ML060860175

Draft - Outlines (Facility Letters Dtd 03/08/06 & 01/04/06) (Folder 2)

ML060860175
Person / Time
Site:	Millstone
Issue date:	03/08/2006
From:	Scace S Dominion, Dominion Nuclear Connecticut
To:	Conte R NRC/RGN-I/DRS/OSB
Conte R
References
05-904C
Download: ML060860175 (19)

Text

Dominion Nuclear Connecticut, Inc.

Millstone Poller Station Rope Ferry Road Waterford, CT 06385 Mr. Richard J. Conte, Chief Operational Safety Branch, Region 1 US. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 475 Allendale Road King of Prussia, PA 19406 Dominion-MAR 8 2%6 Serial No.

05-904C MPS Lic/BAK RO Docket No.

50-336 License No.

DPR-65 DOMINION NUCLEAR CONNECTICUT, INC.

MILLSTONE POWER STATION UNIT 2 REACTOR OPERATOR RETAKE EXAMINATION - EXAMINATION MATERIALS In a letter dated December 21, 2005,() the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) requested that Dominion Nuclear Connecticut, Inc. submit the written examination and examination reference materials for the Reactor Operator Retake Examination -

Millstone Power Station Unit 2, in advance of the examination originally scheduled for the week of February 6, 2006.

Having worked closely with the NRC Chief Examiner, Mr. Gil Johnson, who is currently on site, the examination will be administered after March 9,2006., Written Examination and Examination Reference Material, is being submitted to the NRC for review and approval. Pursuant to 10 CFR 55.40(b)(3), an authorized representative of the facility has approved the complete and ready-to-use examination contained in Attachment 1.

Consistent with the guidance contained in NUREG-1 021 Examiners Standard (ES) 201,, Examination Security and Integrity Consideration, the examination outline contained in Attachment 1 to this letter should be withheld from public disclosure until after the examination has been completed. No redacted versions are being supplied.

rcJ E 3 Should you have any questions regarding this matter, please contact Mr. Jeff Spence at s

st)=

73 m1+1 1

ocom Very truly yours, 0-

-3 5 5 (860) 437-2540.

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Nuclear Station Safety and Licensing (I) Richard J. Conte letter from U.S. NRC, to David A. Christian, Reactor Operator Retake Examination - Millstone Power Station, Unit 2, dated December 21, 2005.

Serial No. 05-904C Reactor Operator Retake Examination -

Examination Materials Page 2 of 2 Attachments:

None Commitments made in this letter: None.

cc:

(w/o attachments)

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region I 475 Allendale Road King of Prussia, PA 19406-1415 Mr. V. Nerses Senior Project Manager U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission One White Flint North 11 555 Rockville Pike Mail Stop 8C2 Rockville, MD 20852-2738 Mr. S. M. Schneider NRC Senior Resident Inspector Millstone Power Station

Serial No. 05-904C Docket No. 50-336 Written Examination and Examination Reference Materials Millstone Power Station Unit 2 Dominion Nuclear Connecticut, Inc. (DNC)

OPERATIONS ENGINEER Mr. Richard Conte U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 475 ALLENDALE ROAD REGION 1 OPERATIONAL SAFETY BRANCH KING OF PRUSSIA PA 19406-1431 Mr. Richard Conte FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY TO BE OPENED BY ADDRESSEE ONLY Please note: All applicable reference material has already been sent electronically to King of Prussia, Region One office. Also, as Lead Examiner is presently the Millstone Unit Two Resident Inspector, exam reference material has been made available to him on an as needed basis.

Dominion Nuclear Connecticut, Inc.

Millstone Power Station Rope Ferry Road Waterford, CT 06385 Mr. Richard J. Conte, Chief Operational Safety Branch, Region 1 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 475 Allendale Road King of Prussia, PA 19406 Dominion Serial No.05-904 MPS Lic/BAK RO Docket No.

50-336 License No.

DPR-65 DOMINION NUCLEAR CONNECTICUT, INC.

MILLSTONE POWER STATION UNIT 2 REACTOR OPERATOR RETAKE EXAMINATION - OUTLINE In a letter dated December 21, 2005,() the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) requested that Dominion Nuclear Connecticut, lnc. submit the examination outline for the Reactor Operator Retake Examination - Millstone Power Station Unit 2, by January 6,2006., Examination Outline, is being submitted to the NRC for review and approval. Pursuant to 10 CFR 55.40(b)(3), an authorized representative of the facility has approved the complete and ready-to-use examination outline contained in.

