ML11339A101: Difference between revisions

From kanterella
Jump to navigation Jump to search
(Created page by program invented by StriderTol)
(StriderTol Bot change)
 
Line 1: Line 1:
{{Adams
#REDIRECT [[PNP 2011-080, EA-PSA-SDP-P8B-11-05, Rev. 1, Assessment of Steam Driven Auxiliary Feedwater P-8B Trip on May 10, 2011, Attachment 3]]
| number = ML11339A101
| issue date = 11/14/2011
| title = EA-PSA-SDP-P8B-11-05, Rev. 1, Assessment of Steam Driven Auxiliary Feedwater P-8B Trip on May 10, 2011, Attachment 3
| author name =
| author affiliation = Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc
| addressee name =
| addressee affiliation = NRC/NRR
| docket = 05000255
| license number = DPR-020
| contact person =
| case reference number = EA-11-227, PNP 2011-080
| document report number = EA-PSA-SDP-P8B-11-05, Rev. 1
| document type = Report, Technical
| page count = 237
| project =
| stage = Other
}}
 
=Text=
{{#Wiki_filter:Attachment 3 Risk Assessment of Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater P-8B Trip 236 Pages Follow
 
EA-PSA-SDP-P8B-1 1-05 m      m VDate:                                                            11/14/2011 Ent[f'    f &gj'                                    Number of Pages: 237 (including signature page, only, and attachments)
 
==Title:==
Assessment of Steam Driven Auxiliary Feedwater P-8B Trip on May 10 th 2011 Approval: See signature page.
Purpose The purpose of this engineering analysis is to assess the increase in risk that could result given failure of P-8B to start and run on 5/10/2011.
 
===Background===
During performance of Tech Spec Surveillance Procedure RO-97, Auxiliary Feedwater System Automatic Initiation Test Procedure, P-8B, Steam Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump, tripped on overspeed (5/10/11).
After the initial actuation of auxiliary feedwater P-8B, the pump was running for 5 minutes prior to taking data at which time the pump tripped on overspeed. During the short period that P-8B was running, it was noted that small amounts of debris and mung were being discharged from the steam trap drain lines to the floor drain that produced a foul odor (CR PLP -2011-02350).
Conclusion Given that the current engineering assessment has not identified any causal factors that were present at the time of failure, the failure of P-8B can be considered a random event. Per pump performance review since 2005 to the present, no additional failures have been identified other than that observed on May 10th, 2011. Using this information, sensitivity calculations show that the ACDF is less than 1E-06/yr when considering the event is random and therefore is colored green.
If it is assumed a pre-existing condition existed, the results show that the full power internal events CDF plus the IPEEE recreated fire analysis CDF, given the observed P-8B failure, produces an aggregate ACDF of 4.81 E-07/yr when crediting recovery of P-8B.
If recovery is not credited, the aggregate ACDF is estimated to be 4.37E-05/yr.
When considering the event as a random failure or a pre-existing condition, with recovery, the condition is colored green.
If considering the event as a pre-existing condition and assuming no recovery, the ACDF is greater than 1E-05 and is colored yellow.
Recall in either case the B.5.b pump is not credited (however, if directed by the Technical Support Center (TSC), today, the pump would be deployed) and that the re-created IPEEE analysis does not include the supplemental diesel.
Note: This engineering analysis is not a 10 CFR 50.2 design basis analysis and the results and conclusions of this analysis do not supersede those of any design basis analyses of record. The biases
 
and degree of conservatism embodied in the methods, inputs and assumptionsof this analysis may not be appropriateto supportall plant activities. An appropriatelevel of engineering rigorcommensurate with the safety significance of the topic under considerationis ensured in this analysis by conformance with all applicable Entergy procedures.
 
Table of Contents 1.0      PURPOSE ..........................................................................................................................................                5 2.0      Background ......................................................................................................................................                5 2.1    CR-PLP-2011-02350 ..............................................................................................                                      ....... 5 2.2    CR-PLP-2011-02364 ......................................................................................................................                        5 2.3    CR-PLP-2011-03368 ......................................................................................................................                        5 3.0      INTRO DUCTIO N TO ISSUE SIGNIFICANCE ...............................................................................                                              6 3.1    As a Random Failure .............................................................................................................                              6 3 .2    A s a F in d ing ....................................................................................................................................          8 4.0      INPUT .................................................................................................................................................          9 4.1    PRA Tools and Models ...........................................................................................................                                9 5.0      ASSUM PTIO NS ...............................................................................................................................                    11 5.1    Major Assum ptions .......................................................................................................................                    11 5.2    Minor Assum ptions .......................................................................................................................                    12 6.0      METHODOLOGY .............................................................................................................................                        13 6.1    Acceptance Criteria ......................................................................................................................                    13 7.0      ANALYSIS/EVALUATION ..........................................................................................................                                  13 7 .1    B .5 .b ............................ :................................................................................................................        13 7 .2    P -8 B T rip .......................................................................................................................................          15 7.3    Exposure Tim e ..............................................................................................................................                  16 7.4    Additional P-8B Reliability Data ..............................................................................................                                21 7.4.1      Data Collection Background ...............................................................................................                                  21 7.4.2      Data Validation ..........................................................................................................................                  21 7.5    Human Reliability Analysis Recovery Modeling ......................................................................                                            24 7.6    Full Power Internal Events at Power (PSAR2c) ......................................................................                                            25 7.7    External Events Fire Modeling ................................................................................................                                29 7.8    Intem al Flood at Power ............................................................................................................                          31 7.9    Seism ic Events at Power ..........................................................................................................                            31 7.10      Other Hazards ...........................................................................................................................                  32 8.0      RESULTS .........................................................................................................................................                32 8.1    Validation of Re-Creating the IPEEE Analysis ........................................................................                                          32
 
8.2  Random Failure (Assum ed) - Results .....................................................................................                  37 8.3  SDP Analysis (Assumed Perform ance Deficiency) - Results .................................................                                  37
 
==9.0  CONCLUSION==
................................................................................................................................. 39
 
==10.0  REFERENCES==
............................................................................................................................. 40 11.0  ATTACHM ENTS .......................................................................................................................... 41
 
1.0 PURPOSE The purpose of this engineering analysis is to assess the consequences of P-8B failing to start and run. A Phase 3 Significance Determination Process (SDP) analysis was performed.
 
==2.0 BACKGROUND==
 
2.1 CR-PLP-2011-02350 During performance of Tech Spec Surveillance Procedure RO-97, Auxiliary Feedwater System Automatic Initiation Test Procedure, P-8B, Steam Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump, tripped on overspeed. After the initial actuation of auxiliary feedwater, P-8B was being run for 5 minutes prior to taking data at which time the pump tripped on overspeed. During the short period that P-8B was running, it was noted that small amounts of debris and mung were being discharged from the steam trap drain lines to the floor drain that produced a foul odor.
The test was stopped and placed in a safe condition. Initiated work request WR# 236481.
2.2 CR-PLP-2011-02364 During investigation of P-8B, Auxiliary Feedwater Pump, overspeed event as documented in CR-PLP-2011-02350, it was noted that the knife edge on the overspeed trip mechanism had been inappropriately greased. An investigation into the work that was performed during 1R21 revealed that WO 214219 was performed to overhaul the turbine of P-8B. Work instruction FWS-M-6, Auxiliary Feedwater Turbine Maintenance, was performed and step 5.40.3 states to grease Pin(12) by referring to Attachments 4 and 5. Pin(12)is in Attachment 4. The step was inappropriately changed to say knife edge which is part(12) of Attachment 5. It appears pin 12 was never greased.
2.3 CR-PLP-2011-03368 During preparation and presentation of LER-2011-004 for the inadvertent trip of the Turbine Driven Aux Feed Water Pump P-8B on 5/10/11, it was determined that other possible causes for the trip were not addressed or eliminated as "potential causes" under C-PAL-2011-2350. In order to ensure that the apparent cause evaluation of C-PAL-2011-2350 is complete for the overspeed trip event, this condition report was generated and these new possible causes, to be discussed, will be added to the apparent cause discussion. The Op Evaluation for this new CR is due at 2000 7/8/2011.
Discussion with the turbine OEM/vendor on 6/22/11 by the system engineer led to discovery that relaxation of the trip reset lever springs and or maladjustments of the overspeed trip valve could lead to a spurious turbine and associated pump trip. The probability of either being the sole cause of a turbine trip is considered low for the following reasons:
        "    Relaxation of the springs, per vendor discussion typically is only seen when the springs are subjected to high operating temperatures on a continuous basis. Since the turbine at Palisades is only run for testing for short periods of time, sustained, elevated temperatures are rarely seen. The turbine has been run for a total of less than 110 hours in the last 20 years (when the springs were installed as new).
        "    Similarly, the overspeed trip valve, rebuilt and reassembled by contract workers was done according to plant procedure FWS-M-6 "Auxiliary Feedwater Turbine Maintenance".
Our assembly process closely matches the guidelines presented by the OEM/Vendor. All
 
critical steps were properly executed. No deviations were noted in the affected completed portions of the maintenance procedure.
Based on these facts there is a low probability that these two conditions were the apparent cause of the pump trip that occurred on 5/10/11. Greasing of the components that are not normally or should be greased (e.g. knife edge of the reset lever) is still under consideration as the contributor to the pump trip.
 
==3.0 INTRODUCTION==
TO ISSUE SIGNIFICANCE The following presents two perceptions regarding the significance of the P-8B trip. The first perspective being that the event can be characterized as a random failure. The second point of view is that the event should be characterized as finding.
Per the NRC Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 0612, Power Reactor Inspection Reports, defines a finding as, "An issue of concern that is related to a Licensee's performance deficiency.
Findings may or may not be related to Regulatory requirements."
3.1 As a Random Failure Two principal considerations are important factors in determining the significance of this issue as a random failure;
        "    First is the question of P-8B operability,
        "    The second is, given the assumption of the cause of the postulated inoperability, whether or not operation of P-8B was recoverable within the time available to establish successful mitigation of the event.
First the issue of inoperability is predicated on the available information which suggests that an inappropriate maintenance activity created a condition for which it could reasonably be inferred that the pump would not be able to operate for its mission time. The initial root cause analysis identified greasing of the interface (knife edge) of the trip lever surface and the mating surface on the trip resetting lever as the cause of failure. Greasing of this surface is not a normal maintenance practice and not required by the maintenance procedures. This original determination of root cause was submitted to external review to determine the appropriateness of the determination. The recently completed vendor report [301 (summarized below) concluded that the application of grease to the knife edge of the trip and reset levers could not have been the root cause of the problem.
Subsequent discussion with the turbine OEM/vendor on 6/22/11 by the system engineer led to discovery that relaxation of the trip reset lever springs and or maladjustment of the overspeed trip valve could lead to a spurious turbine and associated pump trip (noted in CR-PLP-2011-03368 above).
The probability of either being the sole cause of a turbine trip is considered low for the following reasons; Relaxation of the springs, per vendor discussion typically is only seen when the springs are subjected to high operating temperatures on a continuous basis. Since the Palisades P-8B turbine is only run for testing for short periods of time, sustained, and elevated temperatures are rarely seen. The turbine has been run for a total of less than 110 hours in the last 20 years (when the springs were installed as new).
* Similarly, the overspeed trip valve, rebuilt and reassembled by contract workers was
 
performed according to plant procedure FWS-M-6 "Auxiliary Feedwater Turbine Maintenance". The Palisades assembly process closely matches the guidelines presented by the OEMNendor. All critical steps were properly executed. No deviations were noted in the affected completed portions of the maintenance procedure. The current evaluation of these potential causes has failed to identify any indication that either condition currently exists and therefore not considered to be the root cause of the pump trip.
The review of industry experience and other pump vendor information also suggest that it is not unexpected for turbine-driven pumps of this type to experience random spurious actuation of the overspeed trip mechanism. The current plant operating history from 2005 to the present of operating approximately 50 hours with 0 failures of pump P-8B until the May 10 th event could be argued as supporting the conclusion that the occurrence of a random failure of the pump could occur and not be outside the expected failure rate of the pump. Moreover, given that the pump successfully ran after the trip was reset and that the trip could not be repeated provides a stronger basis that the event was random. In 1994 P-8B tripped [31]. The most probable cause was believed to be improper latching of the trip mechanism. However, a vibration induced trip was not ruled out. The proposed corrective actions included;
: 1) P-8B testing frequency should be increased over the next 3 months.
: 2) Incorporate, as appropriate, trip resetting procedures into the Operating, Maintenance and Testing Procedures.
: 3) Consider incorporation of the trip latch observations into the MO-38 testing procedure.
Given the following, one could conclude that P-8B experienced a random failure;
: 1) The evaluation of the root cause by industry experts [30], has concluded that the application of grease to the trip lever knife edge may not have been the root cause. The MPR report further assessed what variables and their values that could affect whether or not the vibratory inertial forces are sufficient to cause the Hand Trip Level to disengage from the Resetting Lever springs causing the turbine to trip.
Per Reference [30];
          "In summary, the geometry of the linkage is such that large accelerationsare needed to cause it to trip, the actual measured accelerationsare small relative to those requiredto cause trip and the measured displacements on the orderof 0.007 inches are too small to move the Hand Trip Lever the approximate 0. 100 to 0. 125" requiredto cause it to trip."
: 2) To date, the analysis of other possible causes has determined that there is currently no evidence that identified causal factors were present at the time of failure.
: 3) The pump is currently considered operable since there have been no identified problems to correct and that the pump has continued to operate for approximately three and a half hours with no indication of a condition that would cause spurious actuation of the overspeed trip.
Since no root cause has yet been identified and in particular no condition specifically related to the occurrence of an overspeed condition or spurious actuation of the overspeed device, the current information would support a conclusion that the pump did not become inoperable until it failed to continue to operate during the conduct of the test.
 
3.2  As a Finding As mentioned above, a finding is, "An issue of concern that is related to a Licensee's performance deficiency. Findings may or may not be related to Regulatory requirements."
Findings are categorized by significance as follows:
                " Green Findings - IMC 0612 defines a Green Finding as, "A finding of very low safety significance."
                " White Findings - IMC 0612 defines a White Finding as, "A finding of low to moderate safety significance." A White Finding will typically result in a Supplemental Inspection; the level of Supplemental Inspection depends on the number and significance of any other non-Green findings or Performance Indicators in the Licensee's Performance Assessment Matrix (PAM).
                " Yellow Findings - IMC 0612 defines a Yellow Finding as, "A finding of substantial safety significance." A Yellow Finding will typically result in a Supplemental Inspection; the level of Supplemental Inspection depends on the number of significance of any other non-Green findings or Performance Indicators in the Licensee's Performance Assessment Matrix (PAM).
                " Red Findings - IMC 0612 defines a Red Finding as, "A finding of high safety significance." A Red Finding will typically result in a Supplemental Inspection per NRC Inspection Procedure (IP) 95003.
3.2.1 NRC's Significance Determination Process (SDP)
The SDP as defined in NRC Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 0612 consists of three phases:
Phase 1 - Characterization and Initial Screening of Findings: This phase is used by the NRC to screen very low-significance findings for disposition by the Licensee's Corrective Action Program.
Phase 2 - Initial Approximation and Basis for Risk Significance: Initial approximation of risk significance of the finding and development of the basis for this determination for those findings that filter through the Phase 1 screening process.
Phase 3 - Finalized Determination and Basis of Risk Significance: Review and perform as-needed refinement of the risk significance estimation results from Phase 2 or perform any risk significance analysis outside of NRC Phase 2 guidance.
Most findings screen with a low significance during Phase 1 of the NRC's process. For those that do not, either the Inspector or the NRC's Senior Reactor Analyst (SRA) will perform a Phase 2 evaluation. At this stage, the station should communicate with the Inspector and/or SRA to assist with the Phase 2 evaluation and determine if the results are reasonable and realistic.
Upon completion of an NRC Phase 2 evaluation that is greater than Green, the NRC will provide written notification to the station of the initial determination of safety significance and enter Phase 3 of the evaluation. However, the NRC will allow the Licensee to provide detailed PRA (Probabilistic Risk Analysis) input for their evaluation prior to entering into Phase 3.
If the Licensee can adequately demonstrate lower risk significance, the NRC will stop at the Phase 2 evaluation. The Phase 3 assessment involves employing the detailed plant risk model to address the issue.
A Phase 3 SDP evaluation was performed presuming a performance deficiency. In this instance, the Phase 3 full power internal events (FPIE) analysis was employed using the Palisades current analysis-of-record PSAR2c [9.6]. Given that Palisades is currently undergoing the transition to NFPA-805, the Individual Plant Examination of External Events (IPEEE) [3] was resurrected as
 
well to evaluate the fire risk.
4.0  INPUT Inputs in this evaluation are separated into several categories: those involving the PRA software tools and existing PRA models and evaluations, and those involving the configuration of the plant during the planned maintenance activities. PRA tools and models input define the starting point of the evaluation. Plant configuration inputs define critical configuration that exists during the maintenance activities.
In this analysis, the full power internal events (FPIE) analysis evaluates the current analysis-of-record [2].
Given the current transition to NFPA-805 with a planned submittal date in October of 2012, the fire external events evaluation is based on recreating the Individual Plant Examination of External Events (IPEEE) [3] and that was augmented by the Reference [5] and [16] work as well.
4.1  PRA Tools and Models 4.1.1 The SAPHIRE software application used for both the IPEEE and FPIE PRA model quantification in this analysis is listed in Table 4.1.1.
Table 4.1.1 [1]
Filename                Date  I Time      Size SAPHIRE-7-27-852878059.exe    6/24/2008  11:48a  18,303 KB 4.1.2 The CAFTA software application is used for creating and viewing PRA model logic. The baseline CAFTA model serves as the starting point of the core damage fault tree model evaluated in this analysis. Table 4.1.2 below lists the baseline CAFTA files used in the FPIE analysis.
Table 4.1.2 [21 Filename                    Description                      Date        Time  Size - KB PSAR2c.be                  PSAR2c CAFTA Basic Event File  6/26/2006    1:42p  1,248 PSAR2c.caf                  PSAR2c CAFTA Fault Tree File    6/26/2006    1:36p  449 PSAR2c.gt                  PSAR2c CAFTA Gate Type File    6/24/2006    1:31p  1,024 PSAR2c.tc                  PSAR2c CAFTA Type Code File    5/27/2004    9:03a  30 PSAR2c CAFTA Files.zip      PSAR2c CAFTA zip file          6/29/2006    8:47a  289 4.1.3 The SAPHIRE project model is used for PRA model quantification. Table 4.1.3 lists the PSAR2c SAPHIRE project files used as the initial data set for the FPIE analysis.
Table 4.1.3 [2]
 
Filename            Date        Time    Size - KB                        Description Text rules file used by caf2sap.exe to create MAR-Caf2Sap PSAR2c.txt        6/29/2006      8:59a        11      D files.
Visual basic application for creating SAPHIRE Caf2Sap.exe                3/24/2003      8:16a        28    MAR-D fault tree files.
Creation of Rules File    6/26/2006      2:42p      2,162    EXCEL spreadsheet that creates the *.txt rules file PSAR2c.xls                                                    for SAPHIRE MAR-D fault tree assembly.
MAR-D fault tree file created from the PSAR2c PSAR2c FTree Logic.ftl    6/29/2006      9:16a      3,421    CAFTA master fault tree.
SAPHIRE v7.26 PSAR2c      6/29/2006      9:43a      1,099    Above listed supporting files.
Ftree Files.zip 4.1.4    Table 4.1.4 defines the house event configuration used in the FPIE evaluation:
Table 4.1.4 House Event            House Event A-HSE-CST-MAKEUP    F I-HSE-M2LEFT-INS          T C-HSE-P-52A-STBY    T I-HSE-M2RGHT-INS          F C-HSE-P-52B-STBY    T M-HSE-P-2A-TRIP          T C-HSE-P-52C-STBY    F M-HSE-P-2B-TRIP          F D-HSE-CHGR1-INS      T M-HSE-SJAEI-INS          T D-HSE-CHGR2-INS      T M-HSE-SJAE2-INS          F D-HSE-CHGR3-INS      F U-HSE-P-7A-STBY          F D-HSE-CHGR4-INS      F U-HSE-P-7B-STBY          F E-HSE-AIR-GT-75F    T U-HSE-P-7C-STBY          T E-HSE-AIR-LT-75F    F X-HSE-2SG-BLDN            1 E-HSE-BYPASS-REG    T X-HSE-2SG-BLDN-A          1 E-HSE-EDG11-DEM      T X-HSE-2SG-BLDN-B          1 E-HSE-EDG11-RUN      T X-HSE-SGA-BLDN            1 E-HSE-EDG12-DEM      T X-HSE-SGB-BLDN            1 E-HSE-EDG12-RUN      T Y-HSE-LOOP1A-BRK          T I-HSE-C-2AC-INS      T Y-HSE-LOOP1B-BRK          F I-HSE-C-2B-INS      F Y-HSE-LOOP2A-BRK          F I-HSE-F-12A-INS      T Y-HSE-LOOP2B-BRK          F I-HSE-F-12B-INS      F Y-HSE-RAS-POST            F I-HSE-F-5A-INS      T Y-HSE-RAS-PRE            F I-HSE-F-5B-INS      F X-HSE-DOOR-167B          IT X-HSE-DOOR-167      IT
 
4.1.5 The individual plant evaluation of external events (IPEEE) [3] provided is the major input to this evaluation. The input includes;
          "    Modeling methodology,
          "    Modeling assumptions,
          "    Fire detection, suppression, growth and propagation,
          "    Fire area definitions, combustible loads, ignition sources, etc.
4.1.6 The SAPHIRE project used to support the creation of the re-created IPEEE fire model described in references [4], [5] and [16] is listed below in Table 4.1.6.
Table 4.1.6 Filename                  Description              Date      Time    Size - KB PSAR2-fire-5 VIA            SAPHIRE IPEEE Fire Project    12/11/2010    12:00a    9,831 sensitivity 101210.zip 5.0  ASSUMPTIONS Assumptions in this evaluation are classified as major or minor. These assumptions are specific to this evaluation. All assumptions of other risk evaluations (e.g., full power internal events, flooding, etc.) are applicable unless specifically noted.
5.1  Major Assumptions 5.1.1 The B.5.b pump is NOT credited in this analysis.
Basis:
While pump alignment is proceduralized, tested quarterly and that training occurs annually, the pump is currently not modeled in the analysis of record and per RIS 2008-15 cannot be credited in recovery.
Bias:
This assumption is conservative. Crediting the B.5.b pump would likely result in a factor of 10 reduction in the estimated ACDF. And given that if an event were to occur today and if directed by the Technical Support Center (TSC), the pump would be deployed.
5.1.2 The exposure period considered in this analysis was estimated to be 85 days.
Basis:
85 days is the applied exposure time based on successful QO-21 B testing on 2/15/11 to the observed May 10th failure.
Bias:
This assumption is considered neutral.
 
5.1.3 Recovery Diagnosis and Execution Time Basis:
The calculated recovery action is predicated on the time to reach -84% in both steam generators which is the cue to commence once-through-cooling. Therefore, this analysis uses 84 minutes as the total time available to diagnose and execute P-8B recovery.
Bias:
This assumption is conservative. For example, past calculations have cited 2 hours and 2.5 hours as the time at which either OTC recovery must occur or steam generator heat removal shall be re-established. Moreover, current MAAP analyses [11] show that at least 3 hours are now available to prevent core damage by either recovering OTC or re-establishing steam generator heat removal.
5.1.4 Other P-8B Random Failures Basis:
This analysis only considers the P-8B trip reset as the explicit modeled recovery. Other pump failure modes are not explicitly treated nor are their recoveries modeled. However, the pump failure to run probability is added to the estimated trip recovery term (Attachment 5) to account for other non-explicit random failures.
Bias:
This assumption is considered neutral given that random failure is included in the recovery term.
5.2  Minor Assumptions 5.2.1 The fire model does not include the full power internal events credited supplemental diesel.
Basis:
The fire model employed in this analysis is based on the IPEEE dated 1995 [3]. The supplemental diesel was declared operation on June 3 0th, 2006.
Bias:
The fire model is conservative with respect to the current plant configuration.
5.2.2 Large Early Release Frequency (LERF).
Basis:
Though not quantified it is considered that LERF would be a couple of orders of magnitude less than the estimated CDF cited herein.
Bias:
This assumption is neutral.
 
5.2.3 Reliability Evaluation Basis:
In performing the ACDF sensitivity analysis with the full power internal events model, the May    1 0 th failure is added to both the failure to start and failure to run counts.
Bias:
This assumption is conservative.
6.0  METHODOLOGY This evaluation employs the analytical procedures defined in References [2], [3], [4], [5], 16], [7],
[8], [9] and [10].
6.1  Acceptance Criteria The Reactor Oversight Process (ROP) acceptance criteria based on quantitative results is presented below:
Evaluated Configuration        Color ACDF < 10.'              Green ACDF > 10-6                White ACDF > 10i'              Yellow ACDF > 104                Red 7.0  ANALYSIS/EVALUATION This section describes the analysis, assessment and evaluation employed. Discussion of procedures, event timelines, the B.5.b hi-level design functions, the quantified exposure time, the key aspects of the fire modeling, applied recovery actions, P-8B reliability data etc. are presented.
Results are included when appropriate. Summary results are presented in Section 8.
7.1  B.5.b As noted in Assumption 5.1.1, the B.5.b is not credited in this evaluation. However, if an event were to occur and if directed by the Technical Support Center (TSC), the pump would be deployed. Nevertheless, an overview of pump operation is presented.
NEI-06-012, "B.5.b Phase 2 & 3 Submittal Guideline" [10], was developed to assist licensees with regulatory submittals describing their proposed strategies for closing Phases 2 and 3 of Section B.5.b of the 2002 Interim Compensatory Measure (ICM). In the security area, nuclear power plant licensees are responsible for providing assurance that their sites are taking reasonable measures to ensure that available resources are used effectively in responding to beyond design-basis threats. Site-specific assessments have demonstrated that a flexible response capability is desirable, and the following is an example of some components that have been identified for implementation:
            "  Diverse Spent Fuel Pool (SFP) Makeup Source (Internal Strategy) - Phase 2
            "  Flexible, Power-Independent SFP Makeup/Spray Source (External Strategy) - Phase 2, and
            "  Enhanced response Strategies for PWR's - Phase 3
 
Interim Compensatory Measure (ICM) B.5.b, Phase 3 included the following requirements which are non-concurrent [12, 13]:
    " Supplying 200 gpm in steam generator makeup flow to the feedwater heaters 6A and 6B given a steam generator pressure of 50 psig.
    " Supplying 300 gpm flow to containment spray.
The equipment procured to perform this function consists of a trailer mounted portable diesel driven pump (P-990), hoses, and fittings. The trailer is stored in the B.5.b equipment building, which is a climate controlled NEIL rated enclosure, adjacent to the Palisades dry fuel storage building parking lot and is towed to the plant protected area via pick-up truck if needed.
For purposes of providing an alternate water supply to the steam generators, the analysis [13]
demonstrates that the pump is capable of drawing suction from the intake structure, Lake Michigan beach front, the cooling tower basin, or the municipal water supply and discharging at least 220 gpm to the steam generators.
The pump's operation, and hose routing for the various suction points is described in Attachment 13 of the El Plan Alternate Resources Document. This procedure would be implemented on recommendation of the technical support center. Step 'e' of the procedure instructs the pump operators to depressurize the steam generators per EOP Supplement 23, isolate or vent the safety injection tanks prior to PCS pressure lowering below 300 psia and to align the pump discharge to the feedwater heater vents and drains as shown in the figure below:
50' 50' 4" Supply    11/2"Discharge Connect to Main Feed Pump            Vents and Drains The portable pump is tested quarterly per model work order number 00155644, "B5B Strategy PM for Inspection and Testing", by operating it for 30 minutes with a minimum flow rate of 500 gpm. The pump was tested satisfactorily in December 2010 (WO# 52283989) and March 2011 (WO# 52303204).
Per Reference [11], typically the operator has 3 hours to align S/G makeup to prevent core damage when assuming 165 gpm design flow to each generator. Moreover, sensitivity analyses have shown that 50 gpm to each generator is sufficient to meet the 1800 'F hot core node temperature success criterion. A 2008 test using the Hale pumper with suction from a static source showed that alignment with the pumper running and all hoses pressurized and flowing water took some 75 minutes. After completing the pump alignment, the operators are instructed to match feed flow to decay heat generation in accordance with EOP Supplement 19 [21].
 
7.2  P-8B Trip 7.2.1 Background EOP Supplement 19 Rev. 10, "Alternate Auxiliary Feedwater Methods", is referenced from EOP-3.0 Rev. 14, "Station Blackout Recovery", EOP-7.0 Rev13, "Loss of All Feedwater Recovery", and EOP-9.0 HR-1 Rev. 19, HR-2 Rev. 22, HR-3 Rev. 22, "Functional Recovery Procedure", ONP-25.1 Rev. 20, "Fire which Threatens Safety-Related Equipment", and ONP-25.2 Rev. 26, "Alternate Safe Shutdown Procedure", when local actions are necessary to restore the auxiliary feedwater system. Section 4.0 of the supplement provides direction for restoration of the steam supply to auxiliary feedwater pump P-8B. Step 2.c. directs the Operators to verify the pump's turbine driver, K-8, is latched and subsequently lists instructions for resetting the trip lever. The procedure states:
: c. CHECK Turbine Driver K-8 is latched as follows:
NOTE: The knife edge should overlap the latch.
: 1) ENSURE the end of resetting lever (knife edge) is in contact with hand trip lever (can NOT slip a sheet of paper between). Refer to Figure 1. (Page 20)
: 2) IF Turbine Driver K-8 is NOT latched, THEN RELATCH as follows:
a) ENSURE CLOSED CV-0522B, K-8 Normal Steam Supply.
b) RESET the overspeed trip lever on Turbine Driver K-8 using the Auxiliary Reset lever.
Figure 1 from page 20 of EOP-Supplement 19 is shown below
 
Flgure 1 TRTP VALVE LINKAGE AUXILLARY KNIFE        RESETTING            RESETTING EDGE                              LEVER 7.3 Exposure Time 85 days is the applied exposure time based on successful QO-21 B testing on 2/15/11.
A time line of P-8B activities is presented in Table 7.3 below. Following Table 7.4 provides a "run log" since the end of REFOUT 21.
 
Table 7.3: P-8B Auxiliary Feedwater Pump - Overspeed Trip CR-PLP-2011-02350 Date      Activity                                                                    Run time, hrs WO214219 - K-8 Overhaul per FWS-M-6; Auxiliary Feedwater Turbine Maintenance.
10/06/10-10/20/10 Worn carbon sealrings, and axial indication identified. Determined cracks on rotor will requireuse of spare rotor. Ref. CR-PLP-2010-04631.
Resetting Lever knife-edge inadvertently lubricatedper procedure Step 5.40.3 (write-in) 10/06/10    WO201016 - RV-0521B, K-8 steam supply relief valve removed. Sent offsite.
10/11/10    W0208306 - Performed FWS-1-1 7, Lo Suction Trip test for P-8A, P-8B.
W0214382 - K-8 Overspeed Trip test per T-186. Requires SSTM.
Acceptance criterianot met for overspeed trip. TTOD device showed trip at 3793 rpm.
10/15/10-10/16/10 Criteria: 3845 - 3916 rpm.
Action: Use old rotor spring and shim washer,screw adjustment to 4 1/2 turns. Retest resulted in SAT trip test. Ref. CR-PLP-2010-05113.
10/17/10    WO214219 - Recoupled K-8 to P-8B and aligned.
10/22/10    1R21-1 /AFW - P-8B Tags cleared and verified.
10/25/10    WR216703 - Packing adjustment to MV-FW146.
W0255002 - PMT complete; RO-145B, Comprehensive Pump Test.
Verified overspeed trip resetting lever positioned correctlyprior to pump testing.                                                                  0.33 (RO-145B) 10/28/10    Required feed flow rates (165 gpm in cascade) were not met. Could not      0.73 (SOP-12) perform speed adjustment per RO-145 (procedureuse issue). Performed speed adjustment following SOP-12 pump start. Ref. CR-PLP-2010-05796.      1.17 (RO-145B)
Verified overspeed trip resetting lever operatedSA T following pump testing. No observationsnoted.
Report of steam leak from CK-MS402, Steam Supply Check. Removed insulation verified NO leak.
10/29/10    Report of excessive steam exiting from steam traps ST-0512, ST-0513 during RO-145. Ref. CR-PLP-2010-05812.
WR217303 - Repair packing gland leak MV-FW710, Discharge vent. Ref. CR-PLP-2010-0581 1.
W052243399 - QO-5X1 - Valve Test procedure (includes CIS valves) for CV-02/14/11      02B 0522B.
W052293482 - QO-21B - In-service Test.
02/15/11      Verified overspeed trip resetting lever positioned correctlyprior to pump  0.78 (QO-21 B) testing.
Verified overspeed trip resetting lever operated SAT following pump
 
Table 7.3: P-8B Auxiliary Feedwater Pump - Overspeed Trip CR-PLP-2011-02350 Date      Activity                                                                    Run time, hrs testing. No observations noted.
WR204330 - K-8 Turbine Driver, severity level 2 oil leak. Ref. CR-PLP-201 1-02/15/11    02413.
WR025156 - CK-FW743, P-8B Discharge valve, 20 gpm leak.
02/23/11    RO-145C, Comprehensive Pump Test for Pump P-8C.
03/15/11    RO-145A, Comprehensive Pump Test for Pump P-8A.
RI-95A, AFW Flow FT-0727 Instrument Loop Calibration.
W0251496 - Replace HIC-0749, AFW P-8B to Stm Gen E-50A Flow Controller.
05/10/11    W052235979 - AFW Control to E-50A CV-0749, P-8A/B Flow Control to E-50A          0.08 calibration.
W052235978 - AFW Flow Control to E-50B calibration.
W052235982 - AFW P-8B Steam Supply CV-0522B, grease.
W052289689 - RO AFW Auto Initiation Test, for P-8A, P-8B.
Verified overspeed trip resetting lever positionedcorrectly prior to pump testing.
Pump P-8B inoperabledue to trip on overspeed during RO-97. Ref. CR-PLP-2011-2350 05/10/11 (2154) Pump P-8B available for maintenance rule following reset of over-speed trip  0.05 (RO-97) device.
Pump P-8B unavailable for maintenance rule. HS-0522B to CLOSED for overspeed trip T/S.
Pump P-8B tripped using manual trip lever.
Pump P-8B reset manual trip lever. SOP-12, Attachment 7.
W052322759 - QO-21B - In-service Test. Performed to support T/S.
Verified overspeed trip resettinglever positionedcorrectly priorto pump 05/11/11 (1248) testing.                                                                    0.72 (QO-21 B)
Verified overspeed trip resetting lever operatedSAT following pump testing. No observationsnoted.
05/11/11 (1356) Pump P-8B unavailable for maintenance rule. HS-0522B to CLOSED to support maintenance.
05/11/11 (1456) Pump P-8B tripped using manual trip lever.
W0276614 - Clean lube off knife-edge/latch edge of overspeed trip. Ref.
05/11/11 (1559) CR-PLP-2011-2364.
Pump P-8B reset manual trip lever. SOP-12 Attachment 7. HS-0522B to 05/11/11 (1832) AUTO.                                                                        0.32 (RO-97)
W052289689 - RO AFW Auto Initiation Test for P-8B completed SAT.
 
Table 7.3: P-8B Auxiliary Feedwater Pump - Overspeed Trip CR-PLP-2011-02350 Date      Activity                                                                      Run time, hrs Pump OPERABLE.
Verified overspeed trip resetting lever positioned correctlyprior to pump testing.
P-8B declared INOPERABLE to perform inspection of steam traps following test 05/11/11 (1937)  RO-97.
W000276751 - QO-21B - In-service Test. Completed UNSAT.
Verified overspeed trip resettinglever positionedcorrectlyprior to pump testing.
05/12/11 (0548)  Verified overspeed tripresetting lever operatedSAT following pump              1.32 (QO-21 B) testing. No observations noted.
Pump P-8B inoperable during and following test due to not discharging condensate from ST-0514, and ST-0523. Ref. CR-PLP-2011-02380.
Pump P-8B operated for >60 minutes in recirculation mode to verify operability 05/12/11 (1412)  of steam traps.                                                                  1.03 (test) 05/12/11 (2010)  P-8B declared OPERABLE following completion of EC reply documenting basis for no steam trap discharge.
eSOMS -
Shiftly (2x/day) Check trip valve latched, governor oil level, shaft not rotating when NIS.
6.53 (TOTAL)
Comments in bold-italic are adverse conditions and/or conditions related to the overspeed trip mechanism. All run-times are with P-8B on recirc, and annotatedin bold-italic means that both SIGs are receiving flow.
 
