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                              '-    ''                                        ,:i,,,.n DUKEPOWER Juyly 1, 1991 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555
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,:i,,,.n DUKEPOWER Juyly 1, 1991 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555


==Subject:==
==Subject:==
McGuire Nuclear ' tation Docket Nos. 50-369 and 50-370 Catawba Nuclear Station Docket Nos. 50-413 and 50-414 Oconee Nuclear Station Docket Nos. 50-265 50-270, and 50-287 Crisis Management In,si: enting Procedures Gentlemen:
McGuire Nuclear ' tation Docket Nos. 50-369 and 50-370 Catawba Nuclear Station Docket Nos. 50-413 and 50-414 Oconee Nuclear Station Docket Nos. 50-265 50-270, and 50-287 Crisis Management In,si: enting Procedures Gentlemen:
Attached for NRC 6:a and review is a revision to the following Duke Power Company Crisis Management Implementing Procedure:
Attached for NRC 6:a and review is a revision to the following Duke Power Company Crisis Management Implementing Procedure:
CMIP-12   REV. 13 Please delete privacy material in the form of personal telephone numbers prior to placing in the Public Document Room.
CMIP-12 REV. 13 Please delete privacy material in the form of personal telephone numbers prior to placing in the Public Document Room.
By copy of this letter two revisions are being provided to NRC, Region 11, Atlanta.
By copy of this letter two revisions are being provided to NRC, Region 11, Atlanta.
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M. 5. Tuckman HAF:haf Attachment t
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DUKE POWER COMPANY CR. ISIS MANAGEMENT IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES June 11, 1991 l
DUKE POWER COMPANY CR. ISIS MANAGEMENT IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES June 11, 1991 l
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j TABLE OF CONTENTS Volume 2 Igh                 Procedure Descrintion CHIP-8             Oconee Crisis Phone Directory (Rev. 30)
TABLE OF CONTENTS j
CMIP-9             McGuire/ Catawba Crisis Phone Directory (Rev. 39)
Volume 2 Igh Procedure Descrintion CHIP-8 Oconee Crisis Phone Directory (Rev. 30)
CMIP-10             Emergency Classification - Catawba (Rev. 3)
CMIP-9 McGuire/ Catawba Crisis Phone Directory (Rev. 39)
          'P-11           Emergency Classification - McGuire (Rev. 10)
CMIP-10 Emergency Classification - Catawba (Rev. 3)
CM t .'- 12         Emergency Classification - Oconee (Rev. 13)
'P-11 Emergency Classification - McGuire (Rev. 10)
CMIP-13             Notifications to States and Counties from the Crisis Management Center (Rev. 22)
CM t.'- 12 Emergency Classification - Oconee (Rev. 13)
CMIP-14             Crisis Management Data Transmittal System Access for Offsite Agencies - (Rev. 3)
CMIP-13 Notifications to States and Counties from the Crisis Management Center (Rev. 22)
CMIP-15             Reserved for future use CMIP-16             Crisis Management Data Transmittal Systein Access from the Crisis Management Center -
CMIP-14 Crisis Management Data Transmittal System Access for Offsite Agencies - (Rev. 3)
CMIP-15 Reserved for future use CMIP-16 Crisis Management Data Transmittal Systein Access from the Crisis Management Center -
(Rev. 11)
(Rev. 11)
CMIP-17             Reserved for future use CMIP-18             Maintaining Emergency Preparedness (Rev. 5)
CMIP-17 Reserved for future use CMIP-18 Maintaining Emergency Preparedness (Rev. 5)
CMIP-19             Communications Test for McGuire/ Catawba CMC (Rev. 16)
CMIP-19 Communications Test for McGuire/ Catawba CMC (Rev. 16)
CMIP-20             Communications Test for Oconee CMC (Rev. 10)
CMIP-20 Communications Test for Oconee CMC (Rev. 10)
CMIP-21             Quarterly Inventory Equipment Check (Rev. 35)
CMIP-21 Quarterly Inventory Equipment Check (Rev. 35)
CMIP-22             Telephone Number Updates (Rev. 3)
CMIP-22 Telephone Number Updates (Rev. 3)
June 11, 1991
June 11, 1991


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1 CRISIS MANAGEMENT IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURE                                                                 l CHIP-12 Classification of Emergency for                                                             '
CRISIS MANAGEMENT IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURE CHIP-12 Classification of Emergency for Oconee Nuclear Station Rev. 13 June 11, 1991
Oconee Nuclear Station Rev. 13 June 11, 1991
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Approved By U               Md c~ L Date
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                                                .      _        _ _ _ .. _ __ _ -_- _ ._ - _ ~ ~ ..--                                            -_ _ __                  _ _ _ _ . _ _ -
7
7 CMIP-12
_ _ _.. _ __ _ -_- _._ - _ ~ ~..--
(                                                               CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCY FOR OCONEE NUCLEAR STATION 1.0 SYMPTOMS 1.1 Notification of Unusual Event 1.1.1 Events are in process or have occurred which indicate a potential degradation of the level of safety of the plant.
CMIP-12
(
CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCY FOR OCONEE NUCLEAR STATION 1.0 SYMPTOMS 1.1 Notification of Unusual Event 1.1.1 Events are in process or have occurred which indicate a potential degradation of the level of safety of the plant.
1.1.2 No releases of radioactive material requiring offsite response or monitoring are expected unless further degradation of safety occurs.
1.1.2 No releases of radioactive material requiring offsite response or monitoring are expected unless further degradation of safety occurs.
1.2 Alert 1.2.1   Events are in process or have occurred which involve an actual or potential substantial degradation of the level of
1.2 Alert 1.2.1 Events are in process or have occurred which involve an actual or potential substantial degradation of the level of
                                                        -safety of the plant.
-safety of the plant.
1.2.2 Loss of one fission product barrier.
1.2.2 Loss of one fission product barrier.
1.2.3 Any releases are expected to be limited to small fractions of the EPA Protective Action Guideline exposure levels.
1.2.3 Any releases are expected to be limited to small fractions of the EPA Protective Action Guideline exposure levels.
1.3 Site Area Emergency 1.3.1   Events are in process or have occurred which involve actual or likely major failures of plant functions needed for protection of the public.
1.3 Site Area Emergency 1.3.1 Events are in process or have occurred which involve actual or likely major failures of plant functions needed for protection of the public.
1.3.2 Loss of two fission product barriers.
1.3.2 Loss of two fission product barriers.
1.3.3 Releases do not, nor are they expected to, exceed EPA Protec-tive Action Guideline exposure levels outside the Site Boundary.
1.3.3 Releases do not, nor are they expected to, exceed EPA Protec-tive Action Guideline exposure levels outside the Site Boundary.
1.4 General Emergency 1,4.1   Events are in process or have occurred which involve actual or imminent substantial core degradation or melting with potentiel for loss of containment integrity.
1.4 General Emergency 1,4.1 Events are in process or have occurred which involve actual or imminent substantial core degradation or melting with potentiel for loss of containment integrity.
1.4,2 Loss of two fission product barriers and failure or imminent failure of the third barrier.
1.4,2 Loss of two fission product barriers and failure or imminent failure of the third barrier.
1.4.3   Releases, if made, could be expected to exceed EPA Protective Action Guideline exposure levels outside the Site Boundary.
1.4.3 Releases, if made, could be expected to exceed EPA Protective Action Guideline exposure levels outside the Site Boundary.
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l 2.0 IMMEDIATE ACTIONS I.
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2.1 Compare actual plant conditions to the Emergency Action Level (s) listed in Enclosure 4.1 then declare the appropriate Emergency Class as indicated.
2.0 IMMEDIATE ACTIONS 2.1 Compare actual plant conditions to the Emergency Action Level (s) listed in Enclosure 4.1 then declare the appropriate Emergency Class as indicated.
If a change in the emergency class is made, perform steps 2.2, 2.3, and 2.4 below.
If a change in the emergency class is made, perform steps 2.2, 2.3, and 2.4 below.
2.2 Instruct the State / County Communicator to notify the state (s) and counties per CMIP-13 of any change in the emergency class. If the emergency class is SITE AREA EMERGENCY or GENERAL EMERGENCY, determine protective action recommendations per CPIP-1 and transmit these recommendations.
2.2 Instruct the State / County Communicator to notify the state (s) and counties per CMIP-13 of any change in the emergency class.
NOTE:   Notifications to the state (s) and counties must be made within 15 minutes whenever there is a change in the emergency classification.
If the emergency class is SITE AREA EMERGENCY or GENERAL EMERGENCY, determine protective action recommendations per CPIP-1 and transmit these recommendations.
NOTE:
Notifications to the state (s) and counties must be made within 15 minutes whenever there is a change in the emergency classification.
2.3 Announce the change in the emergency class to all CMC personnel and to the Emergency Coordinator at the TSC.
2.3 Announce the change in the emergency class to all CMC personnel and to the Emergency Coordinator at the TSC.
2.4 Instruct the NRC Communicator in the CMC Plant Assessment Group to notify NRC immediately and within one hour per CMIP-15, 3.0 SUBSEQUENT ACTIONS 3.1 To de-escalate the Emergency, compare plant conditions to the Initiating Conditions of Enclosure 4.1. To terminate the emergency, refer to the Termination Criteria in Enclosure 4.3.
2.4 Instruct the NRC Communicator in the CMC Plant Assessment Group to notify NRC immediately and within one hour per CMIP-15, 3.0 SUBSEQUENT ACTIONS 3.1 To de-escalate the Emergency, compare plant conditions to the Initiating Conditions of Enclosure 4.1.
To terminate the emergency, refer to the Termination Criteria in Enclosure 4.3.
Notify state (s), counties, and NkC by verbal summary of any reduction or termination in the emergency class followed by a written summary within eight (8) hours.
Notify state (s), counties, and NkC by verbal summary of any reduction or termination in the emergency class followed by a written summary within eight (8) hours.
4.0 EHCLOSURES 4.1 Emergency Action Level (s) for Emergency Classes Event No.                                                                         Pagels) 4.1.1       Primary Coolant Leak                                                 1&2 4.1.2       Fuel Integrity                                                       3 4.1.3       Steam System Failure                                                 4 4.1.4       High Radiation /Radiciogical Effluents                               5 4.1.5       Loss of Shutdown Function                                           6 4.1.6       Loss of Power                                                       7 4.1.7       Fires and Security Actions                                           8 4.1.8       Spent Fuel Damage                                                   9
4.0 EHCLOSURES 4.1 Emergency Action Level (s) for Emergency Classes Event No.
Pagels) 4.1.1 Primary Coolant Leak 1&2 4.1.2 Fuel Integrity 3
4.1.3 Steam System Failure 4
4.1.4 High Radiation /Radiciogical Effluents 5
4.1.5 Loss of Shutdown Function 6
4.1.6 Loss of Power 7
4.1.7 Fires and Security Actions 8
4.1.8 Spent Fuel Damage 9