Consistent with the guidance contained in NUREG-1 021 Examiners Standard (ES) 201,, Examination Security and Integrity Consideration, the examination outline contained in Attachment 1 to this letter should be withheld from public disclosure until after the examination has been completed. No redacted versions are being supplied.

Should you have any questions regarding this matter, please contact Mr. Jeff Spence at (860) 437-2540.

Very truly yours, Price

@ice President - Millstone

()

Richard J. Conte letter from U.S. NRC, to David A. Christian, Reactor Operator Retake Examination - Millstone Power Station, Unit 2, dated December 21, 2005.

ES-401 PWR Examination Outline Form ES-401-2 Facility: Millstone Unit 2 Date of Exam:

II Tier 1 Group lm

1.

1 5

1 2

2 2

2 2

Emergency Abnormal Tier 7 3 4 Evolutions Plant Totals Plant Systems

3. Generic Knowledge and Abilities Categories Note:

1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

6.*

'n

7.

8.

9.

10 7

Ensure that at least two topics from every WA category are sampled within each tier of the RO outline (i.e., the "Tier Totals" in each WA category shall not be less than two). Refer to Section D.l.c for additional guidance regarding SRO sampling.

The point total for each group and tier in the proposed outline must match that specified in the table. The final point total for each group and tier may deviate by 21 from that specified in the table based on NRC revisions. The final RO exam must total 75 points and the SRO-only exam must total 25 points.

Select topics from many systems and evolutions; avoid selecting more than two WA topics from a given system or evolution unless they relate to plant-specific priorities.

Systems/evolutions within each group are identified on the associated outline.

The shaded areas are not applicable to the categoryhier.

The generic (G) WAS in Tiers 1 and 2 shall be selected from Section 2 of the WA Catalog, but the topics must be relevant to the applicable evolution or system. The SRO WAS must also be linked to 10 CFR 55.43 or an SRO-level learning objective.

On the following pages, enter the WA numbers, a brief description of each topic, the topics' importance ratings (IR) for the applicable license level, and the point totals for each system and category. Enter the group and tier totals for each category in the table above; summarize all the SRO-only knowledge and non-A2 applicable categories in the columns labeled " K and "A". Use duplicate pages for RO and SRO-only exams.

For Tier 3, enter the WA numbers, descriptions, importance ratings, and point totals on Form ES-401-3.

Refer to ES-401, Attachment 2, for guidance regarding the elimination of inappropriate WA statements.

NUREG 1021, Draft Revision 9

ES-40 1 PWR Examination Outline Form ES-401-2 Emergency and Abnormal Plant Evolutions -Tier l/Group 1 (RO/SRO)

UAPE#/Name/SafetyFunction K K K A A G

WA Topic(s)

IR 000007 (BW/E02&E10; CWE02) Reactor X

EK3.2: Knowledge of the reasons for normal, abnormal and 2.8 1

Trip - Stabilization - Recovery / 1 000008 Pressurizer Vapor Space X

AK1.02: Knowledge of the operational implications of the 3.1 1

Accident / 3 1

2 3

1 2

emergemy operating procedures associated with Reactor Trip Recovery as they apply to the Reactor Trip Recovery.

following concepts as they apply to a Pressurizer Vapor Space Accident: Change in leak rate with change in pressure following concepts as they apply to the small break LOCA:

Use of steam tables apply to a Large Break LOCA: Consequences of managing LOCA with loss of CCW 3.5 3.7 000009 Small Break LOCA / 3 X

EK1.02: Knowledge of the operational implications of the 3.5 1

4.2 00001 1 Large Break LOCA I 3 X

EA2.03: Ability to determine or interpret the following as they 3.7 1

4.2 00001 5/17 RCP Malfunctions I 4 X

G2.2.23: Ability to track limiting conditions for operations.

2.6 1

000027 Pressurizer Pressure Control X

AK1.02: Knowledge of the operational implications of the 2.8 1

System Malfunction / 3 following concepts as they apply to Pressurizer Pressure Control Malfunctions: Expansion of liquids as temperature increases following concepts as they apply to the ATWS: Effects of boron on reactivity G2.3.2: Knowledge of facility ALARA program.