Table 7.4: P-8B Run Log Eqi      Record  Start Date  Start Time  End Date    End Time      Run                          Comments                        Reference Document quip    Type                                                      Time Pump ran in recirc mode to verify proper and P-8B  Run Time 5/12/2011      13:11    5/12/2011      14:13        1:02    continuous operation of the turbine casing and              Ops Log exhaust steam traps i.e. ST-0514 & ST-0523 I respectively.
P-8B  Run Time 5/12/2011      3:29    5/12/2011      4:46        1:17    Pump ran in support of QO-21B used as PMT for                QO-21B strainer trap ST-0514 & ST-0523 inspection.
P-8B  Run Time 5/11/2011      16:24    5/11/2011      16:44        0:20    Pump    auto recorded).
delay time    sequence started per RO-97 (118s              RO-97B P-8B  Run Time 5/11/2011      8:57    5/11/2011      9:39        0:42    Ran pump in support of QO-21B test spec test                QO-21B P-8B  Run Time 5/10/2011      22:32    5/10/2011      22:35        0:03    Pump auto sequence started per RO-97 (117.72s                RO-97B delay time recorded).
P-8B  Run Time 2/14/2011      22:07    2/14/2011      22:54        0:47    Pump ran for quarterly surveillance test QO-21B              QO-21B (retest).
RO-145 Comprehensive Run Time 10/28/2010    18:40    10/28/2010    19:49        1:09    Pump ran for PMT using Surveillance Test RO-145      surveillance pump test P-8B P-8B  Run Time 10/28/2010    18:17    10/28/2010    18:19        0:02    Pump SOP-12started to verify speed adjustment using      PPC Data Link, Ops Log P-8B  Run Time 10/28/2010    17:41    10/28/2010 F  18:09        0:28    Pump started to make initial speed adjustment I                    I                                    I          I after turbine  maintenance (e.g. 10 yr inspection). PPC Data Link, Ops Log
 
7.4  Additional P-8B Reliability Data The following describes the review of past P-8B performance data from 2005 to the present.
7.4.1 Data Collection Background Data for auxiliary feedwater pump start demands and run-time was obtained from the PI data archive. PI is a classified category "C" (important to business) system in accordance with Entergy procedure EN-IT-1 04, "Software Quality Assurance Program". The plant process computer (PPC) is its source of data which is a SQA category "B"system (regulatory commitment). Most PPC points are calibrated via technical specification surveillance procedure or by preventive maintenance and controlled calibration sheets.
Part of the PI server system runs on the plant process computer (PPC). This portion monitors selected points every second to test against the exception threshold change value. If the change value is exceeded, the data is passed to the P1 server and recorded. The PI server also compares the new value against previous values to see if it still fits on a line within the compression limit. If yes, the data is discarded, otherwise it is added to the archive. For pump starts, the compression limit is simply a change in state (on-off or start-stopped), if 8 hours have passed without an archive update, one is made regardless. PI will generally provide accurate long term values and greater amounts of data when events are changing rapidly.
For this analysis, Pi server tag YSP8BD (Turb Driven Aux Fwtr Pump P-8B) was used to extract sampled data from the P1 archive for the period from 7-25-05 to 7-28-2011. The data was imported into a common commercial spreadsheet application, Microsoft ExcelTM 2007, using the P1 DataLink add-on module. A visual basic macro was then developed -to count the pump starts and stops and accumulated run time between the dates of 7-25-2005 and 7-28-2011. The macro processed each data point in chronological order to find when the pump state changed from "Off" to "On". When a change in state was found, a pump start (demand) was recorded as well as the date- time stamp and the cell shaded yellow. The macro then determined when the pump state was changed from "On" to "Off', calculated the run time for the demand and shaded the cell light blue. If the calculated run time was less than one minute, the data was considered erroneous, and the demand as well as the run-time was not counted; in these cases the cell color was changed from light blue to green. A one minute threshold for including the data was based on a review of manually recorded information by the AFW system engineer that documented run times as short as 0.01 hours. These short runs are valid and were performed occasionally for system testing or maintenance. Discarded erroneous runs were typically on the order seconds in duration.
7.4.2 Data Validation As validation of the final accumulated data, the results were reviewed against system engineering records. It was noted that several additional start demands were recorded in the PI archive data, but this is expected as the PI server records a start each time the pump's steam admission valve is opened; whereas the plant and system engineer logs lump several post maintenance test steam admission valve cycles into a single record for a pump run. Other than the increased number of pump demands, there was excellent agreement between the macro data and the manually recorded data.
Based on the 19,000 data points extracted from the PI data archive, AFW pump P-8B received 142 start demands and operated for 52.3 hours between 7-25-05 and 7-28-2011. A review of maintenance rule records was performed for this period and no failures were recorded other than
 
the May 2011 event. Based on this information, the failure probability of the turbine driven feedwater pump to start, and to run, was updated per the Bayesian methodology described in Section 8.1 of Palisades Safety Assessment Notebook [115]. Probabilities were calculated assuming 0, 1, and 2 pump start and run failures as presented in Table 7.4.1 below. Note both failure to start and failure to run calculations applied the May 10th failure.
 
Table 7.4.1: Auxiliary Feedwater Pump P-8B Failure Probability Data Basic Event  No of    Units    Exposure                      Prior                    Prior                  New Post Error Basic Event ID    Desc    Failures Dem (d) /  (dem run    Prior Mean      Error    Prior Dist    Alpha        Prior Beta                Reference / Notes Hrs (h)    hrs)                      Factor AFW-PMME-P-8B  Pump  Fails    0      d          142        9.52E-03        5.65        B          0.57        5.98E+01  2.84E-03 10.3      Prior data to Start                                                                                                                    NUREG/CR-6928 AFW-PMME-P-8B  Pump Fails      1      d          142        9.52E-03        5.65        B          0.57        5.98E+01  7.78E-03  5.1 to Start AFW-PMME-P-8B  Pump Fails      2      d          142        9.52E-03        5.65        B          0.57        5.98E+01  1.27E-02  3.8 to Start AFW-PMMG-P-8B  Pump Fails      0      h        52.3        7.35E-05        8.4        G            0.5        6.80E+03  7.30E-05 11.5 to Run AFW-PMMG-P-8B  Pump Fails      1      h        52.3        7.35E-05        8.4        G            0.5        6.80E+03  2.19E-04  5.3 to Run AFW-PMMG-P-8B  Pump Fails      2      h        52.3        7.35E-05        8.4        G          0.5        6.80E+03  3.65E-04  3.9 to Run
 
7.5  Human Reliability Analysis Recovery Modeling The recovery model developed for this assessment began with the A-AVOA-AFWSTEAM term which was part of the PSAR2 model and subsequently used in the Reference [5] analysis as well.
The initial human failure event (HFE) (A-AVOA-AFWSTEAM) modeled failure to take local manual control of P-8B by opening CV-0522B.
This operator action is based on implementation of EOP Supplement 19 for cases where all AFW pumps fail to auto start and fail to start from the control room. Consequently the HFE development includes the step EOP Supplement 19 to verify that the turbine is latched (overspeed mechanism not tripped).
The initial Human Error Probability (HEP) was based on the ASEP methodology.
The current HEP development is included in the latest HRA notebook [17] was developed using the EPRI HRA calculator [18]. Attachment 5 provides the input used in the HRA calculator.
The performance shaping factors impacting the HEP development were reviewed to verify they were appropriate to support implementation in the fire analysis (Attachment 5). The HEP calculated using the HRA calculator is lower than the value used in analysis of the impact of the performance deficiency. Therefore the value used is conservative.
7.5.1 EOP Supplement 19 Background The implementation of EOP Supplement 19 is part of routine operator training. Section 4 of the supplement for local operation of P-8B via manual operation of CV-0522B is specifically addressed in training via a job performance measure (JPM) PL-OPS-ONP-010J (Start AFW Pump P-8B locally using CV-0522B). The operator is required to demonstrate each step which includes re-latching the turbine and controlling steam pressure via manual operation of CV-0522B. The JPM requires the actions be completed within a validation time of 15 minutes. The off normal procedures for fire (ONP-25.1 [19] and ONP-25.2 [20]) require completion of the action to have AFW in service based on the implementation of EOP Supplement 19.
This analysis includes credit for once through cooling (OTC), if available, for a given fire area.
Therefore the time available to the operator to recover AFW prior initiation of OTC is the time for the steam generator level to lower to -84%. The supporting hydraulic analysis indicated that this level occurs at 1.4 hours (84 minutes) for the station blackout (SBO) case. Should the fire make OTC unavailable then again at least 3 hours (Attachment 5) are available for the operator to complete the restoration of P-8B operation.
The HFE was originally developed for use in station blackout sequences and the stress factor was originally set to HIGH stress and the performance shaping factor for lighting was set to EMERGENCY LIGHTING. The other stress factors for heat/humidity, radiation and atmosphere were reassessed for appropriateness given the action is being implemented in fire scenarios.
The heat/humidity factor was changed from NORMAL to HOT/HUMID. The shaping factor for atmosphere was changed from NORMAL to SMOKE. The shaping factor for radiation was left unchanged since this action occurs in the AFW pump room. These changes to the performance shaping factors influence the stress factor used by the calculator. Assignment of these factors would be considered conservative as the action as indicated is implemented in the AFW pump room away from the fire except for fires in the turbine building where the action is not credited in the AFW pump. However, the assignment of 'Emergency Lighting' for the lighting factor already altered the stress factor and the changes to the other performance shaping factors do not further impact the stress factor. For the AFW pump room the pump would already be considered failed
 
by the fire and inaccessible. With stress set to HIGH, lighting set to EMERGENCY, environment set to HOT and atmosphere set to SMOKE the original calculated HEP was 1.2E-02. A sensitivity analysis was conducted by changing the shaping factor for complexity of response from SIMPLE to COMPLEX in addition to the changes listed above. This change had no impact on the calculated HEP.
This value is subsequently added to the pump failure to run failure mode to account for other pump random failures. Since this action is intended to address recovery from a spurious pump trip as a consequence of the performance deficiency (a specific cause of pump failure) the HEP was combined numerically with the probability of pump fail to run. This combination provides for the analysis of recovery of the specific cause (performance deficiency with a probability of 1.0) while retaining the probability of pump failure to run from other causes without recovery.
From Table 7.4.1, the pump failure to run X value is estimated to be 7.3E-O5/hr. Therefore, 7.3E-05/hr x 24 hr = 1.75E-03 and 1.2E-02 + 1.75E-03 = 1.38E-02 The value 1.38E-02 was used in the "credited recovery" cases.
Subsequent review, ERIN Engineering Memorandum - Attachment 8 and resolution of comments (included in the EN-DC-134-ATT-9.7 document) regarding the HEP development, resulted in removing some conservative assumptions input to the calculation. The conservatism removed focused on the recovery of cognitive and execution errors. The impact was a reduction of the calculated HEP from 1.38E-02 to 5.9E-03. Since this value is lower than the value used in the significance determination the value used is considered conservative. The 1.38E-02 value was employed in this evaluation.
7.6  Full Power Internal Events at Power (PSAR2c)
The current analysis-of-record [2] model was employed to evaluate the significance of failing P-B with respect to the full power internal events analyses. Attachment 6 provides a high level PRA model history description since the IPE submittal.
To support the risk evaluation, the SAPHIRE code [1] was employed to evaluate P-8B failed for all full power internal events. The following change set data was prepared:
7.6.1 FPIE Random Failure Analysis To support the full power internal events random failure analysis, the following SAPHIRE change set data were employed; PSAR2c.csd PSAR2C=
P-81,                        PSAR2c Reliability - FTR and FTS With No Failures Using Updated Data P-8B(1),                    PSAR2c Reliability - Case 1 FTR and FTS w/1 Failure P-8B(2),                    PSAR2c Reliability - Case 2 FTR and FTS w/2 Failures P-8B(SDP-NO-RECOVERY),      PSAR2c Reliability - with FTR Set to 1.0 P-8B(SDP-RECOVERY),          P-8B FTS wUpdated Data FTR wRecovery & Pump Random Failure PSAR2c.csi PSAR2C, P-8B =
 
APROBABILITY A-PMMG-P-8B    ...7.300E-005 ......
A-PMME-P-8B    _ 2.840E-003 .......
      ^CLASS AEOS PSAR2C, P-8B(1) =
APROBABILITY A-PMMG-P-8B    ...2.190E-004 ......
A-PMME-P-8B  ,    7.780E-003 .......
      ^CLASS AEOS PSAR2C, P-8B(2) =
APROBABILITY A-PMMG-P-8B    ...3.650E-004 ......
A-PMME-P-8B    - 1.270E-002 .......
ACLASS
      ^EOS PSAR2C, P-8B(SDP-NO-RECOVERY) =
APROBABILITY A-PMMG-P-8B    ,,,  1.OOOE+000 ......
A-PMME-P-8B    _ 2.840E-003 .......
      ^CLASS AEOS PSAR2C, P-8B(SDP-RECOVERY) =
APROBABILITY A-PMME-P-8B      1,, 2.840E-003 .......
A-PMMG-P-8B      1, 1.380E-002 .......
      ^CLASS AEOS 7.6.2 Re-Created IPEEE Analysis To evaluate the re-created IPEEE analysis, the following SAPHIRE change set data were employed; PSAR2c.csd P-8B(FIRE-SDP-LOGICAL),              SDP with Recovery- A-HSE-P8B-RECOVERY Event if Set to "T" (Re-created IPEEE)
P-8B(FIRE-SDP-NO-RECVRY),            SDP Failure Random FTS and FTR set to 1 (Re-created IPEEE)
SDP Failure Random FTS and FTR wRecovery & P-8B Random Failures (Re-created P-8B(FIRE-SDP-RECVRY),
IPEEE)
P-8B(FIRE-SDP-TRUE),                  SDP Random Failure FTS and FTR set to True (Re-created IPEEE)
P-8B(FIRE-SDP),                      SDP P8B with Random FTS and FTR data (Re-created IPEEE)
 
PSAR2c.csi FIRE-PSAR2-P8B(1), P-8B(FIRE-SDP-LOGICAL)    =
APROBABILITY A-HSE-P8B-RECOVERY , T .........
ACLASS AEOS FIRE-PSAR2-P8B(1), P-8B(FIRE-SDP-NO-RECVRY) =
APROBABILITY A-PMME-P-8B      1,, 2.840E-003 .......
A-PMMG-P-8B , 1,, 1.OOOE+000 .......
ACLASS AEOS FIRE-PSAR2-P8B(1), P-8B(FIRE-SDP-RECVRY)    =
APROBABILITY A-PMME-P-8B      1,, 2.840E-003 .......
A-PMMG-P-8B      1,, 1.380E-002 .......
ACLASS AEOS FIRE-PSAR2-P8B(1), P-8B(FIRE-SDP-TRUE)    =
APROBABILITY A-PMMG-P-8B , T .........
A-PMME-P-8B  ,,    2.840E-003 .......
ACLASS A^EOS FIRE-PSAR2-P8B(1), P8B(FIRE-SDP)        =
APROBABILITY A-PMME-P-8B  ...2.840E-003 .......
A-PMMG-P-8B .... 7.300E-005 ......
ACLASS AEOS 7.6.3 Equipment Rotation The assumed plant configuration cited in Reference [2] and is repeated below; PSAR2c.csd PSAR2C=
HEVENTS (LGCLS-NRML-CNF), House Events w/Normal Plant Rotation Set to True PSAR2c.csi C-HSE-P-52A-STBY            T .........
C-HSE-P-52B-STBY            T .........
 
C-HSE-P-52C-STBY  F .........
D-HSE-CHGR1-INS D-HSE-CHGR2-INS    Fj,,j,,,,
D-HSE-CHGR3-INS F,,i,,,,,,,
D-HSE-CHGR4-INS E-HSE-AIR-LT-75F E-HSE-AIR-GT-75F I-HSE-M2LEFT-INS  F,,,,,,,,,
I-HSE-M2RGHT-INS t ,,,,,,,~,
I-HSE-F-12A-INS I-HSE-F-12B-INS I-HSE-F-5A-INS F,*,,p,,,,
I-HSE-F-5B-INS    T, 1.000E+000..    ...
I-HSE-C-2AC-INS  F, 1.000E+000..    ...
I-HSE-C-2B-INS    F, 1.000E+000.    ...
F,,,,,,,j M-HSE-P-2A-TRIP  F, 1.000. +000.. ..    .
M-HSE-P-2B-TRIP M-HSE-SJAE1-INS F,,,,,,,,,
M-HSE-SJAE2-INS 1,, 1.OOEOO,,,,,
U-HSE-P-7A-STBY U-HSE-P-7B-STBY 1,    1 OOO+OO,,,,,
U-HSE-P-7C-STBY F,,100 T              0.. .
X-HSE-SGA-BLDN X-HSE-SGB-BLDN    F,,,,j,,*
X-HSE-2SG-BLDN F,,,,,,,,,
X-HSE-2SG-BLDN-A X-HSE-2SG-BLDN-B Y-HSE-LOOP1A-BRK Y-HSE-LOOP1 B-BRK Y-HSE-LOOP2A-BRK    F,,*,,,,,
Y-HSE-LOOP2B-BRK Y-HSE-RAS-PRE    F,,,,,,,,
Y-HSE-RAS-POST A-HSE-CST-MAKEUP X-HSE-DOOR-167B X-HSE-DOOR-167    T,,,,,,,,,
ACLASS AEOS
 
7.7  External Events Fire Modeling This section describes the steps taken to re-create the IPEEE fire analysis. The recreated IPEEE analysis is built upon the Palisades 2004 PSAR2 model [161 as well as that documented in Reference [5].
This analysis resurrected the Reference [5] and [16] analyses and applied the IPEEE data, fault tree and event tree logic.
Below a summary description that describes how the IPEEE model was changed. This is followed by a discussion of the operator recovery action to reset P-8B.
To create the IPEEE fire model using PSAR2, the Reference [51 analysis performed the following:
: 1.      Converted the basic events representing component fire damage in the fire IPEEE to basic event names currently used in the PSAR2 analysis.
: 2.      Modify the PSAR2 fault tree logic to reflect assumptions made in the fire IPEEE.
: 3.      Add fire related failure modes to the PSAR2 fault tree logic.
: 4.      Recreated fire area initiating events.
: 5.      Developed fire accident sequences (1,776).
7.7.1 Basic Event Conversion The fire IPEEE was based on a Palisades internal events PSA model that was current as of 1995.
Updates to the 1995 PSA model have been performed since the IPEEE submittal. Among the changes was a restructuring of the format of the basic event names.
Attachment 1 provides a listing of the basic event names that were selected in the fire IPEEE to represent component failures that would occur as a result of fire damage in the various fire areas of the plant.
7.7.2 Modifications to the PSAR2 [16] Fault Trees [5]
As noted above, the fire IPEEE was based on a Palisades internal events PSA model that was current as of 1995 and updates subsequently have been made to the PSA models. These updates reflect plant design that have occurred since the fire IPEEE, modifications to the models to address comments by external peer reviewers, changes resulting from a technical adequacy self assessment performed in accordance with Regulatory Guide 1.200 and updates to reliability data have been addressed. Attachment 6 provides an overview of PRA model changes since the IPEEE submittal.
Changes made to PSAR2 logic to recreate the IPEEE are summarized below and in Attachment 2.
Modifications to Reflect Loqic in the Fire IPEEE A number of local operator actions were credited in the fire IPEEE that are not included in the internal events PSA fault tree logic. These operator actions generally take place as a result of loss of power or control circuits due to fire damage in specific fire areas. These recovery actions generally include local closure of breakers or operation of control valves. Attachment 2 provides a complete listing.
Modifications to the PSAR2 logic to reflect logic in the fire IPEEE were implemented in a manner
 
that the fault trees could be quantified in one of three ways:
Implement the fire IPEEE logic specifically for the fire area for which the change was intended. For example, local closure of the breaker for P7B was credited in the fire IPEEE only for control room fires. Gate U973-DG-FIRE was developed to include a local operator action (U-PMOE-PUMP) for closure of this breaker ANDed with all control room fires (gate A69A5-FIRE under OR gate U973-DGA2-FIRE). By setting any of the control room cabinet fire initiating event house events to True, this recovery logic is enabled.
Implement the fire IPEEE logic for all fire areas. This is performed using a house event created for this purpose. For example, HSE-ANYFIRE is set to True enabling the U-PMOE-PUMP logic under gate U973-DGA2-FIRE. The HSE-ANYFIRE house event appears ANDed with all fire IPEEE logic incorporated in the PSAR2 fault tree and enables the fire IPEEE logic for all fire areas.
Disable the fire IPEEE logic in the quantification of the fire accident sequences using the PSAR2 logic. This is performed using the HSE-NOTANY house event.
By setting this event to True and the HSE-ANYFIRE to False, fire IPEEE changes are disabled and the fault trees quantified without this recovery logic.
The purpose of the HSE-NOTANY house event was to facilitate comparison of the effects of the fire IPEEE changes with the PSAR2 logic.
Modifications to Assure Logic Reflects Correct Plant Transient Response to a Fire The PSAR2 fault tree models include house events to activate fault tree logic associated with plant response to transient initiators. As fire initiators are not a part of the list of internal events in PSAR2, a house event is added to the list of transient initiators representing plant trip due to a fire initiator.
Addition of Fire Areas Initiators to the Fault Tree Logic The Palisades PSA models are quantified using house events to represent the various initiating events. For a given initiating event, setting its house event to True and all other initiator related house events to False enables the appropriate logic in the fault trees for that given initiating event.
Fire initiator house events were added to the PSAR2 model using the information in Attachment
: 1. Each basic event listed as representing a component failure for a given fire area in Attachment 1 was ORed with a house event representing that fire area. The AddEvent program [14] was used to incorporate the house events into the fault trees. The following files were created as input to the AddEvent program for this purpose. AddEvent was executed to incorporate the effects of fire initiators from the IPEEE (Attachment 1).
Quantification of the fault trees for a given fire area can then be performed by setting a selected fire area house event to True and all other fire area house events to False. , lists the IPEEE Ignition Frequencies, Fault Tree Names/Frequencies and Fire Area Assigned/Associated Logical Event.
Event Tree Diagrams Two types of event trees were developed. The first type of event tree simply distributes a given fire area into the different sub areas that were developed for that fire area in the Fire IPEEE. For example, the Control Room can be distributed among 18 different control cabinets or an exposure fire that, if unsuppressed, can affect equipment in the entire room. Attachment 4, Figure 4.1 is an
 
example of the event tree that distributes the fires among the various sub areas for the Control Room. The second event tree type defines plant accident sequence response to a given fire and includes important functions and system logic that are developed by the fault trees.
This second linked event tree transfers to the appropriate sub area. Figures 4.8 is an example of an event tree used to quantify control room fires.
Event Tree Rules Attachment 4, Tables 4.1 through 4.10 list rules for quantification of the accident sequences for each fire area.
Accident Sequence Generation and Solution Three steps were performed to quantify the event tree accident sequences.
0        Convert the PSAR2 fire fault tree to SAPHIRE format N        Develop Change Sets to perform the accident sequence quantification N        Generate accident sequences using the SAPHIRE "link" command N        Quantify all the accident sequences First conversion of the PSAR2 fire CAFTA fault tree to a MAR-D format described in the above steps was performed using the Caf2sap program [14].
Modifications to Incorporate P-8B Recovery Given the HFE developed recovery factor (1.38E-02), a SAPHIRE change set was created to zero out the P-8B failure to start event and use the recovery factor as the failure to run value for P-8B (again, this recovery factor included pump failure to run random failures). The 1,776 IPEEE recreated sequences were subsequently solved.
7.8 Internal Flood at Power From the Individual Plant Examination [28] Appendix A for internal floods, the total core damage frequency for internal flooding events by flood zone was 3.OE-7 per year.
A sensitivity analysis [291 was performed failing P-8B (with no recovery) and resulted in a ACDF/yr of (9.5E 2.43E-07)/yr using a truncation limit of 1E-10. The ACDF applying the 85 day exposure period was 1.65E-07.
From the above, flooding is not considered a threat to P-8B operability. Moreover, given the May 10th event and taking into account that the ACDF/yr (Table 8.2) when including the May 10th trip as a failure is less than 1E-06, the Reference [28] and [29] conclusions will not change when evaluating P-8B importance in mitigating the consequences of internal flooding zones as confirmed by the above discussed sensitivity analysis.
7.9 Seismic Events at Power In the Palisades IPEEE (Individual Plant Examination of External Events), a seismic risk assessment was used to assess risks due to seismic events. The risk assessment was a hybrid of the conventional PSA and seismic margins analysis.
The seismic analysis has not been updated since that originally developed for the Individual Plant Examination of External Events (IPEEE) submittal [3]. A review of the results of the IPEEE submittal indicated that the core damage frequency was 8.88E-06 with a high confidence low probability of failure (HCLPF) of 0.217g PGA (peak ground acceleration). There were no specific seismic events identified as dominant contributors to the core damage frequency. Important
 
seismic induced failures identified were; the Fire Protection System, Main Steam Isolation Valves, Diesel Generator Fuel Oil Supply, and an under voltage relay for 2400 volt ac Bus 1D. Several important random failures were identified in the report as important because of their contribution in combination with seismically induced failures. The important random failures (not seismically induced) identified in the report were: diesel generator 1-2, auxiliary feedwater (AFW) pump, P-8C, and atmospheric dump valves.
As noted, the fire protection system is an important contributor to seismic analysis due to the probability of seismically induced failure of fire protection system components and the condensate storage tank (CST). Seismically induced failure of the condensate storage tank results in an earlier need for alignment of an alternate suction source for the operating auxiliary feedwater pump. The fire protection system provides an alternate suction source to AFW pumps P-8A and P-8B. The seismically induced failures of the fire protection system result in long term failure of auxiliary feedwater pumps P-8A and P-8B due to the unavailability of a suction source.
Auxiliary feedwater pump P-8C is important to long term makeup to the steam generators should the fire system become unavailable following a seismic event (as discussed in the results for Accident Classes IA & IB, Section 3.6.5.3.1 [3].
The fire protection system has a low fragility and is a significant contributor to seismic risk once the contents of the condensate storage tank (T-2) are depleted and a long term suction source is required for continued operation of the AFW pumps. The seismically induced failure of the fire protection system represents a higher probability of failure of the long term suction to motor-driven auxiliary feedwater pump P-8A and turbine-driven auxiliary feedwater pump P-8B after the depletion of the available tank T-2 inventory. This increased probability of failure of heat removal via the A and B pump trains results in an increased importance of motor-driven auxiliary feedwater pump P-8C. The importance of pump P-8C is a consequence of the fact that service water (a much more seismically rugged system) is more likely to remain available as a long term suction source to pump P-8C.
In summary, P-8B unreliability in of itself is not a significant contributor to the seismic results.
Moreover, given the May 10th event and considering the ACDF/yr (Table 8.2) when including the May 10th trip as a failure is less than 1E-07, the IPEEE conclusions will not change.
7.10 Other Hazards There were no other external events identified that have an impact on the core damage frequency at Palisades. All of the screening criteria used from NUREG-1407 [22] and Generic Letter 88-20, Supplement 4 [23] were satisfied. Results of the Palisades Systematic Evaluation Program (SEP)
[24] were used, whenever possible, to complete the evaluation of other external events.
8.0  RESULTS The following results are presented in this section;
          "    First, validation of the re-created IPEEE fire modeling results is presented.
          "  Next, considering the event as a random failure, the delta risk results are listed.
          "    Finally, considering that a performance deficiency exists, the results with and without recovery is shown.
8.1  Validation of Re-Creating the IPEEE Analysis Prior to evaluating the significance of the P-8B trip, validation analysis comparing the Fire IPEEE
 
from Table 4.11-1 [3], PSAR2 and this analysis were performed.
Table 8.1-1 below, compares the results of the IPEEE, the updated fire PSAR2 model [5] & [16]
and this analysis.
The biggest difference in the results lays in the selection of the worst cabinet/junction box fire for areas 1 and 2, the control and cable spreading rooms. Both the IPEEE and PSAR2 analyses applied engineering judgment in selecting the worst cabinet fire before any quantification was conducted.
However, this analysis solved all cabinet fires and sequences to ascertain the worst case.
Consequently the EC-1 3 and EB-1 1 results were found to be more limiting. Though inconsequential, the FA-9-9B results were found to be slightly more limiting than the PSAR2 results.
Consequently the overall CDF for this analysis was about a factor of 2 larger than that reported in the IPEEE principally due to the FA-1 analyzed cabinet and junction box sequences.
With exception of the control and cable spreading rooms, the CDF results for other areas are similar to the original IPEEE results. The exceptions are fire areas 13A11 (Aux Bldg Corridor) and 23E (East turbine building). For fire area 13A1, the Fire IPEEE credited repair of AFW components that failed due to random (non-fire related) causes. Were this repair and recovery action taken in the reference [5] and this analysis, the CDF for this area would be within a factor of about 2.5 of the Fire IPEEE.
In fire area 23E, supporting equipment for demineralized water makeup to the CST is found.
Loss of this makeup source leaves service water and the fire protection system available for long term makeup to the CST. However, the difference between the Fire IPEEE and the reference [5]
(and this analysis) models is that the T-81 is no longer credited as a means of making up to the CST (in the Fire IPEEE the Primary Makeup Tank was considered to be redundant to the CST).
In addition, conditional human error model modeling has been incorporated into PSAR2 [16], [5]
and this analysis, which introduced some dependencies between service water and the fire protection system that were not considered in the Fire IPEEE.
Following Table 8.1-1, Table 8.1-2 compares selected accident class CDF results. Similar to the overall CDF for each fire area, a comparison of Fire IPEEE with the updated PSAR2 Fire PSA results [5] and this analysis shows the dominant accident classes are similar.
The exceptions are fire areas 13A1, 23E (for the reasons described above) and accident class IB for each of the fire areas in general. Accident class lB are those accident sequences in which auxiliary feedwater fails, but once-through-cooling (OTC) is successfully initiated. Core damage occurs as a result of failure to switchover to recirculation from the containment sump.
In the Fire IPEEE, manual action to align containment spray pumps to the suction of the HPSI pumps was considered to be required to assure adequate subcooling and NPSH during recirculation. The PSAR2 models reflect a plant modification that makes this alignment automatic. A dominant contributor to CDF prior to this modification, elimination of this operator 1 There are two entries for fire area 13A, Auxiliary Building Corridor. The walkdown for the IPEEE recognized that there were potentially significant ignition sources in the 590' Aux Building Corridor as well as cables for important mitigating equipment. However, it noted that there was a large horizontal span between the ignition sources and the location of the cables with no intervening combustibles. Given this configuration, the area was subdivided into 13A1 (containing the cables) and 13A2 (containing the potentially significant ignition sources).
 
action reduces the CDF for accident class IB by a factor of 5 to 10 for some of the fire areas in this analysis.
Regarding Class 1B, also recognize that the FPIE analysis-of-record, PSAR2c (2006), includes credit for the supplemental diesel whereas the IPEEE (1995) and PSAR2 (2004) do not.
In summary, it is considered that the developed re-created IPEEE model accurately reflects the reference [51 re-creation of the IPEEE and moreover improves upon the solution given that all cabinet/junction box fires are evaluated when compared to Reference [3].
 
Table 8. 1-I: Comparison of IPEEE, Reference [5] and This Analysis IPEEE TABLE 4T        I-I                                  IPEEE Total      Ref [5] Analysis (Using IPEEE Cabinets              This Analysis Worst Case Cabinet Fires for FA-I, CDF/yr                  for FA-I and FA-2)                              FA-2, and Exposure Fire for FA-9-9B Cabinet/                                                                                              Cabinet Fire Area/    Fire Area        Ignition        Class      Class      Class        Total                      junction                        Cabinet                    Cabinet/      Cabinet      Exposure          +
Zone      Description      Frequency            IA          IB        II      CDF/yr                          Box/          CDF/yr          +        Fire Area    junction      CDF/yr        CDF/yr      Exposure Fire Area                      Exposure                      Box                                    CDF/yr CDF Cabinet Fire 9.50E-3        .93E-7    7.12E-7      N/A        1.30E-6    8. OE-06 8Control        EC-03R          8.13 E-07    2.59E-06        FA-I        EC-13L      3.52E-05      3.38E-06      3.55E-05 Room          Exp. Fire      4.33E-6      2.46E-6      N/A      6.79E-6 2.43E-3 Cable        Cabinet 2        Spreading    Fire 3.20E-3      1.91 E-7    2.06E-7      N/A      3.98E-7      I lIE Room          Exp. Fire      7.48E-6      3.23E-6      N/A        1.07E-6          -05        EJ-575          1.71E-07    6.57E-06        FA-2        EB- II    4.09E-07      4.35E-07      8.44E-07 3.19E-3 Intake 9B        Structure -      7.20E&deg;03          N/A        N/A        N/A          N/A                      FA-9-9B          1.54E-08                    FA-9-9B                                  1.46E-08      1.46E-08 FPS' CDF/yr Total                                      1.97E-5      1.31E-5    3.48E-7    3.31E-5      3.33E-05                                      3.00E-05                                                            5.09E-05 NOTES:
I) Fire Zone 9A is the worst case fire for this fire area and, therefore, Fire Zone 9B is not included in the results since they are mutually exclusive events.
: 2) Fire Zone 21B is the worst case fire for this fire area and, therefore, Fire Zone 21 A is not included in the results since they are mutually exclusive events.
: 3) Manual or automatic suppression credited for FA- I, FA-2, FA-3 and FA-4
 
t                                  Entergy PSA              EA-PSA-SDP-P8B-1 1-05                      Rev. 1 SEntergy                          Engineering Analysis                                          Page 36 of 41 Table 8.1-2: Plant Damage State for FA- I and FA-2 Comparison of IPEEE [3], Reference [5] and This Analysis (EC-03R and EJ-575)
Fire IPEEE [3]                                      Updated PSAR2 Fire PSA (5]/,This Analysis' CDF/yr                                                          CDF/yr IA            IB              II        IV                IA                    IB                II                    IV Exposure  Fire (Uspresd      1.35E-06            --                                4.38E-06/I4.1E-06
_1E(&#xfd;                                                    I17E- 10 I..17-1 (Unsuppressed)
FA-  I FA-tro          Exposure Fire 2.46E-06                                1.4E-06/1382E-0*      3.79E-07/3.327E-07    2.18E-09              3.33E-09 Control                            2,98E-06                                                                                  __107 Room              (Suppressed)
W orst C abinet r5.93E-07      5,3    07    7.12E-07
                                                      .1 E 7                              3.48E-07/3.479E-07      4.51E-07/4.514E -07                    1.37E-08/81
__________      Fire (EC-03R)                  _____            ______________                                                        ______________
Fire IPEEE [3]                                      Updated PSAR2 Fire PSA [5]yssAnalysj CDF/yr                                                          CDF/yr
_____IA                                        lB              II        IV                IA                    lB                  II                    IV Exposure Fire (Unsuresse        3.56E-06                                              1.47E-05/I                                                          2.98E- 10 (Unsuppressed)
FA-2            Exposure Fire    3.91 E-06      3.23E-06                                1.77E-06/.-    -75E    4.86E-07/4,4E-7      2.75E-09            4.33E-09 27      0            4      E Cable            (Suppressed)  ______
Spreading              Worst Cabinet/Junction  1.91 E-07      2.06E-07            -                  1.01 E-07/I            6.58E-08/6.595E-08                    4.56E-09/,4.56E-0I9 Box Fire (EJ-575)
Notes: I] EC-03R and EJ-575 were used for the comparison
 
8.2    Random Failure (Assumed) - Results 8.2.1  Full Power Internal Events (FPIE)
As described in Section 7.4, P-8B past performance was evaluated from 2005 to the present.
Based on the data update, the ACDF between the baseline and the 0, 1 and 2 pump failure to start and run cases was less than 1E-07Iyr. No recovery was credited in this calculation. These sensitivity calculations are shown below.
Table 8.2.1: Review of FPIE P-8B Reliability Data Model                P-S1                  P-BB                    CDF/yr & ACDFlyr          # Cutsets            Comments Fail to Start      Fail to Run (k)              (Truncation @ 1E-10)
PSAR2c baseline    2.84E-03/demand          7.3E-05/hr                  2.804E-05/2.668E-05        10,200/
8,463  Updated data with no failures Updated data with 1 failure PSAR2c w/1 Failure  7.78E-03/demand          2.19E-04/hr                2.808E-05/2.672E-05        10,265/  (from 5/10/11) assigned to both 8,492  fail to start and run failure modes.
PSAR2c w/2      1.27E-02/demand          3.65E-04/hr                2.811 E-05/2.676E-05        10,373/  Updated data with 2 failures.
Failures                                                                                          8,515 ACDF/yr                                                        (2.672E 2.668E-05) = 4E-08            1 failure - baseline.
ACDF/yr                                                        (2.676E 2.668E-05) = 8E-08            2 failures - baseline.
2 failures - 1 failure (this ACDF/yr                                                        (2.676E 2.672E-05) = 4E-08            assumes the 1 failure case is the new baseline).
8.3    SDP Analysis (Assumed Performance Deficiency) - Results 8.3.1  Full Power Internal Events (FPIE)
Table 8.3.1 summarizes the FPIE results. In this instance the baseline case includes the P-8B May 10 observed failure, in the failure to start and run counts. Recovery was included in these data.
Table 8.3.1: Review of FPIE P-8B SDP Data Model            Fail P-81 to Start            P-81                    CDFlyr & ACDFlyr          # Cutsets            Comments Fail to  Run (k)            (Truncation  @ 1E-1 0)
PSAR2c baseline    2.84E-03/demand          7.3E-05/hr                  2.804E-05/2.668E-05        10,200/
8,463  Updated data with no failures 10,265 7.78E-03/demand          2.19E-04/hr                2.808E-05/2.672E-05        10265/  Updated data with 1 failure 8,492  (5/10/11)
PSAR2c SDP w/o      2.84E-03/demand              1.0                    3.324E-05/3.184E-05          13,920/
recovery                                                                                        10,025 PSAR2c SDP        2.84E-03/demand          1.38E-02'                  2.809E-05/2.674E-05        10,336/
w/recovery                                (probability)                                            8,499 ACDF/yr SDP w/o                                                  (3.184E 2.668E-05) = 5.16E-06 recovery ACDF/yr SDP w/                                                    (2.674E 2.668E-05) = 6E-08 recovery ACOF/yr x 85/365                                                                                              No Recovery: exposure time days w/o recovery                                                  5.16E-06 x 85/365 = 1.202E-06            from 2/15/11 to 5/10/11 - 85 daysw/orecovery  _days                                                                                              (Section 7.3).
ACDF/yr x 85/365                                                      6E-08 x 85/365 = 1.397E-08              With Recovery: exposure time days w/ recovery                                                                                            from 2/15/11 to 5/10/11 - 85
 
Notes: 1] recovery = failure to run random faults + recovery.
8.3.2    IPEEE Fire The PSAR2 model created to replicate the IPEEE fire analysis was solved twice, with and without recovery. Attachment 7 provides a detailed list of the first 100 cutsets for selected fire cases.
Table 8.3.2: SDP Evaluation w/Recreated IPEEE Model P-8B                    P-8B                  CDF/yr & ACDF/yr        # Cutsets          Comments Fail to Start        Fail to Run (k)            (Truncation @ IE-10)
Recreated IPEEE        2.84E-03/demand            7.3E-05/hr                    5.09E-05            10,200  Updated data with no failures baseline Recreated IPEEE w/o      2.84E-03/demand                True                        2.33E-04            61,132 recovery Recreated IPEEE w/      2.84E-O3ldemand            1.38E-025 recovery                                      (probability)
ACDF/yr w/o recovery      2.84E-03/demand                True          (2.33E 5.09E-05) = 1.82E-04 ACDF/yr SDP w/o                                                                                                With Recovery: exposure time recovery x 85/365 days                                                      1.82E-04 x 85/365 = 4.24E-05          from 2/15/11 to 5/10/11 - 85 days (Section 7.3).
ACDF/yr SDP w/                                                      (5.29E 5.09E-05) = 2.00E-06 recovery With Recovery: exposure time AcDF/yr Sx P w/                                                        2.00E-06 x 85/365 = 4.69E-07            from 2/15/11 to 5/10/11 - 85 recovery x 85/365 days    _days                                                                                        (Section 7.3).
ACDF/yr (FPIE + Fire)                                                    1.20E-06 + 4.24E-05 = 4.37E-05          Summation of FPIE and Fire w/o recovery                                                                                                  ACDF ACDF/yr (FPIE + Fire)                                                    1.40E-08 + 4.69E-07 = 4.81E-07          Summation of FPIE and Fire S
w/recovery                                                                                                  ACDF Notes: 1] recovery = failure to run random faults + recovery.
 