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4.1.9         Natural Disasters and Other Hazards                                                                                                               10
4.1.9 Natural Disasters and Other Hazards 10
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4.1.10         Other Abnormal Plant Conditions                                                                                                                   11 & 12 4.2           Area Monitors and Process Monitors 4.3           Termination Criteria e
4.1.10 Other Abnormal Plant Conditions 11 & 12 4.2 Area Monitors and Process Monitors 4.3 Termination Criteria e
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                                                                                                                                            ~
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CMIP-12 EHCLOSURE 4.1.1                                               PAGE 1 of 12 PRIMARY COOLANT LEAK SITE AREA Erf9CENCY           CENERAL ENE9CENCY 17aEUAL EVENT                                     ALERT E LEAfutE E3tEATER TMApt        1. " MALL ABER LAfEE s rirat MET 1B
CMIP-12 EHCLOSURE 4.1.1 PAGE 1 of 12 PRIMARY COOLANT LEAK ALERT SITE AREA Erf9CENCY CENERAL ENE9CENCY 17aEUAL EVENT 1.
: 1. RCS LEAKAGE CpfATER TMAN OR             1.
REACTUR SM.fTDO@f REEKf1Rf D BY RCS 1.
: 1. REACTUR SM.fTDO@f REEKf1Rf D BY RCS                                                  AVAILABLE MAKIW PtDP CAPACITY     FAILLAEE OF ECCS-tEAAG.TD N II AIUlCE T*, 3.1.6                   EillALL TD 50 CPM                                                               NLT Prismary or Pri g /* A'           - IIEA SAE S1 EAL OPERATTDC 9mE: DE3T 9RITDED44          (PERATTDC IME: MDT $1RITIND98                                                              ~ Ape ETTER THEU PortR EPfRATICM                   TNitt POER (PERATTtDG                                                               Loss of all injecticn or
RCS LEAKAGE CpfATER TMAN OR 1.
                                                                                        - Full HPI tsiecle to musintain       isseinant loss of inyection Priseery or PrismaryEmerwwiery                 st6ccoling >0* F                                                       ,
E LEAfutE E3tEATER TMApt 1.
peacto, sNicken initiated                                                                                                  capability                         j
" MALL ABER LAfEE s rirat MET 1B AVAILABLE MAKIW PtDP CAPACITY FAILLAEE OF ECCS-tEAAG.TD N II AIUlCE T*, 3.1.6 EillALL TD 50 CPM NLT OPERATTDC 9mE: DE3T 9RITDED44 (PERATTDC IME: MDT $1RITIND98 Prismary or Pri g /* A'
  $msesuan t to TS 3.1.6                                                         2. STEAM LIK SIEEAft MITM F/S                                               l
- IIEA SAE S1 EAL
                                          - Leak 2 50 gpm                               LEAst equal TD GR EMIEATER TMAN                 OR
~ Ape ETTER THEU PortR EPfRATICM TNitt POER (PERATTtDG
                                                                                                                                        ~
- Full HPI tsiecle to musintain Loss of all injecticn or peacto, sNicken initiated Priseery or PrismaryEmerwwiery st6ccoling >0* F isseinant loss of inyection capability j
  ~~AMD ANY DK or TM f DLtEMDs   ~
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50 Crn E-. s y actions per EOP Ape inadequate core cooling
$msesuan t to TS 3.1.6 2.
  - Primary leakage etnidentifiede         SeAccoling > 0*F                                                                 section are unsuccessful -
STEAM LIK SIEEAft MITM F/S
GPERATI7C teDE: IEUT 9EJTDupes exceeds 1 gpm                                                                     T15El MBER OPERATTGPG                 CETC 2 It00*F Ase Leak CAf*EUT be isolated.                 IWJDE CaffADeENT MTTM             LDCA METM IMITIALLY aerswtg.
- Leak 2 50 gpm OR LEAst equal TD GR EMIEATER TMAN
  - Total prinary leakage                        --
~
                                                                                                              ~
~~AMD ANY DK or TM f DLtEMDs E-. s y actions per EOP
                                                                                        'T7erCAlltM OF-FAIUDftfL       2.
~
tsdeiniifiedI ewceeds 10 gun                                                     DMesa lane Pressure rapidly       ECE5 ptITH SUERSE4ptR3tr F Altl.5IE OF
Ape 50 Crn inadequate core cooling
: 2. STEAM LIK PJtEAK OLITTJDE                                                       ECES KAT SDet Ape f AI115tE Or CIDETADOENT MITM P/S LIAK                       decreasing
- Primary leakage etnidentifiede SeAccoling > 0*F section are unsuccessful -
  - Total prinary leakage                                                                            Ape                  CENTADetDET MAT 8tDENAL CptEATER TMAM OR teuRL TO 10 CPM i incitaling returesnble 4 SG ttbe lee 2 50 gue             CAPA81tJTY exceeds 30 gp==                                                                                 Are Valid pla S for 58 alarm        - LOCA SAE SI EAL
GPERATI7C teDE: IEUT 9EJTDupes exceeds 1 gpm T15El MBER OPERATTGPG CETC 2 It00*F Ase
  - SG tche leakaoe >.35 gpn             OPERATDC SME: MGT S3EJTDCD M T751LI MBER (PERATTEDG                          Et.kiit 112 MICM - 630 RherB                 _Afe
- Total prinary leakage Leak CAf*EUT be isolated.
                                          - Failure on secondary side of SG               sL>3it 3 ALERT - 286 R/hrt
IWJDE CaffADeENT MTTM
  - Any reactor coolant leakaa.            results in a direct opening to Loss of LPI hast removel evaluated as sesafe                                                               GUTT.JDE CDptTADOOff the erwironment                            - Failure on secondery side of                _ADSD Aped EITW R CF T K FOt1 D>tD C
'T7erCAlltM OF-FAIUDftfL 2.
  - Any leakage exists through                                                           SG results in a direct waning       Loss of heet reenovel the RCS strength txnsulary                                                                                             capability of RBCDs.
LDCA METM IMITIALLY aerswtg.
f encept SG ttees b                   Ttee leak 210 cpm in either                 to the erwirunment Ape sieme generator Out                                Tshe leek [50 grwe exists Actiwity deteeted at the                     in the same stease genereior Protected Aree Fe-ee:
~
tsdeiniifiedI ewceeds 10 gun DMesa lane Pressure rapidly ECE5 ptITH SUERSE4ptR3tr F Altl.5IE OF 2.
STEAM LIK PJtEAK OLITTJDE ECES KAT SDet Ape f AI115tE Or
- Total prinary leakage CIDETADOENT MITM P/S LIAK decreasing CENTADetDET MAT 8tDENAL Ape i incitaling returesnble 4 CptEATER TMAM OR teuRL TO 10 CPM CAPA81tJTY SG ttbe lee 2 50 gue exceeds 30 gp==
Are
- SG tche leakaoe >.35 gpn OPERATDC SME: MGT S3EJTDCD M Valid pla S for 58 alarm
- LOCA SAE SI EAL Et.kiit 112 MICM - 630 RherB
_Afe T751LI MBER (PERATTEDG
- Any reactor coolant leakaa.
- Failure on secondary side of SG sL>3it 3 ALERT - 286 R/hrt Loss of LPI hast removel evaluated as sesafe results in a direct opening to the erwironment GUTT.JDE CDptTADOOff Aped EITW R CF T K FOt1 D>tD C
- Failure on secondery side of
_ADSD
- Any leakage exists through SG results in a direct waning Loss of heet reenovel the RCS strength txnsulary f encept SG ttees b Ttee leak 210 cpm in either to the erwirunment capability of RBCDs.
Ape sieme generator Tshe leek [50 grwe exists Out Actiwity deteeted at the in the same stease genereior Protected Aree Fe-ee:
2 2 mR/br HB
2 2 mR/br HB


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                                                                                                                                                                        -q y
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CPt1P-12 ENCLOGURE 4.1.2                                                             PAGE 3 of 12 FUEL INTEGRITY SITE AR! A ENERGENCY                       GENERAL fNERGENCY UNtI;UAL EVENT                               ALERT
CPt1P-12 ENCLOGURE 4.1.2 PAGE 3 of 12 FUEL INTEGRITY SITE AR! A ENERGENCY GENERAL fNERGENCY ALERT UNtI;UAL EVENT I. irm OF 2 OF 3 FISSItSt FWEET 1.
: 1. DEMADED CDIIE DETTDI POSSIBLE trm I. irm OF 2 OF 3 FISSItSt FWEET
C2IQt IECS ACTIVITY 1.
: 1. C2IQt IECS ACTIVITY                 1. SEVERE ED3S OF FML CNDE                                                                     BARRIm stITM A POTEWrIAL F15t OF CDDtJetr CEGETRY t tr*- OF 3se SAdutITR
SEVERE ED3S OF FML CNDE 1.
                                            - Total f ailed ftel > 5% per               - Avew of f rve highest CETC
DEMADED CDIIE DETTDI POSSIBLE trm BARRIm stITM A POTEWrIAL F15t OF CDDtJetr CEGETRY t tr*- OF 3se SAdutITR
    - Total failed fuel is betwawi                                                        reading 3 70C*r                                    8035 OF CLAssDec aAsutITR 1% - 5% per Chmistry onelysis     Chemistry analysis'-
- Total failed fuel is betwawi
Condition 1                               - tDuble to emintain stbcooling                 - Total failed fuel is 2 5Z pee
- Total f ailed ftel > 5% per
    - Total activity of RCS da.                                                           > 0* F Channistry onelysis -
- Avew of f rve highest CETC 8035 OF CLAssDec aAsutITR 1% - 5% per Chmistry onelysis Chemistry analysis'-
to isotopes with half lives     - Area ce process RI A sons tors             ~
reading 3 70C*r Condition 1
Cendition 2 lonuer than 30 einutes            ir. the R9 anml or eweeed                 - RB bydrooses ccccentration exceeds 224/E pei/el 4wn             lieits stated in Enclosure 4.2               > 0.5% and ircreesing at =                   - RIA 57 or 58 ALAfst the RX is critical                                                             ~rste of > C.1% per hour                         athit 152 ARIRT - 2500 R/he a ethit 3 IEIm - 1.2E 3 R/hr t
- tDuble to emintain stbcooling
    - I-131 on secondary side exceeds 1.4 pei/e1                                                                                                             - Aver.g of five hidwst
- Total failed fuel is 2 5Z pee Channistry onelysis -
                                                                                        - valid RIA 57 or 58 Alare                         CETC reading 3 790*F (thit 182 BEIm - 430 R/hr B ttbit 3 AlfRT - 286 R/ bel                       LD35 CEDfTADOOfT SAflRITR Z. ARNusgMAL C00UtMT TEMYRAftstE AM3/ tnt PRESEEE GR51DE TS LIMITS                                                                                                                           - RB ponetratiW s I are cet isolated                       I OPERATING MODE: AROVE COLD
- Total activity of RCS da.
    *2tittitDN                                                                                                                          - RB 99 2 c e tration is > 92
> 0* F to isotopes with half lives
    - An event has nocurred A ich                                                                                                       - Contairww.st leak. age eweseds rwqsi_rm operstion in the                                                                                                       E.6E6 el/hr Thermal Shock Operating Region                                                                                                                       - RB peessure > 5* psig
- Area ce process RI A sons tors
    - TS pressure /teeserature *HDTI                                                                                                       tocs Or aCs encam!E SAsutTTR limits violated
~
                                                                                                                                          - LOCA 3 50 g-     Inon-isolable fault 8
Cendition 2 ir. the R9 anml or eweeed lonuer than 30 einutes exceeds 224/E pei/el 4wn lieits stated in Enclosure 4.2
                                                                                                                                          - SG ts6e leek 2 50 gzs I
- RB bydrooses ccccentration
> 0.5% and ircreesing at =
- RIA 57 or 58 ALAfst athit 152 ARIRT - 2500 R/he a the RX is critical
~rste of > C.1% per hour ethit 3 IEIm - 1.2E 3 R/hr t
- I-131 on secondary side exceeds 1.4 pei/e1
- valid RIA 57 or 58 Alare
- Aver.g of five hidwst (thit 182 BEIm - 430 R/hr B CETC reading 3 790*F ttbit 3 AlfRT - 286 R/ bel Z.
ARNusgMAL C00UtMT TEMYRAftstE LD35 CEDfTADOOfT SAflRITR AM3/ tnt PRESEEE GR51DE TS LIMITS
- RB ponetratiW s I are cet I
isolated OPERATING MODE: AROVE COLD 2 c e tration is > 92
*2tittitDN
- RB 99
- An event has nocurred A ich
- Contairww.st leak. age eweseds rwqsi_rm operstion in the E.6E6 el/hr Thermal Shock Operating Region
- RB peessure > 5* psig
- TS pressure /teeserature *HDTI tocs Or aCs encam!E SAsutTTR limits violated
- LOCA 3 50 g-Inon-isolable fault 8
- SG ts6e leek 2 50 gzs I
l l
l l


NA ENCLOSURE 4.1.3                                                                                                                                       CMIP-12 STEAM SYSTEM FAILURE                                                                                                                                     PAGE 4 of 12 L'etfSUAL EvtNT                                   ALERT                                                                                             SITE ARE A EMERGENCY                                                           GEPEERAL EMERGENCY
l NA ENCLOSURE 4.1.3 CMIP-12 i
: 1. RAPID DEPerwarrraTitpe os'           1. STEMI LIBE SEAst WJSE                                         1.       STEmt LDE 86 SETM SrtmeeWdrf SIDE                         EIBUTADeptr 8EITM F/S LDWL                                             P/S 11Ast EMEATER TIGAN                                                                                                                       '
STEAM SYSTEM FAILURE PAGE 4 of 12 I
ssIEATER Titass OR EguRL in le Ern                                     cR equal TD 54 EFM OPERATDC PEIDE: petrT SNnnarpse T19tU P(DE R EFERATitBG                 GPERATIDE DEeE: letN SseMDEBet                                         (FEMATTIE DEeE: IENT SutNEGBS8 19mJ PtBER (FERATItBG                                                 TIM 3 PEBER EMBATitBE5
L'etfSUAL EvtNT ALERT SITE ARE A EMERGENCY GEPEERAL EMERGENCY 1.
                                      - Visual observation of rwn-isolable tank on semin s tespa       - Failure on secondary side of SG                                     _DE15E_CfDetADenft 98tTM line requiring plant shutck c         results in a direct epaning to                                       _Det_CA_Titse OF FAIB E0 FUEL the erwirtreamt                                                     - Steen line pressure rapidly
RAPID DEPerwarrraTitpe os' 1.
                                      - Steam line pressure rapidly-                                                                                                 cheerensing decreasing                             Ape EITWR OF TIE F13LitBEDG
STEMI LIBE SEAst WJSE 1.
STEmt LDE 86 SETM SrtmeeWdrf SIDE EIBUTADeptr 8EITM F/S LDWL P/S 11Ast EMEATER TIGAN ssIEATER Titass OR EguRL in le Ern cR equal TD 54 EFM OPERATDC PEIDE: petrT SNnnarpse T19tU P(DE R EFERATitBG GPERATIDE DEeE: letN SseMDEBet (FEMATTIE DEeE: IENT SutNEGBS8 19mJ PtBER (FERATItBG TIM 3 PEBER EMBATitBE5
- Visual observation of rwn-isolable tank on semin s tespa
- Failure on secondary side of SG
_DE15E_CfDetADenft 98tTM line requiring plant shutck c results in a direct epaning to
_Det_CA_Titse OF FAIB E0 FUEL the erwirtreamt
- Steen line pressure rapidly
- Steam line pressure rapidly-cheerensing decreasing Ape EITWR OF TIE F13LitBEDG
_M SG ttee leek 2 50 gram
_M SG ttee leek 2 50 gram
                                      - Steam line besak requiring             Tsaw le=A > 10 gpa in either                                                                                                                                 _ase isolation purstent to the             steam generator                                                                     Valid RIA 57 or 58 alaru
- Steam line besak requiring Tsaw le=A > 10 gpa in either
                                        ; a m p operating procedure,                                 tur                                                             ILMit 182 90438 - 630 R/hrt
_ase isolation purstent to the steam generator Valid RIA 57 or 58 alaru
; a m p operating procedure, tur ILMit 182 90438 - 630 R/hrt t thit 3 ALFRT - 28. R/he t
+
+
t thit 3 ALFRT - 28. R/he t
Activity detected at the Protected Area fence:
;                                                                                Activity detected at the Protected Area fence:                                               WJBE CIBfTADSOWT
WJBE CIBfTADSOWT
                                                                                                                                                      - Failure on secondary side of 2 2 esR/hr DO                                                                   SG results in a direct wening to the erwircrwent mee Tskm lenAT50 gror exists in the same steem omneratoe.
- Failure on secondary side of 2 2 esR/hr DO SG results in a direct wening to the erwircrwent mee Tskm lenAT50 gror exists in the same steem omneratoe.
                                                                                                                                                      - Failure en s- " p side of                                                                                                                     ,
- Failure en s- " p side of j
j                                                                                                                                                                    SG results in a direct opening to the erwironment ase Tsee le=A T 50 g m ewists in the other steem generator s SG with the secondary side failurr a s being fed FDM fetxe the e rected snit.
SG results in a direct opening to the erwironment ase Tsee le=A T 50 g m ewists in the other steem generator s SG with the secondary side failurr a s being fed FDM fetxe the e rected snit.
 
