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July 19, 1988 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attn:   Document Control Desk Mail Stop Pl-137 Washington, D.C.                 20555 Gentlemen:                                                               ULNRC ~ 1809 DOCKET NUMBER 50-483 CALLAWAY PLANT j                             SIMULATOR FACILITY CERTIFICATION U
July 19, 1988 U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attn:
Document Control Desk Mail Stop Pl-137 Washington, D.C.
20555 Gentlemen:
ULNRC ~ 1809 DOCKET NUMBER 50-483 CALLAWAY PLANT j
SIMULATOR FACILITY CERTIFICATION U


==References:==
==References:==
: 1)   ULNRC-1686 dated November 30, 1987                 i
1)
                                                  --2 )   NRC Letter from T. W. Alexion to.                   l D. F. Schnell dated June 21, 1988 Reference 1 transmitted the certification of the Callaway                                   I Simulator"in accordance with 10CFR55.45. Provided herewith                                     i are responses to NRC's request for additional data transmitted by Reference 2.
ULNRC-1686 dated November 30, 1987 i
--2 )
NRC Letter from T. W. Alexion to.
D.
F.
Schnell dated June 21, 1988 Reference 1 transmitted the certification of the Callaway Simulator"in accordance with 10CFR55.45.
Provided herewith are responses to NRC's request for additional data transmitted by Reference 2.
If there are any' additional questions, please contact us.
If there are any' additional questions, please contact us.
Very truly yours, 1
Very truly yours, 1
l Donald F. Schnell SMH/heb                                                                                     o i
Donald F.
QV          Attachments                                                                          (00? '
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            . STATE OF MISSOURI )                                                                                                                                 )
. STATE OF MISSOURI )
                                                            )         sS                                                                                           i CITY OF ST. LOUIS )
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Donald F. Schnell, of lawful age, 'being' first duly sworn upon oath says that he is Senior Vice President-Nuclear and an officer of Union Electric Company; that he has read the foregoing document and 'knows the content thereof; that he has executed the' same for and on behalf of said company with full power and authority to do so; and that the facts therein stated are-true and correct to the best of his knowledge , information and belief.
Donald F.
Schnell, of lawful age, 'being' first duly sworn upon oath says that he is Senior Vice President-Nuclear and an officer of Union Electric Company; that he has read the foregoing document and 'knows the content thereof; that he has executed the' same for and on behalf of said company with full power and authority to do so; and that the facts therein stated are-true and correct to the best of his knowledge, information and belief.
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By_                       .i                   L Donald F. Schnell Senior Vice President Nuclear SUBSCRIBED arid sworn t o before me this /9b day of                                                                                         , 1987 0/
By_
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Donald F.
Schnell Senior Vice President Nuclear SUBSCRIBED arid sworn t o before me this /9b day of 1987 0/
BARDA[ J PFAff NOTARY PUBUC, STATE OF MISSOURI NY COMMISSION EXPIRES APRIL 22, 1989 ST.' LOUIS COUN1%
BARDA[ J PFAff NOTARY PUBUC, STATE OF MISSOURI NY COMMISSION EXPIRES APRIL 22, 1989 ST.' LOUIS COUN1%
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:                                                                                                                                            1 cc:     Gerald Charnoff, Esq.
Shaw,_Pittman, Potts & Trowbridge l
Shaw,_Pittman, Potts & Trowbridge                                                                                       l 2300-N. Screet, N.W.
2300-N. Screet, N.W.
Washington, D.C.         20037 Dr. J. O. Cermak                                                                                                       '
Washington, D.C.
CFA, Inc. _                                               '
20037 Dr.
J.
O. Cermak CFA, Inc. _
4 Professional Drive (Suite 110)
4 Professional Drive (Suite 110)
Gaithersburg, MD         20879 R. C. Knop Chief, Reactor Project Branch 1
Gaithersburg, MD 20879 R.
                          -U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region III                                                                                                               i 799 Roosevelt Road Glen Ellyn, Illinois 60137 Bruce Little Callaway Resident Office U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission RR$1 Steedman, Missouri       6507/
C.
Knop Chief, Reactor Project Branch 1
-U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region III i
799 Roosevelt Road Glen Ellyn, Illinois 60137 Bruce Little Callaway Resident Office U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission RR$1 Steedman, Missouri 6507/
Tbm Alexion (2)
Tbm Alexion (2)
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Mail Stop 316 7920 Norfolk Avenue Bethesda, MD   20014 Manager, Electric Department                       ,
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation U.S.
Missouri Public Service Commission P.O. Box 360 Jefferson City, MO 65102 29)U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Document Control Desk                               -
Nuclear Regulatory Commission Mail Stop 316 7920 Norfolk Avenue Bethesda, MD 20014 Manager, Electric Department Missouri Public Service Commission P.O.
Washington, D.C. 20SSS t
Box 360 Jefferson City, MO 65102 29)U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN:
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Sha f or /A160. 761
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                                        -p.         J. Walker O. Maynard (WCNOC)
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N. P. Goel (Bechtel)
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            , July 12, 1988 Callaway Plant Simulator Certification Response to NRC Questions TABLE OF CONTENTS 1.0       Response to questions ATTACEMENTS A)         TDP-ZZ-00009, Course Deficiences B)         TDP-ZZ-00013, Call.away Simulator Modifications C)         OSP-ZZ-00001,   Control Room   Shift   And                   Daily Log Readings And Channel Checks D)         OTG-ZZ-00004, Power Operations l
July 12, 1988 Callaway Plant Simulator Certification Response to NRC Questions TABLE OF CONTENTS 1.0 Response to questions ATTACEMENTS A)
E)         List of Malfunctions tested F)       Malfunction test abstracts G)         Certification testing schedule I
TDP-ZZ-00009, Course Deficiences B)
i l
TDP-ZZ-00013, Call.away Simulator Modifications C)
OSP-ZZ-00001, Control Room Shift And Daily Log Readings And Channel Checks D)
OTG-ZZ-00004, Power Operations l
E)
List of Malfunctions tested F)
Malfunction test abstracts G)
Certification testing schedule i
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July 12, 1988 Callaway Plant Simulator Certification Response to NRC Questions GENERAL OUESTIONS
July 12, 1988 Callaway Plant Simulator Certification Response to NRC Questions GENERAL OUESTIONS 1.
: 1. No specific action   is required other than       to   respond   to questions 2, 3, and 4.
No specific action is required other than to respond to questions 2, 3,
: 2. A list of the   Malfunction performance tests           conducted for  your  information. Abstracts (attachment E) is provided used for Malfunction performance tests were obtained from a
and 4.
            ' Malfunction   Description'     document     used   by     simulator instructors. Copies of specific malfunction           descriptions tested are attached (attachment F) for review as requested.
2.
: 3. A general statement in procedure APA-ZZ-00645, Simulator Configuration Management, indicated that items would continue to be tested on an'cngoing basis. A specific schedule was not included to     minimize   the     paper   requirement       of   the certification     submittal.     A   schedule     for     simulator certification testing during the next four years is provided as requested (attachment G).                                            .
A list of the Malfunction performance tests conducted (attachment E) is provided for your information.
: 4. No exceptions are being taken to the standard.         Tests   not applicable to the Callaway Plant are         not   being conducted.