==9.0 CONCLUSION==
 
Given that the current engineering assessment has not identified any causal factors that were present at the time of failure, the failure of P-8B can be considered a random event. Per pump performance review since 2005 to the present, no additional failures have been identified other than that observed on May 10th, 2011. Using this information, sensitivity calculations show that the ACDF is less than 1E-06/yr when considering the event is random and therefore is colored green.
If it is assumed a pre-existing condition, the results show that the full power internal events CDF plus the IPEEE recreated fire analysis CDF, given the observed P-8B failure, produces an aggregate ACDF of 4.81 E-07/yr when crediting recovery of P-8B.
If recovery is not credited, the aggregate ACDF is estimated to be 4.37E-05/yr.
When considering the event as a random failure or a pre-existing condition, with recovery, the condition is colored green.
If considering the event as a pre-existing condition and assuming no recovery, the ACDF is greater than 1E-05 and is colored yellow.
Recall in either case the B.5.b pump is not credited (however, if directed by the Technical Support Center (TSC), today, the pump would be deployed) and that the re-created IPEEE analysis does not include the supplemental diesel.
 
==10.0 REFERENCES==
 
[1]  EA-PSA-SAPHIRE-09-08, Revision 0, SAPHIRE v7.27 Testing and Software Quality Assurance Plan, December 2009.
[2]  EA-PSA-PSAR2c-06-1 0, Revision 0, Update of Palisades CDF Model - PSAR2b to PSAR2c, June 2006.
[3]  Letter from Consumers Power to U.S. NRC (Document Control Desk),
 
==Subject:==
Response to Generic Letter 88-20, Supplement 4, Individual Plant Examination of External Events for Severe Accident Vulnerabilities, Final Report, Dated: June 30, 1995[G326/2290].
[4]  EA-PSA-FIRE-06-03, Revision 0, Owners Review of Use of the Palisades PSA to Evaluate the Importance of MOV Hot Shorts.
[5]  EA-PSA-MOV-05-01, Revision 0, Use of the Palisades PSA to Evaluate the Importance of MOV Hot Shorts.
[6]  SAPHIRE REFERENCE MANUAL, "SYSTEMS ANALYSIS PROGRAMS FOR HANDS ON INTEGRATED RELIABILITY EVALUATIONS (SAPHIRE) VERSION 6.0", Idaho National Engineering Laboratory, 1998. EN-WM-104, Revision 4, On Line Risk Assessment, May 2011.
[7] SAPHIRE TECHNICAL REFERENCE, "Systems Analysis Program for Hands-on Integrated Reliability Evaluations (SAPHIRE) Version 6.0", Idaho National Engineering Laboratory, 1998.NUMARC 93-01, Revision 3, Industry Guideline for Monitoring the Effectiveness of maintenance at Nuclear Power Plants, Nuclear Energy Institute, July 2000.
[8] NUREG/CR-2300 volume 1, "PRA Procedures Guide". ASME/ANS RA-Sa-2009, Standard for Level l/Large Early Release Frequency Probabilistic Risk Assessment for Nuclear Power Plant Applications, American Society of Mechanical Engineers, American National Standard.
[9]  NUREG-0492, "Fault Tree Handbook".
[10] NEI-06-012, "B.5.b Phase 2 & 3 Submittal Guideline," Revision 2, December 2006 OPR-1077798-04, rev 2.
[11] PLP0247-07-0004.01, R2, Palisades Nuclear Plant Thermal Hydraulic MAAP Calculations.
[12] Implementation of B.5.b Strategy, EC 10716 rO.
[13] Evaluation of External Water Supply for B.5.b Scenarios, EA-EC10716-01 rO.
[14] EA-PSA-SAPHIRE-03-02 rO, "Verification and Validation of SAPHIRE Versions 6.75, 6.76, 7.18, 7.20 and 7.21".
[15] Palisades Safety Assessment Notebook NB-PSA-DA, r5, "Data Analysis".
[16] EA-PSA-SAPHIRE-04-02 rO, "Update of Palisades CDF Model - PSAR1B Modified w/HELB to PSAR2".
[171 Palisades Safety Assessment Notebook NB-PSA-HR Volume 1, r4, "Human Reliability Analysis Notebook Volume 1 (Post Initiator Operator Actions)".
[18] The EPRI HRA Calculator Version 4.0 Software.
[19] ONP-25.1, FIRE WHICH THREATENS SAFETY-RELATED EQUIPMENT, r20.
[20] ONP-25.2, FIRE WHICH THREATENS SAFETY-RELATED EQUIPMENT, r27.
 
[21] EOP Supplement 19, Alternate Auxiliary Feedwater Methods, rl0.
[22] NUREG-1407, Procedural and Submittal Guidance for the Individual Plant Examination of External Events (IPEEE) for Severe Accident Vulnerabilities.
[23] NRC Generic Letter 88-20, Supplement 4, Individual Plant Examination of External Events (IPEEE) for Severe Accident Vulnerabilities - 10 CFR 50.54(f), April 1991.
[24] NUREG-0820, Integrated Plant Safety Assessment - Systematic Evaluation Program, Palisades Plant, Final Report, October 1982.
[25] EA-PSA-INTFLOOD-09-03(01), "Internal Flooding and Spray Initiating Events - Identification of Flood Areas, Flood and Spray Sources, and Impacted Components", draft.
[26] EA-PSA-INTFLOOD-09-03(02), "Palisades Internal Flooding Analysis for Internal Events PSA -
Initiating Event Frequencies for Flooding and Spray Events", draft.
[27] EA-PSA-INTFLOOD-09-03(03), "Palisades Internal Flooding Analysis for Internal Events PSA -
Calculation of Core Damage Frequency", draft.
[28] CPCo to NRC Letter, January 29, 1993, Palisades Plant Individual Plant Examination for Severe Accident Vulnerabilities (IPE), [F341/1523].
[29] EA-PSA-FLOOD-04-17, "Palisades Internal Flood Analysis Update", December, 2004.
[30] 0098-0171-01, "Calculation of Overspeed Trip Mechanism Linkage Forces", Task No. 0098-1103-0171-00, MPR Associates, Inc., EA-EC31177-01, r2, November, 2011.
[31] D-PAL-94-041, "P-8B Tripped on Overspeed during MO-38", February, 1994, [G186/0556].
11.0 ATTACHMENTS Attachment 1:      Fire IPEEE to PSAR2 Basic Event Translation (66 pgs)
Attachment 2:      Modifications to PSAR2 Fault Tree Logic (18 pgs)
Attachment 3:      IPEEE Ignition Frequencies, Fault Tree Names/Frequencies and Fire Area Assigned Logical Event (10 pgs)
Attachment  4:    Event Tree Accident Sequences (22 pgs)
Attachment  5:    HRA Analysis (18 pgs)
Attachment  6:    PRA Model History (6 pgs)
Attachment  7:    Fire Results (51 pgs)
Attachment  8:    E-Mail Memorandum "Local AFW Operation HRA Evaluation for Palisades SDP" (4 pgs)
 
Fire IPEEE to PSAR2 Basic Event Translation pg Fire Area 1 - Control Room                  2 Fire Area 2 - Cable Spreading Room          25 Fire Area 3 - Bus 1D Switchgear            38 Fire Area 4 - Bus 1C Switchgear            44 Fire Area 13A1 - Aux Building Corridor      55 Fire Area 13A2 - Aux Building Corridor      60 Fire Area 23B - East Turbine Building      61 Fire Area 23D - West Turbine Building      65
 
Fire Area 1 - Control Room Area/        BE/IST      Orig BE    New BE          Comment Cabinet      (Fire IPEEE)            (PSAR2)
EC-01L        A38          AKVMA0522G  A-KVMA-SV-0522G AHSMB0522B  AHSMB0522B  A-HSMB-HS-0522B DFUMKWO01A  DFUMKWO01A  D-FUMK-WO01-1 DFUMKW006D  DFUMKWO06D  D-FUMK-W006-1 This relay must energize to cause ADVs to open (the TBV solenoids  must spuriously G113B        GCNMA386A8                  energize to open valve)
This relay must energize to cause ADVs to G322B        GCNMA386A3                  open This relay must energize to cause ADVs to G332B        GCNMA386A5                  open GEPMT0511    GEPMT0511  B-EPMT-EP-0511 GHSMB0501A  GHSMB0501A                  No credit for manual closure of MSIVs GKVMB0505A  GKVMB0505A  M-KVMB-SV-0505A GKVMB0505B  GKVMB0505B  M-KVMB-SV-0505B GPBMBE50A    GPBMBE50A  M-PBMB-HS-LPE50A GPCMT0511    GPCMT0511  B-PCMT-PIC-0511 GREMBXE50A  GREMBXE50A  M-REMB-LPXE50A GSCMT0511    GSCMT0511  B-CEPO-PM-0511 IST-11      FAVMC0729                    CST makeup from hotwell not modeled IST-15      AAVMA0521                    SGB no longer supplies steam to TDAFW IST-15      AAVMA0521                    SGB no longer supplies steam to TDAFW IST-164      PC1 MCY3001 P-Cl MC-EY-30-01 IST-166      ZCEPO0751C  M-PCMT-PIC-0751C IST-170      ZCEPO0752C  M-PCMT-PIC-0752C IST-18      AKVMA0522B  A-KVMB-SV-0522B IST-18      AKVMA0522B  A-KVMB-SV-0522B IST-183      GMVMA0510  M-HSMB-0510C IST-184      GHSMB0510C  M-HSMB-0510C IST-19      ACNMC62-2A  A-REMD-62-2P8A IST-198      GKVMA0507B  M-KVMB-SV-0507B IST-199      GKVMA0507A  M-KVMB-SV-0507A A-CEPO-AFAS-MOD IST-20      AMLMACHA    A IST-203      GTPMT0510  B-TPMT-PT-051 0 IST-203      GTPMT0510  B-TPMT-PT-051 0 IST-228      GAVMA0511  B-AVMA-CV-0511 IST-252      FCSMC105    M-CSMB-252-105CS
 
Fire Area 1 - Control Room Area/        BE/IST      Orig BE    New BE          Comment Cabinet      (Fire IPEEE)            (PSAR2)
IST-32      AREMB22P8B  A-REMB-62-2P8B IST-6        ACNMDSX741  A-REMD-PSX-0741 PFUMK3006    PFUMK3006  P-FUMK-Y3006-1 EC-01R        DFUMKWO02A  DFUMKWO02A  D-FUMK-W002-1 GEPMT0511    GEPMT0511  B-EPMT-EP-0511 GHSMB0501A  GHSMB0501A                  No credit for manual closure of MSIVs GKVMA0508    GKVMA0508  M-KVMB-SV-0508 GKVMA0514    GKVMA0514  M-KVMB-SV-0514 GKVMB0502    GKVMB0502  M-KVMB-SV-0502 GKVMB0513    GKVMB0513  M-KVMB-SV-0513 GPBMBE50B    GPBMBE50B  M-PBMB-HS-LPE50B GPCMT0511    GPCMT0511  B-PCMT-PIC-0511 GREMBXE50B  GREMBXE50B  M-REMB-LPXE50B GSCMT0511    GSCMT0511  B-CEPO-PM-0511 IST-1        ACNMD23P8C  A-REMD-62-3P8C IST-11      FAVMC0729                    CST makeup from hotwell not modeled IST-165      PC1 MCY4001 P-Cl MC-EY-40-01 IST-169      ZCEPO0751 D M-PCMT-PIC-0751D IST-173      ZCEPO0752D  M-PCMT-PIC-0752D IST-187      GMVMA0501                    SGB no longer supplies steam to TDAFW IST-188      GHSMB0501C                  SGB no longer supplies steam to TDAFW IST-203      GTPMT0510  B-TPMT-PT-0510 IST-21      ACNMDlC2-6  A-REMB-62-1P8C IST-228      GAVMA0511  B-AVMA-CV-0511 IST-253      FCSMB205    M-CBMB-252-205 IST-32      AREMB22P8B  A-REMB-62-2P8B EC-02L        IST-143      SREMBX161  G-REMB-42-161 IST-273      BMVMA2169  G-MVMA-MO-2169 IST-275      SCSMB127C1  G-CSMB-42-127CS1 IST-276      SCSMB187C1  G-CSMB-42-187CS1 IST-277      42-2425/CS  G-CSMB-42-287CS IST-279      BCVMA2139  G-PMME-P-56B IST-281      BMVMA2170  G-MVMA-MO-2170 IST-301      DFUMKS17A  D-FUMK-S17-1 IST-314      PCBMCC-167  L-C2MC-52-167 IST-314      PCBMCC-167  L-C2MC-52-167 IST-318      SHCMT3025A  L-HCMT-HIC-3025A IST-376      DCBMC72109  D-CBMC-72-109
 
Fire Area 1 - Control Room Area/        BE/IST      Orig BE    New BE          Comment Cabinet      (Fire IPEEE)            (PSAR2)
IST-376      DCBMC72109  D-CBMC-72-109 IST-396      SC2MCC-161  G-C2MC-52-161 IST-396      SC2MCC-161  G-C2MC-52-161 IST-398      DFUMKB1105  D-FUMK-B1 105-1 IST-402      PC2MA1 105C G-C2MC-52-1105C IST-405      PCBMBC1105  G-C2MB-52-1105 S42161 MAN  SCSMB161CS  G-CSMB-42-161CS1
              $55C-l      SCSMB1 105  G-CSMB-52-1105CS SCBA19A      SCSMB42191  G-CSMB-42-191CS SHSMB3025B  SHSMB3025B  L-HSMB-HS-3025B SREMB127-0  SREMB127-0  G-REMB-42-127 auto start of P-56B no longer modeled in SREMBR-191  SREMBR-191                  PSAR2 EC-02R        IST-274      BCVMA2138  G-PMME-P-56A IST-277      42-2425/CS  G-CSMB-42-287CS IST-277      42-2425/CS  G-CSMB-42-287CS IST-278      BMVMA2140  G-MVMA-MO-2140 IST-280      SCSMB227C1  G-CSMB-42-227CS1 IST-301      DFUMKS17A  D-FUMK-S17-1 IST-314      PCBMCC-167  L-C2MC-52-167 IST-377      PB2MKMCC26  P-B2MK-EB-26 IST-377      PB2MKMCC26  P-B2MK-EB-26 IST-391      DFUMKS55B  D-FUMK-S55-2 IST-395      PCBMCC1205  G-C2MC-52-1205 IST-397      SCNMA0101  G-C2MC-52-1206 IST-399      PCBMC52207  G-C2MC-52-207 IST-399      PCBMC52207  G-C2MC-52-207 IST-399      PCBMC52207  G-C2MC-52-207 IST-400      DFUMK72205  D-FUMK-B1205-1 IST-401      PCBMB1206  G-C2MB-52-1206 IST-402      PC2MA1 105C G-C2MC-52-1105C IST-404      SCNMBA0101  D-FUMK-B1206-1 Alternate power source for charging pumps PC2MA1206    PC2MA11206                  no longer modeled in PSAR2 S55A-H      SCSMB1205  G-CSMB-52-1205CS S55B-I      SCSMB1206  G-CSMB-52-1206CS SCSMB207C1  SCSMB207C1  G-CSMB-42-207CS1 SCSMB207C2  SCSMB207C2  G-CSMB-42-207CS1 SREMBR-287  SREMBR-287                  auto start of P-56A no longer modeled in
 
Fire Area 1 - Control Room Area/        BE/IST      Orig BE      New BE            Comment Cabinet      (Fire IPEEE)              (PSAR2)
PSAR2 EC-03L        DFUMKS09    DFUMKS09    D-FUMK-S09-1 DFUMKS13A    DFUMKS13A    D-FUMK-S13-2 IST-296      PCBMCC-147  L-C2MC-52-147 IST-300      DFUMK1111A  D-FUMK-A1111-1 IST-307      PCBMCB-1 11  L-C2MB-152-1 11 IST-308      HPVMD3030B  Q-PVMD-PCV-3030B IST-310      SMVMA3190    L-MVMA-MO-3190 IST-311      SCNMBX147    L-REMB-42X-147 IST-328      PCBMCC-141  L-C2MC-52-141 IST-329      SCNMBX141    L-REMB-42X-141 IST-331      PBSMTMCC23  P-B2MK-EB-23 IST-337      DFUMKI 1 14A D-FUMK-A1 114-1 IST-338      DFUMK1 112A  D-FUMK-A1 112-1 IST-340      PCNMC52112  S-REMB-144-112 IST-341      PCNMC52114  S-REMB-144-114 IST-345      PB2MKMCC23  P-B2MK-EB-23 IST-345      PB2MKMCC23  P-B2MK-EB-23 IST-346      DFUMK1113A  D-FUMK-A1113-1 IST-350      HFLMK3018                      Flow path not modeled in PSAR2 IST-351      PCBMCC-137  H-C2MC-52-137 IST-352      PCBMCC-197  H-C2MC-52-197 IST-353      PCBMCC-157  H-C2MC-52-157 IST-354      PCBMCC-151  H-C2MC-52-151 IST-363      HFLMK3070    I-FLMK-F-319 PCBMBB-1 11  PCBMBB-1 11  L-C2MB-152-111 blocking LPSI trip on RAS not modeled in SCNMA43111  SCNMA43 111                    PSAR2 blocking LPSI trip on RAS not modeled in SCSMA52111  SCSMA52111                    PSAR2 SCSMB111    SCSMB 111    L-HSMB-HS-1 11 SCSMB112    SCSMB1 12    S-CSMB-152-112CS SCSMB1 14    SCSMB1 14    S-CSMB-152-114CS SH117        SCSMB1571    H-CSMB-42-157CS 1 SH157        SCSMB1511    H-CSMB-42-151CS1 SH207        SHSMB3018A                    Flow path not modeled in PSAR2 SH25        SCSMB1371    H-CSMB-42-137CS1 SH314A      SCSMB113    H-CSMB-152-113CS SH77        SCSMB1971    H-CSMB-42-197CS 1
 
Fire Area 1 - Control Room Area/        BE/IST      Orig BE    New BE          Comment Cabinet      (Fire IPEEE)            (PSAR2)
SHSMB3018A  SHSMB3018A                Flow path not modeled in PSAR2 SHSMB3018B  SHSMB3018B                Flow path not modeled in PSAR2 Failure to close failure mode not modeled in SHSMB3059A  SHSMB3059A                PSAR2 Failure to close failure mode not modeled in SHSMB3059B  SHSMB3059B                PSAR2 SKVMA3018    SKVMA3018                  Flow path not modeled in PSAR2 SKVMB3030A  SKVMB3030A Z-KVMB-SV-3030A Failure to close failure mode not modeled in SKVMB3059    SKVMB3059                  PSAR2 SL54        SCSMB1411  L-HSMB-HS-141-1 SL64        SCSMB1471  L-HSMB-HS-147-1 SPMME67B    SPMME67B  L-PMME-P-67B SSD40        SLMMB23395 L-REMB-42-2339 SSD41        SQSMB2339  L-REMB-42-2339 SU28        SHSMB3030A                Manual operation of CV-3030 not in PSAR2 EC-03R        DFUMK1206A  DFUMK1206A D-FUMK-A1206-1 DFUMKS10    DFUMKS1O  D-FUMK-S1O-1 DFUMKS14A    DFUMKS14A  D-FUMK-S14-2 IST-1        ACNMD23P8C A-REMD-62-3P8C IST-295      PCBMCC-251 L-C2MC-52-251 IST-297      PCBMCC-247 L-C2MC-52-247 IST-305      PCBMCB-206 L-C2MB-152-206 IST-306      SAVMA3029  Z-AVMA-CV-3029 IST-309      SMVMA3199  L-MVMA-MO-3199 IST-312      SCNMBX247  L-REMB-42X-247 IST-313      SCNMBX251  L-REMB-42X-251 IST-330      PBSMTMCC24 P-B2MK-EB-24 IST-336      PCBMBB-210 S-CBMB-152-210 IST-339      GCNMB5P8  R-REMB-5P-8 IST-347      HFLMK3037                  Flow path not modeled in PSAR2 IST-348      PB2MKMCC22 P-B2MK-EB-22 IST-348      PB2MKMCC22 P-B2MK-EB-22 IST-349      DFUMK1207A D-FUMK-A1207-2 IST-355      PCBMCC-261 H-C2MC-52-261 IST-356      PCBMCC-257 H-C2MC-52-257 IST-357      PCBMCC-237 H-C2MC-52-237 IST-358      PCBMCC-241 H-C2MC-52-241 IST-362      HFLMK3071  I-FLMK-F-321 IST-392      PCBMCC5221 H-REMT-30721C
 
Fire Area 1 - Control Room Area/        BE/IST      Orig BE    New BE          Comment Cabinet      (Fire IPEEE)            (PSAR2)
PCBMBB-206  PCBMBB-206 L-C2MB-152-206 blocking LPSI trip on RAS not modeled in SCNMA43206  SCNMA43206                  PSAR2 blocking LPSI trip on RAS not modeled in SCSMA52206  SCSMA52206                  PSAR2 SCSMB206    SCSMB206  L-HSMB-HS-206 SCSMB210    SCSMB210  S-CSMB-152-210CS SH135        SCSMB2371  H-CSMB-42-237CS1 SH175        SCSMB2411  H-CSMB-42-241CS1 SH194        SHSMB3037A                  Flow path not modeled in PSAR2 SH233A      SCSMB207  H-CSMB-152-207CS SH49        SCSMB2611  H-CSMB-42-261CS1 SH95        SCSMB2571  H-CSMB-42-257CS1 SKVMB3029A  SKVMB3029A Z-KVMB-SV-3029A SL74        SCSMB2471  L-REMB-42-247 SL84        SCSMB2511  L-REMB-42-251 SPMME67A    SPMME67A  L-PMME-P-67A SSD30        SLMMB24395 L-REMB-42-2439 SSD31        SQSMB2439  L-REMB-42-2439 Sul1        SHSMB3029A                  Manual operation of CV-3029 not in PSAR2 EC-04L        DC6          DCBMC72112 P-CBMA-152-106 DFUDK1 105A  DFUDK1105A D-FUMK-B1105-1 DFUDK1 106A  DFUDK1106A D-FUMK-B1106-1 DFUDK1302A  DFUDK1302A                  backfeed power not modeled in PSAR2.
DFUMKWO01A  DFUMKWO01A D-FUMK-WO01-1 This relay must energize to cause ADVs to open (the TBV solenoids must spuriously G113B        GCNMA386A8                  energize to open valve)
This relay must energize to cause ADVs to G322B        GCNMA386A3                  open This relay must energize to cause ADVs to G332B        GCNMA386A5                  open GHSMB0510A  GHSMB0510A                  No credit for manual closure of MSIVs GKVMB0505A  GKVMB0505A M-KVMB-SV-0505A GKVMB0505B  GKVMB0505B M-KVMB-SV-0505B IST-140      PCIMCY3003 P-ClMC-EY-30-03 IST-141      SCNMBSISX1 R-REMB-SIS-Xl IST-142      SCNMBSISX3 R-REMB-SIS-X3 IST-146      SCNMASIS5  R-REMB-SIS-5 IST-15      AAVMA0521                  SGB no longer supplies steam to TDAFW shutdown sequencer not modeled in IST-158      PCNMB107AB                  PSAR2
 
Fire Area 1 - Control Room Area/        BE/IST      Orig BE    New BE          Comment Cabinet      (Fire IPEEE)            (PSAR2) shutdown sequencer not modeled in IST-158      PCNMB107AB                  PSAR2 IST-159      DFUDK1107A  D-FUMK-AI1107-1 IST-159      DFUDK1107A  D-FUMK-A1 107-1 IST-159      DFUDK1107A  D-FUMK-A1 107-1 IST-160      DCBDC72136  D-CBMC-72-136 IST-160      DCBDC72136  D-CBMC-72-136 IST-160      DCBDC72136  D-CBMC-72-136 IST-19      ACNMC62-2A  A-REMD-62-2PBA IST-190      DCBDC72104  D-CBMC-72-104 IST-198      GKVMA0507B  M-KVMB-SV-0507B IST-199      GKVMA0507A  M-KVMB-SV-0507A IST-203      GTPMT0510  B-TPMT-PT-0510 IST-257      DCBDC72101  D-CBMC-72-101 IST-257      DCBDC72101  D-CBMC-72-101 IST-257      DCBDC72101  D-CBMC-72-101 IST-471      DCBDC721 11 D-CBMC-72-1 11 IST-483      EDGME11    E-DGME-K-6A IST-486      PCBMBB-106  P-CBMB-152-106 IST-490      DCBDC72308  D-CBMC-72-308 IST-491      PREMB1275  P-CBMA-152-106 IST-500      DFUDK1303A  D-FUMK-A1303-1 IST-500      DFUDK1303A  D-FUMK-A1303-1 IST-501      PCBMBB-302                  backfeed power not modeled in PSAR2.
IST-502      PCBMAB-302  P-CBMA-152-302 IST-509      EKVMA1470  E-KVMB-SV-1470 Manual trip of CB-1 52-302 not modeled in P252B        PCNMB303CS                  PSAR2 No manual actuation of 252-302 modeled PBS 1F-08    PCNMB1FCS                  in PSAR2 PCBMAB-105  PCBMAB-105  P-CBMA-152-105 PCBMAB-106  PCBMAB-106  P-CBMA-152-106 PCBMBC1 103  PCBMBC1 103 P-CBMB-52-1103 PCSMBA-301  PCSMBA-301                  Closure of CB-252-302 not modeled PREMB1271    PREMB1271  P-REMA-127-1 PREMB271X1  PREMB271XI  P-REMB-127-1-X1 PREMB271X2  PREMB271IX2 P-REMB-127-1-X2 PREMB38311  PREMB38311  P-REMB-383-11 Circuitry for 152-202 failing to trip not PREMB8612    PREMB8612                  modeled in PSAR2 PREMB8612X  PREMB8612X                  Circuitry for 152-106 failing to trip not
 
Fire Area 1 - Control Room Area/        BE/IST      Orig BE    New BE            Comment Cabinet      (Fire IPEEE)            (PSAR2) modeled in PSAR2 SCNMBSISX5  SCNMBSISX5  R-REMB-SIS-X5 manual initiation of sis relays not modeled SPBMB1-1    SPBMB1-1                      in PSAR2 SREMBSIS1    SREMBSIS1  R-REMB-SIS-1 SREMBSIS5    SREMBSIS5  R-REMB-SIS-5 SREMBSISX5  SREMBSISX5  R-REMB-SIS-X5 SREMBSISX7  SREMBSISX7  R-REMB-SIS-X7 ZCNMB34510  ZCNMB34510  R-CEPO-MC-34L1 05 ZCNMB3453    ZCNMB3453  R-CEPO-MC-34L1 05 ZCNMB3455    ZCNMB3455  R-CEPO-MC-34L1 06 ZCNMB3459    ZCNMB3459  R-CEPO-MC-34L1 05 ZSEMT34-5    ZSEMT34-5  R-CEPO-MC-34L1 05 EC-04R        DFUDK1203A  DFUDK1203A  P-CBMA-152-203 DFUDK1302A  DFUDK1302A                    backfeed not modeled in PSAR2 DFUMKW002A  DFUMKW002A  D-FUMK-W002-1 No credit for manual action to close MSIVs GHSMB0501A  GHSMB0501A                    in PSAR2 GKVMA0508    GKVMA0508  M-KVMB-SV-0508 GKVMA0514    GKVMA0514  M-KVMB-SV-0514 GKVMB0502    GKVMB0502  M-KVMB-SV-0502 GKVMB0513    GKVMB0513  M-KVMB-SV-0513 IST-137      PCl MCY2003 P-Cl MC-EY-20-03 IST-138      SCNMBSISX2  R-REMB-SIS-X2 IST-139      SCNMBSISX4  R-REMB-SIS-X4 IST-149      SCNMASIS8  R-REMB-SIS-8 IST-161      PCNMB213AB  P-CBMB-152-213 IST-161      PCNMB213AB  P-CBMB-152-213 IST-162      DFUDK1213A  P-CBMB-152-213 IST-162      DFUDK1213A  P-CBMB-152-213 IST-162      DFUDK1213A  P-CBMB-152-213 IST-163      DCBDC72238  D-CBMC-72-236 IST-163      DCBDC72238  D-CBMC-72-236 IST-163      DCBDC72238  D-CBMC-72-236 IST-21      ACNMD1C2-6  A-REMB-62-1 P8C IST-259      DCBDC72201  D-CBMC-72-201 IST-259      DCBDC72201  D-CBMC-72-201 IST-259      DCBDC72201  D-CBMC-72-201 IST-259      DCBDC72201  D-CBMC-72-201
 
Fire Area 1 - Control Room Area/        BE/IST        Orig BE    New BE          Comment Cabinet      (Fire IPEEE)            (PSAR2)
IST-492      EDGME12    E-DGME-K-6B IST-494      PCBMBB-202 P-CBMB-152-202 IST-496      DFUDK1202A D-FUMK-A1202-1 IST-497      DCBDC72403 D-CBMC-72-403 IST-498      PREMB1276  P-CBMA-152-202 IST-499      DCBDC72211 D-CBMC-72-211 IST-500      DFUDK1303A D-FUMK-A1303-1 IST-501      PCBMBB-302                  backfeed power not modeled in PSAR2.
IST-502      PCBMAB-302 P-CBMA-152-302 IST-502      PCBMAB-302 P-CBMA-152-302 IST-510      EKVMA1471  E-KVMB-SV-1471 Manual trip of CB-152-302 not modeled in P252B        PCNMB303CS                  PSAR2 No manual actuation of 252-302 modeled PBSIG-08      PCNMBIGCS                  in PSAR2 PCBMAB-203    PCBMAB-203 P-CBMA-152-203 PCBMBC1201    PCBMBC1201 P-C2MB-52-1201 PREMB1272    PREMB1272  P-REMA-127-1 PREMB272X1    PREMB272X1 P-REMB-127-2-X1 PREMB272X2    PREMB272X2 P-REMB-127-2-X2 PREMB38312    PREMB38312 P-REMB-383-12 PREMB38323    PREMB38323 P-REMB-383-23 SCNMBSISX6    SCNMBSISX6 R-REMB-SIS-X6 manual initiation of sis relays not modeled SPBMB1-2      SPBMB1-2                    in PSAR2 SREMBSIS2    SREMBSIS2  R-REMB-SIS-2 SREMBSIS6    SREMBSIS6  R-REMB-SIS-6 SREMBSIS8    SREMBSIS8  R-REMB-SIS-8 SREMBSISX6    SREMBSISX6 R-REMB-SIS-X6 SREMBSISX8    SREMBSISX8 R-REMB-SIS-X8 ZCNMB34610  *ZCNMB34610 R-CEPO-MC-34R106 ZCNMB3463    ZCNMB3463  R-CEPO-MC-34R105 ZCNMB3468    ZCNMB3468  R-CEPO-MC-34R106 ZSEMT34-6    ZSEMT34-6  R-CEPO-MC-34R106 manual start of CCW pumps not modeled in EC-08L        CCSMB1094    CCSMB1094                  PSAR2 manual start of CCW pumps not modeled in CCSMB1 164    CCSMB1 164                  PSAR2 IST-53        CCSMD1092  C-CSMD-152-109CS IST-55        CCSMD1 162 C-CSMD-152-116CS IST-63        CCVMA0944  C-CVMA-CK-CC944
 
Fire Area 1 - Control Room Area/        BE/IST      Orig BE    New BE          Comment Cabinet      (Fire IPEEE)            (PSAR2)
IST-75      DFUMKA1103 D-FUMK-A1 103-1 IST-84      UCNMB44103 U-REMB-144-103 manual start of SWS pumps not modeled in UCSMB103    UCSMB103                    PSAR2 UPSMB1318    UPSMB1318  U-PSMB-PS-1318 UPSMB1325    UPSMB1325  U-PSMB-PS-1325 EC-08R        C200        CANMT0917                  Isolation of CCW leaks not modeled manual start of CCW pumps not modeled in CCSMB2084    CCSMB2084                  PSAR2 IST-54      CCSMD2082  C-CSMD-152-208CS IST-57      CAVMA0918                  Makeup to CCW not modeled IST-65      CCVMA0943  C-CVMA-CK-CC943 IST-74      PCBMCB-204 U-C2MC-152-204 IST-76      PCBMCB-205 P-CBMC-152-205 IST-77      DFUMKA1205 D-FUMK-A1205-1 IST-79      DFUMKA1204 D-FUMK-A1204-1 manual start of SWS pumps not modeled in UCSMB204    UCSMB204                    PSAR2 manual start of SWS pumps not modeled in UCSMB205    UCSMB205                    PSAR2 EC-11L        C517        CPSMB0918  C-PSMB-PS-0918 CHP50        ZPSMT83A  R-PSMD-PS-1803A Isolation of loss of CCW inside containment CHSMB0910    CHSMB0910                  not modeled in PSAR2 Isolation of loss of CCW inside containment CHSMB0911    CHSMB0911                  not modeled in PSAR2 DFUMKWO01A  DFUMKWO01A D-FUMK-W001-1 No credit for manual action to close MSIVs GHSMB0510A  GHSMB0510A                  in PSAR2 GKVMB0505A  GKVMB0505A M-KVMB-SV-0505A GKVMB0505B  GKVMB0505B M-KVMB-SV-0505B IST-15      AAVMA0521                  SGB no longer supplies steam to TDAFW IST-156      ZPSMA811  R-PSMA-PS1801SW1 IST-157      ZPSMA831  R-PSMA-PS1803SW1 IST-18      AKVMA0522B A-KVMB-SV-0522B IST-19      ACNMC62-2A A-REMD-62-2P8A IST-198      GKVMA0507B M-KVMB-SV-0507B IST-199      GKVMA0507A M-KVMB-SV-0507A A-CEPO-AFAS-MOD IST-20      AMLMACHA  A IST-203      GTPMT0510  B-TPMT-PT-0510 IST-30      AFSMB0727A A-FSMA-FS-0727A IST-31      AFSMB0749A A-FSMA-FS-0749A
 
Fire Area 1 - Control Room Area/        BE/IST      Orig BE    New BE            Comment Cabinet      (Fire IPEEE)            (PSAR2)
IST-314      PCBMCC-167 L-C2MC-52-167 IST-32      AREMB22P8B A-REMB-62-2P8B Isolation of CCW leaks inside containment IST-60      CAVMB0910                    not modeled in PSAR2 Isolation of CCW leaks inside containment IST-66      CAVMB0911                    not modeled in PSAR2 Isolation of CCW leaks inside containment IST-68      DFUMKS027A                  not modeled in PSAR2 SCNMBX0327  SCNMBX0327 Z-REMA-LSX-0327 SCNMBX0329  SCNMBX0329 Z-REMA-LSX-0329 SCNMBY0327  SCNMBY0327 Z-REMA-LSY-0327 SCNMBY0329  SCNMBY0329 Z-REMA-LSY-0329 SLSMA0327    SLSMA0327  Z-LSMA-LS-0327 SLSMA0329    SLSMA0329  Z-LSMA-LS-0329 SREMAX0327  SREMAX0327 Z-REMA-LSX-0327 SREMAX0329  SREMAX0329 Z-REMA-LSX-0329 SREMAY0327  SREMAY0327 Z-REMA-LSY-0327 SREMAY0329  SREMAY0329 Z-REMA-LSY-0329 ZPSMB83A1    ZPSMB83A1  R-PSMB-PS-1803A1 ZPSMB83A2    ZPSMB83A2  R-PSMB-PS-1 803A2 EC-11R        CHP46        ZPSMT81A  R-PSMT-PS-1801A CHP49        ZPSMT84A  R-PSMT-PS-1804A CREMBEX5P4  CREMBEX5P4 R-REMB-5P-4 DFUMKWO02A  DFUMKWO02A D-FUMK-W002-1 No credit for manual action to close MSIVs GHSMB0501A  GHSMB0501A                  in PSAR2 GKVMA0508    GKVMA0508  M-KVMB-SV-0508 GKVMA0514    GKVMA0514  M-KVMB-SV-0514 GKVMB0502    GKVMB0502  M-KVMB-SV-0502 GKVMB0513    GKVMB0513  M-KVMB-SV-0513 GREMB5P8    GREMB5P8  R-REMB-5P-8 IST-152      ZPSMA821  R-PSMA-PS1802SW1 IST-153      ZPSMA841  R-PSMA-PS1804SW1 IST-180      MAEMTHOGGR M-AEMT-C-4 IST-21      ACNMD1C2-6 A-REMB-62-1 P8C IST-314      PCBMCC-167 L-C2MC-52-167 IST-32      AREMB22P8B A-REMB-62-2P8B IST-335      GCNMA5P8  R-REMB-5P-8 IST-339      GCNMB5P8  R-REMB-5P-8 IST-46      AFSMB0737  A-FSMA-FS-0737
 