,9%
CMIP-12 ENCLOSURE 4.1.4 PAGE 5 of 12 l HIGH RADIATICM/ RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENTS SITE ARE A EMEPGDCY GEMRAL EMERGENCY ALERT L W SUAL EvtPfT 1.
RADIDtOGICAL EFTitDG TS 13MTTS 1.
KIGDI RASI AT1tBf tiVEL m stTEug 1.
ACCIgDdTAL REll.ASE OF GASES 1.
ACCISDtTAL Ea rnes gr can AImosmE ODETaftDeLTIED6 EXCEEDED
- RIA 45 IIIGN Alerw
- RI A 45 ftIGpt Alacw
- Geseous/11cpJad ef fluent being
- Ae a or process RIA ennators


                                                                                                                                                        ,9%
==ceed limits s tated in released==ceed SLC 16.11.2 or ADED
CMIP-12 ENCLOSURE 4.1.4 HIGH RADIATICM/ RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENTS PAGE 5 of 12 l SITE ARE A EMEPGDCY            GEMRAL EMERGENCY ALERT                                                                                                    '
-Ase SLC16.11.2 limits as deterwined.2 by RP or CNweistry Prtcerbres.
L W SUAL EvtPfT ACCIgDdTAL REll.ASE OF GASES    1. ACCISDtTAL Ea rnes gr can
l RIA 46 reading 2 3000 cpie RIA 46 reading 3 60.500 cpe
: 1. KIGDI RASI AT1tBf tiVEL m stTEug        1.
- Activity detected at the Protected Area fence:
: 1.          RADIDtOGICAL EFTitDG TS 13MTTS EXCEEDED AImosmE ODETaftDeLTIED6
- Gose calculations or field
                                                                                                    - RI A 45 ftIGpt Alacw              - RIA 45 IIIGN Alerw
- Calamletions determine dose 12 e t/Sr te retes or Field Nnitoring Teams etmitorig team emess.
              - Geseous/11cpJad ef fluent being      - Ae a or process RIA ennators released ==ceed SLC 16.11.2 or         ==ceed limits s tated in                              ADED                               -Ase SLC16.11.2 limits as deterwined       Enclosure 4.2                                         -
ts s
by RP or CNweistry Prtcerbres. l                                                   RIA 46 reading 2 3000 cpie           RIA 46 reading 3 60.500 cpe
2.
                                                      - Activity detected at the Protected Area fence:                                                           - Gose calculations or field
RADIDLEGICAL EFTL1DETS DCILCDC sumesure activity at the Site result in a 2 hour dose projection et the site W:
                                                                                                    - Calamletions determine dose                                       ts 12 e st/Sr te                                 retes or Field Nnitoring Teams     etmitorig team emess.
19 TIFES TS txandery ef:
sumesure activity at the Site       result in a 2 hour dose
2 50 mR/hr te ce 250 wiR/hr
: 2. RADIDLEGICAL EFTL1DETS DCILCDC W:                                  projection et the site 19 TIFES TS                                                                         txandery ef:
- Gaseous /Ligsid effluents being Thyroid 2 1 Ree h ie Body released owceed 10 tiess SLC cut 16.11.1 or SLC 16.11.2 limits as determined try RP or Chemistry g
2 50 mR/hr te ce 250 wiR/hr         2 1 Ree h ie Body
3 5 See Thyroid Procochmes I
                                                      - Gaseous /Ligsid effluents being                 Thyroid released owceed 10 tiess SLC                                                             cut 16.11.1 or SLC 16.11.2 limits as determined try RP or Chemistry         g                                           3 5 See Thyroid Procochmes I
i
i
  - - - ~ _ -
- - - ~ _ -


m DCLOSURE 4.1.5                                                                                       OCP-12 t OSS OF SHUTD0 pet FUCT10pG                                                                                   PAGE 6 of 12 LMEUAL EVENT                                                                   ALERT                                   SITE AREA EMEWGENCY                               GDdEDAL EMEDGEACY
m DCLOSURE 4.1.5 OCP-12 t OSS OF SHUTD0 pet FUCT10pG PAGE 6 of 12 LMEUAL EVENT ALERT SITE AREA EMEWGENCY GDdEDAL EMEDGEACY t.
: t. toss or n.cn0.o .ETw.                                           1. . m F n.cn.c -Em To                       1. toss or n Cn.e .rEw. roR                     1.     n.sID.r D ET1A1E. = uns or TD MAIMT AIM P13987 CDtD                                           94kDtTAD8 PUWWT COtB SBENBOppt                 PUpgr sept $3ENBE308                                 FWsAge - TE SYSTB G SSEffBest                                                       _
toss or n.cn0.o.ETw.
EDLimEB SY FAIUK OF ETWC FWt M RATDG SEEBE: COLD SSEJTWEDSG                 OPERATDG PEME: NUT 53Eri3300                         AttEXYD GES PERIM T W 8!Enft.DE                                 TM PtBER EMRATItBG OPERATIDG PEIBE: CDLD                                                                                                                                                   - Innbalaty to feed steen SMllTDupee T354tJ REMEL.DC                                         - tawnble to ammintain core                     - SSF feodang steers gesnerators                           panersters from mff source s e ture< 200*F                                                                                         tincludes the SSFt
1.
    - Loss of residual twat                                                                                             - MPI forced cooling snable                                                             -ABS removal for greater                                                                                                 to musintain seccoling > 0*F                             MP3 forced cooling not than 10 aira.stes.                                             2. WEND FiscT1tBE OF SYSTDetSt                                                                               swailable DEESFS TO HADtTAIN PUlfET BE3T                 - (kable to meintain reactor SSEJT3tpet CWeTTItBG                             subcritical                               2. TRASCIDST SERNRDE EK TWIP DEETW FAlt1 K TO M ABS OPERATDs PDBE: SIUT 53EMBIBes             2. A8877CIPATED THASCIDfT DETTIERJT                     FAltl5E OF N run was T35El PtBER trEDATitBG                         SENMt
. m F n.cn.c -Em To 1.
                                                                                                                                                                              - 2 or more RFS channels trap
toss or n Cn.e.rEw. roR 1.
                                                                        - No HPI ficne available                       OPERATDG SENE:       C-                                     wi +wn.rt autammHc reactor (EsERATitpG                                                 trap
n.sID.r D ET1A1E. = uns or TD MAIMT AIM P13987 CDtD 94kDtTAD8 PUWWT COtB SBENBOppt PUpgr sept $3ENBE308 FWsAge - TE SYSTB G SSEffBest EDLimEB SY FAIUK OF ETWC FWt M RATDG SEEBE: COLD SSEJTWEDSG OPERATDG PEME: NUT 53Eri3300 AttEXYD GES PERIM T W 8!Enft.DE TM PtBER EMRATItBG OPERATIDG PEIBE: CDLD
                                                                        - HPI forced cooling initiated                                                                                                         _Aue
- Innbalaty to feed steen SMllTDupee T354tJ REMEL.DC
                                                                                                                        - 2 or more RPS dernels trip                               Em actions sw EOP
- tawnble to ammintain core
: 3. AffTICIPATED TResEIENT BEIT1ERJr                 withou". autosamtic reactor trip                         f ail to bring reactor
- SSF feodang steers gesnerators panersters from mff source s e ture< 200*F tincludes the SSFt
        .                                                              SCRApt                                                         A88                                         subcritical Cen teci rods resumin with OPORATDG PEBE: POER                               and CApost be immnuelly trigynod
- Loss of residual twat
                                                                                                                                      ~
- MPI forced cooling snable
Age
-ABS removal for greater to musintain seccoling > 0*F MP3 forced cooling not than 10 aira.stes.
;                                                                        EPERATitDe                                       or inserted frese ther control                           PCS S e coulTrwy < C*F
2.
                                                                        - 2 or *= ore R*S charnels trip                   room without automatic reactor trip AfS Centrol rods ~ere e=p= Ale of being inserted saanuel trip or desvent fec= the control room 4
WEND FiscT1tBE OF SYSTDetSt swailable DEESFS TO HADtTAIN PUlfET BE3T
_ _ - _ -    ._--___.____.-.-______--.-...-____.--_a
- (kable to meintain reactor SSEJT3tpet CWeTTItBG subcritical 2.
TRASCIDST SERNRDE EK TWIP DEETW FAlt1 K TO M ABS OPERATDs PDBE: SIUT 53EMBIBes 2.
A8877CIPATED THASCIDfT DETTIERJT FAltl5E OF N run was T35El PtBER trEDATitBG SENMt
- 2 or more RFS channels trap
- No HPI ficne available OPERATDG SENE:
C-wi +wn.rt autammHc reactor (EsERATitpG trap
- HPI forced cooling initiated
_Aue
- 2 or more RPS dernels trip Em actions sw EOP 3.
AffTICIPATED TResEIENT BEIT1ERJr withou". autosamtic reactor trip f ail to bring reactor SCRApt A88 subcritical Cen teci rods resumin with OPORATDG PEBE: POER and CApost be immnuelly trigynod Age EPERATitDe or inserted frese ther control PCS S e coulTrwy < C*F
~
- 2 or *= ore R*S charnels trip room without automatic reactor trip AfS Centrol rods ~ere e=p= Ale of being inserted saanuel trip or desvent fec= the control room 4
.-- a