3.1 000029 ATWS I 1 X

EK1.03: Knowledge of the operational implications of the 3.6 1

3.8 2.5 1

2.9 000038 Steam Gen. Tube Rupture I 3 000040 (BWIEO5; COE05; WIE12)

Steam Line Rupture - Excessive Heat X

LOIT2K5-ES-401-2.do~

NUREG 1021, Draft Revision 9

E/APE#/Name/SafetyFunction K K K A A G

WA Topic(s)

IR I WA Category Totals I 5 I 1 I 2 I 3 I 3 I 4 I Group Point Total:

NUREG 1021, Draft Revision 9

1 000033 Loss of Intermediate Range NI / 7 L O I T ~ K ~ - E S - ~ O ~ - ~. ~ O C NUREG 1021, Draft Revision 9

Operations as they apply to the Natural Circulation CE/All; W/E08 RCS Overcooling - PTS / 4 WA Category Point Totals:

X AA2.2: Ability to determine and interpret adherence to 3.0 1

appropriate procedures and operation within the 3.4 limitations in the facility's license and amendments as they apply to the RCS Overcooling.

- RANDOMLY DESELECTED - Note 4

- RANDOMLY DESELECTED - Note 4 0

0 2

2 2 0 2 1 Group Point Total:

9 NUREG 1021, Draft Revision 9

ES-401 System#/Name 003 Reactor Coolant Pump -

Note 3 004 Chemical and Volume Control Note 3 004 Chemical and Volume Control 005 Residual Heat Removal Note 3 006 Emergency Core Cooling Note 3 007 Pressurizer Relief/Quench Tank 008 Component Cooling Water 310 Pressuriteu Pressure Control M-zh&w-Note 3 112 Reactor

'rotection

)13 Engineered Safety Features 4ctuation 122 Containment holing LOIT2K5-ES-40 1 -2.dOC PWR Examination Outline Form ES-401-2 Plant Systems - Tier ZGroup 1 (RO/SRO)

K1 K2 K3 K4 K5 K6 A1 A2 A3 A4 G

KIA Topic@)

IR X

K6.04 Knowledge of the effect of a loss or 2.8 1

malfunction on the following will have on the RCP operation 3.1 RCPS: Containment isolation valves affecting a

0

• p

+=

level, x3 Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the 2.7 1

following malfunctions or operations on the CVCS; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations: Excessive letdown flow, pressure, and temperatures on ion' exchange resins (also causes) changes in parameters (to prevent exceeding design limits) associated with operating the CVCS controls including: Reactor power implications of the following concepts as they apply the RHRS: Dilution and boration considerations.

2.7 I

X'

' A1.lO: Ability to predict and/or monitor 3.7 1

3.9 X

K5.09: Knowledge of the operational 3.2 1

3.4 0

29 x3 Ability to manually operate and/or monitor in 4.0 1

the control room: Valves 3.8 X

K5.02: Knowledge of the operational 3.1 1

implications of the following concepts as the apply to PRTS: Method of forming a steam bubble in the PZR.

and/or interlock(s) which provide for the following: Operation of the surge tank, including the associated valves and controls.

X A3.01: Ability to monitor automatic operation 3.0 1

of the PZR PCS, including: PRT temperature 3.2 and pressure during PORV testing.

3.4 X

K4.02 Knowledge of CCWS design feature@)

2.9 1

2.7 t

s o

44 X

K3.01: Knowledge of the effect that a loss or 3.9 1

malfunction of the RPS will have dn the following: CRDS the following: ESFAWsafeguards equipment 3.8 control.

changes in parameters (to prevent exceeding design limits) associated with operating the CCS controls including: Containment pressure.

4.0 X

K2.61: Knowledge of bus power supplies to 3.6 1

X' A1.02 Ability to predict andlor monitor 3.6 1

3.8 NUREG 1021, Draft Revision 9

ES-401 PWR Examination Outline Form ES-401-2 1 (RO/SRO)

G WA Topic(s)

X G2.3.1: Knowledge of 10 CFR: 20 and related IR 2.6 3.0 -

4.2 4.2 -

4.2 4.3 -

3.6 3.6 System #/Name 1 K1 022 Containment I x' 026 Containment spray K1.01: Knowledge of the physical connections andlor cause-effect relationships between the CSS and the following systems: ECCS.