Abstracts used for Malfunction performance tests were obtained from a
This is not an exception, but rather,         a   limitation due to plant configuration.
' Malfunction Description' document used by simulator instructors.
Copies of specific malfunction descriptions tested are attached (attachment F) for review as requested.
3.
A general statement in procedure APA-ZZ-00645, Simulator Configuration Management, indicated that items would continue to be tested on an'cngoing basis.
A specific schedule was not included to minimize the paper requirement of the certification submittal.
A schedule for simulator certification testing during the next four years is provided as requested (attachment G).
4.
No exceptions are being taken to the standard.
Tests not applicable to the Callaway Plant are not being conducted.
This is not an exception, but
: rather, a
limitation due to plant configuration.
SIMULATOR CONFIGURATION MANAGEMENT PROCEDURE Page 4, Section 4.0.
SIMULATOR CONFIGURATION MANAGEMENT PROCEDURE Page 4, Section 4.0.
Controlled copies of procedures are used in       the   Callaway Plant Simulator.
Controlled copies of procedures are used in the Callaway Plant Simulator.
Page 5, Section 4.1.1.7.
Page 5, Section 4.1.1.7.
Section 3.1.1(7) of the standard refers to ' Normal Plant Evolutions'. Operation of the Callaway Plant at less than full flow, at power, is not a ' Normal Plant Evolution',but rather.a situation in which Plant Technical Specifications During require a those  six reduction to Hot Standby within six hours.
Section 3.1.1(7) of the standard refers to ' Normal Plant Evolutions'. Operation of the Callaway Plant at less than full flow, at power, is not a ' Normal Plant Evolution',but rather.a situation in which Plant Technical Specifications require a
hours, a plant shutdown is required.       A special   test   procedure allowed the plant to be operated in natural circulation during the initial core startup. This was a special test and not part of ' Normal Plant Evolutions'. The Callaway Plant is not allowed to operate es a normal evolution at less than full flow (i.e. 3 loop operation) and therefore this         item is not applicable for the     Callaway   Plant   Simulator. The Natural Circulation statement will be removed because       at no time would circulation as a the plant be operated at power in       natural normal plant evolution.
reduction to Hot Standby within six hours.
l
During those six hours, a plant shutdown is required.
  .,            Page 6, Section 4.1.2.
A special test procedure allowed the plant to be operated in natural circulation during the initial core startup.
The   procedure     will   be corrected                                                     ta             read:   "shall   be simulated" to correspond with the requirement of the standard.
This was a special test and not part of ' Normal Plant Evolutions'. The Callaway Plant is not allowed to operate es a normal evolution at less than full flow (i.e. 3 loop operation) and therefore this item is not applicable for the Callaway Plant Simulator.
Pl.nt License     Event   Reports   ( LER 's) ,                                                             Incident     Reports (IR's), Significant Operatina Event Reports (SOER's), etc. are evaluated for impact on simulator operations as part of the Course Deficiences.
The Natural Circulation statement will be removed because at no time would the plant be operated at power in natural circulation as a
Course   Deficiency   review per TDP-ZZ-00009,incorported Any items that have simulator impact are configuration on                                                                            the simulator and tested as         part   of the                                                                                   control process.
normal plant evolution.
l Page 6, Section 4.1.2.
The procedure will be corrected ta read:
"shall be simulated" to correspond with the requirement of the standard.
Pl.nt License Event Reports
( LER 's),
Incident Reports (IR's), Significant Operatina Event Reports (SOER's), etc. are evaluated for impact on simulator operations as part of the Course Deficiences.
Course Deficiency review per TDP-ZZ-00009,incorported on the Any items that have simulator impact are simulator and tested as part of the configuration control process.
Page 8, Section 4.4.2.
Page 8, Section 4.4.2.
New malfunctions based on plant operating experience are included as part of the configuration control process                                                                           of the Course Deficiency review per TDP-ZZ-00009, Course                                                                           Deficiences (attachment       A),   and   TDP-ZZ-00013,                                                                   Callaway     Simulator Modifications (attachment B) .
New malfunctions based on plant operating experience are included as part of the configuration control process of the Course Deficiency review per TDP-ZZ-00009, Course Deficiences (attachment A),
and TDP-ZZ-00013, Callaway Simulator Modifications (attachment B).
Page 10, Section 5.2.3.
Page 10, Section 5.2.3.
Section 5.2.3 of procedure APA-ZZ-00645                                                                     will be     revised as follows to comply with section 4.1(3) of the standard:
Section 5.2.3 of procedure APA-ZZ-00645 will be revised as follows to comply with section 4.1(3) of the standard:
                          " ...shall agree within +/-2% of the                                                                     callaway Plant parameters and shall not detract from training..."
...shall agree within +/-2% of the callaway Plant parameters and shall not detract from training..."
Page 10, Section 5.3.1.
Page 10, Section 5.3.1.
Section 5.3.1 of procedure APA-ZZ-00645                                                                     will be revised replacing the term "trip" with "automatic                                                                       action" to comply with section 4.2.1(c) of the standard.
Section 5.3.1 of procedure APA-ZZ-00645 will be revised replacing the term "trip" with "automatic action" to comply with section 4.2.1(c) of the standard.
Automatic actions associated with                                                     valves and biscables are controlled by "logic statements" within the valve handlers and bistable handlers.       Setpoints are validated by comparison agiainst the plant .setpoint document referred to as the "JU8000". These logic tests and setpoint tests are conducted as part of the configuration control process at the time that changes are made to the various handlers.                                                                         Automatic actions during the evolutions are validated by monitoring control board indications and alarms.
Automatic actions associated with valves and biscables are controlled by "logic statements" within the valve handlers and bistable handlers.
Setpoints are validated by comparison agiainst the plant.setpoint document referred to as the "JU8000".
These logic tests and setpoint tests are conducted as part of the configuration control process at the time that changes are made to the various handlers.
Automatic actions during the evolutions are validated by monitoring control board indications and alarms.
Page 11, Section 5.3.3.
Page 11, Section 5.3.3.
The safety parameter display system                                                                   has     been   previously engineered to monitor the parameters that are necessary during the use of the emergency procedures and are considered to include the critical parameters. If any additional parameters are required for a specific minor malfunction,                                                                         they can be easily added to the monitor file.
The safety parameter display system has been previously engineered to monitor the parameters that are necessary during the use of the emergency procedures and are considered to include the critical parameters.
If any additional parameters are required for a specific minor malfunction, they can be easily added to the monitor file.
Page 11, Section 5.4.
Page 11, Section 5.4.
The message area for the simulator and the plant SPDS is normally displayed and available to the operators in the control room. This is not unique to the simulator.                                                                                 The message is visible to both the operator and the simulator instructor.
The message area for the simulator and the plant SPDS is normally displayed and available to the operators in the control room.
This is not unique to the simulator.
The message is visible to both the operator and the simulator instructor.
_3
_3


