I 28 Panel lDGOlJA Temperatures TVls39 TV1s40 TVlsSS TV1s56 )TVJ.7 29 Panel 1DG06SA Temperatures TVlsS TV1s6 TVls21 TV1s22 )TV17 30 Panel lDGOlKA 12cyl Temperatur TVlsll TV1s27 TVls43 TV1s59 )TVJ.* 31 Panel lDGOlKA 16cyl Temperatur TVls7 TVls23 TVls39 TVlsSS )TVJ.* \TV20 32 Panel Bulk Average Temperature cvlOC cv14C cvlBC 33 Panel Bulk Average Temperature cv22C cv26C cv30C 34 Division 1 Room Door DPs DP14 DP15 DP34 35 Division 1 Room Rollup Door DP DP16 DP17 DP35 DP36 36 Div 1 DG Heat Absorption cv2C July 25, 2017 9:40 AM EDT I NAI-2007-004 Revision 0 Page Bll6 ofB156 115 curve Ops \L2"TV15 {1PL93J /Ll*cvlDC (1PL12 \Ll*cvlDC (1PL12 Ll11cv22C (1DG06 EC 620632, Attachment 2, Page 182 of 254 Clinton Division 1 Diesel Generator Room GOTHIC Uncertainty Evaluation File Comparison: Double entries indicate differences. I Current File: C:\Work\Penley\Clinton\NAl-2007-004_RO\CPS_ 1A_DG_LoV _LOOP-TRANS_Case_ 12.GTH \ Compare File: C:\Work\Penley\Clinton\NAl-2007-004_RO\CPS_ 1 A_DG_LoV _LOOP-TRANS_ Case_ 12a.GTH Jul/24/2017 20:59:29 GOTHIC Version B.2(QA) -Oct 2016 Fluid Boundary Conditions -Table 1 Press. Temp. Flow s BC# Description (psia) FF (F) FF (lbm/s) FF p lP Outside Air 14 .3 /36 I N 2F Outside Air 14. 266 );. )ll 10000 N \l \ll 3P Emergency Suppl 14 .3 72 N 4P Make-up Supply 14 .3 78 N Fluid Boundary Conditions -Table 2 Liq. v. Stm. v. Drop D. Drop Drop BC# Frac. FF Frac. FF (in) FF GSD Frac. lP /H40 NONE 1. 0. )0.024 2F H40 NONE 1. 0. \0.024 3P H25 NONE 1. 0. 4P H25 NONE 1. 0. Volumetric Fan -Table 2 Vol Flow Flow Fan Flow Rate Rate Option (CFM) FF lQ Time 3020. 2Q Time 3020. 3Q Time 77567. 4Q Time 4250. SQ Time 4250. 6Q Time 4250. 7Q Time 4250. SQ Time /1510. \2800. Time DT DT DT Dom Min Max Ratio 0. 001 0 .1 le+ OB 0. 001 /1.5 1. )O.S 0. 001 l.S 1. 0. 001 1. \0.5 Run Options Option Restart Option Start Time (sec) Parallel Processes Preprocessor Multi threading Revaporization Fraction Maximum Mist Density (lbm/ft3) Drop Diam. From Mist (in) Minimum HT Coeff. (B/h-ft2-F) Reference Pressure (psia) Heat Option Time Time Time Time Time Time Time Time End Time 5. 100. 1000. 86400. Heat Heat Rate Rate (Btu/s) FF 0. 0. 0. 0. 0. 0. 0. o. Time Domain Data Print Graph Int Int 1. /60. 10. )k \10. 60. 60. /60. 3600. \3600. Setting /l \2 NONE o. 0 YES DEFAULT DEFAULT DEFAULT 0.0 IGNORE Cpld FF BC# Disch Vol lsB6 lls3 ls70 ls6 lsB ls54 ls56 ln Gas Error Relax T DEFAULT DEFAULT DEFAULT DEFAULT J ON OFF Elev. 0 Trip Trip (ft) N 749. N 10 800. N 749. N 749. Flow Heat Outlet Frac. FF (Btu/s) FF Quality DEFAULT DEFAULT DEFAULT DEFAULT Dump Ph Chng L Flow Int T Scale Shutoff 0. DEFAULT DEFAULT 0. DEFAULT DEFAULT 0. DEFAULT DEFAULT 0. DEFAULT DEFAULT July 25, 2017 9:40 AM EDT FF NAI-2007-004 .Revision 0 PageB117 ofB156 116 EC 620632, Attachment 2, Page 183 of 254 File Comparison: Double entries indicate differences. Clinton Division 1 Diesel Generator Room GOTHIC Uncertainty Evaluation I Current File: C:\Work\Penley\Clinton\NAl-2007-004 RO\CPS 1A DG LoV LOOP-TRANS Case 12.GTH \ Compare File: C:\Work\Penley\Clinton\NAl-2007-004_RO\CPS_ 1A_DG_LoV _LOOP-TRANS_ Case_ 12a.GTH Jul/24/2017 20:59:29 GOTHIC Version 8.2(QA) -Oct 2016 Run Optiom1 (cont.) Option Maximum Pressm:e (psial Forced Ent. Drop Diam. {in) Vapor Phase Head Correction Kinetic Energy Vapor Phase Liquid Phase Drop Phase Force Equilibrium Drop-Liq. Conversion OA Logging Debug Output Level Debug Starting Time Step Debug Time Step Frequency Restart Dump on CPU Interval {sec) Pressure Initialization Iteration Pressure Initialization Convergenc Solver Command Line Options Function 3T Model Gen. Heat Rate Ind. Var.: Time (sec) Dep. Var.: Heat Rate (BTU//sec) Ind. Var. Dep. Var. Ind. Var. 0. 0. 4 .9 s. /0.07 9 .9 )O.OS 10. 0.41 23. 9 24. 39. 9 )'-72 40. 1.81 119 .9 )1->2 120. 5.59 899 .9 900. 1199. 9 1200. 4919. 9 )Uo?=a 4920. 7199. 9 7200. )fi4?:s 14399.9 14400. 21600. 86401. \103.55 Setting INCLUDB IGNORB INCLUDE INCLUDE l.De-6 Dep. Var. /0.07 )O.OS 0.14 )8:&sect;, )0.71 l. 65 )"*** Go.ea )84.21 123.5 \lOJ.55 Control Volume Parameters Vol Vol Elev Ht Hyd. D. # Description (ft3) (ft) (ft) (ft) ls DG Room (Div. 1 82470. 737. 24. 24. 2s DG Room (Div. 2 54300. 737. 24. 24. 3s DG Room (Div. 3 64300. 737. 24. 24. 4s Hallway 143900. 737. 24. 24. s Day Tank Room 1300. 737. 10. 10. 6 Oil Tank Room 14000. 712. 24. 24. 7 Make up Air Sup 10000. 762. 24. 24. 8 Rest of El 737' 247000. 737. 24. 24. 9 Rest of El 762' 480000. 762. 24. 24. 10 712' El 480000. ?12. 24. 24. lls Outside Air le+07 ?37. 74. 20. 12 Fan Room 23?50. ?62. 24. 24. 13 Interposing Int 1000. ?62. 24. 24. )!!.,. \15 \1PL93JA \0.787 \739.917 \l.354 \0.463 L/V IA SA Min Film (ft2) FF (ft) DEFAULT DEFAULT DEFAULT DEFAULT DEFAULT DEFAULT DEFAULT DEFAULT DEFAULT DEFAULT DEFAULT DEFAULT DEFAULT DEFAULT DEFAULT DEFAULT DEFAULT DEFAULT DEFAULT DEFAULT DEFAULT DEFAULT DEFAULT DEFAULT DEFAULT DEFAULT /DBFAULT /DBFAULT )DEFAULT DEFAULT )DEFAULT DEFAULT \DEFAULT \ \DEFAULT July 25, 2017 9:40 AM EDT Min Film FF \ NAI-2007-004 Revision 0 Page B118 ofB156 117 EC 620632, Attachment 2, Page 184 of 254 Clinton Division 1 Diesel Generator Room GOTHIC Uncertainty Evaluation File Comparison: Double entries indicate differences. I Current File: C:\Work\Penley\Clinton\NAl-2007-004_RO\CPS_ 1A_DG_LoV_LOOP-TRANS_Case_12.GTH \Compare File: C:\Work\Penley\Clinton\NAl-2007-004_RO\CPS_ 1 A_DG_LoV _LOOP-TRANS_Case_ 12a.GTH Jul/24/2017 20:59:29 GOTHIC Version 8.2(QA)-Oct2016 Control Volume E'arameters {cont.) Vol Vol Elev Ht Hyd. D. L/V IA SA Min Film Min Film * Description (ftJ) {ft) (ft) (ft) (ft2) FF {ft) FF /=x '"""""'&deg;"' '""'&deg;"""'&deg;' '"""""""' I= '"""&deg;&deg;""" /DBFAOLT /DEFAOLT '""""""" )i!xx )DEFAULT DEFAULT >= )DBFAOLT DEFAULT )t>EFAOLT DBFAOLT >= )DBFAtJLT DEFAULT )xxxxxxx )i!xx >== )DEFAULT DKFAOLT >= )DEFAULT DEFAULT >= )i!xx )DEFAULT DBFAOL'I' )DEFAULT DEFAULT >= \20 \lDGOlltA Heyl \9.868 \739.458 \5.833 \0.883 \DEFAOLT \ \DEFAtJLT \ Control Volume Options Vol S Wava Pool HMT Pool Pool Pres. Pool Op. Bu= Damper MUlt Opt Correction Tracking Opt Drag l* LOCAL ON 2, DEFAULT ON NONE LOCAL ON ,, LOCAL ON DEFAULT LOCAL NONE ON LOCAL 1. DEFAULT ON NONE l. ON 1. NONE '" DEFAULT LOCAL ON 12 l. LOCAL ON 13 l. DEFAULT LOCAL ON ON NONE ON I= /DRFAULT I= I= I= /xxxxxxx I= )i!xx )DEFAULT DEFAULT )xxxxxxx )DRFAOLT DEFAULT >= )i!xx )DEFAULT DEFAULT >= )DEFAULT DEFAULT >= )i!xx )DEFAULT DEFAtJL'l' )xxxxxxx )i!xx )DEFAULT DEFAULT )xxxxxxx \20 \1. \DEFAULT \LOCAL \ON \ \ON \NONE \ON Laminar Leakage Lk Rate .. , Ref Sink Leak Vol Temp Humid Model Rep Subvol (\/hr) (psia) (Fl ,., Option Wall Option (ft2) ,, o. UNIFORM CNST T UNIFORM DEFAULT 13 CNST T I= I= I= /xxxxxxx I= /xxxxxxx /DEFAULT )!!xx >= >= >= )DEFAULT DEFAULT )i!xx >= >= >= )DEFAULT DEFAULT )i!,.. >= >= )DEFAULT DEFAULT >= >= >= )DEFAULT DEFAULT )i!xx >= )>=>ca >= )DEFAULT DEFAULT )xxxxxxx )xxxxxxx )DEFAULT DEFAULT '" \0. \ \ \CNST T \ \UNIFORM \DEFAULT July 25, 2017 9:40 AM EDT NAI-2007-004 Revision 0 Page Bll9 ofB156 118 EC 620632, Attachment 2, Page 185 of 254 Clinton Division 1 Diesel Generator Room GOTHIC Uncertainty Evaluation File Comparison: Double entries indicate differences. I Current File: C:\Work\Penley\Clinton\NAl-2007-004 RO\CPS 1A DG LoV LOOP-TRANS Case 12.GTH \ Compare File: C:\Work\Penley\Clinton\NAl-2007-004_RO\CPS_ 1A_DG_LoV _LOOP-TRANS_ Case_ 12a.GTH Jul/24/2017 20:59:29 GOTHIC Version 8.2(QA) -Oct 2016 Turbulent Leakage Lk Rate Ref Ref Ref Sink Leak Vol Factor Press Temp Humid or Model Rep Subvol Area # (%/hr) (psia) (F) (%) Src Option Wall Option (ft2) fL/D ls 0. CNST T UNIFORM DEFAULT 2s 0. CNST T UNIFORM DEFAULT 3s o. CNST T UNIFORM DEFAULT 4s 0. CNST T UNIFORM DEFAULT s o. CNST T UNIFORM DEFAULT 6 o. CNST T UNIFORM DEFAULT 7 o. CNST T UNIFORM DEFAULT 8 0. CNST T UNIFORM DEFAULT 9 0. CNST T UNIFORM DEFAULT 10 0. CNST T UNIFORM DEFAULT lls o. CNST T UNIFORM DEFAULT 12 0. CNST T UNIFORM DEFAULT 13 o. CNST T UNIFORM DEFAULT /xxxx I= l=x /=x I= /xxxx I= '"""" I= /DEFAULT I= )i!xx )=x >= >= )xxxx )"""" )DEFAULT DEFAULT >= >= >= )xzxx )"""" )DEPA17LT DEFAULT >= >= >= )"""" )xzxx )DEFAU'LT DEFAULT >= >= >= >= )"""" )xxxx )DEFAULT DEFAULT >= )i!.x >= >= >= )"""" )xxxx )DEFAULT DEPA ULT >= )ii.,. >= >= >= )"""" )"""" )DEFAULT DEFAULT >= \20 \0. \ \ \ \ \CNST T \ \UNIFORM \DEFAULT \ Discrete Burn Parameters Min Min Max Burn Flame Burn Un Vol H2 02 H20 Length Speed Rate Burn Burn # Frac Frac Frac (ft) (ft/s) FF Frac Opt ls 0 .07 0. OS 0 .SS DEFAULT DEFAULT DEFAULT FBR 2s 0. 07 0. OS 0 .SS DEFAULT DEFAULT DEFAULT FBR 3s 0. 07 o. OS 0 .SS DEFAULT DEFAULT DEFAULT FBR 4s 0. 07 0 .OS 0 .SS DEFAULT DEFAULT DEFAULT FBR s 0. 07 0. OS 0. 5S DEFAULT DEFAULT DEFAULT FBR 6 0 .07 0. OS 0 .SS DEFAULT DEFAULT DEFAULT FBR 7 0 .07 0. OS 0 .5S DEFAULT DEFAULT DEFAULT FBR 8 0 .07 o. 05 0 .SS DEFAULT DEFAULT DEFAULT FBR 9 0. 07 0.05 0.55 DEFAULT DEFAULT DEFAULT FBR 10 0. 07 0 .05 0.55 DEFAULT DEFAULT DEFAULT FBR lls 0. 07 0. 05 0. SS DEFAULT DEFAULT DEFAULT FBR 12 0. 07 0. 05 0 .SS DEFAULT DEFAULT DEFAULT FBR 13 0. 07 0. 05 0 .SS DEFAULT DEFAULT DEFAULT FBR I= I= I= /DEFAULT /DEFAULT '"""" /DEFAULT )i!xx )DEFAULT DEFAULT )DEFAULT DEFAULT )"""" )DEFAULT DEFAULT )DEFAULT DEFAULT )DEFAULT DEFAULT )DEFAULT DEFAULT )DEFAtJLT DEFAULT )DEFAULT DEFAULT )"""" )DEFAULT DEFAULT )DEFAtJLT DEFAULT )&deg;EFADLT DEFAULT )DEFAtJLT DEFAULT )i!.x )DEFAULT DEFAULT )DEFAULT DEFAULT )"""" )DEFAULT DEFAULT )ii.,. )DEFAULT DEFAULT )DEFAULT DEFAULT )DEFAULT DEFAULT \20 \D.07 \0.05 \0.55 \DEFAULT \DEFAULT \ \DEFAULT \FSR Continuous Burn Parameters Vol Min H2 Min Max Max Burn Vol Flow 02 H20 H20/H2 Frac (lbm/s) Frac Frac Ratio ls 0. 0 .OS a.SS 1000. l. 2s 0. 0 .OS O .SS 1000. l. July 25, 2017 9:40 AM EDT NAI-2007-004 Revision 0 Page Bl20 ofB156 119 EC 620632, Attachment 2, Page 186 of 254 File Comparison: Double entries indicate differences. Clinton Division 1 Diesel Generator Room GOTHIC Uncertainty Evaluation I Current File: C:\Work\Penley\Clinton\NAl-2007-004_RO\CPS_ 1 A_DG_LoV_LOOP-TRANS_ Case_ 12.GTH \ Compare File: C:\Work\Penley\Clinton\NAl-2007-004_RO\CPS_ 1 A_DG_LoV _LOOP-TRANS_Case_ 12a.GTH Jul/24/2017 20:59:29 GOTHIC Version 8.2(QA) -Oct 2016 Ccntinuous B= Parameters (cont.) Vol Min H2 Min Max *= Vol Flow H20/H2 Frac (lbm/s) Ratio o.os 1000. o.os 1000. l. 0.05 1000, 1. o.os l. o.ss 1. o. 1000. o. 0.05 1000. l. 1000. o.os o.ss 1. o. 0.05 1000. 1. 13 0. 0.05 0.55 1000. l. I= I= I= I= >=xx )ixxx.x >=xx )ixxx.x )i!.x )ixxx.x \20 \0. \0.05 \0.55 \1000. \1. Mechanistic Burn Rate Parameters Min Min M= Lam Bum Turb Turb Vol H2 Pa Temp Limit No. (lbm/ft3-s) (F} Opt 1. 350. DEFAULT BOIS 0. 1. 350. 4* DEFAULT Bl>IS 1. DEFAULT BOIS 350, l. DEFAULT BDIS 1. 350. l. DEFAULT 350. EDIS 1. 350. 0. 1. l. 350. /=x /=x /=x /DEFAULT I= I= I== I== )!!xx )DEFAULT DEFAULT >= >= >= )DEFAULT DEFAULT >= >= >= )DEFAULT DEFAULT >= >= >= )DEFAULT DEFAULT >= >= >= )!!xx )DEFAULT DEFAULT >= >= >== )DEFAULT DEFAULT >= >= >= \20 \0. \o. \1. \1. \DEFAULT \JSa. \ \EDIS \ Mechanistic Burn Propagation Parameters Unburned Burned l'lame lg Min lg Min lg MaX Auto lg Vel Thick Temp FF (ft/s) (ft) (F} 0,04 o.ss o.ss 0.164 o.55 DB FAULT DEFAULT 0.04 0.05 o.ss 0.164 July 25, 2017 9:40 AM EDT FF NAI-2007-004 Revision 0 Page B121 ofB156 120 EC 620632, Attachment 2, Page 187 of 254 File Comparison: Double entries indicate differences. Clinton Division 1 Diesel Generator Room GOTHIC Uncertainty Evaluation I Current File: C:\Work\Penley\Clinton\NAl-2007-004 RO\CPS 1A DG LoV LOOP-TRANS Case 12.GTH \ Compare File: C:\Work\Penley\Clinton\NAl-2007-004_RO\CPS_ 1A_DG_LciV _LOOP-TRANS_ Case_ 12a.GTH Jul/24/2017 20:59:29 GOTHIC Version 8.2(QA) -Oct 2016 Mechanistic Burn Propagation Parameters (cont.) Unburned Burned cc Flow Flame Ig Min Ig Min Ig Max Auto Ig Vol H2 Vol Thick H2 Temp (ft/s} (ft) (F) 0.001 DEFAULT 0.04 DEFAULT 0.001 0.04 D.164 10 0.001 DEFAULT 0,04 DSFAULT 0.001 0.04. 0,55 12 0.04 0.164 0,04. 0.05 l3 0.04 0.001 0.164 0.04 a.SS /xx /xx /DEFAULT /xx /xx /DEFAULT /xx )!!xx )xx )xx )DEFAULT DEFAULT )xx )xx )DEFAULT DEFAULT )xx )iixx )xx )xx )DEFAULT DBll'AULT )xx )xx )DEFAULT DEFAULT )xx )xx )xx }DBFAOLT DBFAOLT )xx )xx )DEFAULT DEFAULT )xx )xx )xx )DEFAULT DEFAULT )xx )xx )DEFAULT DEFAULT )xx )i!xx )xx )xx )DB FAULT DEFAULT )xx )xx )DEFAULT DEFAULT )xx )i!xx )xx )xx )DEFAULT DB FAULT )xx ),.,. }DEFAULT DEFAULT )xx \20 \0.04 \ \0.001 \ \DEFAULT \ \0.164 \ \0.04 \O.OS \O.S5 \DEFAULT \ Pipe Parameters Ri:olative Lam Modulua of Vol Rough-Geom 00 ID Elasticity Stiffness * ne:Js Pact (in) (in) (p:d) Factor ,. OBFA " DBFA .. DBFA .. DBFA 5 OBFA 6 DEL"A 7 DEPA ' DEPA ' DEPA 10 DEFA ll* DBFA 12 DEPA 13 DEL"A /xxxx '""""'&deg;""' /DBFA '"""""" I= I= I= )!!xx )DEPA DEPA )xxxxxx )xxxxxx )xxxx= >= )DBFA DEPA )xxxxxx )xxxxxx >= >= )DEPA DEPA )xxxxxx )xxxxxx >= >= )DEPA DEPA )xxxxxx )xxxxxx )xxxx= >= )i!xx )DEPA DEPA )xxxxxx )xxxxxx )xxxx= >= )DEFA DEFA )xxxxxx )xxxxxx >= >= \20 \ \DEFA \ \ \ \ Flow Paths -Tabh 1 Vol Rlev Vol Elev Tilt Description (ft) (ft) (ft} {ft) (deg) {deg} Hatch (El 762 f 0.1 762. 0.1 Hatch (762' Hal 760. 0.1 762. Hatch (762' Hal 760. ?62. Hatch (Bl 737 f Hatch (737'Half Hatch (737'Half Make Up supply 7451. Normal Fan to D ?62. Exhaust from DG lslOS 760. 787. 0.1 July 25, 2017 9:40 AM EDT NAI-2007-004 Revision 0 Page B122 ofB156 121 EC 620632, Attachment 2, Page 188 of 254 m NUMER.ICAL Clinton.Division 1 Diesel Generator NAI-2007-004 APPLICATIONS Room GOTHIC Uncertainty RevisionO ;. n 'J rJ:"'t'-1 ri* r*ri I':,.. *;.e n.rat.rn:l'-1:": tT Evaluation Page Bl23 ofB156 File Comparison: Double entries indicate differences. I Current File: C:\Work\Penley\Clinton\NAl-2007-004_RO\CPS_ 1A_DG_LoV _LOOP-TRANS_Case_ 12.GTH 122 \ Compare File: C:\Work\Penley\Clinton\NAl-2007-004_RO\CPS_ 1 A_DG_LoV _LOOP-TRANS_ Case_ 12a.GTH Jul/24/2017 20:59:29 GOTHIC Version 8.2(QA) -Oct 2016 Flow Paths -'!able 1 (cont.) Vol Elev Vol Elev Tilt Description A (ft) (ft) (ft) (ft) (deg) (deg) 10 Outside Air llsl 737. 0.1 lP 749. 0.1 Outside Air 0.1 12 Divl-Div2 Upper lsJ6 742. 742. 13 Divl-Div2 Lower 737. 1. 2'1 737. 1. 14 DG Rl Door (Low ... 737 * 2.s lsl6 737. DG Rl Dogr (Mid DG Rl Rollup (L . ., 2.s 1s1J 737, 17 DG Rl Rollup (L 4s63 ls29 2.S 1' Dl-03 Roll Up 315127 742. 1. ls41 742. l. Dl-DJ Roll Low 20 Dl-03 Up 3s24 742. l. ls37 742. 1. "' Emergency Fan t 763. 0.1 ls70 750. .. 24 Recirc to Fan R lslOS 2. 12 2. 2S Emergency Suppl 13 774. 0.1 774. 0.1 26 Oil Fan Supply 13 774. 0.1 12 774. BC to Intake 0.1 749, LoV Leakage Pat 13 lls2 0.1 Hallway Leakage 7451. llial 7451. 0.1 Gen Fan Flow Lo /1s7 /738. /l.S 1'6 738. )1s3SI )742. )'** Gen Fan Flow Lo 1*7 738. l.S )lsJSI HU:s )'*' 32 Gen Fan Flow Hi 1s55 '* ls54 '* )11139 )2.5 33 Gen Fan Flow Hi ls55 '* ls56 744.5 '* \1a39 \742. \2.S DG Rl Door (Top 49124 2.1667 la4B DG Rl Rollup (0 1945 742. 2.s " DG Rl Rollup (T 4slB3 s 744.5 2.5 ls61 * 744.5 2.S '"""" '""""""" I= /x /XXXXJllX I= I= /x /lUCXlOO< '"'&deg;"""' I= '""""" Pressur >= >= Pressur )xxxxx >= )!!xx Presaur )xxxxx )xxxxx Preasur )xxxxx >= )!ix. Prossur )xxxxx )xxxxx l2cyl P )i!.x.x )xxxxx )xxxxx P )xxxxx >= \44 \Bzhaust Pipe Le \lslll \T \760.98 \0,01 \llsJ \B \788.01 \0.01 \ \ Flew Paths -Table 2 Flow Flow Hyd. Inertia Friction Relative Dep Diam, Length Length Rough-Bend Flow (ft2) (ft) (ftJ (ft) {deg) Opt Opt le-OS 3 ** NONE 7.1 i. le-OS DEFA 42.651 7.4 20. NONE 7.5 5. 5.5 DBFA 20. o. o. 18 '*' le-OS July 25, 2017 9:40 AM EDT EC 620632, Attachment 2, Page 189 of 254 Clinton Division 1 Diesel Generator Room GOTHIC Uncertainty Evaluation File Comparison: Double entries indicate differences. I Current File: C:\Work\Penley\Clinton\NAl-2007-004_RO\CPS_ 1A_DG_LoV _LOOP-TRANS_Case_ 12.GTH \ Compare File: C:\Work\Penley\Clinton\NAl-2007-004_RO\CPS_ 1 A_DG_ LoV _LOOP-TRANS_ Case_ 12a.GTH Jul/24/2017 20:59:29 GOTHIC Version 8.2(QA) -Oct 2016 Flow Paths -Table 2 (cont.) Flow Flow Hyd. Inertia Friction Relative Lam Dop St rat Path Diam. Length Length Rough-Bend T= Flow (ft2) (ft) (ft) {ft.) !deg) Opt Opt 40. '*' DBFA NONE le-OS NONE 10.7 o. NONE 66.39 51.19 le-05 DBFA NONE ... '* DBFA 24 21.3 '* le-05 o. NONE 3. NONE " NONE 0.073 '* o. le-05 NONE 2. 2. o. NONE 1. le-OB DBFA NONE 31 N&T NONE 32 " 2. le-OB o. NOT NONE 1. G.5 " o. DBFA 20. " o. " 20. 5. s.s 0. 0. DBFA 0. NONE I= I= '"""""""' I= I= /PBFA />= I= I= >== >= )DBFA DBFA ):X >= >= )DEPA DBFA )!!xx >= >= )DBFA DBFA )ixxxxxxx >= >= >"= )!ix. >= >= )DBFA DBFA )!!xx >= >= )DEPA DEPA ):X )!!xx >= >= )DEPA DEPA ):X \44 \10. '" \41. \ \ \DEPA \0. \N&T \NONE Flow Paths -Table 3 Flow Fwd. Critical Exit Drop Homog. Path Lo8' Comp. Flow Loss Breakup Flew Cceff. Cceff. Opt. Model Coeff. Model Ope. 0.1 OFF OFF OFF 0.1 0.1 OFF OFF 0.1 0.1 OFF o. OFF o.l OFF OFF 0.1 OFF 0.1 0.1 OFF OFF 2.78 OFF 1.5 OFF OFF 1.5 OFF OFF OFF OFF OFF OFF OFF OFF 2.76 o. OFF 2.78 OFF 2.76 2.76 OFF OFF 2.?B OFF 2.78 OFF OFF July 25, 2017 9:40 AM EDT NAI-2007-004 Revision 0 Page B124 ofB156 123 EC 620632, Attachment 2, Page 190 of 254 NUMERICAL APPLICATIONS Clinton Division 1 Diesel Generator Room GOTHIC Uncertainty Evaluation File Comparison: Double entries indicate differences. I Current File: C:\Work\Penley\Clinton\NAl-2007-004_RO\CPS_ 1 A_DG_LoV _LOOP-TRANS_Case_ 12.GTH \Compare File: C:\Work\Penley\Clinton\NAl-2007-004_RO\CPS_1A_DG_LoV_LOOP-TRANS_Case_12a.GTH Jul/24/2017 20:59:29 GOTHIC Version 8.2(QA) -Oct 2016 Flow Paths -Table 3 (cont.) Flow Fwd.. critical Exit Drop Homog. Path Loss Comp. Flgw Losa Breakup Flow Coeff. Coeff. Opt. Model Coeff. Model Opt. 27 OFF OFF 2.78 OFF OFF 29 2.78 OFF OFF 30 l. o. n l. 32 l. o. OFF l. o. OFF 2.78 OFF OFF OFF 36 2.78 2.78 OFF OFF 0. OFF OFF '"""' I= '"" '""""""" '"" '""""" I= '""""""" I= ).,. '"" )!!xx '"" '"" )!!xx '= '= '"" '"" )!i.x ).,. '"" '"" '= '"" '= \44 \S.56 \ \5.56' \OFF \OFF \0. \OFF \OFF Flow Paths -Table 4 Forward Prop Flow Min Min Min Min With Path Time Prop Frac Opt 0,06 0.05 0.05 CO FLOW 0.06 0.06 NO CO FLOW o.os 0.5 0,06 NO COFLOlf 0,55 0.06 10 0,55 0.06 O.> NO *0.06 0,55 o.ss 0,06 0,06 0,06 o.ss o.ss 0.5 o.os 21 0.06 0.55 0.06 o.ss 0.06 o.os o.os D.55 CO FLOW 0,06 D.55 0.5 o.ss o.os 0.06 0.06 0.06 CO FLOW o.os 0.06 0.06 0.06 o.os 0.55 o.ss July 25, 2017 9:40 AM EDT NAI-2007-004 Revision 0 Page B125 ofB156 124 EC 620632, Attachment 2, Page 191 of 254 Clinton Division 1 Diesel Generator Room GOTHIC Uncertainty Evaluation File Comparison: Double entries indicate differences. I Current File: C:\Work\Penley\Clinton\NAl-2007-004 RO\CPS 1A DG LoV LOOP-TRANS Case 12.GTH \ Compare File: C:\Work\Penley\Clinton\NAl-2007-004_RO\CPS_ 1A_DG_ LoV _LOOP-TRANS_Case_ 12a.GTH Jul/24/2017 20:59:29 GOTHIC Version 8.2(QA) -Oct 2016 Flow Paths -Table 4 (cont.) Forward RevcrBc Prop FlgW Min Min Mox Min Min Mox With Path Time Prop Frac Frac Frac Frac Flow Opt 0,06 o.os o.ss o.os NO a.as 0.55 0.06 0,05 0.55 COFLOlf " 0.06 0.05 o.ss 0.06 0.05 0.55 o.s NO CO FLOW '"""""' I= I= I= I= I= I= I= I= >= )!!.. >= )!!,. >= >= )!ix,. >= )!ix,. >= )!ixx >= \44 \0.06 \0.05 \0.55 \0.06 \0.05 \0.55 \O.S \NO \COi!' LOW Thermal Conductorir Cond Vol Vol Srf Description Opt Opt Typo {ft2) DG (Wann) (Conv) 1117-5::1 848. DO (Hot) (Conv) 11i?l eo. DG Rl E Wall loE DG Rl S Wall "' llel 936, ,, DG Rl N Wall 1'N 936. ,, DG Rl Ceiling under Fan Room ls97-1 Divl Ceiling-762 2900. Divl Floor 1'F 10 DG Rl W Wall /Jaw /lsS-10 /2376. \JDB \lsW \2350. 10s Wall (Tank Room -DG Rl} 200. 11* Wall {DG R2 -Hallway) 2'N 4s5-36 670. 12* Wall (DG R2 -othar rool!llJ) 2'E 2400. 13* Wall IDG R2 -outside Air) ,,, llsl 6"70. Div2 to 912" "' 15* Div2 to 962" 2'0 2800. Div3 to /\mb. JoS Div3 to 962" 3sC 36"00. 19* Div3 to 912' 33F 3600. Ceiling {El 737ft Hallway) Hallway Floor 10 ,,, Hall {El 737ft* Hallway -outside Air) 4sW 384. Wall (Tank Room -Outside Air) llsl 120. Wall (Fan Room -Other Rooms) Wall (Fan Room -Outside Air) 936. Wall (El 737ft Other Room.s -Outside Air) 10000. Wall (El 762ft Other Rooms -Outside Air} Willl !El 712ft -Outside Air) 10 llsl Fan Room to Aroh. ,, 960. 29 Fan Rm to 962' 12 936. JO Fan Riii to Am.b (ceiling) 12 2 3 1 1521. /xxxx /=x /x=xxx I= I= I= /xxxx )ii!x North Side )!!.xx. )i.x )i.x South Side )!!.xx. )i.x )i.x Side )!!.xx. )i.x )i.x Side )!!.xx. )i.x )i.x )!!!x Side )!!.xx. )ixx )ixx )!!.. North Side )i.x )i.x South Side )i.x )i.x Sid* )i.x )i.x Side )ixx )ixx )!!a Bottom Side )ixx )ixx \'1 \1PL92JA North Sid* \lG \1 \1812 \1 \7 \0.705 July 25, 2017 9:40 AM EDT NAI-2007-004 Revision 0 Page Bl26 ofB156 125 Init. G'P T. (F) ,,, "* ". 79. 79. 78. "* 79. 79. 78. 78. 78. I= )xxxx )xxxx )xxxx )xxxx )xxxx \7B. \X \
===Opened===