e ENCLOSURE 4.1.6                                                 OGP-12 LOSS OF PONER                                                 PAGE 7 of 12 UNUSUAL EVENT                                       ALERT                             SITE AREA EMERGENCY             GENEDAL EMEWGENCY
e ENCLOSURE 4.1.6 OGP-12 LOSS OF PONER PAGE 7 of 12 UNUSUAL EVENT ALERT SITE AREA EMERGENCY GENEDAL EMEWGENCY
: 1. . IRSS OF OFT *ITE AC PEBER tm a ant: . 1. Im OF EETSITE AC PEBER ABS               1. IN OF OFFSITE AC PtBER Age         1. FAI1M SF N MS FE OF sptGITE AC PtpeR CAPAIBILITY-       HEES OF ALL (ptSITE AC PtBER                 am OF Att 13e5ITE AC PEBER             AC PEBER RWE BETN M 19tAL q fR'i OF EFWDS MIWCHF CAPMLITY OfTRAT1DE 9mBE.: CDtB Span 30 pet       ENEltATTNG SWEX: CDLB SsRFTWEDes             trERATDE TEBE       CDLS SetKSEmes Tiegt7 REFWLDE                         TymJ KF1KL1%                                 TimJ NEf1ELDE                         trEmaTDS fEWE: MN SBENEpet
: 1.. IRSS OF OFT *ITE AC PEBER tm a ant:.
                        - MTB 1 and 2 & ;-.wgized for           - MFB 1 and 2 de-erwrgized for               - MFB 1 and 2 e - vized for
1.
!                          >1 but <15 mamtes                       > 15 minutes                                 >15 minutes                         - No AC pr=ser iBlach utI Age OPERATING teSE: AftoVE CDtB             OPEltATDC 9EBE: ABOYE CDLS                     Temperature sn the core is                       _ ABS SMUTDopet                               $3EJTBEBet:                                     s200* F j                                                                                                                                                     Inability to feed steen
Im OF EETSITE AC PEBER ABS 1.
                        - Shutdown initiated pursuant           - MFB 1 and 2 a a +;gized                   EFERATDC IEBE: ASOWE CDL3               ponerators from ANY source to T.S. 5.7                             for >l but <15 annutes                   Spanttgot                               sincludes the SSF5
IN OF OFFSITE AC PtBER Age 1.
                        - Loss of of fsite AC power         2. t er:": Or ALL VITAL EBCITE SC               - MFB 1 and 2 O - - wired and usit auwiliaries being           PEBER                                           > 15 minutes powered through CTve or CT5 trERATDE DEBE: CDLS LSEMBEBet           2. 88M't OF ALL VITAL EDESITE SC LOSS OF ALL VTTAL EBCITE SC             T15El WiFtELDE                               PtBER PtBE R
FAI1M SF N MS FE OF sptGITE AC PtpeR CAPAIBILITY-HEES OF ALL (ptSITE AC PtBER am OF Att 13e5ITE AC PEBER AC PEBER RWE BETN M 19tAL q fR'i OF EFWDS MIWCHF CAPMLITY OfTRAT1DE 9mBE.: CDtB Span 30 pet ENEltATTNG SWEX: CDLB SsRFTWEDes trERATDE TEBE CDLS SetKSEmes Tiegt7 REFWLDE TymJ KF1KL1%
                                                                - Loss of DC power to all vital             trERATDE 8WWE: CDL3 SISKDEBet OPERATDE MUDE: CDLD SPUratmos             panelhoords for >15 minutes               7tm3 NEf1ELDE TlWIO IEEF1KLDS crutATTNG 9WWE: AnovE CDLS                   - Sustained loss of DC power to
TimJ NEf1ELDE trEmaTDS fEWE: MN SBENEpet
                        - m nentary loss of DC power to         SeanaDuet                                       all vital panelbaards for all vital penalbomeds >l but                                                         >15 minutes
- MTB 1 and 2 & ;-.wgized for
                            <15 minutes                         - Momentary loss of DC power                                 _Afe to all vital panelboards                     Temperature an the core is
- MFB 1 and 2 de-erwrgized for
                                                                    > 1 but < 15 mirutes                         >200*F
- MFB 1 and 2 e - vized for
;                                                            3. STEArt GOERATUR 7tBE LEAft et[TM             GPURATDE DWWE       AAOWE COLD n m Or OFFSITE AC PtBER                     SIRITDEBSE 4
>1 but <15 mamtes
OPERATDE 84BE: ASOWE CULB                   - Sustained loss of DC pcmer to
> 15 minutes
                                                                $senarset                                       a11 vita 1 pan Ibo.eds for 4                                                                               .
>15 minutes
                                                                                                                > 15 minutes
- No AC pr=ser iBlach utI Age OPERATING teSE: AftoVE CDtB OPEltATDC 9EBE: ABOYE CDLS Temperature sn the core is
                                                                - SG tsee leak > 10 gpm Ase S.bcooling Wegin > 0*r                                                                                                   ,
_ ABS SMUTDopet
Loss of 4900v prwer to                                                                                                   i all PCPs                                                                                                                 i i
$3EJTBEBet:
k.
s200* F j
Inability to feed steen
- Shutdown initiated pursuant
- MFB 1 and 2 a a +;gized EFERATDC IEBE: ASOWE CDL3 ponerators from ANY source to T.S.
5.7 for >l but <15 annutes Spanttgot sincludes the SSF5
- Loss of of fsite AC power 2.
t er:": Or ALL VITAL EBCITE SC
- MFB 1 and 2 O - - wired and usit auwiliaries being PEBER
> 15 minutes powered through CTve or CT5 trERATDE DEBE: CDLS LSEMBEBet 2.
88M't OF ALL VITAL EDESITE SC LOSS OF ALL VTTAL EBCITE SC T15El WiFtELDE PtBER PtBE R
- Loss of DC power to all vital trERATDE 8WWE: CDL3 SISKDEBet OPERATDE MUDE: CDLD SPUratmos panelhoords for >15 minutes 7tm3 NEf1ELDE TlWIO IEEF1KLDS crutATTNG 9WWE: AnovE CDLS
- Sustained loss of DC power to
- m nentary loss of DC power to SeanaDuet all vital panelbaards for all vital penalbomeds >l but
>15 minutes
<15 minutes
- Momentary loss of DC power
_Afe to all vital panelboards Temperature an the core is
> 1 but < 15 mirutes
>200*F 3.
STEArt GOERATUR 7tBE LEAft et[TM GPURATDE DWWE AAOWE COLD n m Or OFFSITE AC PtBER SIRITDEBSE 4
OPERATDE 84BE: ASOWE CULB
- Sustained loss of DC pcmer to
$senarset a11 vita 1 pan Ibo.eds for 4
> 15 minutes
- SG tsee leak > 10 gpm Ase S.bcooling Wegin > 0*r Loss of 4900v prwer to i
all PCPs i
i k.
b
b
_= - - _ _ _ _ _
= - -


                                                                                                                                                                      .y
.y
                                                                                                                                                    ~
~
CMIP-12 ENCLOSURE 4.1.7                                                       PAGE 8 of 12 FIRES AND SECURITY ACTIONS SITE ARE A EMERGENCY               CENERA: EMEPGENCY t#ULUAL EVENT                                     ALERT
CMIP-12 ENCLOSURE 4.1.7 PAGE 8 of 12 FIRES AND SECURITY ACTIONS SITE ARE A EMERGENCY CENERA: EMEPGENCY ALERT t#ULUAL EVENT 1.
: 1. FIRE CDFWDPGSDE TK H.DCTIt3G           1. Aser 9tunut 1NTTEBent (Et EXTEtWent
FTRE MITNTM Pt#fr LASTDG 1.
: 1. FTRE MITNTM Pt#fr LASTDG            1. FTRE POTINTIALLY AFfTCTING SAFETY                                                        EWir seGC8 CsutA CMM saav3VE OF SAFETY SYSTDES ImRE TitRN 10 KiVTES                   SYSTTMS                                                                                 CIDTGM SAftpK TO TIE Pustr
FTRE POTINTIALLY AFfTCTING SAFETY 1.
                                                                                        - Observation of a fare causing the POTE: Mathan the plont means:          - vasual obsN vataan of fire                      loss oii red edant traits of safety    - Unst cannot be sumtntained at Aux Bldg. TB, PB,D.cowee         poten+~-'Iv affecting s.afety                 ocp.sipement required by Tectnical         hot shutdcaen frose any location egai. .%  ; e wirvd by Teck1r ical ifydro Spn: it su tw *s for current                 Specs. for current mode M operation
FIRE CDFWDPGSDE TK H.DCTIt3G 1.
: 2. M OF PfrfSICAL CtptnUL OF TN           y mode -f c,ec lion
Aser 9tunut 1NTTEBent (Et EXTEtWent EWir seGC8 CsutA CMM saav3VE OF SAFETY SYSTDES ImRE TitRN 10 KiVTES SYSTTMS CIDTGM SAftpK TO TIE Pustr
  - E f f orts to ewtirgsish a fire                                                     - Fire in Contml Room rm.p. airing       Pl. ANT ISEI SUTEul within the plant last                                                                 swacuation and thit carnot be
- vasual obsN vataan of fire
    > 10 minutes                         - Fire in     c -oritrol Roose requiring evacuttien and thit                 maintain >d at hot shstchwn from the auxiliary shutdcaes           - Physacal attac$t resulting an keing maintainert at bot                                                                tsinuthorized pervnnel shutckwi f row the auxiliary                  panel
- Observation of a fare causing the Aux Bldg. TB, PB,D.cowee poten+~-'Iv affecting s.afety loss oii red edant traits of safety
: 2. SEC15tTTY algtEAT OR ATTUW'TED                                                                                                     ocercying the CR or any other ENTRY OR SARDTAE ESEE PUTEs t             shutdown pariel                                                                         vital areas
- Unst cannot be sumtntained at POTE: Mathan the plont means:
: 2. D9GMNT Im OF 79fYSICAL CtptinDL OF TE PLAffT (SEE DUTEul
ifydro egai..%
: 2. (DE23DG SECUtI(Y CJPHmESE
; e wirvd by Teck1r ical ocp.sipement required by Tectnical hot shutdcaen frose any location Spn: it su tw *s for current Specs. for current mode M operation 2.
  - Diservery of bOPib within the       (*.EE DUTEs t si te barwtary                                                                     - Pnysical aitack e ,sulting
M OF PfrfSICAL CtptnUL OF TN y
                                          - Adversaries coresandeer an area                 in inseinent ocotpancy of
- E f f orts to ewtirgsish a fire mode -f c,ec lion
  - Civil disturbance thostile s            of the plant but not control                 control room or other vital over tnit shutdown capahility                 areas
- Fire in Contml Room rm.p. airing Pl. ANT ISEI SUTEul within the plant last
  - IntrusiorVAt teepted Intrusics (Protected Areal
> 10 minutes
                                          - Disa.nery of breached barrier               - Discovery of bcad> in the
- Fire in c -oritrol Roose swacuation and thit carnot be requiring evacuttien and thit maintain >d at hot shstchwn keing maintainert at bot from the auxiliary shutdcaes
  - Hostage situation / extortion           (security-relatede caused by                 vital Areas intrusion or sabotage in Vita' Area DCTEn: RP/D/B/1000/07 shall be used in conjtsiction with     - Discovery of bos6 in the all sea.srity related           Protected Area
- Physacal attac$t resulting an tsinuthorized pervnnel 2.
: n. r ,.f classifications
SEC15tTTY algtEAT OR ATTUW'TED shutckwi f row the auxiliary panel ocercying the CR or any other ENTRY OR SARDTAE ESEE PUTEs t shutdown pariel vital areas 2.
D9GMNT Im OF 79fYSICAL 2.
(DE23DG SECUtI(Y CJPHmESE CtptinDL OF TE PLAffT (SEE DUTEul
- Diservery of bOPib within the
(*.EE DUTEs t si te barwtary
- Pnysical aitack e,sulting
- Civil disturbance thostile s
- Adversaries coresandeer an area in inseinent ocotpancy of of the plant but not control control room or other vital
- IntrusiorVAt teepted Intrusics over tnit shutdown capahility areas (Protected Areal
- Disa.nery of breached barrier
- Discovery of bcad> in the
- Hostage situation / extortion (security-relatede caused by vital Areas intrusion or sabotage in Vita' Area DCTEn: RP/D/B/1000/07 shall be used in conjtsiction with
- Discovery of bos6 in the all sea.srity related Protected Area
: n. r,.f classifications


                                                          ?                                                               '
?
W CMIP-12 ENCLOSURI 4.1.8                                           PAGE ? of 12 SPENT FUEL DAPtAGE SITE AREA EMERGENC(       GEMRAL EMERGENCY LDAfSUAL EVENT                   ALERT I. treAE TD SPDfT fML MTTH               1. IEJOR DAPtAE TD SPDfT F1EL METH                     -
W CMIP-12 ENCLOSURI 4.1.8 PAGE ? of 12 SPENT FUEL DAPtAGE SITE AREA EMERGENC(
anJASE OF RADIDACTIVITY                     IEELEASE OF RADIDACTIVITY
GEMRAL EMERGENCY ALERT LDAfSUAL EVENT I.
              -  Activity at protected area fence:                     CDMTADOENT                                  ,
treAE TD SPDfT fML MTTH 1.
                      > 2 mRAw >E Valid RIA 57/58 Alarm tLhit 142 MIQt - 630 R/hri CCMTAIWW3fT                         (thit 3 AtElff - 286 R/hr t                                 l
IEJOR DAPtAE TD SPDfT F1EL METH anJASE OF RADIDACTIVITY IEELEASE OF RADIDACTIVITY CDMTADOENT Activity at protected area fence:
                                                            - Valid RIA 49A > 1.13E6 cpas                                   !
> 2 mRAw >E Valid RIA 57/58 Alarm tLhit 142 MIQt - 630 R/hri CCMTAIWW3fT (thit 3 AtElff - 286 R/hr t l
              -  thit 152 valid RIA 2. 3, 4                                                                                1 or 49 MItat alarm                       -  Dose rate inside RB cm4>1ed
thit 152 valid RIA 2. 3, 4
              -  Lhit 3 - Valid RIA 3, 4, or                 with RB leak rate results in 49 MIDI alarm                                calculated dose rate at Site Boundary:
- Valid RIA 49A > 1.13E6 cpas 1
                              '~~Are
or 49 MItat alarm Dose rate inside RB cm4>1ed with RB leak rate results in Lhit 3 - Valid RIA 3, 4, or calculated dose rate at Site 49 MIDI alarm Boundary:
                                                                ~> 50 mR/hr NB or 250 mR/hr Open flow path exists fron                     Thyroid coniairwennt                                   FWL MApeLDC MIILSDE FWL MApellNG BUILDDE Valid RI A-6 IGO' ar RIA 41
'~~Are
              - Valid RI A 6 HItal Alarm or                   A11RT Alarm RI A 41 ALERT alaru                                   ***
~> 50 mR/hr NB or 250 mR/hr Open flow path exists fron Thyroid coniairwennt FWL MApeLDC MIILSDE FWL MApellNG BUILDDE Valid RI A-6 IGO' ar RIA 41
                                ~~ ape RIA 45 ALENT alarm RIA 46 HIGt Alarm iverified by RIA 458                                   _Afe Ape                            RIA 46 reading > 3000 ctwo Release rate calculations using vent secole analysis arvi ficw rate data are in excess of 10 times limits established by Tee nical Specifications
- Valid RI A 6 HItal Alarm or A11RT Alarm RI A 41 ALERT alaru
~~ ape RIA 45 ALENT alarm RIA 46 HIGt Alarm iverified by RIA 458
_Afe RIA 46 reading > 3000 ctwo Ape Release rate calculations using vent secole analysis arvi ficw rate data are in excess of 10 times limits established by Tee nical Specifications