K3.02: Knowledge of the effect that a loss or malfunction of the CSS will have on the following: Recirculation spray system.

K5.08: Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as the apply to the MRSS: Effect of steam removal on reactivity.

Kl.03: Knowledge of the physical connections and/or cause-effect relationships between the Condensate system and the following systems: MFW.

A1.OR Ability to predict and/or monitor changes in parameters (to prevent exceeding design limits) associated with operating the MFW controls including: Feed Pump speed, including normal control speed for ICs.

K3.02 Knowledge of the effect that a loss or malfunction of the AFW will have on the following: S/G.

K6.02: Knowledge of the effect of a loss or malfunction of the following will have on the AFW components: Pumps.

AI.03: Ability to predict and/or monitor changes in parameters (to prevent exceeding design limits) associated with operating the ac distribution system controls including: Effect on instrumentation and controls of switching power supplies.

026 Containment Spray 039 Main and Reheat Steam X

2.6 2.6 1

056 Condensate 2.5 2.6 4.2 4.4 -

2.6 2.7 -

2.5 2.8 1

1 -

1 -

1 059 Main Feedwater 061 Auxiliary/Emergency Feedwater 061 Auxiliary/Emergency Feedwater 062 AC Electrical Distribution 0

1 1

Note 3 062 AC Electrical Distribution 3.4 3.8 Al.01: Ability to predict and/or monitor changes in parameters (to prevent exceeding design limits) associated with operating the ac distribution system controls including:

Significance of D/G load limits K2.01: Knowledge of bus power supplies to the following: Major DC loads.

A1.01: Ability to predict andlor monitor changes in parameters associated with operating the DC electrical system controls including: Battery capacity as it is affected by discharge rate.

A2.05: Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the ED/G system; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations: Loading the I ED/G.

2.9 3.1 2.5 3.3 1

1 063 DC Electrical Distribution 3.1 3.2 064 Emergency Diesel Generator NUREG 1021, Draft Revision 9

System#/Name

~ 073Process

' Radiation Monitoring 076 Service Water 078 Instrument Air 103 Containment WA Category Point Totals:

I Plant Systems - Tier 2/Group 1 (RO/SRO)

K1 K2 K3 K4 K5 K6 A1 A2 A3 A4 G

WA Topic(s)

X G2.1.7: "Ability to evaluate plant performance and make operational judgments based on operating characteristics, reactor behavior, and instrument interpretation."

A3.02: Ability to monitor automatic operation of the SWS, including: Em,ergency heat loads.

Kl.03: Knowledge of the physical connections and/or cause-effect relationships between the IAS and the following systems: Containment air.

A1.O1: Ability to predict and/or monitor changes in parameters (to prevent exceeding design limits) associated with operating the containment system controls including:

Containment pressure, temperature, and humidity.

X X2*

Q -

x2 3

2 3

1 3

2 6

2 3

1 2

Group Point Total:

I q-+

4.4 4.1 NUREG 1021, Draft Revision 9

11 ES-401 PWR Examination Outline Form ES-4014 YS RO)

A3 I A4 I I

G WA Topic@)

K5.95: Knowledge of the following operational implications as they apply to the CRDS: Effect of reactor power changes on RCS temperature.

- RANDOMLY DESELECTED - Note 4 K6.04: Knowledge of the effect of a loss or malfunction on the following will have on the PZR LCS:

Operation of PZR level controllers.

K4.06: Knowledge of RPIS design feature(s) and/or interlock(s) which provide for the following: Individual and group misalignment.

K2.01: Knowledge of bus power supplies to the following: NIS channels, components, and interconnections.

- RANDOMLY DESELECTED - Note 4

- RANDOMLY K1.01: Knowledge of the physical connections and/or cause-effect relationships between the HRPS and the following systems:

Containment annulus ventilation system (including pressure limits).

- RANDOMLY DESELECTED - Note 4 DESELECTED - Note 4 DESELECTED - Note 4

- RANDOMLY

- RANDOMLY

- RANDOMLY DESELECTED - Note 4 K5.08: Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as the apply to the SDS: Effect of power change on fuel cladding. :I A4.01: Ability to manually operate and/or monitor in the

' control room: Turbine valve indicators (throttle, governor, control, stop, intercept),

alarms, and annunciators.