EC 620632, Attachment 2, Page 192 of 254 Clinton Division 1 Diesel Generator Room GOTHIC Uncertainty Evaluation File Comparison: Double entries indicate differences. I Current File: C:\Work\Penley\Clinton\NAl-2007-004_RO\CPS_ 1A_DG_LoV_LOOP-TRANS_Case_12.GTH \ Compare File: C:\Work\Penley\Clinton\NAl-2007-004_RO\CPS_ 1 A_DG_LoV _LOOP-TRANS_ Case_ 12a.GTH Jul/24/2017 20:59:29 GOTHIC Version 8.2(QA) -Oct 2016 Thermal Com:l.uctors (cont.) Cond Vol Srf Vol Srf Cond S. A. * Dei!lcription A Opt B Opt Type (ft:2J /xxxx '""""""" I= /xxx I= I= /xxxx I= South Sida )ixx )ixx )k Side )ixx )ixx )k Sida )ixx )ixx )k )!i.x Side )k )k );:.,.,. Bottom Sida )k )k )k North Side )ixx )ixx )k )!!:x South Side )ixx )ixx )k )!i:x EaDt Sida )ixx )ixx )k Side )ixx )ixx )k Side )k )k )k North Side )k )k );:.,.,. South Side )ixx )ixx )k Sida )ixx )ixx )k Sida )ixx )ixx )k Side )k )k )k Bottom Side )k )k )k J.2cyl North Side )k )ixx )k J.2cyl South Side )k )ixx )k 12cyl Bast Side )ixx )ixx )k J.2cyl Wost Side )ixx )ixx )k J.2cyl 'l'op Side )k )k )k 12cyl Bottom Sida )k )k )k J.6cyl North Side )ixx )k )k )!i:x 16cyl South Side )ixx )k )k 16cyl Bast Side )k )k )k 16cyl West Side )ixx )ixx )k )!i.x 16cyl "rep Side )k )k )k )!i.x 16cyl BcttCllll Side )k )k )k Air Piping )!,.,. );:.,. )!.xx Air Piping )!,.,. );:.,. )!.xx Air Piping )!,.,. );:.,. )!.xx \73s \DG Ccmbust. Air Piping \ls7l-8 \8 \ls71-8 \7 \8 \198.6 Thermal Conductors -Radiation Parameters Ccnd Therm. Rad. Emiss. Emiss. Side A Side A Side B Side B Scope No FULL ,. '" lls No FULL No 14s 15* 18' July 25, 2017 9:40 AM EDT NAI-2007-004 Revision 0 Page B127 ofB156 126 Init. .,,, T. {F) I/X * /xxxxxx I= /=xx )xxxx )xxxx >= )xxxx )xxxx )xxxx )xxxx )xxxx )xxxx )xxxx )xxxx )xxxx )xxxx )xxxx )xxxx )xxxx )xxxx )..,.,. )xxxx )xxxx )xxxx )xxxx )xxxx )xxxx )xxxx )xxxx )xxxx )xxxx )i.x.x )!.xx )i.x.x )!.xx )i.x.x )!.xx \78. \I \4 EC 620632, Attachment 2, Page 193 of 254 Clinton Division 1 Diesel Generator Room GOTHIC Uncertainty Evaluation File Comparison: Double entries indicate differences. I Current File: C:\Work\Penley\Clinton\NAl-2007-004 RO\CPS 1A DG LoV LOOP-TRANS Case 12.GTH \ Compare File: C:\Work\Penley\Clinton\NAl-2007-004_RO\CPS_ 1A_DG_ LoV _LOOP-TRANS_ Case_ 12a.GTH Jul/24/2017 20:59:29 GOTHIC Version 8.2(QA) -Oct 2016 Therm.al Conductor.s -Radiation Parameters (cont.) Cond Therm. Rad. Em!as. Therm, Rad. Em.iss * * Side A Side A Side B Side B Scope 23 NO No FULL 24 NO No FOLL 2S No No FULL " NO No FULL 27 NO No FULL 28 No No FULL ., NO No FULL JO NO No FULL /xxxxxxx /xxxxxxx '"'&deg;"""&deg;" /xxxxxxx /XXXXXXX )!i:x )xxxxxxx )xxxxxxx )!!:x )xxxxxxx )xxxxxxx )xxxxxxx )xxxxxxx )xxxxxxx )xxxxxxx )xxxxxxx )xxxxxxx )i!.x )xxxxxxx >= )xxxxxxx >= )xxxxxxx >= )!!xx )xxxxxxx )xxxxxxx )xxxxxxx >= )!ixx )xxxxxxx )xxxxxxx )xxxxxxx >= )xxxxxxx )xxxxxxx )!!xx )xxxxxxx >= )xxxxxxx )xxxxxxx )!!xx )xxxxxxx )xxxxxxx )xxxxxxx )xxxxxxx )!!:x )xxxxxxx )xxxxxxx )!!!x )xxxxxxx )xxxxxxx )xxxxxxx )xxxxxxx )xxxxxxx )xxxxxxx )xxxxxxx )xxxxxxx )xxxxxxx )xxxxxxx )xxxxxxx )xxxxxxx )xxxxxxx )xxxxxxx )xxxxxxx )xxxxxxx )xxxxxxx )xxxxxxx )xxxxxxx )xxxxxxx )xxxxxxx )xxxxxxx )xxxxxxx )xxxxxxx )!!!,. )xxxxxxx )xxxxxxx )xxxxxxx )xxxxxxx )!!xx )xxxxxxx )xxxxxxx )!!:x )xxxxxxx )xxxxxxx )!i:x )xxxxxxx )xxxxxxx )xxxxxxx )xxxxxxx )xxxxxxx )xxxxxxx )!!xx )xxxxxxx )xxxxxxx )!!,.,. )xxxxxxx )xxxxxxx )xxxxxxx )xxxxxxx )xxxxxxx )xxxxxxx )xxxxxxx )xxxxxxx \7Js \No \ \No \ \FULL Thermal Conductors -Ice Parameters Side A Side B Node Cond. Spacing Thick. Thick. (inl Option (in) Porosity {in) Porosity July 25, 2017 9:40 AM EDT NAI-2007-004 Revision 0 Page Bl28 ofB156 127 EC 620632, Attachment 2, Page 194 of 254 (r+JJ Clinton Division 1 Diesel Generator Room GOTHIC Uncertainty Evaluation File Comparison: Double entries indicate differences. I Current File: C:\Work\Penley\Clinton\NAl-2007-004 RO\CPS 1A DG LoV LOOP-TRANS Case 12.GTH \ Compare File: C:\Work\Penley\Clinton\NAl-2007-004_RO\CPS_ 1A_DG_LoV _LOOP-TRANS_Case_ 12a.GTH Jul/24/2017 20:59:29 GOTHIC Version 8.2(QA) -Oct 2016 Thermal Conductors -Ice Parameters (cont,} -------Side A -----------Side B ----Node Area Ice Ice Cond. Spacing FF Thick. Ice Area Thick. Ice Area * (in) Nodes Option (in) Porosity FF (in) Porosity FF 2 NONE NONE " NONE NONE " NONE NONE .. NONE NONE ,, NONE NONE 7' NONE NONE " NONE NONE ,, NONE NONE '" NONE NONE 11' NONE NONE '" NONE NONE 13* NONE NONE '" NONE NONE "' NONE NONE 16* NONE NONE 17* NONE NONE lBs NONE NONE "" NONE NONE 20s NONE NONE 21* NONE NONE 22 NONE NONE 23 NONE NONE 24 NONE NONE 25 NONE NONE 26 NONE NONE 27 NONE NONE 28 NONE NONE " NONE NONE 30 NONE NONE /xxxx I= I= I= /NONE '""'&deg;""""' '""""' /NONE I= /xxxx >= >= )NONE NONE >= }xxxx )NONI! NONE >= }xxxx }xxxxxxx >= >= )NONE NONE >= }xxxx )NONE NONE >= }xxxx )xxxxxxx >= >= )NONE NONE >= )xxxx )NONE NONE >= )xxxx >= >= >= )NONE NONE >= }xxxx )NONE NONE >= }xxxx }xxxxxxx >= >= >= }xxxx )"&deg;"" NO?IE >= }xxxx )i!xx }xxxxxxx >= >= )NONE NONE >= }xxxx >= }xxxx >= >= >= )"ONE NONI! >= }xxxx )RONE NON3 >= }xxxx )i!.x }xxxxxxx >= >= )NONE NONE >= }xxxx >= }xxxx )i!.x }xxxxxxx >= >= )NONE NONE >= }xxxx >= }xxxx }xxxxxxx >= >= )NONE NONE >= }xxxx }NONE NONE >= )xxxx }xxxxxxx >= >= )NONE NONE >= }xxxx )"ONE NONE >= }xxxx }xxxxxxx >= >= )NONE NONE >= }xxxx )NONE NONE >= }xxxx )!ixx )xxxxxxx >= )xxxxxx )NONE NONE >= }xxxx )NONE NONE >= }xxxx )!!.,. )xxxxxxx >= >= )NONE NONE >= }xxxx )NONE NONE >= }xxxx )!ixx }xxxxxxx >= >= )"ONE NONE >= }xxxx )NONE NONE >= }xxxx )!!.,. }xxxxxxx >= >= )NONE NONE }xxxxxxxx }xxxx )NONE NONE >= }xxxx )xxxxxxx >= >= )NONE NONE >= }xxxx )NONE NONE >= }xxxx )!!:x }mxxxx >= >= }NONE NONE }xxxxxxxx }xxxx )NONE NONE >= }xxxx )xxxxxxx >= >= )NONE NONE }xxxxxxxx }xxxx }NONE NONE >= }xxxx }xxxxxxx >= >= )NONE NONE }xxxxxxxx }xxxx )NONE NONE >= }xxxx }xxxxxxx >= >= )NONE NONE >= }xxxx }NONE NONE >= }xxxx )xxxxxxx >= >= )NONE NONE >= )xxxx )HONE NONE )xxxxxxxx )xxxx }xxxxxxx >= >= )NONE NONE >= )xxxx )NONE NONE }xxxxxxxx }xxxx )x=xxx >= >= )NONE NONE >= )xxxx )NONE NONE >= }xxxx }xxxxxxx >= >= )NONE NONE >= )xxxx )NONE NONE )xxxxxxxx )xxxx }xxxxxxx >= }xxxxxx )NONE NONE >= }xxxx )NONE NONE )xxxxxxxx }xxxx }xxxxxxx >= )xxxxxx )NONE NONE >= }xxxx )NONE NONE >= }xxxx }xxxxxxx >= >= )NONE NONE >= )xxxx >= }xxxx )i!:x }xxxxxxx >= )xxxxxx )NONE NONE >= }xxxx )NONE NONE >= }xxxx )xxxxxxx >= >= )NONE NONE >= )xxxx )NONE NONE >= }xxxx \6l!i! \ \ \ \NONE \ \ \NONE \ \ July 25, 2017 9:40 AM EDT NAI-2007-004 Revision 0 Page Bl29 ofB156 128 EC 620632, Attachment 2, Page 195 of 254 File Comparison: Double entries indicate differences. Clinton Division 1 Diesel Generator Room GOTHIC Uncertainty Evaluation I Current File: C:\Work\Penley\Clinton\NAl-2007-004_RO\CPS_ 1 A_DG_LoV _LOOP-TRANS_Case_ 12.GTH \Compare File: C:\Work\Penley\Clinton\NAl-2007-004_RO\CPS_ 1 A_DG_LoV _LOOP-TRANS_Case_ 12a.GTH Jul/24/2017 20:59:29 GOTHIC Version 8.2(QA) -Oct 2016 Thermal Conductors -Ice Parameters (cont.) -------Side A Node Area Ice Cond. Spacing M= FF Thick. Ice * (in) Nodes Opt.ion (in) Porosity /xxxx /xxxxxxx /xxxxx I= /NONE I= )xxxx= )xxxxx >= )NONE NONE >= )xxxxxxx )xxxxx >= )NONE NONE )xxxxxxxx )xxxxxxx )xxxxx )xxxxxx )NONE NONE >= )xxxxxxx )xxxxx >= )NONE NONE >= )xxxxxxx )xx= )xxxxxx )NONX NONE )xxxxxxxx )xxxxxxx )xx= >= )NONE NONE )xxxxxxxx )xxxxxxx )xxxxx >= )NONE NONE )xxxxxxxx )!ixx )xxxxxxx )xxxxx >= )NONE NONE )xxxxxxxx )xxxxxxx )xx= )NONE NONE >= )xxxxxxx )xxxxx >= )NONE NONE )xxxxxxxx )xxxxxxx )=xx )xxxxxx )NONE NONE >= \73s \ \ \ \NONE \ Thermal Conductor Types Type Thick. O.D. Description (in) {in) Ceiling/Floor Internal Hall External Wall 1. DG Hot WALL 6 Internal Block WALL 11.625 I= /xxxxxxx /xxxx /xxxxxxxx /xxxxxxxx >= >= ,, \24" Piping \TtJBE \0.375 \24. Forcing Function Tables ... Description Ind. var. Dep. Var. Constant OG Warm Temp Time (sec) Tcmpc.ratur DG Hot Temp Time (sec) Temperatur Model Gen. Heat Time (sec) Benchmark Heat Time (sec) Benchmark Benchmark Exhau Time (sec) Benchmark Benchmark Inlet Time (sec) Temperatur 7T Benchmark Loe 1 Time (sec) Temperatur Benchmark Loe 2 Time (sec) Temperatur Benchmark Loe 3 Time (sec) Temperatur lOT Benchmark Loe 4 Time (sec) Temperatur /xxxx /xxxxxxx /xxxxxxx \11T \outdoor Air Tem \Time (sec) \Temperatur Pile ff Name 1 I /CPS _lA _DG _LoV _LOOP-TRANS_ Cose _12. csv \2 \Case _12a_ Panel._ Temperatures. csv. 0. -----------Side B Ice Area Thick. FF (in) I= /NONE )xxxx )NONE NONE )xxxx )NONX NONE )xxxx )xxxx )xxxx )NONE NONE )xxxx )NONE NONE )xxxx >= )NONE NONE )xxxx )NONE NONE )xxxx )NONE NONE )xxxx \ \NONE Regions 20 23 20 /xxxxxxx \13 Points 45 15 15 I= \1535 lee Porosity I= >= )xxxxxxxx )xxxxxxxx )=xx= >= >=
: 05000461/2017009-01 AV Failure to Evaluate Replacement Relay Dropout Voltage (Section 1R15)
>=
>= )xxxxxxxx )xxxxxxxx )xxxxxxxx \ Heat (Btu/ft.3-s) o. o. I= \0. ----Area FF /xxxx )xxxx )xxxx )xxxx >= )xxxx )xxxx )xxxx )xxxx )xxxx )xxxx )xxxx \ Heat FF /xxxx )xxxx )xxxx Data Files Inter-Type polate I I I= \TIME \YES July 25, 2017 9:40 AM EDT Output Detail Files Level I SINGLE I =L I= /"&deg;"""""" \S:WGLE \POLL NAI-2007-004 Revision 0 Page Bl30 ofB156 Format Option I(= 129 EC 620632, Attachment 2, Page 196 of 254 File Comparison: Double entries indicate differences. Clinton Division 1 Diesel Generator Room GOTHIC Uncertainty Evaluation I Current File: C:\Work\Penley\Clinton\NAl-2007-004_RO\CPS_ 1 A_DG_LoV _LOOP-TRANS_Case_12.GTH \ Compare File: C:\Work\Penley\Clinton\NAl-2007-004_RO\CPS_ 1 A_DG_LoV _LOOP-TRANS_Case_ 12a.GTH Jul/24/2017 20:59:29 GOTHIC Version 8.2(QA) -Oct 2016 Conductor Surface Options -Table 1 surf Heat Cnd/ Sp Nat For Opt Transfer Nominal Cnv end Cnv Cnv Cnv # Description Option Value FF Opt Opt HTC Opt Opt 1 Wall Direct DLM-FM VERT SURF USER DEF 2 Ceiling Side Direct DLM-FM FACE DOWN USER DEF 3 Floor Side .Direct DLM-FM FACE UP USER DEF 4 DG Warm Temper Sp Temp 1. lT 5 DG Hot Temperat Sp Temp 1. 2T 6 HTC Sp Conv /4.9 I= '""""""" /xxxxxxx I= I= I= I= /xxxxxxx /xxxxxxx for DQ >=== >= >= >= >= )!..,. )!! >= >== )xxxxxxx )xxxxxxx ,, \DG Intake HTC \Sp Conv \4.752 \ \ \ \ \ \ conductor Surface Options -Table 2 Surf Min Max Convection Condensation Rad to Stearn Opt Phase Liq Liq Bulk Temp Bulk Temp Emissivity # Opt Fr act Fract Model FF Model FF Dry Wet 1 VAP Tg-Tf Tb-Tw DEFAULT DEFAULT 2 VAP Tg-Tf Tb-Tw DEFAULT DEFAULT 3 VAP Tg-Tf Tb-Tw DEFAULT DEFAULT 4 5 6 VAP Tg-Tw 0. 0. I= I== I= I= I== I= I== I= /DBFAlTLT /DEFAULT >= >= >= >= }DEFAULT DEFAULT )DEFAULT DEFAULT )!..,. >= >= >= >== >= >== >= )DEFAULT )DEFAULT ,, \VAP \ \ \Tg-Tw \ \ \ \0. \0. Conductor Surface Options -Table 3 Surf Char. Norn Minimum Char. Cond. Opt Length Vel Vel Conv HTC Height Length # (ft) (ft/s) FF (B/h-f2-F) (ft) (ft) 1 DEFAULT DEFAULT DEFAULT 2 DEFAULT DEFAULT DEFAULT 3 DEFAULT DEFAULT DEFAULT 4 DEFAULT DEFAULT 5 DEFAULT DEFAULT 6 DEFAULT DEFAULT DEFAULT I= I= I= I= /DEFAULT I== I== >== >= >= )DEFAULT DEFAULT >== >== )!..,. >= >= >= )DEFAULT >== >== ,, \ \ \ \DEFAULT \DEFAULT \DEFAULT Conductor Surface Options -Table 4 Surf Tot.al Peak Initial BD Post-BO Post-BO Opt Const Heat Time Exp Value Exp Exp Direct CT (Btu) (sec) XT (B/h-f2-F) yt xt FF July 25, 2017 9:40 AM EDT NAI-2007-004 RevisionO PageB131 ofB156 130 L __ EC 620632, Attachment 2, Page 197 of 254 Clinton Division 1 Diesel Generator Room GOTHIC Uncertainty Evaluation File Comparison: Double entries indicate differences. I Current File: C:\Work\Penley\Clinton\NAl-2007-004_RO\CPS_ 1 A_DG_LoV _LOOP-TRANS_ Case_ 12.GTH \ Compare File: C:\Work\Penley\Clinton\NAl-2007-004_RO\CPS_ 1 A_DG_LoV _ LOOP-TRANS_Case_ 12a.GTH Jul/24/2017 20:59:30 GOTHIC Version 8.2(QA) -Oct 2016 Conductor surface Options -Table 4 (cont.) surf Total Peak Initial BP Post-BD Post-BO Ope Cenat Heat Time Exp Value Exp Exp Direct ff CT (Btu) (sec) XT (B/h-f2-F) ye " FF /rxxx I= I= I= I= I= I= /xxxxxxx '= '= >= '= >= )xxxxxx )xxxxxxx )xxxxxxx )!.,.,. )xxxxxx >= >= >= >= >= )xx=xx ,, \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ Control Variables Fune. Initial Coe.ff. Coe.ff. Description Value aO Min Div l DG Heat Load le.,.32 Div 1 DG Heat Abeo:rption -1. -let-32 le+32 Bounding Panel T_bulk_avg o. 1. o. le+32 Bounding Panel T_max Door T_bulk_avg a Operator Act if Door T_max l.l Operator Action if 1. -le+-32 le+32 'c Panel lPL12JA [Vole] 1. -le.,.32 le+32 Panel 1PL12JA [Temv] o. o. le+l2 Panel 1PL12JA [Vole] [Temv] eumprod J.e+l2 lOC Panel 1PL12JA T_bulk_avg div 1. -le*32 le*J2 llC Panel 1PL92JA/1PL93JA [VoleJ 1. -le*32 le*32 Panel 1PL92JA/1PL93JA [TcmvJ o. le+32 Panel lPL92JA/lPL93JA [Vole] [T a ump rod 1. -le+32 let32 l<C Panel lPL92Ja/lPL93JA T_bulk_a div o. -le+32 le+l2 Panel 1DG01JA [Vole] 0. 1. le+32 16C Panel lDGOlJA [Temv] le+32 Panel lDGDlJA [Vole] [Temv] sump rod o. letl2 18C Panel lDGOlJA T_bulk_avg div o. 0. le+32 1'C Panel 1DG06SA [Vole] 1. o. -le+J2 le+32 20C Panel 1DG06SA [Temv] -le ... 32 le+32 Panel 1DG06SA [Vole] (Temv] a ump rod o. -le+32 le*l2 22C Panel 1DG06SA T_bulk_avg div 0. 1. -le+J2 le+32 Panel lDGOlKA l2cyl [Vole] -lc+32 le*32 Panel lDGDlKA 12cyl [Temv] 1. -le*l2 le*32 Panel lDGDlKA 12cyl [Vole] [Tem a ump rod o. 1. o. -le+32 le*32 26C Panel 1DG01KA 12eyl T_bulk_avg div 0. 1. 0. le+32 Panel lDGDlKA 16eyl [Vole] 1. -la*l2 J.e+32 Panel lDGDlXA 16eyl [Temv] 29C Panel lDGDlKll 16cyl [Vole] (Tem aumprcd o. o. -le ... 32 le*32 Panel lDGOlKA 16cyl T_bulk_avg div o. le*32 Rollup Door [Vole] Rollup Door [Temvl -ie ... 32 le.,.32 JJC Rollup Door [Vole) [Temv] a ump rod 1. o. -le+J2 le+32 Rollup Door T_bulk._avg div o. lOTJ2 '5C Personnel Door [Vole] Personnel Door [Temv] 1. le+32 Personnel Door [Vole] (Temv] sump rod o. -le+32 Pl!rsonnel Door T_bulk_a.vg div le+32 Max Door Temperature le.,.32 40C Max Door T_bulk_avg 0. o. -le+l2 le+32 /xxxxxxx I= I= )!!ix )=.i Air Temper11oture Heat Trll.Dsfar Beat Transfer + Dola )!i.x..x Thot )!!ix + Vy**2 ... vz**2) )!!ix \SOC \Local Rho*v*D \mult \0. \1. \0. \-le+32 \le+J:Z July 25, 2017 9:40 AM EDT Upd. Int. Mult. \0. NAI-2007-004 Revision 0 Page B132 ofB156 131 o. o. o. 0. o. o. o. EC 620632, Attachment 2, Page 198 of 254 Clinton Division 1 Diesel Generator Room GOTHIC Uncertainty Evaluation File Comparison: Double entries indicate differences. I Current File: C:\Work\Penley\Clinton\NAl-2007-004_RO\CPS_ 1 A_DG_LoV _LOOP-TRANS_ Case_ 12.GTH \Compare File: C:\Work\Penley\Clinton\NAl-2007-004_RO\CPS_ 1 A_DG_LoV _LOOP-TRANS_Case_ 12a.GTH Jul/24/2017 20:59:30 GOTHIC Version 8.2(QA) -Oct 2016 Control Variables (cont.) CV Fune. Initial Coeff. Coeff, * Description Form Value G ao Min Max '"""" '""'&deg;"""" I= '"""""&deg;"' I= I= I= I= )ixxxxxx )ixxxxxx )ixxxxxx )ixxxxxx )ixxxxxx (1/2) *Pr** (1/3) (2/3)] ** (1/4) )ix.xxxx )ixxxxxx )ixxxxxx ** (5/8) u (5/8)] ** (4/S) )ixxxxxx )ixxxxxx (1/2) *Pr** (1/3) I [l+ (D =;,,xx )ixxxxxx \63C \Local Nu \sum \0. \1. \0.3 \-lo+32 \le+32 Turbulence Parameters 1----Liquid --1 1----Vapor --1 Vol Mclee, Turb. Mix.L. ScT Mix.L PrT ScT Phase Diff. Model (ft) No. (ft} No. Option ls NO NONE o. o. 0. 0. 2s NO o. 0. o. o. NO NONE o. o. 0. VAPOR ,. NO NONE o. o. NONE 0. o. o. 0. VAPOR NO NONE o. 0. NO NONE o. 0. VAPOR NO NONE o. o. 0. 0. NO NONE o. VAPOR NO lls o. o. 12 NO NONE o. 0. VAPOR 13 NO NONE 1. l. 1. 1. VAPOR !== I= I= I= I= I= I= I= )xxxxxx >= )iixxx >= >= >= )xxxxxx >= )xxxxxx )i:xxx >= >= )i!xxx >= >= \20 \NO \NONE \1. \1. \ \l. \l. \VAPOR Cell Blockages -Table 1 Volume ls Blockage No. Description Type l Day Tank Room BLX B l N /x. /x. /x >ni ): >ni ): )ixxxx )!}i ): )ixxxx >ni ): )ixxxx )=li ): 12cy1 >ni \B \1DGD1XA 16cy1 \BLK \B \I \N July 25, 2017 9:40 AM EDT NAI-2007-004 Revision 0 Page B133 ofB156 Upd. Int. Mult. I= \0. 132 EC 620632, Attachment 2, Page 199 of 254 Clinton Division 1 Diesel Generator Room GOTHIC Uncertainty Evaluation File Comparison: Double entries indicate differences. I Current File: C:\Work\Penley\Clinton\NAl-2007-004_RO\CPS_ 1 A_DG_LoV _LOOP-TRANS_ Case_ 12.GTH \ Compare File: C:\Work\Penley\Clinton\NAl-2007-004_RO\CPS_ 1 A_DG_LoV _LOOP-TRANS_ Case_ 12a.GTH Jul/24/2017 20:59:30 GOTHIC Version 8.2(QA) -Oct 2016 Cell Blockages -Table 2 Volume ls Blockage Coordinates & Dimensions (ft) Angle No. Xl Yl Zl X2 Y2 Z2 X3 Y3 Z3 L (Deg) 1 0. o. 0. 10. 10. 10. I= I= I= I= I= I= I= I= I= I= I= >= >= )xxxxxx )= >= )!..xx >= )xxxxxx >= >= )xxxxxx )!.xx. >= >= )xxxxxx >= >= )!..xx >= >= )xxxxxx )xx=x >= >= )xxxxxx >= >= >= >= )xxxxxx >= >= >= \8 \29.479 \11.583 \2.458 \30.479 \14. \8.292 \ \ \ \ \ X-Direction Cell Face Variations Volume ls Cell Blockage Area Hyd. Dia. Loss Drop De-ent. No. No. Porosity FF (ft) Coeff. FF Factor def On 1. 1000000. 0. 0. lsl 1 0. le-06 0. 0. lsS 1 1. 260. 0. 0. lsl 7 1 0. le-06 0. 0. ls21 1 1. 260. 0. 0. ls33 1 0. le-06 0. 0. ls37 1 1. 260. 0. 0. ls49 1 0. le-06 0. 0. ls53 1 1. 260. 0. 0. ls65 1 1. 20. 0. 0. I= '"""" I= I= /xx /JCll:Xll:XXJl:XltXXX )xxxx ) .. )0. .. ... )xxxx ) .. )0. X'O'XXXXXXXXX )xxxx ).,. )O* )xxxx ) .. )O* )!..xx.. )xxxx ) .. )O* )i.....x ) .... ) .. )!Xxxxxxxxzxx )i.....x )xxxx ) .. )0* xxxzxx )i.....x )xxxx ) .. )0. * .... )i.....x )xxxx ) .. )!Xxxxxxxxxxx )i.....x )!xx..... )xxxx ) .. )!xzxxxxxx::xxx \11121 \6 \1. \ \681.822 \0. \ \D. Z-Direction Cell Face Variations Volume ls Cell Blockage Area Hyd. Dia. Loss Drop De-ent. curb Ht No. No. Porosity FF (ft) Coeff. FF Factor (ft) def On 1. 1000000. 0. 0. lsl 0. 1e-06 0. 0. 0. ls2 1. 36. 0. 0. 0. lsS 1. 260. 0. 0. 0. 1s17 o. le-06 0. 0. 0. ls18 1. 36. 0. 0. 0. ls21 1. 260. 0. 0. 0. 1s33 o. le-06 0. 0. o. ls34 1. 36. 0. 0. 0. ls37 1. 260. 0. 0. 0. ls49 0. le-06 0. 0. 0. ls SO 1. 36. 0. 0. 0. ls53 1. 260. 0. 0. 0. July 25, 2017 9:40 AM EDT Curb Height 0. I= \0. NAI-2007-004 Revision 0 Page B134 ofB156 133 EC 620632, Attachment 2, Page 200 of 254 Clinton Division 1 Diesel Generator Room GOTHIC Uncertainty Evaluation File Comparison: Double entries ind.icate differences. I Current File: C:\Work\Penley\Clinton\NAl-2007-004_RO\CPS_ 1 A_DG_LoV _LOOP-TRANS_ Case_ 12.GTH \ Compare File: C:\Work\Penley\Clinton\NAl-2007-004_RO\CPS_ 1 A_DG_LoV _LOOP-TRANS_Case_ 12a.GTH Jul/24/2017 20:59:30 GOTHIC Version 8.2(QA) -Oct 2016 Z-Direction Cell Face Variations (cont.) Volume ls Cell Blockage Aro* Hyd. Dia. Loss Drop De-ent. CW:b Ht No. No. Porosity FF {ft) Coeff. FF l.l'ac:tor (ft) /xxxx I= /xx /xxxxxxxxxxxx )xxxx )xx )0. )xxxx )xx )0. axxxxx )xxxx )xx )0. xxxxxmxxxx )xxxx )xx )O* = )xxxx )xx )O* =xx )xxxx )xx )0. xxxxxxx. )!x.xxxx )ixxxxxxx )xxxx )xx )D, )!x.xxxx )xxxx )xx )!x.xxxx )ixxxxxxx )xxxx )xx )0* :ii::ic )!x.xxxx )xxxx )xx )O* xxxxxxxxxxxx )!.x...x )ixxxxxxx )xxxx )xx )0. xx )!.x...x )xxxx )xx )!.x...x )ixxxxxxx )xxxx )xx )0. """" )ixxxx.xx )xxxx )xx )ixxxxxxx )xxxx )xx )0. )ixxxxxxx )xxxx )xx )0* xxx )ixxxxxxx )xxxx )xx )0. xx )ixxxxxxx )xxxx )xx )!xx.xx. )ixxxxxxx )xxxx )xx \lal9 \8 \1. \ \586.978 \0. \ \0. \0. Volume Variations Volume ls Cell Blockage Volume Hyd. Dia. No. Porosity (ft) 1000000. lslB 1. 1a21 "* ls37 l /xxxx I= )xxxx )xxxx )xxxx )xxxx )xxxx )xxxx )xxxx )xxxx )ixxxxxxx )xxxx )!x.xxxx )ixxxxxxx )xxxx )ixxxxxxx )xxxx )xxxx )ixxxxxxx )xxxx )xxxx )ixxxxxxx )xxxx )xxxx )ixxxxxxx )xxxx \ls27 \7 \1. \15B. 76504 July 25, 2017 9:40 AM EDT NAI-2007-004 Revision 0 Page B135 ofB156 134 EC 620632, Attachment 2, Page 201 of 254 File Comparison: Double entries indicate differences. Clinton Division 1 Diesel Generator Room GOTHIC Uncertainty Evaluation I Current File: C:\Work\Penley\Clinton\NAl-2007-004 RO\CPS 1A DG LoV LOOP-TRANS Case 12.GTH \ Compare File: C:\Work\Penley\Clinton\NAl-2007-004_RO\CPS_ 1A_DG_LoV _LOOP-TRANS_ Case_ 12a.GTH Jul/24/2017 20:59:30 GOTHIC Version 8.2(QA) -Oct 2016 Volume Variations (cont.) Volume ls Cell Blockage Volume Hyd. Dia. Porosity (ft) )"""" )!.xx.xx )"""" \lsl!J \8 \l. \ \571.38501 Conductor Surface Options -Natural Convection Variallles htc * (k/ll * (A + e*cruc*Pr**D) Surf Opt Conv Var c FF ' 0. 0.59 0.25 I"""" I= I= )k >= >= )!.xx >= >= ,, \0. \ \O.S!il \ \0.25 Conductor Surface Options -Forced Convection Variables htc * lk/l) * (A + B*Re**C:*Pr**D) Opt C:onv Var C Nom. FF Nom. 0.8 0,037 0,037 ' 0. D.023 O.B I"""" I= I= )k >= )!.xx >= >= ,, \0. \ \0.023 \ \0.8 Following table in the Compare File but. not in the current File. Thermal Conductor Type Panl!l Steel Bdry. Thick Sub-Region (in) (in) regs. 0.00324 0.00648 0,02592 0.01511 0.0191 0.014.24 0,00648 0.25 I= I= >= >= >= }xxxxx \ \0.25 \ FF Nom, 0,333 I= I= >= >= >= >= \ \0.4 \ o. July 25, 2017 9:40 AM EDT NAI-2007-004 Revision 0 Page B136 ofB156 135 EC 620632, Attachment 2, Page 202 of 254 Clinton Division 1 Diesel Generator Room GOTHIC Uncertainty Evaluation File Comparison: Double entries indicate differences. I Current File: C:\Work\Penley\Clinton\NAl-2007-004_RO\CPS_ 1 A_DG_LoV _LOOP-TRANS_ Case_ 12.GTH \ Compare File: C:\Work\Penley\Clinton\NAl-2007-004_RO\CPS_ 1 A_DG_LoV _LOOP-TRANS_Case_ 12a.GTH Jul/24/2017 20:59:30 GOTHIC Version 8.2(QA) -Oct 2016 Thermal Conductor Type (cont.) 7 Panel Staal Mat. Bdry. Thick Sub* Heat Region * (in) linl regs. Factor 10 I l I 0.12176 I 0.00324 I l I o. Following table in the Compare File but not in the current File. Function llT Outdoor Air Temperature Ind. Var.: Time (sec) Dep. Var.: Temperature (F) Ind. Var. Dep. Var. Ind. Var. Dep. Var. o. 90. 60. 89. 9999191 120. 89. 9996764 180. 89. 9992718 240. 89. 9987054 . 300. 89. 9979772 360. 89.9970873 420. 89. 9960355 480. 89. 994822 540. 89. 9934468 600. 89. 9919099 660. 89. 9902113 720. 89. 9883511 780. 89.9863292 840. 89. 9841458 900. 89. 9818008 960. 89.9792944 1020. 89. 9766266 1080. 89. 9737973 1140. 89. 9708068 1200. 89.9676549 1260. 89. 9643419 1320. 89. 9608677 1380. 89. 9572324 1440. 89.9534361 1500. 89. 9494789 1560. 89.9453608 1620. 89. 9410819 1680. 89. 9366423 1740. 89. 9320421 1800. 89. 9272813 1860. 89. 9223601 1920. 89. 9172786 1980. 89. 9120368 2040. 89. 9066348 2100. 89. 9010728 2160. 89. 8953509 2220. 89. 8894691 2280. 89. 8834276 2340. 89. 8772265 2400. 89. 8708659 2460. 89.8643459 2520. 89. 8576667 2580. 89. 8508284 2640. 89. 8438311 2700. 89. 8366749 2760. 89. 82936 2820. 89. 8218865 2880. 89. 8142546 2940. 89. 8064644 3000. 89. 7985161 3060. 89. 7904097 3120. 89. 7821455 3180. 89. 7737237 3240. 89. 7651443 3300. 89.7564076 3360. 89. 7475137 3420. 89. 7384627 3480. 89. 7292549 3540. 89. 7198905 3600. 89. 7103695 3660. 89. 7006923 3720. 89. 6908588 3780. 89. 6808695 3840. 89. 6707244 3900. 89. 6604238 3960. 89. 6499678 4020. 89. 6393566 4080. 89,.6285904 4140. 89. 6176695 4200. 89. 6065941 4260. 89. 5953643 4320. 89.5839804 4380. 89.5724426 4440. 89. 5607511 4500. 89.5489061 4560. 89.5369079 4620. 89.5247567 4680. 89. 5124527 4740. 89.4999961 4800. 89.4873873 4860. 89.4746264 4920. 89.4617136 4980. 89. 4486493 5040. 89. 4354336 5100. 89. 4220669 5160. 89. 4085493 5220. 89. 3948812 5280. 89. 3810628 5340. 89. 3670943 5400. 89. 352976 5460. 89. 3387083 5520. 89. 3242913 5580. 89.3097253 5640. 89. 2950106 5700. 89.2801476 July 25, 2017 9:40 AM EDT NAI-2007-004 Revision 0 Page B137 ofB156 136 EC 620632, Attachment 2, Page 203 of 254 Clinton Division 1 Diesel Generator Room GOTHIC Uncertainty Evaluation File Comparison: Double entries indicate differences. I Current File: C:\Work\Penley\Clinton\NAl-2007-004_RO\CPS_ 1A_DG_LoV _LOOP-TRANS_Case_ 12.GTH \ Compare File: C:\Work\Penley\Clinton\NAl-2007-004_RO\CPS_ 1 A_DG_LoV _LOOP-TRANS_Case_ 12a.GTH Jul/24/2017 20:59:30 GOTHIC Version 8.2(QA) -Oct 2016 Ind. var. 5760. ssso. 6000, 6240. 6360, 6600. 6720. 6840. 7080. 7440, 7560. 7680. 7800. 7920. 8400. 8760. 8880. 9120. 9240. 9360. 9600. 9120. 9840. 9960. 10080. 10200. 104'1.D. 10560. 10920. 11400. 11520. 11760, 11880, 12000. 12120. 12240, 12360. 12480. Function (cont.) outdoor Air Temperature Ind. Var.: Time (sec:) Dep. Var.: Temperature (F) Dep. Var. Ind. Var. Dep. Var. 89.2036162 89.1069421 89.0050545 88.9342675 BS.7859221 88.7474414 88,6286998 88.5880295 88.5468194 88.5050726 88.4627924 BIL2884018 88.2435034 88.1521693 88.1057407 BB.0113778 87.9634507 87,816731 87.4045962 87.3510139 87.2969861 87.1322704 86.9636947 86.9066649 86.8492233 5820. 6180. 6300. 6660, 6900. 7140. 7500, 7620. 7740. 7860. 7980, 8460. 89.2499774 89.1878687 119.155935 89.1234183 89.05664.57 89.022394.9 88.9875713 88.9162161 88.87961199 88.7667509 88.7279939 88,6084323 88.5674.917 88.5260129 BB.4Bln9 88.3983789 88.3106574 8940. 88.266017 9060. 88.2208614. 9300. 88.1290181 9420. 88.0823375 88.0351556 5660. 87.9874.76 9780. 87.9393024 87.8906384. 87.8414877 10140. 87.7417413 87.6911532 87.5365757 87.48'11252 87.4312189 11100. 87.2151179 11580. 87.1599942 12060. 12180. 12300. 86.8203495 86.7622986 86.5857591 July 25, 2017 9:40 AM EDT NAI-2007-004 Revision 0 Page Bl38 ofB156 137 EC 620632, Attachment 2, Page 204 of 254 Clinton Division 1 Diesel Generator Room GOTHIC Uncertainty Evaluation File Comparison: Double entries indicate differences. I Current File: C:\Work\Penley\Clinton\NAl-2007-004_RO\CPS_ 1 A_DG_LoV _LOOP-TRANS_Case_ 12.GTH \ Compare File: C:\Work\Penley\Clinton\NAl-2007-004_RO\CPS_ 1 A_DG_LoV _LOOP-TRANS_ Case_ 12a.GTH Jul/24/2017 20:59:30 GOTHIC Version 8.2(QA) -Oct 2016 Function (cont.) outdoor Air Temperature Ind. Var.: Time (sec) Dep. Var.: Temperature (Fl Ind. Var. Dep. Var. Ind. Var. Oep. Var. 12840. 86.5559937 12960. 86.4961746 86.4661222 13080. 86.4359751 13140. 86.3753997 13260. 86.34451725 13320. 86.314453 13380. 86.2838419 13440. 86.2531H7 13500, 86.222347 86.1604925 13680. 86.1294318 13800. 86.0670467 13860. 86.0357234 13920. 86.0043137 85.9412378 14100. 85.9095727 14160. 85.8778236. 14220. 85.8459912 14280. 85.8140761 14400. 85.75 14460. 85.7178403 85,6856003 14580. 85.6532806 14640. 85.6208818 14760. 85,55584!15 14880. 85.4905083 14940. 