                                                                                                                                                                                                                              .      M ENCLOSURE 4.1.9                                                             CMIP-12 NATURAL DISASTERS AND OTHER HAZARDS                                                     PAGE 10 of 12 LNLfSUAL EVENT                                                                                                   ALE RT                                 SITE ARE A EERGENCY                   GOERAL EMERGENCY
M ENCLOSURE 4.1.9 CMIP-12 NATURAL DISASTERS AND OTHER HAZARDS PAGE 10 of 12 LNLfSUAL EVENT ALE RT SITE ARE A EERGENCY GOERAL EMERGENCY 1.
: 1. EARTH 4UAKE DCTECTED                                                                                 1. DESIE3 matit EAftTyganar                 1. 3Apeng ratBt EAftTimanarr, ADIERAFT     1. Affr ftL3EBt INFEEWERL GR EXTUWERL romans, T1354A30, femiti OR                 EYHettSt ti.e., FI M S , Fi m .
EARTH 4UAKE DCTECTED 1.
    - 1 rem >r felt and strong motson                                                                     - Treror. felt and sensmic                     EAufflamaAILE                             " EAfrpmannert StBSTAffr1 ALLY SEYEBS accelerograph actuates 40.01 gi                                                                         trigger alarm actuales                                                                   WES2438 LEVELSI DOEICIe metre 40.05 gl                                   DPERATIDEG MDDE: ASUWE COLD                 penSSIVE CIBGEst BArthE TD PtJIffr
DESIE3 matit EAftTyganar 1.
: 2. LAKE L1 VEL EKEODE~E l                                                                                                                                 SSEUTWEDOS                                   SYSTDES                     *
3Apeng ratBt EAftTimanarr, ADIERAFT 1.
: 2. DaftmE flitDe AIRC3tAFT CatASft,
Affr ftL3EBt INFEEWERL GR EXTUWERL romans, T1354A30, femiti OR EYHettSt ti.e., FI M S, Fi m.
    - Level < 780 ft.                                                                                       T1334400, IENTLE OR EXPtDSION                 - Damage c6 served to safety           -    Unit carvet be ausantaanori at Afe)                                                                                                                                             ogsipment causing the inability         . bot shutdram from any location Unit shutdom initiated per                                                                                                                             to establish and unintain hot TS 3.3.7 ILPSH operabilityl                                                                           - Damage observed to                             shuidown from 'he control safety equipment causing                       room or the auxiliary i 3. DAMAGE FlIDM AIRCRAFT C3tASH                                                                               the inability to establish                     stustdown panel TURNADO, MISSLE Oft EXPLDSION                                                                             and emintain cold shut-do n                                       - Tremor felt and peak acceleration
- 1 rem >r felt and strong motson
    - Damage ancmarred to                                                                                                                                     recorder reading > 0.10g equipment / structures evithin                                                                     3. IIAZAIEBERS MERSTAfCE OR FLAf9 taste the Site Bouviary                                                                                     GAS BEELEASE                             2. learamatu r: SEERSTAfqCE OR FLAf9 TABLE CAS NELEASE 4 MAZAltDOLE $1ERSTANCE OR FtJRf9tASLE                                                                   - 4.hcontrolled eritry of a GAS REtEASE                                                                                               toxic sthstance or flassemble               GPERATDeGPEBE       Alt 0VE CDLD gas into an area of the plant               SpeK 3tpOE
- Treror. felt and sensmic EAufflamaAILE
    - A spill or release determined                                                                           ...ich jeopardizes the operation to be reportable pursuant to                                                                             of equipment necessary                     - t.hoontrolled entry of a toxic RP/0/B/1000/17. Hazardous                                                                               to establish and maintain                     stestance or flanumable gas.
" EAfrpmannert StBSTAffr1 ALLY SEYEBS accelerograph actuates 40.01 gi trigger alarm actuales WES2438 LEVELSI DOEICIe metre 40.05 gl DPERATIDEG MDDE: ASUWE COLD penSSIVE CIBGEst BArthE TD PtJIffr 2.
Sahstance Release                                                                                       cold shutdown                                 into any area of the plant eAich prevents the operatiro                                             ,
LAKE L1 VEL EKEODE~E l SSEUTWEDOS SYSTDES 2.
of ocpipment necessary to establish and maintain hot stastdown i
DaftmE flitDe AIRC3tAFT CatASft,
- Level < 780 ft.
T1334400, IENTLE OR EXPtDSION
- Damage c6 served to safety Unit carvet be ausantaanori at Afe) ogsipment causing the inability
. bot shutdram from any location Unit shutdom initiated per to establish and unintain hot TS 3.3.7 ILPSH operabilityl
- Damage observed to shuidown from 'he control safety equipment causing room or the auxiliary i
3.
DAMAGE FlIDM AIRCRAFT C3tASH the inability to establish stustdown panel TURNADO, MISSLE Oft EXPLDSION and emintain cold shut-do n
- Tremor felt and peak acceleration
- Damage ancmarred to recorder reading > 0.10g equipment / structures evithin 3.
IIAZAIEBERS MERSTAfCE OR FLAf9 taste the Site Bouviary GAS BEELEASE 2.
learamatu r: SEERSTAfqCE OR FLAf9 TABLE CAS NELEASE 4
MAZAltDOLE $1ERSTANCE OR FtJRf9tASLE
- 4.hcontrolled eritry of a GAS REtEASE toxic sthstance or flassemble GPERATDeGPEBE Alt 0VE CDLD gas into an area of the plant SpeK 3tpOE
- A spill or release determined
...ich jeopardizes the operation to be reportable pursuant to of equipment necessary
- t.hoontrolled entry of a toxic RP/0/B/1000/17. Hazardous to establish and maintain stestance or flanumable gas.
Sahstance Release cold shutdown into any area of the plant eAich prevents the operatiro of ocpipment necessary to establish and maintain hot stastdown i


_, sq A.
_, sq A.
CMIP-12 EtCLOS:
CMIP-12 EtCLOS: E 4.1.10 PAGE II of 32 T
T E 4.1.10 PAGE II of 32 OTHER ABNORMAL PLANT CONDITIOpG SITE ARE A EMERGENCY             GEMERAL EMERGENCY LDAEUAL EVENT                                   ALERT OTER PLANT CGWITTIBES EXIST        1. OTER PUMT CEBeITIEDG bGST ECCS IMITIATED                   1. OTER PLANT CIBeITIOp6 EXIST                 1.
OTHER ABNORMAL PLANT CONDITIOpG SITE ARE A EMERGENCY GEMERAL EMERGENCY ALERT LDAEUAL EVENT OTER PUMT CEBeITIEDG bGST 1.
FREBt 9084TEVUt aumT TMAT MilEE
ECCS IMITIATED 1.
: 1.                                                                                     THAT MARRANT CLASS 3FICATIEDt OF A T1 TAT V W PitECAUTJtDeARY                                                            N F A K LEASE OF N CLASS JCATitDe OF A88 ALTNT                   SITE AAEA DEREE)CY                     ApelatT5 OF SEASIGACTIVITY IN A (PERATDE fG E: FDER MTRATitDG
OTER PLANT CIBeITIOp6 EXIST 1.
                                                                                        - Esmerpecy Coordanator or Recovery    SetDWT TIPE PERIOD
OTER PLANT CGWITTIBES EXIST 1.
    - ES systemiss required to be       - Er .,rtrauncy Coordanator
T1 TAT V W PitECAUTJtDeARY THAT MARRANT CLASS 3FICATIEDt OF A FREBt 9084TEVUt aumT TMAT MilEE N F A K LEASE OF N (PERATDE fG E: FDER MTRATitDG CLASS JCATitDe OF A88 ALTNT SITE AAEA DEREE)CY ApelatT5 OF SEASIGACTIVITY IN A
* ftanager judgn=nnt operable per TS                      judrpent                                                                          - Emerspency actacns per the t.HC                                                                      EVACUATTG4 OF (IDrillDL REXM EOP inedequate core cooling 2.
- ES systemiss required to be
Automisc or marual ES          2. EVACUATTED4 OF CIDtTitDL RotDe                                                          section are msuccessful -
- Er.,rtrauncy Coordanator
actuation on VALID sicpal er                                               -
- Esmerpecy Coordanator or Recovery SetDWT TIPE PERIOD operable per TS judrpent ftanager judgn=nnt
CETC > 1200* F
- Emerspency actacns per the Automisc or marual ES 2.
                                          - Evacuataan of Control Room                   - Evacuat2on of Control Room indication Ape Ape Afe Heter injected to RCS or core       unit beirwi mmintained at hot                 thit comot be sumintained at shutdown f rom the Ataciliary as a result of ES actuation                                                        hot shutdown from the shutdown Panel e.briliary shutdown panel
EVACUATTED4 OF CIDtTitDL RotDe 2.
: 2. LfES OF EIDtTAD#ENT INTTCRITY Rf 4tJTRDE SIRTI1EDet BY TS       3. LOSS OF ASS [S3R3tT
EVACUATTG4 OF (IDrillDL REXM EOP inedequate core cooling t.HC section are msuccessful -
    - LMs t shutdown 2nitanted per       EFERATDE teDE: HEIT SNJTDG94 TS 3.6 ICentainment Integrityi   T15tU FGER OPERATICDG
actuation on VALID sicpal er
                                          - Loss of 50% or ow>re of a 1D55 OF ES ITAT1stE OR FIRE             mit's applicable statalern 3.
- Evacuat2on of Control Room CETC > 1200* F indication
F5tDTECTICM SYSTDI T1DCTION             panels for > 15 minutes RE*JtfINDE SMITDGee BY TS APPtJCABLE STATALAfEH PAfELS
- Evacuataan of Control Room Ape Ape Afe Heter injected to RCS or core unit beirwi mmintained at hot as a result of ES actuation shutdown f rom the Ataciliary thit comot be sumintained at shutdown Panel hot shutdown from the e.briliary shutdown panel 2.
    - Unit stoicbwn initiated per TS 3.3 IES systeest                               (MIT 143 1 sal-9, 14-16, 16
LfES OF EIDtTAD#ENT INTTCRITY Rf 4tJTRDE SIRTI1EDet BY TS 3.
    - Unit shutdown initiated per             3SA1-9, 14-16, 18 TS 3.17 (Fire Prefection                         LMIT 2 Systems includes groowee 2 sal-9, 14-16 Hydrol fctrwi innperable l
LOSS OF ASS [S3R3tT
- LMs t shutdown 2nitanted per EFERATDE teDE: HEIT SNJTDG94 TS 3.6 ICentainment Integrityi T15tU FGER OPERATICDG
- Loss of 50% or ow>re of a 3.
1D55 OF ES ITAT1stE OR FIRE mit's applicable statalern F5tDTECTICM SYSTDI T1DCTION panels for > 15 minutes RE*JtfINDE SMITDGee BY TS APPtJCABLE STATALAfEH PAfELS
- Unit stoicbwn initiated per (MIT 143 TS 3.3 IES systeest 1 sal-9, 14-16, 16
- Unit shutdown initiated per 3SA1-9, 14-16, 18 TS 3.17 (Fire Prefection LMIT 2 Systems includes groowee Hydrol fctrwi innperable 2 sal-9, 14-16 l
i l
i l


z,
z, l
    ..~
.. ~
                                                                                                                                          ,.m           _
,.m i-ENCLOSURE 4.1.10
i-                                                                                                                       .
- CPGP-12 ~
ENCLOSURE 4.1.10                                     - CPGP-12 ~
..OTHER ABNORMAL PLANT CtmOITIONS
                                                                      ..OTHER ABNORMAL PLANT CtmOITIONS                             - PAGE 12 of 12?       -
- PAGE 12 of 12?
LNf2JAL EVENT                                   ALERT                               SITE ARE A EPERGENCY     GENERAL EFENGOCY ' '~
LNf2JAL EVENT ALERT SITE ARE A EPERGENCY GENERAL EFENGOCY ' '~
?
?
* A 23GHf 3CAffT LIISS OF N               3. TMDE MKLMBE FLN a           DR CIB98DelCA11tBI CAPABILITY
A 23GHf 3CAffT LIISS OF N 3.
                                                    - TB flood regtJarang use of AP/1.2,3/A/1700/10 procedtsre
TMDE MKLMBE FLN a
            - Loss of accident monitoring in-       unecntrollable Flooding of Turbine Building
DR CIB98DelCA11tBI CAPABILITY
* strsmentation iTable 3.5.6-1:
- TB flood regtJarang use of AP/1.2,3/A/1700/10 procedtsre
and init shutdown initiated per TS 3.5.6
- Loss of accident monitoring in-unecntrollable Flooding of strsmentation iTable 3.5.6-1:
            - Loss of ONS comwamications capability with all Offsite Agencies from the' Control Room
Turbine Building and init shutdown initiated per TS 3.5.6
: 5. TREA17HET OF P' TMpeEL AT-
- Loss of ONS comwamications capability with all Offsite Agencies from the' Control Room 5.
,          .OFFSITE MGSP.aAL
TREA17HET OF P' TMpeEL AT-
            - Decontamination offorts fail to reduce enternal contamination below 150 com l               beta-gama j                 -      M-Rad Protection determines that
.OFFSITE MGSP.aAL
,              radiological antrols are required for offsite medical
- Decontamination offorts fail to reduce enternal contamination below 150 com l
,              treatment
beta-gama 1
            - Interrini contamination t               requ'eing medical assessment / '
j M-Rad Protection determines that radiological antrols are required for offsite medical treatment
- Interrini contamination t
requ'eing medical assessment / '
trea ment
trea ment
;            - Extemal exposure recpJiring medical assessment / treatment 4
- Extemal exposure recpJiring medical assessment / treatment 4
i
i
                                                                                      -          -                  -,1         e.                   r
-,1 e.
r