Fire Area 1 - Control Room Area/        BE/IST      Orig BE    New BE            Comment Cabinet      (Fire IPEEE)            (PSAR2)
IST-47      AFSMB0736  A-FSMA-FS-0736 IST-57      CAVMA0918                    Makeup to CCW not modeled PFUMKS04    PFUMKS04  P-FUMK-S04-1 PREMB5P8    PREMB5P8  R-REMB-5P-8 SCNMBX0328  SCNMBX0328 Z-REMA-LSX-0328 SCNMBX0330  SCNMBX0330 Z-REMA-LSX-0330 SCNMBY0328  SCNMBY0328 Z-REMA-LSY-0328 SCNMBY0330  SCNMBY0330 Z-REMA-LSY-0330 SLSMA0328    SLSMA0328  Z-LSMA-LS-0328 SLSMA0330    SLSMA0330  Z-LSMA-LS-0330 SREMAX0328  SREMAX0328 Z-REMA-LSX-0328 SREMAX0330  SREMAX0330 Z-REMA-LSX-0330 SREMAY0328  SREMAY0328 Z-REMA-LSY-0328 SREMAY0330  SREMAY0330 Z-REMA-LSY-0330 ZPSMB81A1    ZPSMB81A1  R-PSMB-PS-1801A1 ZPSMB81A2    ZPSMB81A2  R-PSMB-PS-1i801A2 ZPSMB84A1    ZPSMB84A1  R-PSMB-PS-1804A1 ZPSMB84A2    ZPSMB84A2  R-PSMB-PS-1804A2 EC-12L        ABIOPASCA    ABIOPASCA  A-BIPO-LS-0751A ABIOPASCC    ABIOPASCC  A-BIPO-LS-0751C ABIOPBSCA    ABIOPBSCA  A-BIPO-LS-0752A ABIOPBSCC    ABIOPBSCC  A-BIPO-LS-0752C ATLMT0751A  ATLMT0751A A-TLMT-LT-0751A ATLMT0751 C  ATLMT0751C A-TLMT-LT-0751 C ATLMT0752A  ATLMT0752A A-TLMT-LT-0752A ATLMT0752C  ATLMT0752C A-TLMT-LT-0752C DFUMKWOO1A  DFUMKWO01A D-FUMK-WO01-1 This relay must energize to cause ADVs to open (the TBV solenoids  must spuriously G113B        GCNMA386A8                  energize to open valve)
This relay must energize to cause ADVs to G322B        GCNMA386A3                  open This relay must energize to cause ADVs to G332B        GCNMA386A5                  open GEPMT0511    GEPMT0511  B-EPMT-EP-0511 GHSMB0510A  GHSMB0510A                  No credit for manual closure of MSIVs GKVMB0505A  GKVMB0505A M-KVMB-SV-0505A GKVMB0505B  GKVMB0505B M-KVMB-SV-0505B GPBMBE50A    GPBMBE50A  M-PBMB-HS-LPE50A GPCMT0511    GPCMT0511  B-PCMT-PIC-0511
 
Fire Area 1 - Control Room Area/        BE/IST      Orig BE    New BE          Comment Cabinet      (Fire IPEEE)            (PSAR2)
GREMBXE50A  GREMBXE50A  M-REMB-LPXE50A GSCMT0511    GSCMT0511  B-CEPO-PM-0511 IST-143      SREMBX161  G-REMB-42-161 IST-15      AAVMA0521                    SGB no longer supplies steam to TDAFW IST-164      PCl MCY3001 P-Cl MC-EY-30-01 IST-166      ZCEPO0751C  M-PCMT-PIC-0751C IST-166      ZCEPO0751C  M-PCMT-PIC-0751C IST-168      ZCEPO0751A  M-PCMT-PIC-0751A IST-168      ZCEPO0751A  M-PCMT-PIC-0751A IST-170      ZCEPO0752C  M-PCMT-PIC-0752C IST-170      ZCEPO0752C  M-PCMT-PIC-0752C IST-172      ZCEPO0752A  M-PCMT-PIC-0752A IST-172      ZCEPO0752A  M-PCMT-PIC-0752A IST-198      GKVMA0507B  M-KVMB-SV-0507B IST-199      GKVMA0507A  M-KVMB-SV-0507A IST-203      GTPMT0510  B-TPMT-PT-051 0 IST-203      GTPMT0510  B-TPMT-PT-051 0 IST-228      GAVMA0511  B-AVMA-CV-0511 IST-277      42-2425/CS  G-CSMB-42-287CS IST-30      AFSMB0727A  A-FSMA-FS-0727A IST-314      PCBMCC-167  L-C2MC-52-167 IST-314      PCBMCC-167  L-C2MC-52-167 IST-376      DCBMC72109  D-CBMC-72-109 IST-396      SC2MCC-161  G-C2MC-52-161 IST-396      SC2MCC-161  G-C2MC-52-161 IST-398      DFUMKB1105  D-FUMK-B1 105-1 IST-402      PC2MA1 105C G-C2MC-52-1105C IST-405      PCBMBC1 105 G-C2MB-52-1105 S42161 MAN  SCSMB161CS  G-CSMB-42-161CS1
              $55C-I      SCSMB1 105  G-CSMB-52-1105CS SPCMT102A    SPCMT102A  P-DCPO-PS-0102A SPCMT102C    SPCMT102C  P-DCPO-PS-0102C SREMAXPA1    SREMAXPA1  R-REMA-XPA1 SREMAXPA2    SREMAXPA2  R-REMA-XPA2 SREMAXPC1    SREMAXPC1  R-REMA-XPC1 SREMAXPC2    SREMAXPC2  R-REMA-XPC2 EC-12R        ABIOPASCB    ABIOPASCB  A-BIPO-LS-0751 B
 
Fire Area 1 - Control Room Area/        BE/IST      Orig BE    New BE            Comment Cabinet      (Fire IPEEE)            (PSAR2)
ABIOPASCD    ABIOPASCD  A-BIPO-LS-0751 D ABIOPBSCB    ABIOPBSCB  A-BIPO-LS-0752B ABIOPBSCD    ABIOPBSCD  A-BIPO-LS-0752D ATLMT0751 B  ATLMT0751 B A-TLMT-LT-0751 B ATLMT0751 D  ATLMT0751 D A-TLMT-LT-0751 D ATLMT0752B  ATLMT0752B  A-TLMT-LT-0752B ATLMT0752D  ATLMT0752D  A-TLMT-LT-0752D C200        CANMT0917                    Isolation of CCW leakage not modeled DFUMKWO02A  DFUMKWO02A  D-FUMK-W002-1 GEPMT0511    GEPMT0511  B-EPMT-EP-0511 No credit for manual action to close MSIVs GHSMB0501A  GHSMB0501A                    in PSAR2 GKVMA0508    GKVMA0508  M-KVMB-SV-0508 GKVMA0514    GKVMA0514  M-KVMB-SV-0514 GKVMB0502    GKVMB0502  M-KVMB-SV-0502 GKVMB0513    GKVMB0513  M-KVMB-SV-0513 GPBMBE50B    GPBMBE50B  M-PBMB-HS-LPE50B GPCMT0511    GPCMT0511  B-PCMT-PIC-0511 GREMBXE50B  GREMBXE50B  M-REMB-LPXE50B GSCMT0511    GSCMT0511  B-CEPO-PM-0511 IST-165      PCl MCY4001 P-Cl MC-EY-40-01 IST-167      ZCEPO0751B  M-PCMT-PIC-0751B IST-167      ZCEPO0751B  M-PCMT-PIC-0751B IST-169      ZCEPO0751D  M-PCMT-PIC-0751D IST-169      ZCEPO0751D  M-PCMT-PIC-0751iD IST-171      ZCEPO0752B  M-PCMT-PIC-0752B IST-171      ZCEPO0752B  M-PCMT-PIC-0752B IST-173      ZCEPO0752D  M-PCMT-PIC-0752D IST-173      ZCEPO0752D  M-PCMT-PIC-0752D IST-203      GTPMT051 0  B-TPMT-PT-0510 IST-21      ACNMD1C2-6  A-REMB-62-1 P8C IST-228      GAVMA0511  B-AVMA-CV-0511 IST-274      BCVMA2138  G-PMME-P-56A IST-277      42-2425/CS  G-CSMB-42-287CS IST-277      42-2425/CS  G-CSMB-42-287CS IST-301      DFUMKS17A  D-FUMK-S17-1 IST-314      PCBMCC-167  L-C2MC-52-167 IST-314      PCBMCC-167  L-C2MC-52-167
 
Fire Area 1 - Control Room Area/        BE/IST      Orig BE    New BE          Comment Cabinet      (Fire IPEEE)            (PSAR2)
IST-32      AREMB22P8B  A-REMB-62-2P8B IST-377      PB2MKMCC26  P-B2MK-EB-26 IST-391      DFUMKS55B  D-FUMK-S55-2 IST-395      PCBMCC1205  G-C2MC-52-1205 IST-397      SCNMA0101  G-C2MC-52-1206 IST-399      PCBMC52207  G-C2MC-52-207 IST-399      PCBMC52207  G-C2MC-52-207 IST-400      DFUMK72205  D-FUMK-B1205-1 IST-401      PCBMB1206  G-C2MB-52-1206 IST-402      PC2MA1 105C G-C2MC-52-1105C IST-404      SCNMBA0101  -              Auto start of P55B not modeled IST-46      AFSMB0737  A-FSMA-FS-0737 Alternate power source for charging pumps PC2MA1206    PC2MA1206    -              no longer modeled in PSAR2 S55A-H      SCSMB1205  G-CSMB-52-1205CS S55B-1      SCSMB1206  G-CSMB-52-1206CS SCSMB207C1  SCSMB207C1  G-CSMB-42-207CS1 SCSMB207C2  SCSMB207C2  G-CSMB-42-207CS1 SPCMT102B    SPCMT102B  P-DCPO-PS-0102B SPCMT102D    SPCMT102D  P-DCPO-PS-0102D SREMAXPB1    SREMAXPB1  R-REMA-XPB1 SREMAXPB2    SREMAXPB2  R-REMA-XPB2 SREMAXPD1    SREMAXPD1  R-REMA-XPD1 SREMAXPD2    SREMAXPD2  R-REMA-XPD2 auto start of P-56A no longer modeled in SREMBR-287  SREMBR-287    -              PSAR2 EC-13L        C517        CPSMB0918  C-PSMB-PS-0918 manual start of CCW pumps not modeled in CCSMB1094    CCSMB1094                    PSAR2 manual start of CCW pumps not modeled in CCSMB1 164  CCSMB1164                    PSAR2 CHP50        ZPSMT83A    R-PSMT-PS-1803A Isolation of loss of CCW inside containment CHSMB0910    CHSMB0910                    not modeled in PSAR2 Isolation of loss of CCW inside containment CHSMB0911    CHSMB091 1                  not modeled in PSAR2 Backfeed power to Bus 1C,D&E not DFUDK1302A  DFUDK1302A  -              modeled in PSAR2 DFUMKS13A    DFUMKS13A  D-FUMK-S13-2 DFUMKS13B    DFUMKS13B  D-FUMK-S13-1 GCNMBHPX1 L  GCNMBHPX1 L S-AVMA-CV-3002 IST-100      ICMME2C    I-CMME-C-2C
 
Fire Area 1 - Control Room Area/        BE/IST      Orig BE    New BE          Comment Cabinet      (Fire IPEEE)            (PSAR2)
IST-100      ICMME2C    I-CMME-C-2C IST-101      ICMMTC2C    I-CMME-C-2C IST-101      ICMMTC2C    I-CMME-C-2C IST-102      ICMME2A    I-CMME-C-2A IST-102      ICMME2A    I-CMME-C-2A IST-104      ICSMB1207  I-C2MB-52-1207 IST-105      ICNMBCR4    I-REMB-CR-4 IST-109      ICMMTC2A    I-CMME-C-2A IST-109      ICMMTC2A    I-CMME-C-2A IST-140      PC1 MCY3003 P-Cl MC-EY-30-03 IST-141      SCNMBSISX1  R-REMB-SIS-Xi IST-142      SCNMBSISX3  R-REMB-SIS-X3 IST-143      SREMBX161  G-REMB-42-161 IST-146      SCNMASIS5  R-REMB-SIS-5 IST-156      ZPSMA811    R-PSMA-PS1801SW1 IST-157      ZPSMA831    R-PSMA-PS1803SW1 shutdown sequencer not modeled in IST-158      PCNMB107AB                  PSAR2 shutdown sequencer not modeled in IST-158      PCNMB107AB                  PSAR2 IST-159      DFUDK1107A  D-FUMK-A1107-1 IST-160      DCBDC72136  D-CBMC-72-136 IST-160      DCBDC72136  D-CBMC-72-136 IST-174      XAVMA2008                    T81 makeup to CST no longer modeled IST-176      XAVMA201 0  A-AVMA-CV-201 0 IST-19      ACNMC62-2A  A-REMD-62-2P8A IST-19      ACNMC62-2A  A-REMD-62-2P8A IST-192      DCBMC72119  D-CBMC-72-119 A-CEPO-AFAS-MOD IST-20      AMLMACHA    A IST-273      BMVMA2169  G-MVMA-MO-2169 IST-275      SCSMB127CI  G-CSMB-42-127CS1 IST-276      SCSMB187C1  G-CSMB-42-187CS1 IST-277      42-2425/CS  G-CSMB-42-287CS IST-279      BCVMA2139  G-PMME-P-56B IST-281      BMVMA2170  G-MVMA-MO-2170 IST-283      PCBMCC-131                  ESF room cooling no longer modeled IST-285      VTSFC1850                    ESF room cooling no longer modeled IST-288      PCBMCC-133                  ESF room cooling no longer modeled IST-290      VTSFC1857                    ESF room cooling no longer modeled
 
Fire Area 1 - Control Room Area/        BE/IST      Orig BE    New BE          Comment Cabinet      (Fire IPEEE)            (PSAR2)
IST-296      PCBMCC-147  L-C2MC-52-147 IST-300      DFUMK1111A  D-FUMK-A1111-1 IST-307      PCBMCB-1 11 L-C2MB-152-111 IST-308      HPVMD3030B  Q-PVMD-PCV-3030B IST-311      SCNMBX147  L-REMB-42X-147 IST-328      PCBMCC-141  L-C2MC-52-141 IST-329      SCNMBX141  L-REMB-42X-141 IST-337      DFUMK1114A  D-FUMK-A1114-1 IST-338      DFUMK1 112A D-FUMK-A1 112-1 IST-340      PCNMC52112  S-REMB-144-112 IST-341      PCNMC52114  S-REMB-144-114 IST-346      DFUMK1113A  D-FUMK-A1 113-1 IST-351      PCBMCC-137  H-C2MC-52-1137 IST-352      PCBMCC-197  H-C2MC-52-197 IST-353      PCBMCC-157  H-C2MC-52-157 IST-354      PCBMCC-151  H-C2MC-52-151 IST-366      PCBMBC1305  F-C2MC-52-1305 IST-369      QCXMTC1305  F-C2MC-P-9ALOCAL IST-371      QCNMBPS2    F-PSMB-PS-1310 IST-378      IST-378    Z-REMB-4L1 IST-380      IST-380    Z-REMB-4L3 IST-396      SC2MCC-161  G-C2MC-52-161 IST-396      SC2MCC-161  G-C2MC-52-161 IST-398      DFUMKB1 105 D-FUMK-B1 105-1 IST-402      PC2MA1105C  G-C2MC-52-1105C IST-405      PCBMBC1105  G-C2MB-52-1105 IST-501      PCBMBB-302                  backfeed power not modeled in PSAR2.
IST-502      PCBMAB-302  P-CBMA-152-302 IST-53      CCSMD1092  C-CSMD-152-109CS IST-55      CCSMD1162  C-CSMD-152-116CS IST-57      CAVMA0918                    Makeup to CCW not modeled IST-57      CAVMA0918                    Makeup to CCW not modeled Isolation of CCW leaks inside containment IST-60      CAVMB0910                    not modeled in PSAR2 IST-63      CCVMA0944  C-CVMA-CK-CC944 Isolation of CCW leaks inside containment IST-66      CAVMB0911                    not modeled in PSAR2 Isolation of CCW leaks inside containment IST-68      DFUMKS027A                  not modeled in PSAR2 IST-69      UKVMA0801                    Compressors no longer require SW cooling
 
Fire Area 1 - Control Room Area/        BE/IST      Orig BE    New BE          Comment Cabinet      (Fire IPEEE)            (PSAR2)
IST-70      UKVMA0803                    Compressors no longer require SW cooling IST-75      DFUMKA1103  D-FUMK-A1 103-1 CV-1 359 sis test contacts not modeled in IST-82      SCNMA16-3                    PSAR2 IST-84      UCNMB44103  U-REMB-144-103 IST-98      DFUMKB1207  D-FUMK-B1207-1 IST-99      DFUMKB1 106 D-FUMK-B1106-1 IST-99      DFUMKB1106  D-FUMK-B1106-1 IST-99      DFUMKB1106  D-FUMK-B1106-1 PCBMBB-1 11  PCBMBB-1 11 L-C2MB-152-111 QCNMB5TR1C  QCNMB5TR1C  F-PSMB-PS-1310 S42161 MAN  SCSMB161CS  G-CSMB-42-161CS1 S55C-l      SCSMB1 105  G-CSMB-52-1105CS SCBA19A      SCSMB42191  G-CSMB-42-191CS blocking LPSI trip on RAS not modeled in SCNMA43111  SCNMA43 111                  PSAR2 SCNMA4L1    SCNMA4L1    Z-REMB-4L1 SCNMBSISX5  SCNMBSISX5  R-REMB-SIS-X5 SCNMBX0327  SCNMBX0327  Z-REMA-LSX-0327 SCNMBX0329  SCNMBX0329  Z-REMA-LSX-0329 SCNMBY0327  SCNMBYO327  Z-REMA-LSY-0327 SCNMBY0329  SCNMBY0329  Z-REMA-LSY-0329 blocking LPSI trip on RAS not modeled in SCSMA521 11  SCSMA52111                  PSAR2 SCSMB111    SCSMB111    L-HSMB-HS-111 SCSMB112    SCSMB1 12  S-CSMB-152-112CS SCSMB1 14    SCSMB1 14  S-CSMB-152-114CS SH117        SCSMB1571  H-CSMB-42-157CS1 SH157        SCSMB1511  H-CSMB-42-151CS1 SH25        SCSMB1371  H-CSMB-42-137CS1 SH314A      SCSMB113    H-CSMB-152-113CS SH77        SCSMB1971  H-CSMB-42-197CS1 SKVMB3030A  SKVMB3030A  Z-KVMB-SV-3030A SL54        SCSMB1411  L-HSMB-HS-141-1 SL64        SCSMB1471  L-HSMB-HS-147-1 SLSMA0327    SLSMA0327  Z-LSMA-LS-0327 SLSMA0329    SLSMA0329  Z-LSMA-LS-0329 manual initiation of sis relays not modeled SPBMB1-1    SPBMB1-1                    in PSAR2 SPMME67B    SPMME67B    L-PMME-P-67B
 
Fire Area 1 - Control Room Area/        BE/IST      Orig BE    New BE            Comment Cabinet      (Fire IPEEE)            (PSAR2)
SREMAX0327  SREMAX0327 Z-REMA-LSX-0327 SREMAX0329  SREMAX0329 Z-REMA-LSX-0329 SREMAY0327  SREMAY0327 Z-REMA-LSY-0327 SREMAY0329  SREMAY0329 Z-REMA-LSY-0329 SREMB127-O  SREMB127-O G-REMB-42-127 SREMB4L1    SREMB4L1  Z-REMB-4L1 auto start of P-56B no longer modeled in SREMBR-191  SREMBR-191                  PSAR2 SREMBSIS1    SREMBSIS1  R-REMB-SIS-1 SREMBSIS5    SREMBSIS5  R-REMB-SIS-5 SREMBSISX5  SREMBSISX5 R-REMB-SIS-X5 SREMBSISX7  SREMBSISX7 R-REMB-SIS-X7 SU28        SHSMB3030A                  Manual operation of CV-3030 not in PSAR2 manual start of SWS pumps not modeled in UCSMB103    UCSMB103                    PSAR2 UPSMB1318    UPSMB1318  U-PSMB-PS-1318 UPSMB1325    UPSMB1325  U-PSMB-PS-1325 V22          VCSMB131                    ESF room cooling no longer modeled V48          VCSMB133                    ESF room cooling no longer modeled ZCNMB3451 0  ZCNMB34510 R-CEPO-MC-34L1 05 ZCNMB3453    ZCNMB3453  R-CEPO-MC-34L1 05 ZCNMB3455    ZCNMB3455  R-CEPO-MC-34L1 06 ZCNMB3459    ZCNMB3459  R-CEPO-MC-34L1 05 ZPSMB83A1    ZPSMB83A1  R-PSMB-PS-1803A1 ZPSMB83A2    ZPSMB83A2  R-PSMB-PS-1803A2 ZSEMT34-5    ZSEMT34-5  R-CEPO-MC-34L1 05 manual start of CCW pumps not modeled in EC-13R        CCSMB2084    CCSMB2084                    PSAR2 CHP46        ZPSMT81A  R-PSMT-PS-1801A CHP49        ZPSMT84A  R-PSMT-PS-1804A Isolation of CCW to containment not CHSMB0940    CHSMB0940                    modeled in PSAR2 CREMBEX5P4  CREMBEX5P4 R-REMB-5P-4 Backfeed power to Bus 1C,D&E not DFUDK1302A  DFUDK1302A                  modeled in PSAR2 DFUMK1206A  DFUMK1206A D-FUMK-A1206-1 DFUMKS14A    DFUMKS14A  D-FUMK-S14-2 DFUMKS14B          #N/A D-FUIMK-S14-1 GREMB5P8    GREMB5P8  R-REMB-5P-8 ICNMAK24    ICNMAK24  I-CMME-C-2B ICNMBK21    ICNMBK21  I-CMME-C-2B
 
Fire Area 1 - Control Room Area/        BE/IST      Orig BE    New BE            Comment Cabinet      (Fire IPEEE)            (PSAR2)
ICNMBK22    ICNMBK22    I-CMME-C-2B IFUMKF3      IFUMKF3    I-CMME-C-2B IREMBK22    IREMBK22    I-CMME-C-2B IREMBK24    IREMBK24    I-CMME-C-2B IST-103      ICNMAK22    I-CMME-C-2C IST-104      ICSMB1207  I-C2MB-52-1207 IST-105      ICNMBCR4    I-REMB-CR-4 IST-106      ICNMCK23    I-CMME-C-2B IST-107      ICNMBK23    I-CMME-C-2B IST-137      PCi MCY2003 P-Cl MC-EY-20-03 IST-138      SCNMBSISX2  R-REMB-SIS-X2 IST-139      SCNMBSISX4  R-REMB-SIS-X4 IST-149      SCNMASIS8  R-REMB-SIS-8 IST-152      ZPSMA821    R-PSMA-PS 1802SWl IST-153      ZPSMA841    R-PSMA-PS 1804SW1 IST-161      PCNMB213AB  P-CBMB-152-213 IST-161      PCNMB213AB  P-CBMB-1 52-213 IST-162      DFUDK1213A  P-CBMB-152-213 IST-163      DCBDC72238  D-CBMC-72-236 IST-163      DCBDC72238  D-CBMC-72-236 IST-174      XAVMA2008                    T81 makeup to CST no longer modeled IST-175      PB2MKBUS91  P-B2MK-EB-91 IST-176      XAVMA201 0  A-AVMA-CV-201 0 IST-180      MAEMTHOGGR  M-AEMT-C-4 IST-21      ACNMD1C2-6  A-REMB-62-1P8C IST-21      ACNMD1C2-6  A-REMB-62-1P8C IST-274      BCVMA2138  G-PMME-P-56A IST-277      42-2425/CS  G-CSMB-42-287CS IST-278      BMVMA2140  G-MVMA-MO-2140 IST-280      SCSMB227Cl  G-CSMB-42-227CS1 IST-284      PCBMCC-211                    ESF room cooling no longer modeled IST-286      VTSFC1851                    ESF room cooling no longer modeled IST-289      PCBMCC-221                    ESF room cooling no longer modeled IST-291      VTSFC1858                    ESF room cooling no longer modeled IST-295      PCBMCC-251  L-C2MC-52-251 IST-297      PCBMCC-247  L-C2MC-52-247 IST-305      PCBMCB-206  L-C2MB-152-206 IST-306      SAVMA3029  Z-AVMA-CV-3029
 
Fire Area 1 - Control Room Area/        BE/IST      Orig BE    New BE          Comment Cabinet      (Fire IPEEE)            (PSAR2)
IST-312      SCNMBX247  L-REMB-42X-247 IST-313      SCNMBX251  L-REMB-42X-251 IST-32      AREMB22P8B  A-REMB-62-2PSB IST-335      GCNMA5P8    R-REMB-5P-8 IST-336      PCBMBB-210  S-CBMB-152-210 IST-339      GCNMB5P8    R-REMB-5P-8 IST-339      GCNMB5P8    R-REMB-5P-8 IST-349      DFUMK1207A  D-FUMK-A1207-2 IST-355      PCBMCC-261  H-C2MC-52-261 IST-356      PCBMCC-257  H-C2MC-52-257 IST-357      PCBMCC-237  H-C2MC-52-237 IST-358      PCBMCC-241  H-C2MC-52-241 IST-371      QCNMBPS2    F-PSMB-PS-1310 IST-381      IST-381    Z-REMB-4L2 IST-383      IST-383    Z-REMB-4L4 IST-395      PCBMCC1205  G-C2MC-52-1205 IST-397      SCNMA0101  G-C2MC-52-1206 IST-400      DFUMK72205  D-FUMK-B1205-1 IST-401      PCBMB1206  G-C2MB-52-1206 IST-402      PC2MA1 105C G-C2MC-52-1105C IST-501      PCBMBB-302                  backfeed power not modeled in PSAR2.
IST-502      PCBMAB-302  P-CBMA-152-302 IST-54      CCSMD2082  C-CSMD-152-208CS IST-57      CAVMA0918                    Makeup to CCW not modeled IST-57      CAVMA0918                    Makeup to CCW not modeled IST-65      CCVMA0943  C-CVMA-CK-CC943 containment CCW isolation not modeled in IST-67      CAVMB0940                    PSAR2 IST-74      PCBMCB-204  U-C2MC-152-204 IST-76      PCBMCB-205  P-CBMC-152-205 IST-77      DFUMKA1205  D-FUMK-A1205-1 IST-79      DFUMKA1204  D-FUMK-A1204-1 CV-1 359 sis test contacts not modeled in IST-82      SCNMA16-3                    PSAR2 IST-98      DFUMKB1207  D-FUMK-B1207-1 Failure of logic to unload compressor and prevent RV actuation not modeled in ISWFCS3      ISWFCS3                      PSAR2 Alternate power source for charging pumps PC2MA1206    PC2MA1206                    no longer modeled in PSAR2 PCBMBB-206  PCBMBB-206  L-C2MB-152-206
 
Fire Area 1 - Control Room Area/        BE/IST      Orig BE    New BE          Comment Cabinet      (Fire IPEEE)            (PSAR2)
PFUMKS04    PFUMKS04  P-FUMK-S04-1 PREMB5P8    PREMB5P8  R-REMB-5P-8 QCNMB5TR1C  QCNMB5TR1C F-PSMB-PS-1310 S55A-H      SCSMB1205  G-CSMB-52-1205CS S55B-I      SCSMB1206  G-CSMB-52-1206CS blocking LPSI trip on RAS not modeled in SCNMA43206  SCNMA43206                  PSAR2 SCNMA4L2    SCNMA4L2  Z-REMB-4L2 SCNMBSISX6  SCNMBSISX6 R-REMB-SIS-X6 SCNMBX0328  SCNMBX0328 Z-REMA-LSX-0328 SCNMBX0330  SCNMBX0330 Z-REMA-LSX-0330 SCNMBY0328  SCNMBY0328 Z-REMA-LSY-0328 SCNMBY0330  SCNMBY0330 Z-REMA-LSY-0330 blocking LPSI trip on RAS not modeled in SCSMA52206  SCSMA52206                  PSAR2 SCSMB206    SCSMB206  L-HSMB-HS-206 SCSMB210    SCSMB210  S-CSMB-152-210CS SH135        SCSMB2371  H-CSMB-42-237CS1 SH175        SCSMB2411  H-CSMB-42-241CS1 SH233A      SCSMB207  H-CSMB-152-207CS SH49        SCSMB2611  H-CSMB-42-261CS1 SH95        SCSMB2571  H-CSMB-42-257CS1 SKVMB3029A  SKVMB3029A Z-KVMB-SV-3029A SL74        SCSMB2471  L-REMB-42-247 SL84        SCSMB2511  L-REMB-42-251 SLSMA0328    SLSMA0328  Z-LSMA-LS-0328 SLSMA0330    SLSMA0330  Z-LSMA-LS-0330 manual initiation of sis relays not modeled SPBMB1-2    SPBMB1-2                    in PSAR2 SPMME67A    SPMME67A  L-PMME-P-67A SREMAX0328  SREMAX0328 Z-REMA-LSX-0328 SREMAX0330  SREMAX0330 Z-REMA-LSX-0330 SREMAY0328  SREMAY0328 Z-REMA-LSY-0328 SREMAY0330  SREMAY0330 Z-REMA-LSY-0330 SREMB4L2    SREMB4L2  Z-REMB-4L2 auto start of P-56A no longer modeled in SREMBR-287  SREMBR-287                  PSAR2 SREMBSIS2    SREMBSIS2  R-REMB-SIS-2 SREMBSIS6    SREMBSIS6  R-REMB-SIS-6 SREMBSIS8    SREMBSIS8  R-REMB-SIS-8
 
Fire Area 1 - Control Room Area/        BE/IST      Orig BE    New BE          Comment Cabinet      (Fire IPEEE)            (PSAR2)
SREMBSISX6  SREMBSISX6  R-REMB-SIS-X6 SREMBSISX8  SREMBSISX8  R-REMB-SIS-X8 Sull        SHSMB3029A                  Manual operation of CV-3029 not in PSAR2 manual start of SWS pumps not modeled in UCSMB204    UCSMB204                    PSAR2 manual start of SWS pumps not modeled in UCSMB205    UCSMB205                    PSAR2 V25          VCSMB211                      ESF room cooling no longer modeled V51          VCSMB221                    ESF room cooling no longer modeled X32          XCNMB9631A  A-PBMC-PB-P936 X33          XHSMB8950A  A-HSMC-HS-8950A ZCNMB34610  ZCNMB34610  R-CEPO-MC-34R106 ZCNMB3463    ZCNMB3463  R-CEPO-MC-34R105 ZCNMB3468    ZCNMB3468  R-CEPO-MC-34R106 ZPSMB81A1    ZPSMB81A1  R-PSMB-PS-1801A1 ZPSMB81A2    ZPSMB81A2  R-PSMB-PS-1801A2 ZPSMB84A1    ZPSMB84A1  R-PSMB-PS-1804A1 ZPSMB84A2    ZPSMB84A2  R-PSMB-PS-1804A2 ZSEMT34-6    ZSEMT34-6  R-CEPO-MC-34R106 EC-106        IST-190      DCBDC72104  D-CBMC-72-104 IST-259      DCBDC72201  D-CBMC-72-201 IST-519      PCNMD52402  P-CBMA-252-401 No manual actuation of 252-302 modeled PBS1 F-08    PCNMB1FCS                    in PSAR2 No manual actuation of 252-402 modeled PBS1G-08    PCNMB1GCS                    in PSAR2 No manual actuation of 252-301 modeled PCSMBA-301  PCSMBA-301                  in PSAR2 EC-126        IST-190      DCBDC72104  D-CBMC-72-104 IST-191      DCBDC72207  D-CBMC-72-207 IST-191      DCBDC72207  D-CBMC-72-207 IST-374      QCNMBP41 PS F-PSMB-PS-5350
 
Fire Area 2 - Cable Spreading Room Area/        BEUIST            Orig BE    New BE          Comment Cabinet      (Fire IPEEE)                  (PSAR2)
Exposure A197                  APSMD0762A  A-TPMT-PT-0762A fire A199              APSMD0762B  A-TPMT-PT-0762B A201              APSMD0762C  A-TPMT-PT-0762C A38              AKVMA0522G  A-KVMA-SV-0522G ABIOPASCA        ABIOPASCA  A-BIPO-LS-0751A ABIOPASCB        ABIOPASCB  A-BIPO-LS-0751B ABIOPASCC        ABIOPASCC  A-BIPO-LS-0751C ABIOPASCD        ABIOPASCD  A-BIPO-LS-0751 D ABIOPBSCA        ABIOPBSCA  A-BIPO-LS-0752A ABIOPBSCB        ABIOPBSCB  A-BIPO-LS-0752B ABIOPBSCC        ABIOPBSCC  A-BIPO-LS-0752C ABIOPBSCD        ABIOPBSCD  A-BIPO-LS-0752D AHSMB0522B        AHSMB0522B  A-HSMB-HS-0522B ATLMT0751A        ATLMT0751A  A-TLMT-LT-0751A ATLMT0751 B      ATLMT0751B  A-TLMT-LT-0751 B ATLMT0751 C      ATLMT0751C  A-TLMT-LT-0751C ATLMT0751 D      ATLMT0751 D A-TLMT-LT-0751 D ATLMT0752A        ATLMTO752A  A-TLMT-LT-0752A ATLMT0752B        ATLMT0752B  A-TLMT-LT-0752B ATLMT0752C        ATLMT0752C  A-TLMT-LT-0752C ATLMT0752D        ATLMT0752D  A-TLMT-LT-0752D C200              CAN MT0917                  Isolation of CCW leaks not modeled C517              CPSMB0918  C-PSMB-PS-0918 CCSMB1094        CCSMB1094                    Manual start of CCW pumps not modeled CCSMB1 164        CCSMB1 164                  Manual start of CCW pumps not modeled CCSMB2084        CCSMB2084                    Manual start of CCW pumps not modeled CHP46            ZPSMT81A    R-PSMT-PS-1801A CHP49            ZPSMT84A    R-PSMT-PS-1804A CHP50            ZPSMT83A    R-PSMT-PS-1803A CREMBEX5P4        CREMBEX5P4  R-REMB-5P-4 DC6              DCBMC72112  P-CBMA-152-106 DFUDK1 105A      DFUDK1105A  D-FUMK-B1 105-1 DFUDK1106A        DFUDK1106A  D-FUMK-B1 106-1 DFUDK1203A        DFUDK1203A  P-CBMA-152-203 DFUMK1206A        DFUMK1206A  D-FUMK-A1206-1 DFUMKS09          DFUMKS09    D-FUMK-S09-1 DFUMKS10          DFUMKS10    D-FUMK-S10-1 DFUMKS13A        DFUMKS13A  D-FUMK-S13-2 DFUMKS14A        DFUMKS14A  D-FUMK-S14-2 DFUMKWO01A        DFUMKWO01A  D-FUMK-WO01-1 DFUMKWO02A        DFUMKWO02A  D-FUMK-W002-1
 
Fire Area 2 - Cable Spreading Room Area/        BE/IST            Orig BE    New BE          Comment Cabinet      (Fire IPEEE)                  (PSAR2)
DFUMKWO06D        DFUMKWO06D  D-FUMK-W006-1 G113B              GCNMA386A8                  This relay must energize to cause ADVs to open (the TBV solenoids must spuriously energize to open valve)
G322B              GCNMA386A3                  This relay must energize to cause ADVs to open G332B              GCNMA386A5                  This relay must energize to cause ADVs to open GCNMBIIPX1L        GCNMBIIPX1L S-AVMA-CV-3002 GEPMT0511          GEPMT0511  B-EPMT-EP-0511 GHSMB0501A        GHSMB0501A                  No credit for manual closure of MSIVs GHSMB0510A        GHSMB0510A                  No credit for manual closure of MSIVs GKVMA0508          GKVMA0508  M-KVMB-SV-0508 GKVMA0514          GKVMA0514  M-KVMB-SV-0514 GKVMB0502          GKVMB0502  M-KVMB-SV-0502 GKVMB0505A        GKVMB0505A  M-KVMB-SV-0505A GKVMB0505B        GKVMB0505B  M-KVMB-SV-0505B GKVMB0513          GKVMB0513  M-KVMB-SV-0513 GPBMBE50A          GPBMBE50A  M-PBMB-HS-LPE50A GPBMBE50B          GPBMBE50B  M-PBMB-HS-LPE50B GPCMT0511          GPCMT0511  B-PCMT-PIC-0511 GREMB5P8          GREMB5P8    R-REMB-5P-8 GREMBXE50A        GREMBXE50A  M-REMB-LPXE50A GREMBXE50B        GREMBXE50B  M-REMB-LPXE50B GSCMT0511          GSCMT0511  B-CEPO-PM-0511 IST-1              ACNMD23P8C  A-REMD-62-3P8C IST-11            FAVMC0729                    CST makeup from hotwell not modeled IST-15            AAVMA0521                    SGB no longer supplies steam to TDAFW IST-152            ZPSMA821    R-PSMA-PS1802SW1 IST-153            ZPSMA841    R-PSMA-PS1804SW1 IST-156            ZPSMA811    R-PSMA-PS1801SWl IST-157            ZPSMA831    R-PSMA-PS1803SW1 IST-158            PCNMB107AB                  shutdown sequencer not modeled in PSAR2 IST-159            DFUDK1107A  D-FUMK-Ai 107-1 IST-160            DCBDC72136  D-CBMC-72-136 IST-161            PCNMB213AB  P-CBMB-152-213 IST-162            DFUDK1213A  P-CBMB-1 52-213 IST-163            DCBDC72238  D-CBMC-72-236 IST-164          ' PC1 MCY3001 P-Cl MC-EY-30-01 IST-165            PC1 MCY4001 P-ClMC-EY-40-01 IST-166            ZCEPO0751C  M-PCMT-PIC-0751C IST-167            ZCEPO0751B  M-PCMT-PIC-0751B IST-168            ZCEPO0751A  M-PCMT-PIC-0751A IST-169            ZCEPO0751 D M-PCMT-PIC-0751D IST-170            ZCEPO0752C  M-PCMT-PIC-0752C
 