85,4577234 85.3.919283 15120. 85.3589193 15180. 85.3258367 15240. 85.2926814 1.5300, 85,2594539 85.1927847 85.1258343 15600. 85.0922552 84.99111.03 15840. 84.9572615 15900. 84.9233469 15960. 84.!1893671 16020, 84.7185133 16320. 84.664156 16380, 84.6497382 16440. 84.61.52604 16680. 84.4767627 16740. 84.441995 84.4071.712 16860, 17040. 84.2673293 84.1618924 17400. 83,9851595 83.7715262 18120. 83,62823 83.5563361 18300. 83.5203301 83.4482033 83.412084 18600. 83.3397367 18660. 83.3035102 83.2672494 18960. 19020. 19140. 83.0125201 82.9394708 82.9029046 82.8296929 19500. 19560. 151860, 82.S726!H2 July 25, 2017 9:40 AM EDT NAI-2007-004 Revision 0 Page Bl39 ofB156 138 EC 620632, Attachment 2, Page 205 of 254 Clinton Division 1 Diesel Generator Room GOTHIC Uncertainty Evaluation File Comparison: Double entries indicate differences. I Current File: C:\Work\Penley\Clinton\NAl-2007-004_RO\CPS_ 1A_DG_LoV _LOOP-TRANS_Case_ 12.GTH \ Compare File: C:\Work\Penley\Clinton\NAl-2007-004_RO\CPS_ 1 A_DG_LoV _LOOP-TRANS_Case_ 12a.GTH Jul/24/2017 20:59:30 GOTHIC Version 8.2(QA) -Oct 2016 Function (cont.) llT Outdoor Air Temperature Ind. Var.: Time (sec) Dep. Var.: Temperature (Fl Ind. Var. Dep. Var. Ind. Var. 82.5358894 20040. 20100. 82.3146889 20340. 20400. 82.2408238 20460, 20700. 20760. 82,0189126 20820, 81.9448556 81.7966457 21180. 21240. Bl.7225041 21300. 21600. 21660, 22080, 81,2033543 22140, 22200. Bl.1292352 22260. 80.8330977 22800. 80.7591762 80.6653111 23040. 80,6115081 23100. 23160. 110.5377727 23400. 80.3905274 23460. 110.31702116 23580. 23640. 80.24362 23760, 80.1703071 231120. 23940. 24300. 79.8053726 25140. 25200. 79.300038'1 25260. 25320. 253110. 79.1570825 79.011511696 25620. 25680. 25980, 711.8029104 26100. 262110. 711.6626417 26460, 265110. 78.315844 26940. Dep. Var. 82.4990679 B2.42SJ684 82.2777638 82.2038698 82.0559265 81.981!1887 81.9078141 81..7595774 81.6854265 81..5370881. 81.4629119 81.1662916 80.7961302 80.5746316 110.5009321 110.427301111 110.3537671 80.21103127 80.13361182 80.0605292 79.9874799 79.9145457 79.6240718 79.4796699 78.7677645 711.6976295 July 25, 2017 9:40 AM EDT NAI-2007-004 Revision 0 Page B140 ofB156 139 EC 620632, Attachment 2, Page 206 of 254 Clinton Division 1 Diesel Generator Room GOTHIC Uncertainty Evaluation File Comparison: Double entries indicate differences. I Current File: C:\Work\Penley\Clinton\NAl-2007-004_RO\CPS_ 1 A_DG_LoV _LOOP-TRANS_ Case_ 12.GTH \ Compare File: C:\Work\Penley\Clinton\NAl-2007-004_RO\CPS_ 1 A_DG_LoV _LOOP-TRANS_Case_ 12a.GTH Jul/24/2017 20:59:30 GOTHIC Version 8.2(QA) -Oct 2016 Function (cont.) llT outdoor Air Temperature Ind. Var.: Time (aee) Oep. Var.: Temperature (F) Ind. Var. Oap, Var. Ind. Var. Pep. var. 78,2471908 27060. 78.2129568 271110. 78.1446772 27240. 78.1106329 78.0766531 27360. 78.0427385 27420. 78.0088897 27540. 77.9413922 27600. 27660. 77.8741657 27720. 77.8406557 27900. 77.7405461 27960. 77.7073186 77.6741633 77.6080717 77.5751368 77,5094917 28380. 77.4767828 28500. 77.4115955 28560. 28620. 77.3467194 28680. 77.3143997 77.2821597 77.25 28860. 77.2179212 77.18592351 29100, 2!1160. 77.0587622 77.0271817 29280. 76.9956863 29340. 76.9642766 29400. 76.9329533 29460. 29520. 76.8705682 29580. 76.8395075 29640. 76.8085356 76.777653 76.7468603 76.6550275 30000. 76.6246003 30060. 76.594265!:1 30120. 76.5640249 30180, 76.5338778 76.5038254 76.4440063 76.414240!:1 30480. 76.3845723 30660. 30840. 76.2086256 30900, 76.1796505 30960. 76.1507767 31020, 76.122004.7 76.0933351 31320. 75.9796916 31380. 75.9515421 75.9234982 31740. 75.7848821 75.7301937 75,5422712 75.4373712 75.4114335 75.3856117 32760. 75.3088468 75.2834935 32940, 75.2582587 33180. 75.0849686 75.0365493 33600. 74.9648444 33720. 33780. 74.9176625 74.8942593 33960. 34020. 74.8248061 July 25, 2017 9:40 AM EDT NAI-2007-004 Revision 0 Page B141 ofB156 140 EC 620632, Attachment 2, Page 207 of 254 Clinton Division 1 Diesel Generator Room GOTHIC Uncertainty Evaluation File Comparison: Double entries indicate differences. I Current File: C:\Work\Penley\Clinton\NAl-2007-004_RO\CPS_ 1 A_DG_LoV _LOOP-TRANS_Case_ 12.GTH \ Compare File: C:\Work\Penley\Clinton\NAl-2007-004_RO\CPS_ 1 A_DG_ LoV _LOOP-TRANS_Case_ 12a.GTH Jul/24/2017 20:59:30 GOTHIC Version 8.2(QA) -Oct 2016 Function (cont.) outdoor Air Temperature Ind. Var.: Time {sec) Dep. var.: Temperature (F) Ind. Var. Dep. Var. Ind. Var. Dep. Var. 34140. 74.7791386 74.733993 34320. 74.7115982 34440, 74.6672167 74.6452209 74.6233555 34620, 74.6016212 74.5585468 74.516001 34980. 74.47398?1 35040. 74.4531806 35100. 74.4325083 35160. 74.3511694 3541>0. 74.3113135 74.2915912 35700. 35760. 74,214077.9 35820, 74.1950455 35940. 74.1573982 74.1019766 36180. 36240. 74.0657325 36300. 74.0478226 36360. 74.0300545 36420. 74.0124297 73.9776051 73.960407.9 36660. 73.9433543 36720. 73 .9264445 73.909679 73.87651117 7J .844065 37140. 73.8121313 37200. 73.7963838 37260. 37380. 73.7500226 37440. 37560. 37620. 73.6902747 37690. 37740. 73.6612917 37800. 73.6189372 37980. 73.6051188 3S040. 38100. 73 .5779331 38220. 73.5513507 38280. 73.5253736 73.5126127 38460. 38580. 73.4510939 38940. 73.4046357 39000. 73.3714096 39300. 73.3395762 39360. 73.3292756 73.3091412 73.2801095 73.2707451 39900, 73.2435924 73.2348557 40260. 73.1935356 73.l.7064 73.1561689 40620, 40680. 40740, 73.1356541 73.1291341 40860. 41040. 73.1046491 41100. 73.0989272 July 25, 2017 9:40 AM EDT NAI-2007-004 Revision 0 Page B142 ofB156 141 EC 620632, Attachment 2, Page 208 of 254 Clinton Division 1 Diesel Generator Room GOTHIC Uncertainty Evaluation File Comparison: Double entries indicate differences. I Current File: C:\Work\Penley\Clinton\NAl-2007-004_RO\CPS_ 1 A_DG_LoV _LOOP-TRANS_ Case_ 12.GTH \ Compare File: C:\Work\Penley\Clinton\NAl-2007-004_RO\CPS_ 1 A_DG_LoV _LOOP-TRANS_Case_ 12a.GTH Jul/24/2017 20:59:30 GOTHIC Version 8.2(QA) -Oct 2016 Function (cont.) llT outdoor Air Temperature Ind. Var.: Time (sac) Dep. Var.: Temperature (F) Ind. Var. Dep. Var. Ind. Var. Dep. Var. 41160. 73.0933652 41220. 73.0679632 73.0776399 41400. 7J .0727187 73.0679579 73,0633577 41580. 73.05891Sl 73.0546392 41700. 73.0505211 41760. 73.0465639 41620. 73.0427676 41940. 73. 0356581 42000. 73.0323451 42060. 42120. 73.0262027 42180. 73.0233734 73.0207056 42300. 42360. 73.0158542 73.0136708 42480. 73.0116489 42720. 73.005178 73.0039645 42840. 7J.002n21 42900. 73.0020228 42960. 73.0012946 73.0007282 73.0003236 43260. 73.0000809 43320. 73.0003236 43500. 73.0020228 43560. 73.0039645 43680. 4374.0. 73.0065532 43800, 73.0080901 43660. 73.0116489 43980. 44040. 73.0158542 44100. 73.0181992 44160. 73.0207056 44220. 73.0233734. 44280. 73.0262027 73.0.?.91932 73.0323451 44460. 44520. 73. 0391323 44640. 73.0465639 44700. 73.0546392 73.06751579 45000. 73 ,0727187 45060. 73.07763Sl9 45120. 73.0879632 45420. 7J .1105309 45600. 46020. 46440. 46500. 46560. 73.2615373 73.2801095 4.6600. 46860. 73 .2SISl3077 46920. 73.309141.?. 46980, 73.3191305 73.3292756 4.7280. 73.3714096 47400. 73.4160196 47700. 73.4510939 41760. 73.46309.?.l 73.4.8754'13 48060. 73.5253736 July 25, 2017 9:40 AM EDT NAI-2007-004 Revision 0 Page Bl43 ofB156 142 EC 620632, Attachment 2, Page 209 of 254 Clinton Division 1 Diesel Generator Room GOTHIC Uncertainty Evaluation File Comparison: Double entries indicate differences. I Current File: C:\Work\Penley\Clinton\NAl-2007-004 RO\CPS 1A DG LoV LOOP-TRANS Case 12.GTH \ Compare File: C :\Work\Penley\Clinton\NAl-2007-004_RO\CPS_ 1A_DG_LoV _LOOP-TRANS_ Case_ 12a.GTH Jul/24/2017 20:59:30 GOTHIC Version 8.2(QA) -Oct 2016 Ind. Var. 48360. 46600. 48720. 48840. 48960. 49080. 49560. 49800. 49no. 50280, 50400. 50520. 50640. 50760. 51240. 51360. 51480. 51600. 51720. 51840. 51960. 52080. 52200. 52320. 52440. 52560. 52680, 52920. 53160. 53400. 535:?.0. 54000. 54120, 54480, 54960. 55200. Function (cont.) llT Outdoor Air Temperature Ind. Var.: Time {aec) Pep. Var.: Temperature (F) Dep. Var. Ind. Var. 73.55114507 73.6189372 73.647024 73.6757087 73.7049894 n.1Gsnn 49140. 73.7963838 49260. 73.8280251 73.8930579' 49620. 73.9264445 73.9949455 49SIBO. 74.1387841 50460, 74.1761521 74.2140779 74.2525586 50820. 74.4119705 51300. 74.4949274 74.5372076 51660. 74.6233555 51900. 74. 7115982 52140. 74.7564966 52260, 74.8019086 52500. 74.9886222 52860. 75.183269 53580. 75.3343179 53700. 75.3856117 53820. 53940. 75.5954038 54300. 75.6489861 5442 . 75. 7574832 75.8677296 76.0363053 55260. Dep. Var. 73.5779331 73.6051188 73.6329057 73.6612917 73.6902747 73.7500226 73.780783 73.8121313 73.84.4065 73.8765817 73.909619 73.9776051 74.0124287 74,0478226 74.0837839 74.1203101 74.1950455 74.2332491 74.2720061 74.3113135 74.3511684 74.3915677 74.4739871 74.516001 74.6016212 74.6452209 74.6893426 74.733983 74.7791386 74.8248061 74.8709819 74.9176625 75.012524 75.0606976 75.1585123 75.2081459 *15.2582587 75.4634243 75.5158748 75.5687811 75.622139 75.6759446 75.7301937 75.7848821 75.9515421 76.0647685 July 25, 2017 9:40 AM EDT NAI-2007-004 Revision 0 Page B144 ofB156 143 EC 620632, Attachment 2, Page 210 of 254 Clinton Division I Diesel Generator Room GOTHIC Uncertainty Evaluation File Comparison: Double entries indicate differences. I Current File: C:\Work\Penley\Clinton\NAl-2007-004_RO\CPS_ 1A_DG_LoV_LOOP-TRANS_Case_12.GTH \ Compare File: C:\Work\Penley\Clinton\NAl-2007-004_RO\CPS_ 1 A_DG_LoV _LOOP-TRANS_Case_ 12a.GTH Jul/24/2017 20:59:30 GOTHIC Version 8.2(QA) -Oct 2016 Function {cent.) outdoor Air Temperature Ind. Var.: Time (see) Dep. Var.: Temperature (Fl Ind. Var. Dep. Var. Ind. 55440. 76.1507767 76.2086256 76,2668775 55800. 76.3255279 76.3845723 56040. 76.4440063 56160. 76.5038254 56260. 76.5640249 76.6246003 76.685547 56640. 76.746B603 56760. 76.8705682 57000. 76.9329533 76.9956863 57360. 57480. 77.1859239 77.25 77.3791.182 57960. 7'1.5094917 58200. 58320. 77.6410808 77.7073186 58560. 77.8406557 58800. 77.9077448 59160. 78.1106329 78.315844 59640. 78.3847396 78.5:232373 78.8029104 60480. 78.9440007 ?'il.0148405 60960. 79.228<1738 79.3000381 79.37177 61440. 61800. 61920. 79.7327506 79.8781235 62280. Var. Dep. Var. 55380. 76.1220047 76.1796505 76.2377014 76.25161531. 76.3550011 55980. 76.4142409 76.473868 56220. 56340. 76.5942659 56580. 76.7161581 56700. 56820. 76.8395075 76.901717 57060. 76.9642766 57180. 57300, 77.1540088 77.2179212 57660. 77.2821597 57780, 77.4115955 58020, 77.4767828 77.5422766 77.6080717 77.674.1633 58620. 77.8741657 58860. 77.9413922 59100. 59220. 78.2129568 59460, 59580. 59700. 78.4192767 78.7677645 78.8381076 60540. 78.9086535 78.9793966 79.0503317 60900. 61.020. 61140. 79.2642347 79.3358834 61500. 61740. 61860, 79.6964898 79.7690451 62340. July 25, 2017 9:40 AM EDT NAI-2007-004 Revision 0 Page Bl45 ofB156 144 EC 620632, Attachment 2, Page 211 of 254 Clinton Division 1 Diesel Generator Room GOTHIC Uncertainty Evaluation File Comparison: Double entries indicate differences. I Current File: C:\Work\Penley\Clinton\NAl-2007-004_RO\CPS_ 1 A_DG_LoV _LOOP-TRANS_ Case_ 12.GTH \ Compare File: C:\Work\Penley\Clinton\NAl-2007-004_RO\CPS_ 1 A_DG_LoV _LOOP-TRANS_ Case_ 12a.GTH Jul/24/2017 20:59:30 GOTHIC Version 8.2(QA) -Oct 2016 Ind. Var. 62400. 62640. 62880, 63240. 63Jt;i0. 63720. 64080, 64560. 64680. 64.920. 65400. 65760. 65880. 66240. 66480. 66840. 67680. 67800. 68040. 68160. 68760. Function (cont.) llT Outdoor Air Temperature Ind. Var.: Time (sec) Dep. Var. : Temperature (F) Dep. Var. Ind. Var. Dep. Var. 80.0239905 62460. 80.0605292 80,0970954 62580, 80.1336882 80.1703071 80.24362 62820. 80.2803127 80.4273088 B0.5377727 63300. 80.5746316 80.6115081 80.6484015 63540. 80.7222362 80.7591762 80.8330977 63780. 64020. 81..0lBlJ.lJ 81,0551444 64140. Bl.. 0.921859 81,1292352 64260. 81.1662916 81.2404.226 Bl.3145735 81.3516546 64620. 81.3887384 81.4258244 64740. 81.4629119 81.8707648 Ei54.60. 81..90781.41 81.9448556 65820. 82.1299222 82.16'.69023 6594.0. 82.2038698 82.3884.919 66300. 82.4253684 82,4622273 66420. 82.4990679 82.5358894 66540. 82.5726912 82,6094726 82.6462329 82.6829714 66780. 82.71.96873 82.756)8 66900. 82.9029046 67140. 67260. 83.1946274 83.2672494 67740. 83,3397367 67860. 83.3759282 83.5563361 68220. 83.62823 68340. 83.6641166 83.7715262 68580. 83.9141304 83.9496683 83.9851595 6894.0, 84.0206034 69060. 84.09134.65 69420. July 25, 2017 9:40 AM EDT NAI-2007-004 Revision 0 Page B146 ofB156 145 EC 620632, Attachment 2, Page 212 of 254 Clinton Division 1 Diesel Generator Room GOTHIC Uncertainty Evaluation File Comparison: Double entries indicate differences. I Current File: C:\Work\Penley\Clinton\NAl-2007-004_RO\CPS_ 1A_DG_LoV _LOOP-TRANS_Case_12.GTH \ Compare File: C:\Work\Penley\Clinton\NAl-2007-004_RO\CPS_ 1 A_DG_LoV _LOOP-TRANS_Case_ 12a.GTH Jul/24/2017 20:59:30 GOTHIC Version 8.2(QA) -Oct 2016 Ind. Var. 69480. 69600. 69840. 69960. 70320. 70440. 70560. 70680. 71040. 71160. 71280. 71640. 71760. 71880. 72120. 72360. 72480. 72720. 72960. 73200. 73320. 73440. 73680. 73800. 74160. 74640. 7476 .
75000. 75120. 75240. 7548 . 75840. 75960. 76080. 76440. Function (c:ont.J llT outdoor Air Temperature Ind. Var.: Time {sec) Dep, Var.: Temperature (F) Dep. Var. Ind. Var. 84,3373583 69540. 84.4071712 69660. 84.4767627 84.5461276 69900. 84.6152604 84.684156 84.7528092 70260. 84.8212146 70380. 84.8893671 84.9572615 70620. 85.0248926 70740. 85.0922552 70860. 85.1593443 70980. BS.2261548 71100. 85.2!126814 71220. 85.3589193 71340. 85.4248632 85.4905083 85.5558495 71700. 85.6208918 71820. 85.6856003 71940. 85.75 72060. 85.8140761 72180. 85.8778236 BS.9412378 72420. 86.0043137 72540. 86.0670467 72660. 86.1294318 72780. 86.1914644 86.2531397 86.3753997 73260. 86.435!1751 73380. 86.4961746 73500. 86.5559937 86.6154277 73740. 86.6744722 73860. 86.7331225 7410 . 86.9066649 86.9636947 87.0765018 87.1322704 74820. 87.1876101 74940. 87.2969861 75180. 87.3510139 75300. 75420. 87.4577288 75540. 87.5104076 75660. 87.5626288 87.6143883 87.6656821 76020. 87. 7165065 76380. 87.8661236 76500. Dap. Var. 84.3722921 84.441995 84.5114738 84.6497382 84.7185133 84.9233469 85.0586078 85.1258343 85.2594539 85.3919283 85.4577234 85.5884045 85.6532806 85.7178403 85.8459912 85.9095727 85.9728183 86.0357234 86.098283 86.1604925 86.222347 86.2838419 86.344972.5 86.4661222 86.526132 86.6449989 86.7038469 96.7622986 87.1599942 87.2151179 87.3240554 87.377,861 87.5365757 87.5885665 87.6911532 87.7417413 87.7918541 July 25, 2017 9:40 AM EDT NAI-2007-004 Revision 0 Page B147 ofB156 146 EC 620632, Attachment 2, Page 213 of 254 Clinton Division 1 Diesel Generator Room GOTHIC Uncertainty Evaluation File Comparison: Double entries indicate differences. I Current File: C:\Work\Penley\Clinton\NAl-2007-004_RO\CPS_ 1 A_DG_LoV _LOOP-TRANS_ Case_ 12.GTH \ Compare File: C:\Work\Penley\Clinton\NAl-2007-004_RO\CPS_ 1 A_DG_LoV _LOOP-TRANS_ Case_ 12a.GTH Jul/24/2017 20:59:30 GOTHIC Version 8.2(QA) -Oct 2016 Function (cont.) outdoor Air Temperature Ind. Var.; Tit11e (sec) Pep. Var.: Temperature (F} Incl. Var. Pep. Var. Ind. Var. Pep. Var. 76560. 87.9150314 76620. 87.9393024 76680. 87.9634507 8B.Dll377B 765120. BB.058809 88.1057407 77100. 88.1290181 77160. 88.1980914 77340. 88.2208614 77400. 88.2435034 77460. 88.266017 77520. 88.3106574 88,3327833 77700. 88.3547791 77760. 77880, 78120. 88.5050726 78240. 88.5468194 78300. 88.5674917 78360. BB.5980295 784.20. 88.6084323 BB.6286998 78540. 88.6488316 78600. BS.6688273 78660. 88.6886865 78720. 88.7084088 78780. 88.7279939 78840. 88.7474414 88.7667509 78960. 79080. 88.8238479 H140. 79200. 88,8612159 79260. 88.8796899 88.9162161 79560. 88.9875713 79680. 7!1920. 89.0735555 79980. 89.1069421 80100. 89.1234183 80160. 89.1397494 89.155935 89.1719749 80340. 89.1878687 89.2036162 80460. 80520, 89.2346708 80580. 89.2499774 80640. 89.2651364 80700. 89.2801476 80880. 89.3242913 80940. 89.33870!13 81000. 89.352976 81060. 89.3670943 89.4220669 81360, 89,4354336 81420. 89.4486493 81720. 89.5124527 89.5247567 81840. 89.5369079 81900. 89.54.89061 89.5953643 89.6176695 89.6285904 89.6393566 89.6499678 82680. 89.6908588 89.7006923 89.7292549 83160, 89.7651443 83220. 89.8142546 July 25, 2017 9:40 AM EDT NAI-2007-004 Revision 0 Page B148 ofB156 147 EC 620632, Attachment 2, Page 214 of 254 Clinton Division 1 Diesel Generator Room GOTHIC Uncertainty Evaluation File Comparison: Double entries indicate differences. I Current File: C:\Work\Penley\Clinton\NAl-2007-004_RO\CPS_ 1A_DG_LoV_LOOP-TRANS_Case_ 12.GTH \ Compare File: C:\Work\Penley\Clinton\NAl-2007-004_RO\CPS_ 1 A_DG_LoV _LOOP-TRANS_ Case_ 12a.GTH Jul/24/2017 20:59:30 GOTHIC Version 8.2(QA) -Oct 2016 Function (c:ont.) 11T outdoor Air Temperature Ind. Var.: Time {sec:) Dep. Var.: Temperature (F) Ind. Var. Dep. Var. Ind.. Var. Dep. Var. 83640. 89.82936 89.836670 89,843B3ll 89.8576667 84000. 89.8708659 84060. 89.8772265 84120. 89.8834276 0.8894691 84240. 89,8953509 89.9010728 84360. 89.9066348 89.9120368 84480. 89.9172786 84540. 89.9223601 89.92728l3 84660. 89.9320421 84720. 89.9366423 84780. 89.9410819 84840. 89.9453608 89.9494789 89.9534361 85020. 89.9608677 85200. 89.9676549 89.51708068 85320. 89.97375173 85380. 89.9766266 89.9792944 85500. 85560. 89.9841.458 85620. 851.51863292 89.9883511 851.51902113 89.99U099 85860. 85920. 85980. 851.9960355 89.9970873 851.51979772 86160. 89.9387054 89.95192718 89.9996764 86340. 86400, 89.51999191 89.9996764 86580. 86640. 89.9987054 86700. 89.51979772 86760, 89.9970873 89.9960355 89.994822 865140. 87000. 89.9919099 89.9902113 87120. 89.9883511 89.9863292 89.984].458 87480. 89.9737973 87540. 89.9708068 87600, 89.9676549 87660. 89.9643419 89.9608677 89.9534361 87960. 89.9453608 88020. 88080. 89.9366423 89.8894691 88740, 89,8708659 88920. 89.8576667 88980. 89.8508284 851100. 89.8218865 89280. 89.81.42546 89340. 89.8064644 89.7985161 89460. 89.7821455 89.765144.3 89700. 89760. 89820. 851.7384627 89.7292549 89.7103695 89.7006923 90120. 89.6908588 !:10180. 8!il.68086!il5 90300. 89.6604238 89.6499678 90420. 89.6285904 90510. 89.6176695 90600. 89.6065941 90660. 89.5953643 July 25, 2017 9:40 AM EDT NAI-2007-004 Revision 0 Page B149 ofB156 148 EC 620632, Attachment 2, Page 215 of 254 Clinton Division 1 Diesel Generator Room GOTHIC Uncertainty Evaluation File Comparison: Double entries indicate differences. I Current File: C:\Work\Penley\Clinton\NAl-2007-004 RO\CPS 1A DG LoV LOOP-TRANS Case 12.GTH \ Compare File: C:\Work\Penley\Clinton\NAl-2007-oo""4_RO\CPS_ 1A_DG_LoV _LOOP-TRANS_ Case_ 12a.GTH Jul/24/2017 20:59:30 GOTHIC Version 8.2(QA) -Oct 2016 Function (cont.) outdoor Air Temperature Ind. Var.' Time (aec) Dep. Var. : Temperature (F) Ind. Var. Dep. Var. Ind. Var. Dep. V3.r. 90720. 89.5839804 90780. 89.5724426 89.5607511 89.5489061 90960. BSl.53690751 89.5247567 91200. 89.4873873 91260. 89.4746264 89.4220669 91560. 89.4085493 91620. 89,3948812 91680. 89.3810626 91740, 89.3670943 .91800. 89.352976 89.3387083 91!120. 92040, 89,2950106 Following table in the Compare File but not in the current File. Function Components Control Variable 41C Outdoor Air Temperature: G=l.O aO::O. min::::i-l.e32 max=l.e32 tfunc Y=G*interp (alXl, tableX2) Gothic_s Variable Coef. Min. Max # Name location a Value Value Etime I cM I 1.1 -le+32 I le+32 Table DCllT 1. -le+32 le+32 Following table in the Compare File but not in the current File. Function Components Control Variable 42C DG Intake Heat Transfer: G=l.O a0=0, min=-l.e32 max=l.e32 sum Y=G* (aO+alXl+a2X2+ ... +anXn) Gothic_s variable Coef. Min. Max # Name location a Value Value 11 cond_grp_heat (l) I cC70sl I 1. I -le+32 I le+32 Following table in the Compare File but not in the Current File. Thermal Conductor Type 2411 Piping Mat. Bdry. Thick Sub-Heat Region (in) (in) regs. Factor 0. 0. 00324 0. 0.00324 0.00648 0. 0. 00972 0. 01296 0. 0. 02268 0. 02592 0. 0.0486 0. 05184 0. 0 .10044 0. 06864 o. 0 .16908 0.06864 o. 0.23772 0. 04434 0. 0. 28206 0. 04434 0. 10 0. 3264 0. 02592 o. July 25, 2017 9:40 AM EDT NAl-2007-004 Revision 0 Page Bl50 ofB156 149 EC 620632, Attachment 2, Page 216 of 254 Clinton Division 1 Diesel Generator Room GOTHIC Uncertainty Evaluation File Comparison: Double entries indicate differences. I Current File: C:\Work\Penley\Clinton\NAl-2007-004_RO\CPS_1A_DG_LoV_LOOP-TRANS_Case_12.GTH \Compare File: C:\Work\Penley\Clinton\NAl-2007-004_RO\CPS_ 1 A_DG_LoV _LOOP-TRANS_Case_ 12a.GTH Jul/24/2017 20:59:30 GOTHIC Version 8.2(QA) -Oct 2016 Region 11 12 13 Thermal Conductor Type (cont.) Mat. 24" Piping Bdry. (in) 0.35232 0.36528 0.37176 Thick {in) 0.01296 0.00648 0.00324 Sub-Heat regs. Factor o. o. 0. Following table in the Compare File but not in the current File. Thermal Conductor Type 8 3611 Piping Mat. Bdry. Thick Sub-Heat Region # (in) (in) regs. Factor 1 1 0. 0. 00324 1 0. 2 1 0.00324 0.00648 1 0. 3 1 0. 00972 0. 01296 1 0. 4 1 0.02268 0. 02592 1 0. 5 1 0. 0486 0. 05184 1 o. 6 1 0 .10044 0. 06864 1 0. 7 1 0 .16908 0.06864 1 0. 8 1 0.23772 0. 04434 1 0. 9 1 0.28206 0. 04434 1 o. 10 1 0. 3264 0. 02592 1 0. 11 1 0. 35232 0. 01296 1 0. 12 1 0. 36528 0. 00648 1 0. 13 1 0.37176 0. 00324 1 o. Following table in the Compare File but not in the current File. Function Components Control Variable 44C DG Intake That: G=l.O aO=O. min=-l.e32 max=l.e32 sum Y=G* {aO+a1Xl+a2X2+ *** +anXn) Gothic_s Variable Coef. # Name location a Cvval (0) I cv41C I 0.21783386 1.1 Cvval (0) CV43C Following table in the Compare File but not in the current File. # Function Components Control Variable soc Local Rho*V*D: G=l.O aO=O. min=-l.e32 max=l.e32 mult Y;;::;G* (a1Xl.*a2X2* ... *anXn}, ao unused Gothic_ s Variable Coef. Name location a Rm cV@ Cvval (0) cv49C Dhyd cV@ 1. 1. 1. Min. Max Value Value -1e+32 I le+32 -1e+32 le+32 Min. Max Value Value -le+32 le+32 -1e+32 le+32 -1e+32 le+32 July 25, 2017 9:40 AM EDT NAI-2007-004 Revision 0 Page BISI ofB156 150 EC 620632, Attachment 2, Page 217 of 254 Clinton Division 1 Diesel Generator Room GOTHIC Uncertainty Evaluation File Comparison: Double entries indicate differences. I Current File: C:\Work\Penley\Clinton\NAl-2007-004 RO\CPS 1A DG LoV LOOP-TRANS Case 12.GTH \ Compare File: C:\Work\Penley\Clinton\NAl-2007-004_RO\CPS_ 1A_DG_LoV _LOOP-TRANS_Case_ 12a.GTH Jul/24/2017 20:59:30 GOTHIC Version 8.2(QA) -Oct 2016 Following table in the Compare File but not in the current File, Function Components Control Variable 45C Local Vx**2: G=l. 0 aO=O. min=-1. e32 max=l. e32 mult Y=G* (a1Xl*a2X2* *.. *anXn), ao unused Gothic_s Variable Coef. # Name location a Uccxv I cV I 1.1 Uccxv cV 1. Following table in the compare File but not in the current File. Function components Control Variable 46C Local Vy** 2 : G=l.O aO=O. minc-l.e32 max=l.e32 mult Y=G* (a1Xl*a2X2* ... *anXn), ao unused Gothic_s Variable Coef. # Name location a Uccyv I cV I 1.1 Uccyv cV 1. Following table in the Compare File but not in the current File. Function Components Control variable 4 7C Local Vz**2: G=-1.0 aO:::O. min=-1. e32 max=l. e32 mult (a1Xl*a2X2* ... *anXn) , ao unused Gothic_s Variable Coef. # Name location a Ucczv I cV I 1.1 Ucczv cV 1. Following table in the Compare File but not in the current File, Function Components Control Variable 4 BC Local (Vx**2 + Vy**2 + Vz**2): G=l.O aO=O. min:::-l.e32 max=l.e32 Y=G* (aO+alX1+a2X2+ ... +anXn) Got:hic_s Variable Coef. Name location Cvval(O) cv45C 1. Cvval (0) cv46C 1. Cvval (0) CV47C 1. Following table in the Compare File but not in the current File. Function Components Control Variable 49C Local IVI: G"'l aO=o.S min=-l.e32 max=l.e32 exp Y=G* (aO+alXl) '"'a2X2 or G* (alXl) ... aO Gothic_s Name Variable location Coef. Min. Value -le+32 -le+32 Min. Value -le+32 -le+32 Min. Value -le+32 -le+32 Min. Value -le+32 -le+32 -le+32 Min. Value I I I Cvval (0) I cv48C I 1. 