          .                                                                                            l only the critical paramnters used by SPDS are checked                         i against upper and lower limits for message generation.                         For i
only the critical paramnters used by SPDS are checked i
groups of redundant parameters, two or more must exceed limits                           i to generate the offscale message.           This prevents a' failure of a single channel from providing an off-scale indication to the operator. Since the parameters included in the SPDS are required for safe shutdown of the . unit it includes an all 4
against upper and lower limits for message generation.
inclusive list of critical parameters.
For groups of redundant parameters, two or more must exceed limits i
Page 11, Section 5.5.
to generate the offscale message.
Parametric and time resolution requirements are not delineated in section 4.4 of the standard,                     our monitoring capabilities however, do meet the requirement of 0.5 seconds or less used in appendix B of the standard. Plots done from collected data were generated at a lessor frequency of 1.0 second because it took less time to generate graphs with no perceptable differences over plots generated                       at     higher frequencies.
This prevents a' failure of a single channel from providing an off-scale indication to the operator.
Since the parameters included in the SPDS are required for safe shutdown of the. unit it includes an all inclusive list of critical parameters.
4 Page 11, Section 5.5.
Parametric and time resolution requirements are not delineated in section 4.4 of the
: standard, our monitoring capabilities however, do meet the requirement of 0.5 seconds or less used in appendix B of the standard.
Plots done from collected data were generated at a lessor frequency of 1.0 second because it took less time to generate graphs with no perceptable differences over plots generated at higher frequencies.
Page 14, Section 6.4.3.
Page 14, Section 6.4.3.
10CFR55.45 requires that 25% of the tests be performed each year.           Since some sort of records are required to document conduct of the tests, it is our intent to update the annual report and locate the records in one document.                           If '
10CFR55.45 requires that 25% of the tests be performed each year.
Since some sort of records are required to document conduct of the tests, it is our intent to update the annual report and locate the records in one document.
If '
discrepancies are found they must be reported. By treating the annual report as a living document, the reporting requirement can be easily met.
discrepancies are found they must be reported. By treating the annual report as a living document, the reporting requirement can be easily met.
Page 15, Section 7.4.
Page 15, Section 7.4.
The final revision of NUREG-1258 has been received and will be referenced in future revisions to the procedure.                     This final revision was issued after the completion of the initial certification testing and was therefore not referenced.                                 j ANNUAL REPORT Page 4, Sectioh 2.9, Paragraph 1.
The final revision of NUREG-1258 has been received and will be referenced in future revisions to the procedure.
Data was recorded every 0.25 seconds to                   meet     the requirements of the standard, but it was determined by a trial and error         that plotting on a one second time interval provided adequate visual presentation of the data.
This final revision was issued after the completion of the initial certification testing and was therefore not referenced.
j ANNUAL REPORT Page 4, Sectioh 2.9, Paragraph 1.
Data was recorded every 0.25 seconds to meet the requirements of the standard, but it was determined by a trial and error that plotting on a
one second time interval provided adequate visual presentation of the data.
Page 4, Section 2.10.
Page 4, Section 2.10.
i Baseline data from the plant is only available for the reactor trip transient. The plant has not experienced any of the other nine transients in the Appendix B.                     A   table top review of 'all transients was conducted by the simulator certification review group with members from engineering, operations, training and simulator groups.                   All curves were             ,
i Baseline data from the plant is only available for the reactor trip transient.
reviewed for trend and negative impact on training prior to                             I accepting the transient grapns.               During the           course     of       j training, the emergency procedures can be followed by the                               I operators adding credibility to the simulation fidelity.                                 l During the Appendix B transients, however, no operator action is taken for a majority of the transients.                                             i l
The plant has not experienced any of the other nine transients in the Appendix B.
A table top review of
'all transients was conducted by the simulator certification review group with members from engineering, operations, training and simulator groups.
All curves were reviewed for trend and negative impact on training prior to accepting the transient grapns.
During the course of j
training, the emergency procedures can be followed by the operators adding credibility to the simulation fidelity.
During the Appendix B transients, however, no operator action is taken for a majority of the transients. _ _ _.


1
\\
  .                                                                                      \
j Page 1, Items 1.6 and 1.7 Two sets of photographs were taken and compared to determine differences between the Callaway Plant Control Room and the Callaway Plant Simulator Control Room.
.      ..                                                                              j Page 1, Items 1.6 and 1.7 Two sets of photographs were taken and compared to                   l determine differences between the Callaway Plant Control Room and the Callaway Plant Simulator Control Room.                 A second comparison has been done and         additional minor differences have been discovered and documented. Actions to resolve these differences are expected to be completed by November of 1988.
A second comparison has been done and additional minor differences have been discovered and documented. Actions to resolve these differences are expected to be completed by November of 1988.
CHECKLIST Page 1, Item 1.2.
CHECKLIST Page 1, Item 1.2.
No additional information is available on two SPDS panels that cannot be obtained on a single SPDS panel.             To limit cost with no reduction in training value, it was decided not to purchase and simulate the KC008, SP010, RRIS, and second SPDS panels.
No additional information is available on two SPDS panels that cannot be obtained on a single SPDS panel.
The major users of Training in the above areas, with the exception of SPDS, is presently addressed in the On-The-Job Training fo operators and over the past few years has been shown to be adequate.                                           ,
To limit cost with no reduction in training value, it was decided not to purchase and simulate the KC008, SP010, RRIS, and second SPDS panels.
The major users of Training in the above areas, with the exception of SPDS, is presently addressed in the On-The-Job Training fo operators and over the past few years has been shown to be adequate.
Page 1, Item 1.3.
Page 1, Item 1.3.
Simulator control room lighting levels do not prevent the operators from viewing the indications available and therefore have no negative impact on training. Lighting levels vary in intensity to simulate normal and emergency lighting conditions and to provide the operators with the feel of associated changes in lighting levels. The need to perform a formal study of   lighting level changes between normal and                 emergency conditions has been identified and documented.               It is     our intent to perform a review and submic the results                 to the certification review board at their next meeting.
Simulator control room lighting levels do not prevent the operators from viewing the indications available and therefore have no negative impact on training.
Lighting levels vary in intensity to simulate normal and emergency lighting conditions and to provide the operators with the feel of associated changes in lighting levels. The need to perform a formal study of lighting level changes between normal and emergency conditions has been identified and documented.
It is our intent to perform a review and submic the results to the certification review board at their next meeting.
Page 2, Item 1.4.
Page 2, Item 1.4.
No formal evaluation     of noise levels associated with the VHF system has been done.       We feel that the VHF system does not impact communications     in the control room.         The channels are normally muted to a         very low background level during normal plant operations.
No formal evaluation of noise levels associated with the VHF system has been done. We feel that the VHF system does not impact communications in the control room.
The channels are normally muted to a
very low background level during normal plant operations.
Page 4 and 5, Items 1.9 and 1.10.
Page 4 and 5, Items 1.9 and 1.10.
Section 3.2.2 of the ANSI /ANS-3.5-1985 standard           does not require the       entire plant   computer     system   displays to be simulated.
Section 3.2.2 of the ANSI /ANS-3.5-1985 standard does not require the entire plant computer system displays to be simulated.
Plant computer displays available in the plant           that   are not currently simulated include:
Plant computer displays available in the plant that are not currently simulated include:
Point Display Point Summan                                                   ,
Point Display Point Summan Bar Chart Display Alarm CRT i
Bar Chart Display                                             l Alarm CRT                                                     i Alarm Printer
Alarm Printer -