CMIP-12 7
CMIP-12
Enclosure 4,2 Page 1 of 1
*,2 7
(                                           AREA MONITORS Mr/Hr Monitor Number                   Unf1_1                       Unit 2                           Unit 3 RIA-1                         10                                                             10 (RB) RIA-4                   40,000                       55,000                           80,000 RIA-7                   25,000 RIA-8                   40,000 RIA-9                   15,000 RIA-10                 15,000                       35,000                             50,000 RIA-11                 10,000                                                         20,000 RIA-12                 35,000                                                         40,000 RIA-13                 45,000                                                         50,000 RIA-15                     NIS                                                         25,000 PROCESS MONITORS CPM Monitor Number                   un11_1                       Unit 2                           Unit 3 RIA-31                   1,000,000                                                     1,000,000 (RB) RIA-47                   10,000,000                 10,000,000                         1,000,000 (RB) RIA-48                   10,000,000                 10,000,000                         1,000,000 (RB) RIA-49                   1,400,000                   1,400,000                         1,000,000 (RB) RIA-49A                         5,000                     5,000                             5,000 RIA-51                   1,000,000                 1.,000,000
Page 1 of 1
(
AREA MONITORS Mr/Hr Monitor Number Unf1_1 Unit 2 Unit 3 RIA-1 10 10 (RB) RIA-4 40,000 55,000 80,000 RIA-7 25,000 RIA-8 40,000 RIA-9 15,000 RIA-10 15,000 35,000 50,000 RIA-11 10,000 20,000 RIA-12 35,000 40,000 RIA-13 45,000 50,000 RIA-15 NIS 25,000 PROCESS MONITORS CPM Monitor Number un11_1 Unit 2 Unit 3 RIA-31 1,000,000 1,000,000 (RB) RIA-47 10,000,000 10,000,000 1,000,000 (RB) RIA-48 10,000,000 10,000,000 1,000,000 (RB) RIA-49 1,400,000 1,400,000 1,000,000 (RB) RIA-49A 5,000 5,000 5,000 RIA-51 1,000,000 1.,000,000


1
1 CMiP-12
* CMiP-12
*,3 4
                .                                                        Enclosure 4,3 4
TERMINATION CRITERIA f-1.
TERMINATION CRITERIA f-
Existing conditions no longer meet the emergency classification criteria and it appears unlikely that conditions will deteriorate further.
: 1. Existing conditions no longer meet the emergency classification criteria and it appears unlikely that conditions will deteriorate further.
2, No surveillance relative to off-site protective actions is needed, except for the control of foodstuffs and water, and off-site contamination, or environmental assessment activities.
2,   No surveillance relative to off-site protective actions is needed, except for the control of foodstuffs and water, and off-site contamination, or environmental assessment activities.
3.
: 3. Radiation levels in affected in plant areas are stable or decreasing to below acceptable levels,
Radiation levels in affected in plant areas are stable or decreasing to below acceptable levels, 4.
: 4. Releases of radioactive material to the environment greater than Technical Specifications are under control or have ceased.
Releases of radioactive material to the environment greater than Technical Specifications are under control or have ceased.
: 5. The potential for an uncontrolled release of radioactive material is at an acceptably low level.
5.
: 6. Containment pressure is within Technical Specification requirements.
The potential for an uncontrolled release of radioactive material is at an acceptably low level.
: 7. Adequate long-term core cooling is available.
6.
: 8. Adequate shutdown margin of the core has been verified.
Containment pressure is within Technical Specification requirements.
9,   A fire, flood, earthquake or similar emergency condition is controlled or has ceased.
7.
: 10. Offsite power is available per Technical Specifications.
Adequate long-term core cooling is available.
: 11. Any contaminated / injured personnel have been transported offsite and are receiving appropriate medical care,
8.
,          12. All emergency action level notifications have been completed.
Adequate shutdown margin of the core has been verified.
L           13. Access to radiologically controlled areas of the plant necessary for I
9, A fire, flood, earthquake or similar emergency condition is controlled or has ceased.
operation during recovery are being monitored by the Radiation Protection Section.
10.
l           14. Offsite conditions will not limit access of personnel and support l                 resources.
Offsite power is available per Technical Specifications.
: 15. Discussions have been held with the News Director to determine the impact of termination on public information management.
11.
l
Any contaminated / injured personnel have been transported offsite and are receiving appropriate medical care, 12.
: 16. Discussions have been held with Senior NRC and State Representatives to determile the impact of termination on their activities.
All emergency action level notifications have been completed.
L 13.
Access to radiologically controlled areas of the plant necessary for operation during recovery are being monitored by the Radiation I
Protection Section.
l 14.
Offsite conditions will not limit access of personnel and support l
resources.
15.
Discussions have been held with the News Director to determine the impact of termination on public information management.
l 16.
Discussions have been held with Senior NRC and State Representatives to determile the impact of termination on their activities.
l
l
                                      ,  -                        ..w-.}}
..w-.}}

Latest revision as of 07:21, 14 December 2024

Public Version of Rev 13 to Crisis Mgt Implementing Procedure CMIP-12, Classification of Emergency for Oconee Nuclear Station
ML20082C744
Person / Time
Site: Oconee  Duke Energy icon.png
Issue date: 06/11/1991
From:
DUKE POWER CO.
To:
Shared Package
ML16148B016 List:
References
CMIP-12-01, CMIP-12-1, NUDOCS 9107220316
Download: ML20082C744 (20)
v • d • e


Text

-

11 l

f.

D' n n,,,, a

' '"'/,

b o,.,,,,, ;,,,

' I; '

u,,,, o;,,.,,,,

,:i,,,.n DUKEPOWER Juyly 1, 1991 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555

Subject:

McGuire Nuclear ' tation Docket Nos. 50-369 and 50-370 Catawba Nuclear Station Docket Nos. 50-413 and 50-414 Oconee Nuclear Station Docket Nos. 50-265 50-270, and 50-287 Crisis Management In,si: enting Procedures Gentlemen:

Attached for NRC 6:a and review is a revision to the following Duke Power Company Crisis Management Implementing Procedure:

CMIP-12 REV. 13 Please delete privacy material in the form of personal telephone numbers prior to placing in the Public Document Room.

By copy of this letter two revisions are being provided to NRC, Region 11, Atlanta.

Very truly yours, h s%

e M. 5. Tuckman HAF:haf Attachment t

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DUKE POWER COMPANY CR. ISIS MANAGEMENT IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES June 11, 1991 l

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TABLE OF CONTENTS j

Volume 2 Igh Procedure Descrintion CHIP-8 Oconee Crisis Phone Directory (Rev. 30)

CMIP-9 McGuire/ Catawba Crisis Phone Directory (Rev. 39)

CMIP-10 Emergency Classification - Catawba (Rev. 3)

'P-11 Emergency Classification - McGuire (Rev. 10)

CM t.'- 12 Emergency Classification - Oconee (Rev. 13)

CMIP-13 Notifications to States and Counties from the Crisis Management Center (Rev. 22)

CMIP-14 Crisis Management Data Transmittal System Access for Offsite Agencies - (Rev. 3)

CMIP-15 Reserved for future use CMIP-16 Crisis Management Data Transmittal Systein Access from the Crisis Management Center -

(Rev. 11)

CMIP-17 Reserved for future use CMIP-18 Maintaining Emergency Preparedness (Rev. 5)

CMIP-19 Communications Test for McGuire/ Catawba CMC (Rev. 16)

CMIP-20 Communications Test for Oconee CMC (Rev. 10)

CMIP-21 Quarterly Inventory Equipment Check (Rev. 35)

CMIP-22 Telephone Number Updates (Rev. 3)

June 11, 1991

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CRISIS MANAGEMENT IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURE CHIP-12 Classification of Emergency for Oconee Nuclear Station Rev. 13 June 11, 1991

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CMIP-12

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CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCY FOR OCONEE NUCLEAR STATION 1.0 SYMPTOMS 1.1 Notification of Unusual Event 1.1.1 Events are in process or have occurred which indicate a potential degradation of the level of safety of the plant.

1.1.2 No releases of radioactive material requiring offsite response or monitoring are expected unless further degradation of safety occurs.

1.2 Alert 1.2.1 Events are in process or have occurred which involve an actual or potential substantial degradation of the level of

-safety of the plant.

1.2.2 Loss of one fission product barrier.

1.2.3 Any releases are expected to be limited to small fractions of the EPA Protective Action Guideline exposure levels.

1.3 Site Area Emergency 1.3.1 Events are in process or have occurred which involve actual or likely major failures of plant functions needed for protection of the public.

1.3.2 Loss of two fission product barriers.

1.3.3 Releases do not, nor are they expected to, exceed EPA Protec-tive Action Guideline exposure levels outside the Site Boundary.

1.4 General Emergency 1,4.1 Events are in process or have occurred which involve actual or imminent substantial core degradation or melting with potentiel for loss of containment integrity.

1.4,2 Loss of two fission product barriers and failure or imminent failure of the third barrier.

1.4.3 Releases, if made, could be expected to exceed EPA Protective Action Guideline exposure levels outside the Site Boundary.

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2.0 IMMEDIATE ACTIONS 2.1 Compare actual plant conditions to the Emergency Action Level (s) listed in Enclosure 4.1 then declare the appropriate Emergency Class as indicated.

If a change in the emergency class is made, perform steps 2.2, 2.3, and 2.4 below.

2.2 Instruct the State / County Communicator to notify the state (s) and counties per CMIP-13 of any change in the emergency class.

If the emergency class is SITE AREA EMERGENCY or GENERAL EMERGENCY, determine protective action recommendations per CPIP-1 and transmit these recommendations.

NOTE:

Notifications to the state (s) and counties must be made within 15 minutes whenever there is a change in the emergency classification.

2.3 Announce the change in the emergency class to all CMC personnel and to the Emergency Coordinator at the TSC.

2.4 Instruct the NRC Communicator in the CMC Plant Assessment Group to notify NRC immediately and within one hour per CMIP-15, 3.0 SUBSEQUENT ACTIONS 3.1 To de-escalate the Emergency, compare plant conditions to the Initiating Conditions of Enclosure 4.1.

To terminate the emergency, refer to the Termination Criteria in Enclosure 4.3.

Notify state (s), counties, and NkC by verbal summary of any reduction or termination in the emergency class followed by a written summary within eight (8) hours.

4.0 EHCLOSURES 4.1 Emergency Action Level (s) for Emergency Classes Event No.

Pagels) 4.1.1 Primary Coolant Leak 1&2 4.1.2 Fuel Integrity 3

4.1.3 Steam System Failure 4

4.1.4 High Radiation /Radiciogical Effluents 5

4.1.5 Loss of Shutdown Function 6

4.1.6 Loss of Power 7

4.1.7 Fires and Security Actions 8

4.1.8 Spent Fuel Damage 9

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4.1.9 Natural Disasters and Other Hazards 10

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4.1.10 Other Abnormal Plant Conditions 11 & 12 4.2 Area Monitors and Process Monitors 4.3 Termination Criteria e

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CMIP-12 EHCLOSURE 4.1.1 PAGE 1 of 12 PRIMARY COOLANT LEAK ALERT SITE AREA Erf9CENCY CENERAL ENE9CENCY 17aEUAL EVENT 1.

REACTUR SM.fTDO@f REEKf1Rf D BY RCS 1.

RCS LEAKAGE CpfATER TMAN OR 1.

E LEAfutE E3tEATER TMApt 1.

" MALL ABER LAfEE s rirat MET 1B AVAILABLE MAKIW PtDP CAPACITY FAILLAEE OF ECCS-tEAAG.TD N II AIUlCE T*, 3.1.6 EillALL TD 50 CPM NLT OPERATTDC 9mE: DE3T 9RITDED44 (PERATTDC IME: MDT $1RITIND98 Prismary or Pri g /* A'

- IIEA SAE S1 EAL

~ Ape ETTER THEU PortR EPfRATICM TNitt POER (PERATTtDG

- Full HPI tsiecle to musintain Loss of all injecticn or peacto, sNicken initiated Priseery or PrismaryEmerwwiery st6ccoling >0* F isseinant loss of inyection capability j

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$msesuan t to TS 3.1.6 2.

STEAM LIK SIEEAft MITM F/S

- Leak 2 50 gpm OR LEAst equal TD GR EMIEATER TMAN

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~~AMD ANY DK or TM f DLtEMDs E-. s y actions per EOP

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Ape 50 Crn inadequate core cooling

- Primary leakage etnidentifiede SeAccoling > 0*F section are unsuccessful -

GPERATI7C teDE: IEUT 9EJTDupes exceeds 1 gpm T15El MBER OPERATTGPG CETC 2 It00*F Ase

- Total prinary leakage Leak CAf*EUT be isolated.