1 -le+32 I Max Value le+32 le+32 Max Value le+32 le+32 Max Value le+32 le+32 Max Value le+32 1e+32 1e+32 Max Value le+32 July 25, 2017 9:40 AM EDT NAI-2007-004 Revision 0 Page Bl52 ofB156 151 EC 620632, Attachment 2, Page 218 of 254 Clinton Division 1 Diesel Generator Room GOTHIC Uncertainty Evaluation File Comparison: Double entries indicate differences. I Current File: C:\Work\Penley\Clinton\NAl-2007-004 RO\CPS 1A DG LoV LOOP-TRANS Case 12.GTH \ Compare File: C:\Work\Penley\Clinton\NAl-2007-004_RO\CPS_ 1A_DG_LoV _LOOP-TRANS_Case_ 12a.GTH Jul/24/2017 20:59:30 GOTHIC Version 8.2(QA) -Oct 2016 Following table in the Compare File but not in the Current File. Function Components Control Variable SlC Local Re: G=l.O aO=O. min=-l.e32 max=l.e32 div Y=G* (aO+a2X2) I (alXl) Gothic_s Variable Coef. # Name location a Visv I cV I 1.1 Cvval (0) cvsoc 1. Following table in the Compare File but not in the Current File. Function Components Control Variable 52C Local cp*mu: G=l.O a0=0. rnin=-1.e32 max=l.e32 mult Y=G* (a1Xl*a2X2* *.. *anXn), ao unused Gothic_s Variable Coef. # Name location a Cpv I Viscv cV I cV 1.1 1. Following table in the Compare File but not in the Current File. Function Components Control Variable 53C Local Pr: G:::::l. O aOc:O. min:::::-1. e32 max:::::l. e32 div Y=G* (aO+a2X2) I (alXl) Gothic_s Variable Coef. # Name location a Condv I cV I 1.1 Cvval (O) cvS2C 1. Following table in the Compare File but not in the Current File. Function Components Control Variable S4C Re**l/2: G=l.O aO=O.S rnin=-l.e32 max,.,l.e32 exp Y=G* (aO+alXl) '"'a2X2 or G* (alXl) '"'ao Gothic_s Variable Coef. # Name location a 1 I Cvval (0) I cvSlC I 1. I Following table in the Compare File but not in the Current File. Function Components Control Variable SSC Pr**l/3: G=l.O a0=0.333 min=-l.e32 max=l.e32 exp Y=G* (aO+a1Xl) '"'a2X2 or G* (alXl) '"'ao Gothic_s Name Variable location Coef. Min. Value -le+32 I -le+32 Min. Value -le+32 I -le+32 Min. Value -le+32 I -le+32 Min. Value -le+32 I Min. Value Cvval (0) I cvS3C / 1. 1 -le+32 I Max Value le+32 le+32 Max Value le+32 le+32 Max Value le+32 le+32 Max Value le+32 Max Value le+32 July 25, 2017 9:40 AM EDT NAI-2007-004 Revision 0 Page Bl53 ofB156 152 EC 620632, Attachment 2, Page 219 of 254 Clinton Division 1 Diesel Generator Room GOTHIC Uncertainty Evaluation File Comparison: Double entries indicate differences. I Current File: C:\Work\Penley\Clinton\NAl-2007-004_RO\CPS_ 1 A_DG_LoV _LOOP-TRANS_Case_ 12.GTH \ Compare File: C:\Work\Penley\Clinton\NAl-2007-004_RO\CPS_ 1 A_DG_LoV _LOOP-TRANS_Case_12a.GTH Jul/24/2017 20:59:30 GOTHIC Version 8.2(QA) -Oct 2016 Following table in the Compare File but not in the current File. Function Components Control Variable 56C O. 62*Re** (1/2) *Pr** (1/3) : G=O. 62 aO=O. min=-1. e32 max=l.e32 mult Y=G* (a1x1*a2x2* **. *anXn), ao unused Gothic_a Variable Coef. Min. Max # Name location a Value Value CVVal (0) I cv54C I 1.1 -le+32 I le+32 Cvval (0) cvSSC 1. -le+32 le+32 Following table in the Compare File but not in the Current File. Function Components Control Variable 57C (0.4/Pr)**(2/3)' G=O ,54288 aO=-. 667 min=-l .e32 max=l.e32 exp Y=G* (aO+alXl) "a2x2 or G* (alXl) '"'ao Gothic_s Variable Coef. Min. Max # Name location a Value Value 11 CVVal (O) I cv53C I 1. I -le+32 I le+32 Following table in the Compare File but not in the current File. Function Components Control Variable SBC [l+(0.4/Pr)**{2/3)]**(1/4): G=l.0 aD=l min=-l.e32 max,,,l .e32 exp Y=G* (aO+alXl) "'a2X2 or G* (alXl) "ao Gothic_s Variable Coef. Min. Max # Name location a Value Value CVVal (0) I cv57C I 1.1 -le+32 I le+32 One cM 0 .25 -le+32 le+32 Following table in the Compare File but not in the current File. Function Components Control Variable 60C (Re/282000) ** (S/8): G::::.625 aO=D.000392 min=-l.e32 max=l.e32 exp Y=G* (aO+alXl) '"'a2X2 or G* (alXl) '"'ao Gathic_s Variable Coef. Min. Max # Name location a Value Value l I CVVal (0) I cvSlC I 1. I -le+32 I le+32 Following table in the Compare File but not in the Current File. Function Components Control Variable 61C [l+(Re/282000)**(5/8)]**(4/5): G=l.O aO=l min,,,-l.e32 max=l.e32 exp Y=G* (aO+alXl) "a2X2 or G* (alXl) "ao Gothic_s Variable Coef. Min. Max # Name location a Value Value CVVal (0) I cv60C I 1.1 -le+32 I le+32 One cM 0 .8 -le+32 le+32 July 25, 2017 9:40 AM EDT NAI-2007-004 Revision 0 Page B154 ofB156 153 EC 620632, Attachment 2, Page 220 of 254 Clinton Division 1 Diesel Generator Room GOTHIC Uncertainty Evaluation File Comparison: Double entries indicate differences. I Current File: C:\Work\Penley\Clinton\NAl-2007-004 RO\CPS 1A DG LoV LOOP-TRANS Case 12.GTH \ Compare File: C:\Work\Penley\Clinton\NAl-2007-004_RO\CPS_ 1A_DG_LoV _LOOP-TRANS_Case_ 12a.GTH Jul/24/2017 20:59:30 GOTHIC Version 8.2(QA) -Oct 2016 Following table in the Compare File but not in the Current File. Function Components Control Variable 62C O. 62*Re** (1/2) *Pr** (1/3) I [l+ (0. 4/Pr) ** (2/3) J ** (1/4) * [l+ (Re/282000) mult Y=G* (a1Xl*a2X2* .*. *anJCn), ao unused Gothic_s Variable Coef. # Name location a CVVal (O) I cv59C I 1.1 CVVal (0) cv61C l. Following table in the Compare File but not in the Current File. Function Components Control Variable 59C o. 62*Re** (1/2) *Pr** (1/3) I [l+ (O. 4/Pr) ** (2/3)] ** (1/4) : G=l.O aO=O. m div Y=G* (aO+a2X2) I (alXl) Gothic_s Variable Coef. # Name location a CVVal (0) I cvsec I 1.1 CVVal (0) cv56C 1. Following table in the Compare File but not in the Current File. Function Components Control Variable 63C Local Nu: G=l.O a0=0.3 min=-l.e32 max=l.e32 sum Y=G* (aO+alXl+a2X2+ ... +anXn) Gothic_s Variable Coef. # Name location a 1 I CVVal (0) I cv62C I l. I Following table in the Compare File but not in the current File. Function Components Control Variable 43C DG Intake Heat Transfer+ Delay: G=l.O a0=-5 min=-l.e32 max=l.e32 if (alXl+aO<O alXl+aO=O alXl+aO:.O) Y=Ga2X2 Y=Ga3X3 Y=Ga4X4 Gothic_ s Variable Coef. Name location Etime cM 1. One cM 0. One cM 0. CVVal (0) cv42C 1. Following table in the Compare File but not in the current File. Data File: 2 File Name: Case_l2a_Panel_Temperatures.csv File Type: TIME Min. Value -le+32 -le+32 Min. Value -le+32 -le+32 Min. value -le+32 Min. Value -le+32 -le+32 -le+32 -le+32 Parameter Description Value Reference x. Y, Z Start Time Time Increment End Time UNUSED UNUSED UNUSED Max Value I le+32 le+32 Max Value I le+32 le+32 Max value I le+32 Max Value le+32 le+32 le+32 le+32 July 25, 2017 9:40 AM EDT NAI-2007-004 Revision 0 Page BISS ofBlS6 154 EC 620632, Attachment 2, Page 221 of 254 NUMeRICAL APPLICATIONS File Comparison: Double entries indicate differences. Clinton Division I Diesel Generator Room GOTHIC Uncertainty Evaluation I Current File: C:\Work\Penley\Clinton\NAl-2007-004_RO\CPS_ 1 A_DG_LoV _LOOP-TRANS_Case_ 12.GTH \Compare File: C:\Work\Penley\Clinton\NAl-2007-004_RO\CPS_1A_DG_LoV_LOOP-TRANS_Case_12a.GTH Jul/24/2017 20:59:30 GOTHIC Version 8.2(QA) -Oct 201_6 ___________ ---, Data File: 2 (cont.) File Name: Caae_l2a_Panel_Temperatures ,csv File Type: TIME Parameter Description Value Reference X, Y, Z Volume UNUSED 0,0,0 Item l TV14 Item 2 TV15 Item 3 TV16 Item 4 TV17 Item 5 TV18 Item 6 TV19 Item 7 TV20 July 25, 2017 9:40 AM EDT NAI-2007-004 Revision 0 Page Bl56 ofBI56 155 EC 620632, Attachment 2, Page 222 of 254 Clinton Division I Diesel Generator Room GOTIIlC Uncertainty Evaluation Attachment C. Sensitivities on Case lOa July 25, 2017 9:40 AM EDT NAI-2007-004 Revision 0 Page Cl ofC30
....------------------------------------------------EC 620632, Attachment 2, Page 223 of 254 C.1 Objective Clinton Division 1 Diesel Generator Room GOTHIC Uncertainty Evaluation This attachment performs three sensitivities on Case lOa as follows: NAI-2007-004 Revision 0 Page C2 ofC30 * Case lOb will re-run Case lOa using a surface temperature of 175&deg;F for thermal conductor 1 (engine block "warm" surface) and a surface temperature of 750&deg;F for thermal conductor 2 (engine block "hot" surface) per Reference [8.16]. Prior to running Case 1 Ob, the change will be benchmarked. * Case 1 Oc will re-run Case 1 Oa based on a re-benchmark whereby the benchmarking is conducted such that the calculated room exhaust temperature is 0.8&deg;F higher by the end of the generator test (i.e., at 4,920 seconds) than the room exhaust temperature indicated by the test data (Reference [8.16]). * Case lOd will re-run case lOa using a surface temperature of l 75&deg;F for thermal conductor 1 (engine block "warm" surface) and a surface temperature of 800&deg;F for thermal conductor 2 (engine block "hot" surface) per Reference [8 .16]. Prior to running Case 1 Od, the change will be benchmarked. Benchmarking is performed in accordance with Section 4.12 of Reference [8.14]. C.2 Approach -Engine Block Surface Temperature Changes Thermal conductor 1 represents the wami (i.e., l 72&deg;F) surface of the engine block. It uses surface option 4 to apply a constant surface temperature which references forcing function. Surface option 4 references forcing function 1 T. Forcing function 1 Tis temperature as a function of time. All entries except the first (which constitutes the initial temperature of the engine block) are multiplied by 175/172 to change the steady state temperature values to 175&deg;F (Reference [8.16]) for Cases lOb and lOd and to maintain the same shape of curve for all intermediate temperature values. Thermal conductor 2 represents the hot (i.e., 700&deg;F) surface of the engine block. It uses surface option 5 to apply a constant surface temperature which references forcing function. Surface option 5 references forcing function 2T. Forcing function 2T is temperature as a function of time. All entries except the first (which constitutes the initial temperature of the engine block) are multiplied by 750/700 to change the steady state temperature values to 750&deg;F (Reference [8.16]) for Case lOb and to maintain the same shape of curve for all intermediate temperature values. For lOd, the values are multiplied by 800/700 to change the steady state temperature values to 800&deg;F (Reference [8.16]) and to maintain the same shape of curve for all intermediate temperature values C.3 Set B Benchmark Results Surface option 6, which is the heat transfer coefficient associated with the engine surface thermal conductors, was changed to 5.8 Btu/hr-ft2-&deg;F in order to affect the GOTHIC calculated heat load to match the target load. It is noted that this value is consistent with typical heat transfer coefficient values for forced convection in gases per Reference [8.5], Table 1.1 (from 25 to 250 W/m2-&deg;F or 4.4 to 44 Btu/hr-ft2-&deg;F). This value is used to July 25, 2017 9:40 AM EDT EC 620632, Attachment 2, Page 224 of 254 Clinton Division 1 Diesel Generator Room GOTHIC Uncertainty Evaluation NAI-2007-004 Revision 0 Page C3 of C30 calculate the engine block heat load using 122&deg;F as the ambient temperature for comparison to the vendor provided estimate of 2 Btu/min per KW similar to what was done in Table 4-2 -this is shown in Table C.3-2, which shows that the resulting engine block heat load is conservative. Results are shown below in Figure C-1, Figure C-2, and Table C.3-1. Jul/24/2017 20:13:39 GOTHIC Version 8.2{QA) -Oct 2016 File: C:\Work\Penley\Clinton\NAl-2007-004 _ RO\CPS _ 1 A_ DG _Benchmark_b. GTH Figure C-1-Comparison of Total Heat Rate Transferred into the Division 1 DG Room (red line -heat rate calculated from the DG Surveillance test; white line -heat rate used in the GOTIDC model) July 25, 2017 9:40 AM EDT EC 620632, Attachment 2, Page 225 of 254 NUMERICAL APPLICATIONS Jul/24/2017 20:13:47 GOTHIC Version B.2(QA) -Oct 2016 Clinton Division 1 Diesel Generator Room GOTHIC Uncertainty Evaluation File: C:\Work\Penley\Clinton\NAl-2007-004_RO\CPS_1A_DG_Benchmark_b.GTH NAI-2007-004 Revision 0 Page C4 ofC30 Figure C-2 -Comparison of Supply and Exhaust Air Temperature (green line -supply air temperature measured during the DG surveillance test; yellow line -supply air temperature input into the GOTHIC simulation; red line -exhaust air temperature measured during the DG surveillance; white line -exhaust air temperature calculated in GOTHIC) July 25, 2017 9:40 AM EDT EC 620632, Attachment 2, Page 226 of 254 Clinton Division 1 Diesel Generator Room GOTHIC Uncertainty Evaluation NAI-2007-004 Revision 0 Page CS ofC30 Table C.3-1-Division 1 Room Temperature Comparison at Four Locations Measure GOTHIC Temperature Corresponding Calculated Location Description Temperature Temperature Difference Time (oF) (oF) (oF) (sec) 1 Near the Rollup Door 83.1 87.6 4.5 4800 2 Near Transformer Panel 87.5 89.1 1.6 4860 3 Near Air Compressor Panel 79 86.3 7.3 4920 4 DG General Area 77.7 81.3 3.6 5040 5 Exhaust Air Temperature 84.7 84.7 0 4920 Notes: 1. The measured temperatures at these locations are at the end of the DG surveillance test. The temperatures calculated by GOTHIC model are at the respective time. Table C.3-2 -Adjusted Total Diesel Generator Benchmark Heat Load Compared to Test Data Total Generator Heat Load for Set C Tarea Uwann Aw arm Twann qwarm Ubot Ahot Thot qhot qtotal qvendor LST KW (oF) (Btu/hr-(ft2) (oF) (Btu/sec) (Btu/hr-(fi2) (oF) (Btu/sec) (Btu/sec) (Btu/sec) ft2-oF) ft2-&deg;F) 10:45 AM 3750 122 5.800 848 175 72.4 5.800 80 750 80.9 153.4 125.0 10:50AM 3750 122 5.800 848 175 72.4 5.800 80 750 80.9 153.4 125.0 10:55 AM 3700 122 5.800 848 175 72.4 5.800 80 750 80.9 153.4 123.3 11:00 AM 3750 122 5.800 848 175 72.4 5.800 80 750 80.9 153.4 125.0 11:05 AM 3800 122 5.800 848 175 72.4 5.800 80 750 80.9 153.4 126.7 ll:lOAM 3700 122 5.800 848 175 72.4 5.800 80 750 80.9 153.4 123.3 11:15 AM 3750 122 5.800 848 175 72.4 5.800 80 750 80.9 153.4 125.0 11:20 AM 3700 122 5.800 848 175 72.4 5.800 80 750 80.9 153.4 123.3 11:25AM 3750 122 5.800 848 175 72.4 5.800 80 750 80.9 153.4 125.0 11:30 AM 3750 122 5.800 848 175 72.4 5.800 80 750 80.9 153.4 125.0 11:35AM 3800 122 5.800 848 175 72.4 5.800 80 750 80.9 153.4 126.7 C.4 Set C Benchmark Results Surface option 6, which is the heat transfer coefficient associated with the engine surface thermal conductors, was changed to 6.8 Btu/hr-ft2-&deg;F in order to affect the GOTHIC calculated heat load to match the target load. It is noted that this value is consistent with typical heat transfer coefficient values for forced convection in gases per Reference [8.5], Table 1.1(from25 to 250 W/rn2-&deg;F or 4.4 to 44 Btu/hr-ft2-&deg;F). This value is used to calculate the engine block heat load using l22&deg;F as the ambient temperature for comparison to the vendor provided estimate of 2 Btu/min per KW similar to what was done in Table 4-2 -this is shown in Table C.4-2, which shows that the resulting engine block heat load is conservative. Results are shown below in Figure C-3, Figure C-4, and Table C.4-1. July 25, 2017 9:40 AM EDT EC 620632, Attachment 2, Page 227 of 254 NUMERICAL APPLICATIONS Jul/24/2017 20: 13:59 GOTHIC Version 8.2(QA) -Oct 2016 Clinton Division l Diesel Generator Room GOTHIC Uncertainty Evaluation File: C:\Work\Penley\Clinton\NAl-2007-004_RO\CPS_1A_DG_Benchmark_c.GTH NAI-2007-004 Revision 0 Page C6 of C30 Figure C-3 -Comparison of Total Beat Rate Transferred into the Division 1 DG Room (red line -heat rate calculated from the DG Surveillance test; white line -heat rate used in the GOTHIC model) July 25, 2017 9:40 AM EDT EC 620632, Attachment 2, Page 228 of 254 Jul/24/2017 20:14:04 GOTHIC Version B.2(QA) -Oct 2016 Clinton Division l Diesel Generator Room GOTIITC Uncertainty Evaluation File: C:\Work\Penley\Clinton\NAl-2007-004_RO\CPS _ 1 A_DG _Benchmark_ c. GTH NAI-2007-004 Revision 0 Page C7 ofC30 Figure C-4 -Comparison of Supply and Exhaust Air Temperature (green line -supply air temperature measured during the DG surveillance test; yellow line -supply air temperature input into the GOTHIC simulation; red line -exhaust air temperature measured during the DG surveillance; white line -exhaust air temperature calculated in GOTHIC) July 25, 2017 9:40 AM EDT EC 620632, Attachment 2, Page 229 of 254 NUMERICAL APPLICATIONS Clinton Division 1 Diesel Generator Room GOTHIC Uncertainty Evaluation NAI-2007-004 Revision 0 Page CS of C30 Table C.4-1-Division 1 Room Temperature Comparison at Four Locations Measure GOTHIC Temperature Corresponding Calculated Location Description Temperature Temperature Difference Time (oF) (oF) (oF) (sec) I Near the Rollup Door 83.1 88.6 5.5 4800 2 Near Transformer Panel 87.5 89.9 2.4 4860 3 Near Air Compressor Panel 79 87.1 8.1 4920 4 DG General Area 77.7 81.7 4 5040 5 Exhaust Air Temperature 84.7 85.5 0.8 4920 Notes: I. The measured temperatures at these locations are at the end of the DG surveillance test. The temperatures calculated by GOTHIC model are at the respective time. Table C.4-2 -Adjusted Total Diesel Generator Benchmark Heat Load Compared to Test Data Total Generator Heat Load for Set C Tarca Uwann Awann Twann qwarm Uhot A hot Tho* qtotal qvcndor LST KW (oF) (Btu/hr-(ft2) (oF) (Btu/sec) (Btu/hr-(fi2) (oF) (Btu/sec) (Btu/sec) (Btu/sec) ft2-oF) ft2-&deg;F) 10:45 AM 3750 122 6.800 848 175 84.9 6.800 80 750 94.9 179.8 125.0 10:50AM 3750 122 6.800 848 175 84.9 6.800 80 750 94.9 179.8 125.0 10:55 AM 3700 122 6.800 848 175 84.9 6.800 80 750 94.9 179.8 123.3 11:00 AM 3750 122 6.800 848 175 84.9 6.800 80 750 94.9 179.8 125.0 11:05 AM 3800 122 6.800 848 175 84.9 6.800 80 750 94.9 179.8 126.7 11:10 AM 3700 122 6.800 848 175 84.9 6.800 80 750 94.9 179.8 123.3 11:15 AM 3750 122 6.800 848 175 84.9 6.800 80 750 94.9 179.8 125.0 11:20AM 3700 122 6.800 848 175 84.9 6.800 80 750 94.9 179.8 123.3 11:25AM 3750 122 6.800 848 175 84.9 6.800 80 750 94.9 179.8 125.0 11:30AM 3750 122 6.800 848 175 84.9 6.800 80 750 94.9 179.8 125.0 11:35AM 3800 122 6.800 848 175 84.9 6.800 80 750 94.9 179.8 126.7 C.5 Set D Benchmark Results Surface option 6, which is the heat transfer coefficient associated with the engine surface thermal conductors, was changed to 5.6 Btu/hr-ft2-&deg;F in order to affect the GOTHIC calculated heat load to match the target load. It is noted that this value is consistent with typical heat transfer coefficient values for forced convection in gases per Reference [8.5], Table 1.1(from25 to 250 W/rn2-&deg;F or 4.4 to 44 Btu/hr-ft2-&deg;F). This value is used to calculate the engine block heat load using 122&deg;F as the ambient temperature for comparison to the vendor provided estimate of 2 Btu/min per KW similar to what was done in Table 4-2 -this is shown in Table C.5-2, which shows that the resulting engine block heat load is conservative. Results are shown below in Figure C-5, Figure C-6, and Table C.5-1. July 25, 2017 9:40 AM EDT EC 620632, Attachment 2, Page 230 of 254 Jul/24/2017 20:14:15 GOTHIC Version 8.2(QA) -Oct 2016 Clinton Division 1 Diesel Generator Room GOTHIC Uncertainty Evaluation File: C:\Work\Penley\Clinton\NAl-2007-004_RO\CPS_1A_DG_Benchmark_d.GTH NAI-2007-004 Revision 0 Page C9 ofC30 Figure C-5 -Comparison of Total Heat Rate Transferred into the Division 1 DG Room (red line -heat rate calculated from the DG Surveillance test; white line -heat rate used in the GOTHIC model) July 25, 2017 9:40 AM EDT -___,,,,,,. I EC 620632, Attachment 2, Page 231 of 254 Jul/24/2017 20:14:21 GOTHIC Version 8.2(QA) -Oct 2016 Clinton Division I Diesel Generator Room GOTIITC Uncertainty Evaluation File: C:\Work\Penley\Clinton\NAl-2007-004_RO\CPS_ 1A_DG_Benchmark_d.GTH NAI-2007-004 Revision 0 Page ClO ofC30 Figure C-6 -Comparison of Supply and Exhaust Air Temperature (green line -supply air temperature measured during the DG surveillance test; yellow line -supply air temperature input into the GOTHIC simulation; red line -exhaust air temperature measured during the DG surveillance; white line -exhaust air temperature calculated in GOTHIC) July 25, 2017 9:40 AM EDT EC 620632, Attachment 2, Page 232 of 254 Clinton Division I Diesel Generator Room GOTHIC Uncertainty Evaluation NAI-2007-004 Revision 0 Page Cll ofC30 Table C.5-1-Division 1 Room Temperature Comparison at Four Locations Measure GOTHIC Temperature Corresponding Calculated Location Description Temperature Temperature Difference Time (Of) (&deg;F) (Of) (sec) l Near the Rollup Door 83.l 87.5 4.4 4800 2 Near Transformer Panel 87.5 89.l 1.6 4860 3 Near Air Compressor Panel 79 86.3 7.3 4920 4 DG General Area 77.7 81.3 3.6 5040 5 Exhaust Air Temperature 84.7 84.7 0 4920 Notes: l. The measured temperatures at these locations are at the end of the DG surveillance test. The temperatures calculated by GOTHIC model are at the respective time. Table C.5-2 -Adjusted Total Diesel Generator Benchmark Heat Load Compared to Test Data Total Generator Heat Load for Set C Tarea Uwarm Aw arm Twarm qwarm Uhot A bot Thot qhot qlotal qvendor LST KW (Of) (Btu/hr-(ft2) (of) (Btu/sec) (Btu/hr-(tt2) (of) (Btu/sec) (Btu/sec) (Btu/sec) ft2 _of) ft2-&deg;F) 10:45 AM 3750 122 5.600 848 175 69.9 5.600 80 800 84.4 154.3 125.0 10:50AM 3750 122 5.600 848 175 69.9 5.600 80 800 84.4 154.3 125.0 10:55 AM 3700 122 5.600 848 175 69.9 5.600 80 800 84.4 154.3 123.3 11:00 AM 3750 122 5.600 848 175 69.9 5.600 80 800 84.4 154.3 125.0 11:05AM 3800 122 5.600 848 175 69.9 5.600 80 800 84.4 154.3 126.7 ll:lOAM 3700 122 5.600 848 175 69.9 5.600 80 800 84.4 154.3 123.3 11:15 AM 3750 122 5.600 848 175 69.9 5.600 80 800 84.4 154.3 125.0 11:20 AM 3700 122 5.600 848 175 69.9 5.600 80 800 84.4 154.3 123.3 11:25 AM 3750 122 5.600 848 175 69.9 5.600 80 800 84.4 154.3 125.0 11:30 AM 3750 122 5.600 848 175 69.9 5.600 80 800 84.4 154.3 125.0 11:35 AM 3800 122 5.600 848 175 69.9 5.600 80 800 84.4 154.3 126.7 C.6 Results The resulting temperature impact is rounded to the nearest &deg;F. For Cases 1 Ob through 1 Od, key numeric analysis output data is shown in Table C.6-1 and Table C.6-2. For Table C.6-1, the maximum temperature reported for each panel is the maximum cell temperature. For Table C.6-2, the temperature reported for each panel is the temperature inside each control volume used to model each panel for Cases 1 Ob through 1 Od July 25, 2017 9:40 AM EDT EC 620632, Attachment 2, Page 233 of 254 NUMERICAL rt&deg;" APPLICATIONS * SIOt, a' .!)o.It11!'i M.Uft.IJ :.. llC Clinton Division 1 Diesel Generator Room GOTHIC Uncertainty Evaluation NAI-2007-004 Revision 0 Page Cl2 ofC30 Table C.6-1 -Summary of bounding electrical panel temperature results with various generator load profiles and various combinations of door positions (max cell temperature) Case Panel lOa !Ob lOc lOd Maximum Temperature (&deg;F) 1PL12JA 188 191 191 192 1PL92JN 1PL93JA 182 185 185 187 lDGOlJA 193 196 196 197 1DG06SA 181 184 184 185 lDGOlKA 12cvl 186 189 188 190 lDGOlKA 16cyl 193 196 196 197 Near Doors at 2 Hours NIA NIA NIA NIA Table C.6-2 -Summary of electrical panel internal temperature results with various generator load profiles and various combinations of door positions Case Panel lOa !Ob lOc lOd Internal Cabinet Temperature (&deg;F) 1PL12JA 181 185 186 187 1PL92JA 179 183 184 185 1PL93JA 179 183 184 185 lDGOlJA 184 188 187 189 1DG06SA 176 179 179 181 lDGOlKA 12cyl 181 184 184 186 lDGO 1 KA 16cyl 183 187 186 188 Limiting plots of cell temperatures for Cases 1 Ob through 1 Od are provided in Figure C-7 through Figure C-24. Most of the panels occupy more than one cell in the Division 1 Room control volume. As such, the temperatures of the most limiting cells containing a given panel are shown in the plots. Additionally, the temperature inside the control volumes used to model the panels is included within the figures. For the temperature plots, the GOTHIC plot variable is displayed across the top of the plot. For instance, "TV 1s14" is the vapor temperature of cell 14 inside control volume 1. For lumped parameter volumes, "s#" will be absent. July 25, 2017 9:40 AM EDT EC 620632, Attachment 2, Page 234 of 254 C.6.1 Case lOb Results JuV24/2017 20:36:06 GOTHIC Version 8.2(QA) -Oct 2016 Clinton Division 1 Diesel Generator Room GOTHIC Uncertainty Evaluation File: C:\Work\Penley\Clinton\NAl-2007-004_RO\CPS_ 1A_DG _LoV _LOOP-LOCA_ Case_ 1 Ob.GTH Figure C-7, CPS DG Room Case lOb, Panel 1PL12JA Temperatures July 25, 2017 9:40 AM EDT NAI-2007-004 Revision 0 Page Cl3 ofC30 EC 620632, Attachment 2, Page 235 of 254 JuV24/2017 20:36:06 GOTHIC Version 8.2{QA) -Oct 2016 Clinton Division l Diesel Generator Room GOTHIC Uncertainty Evaluation File: C:\Work\Penley\Clinton\NAl-2007-004_RO\CPS_ 1A_DG_LoV _LOOP-LOCA_ Case_ 1 Ob.GTH NAI-2007-004 Revision 0 Page Cl4 ofC30 Figure C-8, CPS DG Room Case lOb, Panel 1PL92JA and 1PL93JA Temperatures July 25, 2017 9:40 AM EDT EC 620632, Attachment 2, Page 236 of 254 ( f\. I] NU MERICAL APPLICATIONS * L:h << 9Ltil!