Other than the Alarm- CRT and Alarm Printer,         these displays perform no automatic initiations during normal, abnormal, or emergency conditions, and do not affect the safe operation of the. plant. The video trend feature of the plant computer and the SPDS system in addition to the main control board trend recorders provide the most frequently used means to trend important plant parameters.
Other than the Alarm-CRT and Alarm
The Alarm CRT is a documented deficiency identified through our existing student feedback process. The Alarm Printer and CRT are expected to be available for training use by August 1988.
: Printer, these displays perform no automatic initiations during
: normal, abnormal, or emergency conditions, and do not affect the safe operation of the. plant.
The video trend feature of the plant computer and the SPDS system in addition to the main control board trend recorders provide the most frequently used means to trend important plant parameters.
The Alarm CRT is a
documented deficiency identified through our existing student feedback process.
The Alarm Printer and CRT are expected to be available for training use by August 1988.
Page 6, Item 1.11.
Page 6, Item 1.11.
Providing trending capability on the plant computer is   in excess of what is required during normal,         abnormal,   and emergency evolutions. Providing trending capability on only one of the available CRT's is adequate to meet or exceed the requirements of section 3.2.2 on         the   ANSI /ANS-3.5-1985 standard.
Providing trending capability on the plant computer is in excess of what is required during
: normal, abnormal, and emergency evolutions.
Providing trending capability on only one of the available CRT's is adequate to meet or exceed the requirements of section 3.2.2 on the ANSI /ANS-3.5-1985 standard.
Page 6, Item 1.12.
Page 6, Item 1.12.
The computer Alarm CRT display is currently implemented on the simulate.r development system and should be transferred into the training load in August of 1988. The Alarm Printer software is completed. As soon as the hardware is ready to support moving a printer into the simulator control room the Alarm Printer will also be added to the simulator.
The computer Alarm CRT display is currently implemented on the simulate.r development system and should be transferred into the training load in August of 1988.
The Alarm Printer software is completed.
As soon as the hardware is ready to support moving a printer into the simulator control room the Alarm Printer will also be added to the simulator.
Page 6, Item 1.13.
Page 6, Item 1.13.
The following items were treated as special features since     ;
The following items were treated as special features since they were added to the simulator after the initial installation of the simulator at the training facility:
they were added to the         simulator   after   the   initial   ;
)
installation of the simulator at the training facility:             )
RM11 Radiation Monitoring Console SPDS Safety Parameter Display System Emergency Telephone System Merge Capability on the PA System The RMil Console is not required for normal, abnormal, and emergency evolutions.
RM11 Radiation Monitoring Console                             l SPDS Safety Parameter Display System                         !
The panel provides an alternate method for the operator to obtain radiological information about the plant. This information is also available from other nlant indications. Simulation of this panel exceeds the requirements of the standard and is therefore identified as a
Emergency Telephone System                                   l Merge Capability on the PA System 1
special feature.
The RMil Console is not required for normal, abnormal, and     !
Training on this panel could be performed in the control room RMll panel.
emergency evolutions. The panel provides an alternate method       l for the operator to obtain radiological information about the plant. This information is also available from other nlant indications. Simulation of this panel exceeds the requirements of the standard and is therefore identified as a special feature. Training on this panel could be performed in the control room RMll panel. Simulation training on this panel is considered an enhancement.
Simulation training on this panel is considered an enhancement.,
en
en


                  .The SPDS is not rcquired for normal, abnormal, anel emergency evolutions. The panel provides an alternate method
.The SPDS is not rcquired for
      ,      for the operator to obtain           information about the plant condition that is already available on other control room indications.       Simulation   of   this   panel   exceeds   the requirements of the standard and is therefore identified as- a special feature. Training on this panel cou'd be performed in the control room or at the Technical Support Facility.
: normal, abnormal, anel emergency evolutions.
Simulation training on         this   panel   is   considered   an enhancement.
The panel provides an alternate method for the operator to obtain information about the plant condition that is already available on other control room indications.
The Emergency Telephone system is a special feature since the student can actually call the county and state using the emergency phone line. The phone system is personnel only used to support Radiological Emergency Response Plan (RERP)         drill training.
Simulation of this panel exceeds the requirements of the standard and is therefore identified as-a special feature.
The PA system in general         is   a   requirement   for communication between the         students   and   the   simulator instructor. The merge capability is a special feature since the student can actually communicate with the plant. The merge position is only used to support Radiological Em(rgency Response Plan (RERP) drill training.
Training on this panel cou'd be performed in the control room or at the Technical Support Facility.
In general, it is our interpretation of the standard that not all panels in the control room are required to be functionally simulated as implied by the question.         The full scope simulator includes the operating consoles (the main control boards) and control panels required for manual safety actions,     equipment surveillance,     and   to   monitor   plant conditions under normal and accident conditions.             Some of these panels may contain visually simulated hardware if no dynamic interface is required. The extent of simulation is based on required operator actions to conduct normal plant evolutions and respond to malfunctions.
Simulation training on this panel is considered an enhancement.
Page 6,   Item 2.1.
The Emergency Telephone system is a special feature since the student can actually call the county and state using the emergency phone line.
1 With a computer cycle time of approximately 50%, a simple test of monitoring a perceived difference       between real time and simulation time was considered to be more than adequate.
The phone system is personnel only used to support Radiological Emergency Response Plan (RERP) drill training.
A stop watch was used to measure the real time while the
The PA system in general is a
~,'            simulator console displayed the simulation time. No perceived difference could be detected, thus meeting the requirements of real time operation. Graphs of the transients also verified no perceived difference in ' time.     A complex test was not considered to be desired or appropriate with a computer cycle time of 50% percent.
requirement for communication between the students and the simulator instructor. The merge capability is a special feature since the student can actually communicate with the plant. The merge position is only used to support Radiological Em(rgency Response Plan (RERP) drill training.
In general, it is our interpretation of the standard that not all panels in the control room are required to be functionally simulated as implied by the question.
The full scope simulator includes the operating consoles (the main control boards) and control panels required for manual safety
: actions, equipment surveillance, and to monitor plant conditions under normal and accident conditions.
Some of these panels may contain visually simulated hardware if no dynamic interface is required.
The extent of simulation is based on required operator actions to conduct normal plant evolutions and respond to malfunctions.
Page 6, Item 2.1.
1 With a computer cycle time of approximately 50%, a simple test of monitoring a perceived difference between real time and simulation time was considered to be more than adequate.
A stop watch was used to measure the real time while the simulator console displayed the simulation time.
No perceived
~,'
difference could be detected, thus meeting the requirements of real time operation.
Graphs of the transients also verified no perceived difference in ' time.
A complex test was not considered to be desired or appropriate with a computer cycle time of 50% percent.
A more elaborate time measurement could be developed but may not be more reliable or effective at measuring real time.
A more elaborate time measurement could be developed but may not be more reliable or effective at measuring real time.
A more accurate method may be necessary if computer cycle time       j is increased closer to 100%.                                         l Page 9,   Item 7.1 The Loss of Instrument and DC buses malfunctions are scheduled to be added in January of 1989 and November of 1988 respectively.
A more accurate method may be necessary if computer cycle time j
  ~
is increased closer to 100%.
STEADY STATE TESTS
Page 9, Item 7.1 The Loss of Instrument and DC buses malfunctions are scheduled to be added in January of 1989 and November of 1988 respectively.
.          At present, the reference plant data is only compared to the simulator at one condition, either BOL, MOL, or EOL. The condition used for comparison is dependent upon the amount of change in core configuration as well as the receipt and incorporation of new reload data into the simulatut               nre model. 100% steady state data for the remaining conditicna         is then extrapolated or calculated using the existing Stable 100%
 