Fire Area 2 - Cable Spreading Room Area/        BE/IST            Orig BE    New BE          Comment Cabinet      (Fire IPEEE)                  (PSAR2)
IST-171          ZCEP00752B  M-PCMT-PIC-0752B IST-172          ZCEPO0752A  M-PCMT-PIC-0752A IST-173          ZCEPO0752D  M-PCMT-PIC-0752D IST-174          XAVMA2008                    T81 makeup to CST no longer modeled IST-175          PB2MKBUS91  P-B2MK-EB-91 IST-176          XAVMA2010  A-AVMA-CV-201 0 IST-18            AKVMA0522B  A-KVMB-SV-0522B IST-180          MAEMTHOGGR  M-AEMT-C-4 IST-183          GMVMA0510  M-HSMB-0510C IST-184          GHSMB0510C  M-HSMB-0510C IST-187          GMVMA0501                    SGB no longer supplies steam to TDAFW IST-188          GHSMB0501C                  SGB no longer supplies steam to TDAFW IST-19            ACNMC62-2A  A-REMD-62-2P8A IST-190          DCBDC72104  D-CBMC-72-104 IST-191          DCBDC72207  D-CBMC-72-207 IST-198          GKVMA0507B  M-KVMB-SV-0507B IST-199          GKVMA0507A  M-KVMB-SV-0507A IST-20            AMLMACHA    A-CEPO-AFAS-MODA IST-203          GTPMT0510  B-TPMT-PT-0510 IST-21            ACNMDlC2-6  A-REMB-62-1 P8C IST-228          GAVMA0511  B-AVMA-CV-0511 IST-252          FCSMC105    M-CSMB-252-105CS IST-253          FCSMB205    M-CBMB-252-205 IST-257          DCBDC72101  D-CBMC-72-101 IST-259          DCBDC72201  D-CBMC-72-201 IST-277          42-2425/CS  G-CSMB-42-287CS IST-30            AFSMB0727A  A-FSMA-FS-0727A IST-300          DFUMK1111A  D-FUMK-A1111-1 IST-301          DFUMKS17A  D-FUMK-S17-1 IST-305          PCBMCB-206  L-C2MB-152-206 IST-306          SAVMA3029  Z-AVMA-CV-3029 IST-307          PCBMCB-111  L-C2MB-152-111 IST-308          HPVMD3030B  Q-PVMD-PCV-3030B IST-31            AFSMB0749A  A-FSMA-FS-0749A IST-314          PCBMCC-167  L-C2MC-52-167 IST-32            AREMB22P8B  A-REMB-62-2P8B IST-335          GCNMA5P8    R-REMB-5P-8 IST-336          PCBMBB-210  S-CBMB-152-210 IST-337          DFUMK1 114A D-FUMK-A1 114-1 IST-338          DFUMK1112A  D-FUMK-A1 112-1 IST-339          GCNMB5P8    R-REMB-5P-8 IST-340          PCNMC52112  S-REMB-144-112 IST-341          PCNMC52114  S-REMB-144-114
 
Fire Area 2 - Cable Spreading Room Area/        BE/IST            Orig BE    New BE          Comment Cabinet      (Fire IPEEE)                  (PSAR2)
IST-346          DFUMK1 113A D-FUMK-A1113-1 IST-347          HFLMK3037                    Flow path not modeled in PSAR2 IST-348          PB2MKMCC22  P-B2MK-EB-22 IST-349          DFUMK1207A  D-FUMK-A1207-2 IST-350          HFLMK3018                    Flow path not modeled in PSAR2 IST-362          HFLMK3071  I-FLMK-F-321 IST-363          HFLMK3070  I-FLMK-F-319 IST-366          PCBMBC1305  F-C2MC-52-1305 IST-369          QCXMTC1305  F-C2MC-P-9ALOCAL IST-371          QCNMBPS2    F-PSMB-PS-1310 IST-374          QCNMBP41 PS F-PSMB-PS-5350 IST-376          DCBMC72109  D-CBMC-72-109 IST-377          PB2MKMCC26  P-B2MK-EB-26 IST-391          DFUMKS55B  D-FUMK-S55-2 IST-396          SC2MCC-161  G-C2MC-52-161 IST-399          PCBMC52207  G-C2MC-52-207 IST-40            APSMD0741A  A-PSMD-PS-0741A IST-404          SCNMBA0101  D-FUMK-B1206-1 IST-41            APSMD07411B A-PSMD-PS-0741 B IST-42            APSMD741DD  A-PSMD-PS-0741DD IST-43            PC1MCY1014  P-C1MC-EY-10-14 IST-46            AFSMB0737  A-FSMA-FS-0737 IST-47            AFSMB0736  A-FSMA-FS-0736 IST-471          DCBDC721 11 D-CBMC-72-1 11 IST-486          PCBMBB-106  P-CBMB-152-106 IST-491          PREMB1275  P-CBMA-152-106 IST-494          PCBMBB-202  P-CBMB-152-202 IST-496          DFUDK1202A  D-FUMK-A1202-1 IST-498          PREMB1276  P-CBMA-152-202 IST-499          DCBDC72211  D-CBMC-72-211 IST-500          DFUDK1303A  D-FUMK-A1303-1 IST-502          PCBMAB-302  P-CBMA-152-302 IST-519          PCNMD52402  P-CBMA-252-401 IST-53            CCSMD1092  C-CSMD-152-109CS IST-54            CCSMD2082  C-CSMD-152-208CS IST-55            CCSMD1162  C-CSMD-152-116CS IST-57            CAVMA0918                    Makeup to CCW not modeled IST-6            ACNMDSX741  A-REMD-PSX-0741 IST-63            CCVMA0944  C-CVMA-CK-CC944 IST-65            CCVMA0943  C-CVMA-CK-CC943 IST-75            DFUMKA1103  D-FUMK-A1 103-1 IST-82            SCNMA16-3                    CV-1359 sis test contacts not modeled in PSAR2
 
Fire Area 2 - Cable Spreading Room Area/        BE/IST            Orig BE    New BE            Comment Cabinet      (Fire IPEEE)                  (PSAR2)
IST-84            UCNMB44103  U-REMB-144-103 PBS1F-08          PCNMB1FCS                    No manual actuation of 252-302 modeled in PSAR2 PBS1G-08          PCNMB1GCS                    No manual actuation of 252-402 modeled in PSAR2 PCBMAB-105        PCBMAB-105  P-CBMA-152-105 PCBMAB-106        PCBMAB-106 P-CBMA-152-106 PCBMAB-203        PCBMAB-203 P-CBMA-152-203 PCBMBB-1 11      PCBMBB-111  L-C2MB-152-111 PCBMBB-206        PCBMBB-206  L-C2MB-152-206 PCSMBA-301        PCSMBA-301                    Closure of CB-252-302 not modeled PFUMKS04          PFUMKS04  P-FUMK-S04-1 PREMB38311        PREMB38311 P-REMB-383-11 PREMB38312        PREMB38312 P-REMB-383-12 PREMB38323        PREMB38323 P-REMB-383-23 PREMB5P8          PREMB5P8  R-REMB-5P-8 PREMB8612          PREMB8612                    Circuitry for 152-202 failing to trip not modeled in PSAR2 PREMB8612X        PREMB8612X                  Circuitry for 152-202 failing to trip not modeled in PSAR2 QCNMB5TR1C        QCNMB5TR1C  F-PSMB-PS-1310 SCNMA431 11        SCNMA43111                  blocking LPSI trip on RAS not modeled in PSAR2 SCNMA43206        SCNMA43206                  blocking LPSI trip on RAS not modeled in PSAR2 SCNMBX0327        SCNMBX0327 Z-REMA-LSX-0327 SCNMBX0328        SCNMBX0328  Z-REMA-LSX-0328 SCNMBX0329        SCNMBX0329  Z-REMA-LSX-0329 SCNMBX0330        SCNMBX0330  Z-REMA-LSX-0330 SCNMBY0327        SCNMBY0327  Z-REMA-LSY-0327 SCNMBY0328        SCNMBY0328  Z-REMA-LSY-0328 SCNMBY0329        SCNMBY0329  Z-REMA-LSY-0329 SCNMBY0330        SCNMBY0330  Z-REMA-LSY-0330 SCSMA521 11      SCSMA521 11                  blocking LPSI trip on RAS not modeled in PSAR2 SCSMA52206        SCSMA52206                    blocking LPSI trip on RAS not modeled in PSAR2 SCSMB111          SCSMB111    L-HSMB-HS-1 11 SCSMB112          SCSMB112    S-CSMB-152-112CS SCSMB114          SCSMB114    S-CSMB-152-114CS SCSMB206          SCSMB206    L-HSMB-HS-206 SCSMB210          SCSMB210    S-CSMB-152-210CS SH194            SHSMB3037A                    Flow path not modeled in PSAR2 SH207            SHSMB3018A                    Flow path not modeled in PSAR2 SH233A            SCSMB207    H-CSMB-152-207CS SH314A            SCSMB113    H-CSMB-1 52-113CS
 
Fire Area 2 - Cable Spreading Room Area/        BE/IST            Orig BE    New BE          Comment Cabinet      (Fire IPEEE)                (PSAR2)
SHSMB3018A        SHSMB3018A                  Flow path not modeled in PSAR2 SHSMB3018B        SHSMB3018B                  Flow path not modeled in PSAR2 SHSMB3059A        SHSMB3059A                  Failure to close failure mode not modeled in PSAR2 SHSMB3059B        SHSMB3059B                  Failure to close failure mode not modeled in PSAR2 SKVMA3018        SKVMA3018                  Flow path not modeled in PSAR2 SKVMB3029A        SKVMB3029A Z-KVM B-SV-3029A SKVMB3030A        SKVMB3030A Z-KVMB-SV-3030A SKVMB3059        SKVMB3059                  Failure to close failure mode not modeled in PSAR2 SLSMA0327        SLSMA0327  Z-LSMA-LS-0327 SLSMA0328        SLSMA0328  Z-LSMA-LS-0328 SLSMA0329        SLSMA0329  Z-LSMA-LS-0329 SLSMA0330        SLSMA0330  Z-LSMA-LS-0330 SPCMT102A        SPCMT102A  P-DCPO-PS-0102A SPCMT102B        SPCMT102B  P-DCPO-PS-0102B SPCMT102C        SPCMT102C  P-DCPO-PS-0102C SPCMT102D        SPCMT102D  P-DCPO-PS-0102D SPMME67A          SPMME67A  L-PMME-P-67A SPMME67B          SPMME67B  L-PMME-P-67B SREMAX0327        SREMAX0327 Z-REMA-LSX-0327 SREMAX0328        SREMAX0328 Z-REMA-LSX-0328 SREMAX0329        SREMAX0329 Z-REMA-LSX-0329 SREMAX0330        SREMAX0330 Z-REMA-LSX-0330 SREMAY0327        SREMAY0327 Z-REMA-LSY-0327 SREMAY0328        SREMAY0328 Z-REMA-LSY-0328 SREMAY0329        SREMAY0329 Z-REMA-LSY-0329 SREMAY0330        SREMAY0330 Z-REMA-LSY-0330 SUll              SHSMB3029A                  Manual operation of CV-3029 not in PSAR2 SU28              SHSMB3030A                  Manual operation of CV-3030 not in PSAR2 UCSMB103          UCSMB103                    manual start of SWS pumps not modeled in PSAR2 UPSMB1318        UPSMB1318  U-PSMB-PS-1318 UPSMB1325        UPSMB1325  U-PSMB-PS-1325 X32              XCNMB9631A A-PBMC-PB-P936 X33              XHSMB8950A A-HSMC-HS-8950A ZPSMB81A1        ZPSMB81A1  R-PSMB-PS-1801A1 ZPSMB81A2        ZPSMB81A2  R-PSMB-PS-1801A2 ZPSMB83A1        ZPSMB83A1  R-PSMB-PS-1803A1 ZPSMB83A2        ZPSMB83A2  R-PSMB-PS-1803A2 ZPSMB84A1        ZPSMB84A1  R-PSMB-PS-1804A1 ZPSMB84A2        ZPSMB84A2  R-PSMB-PS-1804A2 EB-01        IST-143          SREMBX161  G-REMB-42-161 IST-273          BMVMA2169  G-MVMA-MO-2169
 
Fire Area 2 - Cable Spreading Room Area/        BE/IST            Orig BE    New BE              Comment Cabinet      (Fire IPEEE)                (PSAR2)
IST-275          SCSMB127CI G-CSMB-42-127CS1 IST-276          SCSMB187C1 G-CSMB-42-187CS1 IST-279          BCVMA2139  G-PMME-P-56B IST-281          BMVMA2170  G-MVMA-MO-2170 IST-283          PCBMCC-131 ESF room cooling no longer modeled IST-285          VTSFC1850  ESF room cooling no longer modeled IST-288          PCBMCC-133 ESF room cooling no longer modeled IST-290          VTSFC1857  ESF room cooling no longer modeled IST-296          PCBMCC-147 L-C2MC-52-1147 IST-311          SCNMBX147  L-REMB-42X-147 IST-314          PCBMCC-167 L-C2MC-52-167 IST-328          PCBMCC-141 L-C2MC-52-141 IST-329          SCNMBX141  L-REMB-42X-141 IST-351          PCBMCC-137 H-C2MC-52-137 IST-352          PCBMCC-197 H-C2MC-52-197 IST-353          PCBMCC-157 H-C2MC-52-157 IST-354          PCBMCC-151 H-C2MC-52-151 IST-376          DCBMC72109 D-CBMC-72-109 IST-396          SC2MCC-161 G-C2MC-52-161 IST-470          DBCMTCHG4  D-BCMT-ED-18 IST-477          PCBMCC-145 P-ClMC-52-145 IST-483          EDGME1 1  E-DGME-K-6A IST-509          EKVMA1470  E-KVMB-SV-1470 PB2MKMCC1        PB2MKMCC1  P-B2MK-EB-01 S42161MAN        SCSMB161CS G-CSMB-42-161CS1 SCBA19A          SCSMB42191 G-CSMB-42-191CS SH117            SCSMB1571  H-CSMB-42-157CS1 SH157            SCSMB1511  H-CSMB-42-151CS1 SH25              SCSMB1371  H-CSMB-42-137CS1 SH77              SCSMB1971  H-CSMB-42-197CS1 SL54              SCSMB1411  L-HSMB-HS-141-1 SL64              SCSMB1471  L-HSMB-HS-147-1 SREMB127-O        SREMB127-O G-REMB-42-127 SREMBR-191        SREMBR-191                    auto start of P-56B no longer modeled in PSAR2 V22              VCSMB131                      ESF room cooling no longer modeled V48              VCSMB133                      ESF room cooling no longer modeled EY-01        IST-190          DCBDC72104 D-CBMC-72-104 IST-191          DCBDC72207 D-CBMC-72-207 IST-301          DFUMKS17A  D-FUMK-S17-1 IST-318          SHCMT3025A L-HCMT-HIC-3025A
 
Fire Area 2 - Cable Spreading Ro)om Area/        BE/IST            Orig BE    New BE          Comment Cabinet      (Fire IPEEE)                  (PSAR2)
IST-476            PClMBY0141 -                Bypass re.gulator not modeled in PSAR2 IST-477            PCBMCC-145 P-ClMC-52-145 IST-478            PCBMCC-236 P-ClMC-52-236 PB3MKY01          PB3MKY01  P-PAMK-EY-01 PREFAC-LCO        PREFAC-LCO -                normal ali gnment of power from bypass regulator nnot modeled in PSAR2 SHSMB3025B        SHSMB3025B L-HSMB-HS-3025B EY-10        IST-474            DCBMC72016 P-ClMC-72-16 IST-475            PClMBIV1  P-ClMC-CB-INV1 PPAMKY10          PPAMKY10  P-PAMK-EY-10 PREFAC-LCO        PREFAC-LCO                  normal alignment of power from bypass regulator not modeled in PSAR2 EY-20        IST-44            DCBMC72026 P-Cl MC-72-26 PREFAC-LCO        PREFAC-LCO                  normal alignment of power from bypass regulator not modeled in PSAR2 EY-30        IST-144            DCBMC72011 P-ClMC-72-11 PFUMK3006          PFUMK3006  P-FUMK-Y3006-1 PREFAC-LCO        PREFAC-LCO                  normal alignment of power from bypass regulator not modeled in PSAR2 EY-40        DFUDKD21          DFUDKD21  D-FUMK-D21-1 DFUMKD21          DFUMKD21  D-FUMK-D21-2 IST-135            DCBMC72021 P-Cl MC-72-21 PREFAC-LCO        PREFAC-LCO                  normal alignment of power from bypass regulator not modeled in PSAR2 EY-50        IST-476            PClMBY0141                  Bypass regulator not modeled in PSAR2 IST-478            PCBMCC-236 P-ClMC-52-236 EB-02        IST-274            BCVMA2138  G-PMME-P-56A IST-277            42-2425/CS G-CSMB-42-287CS IST-278            BMVMA2140  G-MVMA-MO-2140 IST-280            SCSMB227C1 G-CSMB-42-227CS1 IST-284            PCBMCC-211                  ESF  room  cooling no longer modeled IST-286            VTSFC1851                  ESF  room  cooling no longer modeled IST-289            PCBMCC-221                  ESF  room  cooling no longer modeled IST-291            VTSFC1858                  ESF  room  cooling no longer modeled IST-295            PCBMCC-251 L-C2MC-52-251 IST-297            PCBMCC-247 L-C2MC-52-247 IST-312            SCNMBX247  L-REMB-42X-247 IST-313            SCNMBX251  L-REMB-42X-251 IST-314            PCBMCC-167 L-C2MC-52-167 IST-355            PCBMCC-261 H-C2MC-52-261 IST-356            PCBMCC-257 H-C2MC-52-257 IST-357            PCBMCC-237 H-C2MC-52-237 IST-358            PCBMCC-241 H-C2MC-52-241 IST-392            PCBMCC5221 H-REMT-30721C IST-399            PCBMC52207 G-C2MC-52-207
 
Fire Area 2 - Cable Spreading Room Area/        BE/IST            Orig BE    New BE            Comment Cabinet      (Fire IPEEE)                  (PSAR2)
IST-469          DBCMTCHG2  D-BCMT-ED-16 IST-478          PCBMCC-236  P-ClMC-52-236 IST-492          EDGME12    E-DGME-K-6B IST-510          EKVMA1471  E-KVMB-SV-1471 PB2MKMCC2        PB2MKMCC2  P-B2MK-EB-02 SCSMB207C1        SCSMB207Cl  G-CSMB-42-207CS1 SCSMB207C2        SCSMB207C2  G-CSMB-42-207CS1 SH135            SCSMB2371  H-CSMB-42-237CS1 SH175            SCSMB2411  H-CSMB-42-241CS 1 SH49              SCSMB2611  H-CSMB-42-261CS1 SH95              SCSMB2571  H-CSMB-42-257CS 1 SL74              SCSMB2471  L-REMB-42-247 SL84              SCSMB2511  L-REMB-42-251 SREMBR-287        SREMBR-287                    auto start of P-56A no longer modeled in PSAR2 V25              VCSMB211                      ESF room cooling no longer modeled V51              VCSMB221                      ESF room cooling no longer modeled EB-11        IST-100          ICMME2C    I-CMME-C-2C IST-101          ICMMTC2C    I-CMME-C-2C IST-102          ICMME2A    I-CMME-C-2A IST-104          ICSMB1207  I-C2MB-52-1207 IST-105          ICNMBCR4    I-REMB-CR-4 IST-109          ICMMTC2A    I-CMME-C-2A IST-160          DCBDC72136  D-CBMC-72-136 IST-192          DCBMC72119  D-CBMC-72-119 IST-398          DFUMKB1105  D-FUMK-B1 105-1 IST-402          PC2MA1 105C G-C2MC-52-1105C IST-405          PCBMBC1 105 G-C2MB-52-1105 IST-490          DCBDC72308  D-CBMC-72-308 IST-69            UKVMA0801                    Compressors no longer require SW cooling IST-70            UKVMA0803                    Compressors no longer require SW cooling IST-98            DFUMKB1207  D-FUMK-B1207-1 IST-99            DFUMKB1106  D-FUMK-B1106-1 PB2MKBUS1 1      PB2MKBUS11  P-B2MK-EB-1 1 PCBMBC1 103      PCBMBC1 103 P-CBMB-52-1103 PREMB1271        PREMB1271  P-REMA-127-1 PREMB271X1        PREMB271X1  P-REMB-127-1-X1 PREMB271X2        PREMB271X2  P-REMB-127-1-X2 PT2MT11          PT2MT11    P-T2MT-EX- 11
              $55C-I            SCSMB1105  G-CSMB-52-1105CS EB-12        ICNMAK24          ICNMAK24    I-CMME-C-2B ICNMBK21          ICNMBK21    I-CMME-C-2B ICNMBK22          ICNMBK22    I-CMME-C-2B IFUMKF3          IFUMKF3    I-CMME-C-2B
 
Fire Area 2 - Cable Spreading Room Area/        BE/IST            Orig BE    New BE          Comment Cabinet      (Fire IPEEE)                  (PSAR2)
IREMBK22          IREMBK22    I-CMME-C-2B IREMBK24          IREMBK24    I-CMME-C-2B IST-100          ICMME2C    I-CMME-C-2C IST-101          ICMMTC2C    I-CMME-C-2C IST-102          ICMME2A    I-CMME-C-2A IST-103          ICNMAK22    I-CMME-C-2C IST-104          ICSMB1207  I-C2MB-52-1207 IST-105          ICNMBCR4    I-REMB-CR-4 IST-106          ICNMCK23    I-CMME-C-2B IST-107          ICNMBK23    I-CMME-C-2B IST-109          ICMMTC2A    I-CMME-C-2A IST-163          DCBDC72238  D-CBMC-72-236 IST-192          DCBMC72119  D-CBMC-72-119 IST-395          PCBMCC1205  G-C2MC-52-1205 IST-397          SCNMA0101  G-C2MC-52-1206 IST-400          DFUMK72205  D-FUMK-B1205-1 IST-401          PCBMB1206  G-C2MB-52-1206 IST-402          PC2MA1 105C G-C2MC-52-1105C IST-497          DCBDC72403  D-CBMC-72-403 IST-69            UKVMA0801                    Compressors no longer require SW cooling IST-70            UKVMA0803                    Compressors no longer require SW cooling IST-98            DFUMKB1207  D-FUMK-B1207-1 IST-99            DFUMKB1106  D-FUMK-B1 106-1 ISWFCS3          ISWFCS3                      Failure of logic to unload compressor and prevent RV actuation not modeled in PSAR2 PB2MKBUS12        PB2MKBUS12  P-B2MK-EB-12 PC2MA1 206        PC2MA1206                    Alternate power source for charging pumps no longer modeled in PSAR2 PCBMBC1201        PCBMBC1201  P-C2MB-52-1201 PREMB1272        PREMB1272  P-REMA-127-1 PREMB272X1        PREMB272X1  P-REMB-127-2-X1 PREMB272X2        PREMB272X2  P-REMB-127-2-X2 PT2MT12          PT2MT12    P-T2MT-EX-12 S55A-H            SCSMB1205  G-CSMB-52-1205CS
              $55B-I            SCSMB1206  G-CSMB-52-1206CS EB-21        IST-345          PB2MKMCC23  P-B2MK-EB-23 IST-503          PCBMCC21 11                  Battery room ventillation not needed in PSAR2 PB2MKMCC21        PB2MKMCC21  P-B2MK-EB-21 EB-23        IST-310          SMVMA3190  L-MVMA-MO-3190 IST-331          PBSMTMCC23  P-B2MK-EB-23 IST-345          PB2MKMCC23  P-B2MK-EB-23 SSD40            SLMMB23395  L-REMB-42-2339 SSD41            SQSMB2339  L-REMB-42-2339
 
Fire Area 2 - Cable Spreading Room Area/        BE/IST            Orig BE    New BE        Comment Cabinet      (Fire IPEEE)                (PSAR2)
EB-24        293AUTO          VTSFC1822  E-TSFC-TS-1822 861AUTO          VTSFC1820  E-TSFC-TS-1820 IST-309          SMVMA3199  L-MVMA-MO-3199 IST-330          PBSMTMCC24 P-B2MK-EB-24 IST-348          PB2MKMCC22 P-B2MK-EB-22 IST-492          EDGME12    E-DGME-K-6B IST-504          PCBMCC2411                Battery room ventillation not needed in PSAR2 IST-507          VCNMB2931                Manual start of EDG fans not modeled in PSAR2 IST-508          VCNMB8611                Manual start of EDG fans not modeled in PSAR2 PB2MKMCC24        PB2MKMCC24 P-B2MK-EB-24 SSD30            SLMMB24395 L-REMB-42-2439 SSD31            SQSMB2439  L-REMB-42-2439 ED-06        IST-474          DCBMC72016 P-Cl MC-72-16 IST-475          PCi MBIV1  P-C1MC-CB-INV1 ED-07        IST-44            DCBMC72026 P-Cl MC-72-26 ED-08        IST-144          DCBMC72011 P-ClMC-72-11 ED-09        IST-135          DCBMC72021 P-ClMC-72-21 ED-10        DCB7218MOD        DCBMC72018 D-CBMC-72-18 DFUDKD11          DFUDKD11  D-FUMK-D1 1-1 DFUDKD11A        DFUDKD11A  D-FUMK-DO18-1 DFUMKD11          DFUMKD1 1  D-FUMK-D11-1 DFUMKD11A        DFUMKD11A  D-FUMK-DO18-1 IST-144          DCBMC72011 P-ClMC-72-11 IST-160          DCBDC72136 D-CBMC-72-136 IST-472          DBCMTCHG1  D-BCMT-ED-15 IST-473          DBCMTCHG3  D-BCMT-ED-17 IST-474          DCBMC72016 P-ClMC-72-16 IST-475          PCi MBIV1  P-ClMC-CB-INV1 ED-15        IST-472          DBCMTCHG1  D-BCMT-ED-15 ED-16        IST-469          DBCMTCHG2  D-BCMT-ED-16 ED-17        IST-473          DBCMTCHG3  D-BCMT-ED-17 ED-18        IST-470          DBCMTCHG4  D-BCMT-ED-18 ED-20        DCB7228MOD        DCBMC72028 D-CBMC-72-28 DFUDKD21          DFUDKD21  D-FUMK-D21-1 DFUMKD21          DFUMKD21  D-FUMK-D21-2 IST-135          DCBMC72021 P-Cl MC-72-21 IST-163          DCBDC72238 D-CBMC-72-236 IST-44            DCBMC72026 P-Cl MC-72-26 IST-470          DBCMTCHG4  D-BCMT-ED-18 EJ-14A        IST-74            PCBMCB-204 U-C2MC-152-204 IST-76            PCBMCB-205 P-CBMC-152-205
 
Fire Area 2 - Cable Spreading Room Area/        BE/IST            Orig BE    New BE          Comment Cabinet      (Fire IPEEE)                  (PSAR2)
IST-77            DFUMKA1205  D-FUMK-A1205-1 IST-79            DFUMKA1204  D-FUMK-A1204-1 UCSMB204          UCSMB204                    manual start of SWS pumps not modeled in PSAR2 UCSMB205          UCSMB205                    manual start of SWS pumps not modeled in PSAR2 EJ-542        CHSMB0940        CHSMB0940                    Isolation of CCW to containment not modeled in PSAR2 DFUDK1302A        DFUDK1302A                  backfeed power not modeled in PSAR2.
IST-137          PCiMCY2003  P-Cl MC-EY-20-03 IST-138          SCNMBSISX2  R-REMB-SIS-X2 IST-139          SCNMBSISX4  R-REMB-SIS-X4 IST-149          SCNMASIS8  R-REMB-SIS-8 IST-161          PCNMB213AB  P-CBMB-152-213 IST-163          DCBDC72238  D-CBMC-72-236 IST-21            ACNMDlC2-6  A-REMB-62-1P8C IST-500          DFUDK1303A  D-FUMK-A1303-1 IST-501          PCBMBB-302                  backfeed power not modeled in PSAR2.
IST-502          PCBMAB-302  P-CBMA-152-302 IST-67            CAVMB0940                    containment CCW isolation not modeled in PSAR2 P252B            PCNMB303CS                  Manual trip of CB-152-302 not modeled in PSAR2 SCNMBSISX6        SCNMBSISX6  R-REMB-SIS-X6 SPBMB1-2          SPBMB1-2                    manual initiation of sis relays not modeled in PSAR2 SREMBSIS2        SREMBSIS2  R-REMB-SIS-2 SREMBSIS6        SREMBSIS6  R-REMB-SIS-6 SREMBSIS8        SREMBSIS8  R-REMB-SIS-8 SREMBSISX6        SREMBSISX6  R-REMB-SIS-X6 SREMBSISX8        SREMBSISX8  R-REMB-SIS-X8 ZCNMB34610        ZCNMB34610  R-CEPO-MC-34R106 ZCNMB3463        ZCNMB3463  R-CEPO-MC-34R105 ZCNMB3468        ZCNMB3468  R-CEPO-MC-34R106 ZSEMT34-6        ZSEMT34-6  R-CEPO-MC-34R106 EJ-543        CHSMB0910        CHSMB0910                    Isolation of loss of CCW inside containment not modeled in PSAR2 CHSMB0911        CHSMB0911                    Isolation of loss of CCW inside containment not modeled in PSAR2 DFUDK1302A        DFUDK1302A                  backfeed power not modeled in PSAR2.
IST-140          PC1 MCY3003 P-ClMC-EY-30-03 IST-141          SCNMBSISX1  R-REMB-SIS-X1 IST-142          SCNMBSISX3  R-REMB-SIS-X3 IST-146          SCNMASIS5  R-REMB-SIS-5 IST-158          PCNMB107AB                  shutdown sequencer not modeled in PSAR2 IST-160          DCBDC72136  D-CBMC-72-136 IST-19            ACNMC62-2A  A-REMD-62-2P8A
 
Fire Area 2 - Cable Spreading Room Area/        BE/IST            Orig BE    New BE            Comment Cabinet      (Fire IPEEE)                (PSAR2)
IST-500          DFUDK1303A D-FUMK-A1303-1 IST-501          PCBMBB-302                  backfeed power not modeled in PSAR2.
IST-502          PCBMAB-302 P-CBMA-152-302 IST-60            CAVMB0910                    Isolation of CCW leaks inside containment not modeled in PSAR2 IST-66            CAVMB0911                    Isolation of CCW leaks inside containment not modeled in PSAR2 IST-68            DFUMKS027A                  Isolation of CCW leaks inside containment not modeled in PSAR2 P252B            PCNMB303CS                  Manual trip of CB-152-302 not modeled in PSAR2 SCNMBSISX5        SCNMBSISX5 R-REMB-SIS-X5 SPBMB1-1          SPBMB1-1                    manual initiation of sis relays not modeled in PSAR2 SREMBSIS1        SREMBSIS1  R-REMB-SIS-1 SREMBSIS5        SREMBSIS5  R-REMB-SIS-5 SREMBSISX5        SREMBSISX5 R-REMB-SIS-X5 SREMBSISX7        SREMBSISX7 R-REMB-SIS-X7 ZCNMB34510        ZCNMB34510 R-CEPO-MC-34L1 05 ZCNMB3453        ZCNMB3453  R-CEPO-MC-34L105 ZCNMB3455        ZCNMB3455  R-CEPO-MC-34L1 06 ZCNMB3459        ZCNMB3459  R-CEPO-MC-34L1 05 ZSEMT34-5        ZSEMT34-5  R-CEPO-MC-34L105 EJ-575        DCB7218MOD        DCBMC72018 D-CBMC-72-18 DFUDKD11A        DFUDKD11A  D-FUMK-DO18-1 DFUMKD11A        DFUMKD1 1A D-FUMK-DO18-1 EJ-576        DCB7228MOD        DCBMC72028 D-CBMC-72-28
 
Fire Area 3 - Bus 1D Switchgear Area/        BE/IST            Orig BE    New BE            Comment Cabinet      (Fire IPEEE)                  (PSAR2)
Exposure      C200              CANMT0917                    Isolation of CCW leaks not modeled fire C517              CPSMB0918  C-PSMB-PS-0918 CHP49            ZPSMT84A    R-PSMT-PS-1804A CHP50            ZPSMT83A    R-PSMT-PS-1803A CHSMB0910        CHSMB0910                    Isolation of loss of CCW inside containment not modeled in PSAR2 CHSMB0911        CHSMB0911                    Isolation of loss of CCW inside containment not modeled in PSAR2 CHSMB0940        CHSMB0940                    Isolation of CCW to containment not modeled in PSAR2 IST-152          ZPSMA821    R-PSMA-PS 1802SW1 IST-153          ZPSMA841    R-PSMA-PS1804SW1 IST-156          ZPSMA811    R-PSMA-PS1801SWI IST-157          ZPSMA831    R-PSMA-PS1803SW1 IST-180          MAEMTHOGGR  M-AEMT-C-4 IST-295          PCBMCC-251  L-C2MC-52-251 IST-297          PCBMCC-247  L-C2MC-52-247 IST-301          DFUMKS17A  D-FUMK-S17-1 IST-312          SCNMBX247  L-REMB-42X-247 IST-313          SCNMBX251  L-REMB-42X-251 IST-314          PCBMCC-167  L-C2MC-52-167 IST-348          PB2MKMCC22  P-B2MK-EB-22 IST-355          PCBMCC-261  H-C2MC-52-261 IST-356          PCBMCC-257  H-C2MC-52-257 IST-357          PCBMCC-237  H-C2MC-52-237 IST-358          PCBMCC-241  H-C2MC-52-241 IST-376          DCBMC72109  D-CBMC-72-109 IST-377          PB2MKMCC26  P-B2MK-EB-26 IST-391          DFUMKS55B  D-FUMK-S55-2 IST-397          SCNMA0101  G-C2MC-52-1206 IST-399          PCBMC52207  G-C2MC-52-207 IST-401          PCBMB1206  G-C2MB-52-1206 IST-402          PC2MA1 105C G-C2MC-52-1105C IST-57            CAVMA0918                    Makeup to CCW not modeled IST-60            CAVMB0910                    Isolation of CCW leaks inside containment not modeled in PSAR2 IST-66            CAVMB0911                    Isolation of CCW leaks inside containment not modeled in PSAR2 IST-67            CAVMB0940                    Isolation of CCW to containment not modeled in PSAR2 IST-68            DFUMKS027A                    Isolation of CCW to containment not modeled in PSAR2 PC2MA1206        PC2MA1206                    Alternate power source for charging pumps no longer modeled in PSAR2
 
Fire Area 3 - Bus 1D Switchgear Areal        BE/IST            Orig BE    New BE          Comment Cabinet      (Fire IPEEE)                  (PSAR2)
S55B-I            SCSMB1206  G-CSMB-52-1206CS SCNMBX0327        SCNMBX0327  Z-REMA-LSX-0327 SCNMBX0328        SCNMBX0328  Z-REMA-LSX-0328 SCNMBX0329        SCNMBX0329  Z-REMA-LSX-0329 SCNMBX0330        SCNMBX0330  Z-REMA-LSX-0330 SCNMBY0327        SCNMBY0327  Z-REMA-LSY-0327 SCNMBY0328        SCNMBY0328  Z-REMA-LSY-0328 SCNMBY0329        SCNMBY0329  Z-REMA-LSY-0329 SCNMBY0330        SCNMBY0330  Z-REMA-LSY-0330 SH135            SCSMB2371  H-CSMB-42-237CS1 SH175            SCSMB2411  H-CSMB-42-241CS1 SH49              SCSMB2611  H-CSMB-42-261CS1 SH95              SCSMB2571  H-CSMB-42-257CS1 SL74              SCSMB2471  L-REMB-42-247 SL84              SCSMB2511  L-REMB-42-251 SLSMA0327        SLSMA0327  Z-LSMA-LS-0327 SLSMA0328        SLSMA0328  Z-LSMA-LS-0328 SLSMA0329        SLSMA0329  Z-LSMA-LS-0329 SLSMA0330        SLSMA0330  Z-LSMA-LS-0330 SPCMT102B        SPCMT102B  P-DCPO-PS-0102B SPCMT102D        SPCMT102D  P-DCPO-PS-0102D SREMAX0327        SREMAX0327  Z-REMA-LSX-0327 SREMAX0328        SREMAX0328  Z-REMA-LSX-0328 SREMAX0329        SREMAX0329  Z-REMA-LSX-0329 SREMAX0330        SREMAX0330  Z-REMA-LSX-0330 SREMAY0327        SREMAY0327  Z-REMA-LSY-0327 SREMAY0328        SREMAY0328  Z-REMA-LSY-0328 SREMAY0329        SREMAY0329  Z-REMA-LSY-0329 SREMAY0330        SREMAY0330  Z-REMA-LSY-0330 ZPSMB83A1        ZPSMB83A1  R-PSMB-PS-1803A1 ZPSMB83A2        ZPSMB83A2  R-PSMB-PS-1803A2 ZPSMB84A1        ZPSMB84A1  R-PSMB-PS-1804A1 ZPSMB84A2        ZPSMB84A2  R-PSMB-PS-1804A2 EA-12        CCSMB2084        CCSMB2084                    manual start of CCW pumps not modeled in PSAR2 DFUDK1203A        DFUDK1203A  P-CBMA-152-203 DFUMK1206A        DFUMK1206A  D-FUMK-A1206-1 IST-1            ACNMD23P8C  A-REMD-62-3P8C IST-137          PCl MCY2003 P-ClMC-EY-20-03 IST-138          SCNMBSISX2  R-REMB-SIS-X2 IST-139          SCNMBSISX4  R-REMB-SIS-X4 IST-149          SCNMASIS8  R-REMB-SIS-8 IST-161          PCNMB213AB  P-CBMB-152-213
 