\ t-LU!.:.rl nc JuV24/2017 20:36:07 GOTHIC Version 8.2(QA) -Oct 2016 Clinton Division 1 Diesel Generator Room GOTHIC Uncertainty Evaluation File: C:\Work\Penley\Clinton\NAl-2007-004_RO\CPS_ 1A_DG_LoV _LOOP-LOCA_ Case_ 1 Ob.GTH Figure C-9, CPS DG Room Case lOb, Panel lDGOlJA Temperatures July 25, 2017 9:40 AM EDT NAI-2007-004 Revision 0 Page C15 ofC30 EC 620632, Attachment 2, Page 237 of 254 NUMERICAL APPLICATIONS JuV24/2017 20:36:07 GOTHIC Version 8.2{QA) -Oct 2016 Clinton Division 1 Diesel Generator Room GOTIDC Uncertainty Evaluation File: C:\Work\Penley\Clinton\NAl-2007-004_RO\CPS_ 1A_DG_LoV _LOOP-LOCA_ Case_ 1 Ob.GTH Figure C-10, CPS DG Room Case lOb, Panel 1DG06SA Temperatures July 25, 2017 9:40 AM EDT NAI-2007-004 Revision 0 Page Cl6 ofC30 EC 620632, Attachment 2, Page 238 of 254 JuV24/2017 20:36:08 GOTHIC Version 8.2(QA) -Oct 2016 Clinton Division 1 Diesel Generator Room GOTHIC Uncertainty Evaluation File: C:\Work\Penley\Clinton\NAl-2007-004_RO\CPS_ 1A_DG _LoV _LOOP-LOCA_ Case_ 1 Ob.GTH NAI-2007-004 Revision 0 Page C17 ofC30 Figure C-11, CPS DG Room Case lOb, Panel lDGOlKA 12-cyl. Temperatures July 25, 2017 9:40 AM EDT EC 620632, Attachment 2, Page 239 of 254 JuV24/2017 20:36:08 GOTHIC Version 8.2(QA) -Oct 2016 Clinton Division l Diesel Generator Room GOTIITC Uncertainty Evaluation File: C:\Work\Penley\Clinton\NAl-2007-004_RO\CPS_ 1A_DG_LoV _LOOP-LOCA_ Case_ 1 Ob.GTH NAI-2007-004 Revision 0 Page Cl8 ofC30 Figure C-12, CPS DG Room Case lOb, Panel lDGOlKA 16-cyl. Temperatures July 25, 2017 9:40 AM EDT EC 620632, Attachment 2, Page 240 of 254 C.6.2 Case lOc Results JuV2412017 20:36:09 GOTHIC Version 8.2{QA) -Oct 2016 Clinton Division 1 Diesel Generator Room GOTHIC Uncertainty Evaluation File: C:\Work\Penley\Clinton\NAl-2007-004_RO\CPS_ 1A_DG_LoV _LOOP-LOCA_Case_ 1 Oc.GTH Figure C-13, CPS DG Room Case lOc, Panel 1PL12JA Temperatures July 25, 2017 9:40 AM EDT NAI-2007-004 Revision 0 Page C19 ofC30 EC 620632, Attachment 2, Page 241 of 254 JuV24/2017 20:36:09 GOTHIC Version 8.2(QA) -Oct 2016 Clinton Division 1 Diesel Generator Room GOTIIlC Uncertainty Evaluation File: C:\Work\Penley\Clinton\NAl-2007-004_RO\CPS_ 1A_DG _LoV _LOOP-LOCA_ Case_ 1 Oc.GTH NAI-2007-004 Revision 0 Page C20 ofC30 Figure C-14, CPS DG Room Case toe, Panel 1PL92JA and 1PL93JA Temperatures July 25, 2017 9:40 AM EDT EC 620632, Attachment 2, Page 242 of 254 ( "-t..1] NUMERICAL 1 '11, APPLICATIONS 11 l:h !ilOt, Cf .!).[hl!'I UC JuV24/2017 20:36:10 GOTHIC Version 8.2(QA) -Oct 2016 Clinton Division 1 Diesel Generator Room GOTIIlC Uncertainty Evaluation File: C:\Work\Penley\Clinton\NAl-2007-004_RO\CPS_ 1A_DG_LoV _LOOP-LOCA_ Case_ 1 Oc.GTH Figure C-15, CPS DG Room Case lOc, Panel lDGOlJA Temperatures July 25, 2017 9:40 AM EDT NAI-2007-004 Revision 0 Page C21 ofC30 EC 620632, Attachment 2, Page 243 of 254 NUMERICAL APPLICATIONS JuV24/2017 20:36:10 GOTHIC Version 8.2(QA) -Oct 2016 Clinton Division 1 Diesel Generator Room GOTHIC Uncertainty Evaluation File: C:\Work\Penley\Clinton\NAl-2007-004_RO\CPS_ 1A_DG _LoV _LOOP-LOCA_ Case_ 1 Oc.GTH Figure C-16, CPS DG Room Case toe, Panel 1DG06SA Temperatures July 25, 2017 9:40 AM EDT NAI-2007-004 Revision 0 Page C22 ofC30 EC 620632, Attachment 2, Page 244 of 254 JuV24/2017 20:36:11 GOTHIC Version 8.2(QA) -Oct 2016 Clinton Division 1 Diesel Generator Room GOTHIC Uncertainty Evaluation File: C:\Work\Penley\Clinton\NAl-2007-004_RO\CPS_ 1A_DG_LoV _LOOP-LOCA_ Case_ 1 Oc.GTH NAI-2007-004 Revision 0 Page C23 ofC30 Figure C-17, CPS DG Room Case toe, Panel lDGOlKA 12-cyl. Temperatures July 25, 2017 9:40 AM EDT EC 620632, Attachment 2, Page 245 of 254 ("'-1\.1] NUMERICAL 1 '1, APPLICATIONS 'Ch !..l!t'l!'I M.Uf.:.11,Ct..r!U'I:.. nc JuV24/2017 20:36:11 GOTHIC Version 8.2(QA) -Oct 2016 Clinton Division 1 Diesel Generator Room GOTHIC Uncertainty Evaluation File: C:\Work\Penley\Clinton\NAl-2007-004_RO\CPS_ 1A_DG _LoV _LOOP-LOCA_ Case_ 1 Oc.GTH NAI-2007-004 Revision 0 Page C24 ofC30 Figure C-18, CPS DG Room Case toe, Panel lDGOlKA 16-cyl. Temperatures July 25, 2017 9:40 AM EDT EC 620632, Attachment 2, Page 246 of 254 C.6.3 Case lOd Results JuV24/2017 20:36:12 GOTHIC Version 8.2(QA) -Oct 2016 Clinton Division 1 Diesel Generator Room GOTHIC Uncertainty Evaluation File: C:\Work\Penley\Clinton\NAl-2007-004_RO\CPS_ 1A_DG _LoV _LOOP-LOCA_ Case_ 1 Od.GTH Figure C-19, CPS DG Room Case lOd, Panel 1PL12JA Temperatures July 25, 2017 9:40 AM EDT NAI-2007-004 Revision 0 Page C25 of C30 EC 620632, Attachment 2, Page 247 of 254 NUMERICAL APPLICATIONS JuV24/2017 20:36:13 GOTHIC Version 8.2(QA} -Oct 2016 Clinton Division l Diesel Generator Room GOTHIC Uncertainty Evaluation File: C:\Work\Penley\Clinton\NAl-2007-004_RO\CPS_ 1A_DG_LoV _LOOP-LOCA_Case_ 1 Od.GTH NAI-2007-004 Revision 0 Page C26 ofC30 Figure C-20, CPS DG Room Case lOd, Panel 1PL92JA and 1PL93JA Temperatures July 25, 2017 9:40 AM EDT EC 620632, Attachment 2, Page 248 of 254 JuV24/2017 20:36:13 GOTHIC Version 8.2(QA) -Oct 2016 Clinton Division 1 Diesel Generator Room GOTHIC Uncertainty Evaluation File: C:\Work\Penley\Clinton\NAl-2007-004_RO\CPS_ 1A_DG_LoV _LOOP-LOCA_ Case_ 1 Od.GTH Figure C-21, CPS DG Room Case lOd, Panel lDGOlJA Temperatures July 25, 2017 9:40 AM EDT NAI-2007-004 Revision 0 Page C27 ofC30 EC 620632, Attachment 2, Page 249 of 254 NUMERICAL APPLICATIONS JuV24/2017 20:36:14 GOTHIC Version 8.2{QA) -Oct 2016 Clinton Division 1 Diesel Generator Room GOTIIlC Uncertainty Evaluation File: C:\Work\Penley\Clinton\NAl-2007-004_RO\CPS_ 1A_DG _LoV _LOOP-LOCA_ Case_ 1 Od .GTH --Figure C-22, CPS DG Room Case lOd, Panel 1DG06SA Temperatures July 25, 2017 9:40 AM EDT NAI-2007-004 Revision 0 Page C28 of C30 EC 620632, Attachment 2, Page 250 of 254 JuV24/2017 20:36:14 GOTHIC Version 8.2(QA) -Oct 2016 Clinton Division 1 Diesel Generator Room GOTHIC Uncertainty Evaluation File: C:\Work\Penley\Clinton\NAl-2007-004_RO\CPS_ 1A_DG _LoV _LOOP-LOCA_ Case_ 1 Od .GTH NAI-2007-004 Revision 0 Page C29 of C30 Figure C-23, CPS DG Room Case lOd, Panel lDGOlKA 12-cyl. Temperatures July 25, 2017 9:40 AM EDT EC 620632, Attachment 2, Page 251 of 254 NUMERICAL rt&deg;" APPLICATIONS 11 L:fi sia-, a !Jlnl!'i t.t..ur.:.11 llC JuV24/2017 20:36:14 GOTHIC Version 8.2(QA) -Oct 2016 Clinton Division I Diesel Generator Room GOTHIC Uncertainty Evaluation File: C:\Work\Penley\Clinton\NAl-2007-004_RO\CPS_ 1A_DG _LoV _LOOP-LOCA_Case_ 1 Od.GTH NAI-2007-004 Revision 0 Page C30 ofC30 Figure C-24, CPS DG Room Case lOd, Panel lDGOlKA 16-cyl. Temperatures July 25, 2017 9:40 AM EDT EC 620632, Attachment 2, Page 252 of 254 CC-AA-103-1003 Revision 12 ATTACHMENT 2 Owner's Acceptance Review Checklist for External Design Analyses Page 1of3 Design Analysis No.: NAl-2007-004 Contract #: 611349 Rev:O Release #: N/A No Question Instructions and Guidance Yes I Nol N/A 1 Do assumptions have All Assumptions should be stated in clear terms with enough D D sufficient documented justification to confirm that the assumption is conservative. rationale? For example, 1) the exact value of a particular parameter may not be known or that parameter may be known to vary over the range of conditions covered by the Calculation. It is appropriate to represent or bound the parameter with an assumed value. 2) The predicted performance of a specific piece of equipment in lieu of actual test data. It is appropriate to use the documented opinion/position of a recognized expert on that equipment to represent predicted equipment performance. Consideration should also be given as to any qualification testing that may be needed to validate the Assumptions. Ask yourself, would you provide more justification if you were performing this analysis? If yes, the rationale is likely incomplete. 2 Are assumptions Ensure the documentation for source and rationale for the D D compatible with the assumption supports the way the plant is currently or will be Assumption is way the plant is operated post change and they are not in conflict with any conservative operated and with the design parameters. If the Analysis purpose is to establish a licensing basis? new licensing basis, this question can be answered yes, if the assumption suooorts that new basis. 3 Do all unverified If there are unverified assumptions without a tracking D D assumptions have a mechanism indicated, then create the tracking item either tracking and closure through an ATI or a work order attached to the implementing mechanism in place? WO. Due dates for these actions need to support verification prior to the analysis becoming operational or the resultant plant chanqe beinq op authorized. 4 Do the design inputs The origin of the input, or the source should be identified and D D have sufficient be readily retrievable within Exelon's documentation system. rationale? If not, then the source should be attached to the analysis. Ask yourself, would you provide more justification if you were performing this analysis? If yes, the rationale is likely incomplete. 5 Are design inputs The expectation is that an Exelon Engineer should be able to D D correct and reasonable clearly understand which input parameters are critical to the with critical parameters outcome of the analysis. That is, what is the impact of a identified, if change in the parameter to the results of the analysis? If the aooropriate? impact is larqe, then that parameter is critical. 6 Are design inputs Ensure the documentation for source and rationale for the D D compatible with the inputs supports the way the plant is currently or will be way the plant is operated post change and they are not in conflict with any operated and with the design parameters. licensinq basis?
EC 620632, Attachment 2, Page 253 of 254 CC-AA-103-1003 Revision 12 ATTACHMENT 2 Owner's Acceptance Review Checklist for External Design Analyses Page 2 of 3 Design Analysis No.: NAl-2007-004 Rev: 0 No Question Instructions and Guidance Yes I No IN/A 7 Are Engineering See Section 2.13 in CC-AA-309 for the attributes that are D D [8J Judgments clearly sufficient to justify Engineering Judgment. Ask yourself, documented and would you provide more justification if you were performing justified? this analysis? If yes, the rationale is likely incomplete. 8 Are Engineering Ensure the justification for the engineering judgment D D [8J Judgments compatible supports the way the plant is currently or will be operated with the way the plant is post change and is not in conflict with any design operated and with the parameters. If the Analysis purpose is to establish a new licensing basis? licensing basis, then this question can be answered yes, if the judgment suooorts that new basis. 9 Do the results and Why was the analysis being performed? Does the stated [8J D D conclusions satisfy the purpose match the expectation from Exelon on the proposed purpose and objective of application of the results? If yes, then the analysis meets the Design Analysis? the needs of the contract. 10 Are the results and Make sure that the results support the UFSAR defined D D [8J conclusions compatible system design and operating conditions, or they support a with the way the plant is proposed change to those conditions. If the analysis operated and with the supports a change, are all of the other changing documents licensing basis? included on the cover sheet as impacted documents? 11 Have any limitations on Does the analysis support a temporary condition or D D [8J the use of the results procedure change? Make sure that any other documents been identified and needing to be updated are included and clearly delineated in transmitted to the the design analysis. Make sure that the cover sheet appropriate includes the other documents where the results of this organizations? analysis provide the input. 12 Have margin impacts Make sure that the impacts to margin are clearly shown [8J D D been identified and within the body of the analysis. If the analysis results in documented reduced margins ensure that this has been appropriately appropriately for any dispositioned in the EC being used to issue the analysis. negative impacts (Reference ER-AA-2007)? 13 Does the Design Are there sufficient documents included to support the [8J D D Analysis include the sources of input, and other reference material that is not applicable design basis readily retrievable in Exelon controlled Documents? documentation? 14 Have all affected design Determine if sufficient searches have been performed to D D [8J analyses been identify any related analyses that need to be revised along documented on the with the base analysis. It may be necessary to perform Affected Documents List some basic searches to validate this. (AOL) for the associated Configuration Change? 15 Do the sources of inputs Compare any referenced codes and standards to the current [8J D D and analysis design basis and ensure that any differences are reconciled. methodology used meet If the input sources or analysis methodology are based on committed technical and an out-of-date methodology or code, additional reconciliation regulatory may be required if the site has since committed to a more requirements? recent code EC 620632, Attachment 2, Page 254 of 254 CC-AA-103-1003 Revision 12 ATTACHMENT 2 Owner's Acceptance Review Checklist for External Design Analyses Page 3of3 Design Analysis No.: NAl-2007-004 Rev: O No Question Instructions and Guidance Yes/ No IN/A 16 Have vendor supporting Based on the risk assessment performed during the pre-job D D technical documents brief for the analysis (per HU-AA-1212), ensure that and references sufficient reviews of any supporting documents not provided (including GE DRFs) with the final analysis are performed. been reviewed when necessary? 17 Do operational limits Ensure the Tech Specs, Operating Procedures, etc. contain D D support assumptions operational limits that support the analysis assumptions and and inputs? inputs. Create an SFMS entry as required by CC-AA-4008. SFMS Number: 59542
------*--------EC 620632, Attachment 3, Page 1 of 29 (KCI ENGINEERING CONSULTANTS Test Specification Title Page Project Number: 424-008 r Document Number: 424-008" TSP2 Revision Number: 00 Title: Test Specification for Determininq Component Survivability and Operation in Ambient Temperature not to Exceed 245"F Nuclear Safety Related: DYES Total Number of Pages: ---'-:1_9..;._ __ _ Date of Issue: 611212017 Prepared by; Print Cheeked by: B. Hussain Print Approved by: P. Brunsaaard Pr Ent I 0 AKB .5.i1112G17 BH l'lo'1112U17 PB !-------REV I DY OA"!l( ('.Hl\r.Kr.D APPROVED (g]NO 5111*'2011 --.. --I nATl( Sign <KCI c:.;c1 ... PROJXO. DOCI.NO. 6/12/2017 Date F.NGTNEERlNG CONST:T ,T ANTS *-I 424-fiWi ---1 42<f.008-TSP2 *-:'>l:C:Ll!.AR SA FF.TY RF.I.A Tm 0 \'TIS D KO ----
EC 620632, Attachment 3, Page 2 of 29 Revision No. 0 Test Specification No.: 424-008-TSP2 Revision: 00 Page: 2of10 Revision Summary Summary of Changes Initial issue for use. ..
1.0 2.0 3.0 4.0 5.0 EC 620632, Attachment 3, Page 3 of 29 Test Specification No.: 424-008-TSP2 Revision: 00 Page: 3 oflO Table of Contents Title Page Revision Summary Table of Contents BACKGROUND PURPOSE TEST SPECIMENS PROCEDURE REFERENCES List of Attachments Basler UFOV Relay and Voltage Regulator 1 2 3 4 4 4 5 9 Attachment A Attachment B Attachment C Attachment D Attachment E Attachment F GE Overcurrent Relay Test-Models# 12IJCV51Al3A and 12IFCV51AD1A Differential Relay Type SA-1 (Westinghouse, part# 290B225A10) GE Loss of Excitation Relay Test -Model# 12CEH51A1A GE Reverse Power Relay Test -Model# 12GGP53C1A Woodward Governor Control Assembly Model 2301A EC 620632, Attachment 3, Page 4 of 29 Test Specification No.: 424-008-TSP2 Revision: 00 Page: 4of10 Test Specification for Determining Component Survivability and Operation in Ambient Temperature not to Exceed 245&deg;F 1.0 BACKGROUND The Division 1 EDG room may be exposed to temperature above 204 &deg;F due loss of ventilation when the EDG is in operation. Under this scenario, various control components required for EDG operation will be exposed to ambient temperature beyond the published temperature rating by the manufacturers. 2.0 PURPOSE 2.1 The purpose of this specification is to monitor performance of various control devices when exposed to 225&deg;F and 245&deg;F ambient temperature. 2.2 Testing performed per this specification will determine if the control devices perform their required function and/or not provide a false trip signal to other connected control components. 3.0 TEST SPECIMENS 3 .1 The equipment under test (EDT) includes the following test specimens: TABLE3 1 T tS -: es ipec1mens Test Specimen# Manufacturer Model Description EUT#l Agastat 7012PD Time Delay Relay EUT#2 Basler 9-1051-00-105 UFOV Assembly EUT#3 Basler SR8A2B01B3A Voltage Regulator EUT#4 GE 12CEH51A1A Loss of Excitation Relay EUT#5 GE 12GGP53BlA Reverse Power Relay EUT#6A GE 12IJCV51A13A Restrained Overcurrent Relay EUT#6B GE 12IFCV51AD1A Restrained Overcurrent Relay EUT#7 P&B MDR 137-8 Relay EUT#8 Phoenix 2938578 125 VDC -24 VDC Power Supply EUT#9 Westinghouse 290B225A10 Differential Relay (Type SA-1) EUT#lO Woodward 2301A Governor Control Assembly 3.2 Testing shall be conducted in the following sequence, with the details of each test specified in Section 4.0 of this test specification: * Receipt inspection * Baseline functional test * Functional test at 225&deg;F oven temperature (Pre-thermal aging) * Thermally aged for 24 hours at 225&deg;F and monitor performance parameters EC 620632, Attachment 3, Page 5 of 29 * Post-thermal aging baseline functional test * Functional test at 245&deg;F oven temperature Test Specification No.: 424-008-TSP2 Revision: 00 Page: 5of10 * Thermally aged 8 hours at 245&deg;F monitor performance parameters 3.3 TOOLS AND EQUIPMENT * DC Current Source (shall be able to provide up to SA) * Assortment of shop made test lead jumpers * Single pole switch (rated for 125VDC, 5A) and can operate in 200&deg;F environment * Wiring cables * Multi-meter for sensing DC current * DC Power Supply (125V, 5A) 4.0 TEST PROCEDURE The test laboratory shall execute the test segments as delineated in this section. 4.1 Receipt Inspection 4.1.1 Identify the manufacturer, model/part number, and serial number (if available) for the test specimens. Record all nameplate information. Assign laboratory identifiers, if desired. 4.1.2 Photograph the test specimens from various angles. 4.1.3 Verify that the test specimens are free from obvious signs of physical damage. Visually inspect and verify the following: * Absence of cracking or bubbling on test specimens cases. * Absence of pitted or burned contacts. * For relay coils, absence of cracking or discoloration of coil insulation, and absence of crystal growth. 4.2 Baseline Functional Test Mount each EUT to simulate field installation. 4.2.1 Choose EUT #1 (Agastat time delay relay). Set the time delay relay dial to 50 seconds. Measure and record the following: * Pick up voltage (information only) and Drop out voltage * Coil current at 125 VDC Perform and record the above measurements three times at room ambient temperature. Determine and record the average of the three readings. Do not move the time delay dial setting between test EC 620632, Attachment 3, Page 6 of 29 Test Specification No.: 424-008-TSP2 Revision: 00 Page: 6of10 4.2.2 Choose EUTs #2 and 3 (Basler UFOV Relay and Voltage Regulator). Measure and record the following: * Connect the UFOV to the voltage regulator as shown in Fig. A-1, Attachment A * Perform test per Section 5-2 of voltage regulator manual (Attachment A) * Ramp the frequency of240V AC power supply shown in Fig. A-1from60Hz down to 53Hz. Ramping down should cause the lamps to dim or extinguish at 56Hz. * Set the 240V AC power supply back to 60Hz and ramp the voltage to 248 volts. The lamps should dim or extinguish. 4.2.3 Choose BUT #4 (GE Loss of Excitation Relay, models# 12CEH51AIA). See attachment D, section D-1 for tools and equipment required for this test * CALIBRATE relays per attachment D, section D-2 * CONNECT the relays as shown on figure D-1 * PERFORM functional testing of the relays per D-4 * ENSURE the functional test meets acceptance criteria in table D-1 * RECORD the ammeter readings at various intervals in table D-1 Perform and record the above measurements three times at room ambient temperature. 4.2.4 Choose BUT #5 (GE Reverse Power Relay, models# 12GGP53B1A). See attachment E, section E-1 for tools and equipment required for this test * CALIBRATE relays per attachment E, section E-2 * CONNECT the relays as shown on figure E-1 * PERFORM functional testing of the relays per E-4 * ENSURE the functional test meets acceptance criteria in table E-1 * RECORD the ammeter readings at various intervals in table E-1 Perform and record the above measurements three times at room ambient temperature. 4.2.5 Choose BUT #6A and 6B (GE Overcurrent Relay, models# 12IJCV51Al3A and 12IFCV51AD1A respectively).