Initial Condition. It is anticipated that once wc-reach         ycle 5 (assuming no significant core load changes), tr e changes from one reload to another will be minimal and BOL 100% steady state data will become the benchmarx for comparison of the reference plant to the simulator for MOL and EOL conditions.
~
The basis for determining a difference between the plant and the simulator assumes a perception by the control room operator. The operator can only determine a change by monitoring available indications. A small indication change will remain undetected. A movement of greater than 2% for critical parameters is assumed to be             detectable.     All differences must be based on the indications available to the operator in the control room.
STEADY STATE TESTS At present, the reference plant data is only compared to the simulator at one condition, either BOL, MOL, or EOL.
Calculations of percent difference is based on indicator scales of the actual plant control room indications. The top of the scale is considered to be 100% and the bottom of the scale is considered to be 0%.         To meet the 2% and 10%
The condition used for comparison is dependent upon the amount of change in core configuration as well as the receipt and incorporation of new reload data into the simulatut nre model. 100% steady state data for the remaining conditicna is then extrapolated or calculated using the existing Stable 100%
deviation requirement between the plant and the simulator a deviation of less than this indicator movement was allowable.
Initial Condition. It is anticipated that once wc-reach ycle 5 (assuming no significant core load changes),
Some scales had values from 0 to 100.       The calculation for these indications is merely a straight difference,             other scales had values such as 1700 to 2500 or 100 to 700.         Scales were normalized to the 0% to 100%           positions, then the difference     was   determined. The   consistancy     in   the calculations is based on the scale of the indication.
tr e changes from one reload to another will be minimal and BOL 100% steady state data will become the benchmarx for comparison of the reference plant to the simulator for MOL and EOL conditions.
Exceptions were boron concentration and switch positions which do not readily allow a percent calculation.         For these items the mismatch was merely noted.
The basis for determining a difference between the plant and the simulator assumes a perception by the control room operator.
For the 50%,     80%, and 100% tests       tha   containment temperature difference does not exceed the       criteria in the standard. Differences are as follows:
The operator can only determine a
50%     6.2%, 4.3%, 3.4%, and 2.9%
change by monitoring available indications.
80%     6.1%, 4.6%, 3.7%, and 3.2%
A small indication change will remain undetected.
100%     5.5%, 4.5%, 4.1%, and 4.4%
A movement of greater than 2%
for critical parameters is assumed to be detectable.
All differences must be based on the indications available to the operator in the control room.
Calculations of percent difference is based on indicator scales of the actual plant control room indications.
The top of the scale is considered to be 100% and the bottom of the scale is considered to be 0%.
To meet the 2%
and 10%
deviation requirement between the plant and the simulator a
deviation of less than this indicator movement was allowable.
Some scales had values from 0 to 100.
The calculation for these indications is merely a
straight difference, other scales had values such as 1700 to 2500 or 100 to 700.
Scales were normalized to the 0%
to 100%
positions, then the difference was determined.
The consistancy in the calculations is based on the scale of the indication.
Exceptions were boron concentration and switch positions which do not readily allow a percent calculation.
For these items the mismatch was merely noted.
For the 50%,
80%,
and 100%
tests tha containment temperature difference does not exceed the criteria in the standard.
Differences are as follows:
50%
6.2%, 4.3%, 3.4%, and 2.9%
80%
6.1%, 4.6%, 3.7%, and 3.2%
100%
5.5%, 4.5%, 4.1%, and 4.4%
The mismatch was calculated as follows:
The mismatch was calculated as follows:
Determining meter scales by observation on control board GN TI-61 meter scale........ 0-400 degrees F GN TI-63 meter sclae........ 0-400 degrees F GN TI-60 meter scale........ 0-400 degrees F GN TI-62 meter scale........ 0-400 degrees F l
Determining meter scales by observation on control board GN TI-61 meter scale........
0-400 degrees F GN TI-63 meter sclae........
0-400 degrees F GN TI-60 meter scale........
0-400 degrees F GN TI-62 meter scale........
0-400 degrees F __


Determining 1% of meter scale
Determining 1% of meter scale 0 = 0%, 400 = 100%.........
. 0 = 0%, 400 = 100%......... implies 4 degrees F per %
implies 4 degrees F per %
Determining allowed deviation Non critical parameter is allowed 10% deviation Determining actual deviation (example: simulator value = 81.2, plant value = 103) 103 - 81.2 = 21.8 21.8 / 4   =   5.5%
Determining allowed deviation Non critical parameter is allowed 10% deviation Determining actual deviation (example: simulator value = 81.2, plant value = 103) 103 - 81.2 = 21.8 5.5%
21.8 / 4
=
Thot and Tcold are not recorded or compared to plant information since these data values are not reported as part of OSP-ZZ-00001, Control Room Shift And Daily Log Readings And Channel Checks (attachment C), which are used as the basis for determining simulator fidelity during steady state operation.
Thot and Tcold are not recorded or compared to plant information since these data values are not reported as part of OSP-ZZ-00001, Control Room Shift And Daily Log Readings And Channel Checks (attachment C), which are used as the basis for determining simulator fidelity during steady state operation.
TRANSIENTS TRIP OF A SINGLE RC PUMP.
TRANSIENTS TRIP OF A SINGLE RC PUMP.
Line 204: Line 362:
POWER RAMP.
POWER RAMP.
Power ramp is the maximum allowed by the operating procedure based on restrictions placed on the plant.
Power ramp is the maximum allowed by the operating procedure based on restrictions placed on the plant.
    "The maximum rate of power increase above.20% of Full Power should be limited to 3% per hour as an administrative limit.
"The maximum rate of power increase above.20%
This may be waived at the discretion of the Shift Supervisor provided. (1)   existing Westinghouse maneuvering guldelines     l would not be violated and (2) a maximum rate of increase of       l 10% per hour would continue to be observed."
of Full Power should be limited to 3% per hour as an administrative limit.
This may be waived at the discretion of the Shift Supervisor provided. (1) existing Westinghouse maneuvering guldelines would not be violated and (2) a maximum rate of increase of 10% per hour would continue to be observed."