IWJDE CaffADeENT MTTM

'T7erCAlltM OF-FAIUDftfL 2.

LDCA METM IMITIALLY aerswtg.

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tsdeiniifiedI ewceeds 10 gun DMesa lane Pressure rapidly ECE5 ptITH SUERSE4ptR3tr F Altl.5IE OF 2.

STEAM LIK PJtEAK OLITTJDE ECES KAT SDet Ape f AI115tE Or

- Total prinary leakage CIDETADOENT MITM P/S LIAK decreasing CENTADetDET MAT 8tDENAL Ape i incitaling returesnble 4 CptEATER TMAM OR teuRL TO 10 CPM CAPA81tJTY SG ttbe lee 2 50 gue exceeds 30 gp==

Are

- SG tche leakaoe >.35 gpn OPERATDC SME: MGT S3EJTDCD M Valid pla S for 58 alarm

- LOCA SAE SI EAL Et.kiit 112 MICM - 630 RherB

_Afe T751LI MBER (PERATTEDG

- Any reactor coolant leakaa.

- Failure on secondary side of SG sL>3it 3 ALERT - 286 R/hrt Loss of LPI hast removel evaluated as sesafe results in a direct opening to the erwironment GUTT.JDE CDptTADOOff Aped EITW R CF T K FOt1 D>tD C

- Failure on secondery side of

_ADSD

- Any leakage exists through SG results in a direct waning Loss of heet reenovel the RCS strength txnsulary f encept SG ttees b Ttee leak 210 cpm in either to the erwirunment capability of RBCDs.

Ape sieme generator Tshe leek [50 grwe exists Out Actiwity deteeted at the in the same stease genereior Protected Aree Fe-ee:

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CPt1P-12 ENCLOGURE 4.1.2 PAGE 3 of 12 FUEL INTEGRITY SITE AR! A ENERGENCY GENERAL fNERGENCY ALERT UNtI;UAL EVENT I. irm OF 2 OF 3 FISSItSt FWEET 1.

C2IQt IECS ACTIVITY 1.

SEVERE ED3S OF FML CNDE 1.

DEMADED CDIIE DETTDI POSSIBLE trm BARRIm stITM A POTEWrIAL F15t OF CDDtJetr CEGETRY t tr*- OF 3se SAdutITR

- Total failed fuel is betwawi

- Total f ailed ftel > 5% per

- Avew of f rve highest CETC 8035 OF CLAssDec aAsutITR 1% - 5% per Chmistry onelysis Chemistry analysis'-

reading 3 70C*r Condition 1

- tDuble to emintain stbcooling

- Total failed fuel is 2 5Z pee Channistry onelysis -

- Total activity of RCS da.

> 0* F to isotopes with half lives

- Area ce process RI A sons tors

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Cendition 2 ir. the R9 anml or eweeed lonuer than 30 einutes exceeds 224/E pei/el 4wn lieits stated in Enclosure 4.2

- RB bydrooses ccccentration

> 0.5% and ircreesing at =

- RIA 57 or 58 ALAfst athit 152 ARIRT - 2500 R/he a the RX is critical

~rste of > C.1% per hour ethit 3 IEIm - 1.2E 3 R/hr t

- I-131 on secondary side exceeds 1.4 pei/e1

- valid RIA 57 or 58 Alare

- Aver.g of five hidwst (thit 182 BEIm - 430 R/hr B CETC reading 3 790*F ttbit 3 AlfRT - 286 R/ bel Z.

ARNusgMAL C00UtMT TEMYRAftstE LD35 CEDfTADOOfT SAflRITR AM3/ tnt PRESEEE GR51DE TS LIMITS

- RB ponetratiW s I are cet I

isolated OPERATING MODE: AROVE COLD 2 c e tration is > 92

  • 2tittitDN

- RB 99

- An event has nocurred A ich

- Contairww.st leak. age eweseds rwqsi_rm operstion in the E.6E6 el/hr Thermal Shock Operating Region

- RB peessure > 5* psig

- TS pressure /teeserature *HDTI tocs Or aCs encam!E SAsutTTR limits violated

- LOCA 3 50 g-Inon-isolable fault 8

- SG ts6e leek 2 50 gzs I

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STEAM SYSTEM FAILURE PAGE 4 of 12 I

L'etfSUAL EvtNT ALERT SITE ARE A EMERGENCY GEPEERAL EMERGENCY 1.

RAPID DEPerwarrraTitpe os' 1.

STEMI LIBE SEAst WJSE 1.

STEmt LDE 86 SETM SrtmeeWdrf SIDE EIBUTADeptr 8EITM F/S LDWL P/S 11Ast EMEATER TIGAN ssIEATER Titass OR EguRL in le Ern cR equal TD 54 EFM OPERATDC PEIDE: petrT SNnnarpse T19tU P(DE R EFERATitBG GPERATIDE DEeE: letN SseMDEBet (FEMATTIE DEeE: IENT SutNEGBS8 19mJ PtBER (FERATItBG TIM 3 PEBER EMBATitBE5

- Visual observation of rwn-isolable tank on semin s tespa

- Failure on secondary side of SG

_DE15E_CfDetADenft 98tTM line requiring plant shutck c results in a direct epaning to

_Det_CA_Titse OF FAIB E0 FUEL the erwirtreamt

- Steen line pressure rapidly

- Steam line pressure rapidly-cheerensing decreasing Ape EITWR OF TIE F13LitBEDG

_M SG ttee leek 2 50 gram

- Steam line besak requiring Tsaw le=A > 10 gpa in either

_ase isolation purstent to the steam generator Valid RIA 57 or 58 alaru

a m p operating procedure, tur ILMit 182 90438 - 630 R/hrt t thit 3 ALFRT - 28. R/he t

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Activity detected at the Protected Area fence:

WJBE CIBfTADSOWT

- Failure on secondary side of 2 2 esR/hr DO SG results in a direct wening to the erwircrwent mee Tskm lenAT50 gror exists in the same steem omneratoe.

- Failure en s- " p side of j

SG results in a direct opening to the erwironment ase Tsee le=A T 50 g m ewists in the other steem generator s SG with the secondary side failurr a s being fed FDM fetxe the e rected snit.

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CMIP-12 ENCLOSURE 4.1.4 PAGE 5 of 12 l HIGH RADIATICM/ RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENTS SITE ARE A EMEPGDCY GEMRAL EMERGENCY ALERT L W SUAL EvtPfT 1.

RADIDtOGICAL EFTitDG TS 13MTTS 1.

KIGDI RASI AT1tBf tiVEL m stTEug 1.

ACCIgDdTAL REll.ASE OF GASES 1.

ACCISDtTAL Ea rnes gr can AImosmE ODETaftDeLTIED6 EXCEEDED

- RIA 45 IIIGN Alerw

- RI A 45 ftIGpt Alacw

- Geseous/11cpJad ef fluent being

- Ae a or process RIA ennators

==ceed limits s tated in released==ceed SLC 16.11.2 or ADED

-Ase SLC16.11.2 limits as deterwined.2 by RP or CNweistry Prtcerbres.

l RIA 46 reading 2 3000 cpie RIA 46 reading 3 60.500 cpe

- Activity detected at the Protected Area fence:

- Gose calculations or field

- Calamletions determine dose 12 e t/Sr te retes or Field Nnitoring Teams etmitorig team emess.

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RADIDLEGICAL EFTL1DETS DCILCDC sumesure activity at the Site result in a 2 hour2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> dose projection et the site W:

19 TIFES TS txandery ef:

2 50 mR/hr te ce 250 wiR/hr

- Gaseous /Ligsid effluents being Thyroid 2 1 Ree h ie Body released owceed 10 tiess SLC cut 16.11.1 or SLC 16.11.2 limits as determined try RP or Chemistry g

3 5 See Thyroid Procochmes I

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m DCLOSURE 4.1.5 OCP-12 t OSS OF SHUTD0 pet FUCT10pG PAGE 6 of 12 LMEUAL EVENT ALERT SITE AREA EMEWGENCY GDdEDAL EMEDGEACY t.

toss or n.cn0.o.ETw.

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. m F n.cn.c -Em To 1.

toss or n Cn.e.rEw. roR 1.

n.sID.r D ET1A1E. = uns or TD MAIMT AIM P13987 CDtD 94kDtTAD8 PUWWT COtB SBENBOppt PUpgr sept $3ENBE308 FWsAge - TE SYSTB G SSEffBest EDLimEB SY FAIUK OF ETWC FWt M RATDG SEEBE: COLD SSEJTWEDSG OPERATDG PEME: NUT 53Eri3300 AttEXYD GES PERIM T W 8!Enft.DE TM PtBER EMRATItBG OPERATIDG PEIBE: CDLD

- Innbalaty to feed steen SMllTDupee T354tJ REMEL.DC

- tawnble to ammintain core

- SSF feodang steers gesnerators panersters from mff source s e ture< 200*F tincludes the SSFt

- Loss of residual twat

- MPI forced cooling snable

-ABS removal for greater to musintain seccoling > 0*F MP3 forced cooling not than 10 aira.stes.

2.

WEND FiscT1tBE OF SYSTDetSt swailable DEESFS TO HADtTAIN PUlfET BE3T

- (kable to meintain reactor SSEJT3tpet CWeTTItBG subcritical 2.

TRASCIDST SERNRDE EK TWIP DEETW FAlt1 K TO M ABS OPERATDs PDBE: SIUT 53EMBIBes 2.

A8877CIPATED THASCIDfT DETTIERJT FAltl5E OF N run was T35El PtBER trEDATitBG SENMt

- 2 or more RFS channels trap

- No HPI ficne available OPERATDG SENE:

C-wi +wn.rt autammHc reactor (EsERATitpG trap

- HPI forced cooling initiated

_Aue

- 2 or more RPS dernels trip Em actions sw EOP 3.

AffTICIPATED TResEIENT BEIT1ERJr withou". autosamtic reactor trip f ail to bring reactor SCRApt A88 subcritical Cen teci rods resumin with OPORATDG PEBE: POER and CApost be immnuelly trigynod Age EPERATitDe or inserted frese ther control PCS S e coulTrwy < C*F

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- 2 or *= ore R*S charnels trip room without automatic reactor trip AfS Centrol rods ~ere e=p= Ale of being inserted saanuel trip or desvent fec= the control room 4

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e ENCLOSURE 4.1.6 OGP-12 LOSS OF PONER PAGE 7 of 12 UNUSUAL EVENT ALERT SITE AREA EMERGENCY GENEDAL EMEWGENCY

1.. IRSS OF OFT *ITE AC PEBER tm a ant:.

1.

Im OF EETSITE AC PEBER ABS 1.

IN OF OFFSITE AC PtBER Age 1.

FAI1M SF N MS FE OF sptGITE AC PtpeR CAPAIBILITY-HEES OF ALL (ptSITE AC PtBER am OF Att 13e5ITE AC PEBER AC PEBER RWE BETN M 19tAL q fR'i OF EFWDS MIWCHF CAPMLITY OfTRAT1DE 9mBE.: CDtB Span 30 pet ENEltATTNG SWEX: CDLB SsRFTWEDes trERATDE TEBE CDLS SetKSEmes Tiegt7 REFWLDE TymJ KF1KL1%

TimJ NEf1ELDE trEmaTDS fEWE: MN SBENEpet

- MTB 1 and 2 & ;-.wgized for

- MFB 1 and 2 de-erwrgized for

- MFB 1 and 2 e - vized for

>1 but <15 mamtes

> 15 minutes

>15 minutes

- No AC pr=ser iBlach utI Age OPERATING teSE: AftoVE CDtB OPEltATDC 9EBE: ABOYE CDLS Temperature sn the core is

_ ABS SMUTDopet

$3EJTBEBet:

s200* F j

Inability to feed steen

- Shutdown initiated pursuant

- MFB 1 and 2 a a +;gized EFERATDC IEBE: ASOWE CDL3 ponerators from ANY source to T.S.

5.7 for >l but <15 annutes Spanttgot sincludes the SSF5

- Loss of of fsite AC power 2.

t er:": Or ALL VITAL EBCITE SC

- MFB 1 and 2 O - - wired and usit auwiliaries being PEBER

> 15 minutes powered through CTve or CT5 trERATDE DEBE: CDLS LSEMBEBet 2.

88M't OF ALL VITAL EDESITE SC LOSS OF ALL VTTAL EBCITE SC T15El WiFtELDE PtBER PtBE R

- Loss of DC power to all vital trERATDE 8WWE: CDL3 SISKDEBet OPERATDE MUDE: CDLD SPUratmos panelhoords for >15 minutes 7tm3 NEf1ELDE TlWIO IEEF1KLDS crutATTNG 9WWE: AnovE CDLS

- Sustained loss of DC power to

- m nentary loss of DC power to SeanaDuet all vital panelbaards for all vital penalbomeds >l but

>15 minutes

<15 minutes

- Momentary loss of DC power

_Afe to all vital panelboards Temperature an the core is

> 1 but < 15 mirutes

>200*F 3.