EC 620632, Attachment 3, Page 7 of 29 Test Specification No.: 424-008-TSP2 Revision: 00 Page: 7of10 See attachment B, section B-1 for tools and equipment required for this test. Perform separate test for each relay model * CALIBRATE relays per attachment B, section B-2 * CONNECT the relays as shown on figure B-1 * PERFORM functional testing of the relays per B-4 * ENSURE the functional test meets acceptance criteria in table B-1 * RECORD the ammeter readings at various intervals in table B-1 Perform and record the above measurements three times at room ambient temperature. 4.2.6 Choose EUT #7 (P&B Relay). Measure and record the following: * Pick up voltage (information only) and Dr_op out voltage * Coil current at 125 VDC Perform and record the above measurements three times at room ambient temperature. Determine and record the average of the three readings. 4.2.7 Choose EUT #8 (Phoenix 125 VDC to 24 VDC Power Supply). Measure and record the following: * Output voltage at no load * Output voltage at 80% load current (use a resistive load) Perform and record the above measurements three times at room ambient temperature. Determine and record the average of the three readings. 4.2.8 Choose BUT #9 (Westinghouse SA-1 Differential Relay). See attachment C, section C-1 for tools and equipment required for this test. Perform test as outlined in Attachment C * Relay calibration is not required for this relay. * WIRE relay as shown in figure C-1. * PERFORM test per section C-4 * Verify no trip with zero operating current Perform and record the above measurements three times at room ambient temperatur EC 620632, Attachment 3, Page 8 of 29 Test Specification No.: 424-008-TSP2 Revision: 00 Page: 8of10 4.2.9 Choose BUT #10 (Woodward Governor Control Assembly). * Connect the Governor Control Module as shown in Fig. F-1, Attachment F. * Verify the output voltage across the 50.Q resistor is approximately OVDC when the circuit is energized and the function generator is set to 3975 Hz. * Slowly increase the function generator frequency and note the frequency when the voltage across the resistor begins to increase to 19VDC. The frequency should be within +/- 1 % of the baseline test. * Set the frequency back to 3975Hz and verify that the voltage across the 50.Q resistor returns to approximately OVDC. * Instantaneously step the function generator from 3975Hz to 4974Hz. The voltage across the resistor should reach 19VDc instantaneously. Perform and record the above measurements three times at room ambient temperature. 4.3 Abnormal Temperature Exposure at 225&deg;F Place EUTs 1thru10 in one or more ovens at 225&deg;F and wire them so that its function can be monitored for 24 hours exposure at this temperature. 4.3.1 Choose BUT #1 (Agastat time delay relay). Energize the relay coil with 125 VDC and monitor for coil drop out. Also monitor an open contact for contact resistance. 4.3.2 Choose EUTs #2 and 3 (Basler UFOV Relay and Voltage Regulator). Measure and record the following: * Connect the UFOV to the voltage regulator as shown in Fig. A-1, Attachment A * Ramp the frequency of240V AC power supply shown in Fig. A-1from60Hz down to 53Hz. Ramping down should cause the lamps to dim or extinguish at 56Hz. * Set the 240V AC power supply back to 60Hz and ramp the voltage to 248 volts. The lamps should dim or extinguish. 4.3.3 Choose EUT #4 (GE Loss of Excitation Relay, models# 12CEH51A1A). Connect the relay as shown on figure D-1 and energize with 5 Amps of load current at 120 VAC. Monitor the lamp or bulb in the trip circuit. 4.3.4 Choose BUT #5 (GE Reverse Power Relay, models# 12GGP53BlA). Connect the relay as shown on figure E-1 and energize with 5 Amps of load current at 120 VAC. Monitor the lamp or bulb in the trip circuit. 4.3.5 Choose EUT #6A and 6B (GE Overcurrent Relay, models# 12IJCV51Al3A and 12IFCV51AD1A respectively). Connect each relay as shown on figure B-1 and energize with 4 Amps of load current. Monitor the DM EC 620632, Attachment 3, Page 9 of 29 Test Specification No.: 424-008-TSP2 Revision: 00 Page: 9of10 4.3.6 Choose BUT #7 (P&B Relay). Energize the relay coil with 12S VDC and monitor for coil drop out. Also monitor an open contact for contact resistance. 4.3.7 Choose BUT #8 (Phoenix 12S VDC to 24 VDC Power Supply). Energize the power supply with 12S VDC with a SO% load on the 24 VDC output. Monitor for load current. 4.3.8 Choose BUT #9 (Westinghouse SA-1 Differential Relay). Connect the relay as shown on figure C-1 and with IR at S amperes and adjust the operating current (10) to 0.22 Amps. Verify the relay does not operate. Monitor the lamp or bulb in the trip circuit. 4.3.9 Choose BUT #10 (Woodward Governor Control Assembly). Connect the Governor Control Module as shown in Fig. F-1, Attachment F. * Verify the output voltage across the son resistor is approximately OVDC when the circuit is energized and the function generator is set to 3975 Hz. * Slowly increase the function generator frequency and note the frequency when the voltage across the resistor begins to increase to 19VDC. The frequency should be within+/- 1 % of the baseline test. * Set the frequency back to 397SHz and verify that the voltage across the son resistor returns to approximately OVDC. Perform functional tests as outlined above after one hour exposure at 22S&deg;F. Age the specimens for 24 hours and monitor the performance in suitable interval (at the test facility convenience) Repeat above Section 4.2 functional test before removing the specimens from the oven at 22S&deg;F. 4.4 Abnormal Temperature Exposure at 24S&deg;F * Increase the oven temperature from previous test exposure from 22S&deg;F to 24S&deg;F. * Perform functional tests as outlined in Section 4.3 after one hour exposure at 24S&deg;F. * Repeat above functional test before removing the specimens from the oven at 24S&deg;F. 5.0 REFERENCES S.1 S.2 5.3 Clinton Drawing E02-1AP04, Sheet 17 Basler Electric Instructional Manual for Underfrequency/Overvoltage Module Models: UFOV 2SOA & UFOV 260A, Publication Number: 9 IOSl 00 99X, Rev. E, dated Feb 2000. ; .. '' Basler Electric Instructional Manual for Voltage Regulator Model: SR4A & SR8A, Publication Number: 9 0177 00 XX, Revision R, Dated 09/97
==LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED==
.EC 620632, Attachment 3, Page 10 of 29 Test Specification No.: 424-008-TSP2 Revision: 00 Page: 10 of 10 5.4 GE Instructions for Loss of Excitation Relay Type CEH51A, GEK-27887H 5.5 GE Instructions for Ployphase Power Directional Relay for Ant-Motoring Protection, Type GGP53C, GEK-34117G 5.6 GE publication GEK-34117G (Power Directional Relay Instruction manual) 5.7 GE Instructions for Time Overcurrent Relays with Voltage Restraint Types IFC51AD and IFC51BD, GEK-49946E 5.8 GE Instructions Relay Types IJCV51A, IJCV51B, IJCV52A and IJCV51B, GEK-2029A 5.9 ABB Instruction Leaflet 41-348.1 lC for Type SA-1 Generator Differential Relay 5.10 Woodward Product Manual 02303 for 2301A Load Sharing and Speed Control, Revision B, dated 9/201 EC 620632, Attachment 3, Page 11 of 29 ATTACHMENT A Test Specification No.: 424-008-TSPl Revision: 00 Page: Al of A4 Basler UFOV Relay and Voltage Regulator EC 620632, Attachment 3, Page 12 of 29 El E2 E3 A B 240V AC 3<1> 60Hz Adj. .;.--SA .;.--SA .;.--SA A<jJ 1---+---+-----il-F+ B<jJ ,__ _______ ,__ __ _ C<jJ l--+-----4,__-----4t-.;.--.;.--SA SA 1 2 c D N UFOV F-Test Specification No.: 424-008-TSPl Revision: 00 Page: A2 of A4 SR VOLTAGE REGULATOR A-p Fig. A-1 7 6 1750 25W 4 3 2 1 B A EC 620632, Attachment 3, Page 13 of 29 Test Specification No.: 424-008-TSPl Revision: 00 Page: A3 of A4 ,si:ctie>Ns " *. .. . .. . .. * inspection shDU!d be made on this.WJit to insure it is kept clean and free from dirt and Also, if is reoommended the cailnectioiis belwe&#xa3;in 1he regula1DT and the .sysleffi bEi ched.ed and lightened at this lime. * Due to a prnteclilre transparant confurmal coaling. rapair an the printed circuit board is difficull and should only be. attempted by quaffied pe.sanat An lest. used to detennlne if 1he iajula1Dr is basically opera1funal, @wn bl!l'mv. Ref'e.-llo FJQUra' 5-1. * mMA. IRllA: lNT9 i:EQuiu; 1-PHAllE Ut D l'u.8; . TWCI IKi!NTir;IAL llLUl8 PQlt MBA. Figwe5-1. OperalionalTest. a MD'llE! l:he_wrra 011 the sensing !ransfo!mer (TI} ID the llmninal fisted below: SR4A: Move ta 120 V tap. SR8A: Move le 240 V lap. b. Adjust Ille voltage stability poienliometer {R4) fuliy counter-c!Dckwise (CCW). c. Ccnnect the voltage regulamc-as in. FllJUre &.-.1. The bulb should *bE! 120 V and not mare 1hlm 300 w. See Note 1 of ttie: drawing for the SRRA. d. Ad"jUst !he va!tage adjust potentiome1er for maximum e. Ccmnect the ragu!a1Dr to lhe pawer source. The bulb should flash oo * moment.arify and then extinguish. 5-1 EC 620632, Attachment 3, Page 14 of 29 Test Specification No.: 424-008-TSPl Revision: 00 Page: A4 of A4 f. Skm.IJY atrjUSl the adjUst rfieoStat ll:iWam min.inium resisfance. l}l:i! light billb soou!d raactdull brilliarice befcre miniinum rasi:stance ts attained. (If the light iDummate. aCrJUst Rdjusbnent(R3), s-At. r'egufating pOint. a small change in lhe vofta9e adjust pcitenli!mlES shriuld tum *ttie light 'bUfu ci0 at !he nQht Stays on, Hie reguialn.-is defecfure_ . . * h. This test* may not reV8al a shmjlity problem. tiOweYet, rriliiling tile stability cidjilsimerit (EM) shooid affect the light's tum cr&l'lum cff lime. * -* * * i._ Befure reins!alling the 11Cltage regulator into n!!Xllll'lectthe sensing {T1) -as it was befCre perfOOning SJ:ep 'a. l.s-l:mfutACEM'ENTPARIS' .* *---*.I The (Fili,ura. 5,2) and tallies {Table !F1 and 5-2) i:ooiains only those and .assembl!es whfch !lJe mailitenance Figura 6-3. the wirmg diagram. *when Ordering ref)liioemefit parts, fmrii BBsfeT Becblc alWays specify deScription of tlle ib!m, 1he part riumber. 'ilritl the qUamity_ LEGEND 1. CllCUIT llDAAD Ml*. I. iwWi.EL.lla TIWl&FoRllEFI . INDl.lllTiD WIDER nElll n ... ll!lllllNlili TIWll!l'Dllllll!! .. !l.Pll!w ** CIRCQp AD.llllilT IWlllOmt 1. YOLTMI!!! ADJUST' FHIO!mU' ._ llTltiiUTY Alu.IE' Ill. rtDMMM.. &#xa5;CLT/dE IETTINlll @ 0119 @ Q!l4 &#xa9; Qml @ CRiii @ Cltl1 @ OA1tl I I I I I I I I I I I *1** *1: *I I'* I'-* A-* 'P S -4 : I *. 1 D 0 \
The following is a partial list of documents reviewed during the inspection.
EC 620632, Attachment 3, Page 15 of 29 ATTACHMENT B Test Specification No.: 424-008-TSPl Revision: 00 Page: Bl ofB4 GE Overcurrent Relay Test -Models# 121JCV51A13A and 12IFCV51AD1A B-1 EC 620632, Attachment 3, Page 16 of 29 TOOLS AND EQUIPMENT * AC Current Source * 120V, lOOW light bulb * Ammeter * 125VDC Power Supply * 120V AC power supply Test Specification No.: 424-008-TSPl Revision: 00 Page: B2 ofB4 B-2 RELAY CALIBRATION NOTE: The relay settings below are per station calculation 19-AN-14 table 1 (applies to models 12IJCV51A13A and 12IFCV51AD1A). The settings reflects existing plant configuration. 1. ENSURE the tap screws are screwed into the ten-ampere tap (GIH) for the IFCV, and into the 1 OA tap for the IJCV (Ref. E02-1AP04, Sheet 017) 2. SET the time delay to 3 seconds for both relays B-3 WIRING SETUP NOTE: Relay wiring setup (applies to models 12IJCV51A13A and 12IFCV51AD1A) in figure B-1 are based on plant schematic diagram E02-1DG99 sheet 011. The wiring setup reflects existing plant configuration. 1. SET the voltage source to provide 120V AC 2. SET the current source to supply approximately 4.2A ac to simulate CT secondary current with the generator at full load for (see basis below): Per E02-1APOI sheet 005, the diesel is rated for 4.16KV, 3875KW at 0.8PF, and is loaded not more than 85% of rated power. Also each CT ratio have turns ratio of 800-5A. At full load: I= (3875000W * 0.85)/ (0.8PF * 4160V * ..../3) = 571.435A With CT ration of 800-5A, CT secondary at full load= (571.435 * 5)/800 = 3.571A 3. SET the DC power supply to provide 125VDC. ENSURE the DMM reads zero current when the setup is powered u EC 620632, Attachment 3, Page 17 of 29 Test Specification No.: 424-008-TSPl Revision: 00 POWER SUPPLY 125VDC + Page: B3 of B4 I t.:J I I 7 s I I 5 r:: : I I I I I I I -I I GE OVERCIJRREl'-JT RELAY I I MODEL #121FCV51A01A I I I I I I I --JDMMf---1/lllllr-l-tJ 2 6 C:-1--RESISTOR I I l.5KO I I sow L -------FIGUREB-1 Wiring setup for Overcurrent Relay B-4 RELAY FUNCTIONAL TEST Bench Test: AC CURRENT SOURCE 1. The wiring setup is powered up and verified to no trip (a trip is indicated by the illumination of a 120V, lOOW light bulb and the DMM) 2. The current source is gradually increased until the light bulb illuminates. The current value should be recorded. Oven Test: * The wiring setup is powered up and current source is set to 4.2A. The setup is placed in the oven. Monitor and record DMM reading and light bul EC 620632, Attachment 3, Page 18 of 29 B.5 TEST RESULTS Bench Test: Expected TABLEB-1 Test Specification No.: 424-008-TSPl Revision: 00 Page: B4 of B4 Result Light bulb should illuminate when the For the 12IJCV51A13A: Record current when Light bulb illuminated current approaches lOA (+/-2A) for both relays For the 12IFCV51AD1A: Record current when Light bulb illuminated Oven Test: TABLEB-2 DMM Reading (Amps)/Light bulb status Expected Result O/Not lit EC 620632, Attachment 3, Page 19 of 29 ATTACHMENTC Test Specification No.: 424-008-TSPI Revision: 00 Page: Cl ofC3 Differential Relay Type SA-I (Westinghouse, part# 290B225Al0)
: Inclusion on this list does not imply that the NRC inspector reviewed the documents in their entirety, but rather that selected sections or portions of the documents were evaluated as part of the overall inspection effort.
EC 620632, Attachment 3, Page 20 of 29 Test Specification No.: 424-008-TSPl Revision: 00 Page: C2 of C3 C-1 TOOLS AND EQUIPMENT * 120V-100W, 120V-200W, and 130V-200Wlightbulbs * Variable resistor * Ammeter * 125VDC Power Supply * 208V AC power supply C-2 CALIBRATION NOT REQUIRED FOR THIS TEST C-3 WIRING SETUP + EXT. RESISTOR 2.24K SS 4011 REQ FOR 250VOC RATED Of------1[ = DC .i--t::=>-PHASE:2 @ lG>A 19 17 @ 13' I I SAi RELAY I . (FRONT VIEW) I PHASE 3 I I I I I I I I I .__ ---J t -.a---_____ j VOLTAGE o---------1..__----< 12$ WLT WI. SWITCH Figure C-1 Differential Relay Type SA-1 Wiring Setup C-4 RELAY FUNCTIONAL TEST NOTE: Test instruction is per ABB relay type SA-1 user manual 208 VAC * Differential Characteristic: Apply IR of 5 amperes and adjust the operating current (Io) until the relay operates. Repeat for each phase as shown on the figure abov EC 620632, Attachment 3, Page 21 of 29 C.5 TEST RESULTS Bench Test: Expected TABLE C-1 Test Specification No.: 424-008-TSPl Revision: 00 Page: C3 of C3 Result Phase 1: Record current when Lamp and light bulb illuminates The relay should operate and the indicator lamp should light with an operating Phase 2: Record current when Lamp and current (Io) of 0.25 +/- 0.012 amperes. light bulb illuminates Phase 3: Record current when Lamp and light bulb illuminates Oven Test: TABLEC-2 Indicator Lamp/Light bulb status Expected Result The lamp or bulb should not be lit EC 620632, Attachment 3, Page 22 of 29 ATTACHMENT D Test Specification No.: 424-008-TSPl Revision: 00 Page: Dl ofD3 GE Loss of Excitation Relay Test -Model# 12CEH51A1A EC 620632, Attachment 3, Page 23 of 29 D-1 TOOLS AND EQUIPMENT * 120V, 1 OOW light bulb * 6.9ohm, lOOW resistor * 125VDC Power Supply * 120V AC power supply * 50-SVA CTs * D-2 RELAY CALIBRATION NOTE: Test Specification No.: 424-008-TSPl Revision: 00 Page: D2 ofD3 The relay settings below are per station calculation 19-AN-14 table 1, the settings reflects existing plant configuration. See GE publication GEK-27887H (Loss Of Excitation Relay Instruction manual) for more detail 1. OFFSET setting: Set the tap screw for L is at 0.0, and tap screw for H is at 1.0 for a relay offset of 1.0 Ohm. 2. RESTRAIN setting: Set upper restrain tap (Iu) to 6, and the lower restrain tap (IL) to 40; for a total restrain of 46%. D-3 WIRING SETUP 120//3 13.90 120//3 c LOSS OF EXCITATION RELAY Figure D-1 Loss of Excitation Relay Type CEH51A EC 620632, Attachment 3, Page 24 of 29 D-4 RELAY FUNCTIONAL TEST Bench Test: Test Specification No.: 424-008-TSPI Revision: 00 Page: D3 ofD3 1. With the setup wired as shown above, power up the setup and adjust the three phase load bank to draw approximately 5A from each phase of the power 120VAC supply. 2. Based on the CT turns ratio of 10: 1, 7-loops on the primary side will generate a secondary current of 3.5A (see basis is section B-3 step 2). This simulates the generator running at full load. Ensure the relay does not trip. 3. With the setup de-energized, carefully lift the leads on relay terminals 7 and 8, reverse connections to simulate a loss of excitation. The relay should trip Oven Test: * Place the setup in the oven. Power up the setup and adjust the load bank to pull 5A from each phase of the 120VAC source. Monitor light bulb. D.5 TEST RESULTS Bench Test: TABLED-I Expected Result Light bulb should illuminate when the leads on relay terminals 7 and 8 are reversed Oven Test: TABLED-2 Indicator Lamp/Light bulb status Expected Result The lamp or bulb should not be lit EC 620632, _Attachment 3, Page 25 of 29 ATTACHMENT E Test Specification No.: 424-008-TSPI Revision: 00 Page: El ofE3 GE Reverse Power Relay Test -Model# 12GGP53CIA EC 620632, Attachment 3, Page 26 of 29 Test Specification No.: 424-008-TSPl Revision: 00 Page: E2 of E3 E-1 TOOLS AND EQUIPMENT * 120V, lOOW light bulb * 6.9ohm, 1 OOW resistor * 125VDC Power Supply * 120V AC power supply * 50-5VA CTs E-2 RELAY CALIBRATION * TIME DELAY setting: Set the time delay knob to 5 and half (for a 15 seconds delay). E-3 WIRING SETUP 50:5 CT ""' 7--TURNS SA 9 14 120V 13.90 -120/./3 N) ------\. / 120//3 2 "13. 90 ' .i 5 7-TURNS 5. ""' ./'I e' ' 7 8 REVERSE TER'--tli-41-N-'--A-L 1-r-<::r----e o-b c-d e-f TO *\-RIP RELA y 12 REVERSE POWER RELAY Figure E-1 Reverse Power Relay Type GGP53C EC 620632, Attachment 3, Page 27 of 29 E-4 RELAY FUNCTIONAL TEST Bench Test: Test Specification No.: 424-008-TSPl Revision: 00 Page: E3 of E3 1. With the setup wired as shown above, power up the setup and adjust the three phase load bank to draw approximately 5A from each phase of the power 120VAC supply. 2. Based on the CT turns ratio of 10:1, 7-loops on the primary side will generate a secondary current of3.5A (see basis is section B-3 step 2). This simulates the generator running at full load. Ensure the relay does not trip. 3. With the setup de-energized, carefully lift the leads on relay terminals 3 and 4, 5 and 6, 7 and 8. Reverse connections on these terminals to simulate reverse power. The relay should trip Oven Test: * Place the setup in the oven. Power up the setup and adjust the load bank to pull 5A from each phase of the 120VAC source. Monitor light bulb. E.5 TEST RESULTS Bench Test: TABLEE-1 Expected Result Light bulb should illuminate when the terminals on the relay for each phase are swapped. Oven Test: TABLEE-2 Indicator Lamp/Light bulb status Expected Result The lamp or bulb should not be lit Lamp or bulb did not light up EC 620632, Attachment 3, Page 28 of 29 ATTACHMENT F Test Specification No.: 424-008-TSPI Revision: 00 Page: Fl of F2 Woodward Governor Control Assembly Model 2301A
: Inclusion of a document on this list does not imply NRC acceptance of the document or any part of it, unless this is stated in the body of the inspection report. 1R15 Operability Evaluations -
<( ..... 0 M N _J w 0 0 26 25 13 11 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 EC 620632, Attachment 3, Page 29 of 29 , ... I J 120V AC AcjJ Generate + 125VDC A. Test Specification No.: 424-008-TSPI Revision: 00 Page: F2 of F2 DVM 3&#xa2; 60Hz Adj. CcjJ Fig. F-1 EC 620632, Attachment 4 Evaluation of EPRI August 22"d, 2017 Notice PT-082117-122, Subject: 10 CFR Part 21-Transfer of Information Notice -GOTHIC-Code Error related to thermal conductor modelling could impact safety related components/applications From: Winter, Steven D.[mallto:*winters@zachrygrnup.com] Sent: Monday, August28, 2017 4:42 PM * To: Freeman1. John.M:(GenCo"'Nuc); Gandhir Mukesh M:(GenCo-Nuc) Cc: Lane, Jeffrey W. * Subject: RE: EPRI Part 21 Transfer-ofiriformation Notice related to GOTHIC vS.1 and vB.2 John aM Mukesh, Zachry has completed the evaluation of Projects 2003 {Clinton SX Pump-Room Heat-up) and 2007 {Clinton DG Room Heat-up) for any adverse effects related to GOTHIC Al8.2-095, which was described in th,e Part 21 Notice from EPRI. ow evaluation involved (a} retrrevingthe GOTHIC .GTH fF!es developed for the Clinton* reports frorn our QA storage, (b) running each GOTHIC .GTH file on a single CPU core, and {c} re-running each GOTHIC .GTH file.after implementing the workaround described in the Part 21 This process lets us identify any changes to the GOTHIC .SIN (which a .GTH fife c9ntairiedthe GOTHIC error) ang let5 us compare results qf each case, before and after theworRaround all while controlling for varfap!es. For the two Clinton there were no visible differences in the results; any engineering condusions in the report5 ere unaffected. Some .GTH files we:re, however, f!agg&#xa2;d as producing different .SIN fifes after the workarou.nd was performed. We provide the .GTH. files ta you for your use* in the future. Aftematwely, you can implement the simple workaround the next trrne you use any of the .GTH files from these two projects. If you *want the 'ftxed' files, let me know and I will transmit them via Sharefi!e. As these projects were non-OA, this should be an acceptable *niethod of the files. Please !et me knovl/ if you have any questions. *Thank you, Steve Steven D. Winter Manager I Principal Consultant I:;
: CC-AA-10, "Configuration Control Process Description" Revision 2 -
: CC-AA-102, "Design Input and Configuration Change Impact Screening" Revision 7 -
: CC-AA-102, "Design Input and Configuration Change Impact Screening" Revision 13 -
: CC-AA-103, "Configuration Change Control for Permanent Physical Plant Changes" Revision 6 -
: CC-AA-103, "Configuration Change Control for Permanent Physical Plant Changes" Revision 13 -
: CC-AA-103-1001, "Configuration Change Control Guidance" Revision 7 -
: CC-AA-103-1003, "Owner's Acceptance Review of External Engineering Technical Products" Revision 12 -
: CC-AA-107, "Configuration Change Acceptance Testing Criteria" Revision 3  
-
: CC-AA-107, "Configuration Change Acceptance Testing Criteria" Revision 4 -
: CC-AA-107, "Configuration Change Acceptance Testing Criteria" Revision 5 -
: CC-AA-107, "Configuration Change Acceptance Testing Criteria" Revision 6
-
: CC-AA-309, "Control of Design Analyses" Revision 7
-
: CC-AA-309-1001, "Guidelines for Preparation and Processing Design Analysis" Revision 4  
-
: CC-AA-309-1001, "Guidelines for Preparation and Processing Design Analysis" Revision 9
-
: ER-AA-2007, "Evaluating Margins" Revision 0 -
: HU-AA-1212, "Technical Task Risk/Rigor Assessment, Pre-Job Brief, Independent Third Party Review, and Post-Job Brief" Revision 2 -
: SM-AA-300, "Procurement Engineering Support Activities" Revision 2
-
: SM-AA-300, "Procurement Engineering Support Activities" Revision 3
-
: SM-AA-300-1001-F-01, "Item Equivalency Evaluation" Revision 5 -
: MA-AA-716-004, "Conduct of Troubleshooting" Revision 15 -
: MA-AA-716-004, Attachment 1, Troubleshooting Log" Revision 15 
-
: CPS 8492.01C001, "Cable Termination Checklist" Revision 23
-
: CPS 9080.21, "Diesel Generator 1A - ECCS Integrated" Revision 33f
-
: EC 351247, "Documentation Updates for Alternate GE CR120BD05041 Control Relay Replacing ITE J13PA3312 Control Relays in 1AP60E5E and 1AP61E5E DG Building MCCs Only" -
: EC 366624, "Documentation Updates for Alternate GE CR120BD04341 Control Relay Replacing ITE J13PA4312 Control Relays in 1AP11E3A and 1AP12E3A Unit Substation 1A &
: 1B Only" -
: EC 330624, "Class 1E MCC Molded Case Circuit Breaker Control Unit (Bucket) RE Placements" - PE Evaluation # 57906 "Item Equivalency Evaluation for the GE CR120BD04341 Relay"
-
: PO 00425009, GE CR120BD Relay
-
: PO 00436126, Agastat Relay
-
: PO 00443270, GE CR120BD Relay
-
: PO 00518354, Agastat Relay -
: AR 03982792, "1AP11E427X2-41A Making Loud Clicking Sound" 
-
: AR 03984142, "EC
: 366624 Potential Vulnerability Review" -
: AR 03978312, "Loss of Power"
-
: AR 03978324, "Lost 138 KV Feed Causing ERAT Transient" -
: AR 03983615, "Missed Surveillance of Division 2 Load Shed and Sequencing Relays" -
: AR 03983309, "9080.21 Testing Requirements"
-
: AR 03984164, "Relay 427X6-41B That Was Removed Will Not Be Replaced"
-
: WO 00705887, "EQ-CL023 Gould Auxiliary Relay (J13PA4312)"
-
: WO 01356500, "Replace Relay 1AP11E - 427X2-41A"
-
: WO 01752269, "EQ-CL023 - Replace Agastat Time Delay Relays" -
: WO 01686217, "Calibrate Relay 427X2-41A" -
: WO 04609243, "EOID: 1AP11E427X2-41A Making Loud Clicking Sound"
- DWG E02-1AP99, Sheet 1, Auxiliary Power System 6900V Bus 1A Main Feed
: BKR 552-501A - DWG E02-1AP99, Sheet 80, Auxiliary Power System 480V Buses 1A & 1B DC Failure and AC Under Voltage - DWG E03-1AP11E, Sheet 2,Internal - External Wiring Diagram 480V Unit Substation 1A - DWGM05-1001, Sheet 1, Standard Symbols Piping and Instrumentation Diagram
- DWG M05-1001, Sheet 2, Standard Symbols Piping and Instrumentation Diagram
- DWG M05-1001, Sheet 3, Standard Symbols Piping and Instrumentation Diagram
- DWG M05-1001, Sheet 4, Standard Symbols Piping and Instrumentation Diagram - DWG E02-1VD99, Sheet 1, Diesel Generator Ventilation System Diesel Generator Room 1A Vent Fan - DWG E02-1AP12, Sheet 22, Relaying & Metering Diagram 480V Unit Substations 1A, A,
: 1B & B - DWG E02-1AP04, Sheet 3, 480V & 4169V Relay Settings
==LIST OF ACRONYMS==
: [[USED]] [[]]
: [[ADAMS]] [[Agencywide Document Access Management System]]
: [[AR]] [[Action Request]]
: [[AV]] [[Apparent Violation]]
: [[CDF]] [[Core Damage Frequency]]
: [[CFR]] [[Code of Federal Regulations]]
: [[EA]] [[Enforcement Action]]
: [[EC]] [[Engineering Change]]
: [[EDG]] [[Emergency Diesel Generator]]
: [[GE]] [[General Electric]]
: [[IMC]] [[Inspection Manual Chapter]]
: [[LERF]] [[Large Early Release Frequency]]
: [[MCC]] [[Motor Control Center]]
: [[NRC]] [[]]
: [[U.S.]] [[Nuclear Regulatory Commission]]
: [[PRA]] [[Probabilistic Risk Assessment]]
: [[RAI]] [[Request for Additional Information]]
: [[SDP]] [[Significance Determination Process]]
: [[SPAR]] [[Standardized Plant Analysis Risk]]
: [[SRA]] [[Senior Reactor Analyst]]
: [[TS]] [[Technical Specification]]
: [[USAR]] [[Updated Safety Analysis Report WO Work Order]]
}}
}}