Fire Area 3 - Bus 1 D Switchgear Area/        BE/IST            Orig BE    New BE          Comment Cabinet      (Fire IPEEE)                  (PSAR2)
IST-162            DFUDK1213A P-CBMB-1 52-213 IST-163            DCBDC72238 D-CBMC-72-236 IST-21            ACNMD1C2-6 A-REMB-62-1 P8C IST-259            DCBDC72201 D-CBMC-72-201 IST-305            PCBMCB-206 L-C2MB-152-206 IST-32            AREMB22P8B A-REMB-62-2P8B IST-336            PCBMBB-210 S-CBMB-152-210 IST-339            GCNMB5P8  R-REMB-5P-8 IST-349            DFUMK1207A D-FUMK-A1207-2 IST-492            EDGME12    E-DGME-K-6B IST-494            PCBMBB-202 P-CBMB-152-202 IST-496            DFUDK1202A D-FUMK-A1202-1 IST-497            DCBDC72403 D-CBMC-72-403 IST-498            PREMB1276  P-CBMA-152-202 IST-499            DCBDC72211 D-CBMC-72-211 IST-502            PCBMAB-302 P-CBMA-152-302 IST-510            EKVMA1471  E-KVMB-SV-1471 IST-54            CCSMD2082  C-CSMD-152-208CS IST-65            CCVMA0943  C-CVMA-CK-CC943 IST-74            PCBMCB-204 U-C2MC-152-204 IST-76            PCBMCB-205 P-CBMC-152-205 IST-77            DFUMKA1205 D-FUMK-A1205-1 IST-79            DFUMKA1204 D-FUMK-A1204-1 PB1MKBUS1D        PB1MKBUS1D P-BlMK-EA-12 PCBMAB-203        PCBMAB-203 P-CBMA-152-203 PCBMBB-206        PCBMBB-206 L-C2MB-152-206 PREMB1272          PREMB1272  P-REMA-127-1 PREMB272X1        PREMB272X1 P-REMB-127-2-X1 PREMB272X2        PREMB272X2 P-REMB-127-2-X2 PREMB38312        PREMB38312 P-REMB-383-12 PREMB38323        PREMB38323 P-REMB-383-23 SCNMA43206        SCNMA43206                  blocking LPSI trip on RAS not modeled in PSAR2 SCNMBSISX6        SCNMBSISX6 R-REMB-SIS-X6 SCSMA52206        SCSMA52206                  blocking LPSI trip on RAS not modeled in PSAR2 SCSMB206          SCSMB206  L-HSMB-HS-206 SCSMB210          SCSMB210  S-CSMB-152-210CS SH233A            SCSMB207  H-CSMB-152-207CS SPBMB1-2          SPBMB1-2                    manual initiation of sis relays not modeled in PSAR2 SPMME67A          SPMME67A  L-PMME-P-67A SREMBSIS2          SREMBSIS2  R-REMB-SIS-2 SREMBSIS6          SREMBSIS6  R-REMB-SIS-6
 
Fire Area 3 - Bus 1D Switchgear Area/        BE/IST            Orig BE    New BE            Comment Cabinet      (Fire IPEEE)                  (PSAR2)
SREMBSIS8        SREMBSIS8  R-REMB-SIS-8 SREMBSISX6        SREMBSISX6  R-REMB-SIS-X6 SREMBSISX8        SREMBSISX8  R-REMB-SIS-X8 UCSMB204          UCSMB204                      manual start of SWS pumps not modeled in PSAR2 UCSMB205          UCSMB205                      manual start of SWS pumps not modeled in PSAR2 ZCNMB34610        ZCNMB34610  R-CEPO-MC-34R106 ZCNMB3463        ZCNMB3463  R-CEPO-MC-34R105 ZCNMB3468        ZCNMB3468  R-CEPO-MC-34R10 ZSEMT34-6        ZSEMT34-6  R-CEPO-MC-34R106 EB-22        IST-348          PB2MKMCC22  P-B2MK-EB-22 EC-181        DFUMKW002A        DFUMKWO02A  D-FUMK-W002-1 GHSMB0501A        GHSMB0501A                    No credit for manual closure of MSIVs GKVMA0508        GKVMA0508  M-KVMB-SV-0508 GKVMA0514        GKVMA0514  M-KVMB-SV-0514 GKVMB0502        GKVMB0502  M-KVMB-SV-0502 GKVMB0513        GKVMB0513  M-KVMB-SV-0513 EC-187        ABIOPASCA        ABIOPASCA  A-BIPO-LS-0751A ABIOPASCB        ABIOPASCB  A-BIPO-LS-0751 B ABIOPASCC        ABIOPASCC  A-BIPO-LS-0751C ABIOPASCD        ABIOPASCD  A-BIPO-LS-0751D ABIOPBSCA        ABIOPBSCA  A-BIPO-LS-0752A ABIOPBSCB        ABIOPBSCB  A-BIPO-LS-0752B ABIOPBSCC        ABIOPBSCC  A-BIPO-LS-0752C ABIOPBSCD        ABIOPBSCD  A-BIPO-LS-0752D ATLMT0751A        ATLMT0751A  A-TLMT-LT-0751A ATLMT0751 B      ATLMT0751B  A-TLMT-LT-0751 B ATLMT0751 C      ATLMT0751C  A-TLMT-LT-0751 C ATLMT0751 D      ATLMT0751D  A-TLMT-LT-0751 D ATLMT0752A        ATLMT0752A  A-TLMT-LT-0752A ATLMT0752B        ATLMT0752B  A-TLMT-LT-0752B ATLMT0752C        ATLMT0752C  A-TLMT-LT-0752C ATLMT0752D        ATLMT0752D  A-TLMT-LT-0752D IST-166          ZCEPO0751 C M-PCMT-PIC-0751C IST-167          ZCEPO0751 B M-PCMT-PIC-0751B IST-168          ZCEPO0751A  M-PCMT-PIC-0751A IST-169          ZCEPO0751 D M-PCMT-PIC-0751 D IST-170          ZCEPO0752C  M-PCMT-PIC-0752C IST-171          ZCEPO0752B  M-PCMT-PIC-0752B IST-172          ZCEPO0752A  M-PCMT-PIC-0752A IST-173          ZCEPO0752D  M-PCMT-PIC-0752D IST-18            AKVMA0522B  A-KVMB-SV-0522B
 
Fire Area 3 - Bus 1D Switchgear Area/        BE/IST            Orig BE    New BE            Comment Cabinet      (Fire IPEEE)                  (PSAR2)
IST-19            ACNMC62-2A  A-REMD-62-2P8A IST-20            AMLMACHA    A-CEPO-AFAS-MODA IST-21            ACNMD1C2-6  A-REMB-62-1P8C IST-32            AREMB22P8B  A-REMB-62-2P8B EJ-1005      A38              AKVMA0522G  A-KVMA-SV-0522G AHSMB0522B        AHSMB0522B  A-HSMB-HS-0522B DFUMKW001A        DFUMKWOIA  D-FUMK-WOOi-1 DFUMKWO06D        DFUMKWO06D  D-FUMK-W006-1 GHSMB0510A        GHSMB0510A                    No credit for manual closure of MSIVs GKVMB0505A        GKVMB0505A  M-KVMB-SV-0505A GKVMB0505B        GKVMB0505B  M-KVMB-SV-0505B IST-15            AAVMA0521                    SGB no longer supplies steam to TDAFW IST-18            AKVMA0522B  A-KVMB-SV-0522B IST-19            ACNMC62-2A  A-REMD-62-2P8A IST-198          GKVMA0507B  M-KVMB-SV-0507B IST-199          GKVMA0507A  M-KVMB-SV-0507A IST-20            AMLMACHA    A-CEPO-AFAS-MODA IST-203          GTPMT051 0  B-TPMT-PT-0510 IST-21            ACNMD1C2-6  A-REMB-62-1 P8C IST-32            AREMB22P8B  A-REMB-62-2P8B IST-6            ACNMDSX741  A-REMD-PSX-0741 EJ-1006      IST-1            ACNMD23P8C  A-REMD-62-3P8C IST-18            AKVMA0522B  A-KVMB-SV-0522B IST-21            ACNMD1C2-6  A-REMB-62-1P8C IST-32            AREMB22P8B  A-REMB-62-2P8B EJ-1051      IST-19            ACNMC62-2A  A-REMD-62-2P8A IST-20            AMLMACHA    A-CEPO-AFAS-MODA IST-30            AFSMB0727A  A-FSMA-FS-0727A IST-31            AFSMB0749A  A-FSMA-FS-0749A IST-40            APSMD0741A  A-PSMD-PS-0741A IST-41            APSMD0741 B A-PSMD-PS-0741 B IST-42            APSMD741 DD A-PSMD-PS-0741 DD IST-43            PClMCY1014  P-C1MC-EY-10-14 EJ-1052      Ai97              APSMD0762A  A-TPMT-PT-0762A A199              APSMD0762B  A-TPMT-PT-0762B A201              APSMD0762C  A-TPMT-PT-0762C IST-1            ACNMD23P8C  A-REMD-62-3P8C IST-32            AREMB22P8B  A-REMB-62-2P8B IST-46            AFSMB0737  A-FSMA-FS-0737 IST-47            AFSMB0736  A-FSMA-FS-0736 EJ-9401      DFUDK1203A        DFUDK1203A  P-CBMA-152-203 IST-137          PCi MCY2003 P-ClMC-EY-20-03 IST-138          SCNMBSISX2  R-REMB-SIS-X2
 
Fire Area 3 - Bus 1D Switchgear Area/        BE/IST            Orig BE    New BE          Comment Cabinet      (Fire IPEEE)                (PSAR2)
IST-139          SCNMBSISX4 R-REMB-SIS-X4 IST-149          SCNMASIS8  R-REMB-SIS-8 IST-161          PCNMB213AB P-CBMB-152-213 IST-162          DFUDK1213A P-CBMB-152-213 IST-163          DCBDC72238 D-CBMC-72-236 IST-21            ACNMD1C2-6 A-REMB-62-1 P8C IST-494          PCBMBB-202 P-CBMB-152-202 IST-496          DFUDK1202A D-FUMK-A1202-1 IST-497          DCBDC72403 D-CBMC-72-403 PCBMAB-203        PCBMAB-203 P-CBMA-152-203 PREMB1272        PREMB1272  P-REMA-127-1 PREMB272X1        PREMB272X1 P-REMB-127-2-X1 PREMB272X2        PREMB272X2 P-REMB-127-2-X2 SCNMBSISX6        SCNMBSISX6 R-REMB-SIS-X6 SPBMB1-2          SPBMB1-2                    manual initiation of sis relays not modeled in PSAR2 SREMBSIS2        SREMBSIS2  R-REMB-SIS-2 SREMBSIS6        SREMBSIS6  R-REMB-SIS-6 SREMBSIS8        SREMBSIS8  R-REMB-SIS-8 SREMBSISX6        SREMBSISX6 R-REMB-SIS-X6 SREMBSISX8        SREMBSISX8 R-REMB-SIS-X8 ZCNMB34610        ZCNMB34610 R-CEPO-MC-34R106 ZCNMB3463        ZCNMB3463  R-CEPO-MC-34R105 ZCNMB3468        ZCNMB3468  R-CEPO-MC-34R106 ZSEMT34-6        ZSEMT34-6  R-CEPO-MC-34R106
 
Fire Area 4 - Bus IC Switchgear Area/        BE/IST            Orig BE    New BE          Comment Cabinet      (Fire IPEEE)                  (PSAR2)
Exposure      A197              APSMD0762A  A-TPMT-PT-0762A fire Al 99            APSMD0762B  A-TPMT-PT-0762B A201              APSMD0762C  A-TPMT-PT-0762C A38              AKVMA0522G  A-KVMA-SV-0522G ABIOPASCA        ABIOPASCA  A-BIPO-LS-0751A ABIOPASCB        ABIOPASCB  A-BIPO-LS-0751B ABIOPASCC        ABIOPASCC  A-BIPO-LS-0751C ABIOPBSCA        ABIOPBSCA  A-BIPO-LS-0752A ABIOPBSCB        ABIOPBSCB  A-BIPO-LS-0752B ABIOPBSCC        ABIOPBSCC  A-BIPO-LS-0752C AHSMB0522B        AHSMB0522B  A-HSMB-HS-0522B ATLMT0751A        ATLMT0751A  A-TLMT-LT-0751A ATLMT0751 B      ATLMT0751 B A-TLMT-LT-0751 B ATLMT0751C        ATLMT0751C  A-TLMT-LT-0751C ATLMT0752A        ATLMT0752A  A-TLMT-LT-0752A ATLMT0752B        ATLMT0752B  A-TLMT-LT-0752B ATLMT0752C        ATLMTO752C  A-TLMT-LT-0752C C200              CANMT0917                    Isolation of CCW leaks not modeled C517              CPSMB0918  C-PSMB-PS-0918 CCSMB2084        CCSMB2084                    manual start of CCW pumps not modeled in PSAR2 CHP46            ZPSMT81A    R-PSMT-PS-1801A CHP49            ZPSMT84A    R-PSMT-PS-1804A CHP50            ZPSMT83A    R-PSMT-PS-1803A CHSMB0910        CHSMB0910                    Isolation of loss of CCW inside containment not modeled in PSAR2 CHSMB0911        CHSMB0911                    Isolation of loss of CCW inside containment not modeled in PSAR2 CHSMB0940        CHSMB0940                    Isolation of CCW to containment not modeled in PSAR2 CREMBEX5P4        CREMBEX5P4  R-REMB-5P-4 DC6              DCBMC72112  P-CBMA-152-106 DFUDK1302A        DFUDK1302A                  backfeed power not modeled in PSAR2.
DFUMK1206A        DFUMK1206A  D-FUMK-A1206-1 DFUMKS09          DFUMKS09    D-FUMK-S09-1 DFUMKS10          DFUMKS10    D-FUMK-S10-1 DFUMKS13A        DFUMKS13A  D-FUMK-S13-2 DFUMKS14A        DFUMKS14A  D-FUMK-S14-2 DFUMKWO01A        DFUMKW001A  D-FUMK-W001-1 DFUMKW002A        DFUMKW002A  D-FUMK-W002-1 DFUMKW006D        DFUMKW006D  D-FUMK-W006-1 G113B            GCNMA386A8                  This relay must energize to cause ADVs to open (the TBV solenoids must spuriously
 
Fire Area 4 - Bus 1C Switchgear Area/        BE/IST            Orig BE    New BE          Comment Cabinet      (Fire IPEEE)                  (PSAR2) energize to open valve)
G322B            GCNMA386A3                  This relay must energize to cause ADVs to open G332B            GCNMA386A5                  This relay must energize to cause ADVs to open GCNMBHPX1 L      GCNMBHPX1L  S-AVMA-CV-3002 GEPMT0511        GEPMT0511  B-EPMT-EP-0511 GHSMB0501A        GHSMB0501A                  No credit for manual closure of MSIVs GHSMB0510A        GHSMB0510A                  No credit for manual closure of MSIVs GKVMA0508        GKVMA0508  M-KVMB-SV-0508 GKVMA0514        GKVMA0514  M-KVMB-SV-0514 GKVMB0502        GKVMB0502  M-KVMB-SV-0502 GKVMB0505A        GKVMB0505A  M-KVMB-SV-0505A GKVMB0505B        GKVMB0505B  M-KVMB-SV-0505B GKVMB0513        GKVMB0513  M-KVMB-SV-0513 GPCMT0511        GPCMT0511  B-PCMT-PIC-0511 GREMB5P8          GREMB5P8    R-REMB-5P-8 GSCMT0511        GSCMT0511  B-CEPO-PM-0511 ICNMAK24          ICNMAK24    I-CMME-C-2B ICNMBK21          ICNMBK21    i-CMME-C-2B ICNMBK22          ICNMBK22    I-CMME-C-2B IFUMKF3          IFUMKF3    I-CMME-C-2B IREMBK22          IREMBK22    I-CMME-C-2B IREMBK24          IREMBK24    I-CMME-C-2B IST-1            ACNMD23P8C  A-REMD-62-3P8C IST-100          ICMME2C    I-CMME-C-2C IST-100          ICMME2C    I-CMME-C-2C IST-101          ICMMTC2C    I-CMME-C-2C IST-101          ICMMTC2C    I-CMME-C-2C IST-102          ICMME2A    I-CMME-C-2A IST-102          ICMME2A    I-CMME-C-2A IST-103          ICNMAK22    I-CMME-C-2C IST-104          ICSMB1207  I-C2MB-52-1207 IST-104          ICSMB1207  I-C2MB-52-1207 IST-105          ICNMBCR4    I-REMB-CR-4 IST-105          ICNMBCR4    I-REMB-CR-4 IST-106          ICNMCK23    I-CMME-C-2B IST-107          ICNMBK23    I-CMME-C-2B IST-109          ICMMTC2A    I-CMME-C-2A IST-109          ICMMTC2A    I-CMME-C-2A IST-11            FAVMC0729                    Hotwell reject to CST not credited in PSAR2 IST-137          PCi MCY2003 P-Cl MC-EY-20-03 IST-138          SCNMBSISX2  R-REMB-SIS-X2 IST-139          SCNMBSISX4  R-REMB-SIS-X4
 
Fire Area 4 - Bus 1C Switchgear Area/        BE/IST            Orig BE    New BE            Comment Cabinet      (Fire IPEEE)                  (PSAR2)
IST-143          SREMBX161  G-REMB-42-161 IST-149          SCNMASIS8  R-REMB-SIS-8 IST-15            AAVMA0521                    SGB no longer supplies steam to TDAFW IST-15            AAVMA0521                    SGB no longer supplies steam to TDAFW IST-152          ZPSMA821    R-PSMA-PS1802SW1 IST-153          ZPSMA841    R-PSMA-PS1804SW1 IST-156          ZPSMA811    R-PSMA-PS1801SW1 IST-157          ZPSMA831    R-PSMA-PS1803SW1 IST-161          PCNMB213AB  P-CBMB-152-213 IST-163          DCBDC72238  D-CBMC-72-236 IST-166          ZCEPO0751C  M-PCMT-PIC-0751C IST-167          ZCEPO0751 B M-PCMT-PIC-0751 B IST-168          ZCEPO0751A  M-PCMT-PIC-0751A IST-170          ZCEPO0752C  M-PCMT-PIC-0752C IST-171          ZCEPO0752B  M-PCMT-PIC-0752B IST-172          ZCEPO0752A  M-PCMT-PIC-0752A IST-174          XAVMA2008                    T81 makeup to CST no longer modeled IST-176          XAVMA201 0  A-AVMA-CV-2010 IST-18            AKVMA0522B  A-KVMB-SV-0522B IST-18            AKVMA0522B  A-KVMB-SV-0522B IST-180          MAEMTHOGGR  M-AEMT-C-4 IST-183          GMVMA0510  M-HSMB-0510C IST-184          GHSMB0510C  M-HSMB-0510C IST-187          GMVMA0501                    SGB no longer supplies steam to TDAFW IST-188          GHSMB0501C                    SGB no longer supplies steam to TDAFW IST-190          DCBDC72104  D-CBMC-72-104 IST-191          DCBDC72207  D-CBMC-72-207 IST-191          DCBDC72207  D-CBMC-72-207 IST-191          DCBDC72207  D-CBMC-72-207 IST-192          DCBMC72119  D-CBMC-72-119 IST-198          GKVMA0507B  M-KVMB-SV-0507B IST-199          GKVMAO507A  M-KVMB-SV-0507A IST-203          GTPMT051 0  B-TPMT-PT-0510 IST-203          GTPMT051 0  B-TPMT-PT-0510 IST-21            ACNMD1C2-6  A-REMB-62-1 P8C IST-228          GAVMA0511  B-AVMA-CV-0511 IST-252          FCSMC105    M-CSMB-252-105CS IST-253          FCSMB205    M-CBMB-252-205 IST-257          DCBDC72101  D-CBMC-72-101 IST-257          DCBDC72101  D-CBMC-72-101 IST-259          DCBDC72201  D-CBMC-72-201 IST-259          DCBDC72201  D-CBMC-72-201 IST-259          DCBDC72201  D-CBMC-72-201
 
Fire Area 4 - Bus 1C Switchgear Area/        BE/IST            Orig BE    New BE          Comment Cabinet      (Fire IPEEE)                (PSAR2)
IST-273          BMVMA2169  G-MVMA-MO-2169 IST-274          BCVMA2138  G-PMME-P-56A IST-275          SCSMB127C1 G-CSMB-42-127CS1 IST-276          SCSMB187C1 G-CSMB-42-187CS1 IST-277          42-2425/CS G-CSMB-42-287CS IST-277          42-2425/CS G-CSMB-42-287CS IST-277          42-2425/CS G-CSMB-42-287CS IST-278          BMVMA2140  G-MVMA-MO-2140 IST-279          BCVMA2139  G-PMME-P-56B IST-280          SCSMB227C1 G-CSMB-42-227CS1 IST-281          BMVMA2170  G-MVMA-MO-2170 IST-283          PCBMCC-131                  ESF room cooling no longer modeled IST-284          PCBMCC-211                  ESF room cooling no longer modeled IST-285          VTSFC1850                  ESF room cooling no longer modeled IST-286          VTSFC1851                  ESF room cooling no longer modeled IST-288          PCBMCC-133                  ESF room cooling no longer modeled IST-289          PCBMCC-221                  ESF room cooling no longer modeled IST-290          VTSFC1857                  ESF room cooling no longer modeled IST-291          VTSFC1858                  ESF room cooling no longer modeled IST-295          PCBMCC-251 L-C2MC-52-251 IST-296          PCBMCC-147 L-C2MC-52-147 IST-297          PCBMCC-247 L-C2MC-52-247 IST-30            AFSMB0727A A-FSMA-FS-0727A IST-301          DFUMKS17A  D-FUMK-S17-1 IST-301          DFUMKS17A  D-FUMK-S17-1 IST-305          PCBMCB-206 L-C2MB-152-206 IST-306          SAVMA3029  Z-AVMA-CV-3029 IST-308          HPVMD3030B Q-PVMD-PCV-3030B IST-309          SMVMA3199  L-MVMA-MO-3199 IST-31            AFSMB0749A A-FSMA-FS-0749A IST-310          SMVMA3190  L-MVMA-MO-3190 IST-311          SCNMBX147  L-REMB-42X-147 IST-312          SCNMBX247  L-REMB-42X-247 IST-313          SCNMBX251  L-REMB-42X-251 IST-314          PCBMCC-167 L-C2MC-52-167 IST-314          PCBMCC-167 L-C2MC-52-167 IST-318          SHCMT3025A L-HCMT-HIC-3025A IST-32            AREMB22P8B A-REMB-62-2P8B IST-328          PCBMCC-141 L-C2MC-52-141 IST-329          SCNMBX141  L-REMB-42X-141 IST-330          PBSMTMCC24 P-B2MK-EB-24 IST-331          PBSMTMCC23 P-B2MK-EB-23
 
Fire Area 4 - Bus 1C Switchgear Area/        BE/IST            Orig BE    New BE          Comment Cabinet      (Fire IPEEE)                  (PSAR2)
IST-335          GCNMA5P8    R-REMB-5P-8 IST-339          GCNMB5P8    R-REMB-5P-8 IST-345          PB2MKMCC23  P-B2MK-EB-23 IST-345          PB2MKMCC23  P-B2MK-EB-23 IST-347          HFLMK3037                    Flow path not modeled in PSAR2 IST-348          PB2MKMCC22  P-B2MK-EB-22 IST-348          PB2MKMCC22  P-B2MK-EB-22 IST-350          HFLMK3018                    Flow path not modeled in PSAR2 IST-351          PCBMCC-137  H-C2MC-52-137 IST-352          PCBMCC-197  H-C2MC-52-197 IST-353          PCBMCC-1 57 H-C2MC-52-157 IST-354          PCBMCC-151  H-C2MC-52-151 IST-355          PCBMCC-261  H-C2MC-52-261 IST-356          PCBMCC-257  H-C2MC-52-257 IST-357          PCBMCC-237  H-C2MC-52-237 IST-358          PCBMCC-241  H-C2MC-52-241 IST-362          HFLMK3071  I-FLMK-F-321 IST-363          HFLMK3070  I-FLMK-F-319 IST-366          PCBMBC1305  F-C2MC-52-1305 IST-369          QCXMTC1305  F-C2MC-P-9ALOCAL IST-371          QCNMBPS2    F-PSMB-PS-1310 IST-374          QCNMBP41 PS F-PSMB-PS-5350 IST-376          DCBMC72109  D-CBMC-72-109 IST-376          DCBMC72109  D-CBMC-72-109 IST-391          DFUMKS55B  D-FUMK-S55-2 IST-392          PCBMCC5221  H-REMT-30721C IST-395          PCBMCC1205  G-C2MC-52-1205 IST-396          SC2MCC-161  G-C2MC-52-161 IST-396          SC2MCC-161  G-C2MC-52-161 IST-397          SCNMA0101  G-C2MC-52-1206 IST-398          DFUMKB1105  D-FUMK-B1 105-1 IST-399          PCBMC52207  G-C2MC-52-207 IST-399          PCBMC52207  G-C2MC-52-207 IST-399          PCBMC52207  G-C2MC-52-207 IST-400          DFUMK72205  D-FUMK-B1205-1 IST-401          PCBMB1206  G-C2MB-52-1206 IST-402          PC2MA1 105C G-C2MC-52-1105C IST-402          PC2MA1 105C G-C2MC-52-1105C IST-404          SCNMBA0101  D-FUMK-B1206-1 IST-405          PCBMBC1105  G-C2MB-52-1105 IST-46            AFSMB0737  A-FSMA-FS-0737 IST-47            AFSMB0736  A-FSMA-FS-0736
 
Fire Area 4 - Bus 1C Switchgear Area/        BE/IST            Orig BE    New BE            Comment Cabinet      (Fire IPEEE)                  (PSAR2)
IST-500          DFUDK1303A  D-FUMK-A1303-1 IST-501          PCBMBB-302                    backfeed power not modeled in PSAR2.
IST-502          PCBMAB-302  P-CBMA-152-302 IST-519          PCNMD52402  P-CBMA-252-401 IST-54            CCSMD2082  C-CSMD-1 52-208CS IST-57            CAVMA0918                    Makeup to CCW not modeled IST-57            CAVMA0918                    Makeup to CCW not modeled IST-57            CAVMA0918                    Makeup to CCW not modeled IST-57            CAVMA0918                    Makeup to CCW not modeled IST-60            CAVMB0910                    Isolation of CCW leaks inside containment not modeled in PSAR2 IST-65            CCVMA0943  C-CVMA-CK-CC943 IST-66            CAVMB0911                    Isolation of CCW leaks inside containment not modeled in PSAR2 IST-67            CAVMB0940                    containment CCW isolation not modeled in PSAR2 IST-68            DFUMKS027A                    Isolation of CCW leaks inside containment not modeled in PSAR2 IST-69            UKVMA0801                    Compressors no longer require SW cooling IST-70            UKVMA0803                    Compressors no longer require SW cooling IST-76            PCBMCB-205  P-CBMC-152-205 IST-77            DFUMKA1205  D-FUMK-A1205-1 IST-82            SCNMA16-3                    CV-1359 sis test contacts not modeled in PSAR2 IST-82            SCNMA16-3                    CV-1 359 sis test contacts not modeled in PSAR2 IST-98            DFUMKB1207  D-FUMK-B1207-1 IST-98            DFUMKB1207  D-FUMK-B1207-1 IST-99            DFUMKB1106  D-FUMK-B1106-1 IST-99            DFUMKB1 106 D-FUMK-B 1106-1 IST-99            DFUMKB 1106 D-FUMK-B1 106-1 ISWFCS3          ISWFCS3                      Failure of logic to unload compressor and prevent RV actuation not modeled in PSAR2 P252B            PCNMB303CS                    Manual trip of CB-152-302 not modeled in PSAR2 PBS1G-08          PCNMB1GCS                    No manual actuation of 252-302 modeled in PSAR2 PC2MA1206        PC2MA1206                    Alternate power source for charging pumps no longer modeled in PSAR2 PCBMBB-206        PCBMBB-206  L-C2MB-152-206 PCBMBC1 103      PCBMBC1103  P-CBMB-52-1103 PCBMBC1201        PCBMBC1201  P-C2MB-52-1201 PFUMKS04          PFUMKS04    P-FUMK-S04-1 PREMB5P8          PREMB5P8    R-REMB-5P-8 PREMB8612        PREMB8612                    Circuitry for 152-202 failing to trip not modeled    in PSAR2 PREMB8612X        PREMB8612X                    Circuitry for 152-106 failing to trip not modeled    in PSAR2 QCNMB5TR1C        QCNMB5TR1C  F-PSMB-PS-1310
 
Fire Area 4 - Bus lC Switchgear Area/        BE/IST            Orig BE    New BE            Comment Cabinet      (Fire IPEEE)                (PSAR2)
S42161 MAN        SCSMB161CS G-CSMB-42-161CS1 S55A-H            SCSMB1205  G-CSMB-52-1205CS S55B-I            SCSMB1206  G-CSMB-52-1206CS S55C-l            SCSMBI105  G-CSMB-52-1105CS SCBA19A          SCSMB42191 G-CSMB-42-191CS SCNMA43206        SCNMA43206                  blocking LPSI trip on RAS not modeled in PSAR2 SCNMBSISX6        SCNMBSISX6 R-REMB-SIS-X6 SCNMBX0327        SCNMBX0327 Z-REMA-LSX-0327 SCNMBX0328        SCNMBX0328 Z-REMA-LSX-0328 SCNMBX0329        SCNMBX0329 Z-REMA-LSX-0329 SCNMBX0330        SCNMBX0330 Z-REMA-LSX-0330 SCNMBY0327        SCNMBY0327 Z-REMA-LSY-0327 SCNMBY0328        SCNMBY0328 Z-REMA-LSY-0328 SCNMBY0329        SCNMBY0329 Z-REMA-LSY-0329 SCNMBY0330        SCNMBY0330 Z-REMA-LSY-0330 SCSMA52206        SCSMA52206                  blocking LPSI trip on RAS not modeled in PSAR2 SCSMB206          SCSMB206  L-HSMB-HS-206 SCSMB207C1        SCSMB207C1 G-CSMB-42-207CS1 SCSMB207C2        SCSMB207C2 G-CSMB-42-207CS1 SH117            SCSMB1571  H-CSMB-42-157CS1 SH135            SCSMB2371  H-CSMB-42-237CS1 SH157            SCSMB1511  H-CSMB-42-151CS1 SH175            SCSMB2411  H-CSMB-42-241CS1 SH194            SHSMB3037A                  Flow path not modeled in PSAR2 SH207            SHSMB3018A                  Flow path not modeled in PSAR2 SH25              SCSMB1371  H-CSMB-42-137CS1 SH49              SCSMB2611  H-CSMB-42-261CS1 SH77              SCSMB1971  H-CSMB-42-197CS1 SH95              SCSMB2571  H-CSMB-42-257CS 1 SHSMB3018A        SHSMB3018A                  Flow path not modeled in PSAR2 SHSMB3018B        SHSMB3018B                  Flow path not modeled in PSAR2 SHSMB3025B        SHSMB3025B L-HSMB-HS-3025B SHSMB3059A        SHSMB3059A                  Failure to close failure mode not modeled in PSAR2 SHSMB3059B        SHSMB3059B                  Failure to close failure mode not modeled in PSAR2 SKVMA3018        SKVMA3018                    Flow path not modeled in PSAR2 SKVMB3029A        SKVMB3029A Z-KVMB-SV-3029A SKVMB3030A        SKVMB3030A Z-KVMB-SV-3030A SKVMB3059        SKVMB3059                    Failure to close failure mode not modeled in PSAR2 SL54              SCSMB1411  L-HSMB-HS-141-1 SL64              SCSMB1471  L-HSMB-HS-147-1
 
Fire Area 4 - Bus 1C Switchgear Area/        BE/IST            Orig BE    New BE          Comment Cabinet      (Fire IPEEE)                (PSAR2)
SL74              SCSMB2471  L-REMB-42-247 SL84              SCSMB2511  L-REMB-42-251 SLSMA0327        SLSMA0327  Z-LSMA-LS-0327 SLSMAO328        SLSMA0328  Z-LSMA-LS-0328 SLSMAO329        SLSMA0329  Z-LSMA-LS-0329 SLSMA0330        SLSMA0330  Z-LSMA-LS-0330 SPBMB1-2          SPBMB1-2                    manual initiation of sis relays not modeled in PSAR2 SPCMT102A        SPCMT102A  P-DCPO-PS-0102A SPCMT102C        SPCMT102C  P-DCPO-PS-0102C SPMME67A          SPMME67A  L-PMME-P-67A SREMAX0327        SREMAX0327 Z-REMA-LSX-0327 SREMAX0328        SREMAX0328 Z-REMA-LSX-0328 SREMAX0329        SREMAX0329 Z-REMA-LSX-0329 SREMAX0330        SREMAX0330 Z-REMA-LSX-0330 SREMAY0327        SREMAY0327 Z-REMA-LSY-0327 SREMAY0328        SREMAY0328 Z-REMA-LSY-0328 SREMAY0329        SREMAY0329 Z-REMA-LSY-0329 SREMAY0330        SREMAY0330 Z-REMA-LSY-0330 SREMB127-0        SREMB127-0 G-REMB-42-127 SREMBR-191        SREMBR-191                  auto start of P-56B no longer modeled in PSAR2 SREMBR-287        SREMBR-287                  auto start of P-56A no longer modeled in PSAR2 SREMBSIS2        SREMBSIS2  R-REMB-SIS-2 SREMBSIS6        SREMBSIS6  R-REMB-SIS-6 SREMBSIS8        SREMBSIS8  R-REMB-SIS-8 SREMBSISX6        SREMBSISX6 R-REMB-SIS-X6 SREMBSISX8        SREMBSISX8 R-REMB-SIS-X8 SSD30            SLMMB24395 L-REMB-42-2439 SSD31            SQSMB2439  L-REMB-42-2439 SSD40            SLMMB23395 L-REMB-42-2339 SSD41            SQSMB2339  L-REMB-42-2339 SU11              SHSMB3029A                  Manual operation of CV-3029 not in PSAR2 SU28              SHSMB3030A                  Manual operation of CV-3029 not in PSAR2 UCSMB205          UCSMB205                    manual start of SWS pumps not modeled in PSAR2 V22              VCSMB131                    ESF room cooling no longer modeled V25              VCSMB211                    ESF room cooling no longer modeled V48              VCSMB133                    ESF room cooling no longer modeled V51              VCSMB221                    ESF room cooling no longer modeled ZCNMB34610        ZCNMB34610 R-CEPO-MC-34R106 ZCNMB3463        ZCNMB3463  R-CEPO-MC-34R105 ZCNMB3468        ZCNMB3468  R-CEPO-MC-34R106 ZPSMB81A1        ZPSMB81A1  R-PSMB-PS-1801A1
 
Fire Area 4 - Bus 1C Switchgear Area/        BE/IST            Orig BE    New BE          Comment Cabinet      (Fire IPEEE)                  (PSAR2)
ZPSMB81A2        ZPSMB81A2  R-PSMB-PS-1801A2 ZPSMB83A1        ZPSMB83A1  R-PSMB-PS-1803A1 ZPSMB83A2        ZPSMB83A2  R-PSMB-PS-1803A2 ZPSMB84A1        ZPSMB84A1  R-PSMB-PS-1804A1 ZPSMB84A2        ZPSMB84A2  R-PSMB-PS-1804A2 ZSEMT34-6        ZSEMT34-6  R-CEPO-MC-34R106 EA-11        CCSMB1094        CCSMB1094                    manual st*art of CCW pumps not modeled in PSAR2 CCSMB1164        CCSMB1164                    manual st art of CCW oumDs not modeled in PSAR2 DFUDKI 105A      DFUDK1105A  D-FUMK-B1 105-1 DFUDK1 106A      DFUDK1106A  D-FUMK-B1106-1 IST-140          PClMCY3003  P-Cl MC-EY-30-03 IST-141          SCNMBSISX1  R-REMB-SlS-X1 IST-142          SCNMBSISX3  R-REMB-SIS-X3 IST-146          SCNMASIS5  R-REMB-SIS-5 IST-158          PCNMB107AB                  shutdown sequencer not modeled in PSAR2 IST-158          PCNMB107AB                  shutdown sequencer not modeled in PSAR2 IST-159          DFUDK1107A  D-FUMK-A1107-1 IST-159          DFUDK1107A  D-FUMK-A1107-1 IST-159          DFUDK1 107A D-FUMK-A1 107-1 IST-160          DCBDC72136  D-CBMC-72-136 IST-160          DCBDC72136  D-CBMC-72-136 IST-160          DCBDC72136  D-CBMC-72-136 IST-19            ACNMC62-2A  A-REMD-62-2P8A IST-19            ACNMC62-2A  A-REMD-62-2P8A IST-20            AMLMACHA    A-CEPO-AFAS-MODA IST-257          DCBDC72101  D-CBMC-72-101 IST-300          DFUMK1111A  D-FUMK-A1111-1 IST-307          PCBMCB-111  L-C2MB-152-111 IST-337          DFUMK1114A  D-FUMK-A1 114-1 IST-338          DFUMK1112A  D-FUMK-A1 112-1 IST-340          PCNMC52112  S-REMB-144-112 IST-341          PCNMC52114  S-REMB-144-114 IST-346          DFUMK1113A  D-FUMK-A1113-1 IST-471          DCBDC721 11 D-CBMC-72-1 11 IST-483          EDGME1 1    E-DGME-K-6A IST-486          PCBMBB-106  P-CBMB-1 52-106 IST-490          DCBDC72308  D-CBMC-72-308 IST-490          DCBDC72308  D-CBMC-72-308 IST-491          PREMB1275  P-CBMB-152-106 IST-500          DFUDK1303A  D-FUMK-A1303-1 IST-509          EKVMA1470  E-KVMB-SV-1470 IST-53            CCSMD1092  C-CSMD-152-109CS
 