==Reference:==
==Reference:==
Plant Procedure   OTG-ZZ-00004,   Power Operation (attachment D).
Plant Procedure OTG-ZZ-00004, Power Operation (attachment D).
The hump in the steam generator narrow range icvol   graph is a combination effect of changing primary temperature, power (steam flow and feed flow), and main feedwater regulating valve   (FRV)   controller response time.       The transient is conducted by taking standby control of the turbine and changing turbine load at the maximum allowed rate.       If the steam flow and feed flow graphs are overlaid it can be seen that a slightly higher feed flow exists at the beginning of       !
The hump in the steam generator narrow range icvol graph is a combination effect of changing primary temperature, power (steam flow and feed flow),
the transient bringing the steam generator level up. The FRV     !
and main feedwater regulating valve (FRV) controller response time.
controller then senses the transient and returns water level to normal. At the end of the transient the feed flow is slightly lower than steam flow which also results in a change in steam generator level       (level goes down).     The   FRV controller again senses the transient and restores water level to normal.
The transient is conducted by taking standby control of the turbine and changing turbine load at the maximum allowed rate.
I
If the steam flow and feed flow graphs are overlaid it can be seen that a slightly higher feed flow exists at the beginning of the transient bringing the steam generator level up.
 
The FRV controller then senses the transient and returns water level to normal.
.  - RC SYSTEM RUPTURE
At the end of the transient the feed flow is slightly lower than steam flow which also results in a change in steam generator level (level goes down).
,''      The particular malfunction used had a . maximum size leak which was used to conduct the test.     The ANSI /ANS-3.5-1985 Standard does not specifically indicate that a DBA must be used, only a maximum size break.     Rather than change the malfunction, it was used as provided. The intent was to test the simulator to see if it would run a break transient that would quickly drain the pressurizer, providing indications of increasing containment humidity, pressure and temperature.     A system rupture can be run on the simulator as indicated by the graphs provided.
The FRV controller again senses the transient and restores water level to normal.
SLOW DEPRESSURIZATION Flows cycle at the end due to loss of net positive suction head causing pump cavitation. This is not an indication that the model limits have been exceeded.
RC SYSTEM RUPTURE The particular malfunction used had a. maximum size leak which was used to conduct the test.
                                            .     . _ . - . .}}
The ANSI /ANS-3.5-1985 Standard does not specifically indicate that a
DBA must be used, only a maximum size break.
Rather than change the malfunction, it was used as provided.
The intent was to test the simulator to see if it would run a break transient that would quickly drain the pressurizer, providing indications of increasing containment humidity, pressure and temperature.
A system rupture can be run on the simulator as indicated by the graphs provided.
SLOW DEPRESSURIZATION Flows cycle at the end due to loss of net positive suction head causing pump cavitation.
This is not an indication that the model limits have been exceeded.
... -}}

Latest revision as of 05:36, 11 December 2024

Provides Responses to NRC 880621 Request for Addl Data Re Simulator Facility Certification.Tests Not plant-specific Not Being Conducted Based on Limitation Due to Plant Configuration
ML20151P779
Person / Time
Site: Callaway Ameren icon.png
Issue date: 07/19/1988
From: Schnell D
UNION ELECTRIC CO.
To:
NRC OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATION & RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (ARM)
References
ULNRC-1809, NUDOCS 8808100185
Download: ML20151P779 (14)
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July 19, 1988 U.S.

Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attn:

Document Control Desk Mail Stop Pl-137 Washington, D.C.

20555 Gentlemen:

ULNRC ~ 1809 DOCKET NUMBER 50-483 CALLAWAY PLANT j

SIMULATOR FACILITY CERTIFICATION U

References:

1)

ULNRC-1686 dated November 30, 1987 i

--2 )

NRC Letter from T. W. Alexion to.

D.

F.

Schnell dated June 21, 1988 Reference 1 transmitted the certification of the Callaway Simulator"in accordance with 10CFR55.45.

Provided herewith are responses to NRC's request for additional data transmitted by Reference 2.

If there are any' additional questions, please contact us.

Very truly yours, 1

Donald F.

Schnell SMH/heb o

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. STATE OF MISSOURI )

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Donald F.

Schnell, of lawful age, 'being' first duly sworn upon oath says that he is Senior Vice President-Nuclear and an officer of Union Electric Company; that he has read the foregoing document and 'knows the content thereof; that he has executed the' same for and on behalf of said company with full power and authority to do so; and that the facts therein stated are-true and correct to the best of his knowledge, information and belief.

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By_

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Donald F.

Schnell Senior Vice President Nuclear SUBSCRIBED arid sworn t o before me this /9b day of 1987 0/

BARDA[ J PFAff NOTARY PUBUC, STATE OF MISSOURI NY COMMISSION EXPIRES APRIL 22, 1989 ST.' LOUIS COUN1%

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Shaw,_Pittman, Potts & Trowbridge l

2300-N. Screet, N.W.

Washington, D.C.

20037 Dr.

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O. Cermak CFA, Inc. _

4 Professional Drive (Suite 110)

Gaithersburg, MD 20879 R.

C.

Knop Chief, Reactor Project Branch 1

-U.S.

Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region III i

799 Roosevelt Road Glen Ellyn, Illinois 60137 Bruce Little Callaway Resident Office U.S.

Nuclear Regulatory Commission RR$1 Steedman, Missouri 6507/

Tbm Alexion (2)

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation U.S.

Nuclear Regulatory Commission Mail Stop 316 7920 Norfolk Avenue Bethesda, MD 20014 Manager, Electric Department Missouri Public Service Commission P.O.

Box 360 Jefferson City, MO 65102 29)U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN:

Document Control Desk Washington, D.C.

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July 12, 1988 Callaway Plant Simulator Certification Response to NRC Questions TABLE OF CONTENTS 1.0 Response to questions ATTACEMENTS A)

TDP-ZZ-00009, Course Deficiences B)

TDP-ZZ-00013, Call.away Simulator Modifications C)

OSP-ZZ-00001, Control Room Shift And Daily Log Readings And Channel Checks D)

OTG-ZZ-00004, Power Operations l

E)

List of Malfunctions tested F)

Malfunction test abstracts G)

Certification testing schedule i

1 e

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July 12, 1988 Callaway Plant Simulator Certification Response to NRC Questions GENERAL OUESTIONS 1.

No specific action is required other than to respond to questions 2, 3,

and 4.

2.

A list of the Malfunction performance tests conducted (attachment E) is provided for your information.

Abstracts used for Malfunction performance tests were obtained from a

' Malfunction Description' document used by simulator instructors.

Copies of specific malfunction descriptions tested are attached (attachment F) for review as requested.

3.

A general statement in procedure APA-ZZ-00645, Simulator Configuration Management, indicated that items would continue to be tested on an'cngoing basis.

A specific schedule was not included to minimize the paper requirement of the certification submittal.

A schedule for simulator certification testing during the next four years is provided as requested (attachment G).

4.

No exceptions are being taken to the standard.

Tests not applicable to the Callaway Plant are not being conducted.

This is not an exception, but

rather, a

limitation due to plant configuration.

SIMULATOR CONFIGURATION MANAGEMENT PROCEDURE Page 4, Section 4.0.

Controlled copies of procedures are used in the Callaway Plant Simulator.

Page 5, Section 4.1.1.7.

Section 3.1.1(7) of the standard refers to ' Normal Plant Evolutions'. Operation of the Callaway Plant at less than full flow, at power, is not a ' Normal Plant Evolution',but rather.a situation in which Plant Technical Specifications require a

reduction to Hot Standby within six hours.