Revision as of 00:13, 23 February 2018

Clinton Power Station - NRC Inspection Report 05000461/2017009 And Preliminary White Finding
ML17226A321
Person / Time
Site: Clinton Constellation icon.png
Issue date: 08/14/2017
From: Louden P L
Division Reactor Projects III
To: Bryan Hanson
Exelon Generation Co
References
EA-17-098 IR 2017009
Download: ML17226A321 (16)
v • d • e


Text

B. August 14, 2017 EA-17-098

Mr. Bryan Senior VP, Exelon Generation Company, LLC President and CNO, Exelon Nuclear 4300 Winfield Road Warrenville, IL 60555

SUBJECT: CLINTON POWER STATION-NRC INSPECTION REPORT 05000461/2017009 AND PRELIMINARY WHITE FINDING

Dear Mr. Hanson:

On August 3, 2017, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at your Clinton Power Station, Unit 1. The inspectors presented the results of this inspection during an exit meeting with Mr. B. Kapellas and other members of your staff. The results of this inspection are documented in the enclosed report. The enclosed inspection report documents a self-revealed finding with an associated apparent violation that the NRC has preliminarily determined to be White, with low to moderate safety significance of Title 10 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, "Design Control" and an associated Technical Specification (TS) violation of TS 3.8.1, "AC Sources-Operating." This finding involved the licensee's failure to evaluate the change in the actual drop out voltages for replacement relays associated with the Division 1 Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) Room Vent Fan, which was a component subject to the requirements of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B. The change in drop out voltages prevented the fan from operating during an under voltage condition, resulting in the Division 1 EDG being unable to perform its intended safety function and becoming inoperable. We assessed the significance of the finding using the significance determination process (SDP) and readily available information. We are considering escalated enforcement for the apparent violation consistent with the NRC's Enforcement Policy, which can be found at http://www.nrc.gov/about-nrc/regulatory/enforcement/enforce-pol.html. Because we have not made a final determination, no notice of violation is being issued at this time. Please be aware that further NRC review may prompt us to modify the number and characterization of the apparent violation(s). This finding does not represent an immediate safety concern based upon the licensee's actions to restore the Division 1 EDG room vent fan to the original design and declaring the Division 1 EDG operable.