Fire Area 4 - Bus lC Switchgear Area/        BE/IST            Orig BE    New BE            Comment Cabinet      (Fire IPEEE)                  (PSAR2)
IST-55            CCSMD1162  C-CSMD-152-116CS IST-6            ACNMDSX741  A-REMD-PSX-0741 IST-63            CCVMA0944  C-CVMA-CK-CC944 IST-75            DFUMKA1103  D-FUMK-A1 103-1 IST-84            UCNMB44103  U-REMB-144-103 PB1MKBUS1C        PB1MKBUS1C  P-B1MK-EA-11 PCBMAB-105        PCBMAB-105  P-CBMA-152-105 PCBMAB-106        PCBMAB-106  P-CBMA-152-106 PCBMBB-1 11      PCBMBB-1 11 L-C2MB-152-111 PREMB1271        PREMB1271  P-REMA-127-1 PREMB271X1        PREMB271X1  P-REMB-127-1-X1 PREMB271X2        PREMB271X2  P-REMB-127-1-X2 PREMB38311        PREMB38311  P-REMB-383-11 SCNMA431 11      SCNMA43111                    blocking LPSI trip on RAS not modeled in PSAR2 SCNMBSISX5        SCNMBSISX5  R-REMB-SIS-X5 SCSMA521 11      SCSMA52111                    blocking LPSI trip on RAS not modeled in PSAR2 SCSMB111          SCSMB111    L-HSMB-HS-1 11 SCSMB112          SCSMB112    S-CSMB-152-112CS SCSMB114          SCSMB114    S-CSMB-152-114CS SH314A            SCSMB113    H-CSMB-152-113CS SPBMB1-1          SPBMB1-1                      manual initiation of sis relays not modeled in PSAR2 SPMME67B          SPMME67B    L-PMME-P-67B SREMBSIS1        SREMBSIS1  R-REMB-SIS-1 SREMBSIS5        SREMBSIS5  R-REMB-SIS-5 SREMBSISX5        SREMBSISX5  R-REMB-SIS-X5 SREMBSISX7        SREMBSISX7  R-REMB-SIS-X7 UCSMB103          UCSMB103                      manual start of SWS pumps not modeled in PSAR2 UPSMB1318        UPSMB1318  U-PSMB-PS-1318 UPSMB1325        UPSMB1325  U-PSMB-PS-1325 ZCNMB34510        ZCNMB34510  R-CEPO-MC-34L105 ZCNMB3453        ZCNMB3453  R-CEPO-MC-34L1 05 ZCNMB3455        ZCNMB3455  R-CEPO-MC-34L1 06 ZCNMB3459        ZCNMB3459  R-CEPO-MC-34L1 05 ZSEMT34-5        ZSEMT34-5  R-CEPO-MC-34L1105 ED-11A        DCB7218MOD        DCBMC72018  D-CBMC-72-18 DFUDKD11A        DFUDKD11A  D-FUMK-D018-1 DFUMKD11A        DFUMKD1IA  D-FUMK-D018-1 IST-490          DCBDC72308  D-CBMC-72-308 EJ-9400      DFUDK1105A        DFUDK1105A  D-FUMK-B11105-1 DFUDK1 106A      DFUDK1 106A D-FUMK-B1106-1
 
Fire Area 4 - Bus IC Switchgear Area/        BE/IST            Orig BE    New BE          Comment Cabinet      (Fire IPEEE)                  (PSAR2)
IST-159          DFUDK1107A  D-FUMK-A1107-1 IST-159          DFUDK1107A  D-FUMK-A1 107-1 IST-160          DCBDC72136  D-CBMC-72-136 IST-257          DCBDC72101  D-CBMC-72-101 IST-471          DCBDC721 11 D-CBMC-72-1 11 IST-486          PCBMBB-106  P-CBMB-152-106 IST-490          DCBDC72308  D-CBMC-72-308 IST-491          PREMB1275  P-CBMB-152-106 IST-500          DFUDK1303A  D-FUMK-A1303-1 PCBMAB-105        PCBMAB-105  P-CBMA-152-105 PCBMAB-106        PCBMAB-106  P-CBMA-152-106 PREMB1271        PREMB1271  P-REMA-127-1 PREMB271X1        PREMB271X1  P-REMB-127-1-X1 PREMB271X2        PREMB271X2  P-REMB-127-1-X2 PREMB38311        PREMB38311  P-REMB-383-11
 
Fire Area 13A1 - Aux Building Corridor Area/        BE/IST            Orig BE    New BE            Comment Cabinet      (Fire IPEEE)                  (PSAR2)
Exposure    C517              CPSMB0918  C-PSMB-PS-0918 Fire CCSMB1164          CCSMB1164                    manual start of P52c not modeled in PSAR2 CCSMB2084          CCSMB2084                    manual start of P52c not modeled in PSAR2 CHP46              ZPSMT81A    R-PSMT-PS-1801A CHP50              ZPSMT83A    R-PSMT-PS-1803A CHSMB0910          CHSMB0910                    Isolation of loss of CCW inside containment not modeled in PSAR2 CHSMB0911          CHSMB0911                    Isolation of loss of CCW inside containment not modeled in PSAR2 CHSMB0940          CHSMB0940                    Isolation of loss of CCW inside containment not modeled in PSAR2 CREMBEX5P4          CREMBEX5P4 R-REMB-5P-4 DFUMK1206A          DFUMK1206A D-FUMK-A1206-1 DFUMKS09            DFUMKS09  D-FUMK-S09-1 DFUMKS10            DFUMKS10  D-FUMK-S10-1 DFUMKS13A          DFUMKS13A  D-FUMK-S13-2 DFUMKS14A          DFUMKS14A  D-FUMK-S14-2 GCNMBHPX1L          GCNMBHPX1L S-AVMA-CV-3002 GREMB5P8            GREMB5P8  R-REMB-5P-8 HC6A-MST            HHSMB771                    manual start of compressors not modeled in PSAR2 HC6B-MST            HHSMB811                    manual start of compressors not modeled in PSAR2 IST-1              ACNMD23P8C  A-REMD-62-3P8C IST-100            ICMME2C    I-CMME-C-2C IST-101            ICMMTC2C  I-CMME-C-2C IST-102            ICMME2A    I-CMME-C-2A IST-104            ICSMB1207  I-C2MB-52-1207 IST-105            ICNMBCR4  I-REMB-CR-4 IST-109            ICMMTC2A  I-CMME-C-2A IST-114            HADMTM9B  Q-ADMK-M-9B IST-121            HADMTM9A  Q-ADMK-M-9A IST-131            HPSMB0440  Q-PSMB-PS-0440 IST-133            HPSMB0442  Q-PSMB-PS-0442 IST-143            SREMBX161  G-REMB-42-161 IST-152            ZPSMA821    R-PSMA-PS1802SW1 IST-156            ZPSMA811    R-PSMA-PS1801SW1 IST-157            ZPSMA831    R-PSMA-PS1803SW1 IST-161            PCNMB213AB P-CBMB-152-213 IST-163            DCBDC72238 D-CBMC-72-236 IST-180            MAEMTHOGGR M-AEMT-C-4 IST-192            DCBMC72119 D-CBMC-72-119 IST-273            BMVMA2169  G-MVMA-MO-2169 IST-275            SCSMB127C1  G-CSMB-42-127CS 1
 
Fire Area 13A1 - Aux Building Corridor Area/        BE/IST            Orig BE    New BE          Comment Cabinet      (Fire IPEEE)                  (PSAR2)
IST-276            SCSMB187C1  G-CSMB-42-187CS1 IST-277            42-2425/CS  G-CSMB-42-287CS IST-278            BMVMA2140  G-MVMA-MO-2140 IST-280            SCSMB227C1 G-CSMB-42-227CS1 IST-281            BMVMA2170  G-MVMA-MO-2170 IST-283            PCBMCC-131                  ESF room cooling no longer modeled IST-284            PCBMCC-211                  ESF room cooling no longer modeled IST-285            VTSFC1850                    ESF room cooling no longer modeled IST-286            VTSFC1851                    ESF room cooling no longer modeled IST-288            PCBMCC-133                  ESF room cooling no longer modeled IST-289            PCBMCC-221                  ESF room cooling no longer modeled IST-290            VTSFC1857                    ESF room cooling no longer modeled IST-291            VTSFC1858                  ESF room cooling no longer modeled IST-295            PCBMCC-251 L-C2MC-52-251 IST-296            PCBMCC-147 L-C2MC-52-147 IST-297            PCBMCC-247 L-C2MC-52-247 IST-300            DFUMK1111A D-FUMK-A1111-1 IST-301            DFUMKS17A  D-FUMK-S17-1 IST-305            PCBMCB-206 L-C2MB-152-206 IST-306            SAVMA3029  Z-AVMA-CV-3029 IST-307            PCBMCB-111 L-C2MB-152-111 IST-308            HPVMD3030B Q-PVMD-PCV-3030B IST-309            SMVMA3199  L-MVMA-MO-3199 IST-310            SMVMA3190  L-MVMA-MO-3190 IST-311            SCNMBX147  L-REMB-42X-147 IST-312            SCNMBX247  L-REMB-42X-247 IST-313            SCNMBX251  L-REMB-42X-251 IST-314            PCBMCC-167 L-C2MC-52-167 IST-318            SHCMT3025A L-HCMT-HIC-3025A IST-328            PCBMCC-141 L-C2MC-52-141 IST-329            SCNMBX141  L-REMB-42X-141 IST-330            PBSMTMCC24 P-B2MK-EB-24 IST-331            PBSMTMCC23 P-B2MK-EB-23 IST-335            GCNMA5P8  R-REMB-5P-8 IST-339            GCNMB5P8  R-REMB-5P-8 IST-345            PB2MKMCC23 P-B2MK-EB-23 IST-347            HFLMK3037                  Flow path not modeled in PSAR2 IST-348            PB2MKMCC22 P-B2MK-EB-22 IST-350            HFLMK3018                  Flow path not modeled in PSAR2 IST-351            PCBMCC-137 H-C2MC-52-137 IST-352            PCBMCC-197 H-C2MC-52-197 IST-353            PCBMCC-157 H-C2MC-52-157
 
Fire Area 13A1 - Aux Building Corridor Area/        BE/IST              Orig BE    New BE          Comment Cabinet      (Fire IPEEE)                    (PSAR2)
IST-354            PCBMCC-151  H-C2MC-52-151 IST-355            PCBMCC-261  H-C2MC-52-261 IST-356            PCBMCC-257  H-C2MC-52-257 IST-357            PCBMCC-237  H-C2MC-52-237 IST-358            PCBMCC-241  H-C2MC-52-241 IST-362            HFLMK3071  I-FLMK-F-321 IST-363            HFLMK3070  I-FLMK-F-319 IST-391            DFUMKS55B  D-FUMK-S55-2 IST-392            PCBMCC5221  H-REMT-30721C IST-395            PCBMCC1205  G-C2MC-52-1205 IST-396            SC2MCC-161  G-C2MC-52-161 IST-397            SCNMA0101  G-C2MC-52-1206 IST-398            DFUMKB1105  D-FUMK-B1 105-1 IST-399            PCBMC52207  G-C2MC-52-207 IST-400            DFUMK72205  D-FUMK-B1 205-1 IST-401            PCBMB1206  G-C2MB-52-1206 IST-402            PC2MA1 105C G-C2MC-52-1105C IST-404            SCNMBA0101                  Auto start of P55B not modeled IST-405            PCBMBC1 105 G-C2MB-52-1105 IST-46              AFSMB0737  A-FSMA-FS-0737 IST-54              CCSMD2082  C-CSMD-152-208CS IST-55              CCSMD1162  C-CSMD-152-116CS IST-57              CAVMA0918                    Makeup to CCW not modeled IST-60              CAVMB0910                    Isolation of CCW leaks inside containment not modeled in PSAR2 IST-63              CCVMA0944  C-CVMA-CK-CC944 IST-65              CCVMA0943  C-CVMA-CK-CC943 IST-66              CAVMB0911                    Isolation of CCW leaks inside containment not modeled in PSAR2 IST-67              CAVMB0940                    Isolation of CCW leaks inside containment not modeled in PSAR2 IST-68              DFUMKS027A                  Isolation of CCW leaks inside containment not modeled in PSAR2 IST-69              UKVMA0801                    Compressors no longer require SW cooling IST-70              UKVMA0803                    Compressors no longer require SW cooling IST-74              PCBMCB-204  U-C2MC-152-204 IST-76              PCBMCB-205  P-CBMC-152-205 IST-77              DFUMKA1205  D-FUMK-A1205-1 IST-79              DFUMKA1204  D-FUMK-A1204-1 IST-82              SCNMA16-3                    CV-1 359 sis test contacts not modeled in PSAR2 IST-98              DFUMKB1207  D-FUMK-B1207-1 IST-99              DFUMKB1 106 D-FUMK-B1 106-1 PC2MA1206          PC2MA1206                    Alternate power source for charging pumps no longer modeled in PSAR2
 
Fire Area 13A1 - Aux Building Corridor Area/        BE/IST              Orig BE    New BE            Comment Cabinet      (Fire IPEEE)                    (PSAR2)
PCBMBB-1 11        PCBMBB-1 11 L-C2MB-152-111 PCBMBB-206          PCBMBB-206  L-C2MB-152-206 PCBMBC1 103        PCBMBC1 103 PCBMBC1 103 PCBMBC1201          PCBMBC1201  P-C2MB-52-1201 PFUMKS04            PFUMKS04    P-FUMK-S04-1 PREMB5P8            PREMB5P8    R-REMB-5P-8 S42161MAN          SCSMB161CS  G-CSMB-42-161CS1 S55A-H              SCSMB1205  G-CSMB-52-1205CS S55B-l              SCSMB1206  G-CSMB-52-1206CS S55C-I              SCSMB1105  G-CSMB-52-1105CS SCNMA431 11        SCNMA431 11                  blocking LPSI trip on RAS not modeled in PSAR2 SCNMA43206          SCNMA43206                    blocking LPSI trip on RAS not modeled in PSAR2 SCNMBX0327          SCNMBX0327  Z-REMA-LSX-0327 SCNMBX0328          SCNMBX0328  Z-REMA-LSX-0328 SCNMBX0329          SCNMBX0329  Z-REMA-LSX-0329 SCNMBY0327          SCNMBY0327  Z-REMA-LSY-0327 SCNMBY0328          SCNMBY0328  Z-REMA-LSY-0328 SCNMBY0329          SCNMBY0329  Z-REMA-LSY-0329 SCSMA521 11        SCSMA521 11                  blocking LPSI trip on RAS not modeled in PSAR2 SCSMA52206          SCSMA52206                    blocking LPSI trip on RAS not modeled in PSAR2 SCSMB111            SCSMB111    L-HSMB-HS-1 11 SCSMB206            SCSMB206    L-HSMB-HS-206 SCSMB207C1          SCSMB207C1  G-CSMB-42-207CS 1 SCSMB207C2          SCSMB207C2  G-CSMB-42-207CS1 SH117              SCSMB1571  H-CSMB-42-157CS1 SH135              SCSMB2371  H-CSMB-42-237CS1 SH157              SCSMB1511  H-CSMB-42-151CS1 SH175              SCSMB2411  H-CSMB-42-241CS1 SH194              SHSMB3037A                    Flow path not modeled in PSAR2 SH207              SHSMB3018A                    Flow path not modeled in PSAR2 SH25                SCSMB1371  H-CSMB-42-137CS1 SH49                SCSMB2611  H-CSMB-42-261CS1 SH77                SCSMB1971  H-CSMB-42-197CS1 SH95                SCSMB2571  H-CSMB-42-257CS1 SHSMB3018A          SHSMB3018A                    Flow path not modeled in PSAR2 SHSMB3018B          SHSMB3018B                    Flow path not modeled in PSAR2 SHSMB3025B          SHSMB3025B  L-HSMB-HS-3025B SHSMB3059A          SHSMB3059A                    Failure to close failure mode not modeled in PSAR2 SHSMB3059B          SHSMB3059B                    Failure to close failure mode not modeled in PSAR2
 
Fire Area 13A1 - Aux Building Corridor Areal        BE/IST              Orig BE    New BE          Comment Cabinet      (Fire IPEEE)                  (PSAR2)
SKVMA3018          SKVMA3018                  Flow path not modeled in PSAR2 SKVMB3029A          SKVMB3029A Z-KVMB-SV-3029A SKVMB3030A          SKVMB3030A Z-KVMB-SV-3030A SKVMB3059          SKVMB3059                  Failure to close failure mode not modeled in PSAR2 SL54                SCSMB1411  L-HSMB-HS-141-1 SL64                SCSMB1471  L-HSMB-HS-147-1 SL74                SCSMB2471  L-REMB-42-247 SL84                SCSMB2511  L-REMB-42-251 SLSMA0327          SLSMA0327  Z-LSMA-LS-0327 SLSMA0328          SLSMA0328  Z-LSMA-LS-0328 SLSMA0329          SLSMA0329  Z-LSMA-LS-0329 SPMME67A            SPMME67A  L-PMME-P-67A SPMME67B            SPMME67B  L-PMME-P-67B SREMAX0327          SREMAX0327 Z-REMA-LSX-0327 SREMAX0328          SREMAX0328 Z-REMA-LSX-0328 SREMAX0329          SREMAX0329 Z-REMA-LSX-0329 SREMAY0327          SREMAY0327 Z-REMA-LSY-0327 SREMAY0328          SREMAY0328 Z-REMA-LSY-0328 SREMAY0329          SREMAY0329 Z-REMA-LSY-0329 SREMB127-0          SREMB127-0 G-REMB-42-127 SSD30              SLMMB24395 L-REMB-42-2439 SSD31              SQSMB2439  L-REMB-42-2439 SSD40              SLMMB23395 L-REMB-42-2339 SSD41              SQSMB2339  L-REMB-42-2339 SUll                SHSMB3029A                  Manual operation of CV-3029 not in PSAR2 SU28                SHSMB3030A                  Manual operation of CV-3030 not in PSAR2 UCSMB204            UCSMB204                    manual start of SWS pumps    not modeled in PSAR2 UCSMB205            UCSMB205                    manual start of SWS pumps    not modeled in PSAR2 V22                VCSMB131                    ESF room cooling no longer    modeled V25                VCSMB211                    ESF room cooling no longer    modeled V48                VCSMB133                    ESF room cooling no longer modeled V51                VCSMB221                    ESF room cooling no longer modeled ZPSMB81A1          ZPSMB81A1  R-PSMB-PS-1801A1 ZPSMB81A2          ZPSMB81A2  R-PSMB-PS-1801A2 ZPSMB83A1          ZPSMB83A1  R-PSMB-PS-1803A1
 
Fire Area 13A2 - Aux Building Corridor Area/        BE/IST              Orig BE    New BE          Comment Cabinet      (Fire IPEEE)                    (PSAR2)
Exposure    CHSMB0910          CHSMB0910                    Isolation of loss of CCW inside containment Fire                                                          not modeled in PSAR2 CHSMB091ire1        CHSMB0911                    Isolation of loss of CCW inside containment not modeled in PSAR2 GCNMBHPX1L          GCNMBHPX1L  S-AVMA-CV-3002 IST-273            BMVMA2169  G-MVMA-MO-2169 IST-274            BCVMA2138  G-PMME-P-56A IST-275            SCSMB127C1  G-CSMB-42-127CS1 IST-276            SCSMB187C1  G-CSMB-42-187CS1 IST-277            42-2425/CS  G-CSMB-42-287CS IST-279            BCVMA2139  G-PMME-P-56Bure IST-281            BMVMA2170  G-MVMA-MO-2170 IST-301            DFUMKS17A  D-FUMK-S17-1 IST-318            SHCMT3025A  L-HCMT-HIC-3025A IST-397            SCNMA0101  G-C2MC-52-1206 IST-398            DFUMKB1 105 D-FUMK-B1 105-1 IST-401            PCBMB1206  G-C2MB-52-1206 IST-402            PC2MA1 105C G-C2MC-52-1105C IST-405            PCBMBC1 105 G-C2MB-52-1105 IST-60              CAVMB0910                    Isolation of loss of CCW inside containment not modeled in PSAR2 IST-66              CAVMB0911                    Isolation of loss of CCW inside containment not modeled in PSAR2 IST-68              DFUMKS027A                  Isolation of loss of CCW inside containment not modeled in PSAR2 IST-82              SCNMA16-3                    CV-1 359 sis test contacts not modeled in PSAR2 PC2MA1206          PC2MA1206                    Bus 11 is not an alternate power source for Bus 12 in PSAR2 S55B-1              SCSMB1206  G-CSMB-52-1206CS S55C-l              SCSMB1105  G-CSMB-52-1105CS SCBA19A            SCSMB42191  G-CSMB-42-191CS SHSMB3025B          SHSMB3025B  L-HSMB-HS-3025B SREMB127-O          SREMB127-O  G-REMB-42-127 SREMBR-191          SREMBR-191                  auto start of P-56B no longer modeled in PSAR2 SREMBR-287          SREMBR-287                  auto start of P-56A no longer modeled in PSAR2
 
Fire Area 23B - East Turbine Building Area/        BE/IST              Orig BE    New BE          Comment Cabinet      (Fire IPEEE)                  (PSAR2)
Exposure    A38                AKVMA0522G A-KVMA-SV-0522G Fire AHSMB0522B          AHSMB0522B A-HSMB-HS-0522B CHSMB0910          CHSMB0910                  Isolation of loss of CCW inside containment not modeled in PSAR2 CHSMB0911          CHSMB0911                  Isolation of loss of CCW inside containment not modeled in PSAR2 DC6                DCBMC72112 P-CBMA-152-106 DFUDK1302A          DFUDK1302A                Backfeed power to Bus 1C,D&E not modeled in PSAR2 DFUMKWO01A          DFUMKWO01A D-FUMK-W001-1 DFUMKW002A          DFUMKWO02A D-FUMK-W002-1 DFUMKW006D          DFUMKW006D D-FUMK-W006-1 G113B              GCNMA386A8                This relay must energize to cause ADVs to open (the TBV solenoids must spuriously energize to open valve)
G322B              GCNMA386A3                This relay must energize to cause ADVs to open G332B              GCNMA386A5                This relay must energize to cause ADVs to open GEPMT0511          GEPMT0511  B-EPMT-EP-0511 GHSMB0501A          GHSMB0501A                No credit for manual closure of MSIVs GHSMB0510A          GHSMB0510A                No credit for manual closure of MSIVs GKVMA0508          GKVMA0508  M-KVMB-SV-0508 GKVMA0514          GKVMA0514  M-KVMB-SV-0514 GKVMB0502          GKVMB0502  M-KVMB-SV-0502 GKVMB0505A          GKVMB0505A M-KVMB-SV-0505A GKVMB0505B          GKVMB0505B M-KVMB-SV-0505B GKVMB0513          GKVMB0513  M-KVMB-SV-0513 GPCMT0511          GPCMT0511  B-PCMT-PIC-0511 GSCMT0511          GSCMT0511  B-CEPO-PM-0511 115A                IRVMB1200  I-RVMC-RV-1200 115B                IRVMB1204  I-RVMC-RV-1204 115C                IRVMB1202  I-RVMC-RV-1202 ICNMAK24            ICNMAK24  I-CMME-C-2B ICNMBK21            ICNMBK21  I-CMME-C-2B ICNMBK22            ICNMBK22  I-CMME-C-2B IFUMKF3            IFUMKF3    I-CMME-C-2B IREMBK22            IREMBK22  I-CMME-C-2B IREMBK24            IREMBK24  I-CMME-C-2B IST-100            ICMME2C    I-CMME-C-2C IST-101            ICMMTC2C  I-CMME-C-2C IST-102            ICMME2A    I-CMME-C-2A IST-103            ICNMAK22  I-CMME-C-2C IST-104            ICSMB1207  I-C2MB-52-1207
 
Fire Area 23B - East Turbine Building Area/        BE/IST              Orig BE    New BE          Comment Cabinet      (Fire IPEEE)                    (PSAR2)
IST-105              ICNMBCR4  I-REMB-CR-4 IST-106              ICNMCK23  I-CMME-C-2B IST-107              ICNMBK23  I-CMME-C-2B IST-109              ICMMTC2A  I-CMME-C-2A IST-11              FAVMC0729                  CST makeup from hotwell not modeled IST-1 17            HADMTM9C  Q-ADMK-M-9C IST-134              PB2MKMCC4. P-B2MK-EB-04 IST-15              AAVMA0521                    TDAFW pump no longer gets steam from SGB IST-17              AHSMB0102A  A-HSMB-HS-0102A IST-174            XAVMA2008                    T-81 no longer modeled as redundant to other CST makeup sources IST-175              PB2MKBUS91 P-B2MK-EB-91 IST-176            XAVMA2010  A-AVMA-CV-201 0 IST-177              PBSMTL03  P-BSMK-EL-22 IST-179              MCNMB42615 M-REMB-52-615 IST-18              AKVMA0522B  A-KVMB-SV-0522B IST-180              MAEMTHOGGR M-AEMT-C-4 IST-183              GMVMA0510  M-HSMB-0510C IST-184              GHSMB0510C M-HSMB-0510C IST-185              PB2MKMCC3  P-B2MK-EB-03 IST-187              GMVMA0501                  SGB no longer supplies steam to TDAFW IST-188              GHSMB0501C                  SGB no longer supplies steam to TDAFW IST-190              DCBDC72104 D-CBMC-72-104 IST-191              DCBDC72207 D-CBMC-72-207 IST-192              DCBMC72119 D-CBMC-72-119 IST-198              GKVMA0507B M-KVMB-SV-0507B IST-199              GKVMA0507A M-KVMB-SV-0507A IST-203              GTPMT0510  B-TPMT-PT-0510 IST-228              GAVMA0511  B-AVMA-CV-0511 IST-252              FCSMC105  M-CSMB-252-105CS IST-253              FCSMB205  M-CBMB-252-205 IST-257              DCBDC72101 D-CBMC-72-101 IST-259              DCBDC72201 D-CBMC-72-201 IST-296              PCBMCC-147 L-C2MC-52-147 IST-30              AFSMB0727A  A-FSMA-FS-0727A IST-31              AFSMB0749A  A-FSMA-FS-0749A IST-311              SCNMBX147  L-REMB-42X-147 IST-314              PCBMCC-167 L-C2MC-52-167 IST-328              PCBMCC-141 L-C2MC-52-141 IST-329              SCNMBX141  L-REMB-42X-141 IST-345              PB2MKMCC23 P-B2MK-EB-23 IST-351              PCBMCC-137 H-C2MC-52-137
 
Fire Area 23B - East Turbine Building Area/        BE/IST              Orig BE    New BE          Comment Cabinet      (Fire IPEEE)                    (PSAR2)
IST-352            PCBMCC-197  H-C2MC-52-197 IST-353            PCBMCC-157  H-C2MC-52-157 IST-354            PCBMCC-151  H-C2MC-52-151 IST-366            PCBMBC1 305 F-C2MC-52-11305 IST-369            QCXMTC1305  F-C2MC-P-9ALOCAL IST-371            QCNMBPS2    F-PSMB-PS-1310 IST-374            QCNMBP41PS  F-PSMB-PS-5350 IST-40              APSMD0741A  A-PSMD-PS-0741A IST-403            PCBMB1206B  D-FUMK-B1206-1 IST-406            PCBMBC105B  D-FUMK-B1 105-1 IST-41              APSMD0741B  A-PSMD-PS-0741B IST-42              APSMD741DD  A-PSMD-PS-0741DD IST-43              PC1MCY1014  P-ClMC-EY-10-14 IST-491            PREMB1275  P-CBMD-152-106 IST-498            PREMB1276  P-CBMA-152-202 IST-500            DFUDK1303A  D-FUMK-A11303-1 IST-501            PCBMBB-302                  backfeed power not modeled in PSAR2.
IST-502            PCBMAB-302  P-CBMA-152-302 IST-503            PCBMCC21 11                  Battery room ventilation not needed in PSAR2 IST-504            PCBMCC2411                  Battery room ventilation not needed in PSAR2 IST-516            PGNMTMAIN                    Main xfrmr not modeled in PSAR2 IST-519            PCNMD52402  P-CBMA-252-401 IST-57              CAVMA0918                    Makeup to CCW not modeled IST-60              CAVMB0910                    Isolation of CCW leaks inside containment not modeled in PSAR2 IST-66              CAVMB0911                    Isolation of CCW leaks inside containment not modeled in PSAR2 IST-68              DFUMKS027A                  Isolation of CCW leaks inside containment not modeled in PSAR2 IST-69              UKVMA0801                    Compressors no longer require SWS IST-70              UKVMA0803                    Compressors no longer require SWS IST-98              DFUMKB1207  D-FUMK-B1207-1 IST-99              DFUMKB1 106 D-FUMK-B1 106-1 ISWFCS3            ISWFCS3                      Failure of logic to unload compressor and prevent RV actuation not modeled in PSAR2 P252B              PCNMB303CS                  Manual trip of CB-152-302 not modeled in PSAR2 PBS1F-08            PCNMB1FCS                    No manual actuation of 252-302 modeled in PSAR2 PBS1G-08            PCNMB1GCS                    No manual actuation of 252-402 modeled in PSAR2 PCSMBA-301          PCSMBA-301  P-CBMA-252-301 PREMB38311          PREMB38311  P-REMB-383-11 PREMB38312          PREMB38312  P-REMB-383-12 PREMB38323          PREMB38323  P-REMB-383-23
 
Fire Area 23B - East Turbine Building Area/        BE/IST              Orig BE    New BE          Comment Cabinet      (Fire IPEEE)                  (PSAR2)
PREMB8612          PREMB8612                  Circuitry for 152-202 failing to trip not modeled in PSAR2 PREMB8612X          PREMB8612X                  Circuitry for 152-106 failing to trip not modeled in PSAR2 QCNMB5TR1C          QCNMB5TR1C F-PSMB-PS-1310 SH117              SCSMB1571  H-CSMB-42-157CS1 SH157              SCSMB1511  H-CSMB-42-151CS1 SH25                SCSMB1371  H-CSMB-42-137CS1 SH77                SCSMB1971  H-CSMB-42-197CS1 SL54                SCSMB1411  L-HSMB-HS-141-1 SL64                SCSMB1471  L-HSMB-HS-147-1 X32                XCNMB9631A A-PBMC-PB-P936 X33                XHSMB8950A A-HSMC-HS-8950A
 
Fire Area 23D - West Turbine Building Area/        BE/IST            Orig BE    New BE          Comment Cabinet      (Fire IPEEE)                  (PSAR2)
Exposure    A38                AKVMA0522G  A-KVMA-SV-0522G Fire AHSMB0522B        AHSMB0522B  A-HSMB-HS-0522B DFUMKWO01A          DFUMKW001A D-FUMK-W001-1 DFUMKWO06D          DFUMKWO06D D-FUMK-W006-1 G113B              GCNMA386A8                  This relay must energize to cause ADVs to open (the TBV solenoids  must spuriously energize to open valve)
G322B              GCNMA386A3                  This relay must energize to cause ADVs to open G332B              GCNMA386A5                  This relay must energize to cause ADVs to open GEPMT0511          GEPMT0511  B-EPMT-EP-0511 GHSMB0510A          GHSMB0510A                  No credit for manual closure of MSIVs GKVMB0505A          GKVMB0505A M-KVMB-SV-0505A GKVMB0505B        GKVMB0505B  M-KVMB-SV-0505B GPCMT0511          GPCMT0511  B-PCMT-PIC-0511 GSCMT0511          GSCMT0511  B-CEPO-PM-0511 IST-11              FAVMC0729                  No longer considered a condensate flow diversion path IST-117            HADMTM9C  Q-ADMK-M-9C IST-14            AAVMA0522B  A-AVMA-CV-0522B IST-15            AAVMA0521                    TDAFW pump no longer gets steam from SGB IST-17            AHSMB0102A  A-HSMB-HS-0102A IST-174            XAVMA2008                    T-81 no longer modeled as redundant to other CST makeup sources IST-175            PB2MKBUS91 P-B2MK-EB-91 IST-176            XAVMA201 0  A-AVMA-CV-201 0 IST-179            MCNMB42615 M-REMB-52-615 IST-18            AKVMA0522B  A-KVMB-SV-0522B IST-180            MAEMTHOGGR M-AEMT-C-4 IST-189            IXVMD180CA I-XVMD-MV-CA180 IST-190            DCBDC72104 D-CBMC-72-104 IST-191            DCBDC72207 D-CBMC-72-207 IST-196            FAVMA0730  M-AVMA-CV-0730 IST-198            GKVMA0507B  M-KVMB-SV-0507B IST-199            GKVMA0507A M-KVMB-SV-0507A IST-203            GTPMT051 0 B-TPMT-PT-051 0 IST-228            GAVMA0511  B-AVMA-CV-0511 IST-252            FCSMC105  M-CSMB-252-105CS IST-253            FCSMB205  M-CBMB-252-205 IST-364            PCBMB1306  U-PMME-P5 IST-366            PCBMBC1305 F-C2MC-52-1305 IST-369            QCXMTC1305 F-C2MC-P-9ALOCAL IST-371            QCNMBPS2    F-PSMB-PS-1310 IST-374            QCNMBP41PS F-PSMB-PS-5350
 
Fire Area 23D - West Turbine Building Area/        BE/IST              Orig BE    New BE          Comment Cabinet      (Fire IPEEE)                  (PSAR2)
IST-40            APSMD0741A  A-PSMD-PS-0741A IST-41            APSMD0741B  A-PSMD-PS-0741B IST-42            APSMD741DD  A-PSMD-PS-0741DD IST-43              PCIMCY1014 P-C1MC-EY-10-14 IST-516            PGNMTMAIN                  Main xfrmr not modeled in PSAR2 PCBMB1306          PCBMB1306  U-PMME-P5 QCNMB5TR1C          QCNMB5TR1C F-PSMB-PS-1310 X32                XCNMB9631A  A-PBMC-PB-P936 X33                XHSMB8950A A-HSMC-HS-8950A
 
Modifications to PSAR2 Fault                          Description                    pg Tree Logic Table 2.1        Modifications Made to Reflect Fire IPEEE Logic            2 Table 2.2          Modifications Made to Logic to Assure Correct Modeling of  3 Plant Response to Fire Initiators Table 2.3          Modifications to Logic to Allow Evaluation of MOV        4 Functions Not Currently in the Models (not used in this analysis)                              109 Table 2.4          Modifications to Credit Local Operation of MOVs            5 (not used in this analysis)
Table 2.5          Modifications Adding MOV Hot Short Failure Modes          7 (not used in this analysis)
Modifications Identifying Unsuppressed Fires Requiring Table 2.6                                                                    9 Control from the Hot Shutdown Panel Table 2.7          House Events Added to Fault Tree Models                  10 Table 2.8          Fire Initiating Events Added to Fault Tree Models        13 Table 2.9          Random Failures Added to Fault Trees                      15 Table 2.10          Random Failures Changed for the Purpose of Sequence      16 Quantification Table 2.11          Operator Actions Added to Fault Tree Logic                17 Table 2.12          Hot Short Failure Modes Added to Fault Tree Logic        18 (not used in this analysis)
 
Table 2.1: Modifications Made to Reflect Fire IPEEE Logic Gate                    Description A24-Fire                Local closure of P8C breaker A47-Fire                Local closure of P8A breaker A69A-Fire                Local opening of CV-0749 A89-Fire                Local opening of CV-0727 F39-Fire                Manual action to start fire pump 9A F40-Fire                Manual action to start fire pump 9B F52-Fire                Manual action to start fire pump P41 P106B4A-Fire            Local closure of fast transfer breaker 152-106 P202B4-Fire              Local closure of fast transfer breaker 152-202 U973-DGA-Fire            Local closure of breaker to P78 UGT020-Fire              Alignment of warm water recirc pump (parallel to traveling screens)
H334A-Fire              Local operation of MO-3070
 
Table 2.2: Modifications Made to Logic to Assure Correct Modeling of Plant Response to Fire Initiators Gate                                Description The following logic adds a house event to reflect that fire initiating events do not cause conditions that would generate an automatic SIS Add HSE-FA-INIT as a flag to indicate that a non-SIS fire initiating event NONSISINT-Fire has occurred The following four changes are directed at preventing a dual SG blowdown from disabling all flow paths to the SGs even though AFW is still available AHDR1-1-Fire                        Disable ESDE failing flow path through CV-0749 AHDR2-1-Fire                        Disable ESDE failing flow path through CV-0727 AHDR3-1-Fire                        Disable ESDE failing flow path through CV-0736A AHDR4-1-Fire                        Disable ESDE failing flow path through CV-0737A The following change disables logic that assumes HPSI flow diversion will occur on hot short of MO-3072 (it appears the flow diversion will be back to the PCS) 1-1079-Fire                        Disable HPSI flow diversion through MO-3072
 
Entergy PSA                        EA-PSA-SDP-P8B-11-05                Rev. 0 Entermg A L l Engineering Analysis                                      Attachment 2 - Page 4 of 18 Table 2.3: Modifications to Logic to Allow Evaluation of MOV Functions not Currently in the Models (not used in this analysis)
Gate                            Description GS02-Fire                      Add charging to PCS flow path through MO-3072 LSDC45-Fire                    Add CK-3240 as means of preventing flow downstream of MO-3198 to SIRWT LSDC57-Fire                    Add CK-3239 as means of preventing flow downstream of MO-3189 to SIRWT XADVA-FTO-Fire                  Alignment of hogger as means of preventing demands on SGA SRVs XESDE-DAI1-Fire                Addition of TBV & ADVs on SGB as means of blowing down SGA XESDE-DA2-Fire                  Isolation of SGA including MO-0510 FTRC X1001-FIRE                      Operator action to trip closed CV-0510 locally (without credit for this action, MO-0510 would not be important as SGA MSIV would be failed open for many Fire Areas - see Ref 2.1.8).
 