During those six hours, a plant shutdown is required.

A special test procedure allowed the plant to be operated in natural circulation during the initial core startup.

This was a special test and not part of ' Normal Plant Evolutions'. The Callaway Plant is not allowed to operate es a normal evolution at less than full flow (i.e. 3 loop operation) and therefore this item is not applicable for the Callaway Plant Simulator.

The Natural Circulation statement will be removed because at no time would the plant be operated at power in natural circulation as a

normal plant evolution.

l Page 6, Section 4.1.2.

The procedure will be corrected ta read:

"shall be simulated" to correspond with the requirement of the standard.

Pl.nt License Event Reports

( LER 's),

Incident Reports (IR's), Significant Operatina Event Reports (SOER's), etc. are evaluated for impact on simulator operations as part of the Course Deficiences.

Course Deficiency review per TDP-ZZ-00009,incorported on the Any items that have simulator impact are simulator and tested as part of the configuration control process.

Page 8, Section 4.4.2.

New malfunctions based on plant operating experience are included as part of the configuration control process of the Course Deficiency review per TDP-ZZ-00009, Course Deficiences (attachment A),

and TDP-ZZ-00013, Callaway Simulator Modifications (attachment B).

Page 10, Section 5.2.3.

Section 5.2.3 of procedure APA-ZZ-00645 will be revised as follows to comply with section 4.1(3) of the standard:

...shall agree within +/-2% of the callaway Plant parameters and shall not detract from training..."

Page 10, Section 5.3.1.

Section 5.3.1 of procedure APA-ZZ-00645 will be revised replacing the term "trip" with "automatic action" to comply with section 4.2.1(c) of the standard.

Automatic actions associated with valves and biscables are controlled by "logic statements" within the valve handlers and bistable handlers.

Setpoints are validated by comparison agiainst the plant.setpoint document referred to as the "JU8000".

These logic tests and setpoint tests are conducted as part of the configuration control process at the time that changes are made to the various handlers.

Automatic actions during the evolutions are validated by monitoring control board indications and alarms.

Page 11, Section 5.3.3.

The safety parameter display system has been previously engineered to monitor the parameters that are necessary during the use of the emergency procedures and are considered to include the critical parameters.

If any additional parameters are required for a specific minor malfunction, they can be easily added to the monitor file.

Page 11, Section 5.4.

The message area for the simulator and the plant SPDS is normally displayed and available to the operators in the control room.

This is not unique to the simulator.

The message is visible to both the operator and the simulator instructor.

_3

only the critical paramnters used by SPDS are checked i

against upper and lower limits for message generation.

For groups of redundant parameters, two or more must exceed limits i

to generate the offscale message.

This prevents a' failure of a single channel from providing an off-scale indication to the operator.

Since the parameters included in the SPDS are required for safe shutdown of the. unit it includes an all inclusive list of critical parameters.

4 Page 11, Section 5.5.

Parametric and time resolution requirements are not delineated in section 4.4 of the

standard, our monitoring capabilities however, do meet the requirement of 0.5 seconds or less used in appendix B of the standard.

Plots done from collected data were generated at a lessor frequency of 1.0 second because it took less time to generate graphs with no perceptable differences over plots generated at higher frequencies.

Page 14, Section 6.4.3.

10CFR55.45 requires that 25% of the tests be performed each year.

Since some sort of records are required to document conduct of the tests, it is our intent to update the annual report and locate the records in one document.

If '

discrepancies are found they must be reported. By treating the annual report as a living document, the reporting requirement can be easily met.

Page 15, Section 7.4.

The final revision of NUREG-1258 has been received and will be referenced in future revisions to the procedure.

This final revision was issued after the completion of the initial certification testing and was therefore not referenced.

j ANNUAL REPORT Page 4, Sectioh 2.9, Paragraph 1.

Data was recorded every 0.25 seconds to meet the requirements of the standard, but it was determined by a trial and error that plotting on a

one second time interval provided adequate visual presentation of the data.

Page 4, Section 2.10.

i Baseline data from the plant is only available for the reactor trip transient.

The plant has not experienced any of the other nine transients in the Appendix B.

A table top review of

'all transients was conducted by the simulator certification review group with members from engineering, operations, training and simulator groups.

All curves were reviewed for trend and negative impact on training prior to accepting the transient grapns.

During the course of j

training, the emergency procedures can be followed by the operators adding credibility to the simulation fidelity.

During the Appendix B transients, however, no operator action is taken for a majority of the transients. _ _ _.

\\

j Page 1, Items 1.6 and 1.7 Two sets of photographs were taken and compared to determine differences between the Callaway Plant Control Room and the Callaway Plant Simulator Control Room.

A second comparison has been done and additional minor differences have been discovered and documented. Actions to resolve these differences are expected to be completed by November of 1988.

CHECKLIST Page 1, Item 1.2.

No additional information is available on two SPDS panels that cannot be obtained on a single SPDS panel.

To limit cost with no reduction in training value, it was decided not to purchase and simulate the KC008, SP010, RRIS, and second SPDS panels.

The major users of Training in the above areas, with the exception of SPDS, is presently addressed in the On-The-Job Training fo operators and over the past few years has been shown to be adequate.

Page 1, Item 1.3.

Simulator control room lighting levels do not prevent the operators from viewing the indications available and therefore have no negative impact on training.

Lighting levels vary in intensity to simulate normal and emergency lighting conditions and to provide the operators with the feel of associated changes in lighting levels. The need to perform a formal study of lighting level changes between normal and emergency conditions has been identified and documented.

It is our intent to perform a review and submic the results to the certification review board at their next meeting.

Page 2, Item 1.4.

No formal evaluation of noise levels associated with the VHF system has been done. We feel that the VHF system does not impact communications in the control room.

The channels are normally muted to a

very low background level during normal plant operations.

Page 4 and 5, Items 1.9 and 1.10.

Section 3.2.2 of the ANSI /ANS-3.5-1985 standard does not require the entire plant computer system displays to be simulated.

Plant computer displays available in the plant that are not currently simulated include:

Point Display Point Summan Bar Chart Display Alarm CRT i

Alarm Printer -

Other than the Alarm-CRT and Alarm

Printer, these displays perform no automatic initiations during
normal, abnormal, or emergency conditions, and do not affect the safe operation of the. plant.

The video trend feature of the plant computer and the SPDS system in addition to the main control board trend recorders provide the most frequently used means to trend important plant parameters.

The Alarm CRT is a

documented deficiency identified through our existing student feedback process.

The Alarm Printer and CRT are expected to be available for training use by August 1988.

Page 6, Item 1.11.

Providing trending capability on the plant computer is in excess of what is required during

normal, abnormal, and emergency evolutions.

Providing trending capability on only one of the available CRT's is adequate to meet or exceed the requirements of section 3.2.2 on the ANSI /ANS-3.5-1985 standard.

Page 6, Item 1.12.

The computer Alarm CRT display is currently implemented on the simulate.r development system and should be transferred into the training load in August of 1988.

The Alarm Printer software is completed.

As soon as the hardware is ready to support moving a printer into the simulator control room the Alarm Printer will also be added to the simulator.