We intend to issue our final significance determination and enforcement decision, in writing, within 90 days from the date of this letter. The NRC's SDP is designed to encourage an open dialogue between your staff and the NRC; however, neither the dialogue nor the written information you provide should affect the timeliness of the staff's final determination. Before the NRC makes a final decision on this matter, you may choose to communicate your position on the facts and assumptions used to arrive at the finding and assess its significance by either; (1) attending and presenting at a Regulatory Conference, or (2) submitting your position in writing. The focus of a Regulatory Conference is to discuss the significance of the finding. Written responses should reference the inspection report number and enforcement action number associated with this letter in the subject line. Your written response should be sent to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Center, Washington, DC 20555-0001, with a copy to Ms. Karla Stoedter, Chief, Branch 1, Division of Reactor Projects, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Region III, 2443 Warrenville Road, Lisle, IL 60532. If you request a Regulatory Conference, it should be held within 40 days of the receipt of this letter. Please provide information you would like us to consider or discuss with you at least 10 days prior to any scheduled conference. If a Regulatory Conference is held, it will be open for public observation. If you decide to submit only a written response, such submittal should be sent to the NRC within 40 days of your receipt of this letter. If you choose not to request a Regulatory Conference or to submit a written response, you will not be allowed to appeal the NRC's final significance determination. Please contact Ms. Karla Stoedter at 630-829-9731, and in writing, within 10 days from the issue date of this letter to notify the NRC of your intentions. If we have not heard from you within 10 days, we will continue with our significance determination and enforcement decision. The final resolution of this matter will be conveyed in separate correspondence. This letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be made available for public inspections and copying at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html and at the NRC Public Document room in accordance with 10 CFR 2.930, "Public Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding."

Sincerely,/RA Julio F. Lara Acting for/ Patrick L. Louden, Director Division of Reactor Projects

Docket No. 50-461 License No. NPF-62

Enclosure:

Inspection Report 05000461/2017009 cc: Distribution via LISTSERV

SUMMARY

Inspection Report 05000461/2017009; 03/07/2017 - 08/03/2017; Clinton Power Station; Unit 1, Operability Determinations and Functionality Assessments. The enclosed inspection report documents a finding that has preliminarily been determined to be White, a finding with low to moderate safety significance, that may require additional

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) inspections, regulatory actions, and oversight, with an associated violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, "Design Control," and Technical Specification (TS) 3.8.1, "AC Sources-Operating." The significance of inspection findings is indicated by their color (i.e., greater than Green or Green, White, Yellow, Red) and determined using Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 0609, "Significance Determination Process," dated April 29, 2015. Cross-cutting aspects are determined using IMC 0310, "Aspects Within the Cross-Cutting Areas," dated December 4, 2014. All violations of NRC requirements are dispositioned in accordance with the NRC's Enforcement Policy, dated November 1, 2016. The NRC's program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described in NUREG-1649, "Reactor Oversight Process," dated July 2016.

NRC-Identified

and Self-Revealed Findings

Cornerstone: Mitigating Systems Preliminary

White.

A self-revealed finding preliminarily determined to be of low to moderate safety significance, and an associated apparent violation of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, "Design Control," was identified on March 9, 2017, for the licensee's failure to implement measures for the selection and review for suitability of application replacement relays for the Division 1 Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) Room Vent Fan, which were components subject to the requirements of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B. Specifically, Engineering Changes 330624 and 366624 failed to evaluate the change in the actual drop out voltages for replacement relays on the associated fan circuitry, and instead, introduced new relays into the circuit that resulted in the failure of the fan to operate during an under voltage condition. This rendered the Division 1 EDG inoperable for a time longer than its technical specification allowed outage time, which was a violation of Technical Specification 3.8.1, "AC Sources-Operating." The licensee entered this issue into the corrective action program as action request (AR) 03982792. Corrective actions for this issue included restoring the circuit to allow the ventilation fan to operate and returning the emergency diesel generator to an operable condition.

The inspectors determined that the licensee's failure to verify the suitability of the replacement relays for the Division 1 EDG room vent fan was contrary to the requirements of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III and a performance deficiency which was within the licensee's ability to foresee and correct. The performance deficiency was determined to be more than minor because it was associated with the design control attribute of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of the systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, the failure to verify the suitability of the replacement relays prior to installation in the Division 1 EDG room vent fan circuitry resulted in the inoperability and unavailability of the Division 1 EDG from May 18, 2016 to March 11, 2017, when one of the unsuitable relays was replaced. Using IMC 0609, Appendix A, "Significance Determination Process for 3 Findings At-Power," dated June 19, 2012, a Significance and Enforcement Review Panel preliminarily determined the finding to be of low to moderate safety significance. The inspectors determined that this finding affected the cross-cutting area of human performance in the aspect of challenge the unknown, where individuals stop when faced with uncertain conditions. Risks are evaluated and managed before proceeding.

Specifically, a questioning attitude was not used to understand the consequence of the differences in relay features resulting with installing a relay that was incompatible with the current design. [H.11] (Section 1R15)4

REPORT DETAILS

REACTOR SAFETY

Cornerstone:

Mitigating Systems

1R15 Operability Determinations and Functionality Assessments

Main article: IP 71111.15

.1 Operability Evaluations

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the following issue:

  • 1AP11E427X2-41A Making a loud clicking sound (AR 03982792) The inspectors selected this potential operability issue based on the risk significance of the associated components and systems. The inspectors evaluated the technical adequacy of the evaluation to ensure that Technical Specifications (TS) operability was properly justified and the subject component or system remained available such that no unrecognized increase in risk occurred. The inspectors compared the operability and design criteria in the appropriate sections of the TS and Updated Safety Analysis Report (USAR) to the licensee's evaluation to determine whether the components or systems were operable. Where compensatory measures were required to maintain operability, the inspectors determined whether the measures in place would function as intended and were properly controlled. The inspectors determined, where appropriate, compliance with bounding limitations associated with the evaluations. Additionally, the inspectors reviewed corrective action documents initiated to verify that the licensee was identifying and correcting any deficiencies associated with operability evaluations. This operability inspection constituted one sample as defined in IP 71111.15-05.

b. Findings

Failure to Evaluate Replacement Relays for Suitability

Introduction.

A self-revealing, preliminary White finding associated with an Apparent Violation (AV) of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, "Design Control," and an associated violation of TS 3.8.1 was identified for the licensee's failure to implement measures for the selection and review for suitability of application replacement relays for the Division 1 Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) Room Vent Fan, which were components subject to the requirements of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B. Specifically, Engineering Changes 330624 and 366624 failed to evaluate the change in the actual drop out voltages for replacement relays and introduced new relays into the system, preventing the fan from operating during an under voltage condition and rendering the Division 1 EDG inoperable from May 18, 2016 to March 11, 2017.

Description.

On March 7, 2017, an equipment operator heard a clicking noise coming from Unit Substation 1A while performing rounds. The operator notified the control room operators and documented the issue in AR 03982792. Upon investigation, the licensee 5 determined the noise was coming from relay 427X2-41A (commonly called the X2 relay). Relay 427X2-41A is an Agastat time delay relay that provides a signal to reset the load shed and resequencing circuit for the Division 1 EDG room vent fan. Further troubleshooting determined that the relay was cycling every ten seconds. With the relay cycling, the room vent fan could not start automatically nor be started locally.

On March 9, 2017, the licensee declared the Division 1 EDG inoperable since the vent fan was required to support EDG operation. Additional troubleshooting determined that the X2 relay was cycling because of a relay coordination issue between the X2 relay and circuit seal in relay 427X3-41A (commonly called the X3 relay). The licensee determined that the audible clicking noise likely began on February 24, 2017, when a grid disturbance resulted in a power loss to the emergency reserve auxiliary transformer that was supplying power to the Division 1 safety bus and Unit Substation 1A. However, the clicking noise was not immediately recognized. Under a normal loss of voltage or under-voltage condition, the X2 and the X3 relays should have de-energized, allowing the circuit to reset and start the room vent fan. In this specific case, the coordination issue prevented both relays from dropping out as required. This resulted in the circuit being unable to reset and allow the fan to start. The inspectors reviewed the design change history associated with the replacement of safety-related relays and found that the license issued engineering change (EC) 330624 in 2002. The scope of this EC was to evaluate and authorize alternative replacement motor control center (MCC) control units and associated components for safety-related 480V alternating current and 125V direct current MCCs located in mild environments.

This EC also evaluated the use of General Electric (GE) CR120BD relays for suitability in the plant, but it did not evaluate the use of the GE relays in specific plant locations or components. In January 2008, the licensee implemented a design change to replace X3 relays in the plant (which at the time were Gould J13 relays) with GE CR120BD relays due to obsolescence of the Gould J13 relays. Engineering Change 366624 was issued to allow replacing the Gould J13 relays with GE CR120BD control relays in Unit Substations 1A and 1B. In addition to the X3 relay replacement described above, the licensee also replaced the X2 relay in December 2011 and on May 16, 2016. However, variations in the drop out voltages of both relays and the associated impact that these variations could have on the proper operation of both relays was not evaluated nor understood until after the clicking noise was heard in March 2017. Specifically, the inspectors found that EC 366624 failed to evaluate the use of GE CR120BD relays for suitability in the load shed and resequencing circuit for the Division 1 EDG room vent fan but instead used an item equivalency evaluation which simply stated that the authorization and qualification of the relay was completed under EC 330624. The inspectors questioned the licensee to determine how EC 330624 evaluated the GE CR210BD relay for suitability of application in the Division 1 EDG room vent fan circuit since the EC only provided the following general statements with regards to the relays:

  • These replacement units will retain the functionality of the electrical circuit and all associated electrical characteristics to maintain the existing licensing and design basis; 6
  • The replacement equipment will have no adverse effect on the operation of the AC or DC systems; and
  • The replacement GE CR120BD 125V relays are equivalent to the Gould J13 125V relays. The electrical characteristics of the existing and replacement relays are shown in attached Table 5 [of the EC] [emphasis added].

The inspectors reviewed Table 5 of EC 330624 and found that it simply listed the characteristics of the Gould J13 and the GE CR120BD relays and provided no evaluation or justification for any characteristics that were not exactly the same such as the relay drop out voltages. Therefore, the inspectors determined that EC 330624 only looked at replacing individual relays and did not the evaluate whether the GE CR120BD relay's operating characteristics, including drop out voltage, would operate/coordinate properly when placed in a circuit that contained an additional relay such as the X2 Agastat relay. The licensee performed a root cause evaluation for this issue and concluded that the Division 1 EDG room vent fan failed to operate properly due to personnel not understanding the design basis of the Division 1 EDG room vent fan circuit specific to relay coordination and not understanding the impact the relay coordination had on the operation of the fan during the EC process. The report further stated that having a full understanding of the technical and licensing bases for safety related structures, systems, and components and fully evaluating any changes to these bases was fundamental to design control. In this case, avoidance of a relay coordination condition is fundamental to electrical design. Both EC 330624 and EC 366624 assumed that only a relay independent actuation function evaluation was required rather than an evaluation of the combination of relays for this timing circuit. As a result, replacement of the Gould J13 relay with a GE 120BD relay in January 2008 created a relay coordination condition where the Division 1 EDG room vent fan circuit's sequence of operation was adversely affected due to variations in the relays' electrical characteristics. However, this adverse interaction did not become apparent until after the under-voltage condition occurred on February 24, 2017. To correct the immediate relay coordination issue, the X3 relay was replaced with a Gould J13 relay, the load shed and resequencing circuit was tested satisfactorily, and the licensee declared the Division 1 EDG operable on March 11, 2017.

Analysis.

Title 10 of the CFR, Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, "Design Control," requires, in part, that measures be established for the selection and review for suitability of application of materials, parts, equipment, and processes that are essential to the safety-related functions of the structures, systems and components. The inspectors determined that the licensee's failure to verify the suitability of the replacement relays for the Division 1 EDG room vent fan was contrary to the requirements of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, and a performance deficiency. Specifically, the licensee failed to evaluate the change in the actual drop out voltages for replacement relays associated with the Division 1 EDG room vent fan, and, as a result, failed to recognize that installation of a GE CR120BD relay in conjunction with the Agastat time delay relay was not a suitable modification of the Division 1 EDG room vent fan circuitry. The performance deficiency was determined to be more than minor in accordance with IMC 0612, "Power Reactor Inspection Reports," Appendix B, "Issue Screening," dated September 7, 2012, because it was associated with the design control attribute of the 7 Mitigating Systems cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of the systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, the installation of unsuitable relays in the Division 1 EDG room vent fan circuit resulted in the inoperability and unavailability of the Division 1 EDG due to the inability of the room vent fan to start during under-voltage or loss of voltage conditions.

During this inspection, the licensee provided the inspectors with a copy of Evaluation 619834, "Evaluate Survivability of Equipment in the Division 1 Diesel Generator Room Due to Failure of EDG Ventilation Fan 1VD01CA." The purpose of this evaluation was to demonstrate that the Division 1 EDG would operate successfully for the mission time provided in the licensee's probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) without the fan operating.

The inspectors reviewed Evaluation 619834 and concluded that the licensee had not provided a reasonable basis to show the EDG would have been able to perform its function for the PRA mission time. Specifically, panel internal temperature would have reached approximately 240°F, a point where some of the key components would have been susceptible to failure. Based upon this conclusion, the inspectors continued with the significance determination. The inspectors determined the finding could be evaluated using the SDP in accordance with IMC 0609, "Significance Determination Process," Attachment 4, "Initial Characterization of Findings," dated October 7, 2016 and Appendix A, "The Significance Determination Process for Findings at Power," Exhibit 2, "Mitigating Systems Screening Questions," dated June 19, 2012. The finding represented an actual loss of system safety function of the Division 1 EDG for greater than its Technical Specification 3.8.1, Condition B.4, allowed outage time of 14 days. Therefore, a detailed risk evaluation was performed in accordance with IMC 0609, Appendix A. A Region III Senior Reactor Analyst (SRA) performed a detailed risk evaluation using the Standard Plant Analysis Risk (SPAR) model, Version 8.50, for Clinton Power Station.

The following changes were made to the base model prior to performing the detailed risk evaluation.

  • Room cooling was assumed to be required for diesel generator success. This assumption is based on the current Clinton PRA model of record. Basic events for fans and dampers that are needed for room cooling of Division 1, 2, and 3 diesel generators were added to the SPAR model, along with the appropriate failure probabilities, including common cause failure probabilities. A common cause component group for Division 1, 2, and 3 ventilation fans was defined.
  • The potential to recover room cooling by opening doors to the diesel generator rooms was added to the base model. NRC staff reviewed the licensee's technical analysis which included room heat-up calculations and component testing and concluded that if operators opened doors to the room within 30 minutes after diesel generator start and ventilation fan failure there was adequate justification to conclude the diesel generator mission would be met.
  • The human error probability for the failure to recover room cooling was estimated using the SPAR Human Reliability Analysis Method (SPAR-H). The SRA 8 determined that the performance shaping factor that would be a performance driver was high stress. The human error probability estimate for the failure to recover room cooling was 2.2E-2. This estimate is consistent with the detailed risk evaluation for a similar finding on the EDG fan supply damper documented in NRC Integrated Inspection Report 05000461/2012004.
  • To account for the fact that a diesel generator would not fail immediately upon room cooling failure, the offsite power non-recovery probabilities that are in the baseline model were modified if the failure of the diesel generator occurred because of the loss of room cooling. Two additional hours were assumed to be available for offsite power recovery. For example, the value of the basic event for 4 hour4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> offsite power non-recovery became a 6 hour6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> offsite power non-recovery.
  • For loss of offsite power sequences in which Division 1 and 2 emergency power fails but the high pressure core spray system is operating, offsite power recovery is assumed to be required within 20 hours2.314815e-4 days <br />0.00556 hours <br />3.306878e-5 weeks <br />7.61e-6 months <br /> or containment venting is required. The degraded plant condition was modeled as follows:
  • The basic event representing the Division 1 diesel generator room cooling fan failure to start was set to "True" to model the fan failure as a result of the performance deficiency.
  • The exposure time for the degraded condition was approximately 10 months. The exposure period started when the relay was replaced on May 18, 2016 and ended when the relay was again replaced and the diesel generator fan was returned to service on March 11, 2017. Using the assumptions as stated above, the internal events change in core damage frequency (CDF) estimate was approximately 2.5E-6/yr, which represents a finding of low to moderate safety significance (White). The dominant core damage sequence was a loss of offsite power event, failure of the Division 1, 2, and 3 diesel generators, and the failure to recover power before battery depletion. For the external event risk contribution, the SRA evaluated seismic and fire risk. The SPAR model was used to estimate the contribution from seismic events. The fire risk contribution was evaluated in a manner similar to a previous SDP evaluation for a service water pump failure that was documented in NRC Integrated Inspection Report 05000461/2015001. That evaluation used fire-induced loss of offsite power frequencies that were documented in a response to a request for additional information (RAI) for a license amendment request to extend EDG allowed outage times dated March 22, 2001.

The SRA concluded that any risk contribution from external events would not change the preliminary conclusion on risk significance generated using the internal event risk contribution. Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 0609, Appendix H, "Containment Integrity Significance Determination Process," was used to estimate the change in large early release frequency (LERF) risk contribution. Clinton has a Mark III containment building. The LERF factor for station blackout events with core damage at high pressure is 0.2. This factor was applied to the delta CDF estimate of 2.5E-6/yr. to obtain a delta LERF 9 estimate of 4.9E-7/yr. This risk estimate also supports a White finding. The SRA did not pursue refinement of this value and concluded that the overall significance of the finding should be based on the delta CDF estimate. The inspectors determined that this finding affected the cross-cutting area of human performance in the aspect of challenge the unknown, where individuals stop when faced with uncertain conditions. Risks are evaluated and managed before proceeding.

Specifically, a questioning attitude was not used to understand the consequence of the differences in relay features resulting with installing a relay that was incompatible with the current design. [H.11]

Enforcement.

Title 10 of the CFR, Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, "Design Control," requires, in part, that measures be established for the selection and review for suitability of application of materials, parts, equipment, and processes that are essential to the safety-related functions of the structures, systems and components. Technical Specification (TS) 3.8.1, "AC Sources-Operating," Condition B.4, states, in part, that an inoperable diesel generator be restored to an operable status within 14 days. From January 2008, until March 11, 2017, the licensee failed to review for suitability of application parts essential to the safety-related function of the Division 1 EDG room vent fan. Specifically Engineering Changes 330624 and 366624 failed to consider the effect of the changes in the actual relay drop out voltages on the operation of the Division 1 EDG room vent fan circuitry prior to replacing the X2 and X3 relays on May 18, 2016 and January 2008, respectively. The failure to properly evaluate the effects of the drop out voltages for both relays prevented the room vent fan from operating during an under voltage condition, resulting in the Division 1 EDG being inoperable from May 18, 2016 to March 11, 2017, a period greater than the allowed by the limiting condition for operation outage time provided in TS 3.8.1. The licensee documented this issue in AR 03982792. Corrective actions implemented included replacing one of the relays with the previous design and performing post maintenance testing to ensure the operability of the room vent fan. Additionally, the licensee planned a future modification to the circuit to allow installation of a GE CR120BD relay while maintaining the operation of the vent fan and the Division 1 EDG. (AV 05000461/2017009-01: Failure to Evaluate Replacement Relay Dropout Voltage)

4OA6 Management Meeting

.1 Exit Meeting Summary On August 3, 2017, the inspectors presented the inspection results to Mr. B. Kapellas and other members of the licensee staff.

The licensee acknowledged the issues presented. The inspectors confirmed that none of the potential report input discussed was considered proprietary. ATTACHMENT:

SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION

KEY POINTS OF CONTACT

Licensee

T. Stoner, Site Vice President
B. Kapellas, Plant Manager
D. Avery, Regulatory Assurance
R. Bair, Work Management Director
J. Cunningham, Maintenance Director
T. Dean, Training Director
C. Dunn, Operations Director
K. Engelhardt, Outage Manager
M. Friedmann, Emergency Preparedness Manager
M. Heger, Senior Manager Plant Engineering
T. Krawyck, Engineering Director
W. Marsh, Organizational Effectiveness Manager
S. Minya, Operations Training Manager
F. Paslaski, Radiation Protection Manager
K. Pointer, Regulatory Assurance
D. Shelton, Regulatory Assurance Manager
S. Strickland, Shift Operations Superintendent
J. Ward, Chemistry Manager
J. Wilson, Senior Manager Plant Engineering
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission K. Stoedter, Chief, Reactor Projects Branch 1
W. Schaup, Clinton Senior Resident Inspector

LIST OF ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED

Opened

05000461/2017009-01 AV Failure to Evaluate Replacement Relay Dropout Voltage (Section 1R15)

LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED

The following is a partial list of documents reviewed during the inspection.

Inclusion on this list does not imply that the NRC inspector reviewed the documents in their entirety, but rather that selected sections or portions of the documents were evaluated as part of the overall inspection effort.
Inclusion of a document on this list does not imply NRC acceptance of the document or any part of it, unless this is stated in the body of the inspection report. 1R15 Operability Evaluations -
CC-AA-10, "Configuration Control Process Description" Revision 2 -
CC-AA-102, "Design Input and Configuration Change Impact Screening" Revision 7 -
CC-AA-102, "Design Input and Configuration Change Impact Screening" Revision 13 -
CC-AA-103, "Configuration Change Control for Permanent Physical Plant Changes" Revision 6 -
CC-AA-103, "Configuration Change Control for Permanent Physical Plant Changes" Revision 13 -
CC-AA-103-1001, "Configuration Change Control Guidance" Revision 7 -
CC-AA-103-1003, "Owner's Acceptance Review of External Engineering Technical Products" Revision 12 -
CC-AA-107, "Configuration Change Acceptance Testing Criteria" Revision 3

-

CC-AA-107, "Configuration Change Acceptance Testing Criteria" Revision 4 -
CC-AA-107, "Configuration Change Acceptance Testing Criteria" Revision 5 -
CC-AA-107, "Configuration Change Acceptance Testing Criteria" Revision 6

-

CC-AA-309, "Control of Design Analyses" Revision 7

-

CC-AA-309-1001, "Guidelines for Preparation and Processing Design Analysis" Revision 4

-

CC-AA-309-1001, "Guidelines for Preparation and Processing Design Analysis" Revision 9

-

ER-AA-2007, "Evaluating Margins" Revision 0 -
HU-AA-1212, "Technical Task Risk/Rigor Assessment, Pre-Job Brief, Independent Third Party Review, and Post-Job Brief" Revision 2 -
SM-AA-300, "Procurement Engineering Support Activities" Revision 2

-

SM-AA-300, "Procurement Engineering Support Activities" Revision 3

-

SM-AA-300-1001-F-01, "Item Equivalency Evaluation" Revision 5 -
MA-AA-716-004, "Conduct of Troubleshooting" Revision 15 -
MA-AA-716-004, Attachment 1, Troubleshooting Log" Revision 15

-

CPS 8492.01C001, "Cable Termination Checklist" Revision 23

-

CPS 9080.21, "Diesel Generator 1A - ECCS Integrated" Revision 33f

-

EC 351247, "Documentation Updates for Alternate GE CR120BD05041 Control Relay Replacing ITE J13PA3312 Control Relays in 1AP60E5E and 1AP61E5E DG Building MCCs Only" -
EC 366624, "Documentation Updates for Alternate GE CR120BD04341 Control Relay Replacing ITE J13PA4312 Control Relays in 1AP11E3A and 1AP12E3A Unit Substation 1A &
1B Only" -
EC 330624, "Class 1E MCC Molded Case Circuit Breaker Control Unit (Bucket) RE Placements" - PE Evaluation # 57906 "Item Equivalency Evaluation for the GE CR120BD04341 Relay"

-

PO 00425009, GE CR120BD Relay

-

PO 00436126, Agastat Relay

-

PO 00443270, GE CR120BD Relay

-

PO 00518354, Agastat Relay -
AR 03982792, "1AP11E427X2-41A Making Loud Clicking Sound"

-

AR 03984142, "EC
366624 Potential Vulnerability Review" -
AR 03978312, "Loss of Power"

-

AR 03978324, "Lost 138 KV Feed Causing ERAT Transient" -
AR 03983615, "Missed Surveillance of Division 2 Load Shed and Sequencing Relays" -
AR 03983309, "9080.21 Testing Requirements"

-

AR 03984164, "Relay 427X6-41B That Was Removed Will Not Be Replaced"

-

WO 00705887, "EQ-CL023 Gould Auxiliary Relay (J13PA4312)"

-

WO 01356500, "Replace Relay 1AP11E - 427X2-41A"

-

WO 01752269, "EQ-CL023 - Replace Agastat Time Delay Relays" -
WO 01686217, "Calibrate Relay 427X2-41A" -
WO 04609243, "EOID: 1AP11E427X2-41A Making Loud Clicking Sound"

- DWG E02-1AP99, Sheet 1, Auxiliary Power System 6900V Bus 1A Main Feed

BKR 552-501A - DWG E02-1AP99, Sheet 80, Auxiliary Power System 480V Buses 1A & 1B DC Failure and AC Under Voltage - DWG E03-1AP11E, Sheet 2,Internal - External Wiring Diagram 480V Unit Substation 1A - DWGM05-1001, Sheet 1, Standard Symbols Piping and Instrumentation Diagram

- DWG M05-1001, Sheet 2, Standard Symbols Piping and Instrumentation Diagram

- DWG M05-1001, Sheet 3, Standard Symbols Piping and Instrumentation Diagram

- DWG M05-1001, Sheet 4, Standard Symbols Piping and Instrumentation Diagram - DWG E02-1VD99, Sheet 1, Diesel Generator Ventilation System Diesel Generator Room 1A Vent Fan - DWG E02-1AP12, Sheet 22, Relaying & Metering Diagram 480V Unit Substations 1A, A,

1B & B - DWG E02-1AP04, Sheet 3, 480V & 4169V Relay Settings

LIST OF ACRONYMS

USED [[]]
ADAMS Agencywide Document Access Management System
AR Action Request
AV Apparent Violation
CDF Core Damage Frequency
CFR Code of Federal Regulations
EA Enforcement Action
EC Engineering Change
EDG Emergency Diesel Generator
GE General Electric
IMC Inspection Manual Chapter
LERF Large Early Release Frequency
MCC Motor Control Center
NRC [[]]
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
PRA Probabilistic Risk Assessment
RAI Request for Additional Information
SDP Significance Determination Process
SPAR Standardized Plant Analysis Risk
SRA Senior Reactor Analyst
TS Technical Specification
USAR Updated Safety Analysis Report WO Work Order
Retrieved from "https://kanterella.com/w/index.php?title=IR_05000461/2017009&oldid=316779"