NUREG 1021, Draft Revision 9

PWR Examination Outline Form ES-401-2 ES-401 055 Condenser Air Removal 071 Waste Gas Disposal 086 Fire Protection WA Category Point Totals:

2 Plant Systi K2 K3 K4 X

IS - Tier 2/Gro[

X.

2 (RO/SRO)

A2 A3 A4 WA Topic@)

K1.06: Knowledge of the physical connections and/or cause-effect relationships between the CARS and the following systems: PRM system.

- RANDOMLY DESELECTED - Note 4 K4.03: Knowledge of design feature(s) and/or interlock(s) which provide for the following: Tank loop seals.

DESELECTED - Note 4

- RANDOMLY

- RANDOMLY DESELECTED - Note 4

- RANDOMLY DESELECTED - Note 4 A1.05: Ability to predict and/or monitor changes in parameters (to prevent exceeding design limits) associated with Fire Protection System operating the controls including: FPS lineups.

2.5 2.6 Group Point Total:

Note 1 - Randomly selected to be duplicated to achieve required count for Tier and Group.

Note 2 - Randomly reselected due to no WA with an IR >/= 2.5 existing in the initial category.

Note 3 - Randomly redrawn based on Lead Examiners initial comment of K/A not fitting system Note 4 - Randomly deselected to achieve the required item count per the applicable Tier and Group.

interrelations of MP2 and to ensure required distribution or WAS.

NUREG 1021, Draft Revision 9

ES-401 Generic Knowledge and Abilities Outline (Tier 3)

Form ES-401-3 me Unit 2 Date of Exam:

KIA ##

Topic Facility: Mills Category f

SRC IR -

Only IR 3.0 -

1 -

1.

Conduct of Operations 2.1.2 Knowledge of operator responsibilities during all modes of plant operation.

Knowledge of operator responsibilities during all modes of plant operation.

Ability to execute procedure steps.

2.1.3 2.1.20 Subtotal 3.0 1

1 3 -

4.3 -

Note 1

2.

Equipment Control 3.0 1

Knowledge of surveillance procedures.

Knowledge of tagging and clearance procedures.

"Knowledge of RO duties in the control room during fuel handling such as alarms from fuel handling area, communication with fuel storage facility, systems operated from the control room in support of fueling operations, and supporting instrumentation."

2.2.1 2 2.2.1 3 2.2.30 1

1 -

3.6 3.5 -

3 -

Subtotal 2.7 1

3.

Radiation Control 2.3.1 1 I Ability to control radiation releases.

Note 2 1 -

2 -

1 2.3.1 0 Ability to perform procedures to reduce excessive levels of radiation and guard against personnel exposure.

Subtot:

n 2.4.23 Knowledge of the bases for prioritizing emergency procedure implementation during emergency operations.

Ability to verify system alarm setpoints and operate controls identified in the alarm response manual.

4.

Emergency Procedures I Plan 1

Note 1 1

2.4.50 Note 2 3.3 Subtotal Tier 3 Target Point Total Note 1: Deselected per NRC Examiner initial comments.

Note 2: Randomly reselected, per NRC Examiner, to meet category number requirement.

All WAS were randomly selected using the guidance provided in NUREG 1021, ES-401, Attachment 1 NUREG 1021, Draft Revision 9

ES-401 Record of Rejected K/As Form ES-401-4 Tier /

Group 1 /I 1 / I 1 / I 112 Randomly Selected WA 2.2.23

2. I

.24 EK3.01 AA2.14 LOIT2006-ES-401-4 Reason for Rejection 000015/17 RCP Malfunctions / 4; Redrawn, with the approval of the Lead Examiner, due to the lack of system concepts that would meet the KIA and still distinguish between a competent and non-competent Operator.

Randomly reselected K/A AK3.04: Knowledge of the reasons for the following responses as they apply to the Reactor Coolant Pump Malfunctions (Loss of RC Flow): Sequence of events for manually tripping reactor and RCP as a result of an RCP malfunction 000054 (CE/EO6) Loss of Main Feedwater / 4; Redrawn, with the approval of the Lead Examiner, due to the original WA testing a concept that is meant to be evaluated in a JPM (open reference) format.