Page 6, Item 1.13.

The following items were treated as special features since they were added to the simulator after the initial installation of the simulator at the training facility:

)

RM11 Radiation Monitoring Console SPDS Safety Parameter Display System Emergency Telephone System Merge Capability on the PA System The RMil Console is not required for normal, abnormal, and emergency evolutions.

The panel provides an alternate method for the operator to obtain radiological information about the plant. This information is also available from other nlant indications. Simulation of this panel exceeds the requirements of the standard and is therefore identified as a

special feature.

Training on this panel could be performed in the control room RMll panel.

Simulation training on this panel is considered an enhancement.,

en

.The SPDS is not rcquired for

normal, abnormal, anel emergency evolutions.

The panel provides an alternate method for the operator to obtain information about the plant condition that is already available on other control room indications.

Simulation of this panel exceeds the requirements of the standard and is therefore identified as-a special feature.

Training on this panel cou'd be performed in the control room or at the Technical Support Facility.

Simulation training on this panel is considered an enhancement.

The Emergency Telephone system is a special feature since the student can actually call the county and state using the emergency phone line.

The phone system is personnel only used to support Radiological Emergency Response Plan (RERP) drill training.

The PA system in general is a

requirement for communication between the students and the simulator instructor. The merge capability is a special feature since the student can actually communicate with the plant. The merge position is only used to support Radiological Em(rgency Response Plan (RERP) drill training.

In general, it is our interpretation of the standard that not all panels in the control room are required to be functionally simulated as implied by the question.

The full scope simulator includes the operating consoles (the main control boards) and control panels required for manual safety

actions, equipment surveillance, and to monitor plant conditions under normal and accident conditions.

Some of these panels may contain visually simulated hardware if no dynamic interface is required.

The extent of simulation is based on required operator actions to conduct normal plant evolutions and respond to malfunctions.

Page 6, Item 2.1.

1 With a computer cycle time of approximately 50%, a simple test of monitoring a perceived difference between real time and simulation time was considered to be more than adequate.

A stop watch was used to measure the real time while the simulator console displayed the simulation time.

No perceived

~,'

difference could be detected, thus meeting the requirements of real time operation.

Graphs of the transients also verified no perceived difference in ' time.

A complex test was not considered to be desired or appropriate with a computer cycle time of 50% percent.

A more elaborate time measurement could be developed but may not be more reliable or effective at measuring real time.

A more accurate method may be necessary if computer cycle time j

is increased closer to 100%.

Page 9, Item 7.1 The Loss of Instrument and DC buses malfunctions are scheduled to be added in January of 1989 and November of 1988 respectively.

~

STEADY STATE TESTS At present, the reference plant data is only compared to the simulator at one condition, either BOL, MOL, or EOL.

The condition used for comparison is dependent upon the amount of change in core configuration as well as the receipt and incorporation of new reload data into the simulatut nre model. 100% steady state data for the remaining conditicna is then extrapolated or calculated using the existing Stable 100%

Initial Condition. It is anticipated that once wc-reach ycle 5 (assuming no significant core load changes),

tr e changes from one reload to another will be minimal and BOL 100% steady state data will become the benchmarx for comparison of the reference plant to the simulator for MOL and EOL conditions.

The basis for determining a difference between the plant and the simulator assumes a perception by the control room operator.

The operator can only determine a

change by monitoring available indications.

A small indication change will remain undetected.

A movement of greater than 2%

for critical parameters is assumed to be detectable.

All differences must be based on the indications available to the operator in the control room.

Calculations of percent difference is based on indicator scales of the actual plant control room indications.

The top of the scale is considered to be 100% and the bottom of the scale is considered to be 0%.

To meet the 2%

and 10%

deviation requirement between the plant and the simulator a

deviation of less than this indicator movement was allowable.

Some scales had values from 0 to 100.

The calculation for these indications is merely a

straight difference, other scales had values such as 1700 to 2500 or 100 to 700.

Scales were normalized to the 0%

to 100%

positions, then the difference was determined.

The consistancy in the calculations is based on the scale of the indication.

Exceptions were boron concentration and switch positions which do not readily allow a percent calculation.

For these items the mismatch was merely noted.

For the 50%,

80%,

and 100%

tests tha containment temperature difference does not exceed the criteria in the standard.

Differences are as follows:

50%

6.2%, 4.3%, 3.4%, and 2.9%

80%

6.1%, 4.6%, 3.7%, and 3.2%

100%

5.5%, 4.5%, 4.1%, and 4.4%

The mismatch was calculated as follows:

Determining meter scales by observation on control board GN TI-61 meter scale........

0-400 degrees F GN TI-63 meter sclae........

0-400 degrees F GN TI-60 meter scale........

0-400 degrees F GN TI-62 meter scale........

0-400 degrees F __

Determining 1% of meter scale 0 = 0%, 400 = 100%.........

implies 4 degrees F per %

Determining allowed deviation Non critical parameter is allowed 10% deviation Determining actual deviation (example: simulator value = 81.2, plant value = 103) 103 - 81.2 = 21.8 5.5%

21.8 / 4

=

Thot and Tcold are not recorded or compared to plant information since these data values are not reported as part of OSP-ZZ-00001, Control Room Shift And Daily Log Readings And Channel Checks (attachment C), which are used as the basis for determining simulator fidelity during steady state operation.

TRANSIENTS TRIP OF A SINGLE RC PUMP.

Reactor coolant pump D was the pump tripped.

POWER RAMP.

Power ramp is the maximum allowed by the operating procedure based on restrictions placed on the plant.

"The maximum rate of power increase above.20%

of Full Power should be limited to 3% per hour as an administrative limit.

This may be waived at the discretion of the Shift Supervisor provided. (1) existing Westinghouse maneuvering guldelines would not be violated and (2) a maximum rate of increase of 10% per hour would continue to be observed."

Reference:

Plant Procedure OTG-ZZ-00004, Power Operation (attachment D).

The hump in the steam generator narrow range icvol graph is a combination effect of changing primary temperature, power (steam flow and feed flow),

and main feedwater regulating valve (FRV) controller response time.

The transient is conducted by taking standby control of the turbine and changing turbine load at the maximum allowed rate.

If the steam flow and feed flow graphs are overlaid it can be seen that a slightly higher feed flow exists at the beginning of the transient bringing the steam generator level up.

The FRV controller then senses the transient and returns water level to normal.

At the end of the transient the feed flow is slightly lower than steam flow which also results in a change in steam generator level (level goes down).

The FRV controller again senses the transient and restores water level to normal.

RC SYSTEM RUPTURE The particular malfunction used had a. maximum size leak which was used to conduct the test.

The ANSI /ANS-3.5-1985 Standard does not specifically indicate that a

DBA must be used, only a maximum size break.

Rather than change the malfunction, it was used as provided.

The intent was to test the simulator to see if it would run a break transient that would quickly drain the pressurizer, providing indications of increasing containment humidity, pressure and temperature.

A system rupture can be run on the simulator as indicated by the graphs provided.

SLOW DEPRESSURIZATION Flows cycle at the end due to loss of net positive suction head causing pump cavitation.

This is not an indication that the model limits have been exceeded.

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