STEArt GOERATUR 7tBE LEAft et[TM GPURATDE DWWE AAOWE COLD n m Or OFFSITE AC PtBER SIRITDEBSE 4

OPERATDE 84BE: ASOWE CULB

- Sustained loss of DC pcmer to

$senarset a11 vita 1 pan Ibo.eds for 4

> 15 minutes

- SG tsee leak > 10 gpm Ase S.bcooling Wegin > 0*r Loss of 4900v prwer to i

all PCPs i

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CMIP-12 ENCLOSURE 4.1.7 PAGE 8 of 12 FIRES AND SECURITY ACTIONS SITE ARE A EMERGENCY CENERA: EMEPGENCY ALERT t#ULUAL EVENT 1.

FTRE MITNTM Pt#fr LASTDG 1.

FTRE POTINTIALLY AFfTCTING SAFETY 1.

FIRE CDFWDPGSDE TK H.DCTIt3G 1.

Aser 9tunut 1NTTEBent (Et EXTEtWent EWir seGC8 CsutA CMM saav3VE OF SAFETY SYSTDES ImRE TitRN 10 KiVTES SYSTTMS CIDTGM SAftpK TO TIE Pustr

- vasual obsN vataan of fire

- Observation of a fare causing the Aux Bldg. TB, PB,D.cowee poten+~-'Iv affecting s.afety loss oii red edant traits of safety

- Unst cannot be sumtntained at POTE: Mathan the plont means:

ifydro egai..%

e wirvd by Teck1r ical ocp.sipement required by Tectnical hot shutdcaen frose any location Spn
it su tw *s for current Specs. for current mode M operation 2.

M OF PfrfSICAL CtptnUL OF TN y

- E f f orts to ewtirgsish a fire mode -f c,ec lion

- Fire in Contml Room rm.p. airing Pl. ANT ISEI SUTEul within the plant last

> 10 minutes

- Fire in c -oritrol Roose swacuation and thit carnot be requiring evacuttien and thit maintain >d at hot shstchwn keing maintainert at bot from the auxiliary shutdcaes

- Physacal attac$t resulting an tsinuthorized pervnnel 2.

SEC15tTTY algtEAT OR ATTUW'TED shutckwi f row the auxiliary panel ocercying the CR or any other ENTRY OR SARDTAE ESEE PUTEs t shutdown pariel vital areas 2.

D9GMNT Im OF 79fYSICAL 2.

(DE23DG SECUtI(Y CJPHmESE CtptinDL OF TE PLAffT (SEE DUTEul

- Diservery of bOPib within the

(*.EE DUTEs t si te barwtary

- Pnysical aitack e,sulting

- Civil disturbance thostile s

- Adversaries coresandeer an area in inseinent ocotpancy of of the plant but not control control room or other vital

- IntrusiorVAt teepted Intrusics over tnit shutdown capahility areas (Protected Areal

- Disa.nery of breached barrier

- Discovery of bcad> in the

- Hostage situation / extortion (security-relatede caused by vital Areas intrusion or sabotage in Vita' Area DCTEn: RP/D/B/1000/07 shall be used in conjtsiction with

- Discovery of bos6 in the all sea.srity related Protected Area

n. r,.f classifications

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W CMIP-12 ENCLOSURI 4.1.8 PAGE ? of 12 SPENT FUEL DAPtAGE SITE AREA EMERGENC(

GEMRAL EMERGENCY ALERT LDAfSUAL EVENT I.

treAE TD SPDfT fML MTTH 1.

IEJOR DAPtAE TD SPDfT F1EL METH anJASE OF RADIDACTIVITY IEELEASE OF RADIDACTIVITY CDMTADOENT Activity at protected area fence:

> 2 mRAw >E Valid RIA 57/58 Alarm tLhit 142 MIQt - 630 R/hri CCMTAIWW3fT (thit 3 AtElff - 286 R/hr t l

thit 152 valid RIA 2. 3, 4

- Valid RIA 49A > 1.13E6 cpas 1

or 49 MItat alarm Dose rate inside RB cm4>1ed with RB leak rate results in Lhit 3 - Valid RIA 3, 4, or calculated dose rate at Site 49 MIDI alarm Boundary:

'~~Are

~> 50 mR/hr NB or 250 mR/hr Open flow path exists fron Thyroid coniairwennt FWL MApeLDC MIILSDE FWL MApellNG BUILDDE Valid RI A-6 IGO' ar RIA 41

- Valid RI A 6 HItal Alarm or A11RT Alarm RI A 41 ALERT alaru

~~ ape RIA 45 ALENT alarm RIA 46 HIGt Alarm iverified by RIA 458

_Afe RIA 46 reading > 3000 ctwo Ape Release rate calculations using vent secole analysis arvi ficw rate data are in excess of 10 times limits established by Tee nical Specifications

M ENCLOSURE 4.1.9 CMIP-12 NATURAL DISASTERS AND OTHER HAZARDS PAGE 10 of 12 LNLfSUAL EVENT ALE RT SITE ARE A EERGENCY GOERAL EMERGENCY 1.

EARTH 4UAKE DCTECTED 1.

DESIE3 matit EAftTyganar 1.

3Apeng ratBt EAftTimanarr, ADIERAFT 1.

Affr ftL3EBt INFEEWERL GR EXTUWERL romans, T1354A30, femiti OR EYHettSt ti.e., FI M S, Fi m.

- 1 rem >r felt and strong motson

- Treror. felt and sensmic EAufflamaAILE

" EAfrpmannert StBSTAffr1 ALLY SEYEBS accelerograph actuates 40.01 gi trigger alarm actuales WES2438 LEVELSI DOEICIe metre 40.05 gl DPERATIDEG MDDE: ASUWE COLD penSSIVE CIBGEst BArthE TD PtJIffr 2.

LAKE L1 VEL EKEODE~E l SSEUTWEDOS SYSTDES 2.

DaftmE flitDe AIRC3tAFT CatASft,

- Level < 780 ft.

T1334400, IENTLE OR EXPtDSION

- Damage c6 served to safety Unit carvet be ausantaanori at Afe) ogsipment causing the inability

. bot shutdram from any location Unit shutdom initiated per to establish and unintain hot TS 3.3.7 ILPSH operabilityl

- Damage observed to shuidown from 'he control safety equipment causing room or the auxiliary i

3.

DAMAGE FlIDM AIRCRAFT C3tASH the inability to establish stustdown panel TURNADO, MISSLE Oft EXPLDSION and emintain cold shut-do n

- Tremor felt and peak acceleration

- Damage ancmarred to recorder reading > 0.10g equipment / structures evithin 3.

IIAZAIEBERS MERSTAfCE OR FLAf9 taste the Site Bouviary GAS BEELEASE 2.

learamatu r: SEERSTAfqCE OR FLAf9 TABLE CAS NELEASE 4

MAZAltDOLE $1ERSTANCE OR FtJRf9tASLE

- 4.hcontrolled eritry of a GAS REtEASE toxic sthstance or flassemble GPERATDeGPEBE Alt 0VE CDLD gas into an area of the plant SpeK 3tpOE

- A spill or release determined

...ich jeopardizes the operation to be reportable pursuant to of equipment necessary

- t.hoontrolled entry of a toxic RP/0/B/1000/17. Hazardous to establish and maintain stestance or flanumable gas.

Sahstance Release cold shutdown into any area of the plant eAich prevents the operatiro of ocpipment necessary to establish and maintain hot stastdown i

_, sq A.

CMIP-12 EtCLOS: E 4.1.10 PAGE II of 32 T

OTHER ABNORMAL PLANT CONDITIOpG SITE ARE A EMERGENCY GEMERAL EMERGENCY ALERT LDAEUAL EVENT OTER PUMT CEBeITIEDG bGST 1.

ECCS IMITIATED 1.

OTER PLANT CIBeITIOp6 EXIST 1.

OTER PLANT CGWITTIBES EXIST 1.

T1 TAT V W PitECAUTJtDeARY THAT MARRANT CLASS 3FICATIEDt OF A FREBt 9084TEVUt aumT TMAT MilEE N F A K LEASE OF N (PERATDE fG E: FDER MTRATitDG CLASS JCATitDe OF A88 ALTNT SITE AAEA DEREE)CY ApelatT5 OF SEASIGACTIVITY IN A

- ES systemiss required to be

- Er.,rtrauncy Coordanator

- Esmerpecy Coordanator or Recovery SetDWT TIPE PERIOD operable per TS judrpent ftanager judgn=nnt

- Emerspency actacns per the Automisc or marual ES 2.

EVACUATTED4 OF CIDtTitDL RotDe 2.

EVACUATTG4 OF (IDrillDL REXM EOP inedequate core cooling t.HC section are msuccessful -

actuation on VALID sicpal er

- Evacuat2on of Control Room CETC > 1200* F indication

- Evacuataan of Control Room Ape Ape Afe Heter injected to RCS or core unit beirwi mmintained at hot as a result of ES actuation shutdown f rom the Ataciliary thit comot be sumintained at shutdown Panel hot shutdown from the e.briliary shutdown panel 2.

LfES OF EIDtTAD#ENT INTTCRITY Rf 4tJTRDE SIRTI1EDet BY TS 3.

LOSS OF ASS [S3R3tT

- LMs t shutdown 2nitanted per EFERATDE teDE: HEIT SNJTDG94 TS 3.6 ICentainment Integrityi T15tU FGER OPERATICDG

- Loss of 50% or ow>re of a 3.

1D55 OF ES ITAT1stE OR FIRE mit's applicable statalern F5tDTECTICM SYSTDI T1DCTION panels for > 15 minutes RE*JtfINDE SMITDGee BY TS APPtJCABLE STATALAfEH PAfELS

- Unit stoicbwn initiated per (MIT 143 TS 3.3 IES systeest 1 sal-9, 14-16, 16

- Unit shutdown initiated per 3SA1-9, 14-16, 18 TS 3.17 (Fire Prefection LMIT 2 Systems includes groowee Hydrol fctrwi innperable 2 sal-9, 14-16 l

i l

z, l

.. ~

,.m i-ENCLOSURE 4.1.10

- CPGP-12 ~

..OTHER ABNORMAL PLANT CtmOITIONS

- PAGE 12 of 12?

LNf2JAL EVENT ALERT SITE ARE A EPERGENCY GENERAL EFENGOCY ' '~

?

A 23GHf 3CAffT LIISS OF N 3.

TMDE MKLMBE FLN a

DR CIB98DelCA11tBI CAPABILITY

- TB flood regtJarang use of AP/1.2,3/A/1700/10 procedtsre

- Loss of accident monitoring in-unecntrollable Flooding of strsmentation iTable 3.5.6-1:

Turbine Building and init shutdown initiated per TS 3.5.6

- Loss of ONS comwamications capability with all Offsite Agencies from the' Control Room 5.

TREA17HET OF P' TMpeEL AT-

.OFFSITE MGSP.aAL

- Decontamination offorts fail to reduce enternal contamination below 150 com l

beta-gama 1

j M-Rad Protection determines that radiological antrols are required for offsite medical treatment

- Interrini contamination t

requ'eing medical assessment / '

trea ment

- Extemal exposure recpJiring medical assessment / treatment 4

i

-,1 e.

r

CMIP-12

  • ,2 7

Page 1 of 1

(

AREA MONITORS Mr/Hr Monitor Number Unf1_1 Unit 2 Unit 3 RIA-1 10 10 (RB) RIA-4 40,000 55,000 80,000 RIA-7 25,000 RIA-8 40,000 RIA-9 15,000 RIA-10 15,000 35,000 50,000 RIA-11 10,000 20,000 RIA-12 35,000 40,000 RIA-13 45,000 50,000 RIA-15 NIS 25,000 PROCESS MONITORS CPM Monitor Number un11_1 Unit 2 Unit 3 RIA-31 1,000,000 1,000,000 (RB) RIA-47 10,000,000 10,000,000 1,000,000 (RB) RIA-48 10,000,000 10,000,000 1,000,000 (RB) RIA-49 1,400,000 1,400,000 1,000,000 (RB) RIA-49A 5,000 5,000 5,000 RIA-51 1,000,000 1.,000,000

1 CMiP-12

  • ,3 4

TERMINATION CRITERIA f-1.

Existing conditions no longer meet the emergency classification criteria and it appears unlikely that conditions will deteriorate further.

2, No surveillance relative to off-site protective actions is needed, except for the control of foodstuffs and water, and off-site contamination, or environmental assessment activities.

3.

Radiation levels in affected in plant areas are stable or decreasing to below acceptable levels, 4.

Releases of radioactive material to the environment greater than Technical Specifications are under control or have ceased.

5.

The potential for an uncontrolled release of radioactive material is at an acceptably low level.

6.

Containment pressure is within Technical Specification requirements.

7.

Adequate long-term core cooling is available.

8.

Adequate shutdown margin of the core has been verified.

9, A fire, flood, earthquake or similar emergency condition is controlled or has ceased.

10.

Offsite power is available per Technical Specifications.

11.

Any contaminated / injured personnel have been transported offsite and are receiving appropriate medical care, 12.

All emergency action level notifications have been completed.

L 13.

Access to radiologically controlled areas of the plant necessary for operation during recovery are being monitored by the Radiation I

Protection Section.

l 14.

Offsite conditions will not limit access of personnel and support l

resources.

15.

Discussions have been held with the News Director to determine the impact of termination on public information management.

l 16.

Discussions have been held with Senior NRC and State Representatives to determile the impact of termination on their activities.

l

..w-.

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