Randomly reselected K/A AAI.02: Ability to operate and / or monitor the following as they apply to the Loss of Main Feedwater (MFW): Manual startup of electric and steam-driven AFW DumDs.

000055 Station Blackout / 6; Redrawn, with the approval of the Lead Examiner, due to the similarity with the K/A drawn for question #50.

Randomly reselected K/A EK3.02: Knowledge of the reasons for the following responses as they apply to the Station Blackout: Actions contained in EOP for loss of offsite and onsite Dower.

000028 Pressurizer Level Malfunction / 2; Reselected, with Lead Examiner approval, due to WA concept not existing in a C.E. plant.

Randomly reselected WA AA2. I O : Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to the Pressurizer Level Control Malfunctions: Whether the automatic mode for PZR level control is functioning improperly, necessity of shift to manual modes.

ES401-4, Page 1 of 3

Tier /

Group 1 /2 2/1 2/1 2/1 2/1 Rand om ly Selected K/A 2.1.I A I.05 2.2.33 K3.04 2.3.1 LOIT2006-ES-401-4 Reas on for Reject ion 000032 Loss of Source Range NI / 7: Redrawn based on feedback from Lead Examiner. Original WA did not distinguish between competent and non-competent operator.

Randomly reselected WA AK2.01: Knowledge of the interrelations between the Loss of Source Range Nuclear Instrumentation and the following: Power supplies, including proper switch positions.

~

~

~

~~~

~

~~~~~

~

004 Chemical and Volume Control: Redrawn based on Lead Examiners initial comment of K/A not fitting system interrelations of MP2 and to ensure required distribution or K/As.

Randomly reselected WA A2.21: Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the CVCS; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations: Excessive letdown flow, pressure, and temperatures on ion exchange resins (also causes) 006 Emergency Core Cooling; Redrawn based on Lead Examiners initial comment of WA not fitting system interrelations of MP2 and to ensure required distribution or KlAs.

Randomly reselected WA A4.02: Ability to manually operate and/or monitor in the control room: Valves 01 2 Reactor Protection; Redrawn based on Lead Examiners initial comment of K/A not fitting system interrelations of MP2 and to ensure required distribution or K/As.

Randomly reselected K/A K3.01: Knowledge of the effect that a loss or malfunction of the RPS will have on the following:

CRDS 022 Containment Cooling; K/A redrawn by instruction from Lead Examiner due to over-sampling of ALARA concept.

Randomly reselected WA 2.4.5: Knowledge of the organization of the operating procedures network for normal, abnormal, and emergency evolutions ES401-4, Page 1 of 3

Tier /

Group 2/1 2/2 2/2 3

3 Rand om ly Selected K/A 2.3.9 K5.06 K4.03 2.2.4 2.4.26 Reason for Rejection 062 AC Electrical Distribution; Redrawn based on Lead Examiners initial comment of WA not fitting system interrelations of MP2 and to ensure required distribution or K/As.

Randomly reselected WA A I.01: Ability to predict and/or monitor changes in parameters (to prevent exceeding design limits) associated with operating the ac distribution system controls including: Significance of D/G load limits 041 Steam Dumpmurbine Bypass Control; Redrawn based on Lead Examiner feedback, due to original concept not distinguishing between a competent and non-competent RO.

Randomly reselected K/A K5.02: Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as they apply to the SDS: Use of steam tables for saturation temperature and pressure.

071 Waste Gas Disposal; Randomly redrawn due to original WA not fitting system design of MP2.

Randomly reselected WA K4.05: Knowledge of design feature(s) and/or interlock(s) which provide for the following:

Point of Release.

(multi-unit) Ability to explain the variations in control board layouts, systems, instrumentation and procedural actions between units at a facility. Deselected per NRC Examiner initial comments. (Unit 2 is a CE unit, Unit 3 is a Westinghouse unit)

Randomly reselected WA 2.3.1 0: Ability to perform procedures to reduce excessive levels of radiation and guard against personnel exposure.

Knowledge of facility protection requirements including fire brigade and portable fire fighting equipment usage.

Deselected per NRC Examiner initial comments. (Licensed operators are not necessarily qualified as Fire Brigade members.)

Randomly reselected WA 2.4.50: Ability to verify system alarm setpoints and operate controls identified in the alarm response manual.

LOIT2006-ES-40 1-4 ES401-4, Page 1 of 3