Table 2.4: Modifications to credit local operation of MOVs (not used in this analysis)
Gate                        Description G068-HSFire                  Local operation of MO-2160 GCBA10-HSFire              Local operation of MO-2140 GS02-HSFire                  Local operation of MO-3072 LLSDC-HSFire                Local operation of MO-3012 LLSDC56-HSFire              Local operation of MO-3010 LLSDC76-HSFire              Local operation of MO-3014 LLSDC86-HSFire              Local operation of MO-3008 LLSDC44-HSFire              Local operation of MO-3199 LLSDC46-HSFire              Local operation of MO-3198 LLSDC56-HSFire              Local operation of MO-3190 LLSDC57-HSFire              Local operation of MO-3189 XADVA-FTO7A-HSFire          Local operation of MO-0510 H11IA1-Fire                  Local operation of MO-3011 H151A1-Fire                  Local operation of MO-3013 H19A1-Fire                  Local operation of MO-3007
 
Table 2.4: Modifications to credit local operation of MOVs (not used in this analysis)
Gate                    Description H-18O1A-Fire            Local operation of MO-3009 HH129A1-Fire            Local operation of MO-3064 HH169A1-Fire            Local operation of MO-3062 HH43A1-Fire              Local operation of MO-3068 HH89A1-Fire              Local operation of MO-3066
 
Entergy PSA                    EA-PSA-SDP-P8B-11-05          Rev. 0 I [_Ente-rg,
_ _ _ _ _                      Engineering Analysis                                Attachment 2 - Page 7 of 18 Table 2.5: Modifications Adding MOV Hot Short Failure Modes (not used in this analysis)
Gate                                    Description G068B-HSFire                            Hot short of MO-2160 GCBA1OB-HSFire                            Hot short of MO-2140 GS02B-HSFire                              Hot short of MO-3072 LLSDC66B-HSFire                          Hot short of MO-3012 LLSDC56B-HSFire                          Hot short of MO-3010 LLSDC76B-HSFire                          Hot short of MO-3014 LLSDC86B-HSFire                          Hot short of MO-3008 LSDC46-HSFire                            Hot short of MO-3199 LSDC50-HSFire                            Hot short of MO-3198 LSDC58-HSFire                            Hot short of MO-3190 LSDC62-HSFire                            Hot short of MO-3189 XADVA-FT08-HSFire                        Hot short of MO-0510 H1 10-HSFire                              Hot short of MO-3011 H150-HSFire                              Hot short of MO-3013 H18-HSFire                                Hot short of MO-3007 H800-HSFire                              Hot short of MO-3009 HH128-HSFire                              Hot short of MO-3064
 
Table 2.5: Modifications Adding MOV Hot Short Failure Modes (not used in this analysis)
Gate                                    Description HH168-HSFire                            Hot short of MO-3062 HH42-HSFire                              Hot short of MO-3068 HH88-HSFire                              Hot short of MO-3066 CNT-22-LOOP1A-HPSI-HSFIRE                Hot short of MO-3068 leading to ISLOCA CNT-22-LOOP1 B-HPSI-HSFIRE              Hot short of MO-3066 leading to ISLOCA CNT-22-LOOP2A-HPSI-HSFIRE                Hot short of MO-3064 leading to ISLOCA CNT-22-LOOP2B-HPSI-HSFIRE                Hot short of MO-3062 leading to ISLOCA CNT-23-LOOP1A-HPSI-HSFIRE                Hot short of MO-3007 leading to ISLOCA CNT-23-LOOP1B-HPSI-HSFIRE                Hot short of MO-3009 leading to ISLOCA CNT-23-LOOP2A-HPSI-HSFIRE                Hot short of MO-3011 leading to ISLOCA CNT-23-LOOP2B-HPSI-HSFIRE                Hot short of MO-3013 leading to ISLOCA CNT-32-LOOP1A-LPSI-HSFIRE                Hot short of MO-3008 leading to ISLOCA CNT-32-LOOP1 B-LPSI-HSFIRE                Hot short of MO-301 0 leading to ISLOCA CNT-32-LOOP2A-LPSI-HSFIRE                Hot short of MO-3012 leading to ISLOCA CNT-32-LOOP2B-LPSI-HSFIRE                Hot short of MO-3014 leading to ISLOCA
 
Table 2.6: Modifications identifying Unsuppressed Fires Requiring Control From the Hot Shutdown Panel Gate                            Description FA1SUP                          Fire Area 1 exposure fires anded with SUP FA2SUP                          Fire Area 2 exposure fires anded with SUP-AUTO FA3SUP                          Fire Area 3 exposure fires anded with SUP-AUTO FA4SUP                          Fire Area 4 exposure fires anded with SUP-AUTO Note: These gates are used to distinguish logic differences when unsuppressed fires require manning of the hot shutdown panel.
 
Table 2.7: House Events Added to Fault Tree Models House Event                    Description HS-MO-0510                    Logic enabling MOV hot short failure mode (T)
HS-MO-2140 HS-MO-2160 HS-MO-3007 HS-MO-3008 HS-MO-3009 HS-MO-3010 HS-MO-3011 HS-MO-3012 HS-MO-3013 HS-MO-3014 HS-MO-3062 HS-MO-3064 HS-MO-3066 HS-MO-3068 HS-MO-3072 HS-MO-3189 HS-MO-3190 HS-MO-3198 HS-MO-3199 HSE-3072-FLOWDIV              Disables HPSI flow diversion thru MO-3072 (F)
HSE-AFW-FLOWDIV                Disables AFW flow diversion on SG blowdown (F)
HSE-FA-INIT                    Indicates that a non-SIS fire initiator occurred (T)
HSE-ANYFIRE                    Enables Fire IPEEE logic changes fall fire areas (T)
HSE-NOTANY                    Enables Fire IPEEE logic changes all fire areas (F)
HSE-NOTFA1                    Enables logic changes for FA1 (not used)
HSE-NOTFA13A                  Enables logic changes for FA13A (not used)
HSE-NOTFA2                    Enables logic changes for FA2 (not used)
HSE-NOTFA2-ED-10              Enables logic changes for FA2-ED-10 (not used)
HSE-NOTFA2-ED-20              Enables logic changes for FA2-ED-20 (not used)
HSE-NOTFA23                    Enables logic changes for FA23E, S & W (not used)
HSE-NOTFA23ES                  Enables logic changes for FA23E & S (not used)
HSE-NOTFA3                    Enables logic changes for FA3 (not used)
HSE-NOTFA4                    Enables logic changes for FA4 (not used)
HSE-NOTFACR                    Enables logic changes for FA1 (not used)
IE-FA-1                        Disables components for FA1 exposure fire (T)s IE-FA-1-EC-01L                Disables components for FA1 cabinet fire (T)
IE-FA-1-EC-01R                Disables components for FA1 cabinet fire (T)
IE-FA-1-EC-02L                Disables components for FA1 cabinet fire (T)
IE-FA-1-EC-02R                Disables components for FA1 cabinet fire (T)
 
Table 2.7: House Events Added to Fault Tree Models House Event                  Description IE-FA-1-EC-03L                Disables components for FA1 cabinet fire (T)
IE-FA-1-EC-03R                Disables components for FAl cabinet fire (T)
IE-FA-1-EC-04L                Disables components for FA1 cabinet fire (T)
IE-FA-1 -EC-04R              Disables components for FA1 cabinet fire (T)
IE-FA-1-EC-08L                Disables components for FA1 cabinet fire (T)
IE-FA-1-EC-08R                Disables components for FA1 cabinet fire (T)
IE-FA-1-EC-106                Disables components for FA1 cabinet fire (T)
IE-FA-1-EC-1 1L              Disables components for FA1 cabinet fire (T)
IE-FA-1-EC-11 R              Disables components for FA1 cabinet fire (T)
IE-FA-1-EC-11R                Disables components for FA1 cabinet fire (T)
IE-FA-1-EC-126                Disables components for FA1 cabinet fire (T)
IE-FA-1-EC-12L                Disables components for FA1 cabinet fire (T)
IE-FA-1-EC-12R                Disables components for FA1 cabinet fire (T)
IE-FA-1-EC-13L                Disables components for FA1 cabinet fire (T)
IE-FA-1      3                Disables components for FA1 exposure fire (T)
IE-FA-2-EB-O1                Disables components for FA2 cabinet fire (T)
IE-FA-2-EB-02                Disables components for FA2 cabinet fire (T)
IE-FA-2-EB-1 1                Disables components for FA2 cabinet fire (T)
IE-FA-2-EB-12                Disables components for FA2 cabinet fire (T)
IE-FA-2-EB-21                Disables components for FA2 cabinet fire (T)
IE-FA-2-EB-23                Disables components for FA2 cabinet fire (T)
IE-FA-2-EB-24                Disables components for FA2 cabinet fire (T)
IE-FA-2-ED-06                Disables components for FA2 cabinet fire (T)
IE-FA-2-ED-07                Disables components for FA2 cabinet fire (T)
IE-FA-2-ED-08                Disables components for FA2 cabinet fire (T)
IE-FA-2-ED-09                Disables components for FA2 cabinet fire (T)
IE-FA-2-ED-10                Disables components for FA2 cabinet fire (T)
IE-FA-2-ED-1 1                Disables components for FA2 cabinet fire (T)
IE-FA-2-ED-15                Disables components for FA2 cabinet fire (T)
IE-FA-2-ED-16                Disables components for FA2 cabinet fire (T)
IE-FA-2-ED-17                Disables components for FA2 cabinet fire (T)
IE-FA-2-ED-18                Disables components for FA2 cabinet fire (T)
IE-FA-2-ED-20                Disables components for FA2 cabinet fire (T)
IE-FA-2-ED-21                Disables components for FA2 cabinet fire (T)
IE-FA-2-ED-576                Disables components for FA2 cabinet fire (T)
IE-FA-2-EJ-14A                Disables components for FA2 cabinet fire (T)
IE-FA-2-EJ-542                Disables components for FA2 cabinet fire (T)
IE-FA-2-EJ-543                Disables components for FA2 cabinet fire (T)
IE-FA-2-EJ-575                Disables components for FA2 cabinet fire (T)
IE-FA-2-EJ-576                Disables components for FA2 cabinet fire (T)
IE-FA-2-EY-51                Disables components for FA2 cabinet fire (T)
IE-FA-2-EY-1O                Disables components for FA2 cabinet fire (T)
 
Table 2.7: House Events Added to Fault Tree Models House Event                  Description IE-FA-2-EY-20                Disables components for FA2 cabinet fire (T)
IE-FA-2-EY-30                Disables components for FA2 cabinet fire (T)
IE-FA-2-EY-40                Disables components for FA2 cabinet fire (T)
IE-FA-2-EY-50                Disables components for FA2 cabinet fire (T)
IE-FA-2-FZ2                  Disables components for FA2 cabinet fire (T)
IE-FA-3                      Disables components for FA3 exposure fire (T)
IE-FA-3-EA-12                Disables components for FA3 cabinet fire (T)
IE-FA-3-EB-22                Disables components for FA3 cabinet fire (T)
IE-FA-3-EC-181                Disables components for FA3 cabinet fire (T)
IE-FA-3-EC-187                Disables components for FA3 cabinet fire (T)
IE-FA-3-EJ-1005              Disables components for FA3 cabinet fire (T)
IE-FA-3-EJ-1006              Disables components for FA3 cabinet fire (T)
IE-FA-3-EJ-1051              Disables components for FA3 cabinet fire (T)
IE-FA-3-EJ-1052              Disables components for FA3 cabinet fire (T)
IE-FA-3-EJ-9401              Disables components for FA3 cabinet fire (T)
IE-FA-4                      Disables components for FA4 exposure fire (T)
IE-FA-4-EA-1 1                Disables components for FA4 cabinet fire (T)
IE-FA-4-ED-1 1A              Disables components for FA4 cabinet fire (T)
IE-FA-4-EJ-9400              Disables components for FA4 cabinet fire (T)
IE-FA-13-13A1                Disables components for FA13A1 exposure fire (T)
IE-FA-13-13A2                Disables components for FA1 3A2 exposure fire (T)
IE-FA-23-23E                  Disables components for FA23E exposure fire (T)
IE-FA-23-23S                  Disables components for FA23S exposure fire (T)
IE-FA-23-23W                  Disables components for FA23W exposure fire (T)
 
Table 2.8: Fire Initiating Events Added to Event Tree Logic Initiating Event Frequency        Reference FA-1            2.43E-03        Fire IPEEE (Ref 2.1.3)
FA-1-EC-01L      9.50E-03 FA-1-EC-01R      9.50E-03 FA-1-EC-02L      9.50E-03 FA-1-EC-02R      9.50E-03 FA-1-EC-03L      9.50E-03 FA-1-EC-03R      9.50E-03 FA-1 -EC-04L    9.50E-03 FA-1-EC-04R      9.50E-03 FA-1-EC-08L      9.50E-03 FA-1-EC-08R      9.50E-03 FA-1-EC-106      9.50E-03 FA-1-EC-11L      9.50E-03 FA-1 -EC-11R    9.50E-03 FA-1-EC-126      9.50E-03 FA-1-EC-12L      9.50E-03 FA-1-EC-12R      9.50E-03 FA-1-EC-13L      9.50E-03 FA-1-EC-13R      9.50E-03 FA-2            3.1OE-03 FA-2-EB-01      3.20E-03 FA-2-EB-02      3.20E-03 FA-2-EB-11      3.20E-03 FA-2-EB-12      3.20E-03 FA-2-EB-21      3.20E-03 FA-2-EB-23      3.20E-03 FA-2-EB-24      3.20E-03 FA-2-ED-06      3.20E-03 FA-2-ED-07      3.20E-03 FA-2-ED-08      3.20E-03 FA-2-ED-09      3.20E-03 FA-2-ED-10      3.20E-03 FA-2-ED-1 1      3.20E-03 FA-2-ED-15      3.20E-03 FA-2-ED-16      3.20E-03 FA-2-ED-17      3.20E-03 FA-2-ED-18      3.20E-03 FA-2-ED-20      3.20E-03 FA-2-ED-21      3.20E-03 FA-2-EJ-14A      3.20E-03
 
Table 2.8: Fire Initiating Events Added to Event Tree Logic Initiating Event Frequency        Reference FA-2-EJ-542      3.20E-03 FA-2-EJ-543      3.20E-03 FA-2-EJ-575      3.20E-03 FA-2-EJ-576      3.20E-03 FA-2-EY-01      3.20E-03 FA-2-EY-10      3.20E-03 FA-2-EY-20      3.20E-03 FA-2-EY-30      3.20E-03 FA-2-EY-40      3.20E-03 FA-2-EY-50      3.20E-03 FA-3            9.81E-04 FA-3-EA-12      3.75E-03 FA-3-EB-22      3.75E-03 FA-3-EC-181      3.75E-03 FA-3-EC-187      3.75E-03 FA-3-EJ-1 005    3.75E-03 FA-3-EJ-1006    3.75E-03 FA-3-EJ-1051    3.75E-03 FA-3-EJ-1052    3.75E-03 FA-3-EJ-9401    3.75E-03 FA-4            4.15E-04 FA-4-EA-1 1      3.75E-03 FA-4-ED-11A      3.75E-03 FA-4-EJ-9400    3.75E-03 FA-13-13A1      1.99E-03 FA-13-13A2      5.37E-03 FA-23-23E        2.94E-02 FA-23-23S        6.42E-02 FA-23-23W        1.55E-03
 
Table 2.9: Random Failures Added to Fault Trees Event                                      Prob          Reference                            Description B-AVMB-CV-0511                          3.64E-03          PSAR2.BE ADV FTRC                    Spurious operation of turbine bypass valve 5.85E-04          PSAR2BE Ck Valve FTRC                HPSI injection line check valve FTRC (ISLOCA H-CVMC-CK-ES311HS                                          PRmodel) 5.85E-04                                                HPSI injection line check valve FTRC (ISLOCA H-CVMC-CK-ES313HS                                          PSAR2.BE Ck Valve FTRC                model)
H-CVMC-CK-ES3116HS                      5.85E-04          PSAR2.BE Ck Valve FTRC                HPSI injection line check valve ETRO (ISLOCA H-CVMC-CK-ES3116HS                                        PSAR2.BE Ck Valve FTRC                model) mdl 5.85E-04                                                model)
HPSI injection line check valve FTRC (ISLOCA H-CVMC-CK-ES3131 HS                                        PSAR2.BE Ok Valve FTRO                  odl 5.85E-04                                                model)
HPSI injection line check valve FTRC (ISLOCA H-MVMA-MO-3072                          4.18E-03          PSAR2.BE CVCS MOV FTO                CVCS injection to primary system H-MVMD-MO-3072                          2.96E-05          PSAR2.BE CVCS MOV FTRO                CVCS injection to primary system NA (used to assign fire areas that    I&C failure mode for MO-3072 inj to primary will fail the MOV I&C)                system L-CVMC-CK-ES3101HS                      5.85E-04          PSAR2BE Ck Valve FTRC                LPSI injection line check valve FTRC (ISLOCA
__________________model)
L-CVMC-CK-ES31 16HS                    5.85E-04          PSAR2.BE Ck Valve FTRC                LPSI injection line check valve FTRC (ISLOCA mdl model)
L-CVMC-CK-ES31 31 HS                    5.85E-04          PSAR2BE Ok Vlv  Valve FRFTRC        LPSI injection line check valve FTRC (ISLOCA model)C model)
L-CVMC-CK-ES3146HS                      5.85E-04          PSAR2.BE Ck ValveVlv FTRCFR          LPSI injection line check valve FTRC (ISLOCA model)C model)
M-FUMK-B389                            2.21 E-05          PSAR2.BE      Fuse failure            MO-0510 control failure M-HSMB-0510C                            6.71 E-05          PSAR2.BE      Hand switch FTC        MO-0510 remote hand switch failure M-LMMC-0510A                            2.33E-05          PSAR2.BE      Limit switch FTRC      MO-0510 control failure M-MVMA-MO-0510                          4.18E-03          PSAR2.BE      MOV FTO                MO-0510 FTO to supply steam to hogger M-MVMC-MO-0510                          8.12E-04          PSAR2.BE      MOV FTRC                MO-O51O FTRC preventing SGA from depressurizing M-MVMD-MO-0510                          2.96E-05          PSAR2.BE      MOV FTRO                MO-0510 FTRO to supply steam to hogger M-QSMC-0510                            2.33E-05          PSAR2.BE      Torque sw FTRC          MO-0510 control failure M-REMB-3890                            2.41 E-04          PSAR2.BE      Relay fail to energize  MO-0510 control failure M-REMC-3890                            2.40E-05          PSAR2.BE      Relay FTRE              MO-0510 control failure M-REMD-389C                            2.40E-05          PSAR2.BE      Relay FTRDE            MO-0510 control failure M-REMD-4938                            2.40E-05          PSAR2.BE      Relay FTRDE            MO-0510 control failure M-TRMT-B389                            3.72E-05          PSAR2.BE      Trans fails to function MO-0510 control failure P-B2MK-EB-03                            1.20E-05          PSAR2.BE      Bus fails to function  MCC3 fails to function (power to MO-0510)
P-CBMC-1 52-110                              1.0          NA (conservatively    assigned        Breaker to Bus 13 value  of 1)
P-CBMC-52-389                          1.49E-05          PSAR2.BEMO-0510                                  control failure Breaker FTRC NA (conservatively assigned          Warm water recirc pump FTR (bypasses plugged I value of 1)                          traveling screens)
 
Table 2.11: Operator Actions Added to Fault Tree Logic Operator Action  Prob        Reference                              Description A-AVOE-AVMAN      3.38E-2    Fire IPEEE                            Operator action to open AFW flow control valves on auto signal failure F-PMOE-FPS        3.40E-2    Fire IPEEE                            Operator  action to start fire pumps on auto signal failure G-MVOA-CBALOCAL  1.0        NA (conservatively set to value of 1)  Operator action  to open locally MO-2140 or MO-2160 H-AVOA-SUB-LOCAL  1.0        NA (conservatively set to value of 1.) Operator  action  to open locally CV-3070 H-MVOA-3072LOCAL  1.0        NA (conservatively set to value of 1)  Operator action  to bypass MO-3072 I&C failure H-MVOA-CHG2HPSI  3.40E-2                                            Operator  action  to align charging to primary system H-MVOA-HPSI-LOCAL 1.OE-2      Fire IPEEE                            Operator  action  to align HPSI injection valves locally M-MVOA-051OLOCAL  1.0        NA (conservatively set to value of 1)  Operator  action  to open MO-0510 locally M-CVOA-MSIVLOCAL  0.1        Screening value                        Operator  action  to trip closed MSIVs locally P-CBOT-TFXFR      1E-2        Fire IPEEE                            Operator  action  to manually align fast transfer U-PMOE-P5        1.0        NA (conservatively set to value of 1)  Operator  action  to align warm water recirc pump U-PMOE-PUMP      1.0        NA (conservatively set to value of 1)  Operator  action  to start P7B on auto start failure
 
Table 2.12: Hot Short Failure Modes Added to Fault Trees (not used in this analysis)
Hot Short                              Prob    Description G-MVMD-MO-2140HS                        1.0    Hot short of MO-2140 FTRO G-MVMD-MO-2160HS                        1.0    Hot short of MO-2160 FTRO H-MVMC-MO-3007HS                        1.0    Hot short of MO-3007 FTRC (ISLOCA)
H-MVMD-MO-3007HS                        1.0    Hot short of MO-3007 FTRO H-MVMC-MO-3009HS                        1.0    Hot short of MO-3009 FTRC (ISLOCA)
H-MVMD-MO-3009HS                        1.0    Hot short of MO-3009 FTRO H-MVMC-MO-3011HS                        1.0    Hot short of MO-3011 FTRC (ISLOCA)
H-MVMD-MO-3011HS                        1.0    Hot short of MO-3011 FTRO H-MVMC-MO-3013HS                        1.0    Hot short of MO-3013 FTRC (ISLOCA)
H-MVMD-MO-3013HS                        1.0    Hot short of MO-3013 FTRO H-MVMC-MO-3062HS                        1.0    Hot short of MO-3062 FTRC (ISLOCA)
H-MVMD-MO-3062HS                        1.0    Hot short of MO-3062 FTRO H-MVMC-MO-3064HS                        1.0    Hot short of MO-3064 FTRC (ISLOCA)
H-MVMD-MO-3064HS                        1.0    Hot short of MO-3064 FTRO H-MVMC-MO-3066HS                        1.0    Hot short of MO-3066 FTRC (ISLOCA)
H-MVMD-MO-3066HS                        1.0    Hot short of MO-3066 FTRO H-MVMC-MO-3068HS                        1.0    Hot short of MO-3068 FTRC (ISLOCA)
H-MVMD-MO-3068HS                        1.0    Hot short of MO-3068 FTRO H-MVMD-MO-3072HS                        1.0    Hot short of MO-3072 FTRO L-MVMC-MO-3008HS                        1.0    Hot short of MO-3008 FTRC (ISLOCA)
L-MVMD-MO-3008HS                        1.0    Hot short of MO-3008 FTRO L-MVMC-MO-3010HS                        1.0    Hot short of MO-3010 FTRC (ISLOCA)
L-MVMD-MO-3010HS                        1.0    Hot short of MO-301 0 FTRO L-MVMC-MO-3012HS                        1.0    Hot short of MO-3012 FTRC (ISLOCA)
L-MVMD-MO-3012HS                        1.0    Hot short of MO-3012 FTRO L-MVMC-MO-3014HS                        1.0    Hot short of MO-3014 FTRC (ISLOCA)
L-MVMD-MO-3014HS                        1.0    Hot short of MO-3014 FTRO L-MVMC-MO-3189HS                        1.0    Hot short of MO-3189 FTRC L-MVMC-MO-3198HS                        1.0    Hot short of MO-3198 FTRC L-MVMD-MO-3190HS                        1.0    Hot short of MO-3190 FTRO L-MVMD-MO-3199HS                        1.0    Hot short of MO-3199 FTRO
 
pg Table 3.1 IPEEE Table 4.7-3 Palisades Ignition Source Frequencies and Combustible Loading  2 Table 3.2 Fault Tree/Fire Area Frequencies                                                7 Table 3.3 Fire Area Assigned Logical Event and Frequency                                  9
 
Table 3.1: IPEEE TABLE 4.7-3 PALISADES IGNITION SOURCE FREQUENCIES AND COMBUSTIBLE LOADING FIRE                                                COMBUSTIBLE IGNITION SOURCE AREA                                                  LOADING  FREQUENCY (yr) 1            Control Room                          Moderate      2.43E-3 Exposure Fire Cabinet Fire                                  9.50E-3 Cable Spreading Room                                      3.19E-3 2            Exposure Fire                          Moderate      320E3 Cabinet Fire 1D Switchgear Room 3            Exposure Fire                          Moderate      9.81E-4 Cabinet Fire                                        3.75E-3 1C Switchgear Room 4            Exposure Fire                          Moderate      4.15E-4 Cabinet Fire                                        3.75E-3 5        Diesel Generator 1-1                          Light      1.69E-2 6        Diesel Generator 1-2                          Light      1.72E-2 7 &8          Diesel Day Tanks                          Heavy    N/A - Screened 9A  Intake Structure - East Side (SWS)                  Light      7.20E-3 9B  Intake Structure - West Side (FPS)                  Light      7.20E-3 10    East Engineered Safeguards                    Minimal      2.36E-3
 
Table 3.1: IPEEE TABLE 4.7-3 PALISADES IGNITION SOURCE FREQUENCIES AND COMBUSTIBLE LOADING FIRE                                                        COMBUSTIBLE  IGNITION SOURCE AREA                                                          LOADING    FREQUENCY (yr) 11                Battery Room #2                          Moderate        1.60E-3 12                Battery Room #1                          Moderate        1.60E-3 13A1    Auxiliary Building 590' Corridor (CCW to              Minimal        1.99E-3 Charging) 13A2 Auxiliary Building 590' Corridor (Except Zone            Moderate        5.37E-3 13A1) 13B              Charging Pump Room                          Minimal        2.06E-3 Minimal -
13C All Other Areas on the 590' Auxiliary Building          Moderate        1.15E-2 14              Containment Building                          Light          N/A 15      Engineered Safeguards Panel Room                    Moderate        1.50E-4 16    Component Cooling Water Pump Room                      Minimal        2.36E-3 17    Refueling and Spent Fuel Pool Room                    Minimal    N/A - Screened 18              Demineralizer Room                          Minimal    N/A - Screened
 
Table 3.1: IPEEE TABLE 4.7-3 PALISADES IGNITION SOURCE FREQUENCIES AND COMBUSTIBLE LOADING FIRE                                                      COMBUSTIBLE  IGNITION SOURCE AREA                                                          LOADING    FREQUENCY (yr) 19          Compactor Area - Track Alley                  Minimal Moderate-  N/A - Screened 20        Spent Fuel Pool Equipment Room                    Minimal        6.02E-4 21A  Electric Equipment Room - East Side (Bus 19)              Light        3.80E-3 21 B  Electric Equipment Room - West Side (Bus
: 20)                                  Light        3.80E-3 22              Turbine Lube Oil Room                        Heavy    N/A - Screened 23E            Turbine Building East Side                    Moderate        2.94E-2 23S            Turbine Building South Side                    Heavy        6.42E-2 23W            Turbine Building West Side                    Moderate        1.55E-3 24        Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Room                    Minimal        2.27E-4
 
Table 3.1: IPEEE TABLE 4.7-3 PALISADES IGNITION SOURCE FREQUENCIES AND COMBUSTIBLE LOADING FIRE                                                COMBUSTIBLE  IGNITION SOURCE AREA                                                  LOADING    FREQUENCY (yr) 25        Heating Boiler Rooms                        Moderate  N/A - Screened 26  Southwest Cable Penetration Room                  Moderate      6.89E-5 27        Radwaste Addition - VRS                      Moderate  N/A - Screened 28      West Engineered Safeguards                    Minimal        2.74E-3 29  Center Mechanical Equipment Rooms                  Minimal    N/A - Screened 30  East Mechanical Equipment Rooms                  Moderate  N/A - Screened 31  West Mechanical Equipment Rooms                    Moderate  N/A - Screened 32      SIRW Tank/CCW Roof Area                        Minimal        4.85E-5 33        Technical Support Center                    Moderate  N/A - Screened
 
Table 3.1: IPEEE TABLE 4.7-3 PALISADES IGNITION SOURCE FREQUENCIES AND COMBUSTIBLE LOADING DSRPINCOMBUSTIBLE                      IGNITION SOURCE LOADING  FREQUENCY (yr)
Man Hole #1, #2, #3                          Light      3.97E-5
 
Fault Tree  Frequency/yr Description FA-1          2.43E-03  GENERAL AREA FIRE FA-1-EC-01L  9.50E-03  LEFT CH PANEL EC-01/CONTROL ROOM CAB FIRE FA-1-EC-01R  9.50E-03  RIGHT CH PANEL EC-01/CONTROL ROOM CAB FIRE FA-1-EC-02L  9.50E-03  LEFT CH PANEL EC-02/CONTROL ROOM CAB FIRE FA-1-EC-02R  9.50E-03  RIGHT CH PANEL EC-02/CONTROL ROOM CAB FIRE FA-1-EC-03L  9.50E-03  LEFT CH PANEL EC-03/CONTROL ROOM CAB FIRE FA-1-EC-03R  9.50E-03  RIGHT CH PANEL EC-03/CONTROL ROOM CAB FIRE FA-1-EC-04L  9.50E-03  LEFT CH PANEL EC-04/CONTROL ROOM CAB FIRE FA-1-EC-04R  9.50E-03  RIGHT CH PANEL EC-04/CONTROL ROOM CAB FIRE FA-1-EC-08L  9.50E-03  LEFT CH PANEL EC-08/CONTROL ROOM CAB FIRE FA-1-EC-08R  9.50E-03  RIGHT CH PANEL EC-08/CONTROL ROOM CAB FIRE FA-1-EC-106  9.50E-03  CLG TWR MASTER SUPRVISORY & CONT CABINET CAB FIRE FA-1-EC-11L  9.50E-03  LEFT CH RAD/TURBINE AUX MONITOR PANEL CAB FIRE FA-1-EC-11R  9.50E-03  RIGHT CH RAD/TURBINE AUX MONITOR PANEL CAB FIRE FA-1-EC-126  9.50E-03  CIRCULATION WATER & IODINE REMOVAL PANEL CAB FIRE FA-1-EC-12L  9.50E-03  LEFT CH PRIMARY SYSTEM CONTROL PANEL CAB FIRE FA-1-EC-12R  9.50E-03  RIGHT CH PRIMARY SYSTEM CONTROL PANEL CAB FIRE FA-1-EC-13L  9.50E-03  L CH DBA/SHTDWN & MISC LOADS CNTRL PNL CAB FIRE FA-1-EC-13R  9.50E-03  R CH DBA/SHTDWN & MISC LOADS CNTRL PNL CAB FIRE FA-10        2.36E-03  EAST ENGINEERED SAFEGUARDS EXP FIRE FA-1 1        1.60E-03  BATTERY ROOM 2 EXP FIRE FA-12        1.60E-03  BATTERY ROOM 1 EXP FIRE FA-13-13A1    1.99E-03  AUX BLDNG 590' CORRIDR (CCW - CHARGING) EXP FIRE FA-13-13A2    5.37E-03  AUX BLDNG 590' CORRIDR (EXCEPT ZNE 13A1 ) EXP FIRE FA-13-13B    2.06E-03  CHARGING PUMP ROOM EXP FIRE FA-13-13C    1.15E-02  ALL OTHR AREAS AT 590' AUXI BUILDNG EXP FIRE FA-14        1.00E+00  CONTAINMENT BUILDING FA-15        1.50E-04  ENGINEERED SAFEGUARDS PANEL ROOM EXP FIRE FA-16        2.36E-03  COMPONENT COOLING WATER ROOM EXP FIRE FA-18        1,00E+00  DEMINERALIZER ROOM EXP FIRE FA-2          3.10E-03  CSR EXP FIRE FA-2-EB-01    3.20E-03  CSR 480 V MCC NO.1 CAB FIRE FA-2-EB-02    3.20E-03  CSR 480 V MCC NO.2 CAB FIRE FA-2-EB-1 1  3.20E-03  CSR 480 V BUS NO. 11 CAB FIRE FA-2-EB-12    3.20E-03  CSR 480 V BUS NO. 12 CAB FIRE FA-2-EB-21    3.20E-03  CSR 480 V MCC #21 CAB FIRE FA-2-EB-23    3.20E-03  CSR 480 V MCC #23 CAB FIRE FA-2-EB-24    3.20E-03  CSR 480 V MCC #24 CAB FIRE FA-2-ED-06    3.20E-03  CSR INVERTER NO. 1 CAB FIRE FA-2-ED-07    3.20E-03  CSR INVERTER NO. 2 CAB FIRE FA-2-ED-08    3.20E-03  CSR INVERTER NO. 3 CAB FIRE FA-2-ED-09    3.20E-03  CSR INVERTER NO. 4 CAB FIRE FA-2-ED-10    3.20E-03  CSR 125 V BUS NO. 1- LEFT SIDE - TIE BKR CAB FIRE FA-2-ED-1 1  3.20E-03  CSR 125 V BUS CAB FIRE FA-2-ED-15    3.20E-03  CSR BATTERY CHARGER NO. 1 CAB FIRE FA-2-ED-16    3.20E-03  CSR BATTERY CHARGER NO. 2 CAB FIRE FA-2-ED-17    3.20E-03  CSR BATTERY CHARGER NO. 3 CAB FIRE FA-2-ED-18    3.20E-03  CSR BATTERY CHARGER NO. 4 CAB FIRE FA-2-ED-20    3.20E-03  CSR CSR 125 VDC BUS NO. 2 CAB FIRE
 
Table 3.2: Fault TreelFire Area Frequencies Fault Tree  Frequency/yr    Description FA-2-ED-21    3.20E-03      CSR CSR 125 VOLTS DC DISTRIBUTION PANEL CAB FIRE FA-2-EJ-14A    3.20E-03      CSR J BOX EJ-14A CAB FIRE FA-2-EJ-542    3.20E-03      CSR J BOX EJ-542 CAB FIRE FA-2-EJ-543    3.20E-03      CSR J BOX EJ-543 CAB FIRE FA-2-EJ-575    3.20E-03      CSR J BOX EJ-575 CAB FIRE FA-2-EJ-576    3.20E-03      CSR J BOX EJ-576 CAB FIRE FA-2-EY-01    3.20E-03      CSR INSTRUMENT AC PANEL CAB FIRE FA-2-EY-10    3.20E-03      CSR PREFERRED AC BUS NO. 1 INVERTER CAB FIRE FA-2-EY-20    3.20E-03      CSR PREFERRED AC BUS NO. 2 INVERTER CAB FIRE FA-2-EY-30    3.20E-03      CSR PREFERRED AC BUS NO. 3 INVERTER CAB FIRE FA-2-EY-40    3.20E-03      CSR PREFERRED AC BUS NO. 4 INVERTER CAB FIRE FA-2-EY-50    3.20E-03      CSR EY-01 PANEL TRANSFER SWITCH CAB FIRE FA-20          6.02E-04      SPENT FUEL POOL EQUIPMENT ROOM EXP FIRE FA-21-21A      3.80E-03      EEQUIP ROOM - EAST SIDE (BUS 19) EXP FIRE FA-21-21B      3.80E-03      EEQUIP ROOM - WEST SIDE (BUS 20) EXP FIRE FA-23-23E      2.94E-02      TURBINE BUILDING EAST SIDE EXP FIRE FA-23-23S      6.42E-02      TURBINE BUILDING SOUTH SIDE EXP FIRE FA-23-23W      1.55E-03      TURBINE BUILDING WEST SIDE EXP FIRE FA-24          2.27E-04      AUXILIARY FEEDWATER PUMP ROOM EXP FIRE FA-25          1.00E+00      HEATING BOILER ROOMS EXP FIRE FA-26          6.89E-05      SOUTHWEST CABLE PENETRATION ROOM EXP FIRE FA-28          2.74E-03      WEST ENGINEERED SAFEGUARDS EXP FIRE FA-3          9.81 E-04      1D SWITCHGR LOGICAL PLACEHOLDER FA-3-EA-12    3.75E-03      1D SWITCHGR 2400 V BUS 1D CAB FIRE FA-3-EB-22    3.75E-03      1D SWITCHGR 4160 V BUS 1B CAB FIRE FA-3-EC-181    3.75E-03      1D SWITCHGR MSIV SOLENOID VALVE PANEL CAB FIRE FA-3-EC-187    3.75E-03      1D SWITCHGR AFW ACTUATION CABINET CAB FIRE FA-3-EJ-1005  3.75E-03      1D SWITCHGR J BOX J-1005 CAB FIRE FA-3-EJ-1006  3.75E-03      1D SWITCHGR J BOX J-1 006 CAB FIRE FA-3-EJ-1051  3.75E-03      1D SWITCHGR J BOX J-1 051 CAB FIRE FA-3-EJ-1052  3.75E-03      1D SWITCHGR J BOX J-1 052 CAB FIRE FA-3-EJ-9401  3.75E-03      1D SWITCHGR J BOX J-9401 CAB FIRE FA-32          4.85E-05      SIRW TANK/CCW ROOF AREA EXP FIRE FA-34          3.97E-05      MAN HOLE #1, #2, #3 EXP FIRE FA-4          4.15E-04      1C SWITCHGR LOGICAL PLACEHOLDER FA-4-EA-11    3.75E-03      lC SWITCHGR 2400 V BUS 1C CAB FIRE FA-4-ED-11A    3.75E-03      lC SWITCHGR ED-11A 125 VOLTS DC DIST PANEL CAB FIRE FA-4-EJ-9400  3.75E-03      1C SWITCHGR J BOX J-9400 CAB FIRE FA-5          1.69E-02      DIESEL GENERATOR 1-1 (LOGICAL PLACEHOLDER)
FA-6          1.72E-02      DIESEL GENERATOR 1-2 (LOGICAL PLACEHOLDER)
FA-7          1.OOE+00      DIESEL GENERATOR 1-1 (LOGICAL PLACEHOLDER)
FA-8          1.OOE+00      DIESEL GENERATOR 1-2 (LOGICAL PLACEHOLDER)
FA-9-9A        7.20E-03      INTAKE STRUCTURE - EAST SIDE (SWS) EXP FIRE FA-9-9B        7.20E-03      INTAKE STRUCTURE - WEST SIDE (FPS) EXP FIRE
 
Table 3.3: Fire Area Assigned Logical Event and Frequency Fire Area Assigned Logical Frequency/yr    Description Event IE-FA-1                      1.OOE+00      LOGICAL PLACEHOLDER IE-FA-1-EC-01L              9.50E-03      LEFT CH PANEL EC-01/CONTROL ROOM CAB FIRE (MOD)(IE Freq)
IE-FA-1-EC-01R              9.50E-03      RIGHT CH PANEL EC-01/CONTROL ROOM CAB FIRE (MOD)(IE Freq)
IE-FA-1-EC-02L                9.50E-03      LEFT CH PANEL EC-02/CONTROL ROOM CAB FIRE (MOD)(IE Freq)
IE-FA-1-EC-02R                9.50E-03      RIGHT CH PANEL EC-02/CONTROL ROOM CAB FIRE (MOD)(IE Freq)
IE-FA-1-EC-03L                9.50E-03      LEFT CH PANEL EC-03/CONTROL ROOM CAB FIRE (MOD)(IE Freq)
IE-FA-1-EC-03R                9.50E-03      RIGHT CH PANEL EC-03/CONTROL ROOM CAB FIRE (MOD)(IE Freq)
IE-FA-1-EC-04L              9.50E-03      LEFT CH PANEL EC-04/CONTROL ROOM CAB FIRE (MOD)(IE Freq)
IE-FA-1-EC-04R                9.50E-03      RIGHT CH PANEL EC-04/CONTROL ROOM CAB FIRE (MOD)(IE Freq)
IE-FA-1-EC-08L                9.50E-03      LEFT CH PANEL EC-08/CONTROL ROOM CAB FIRE (MOD)(IE Freq)
IE-FA-1-EC-08R                9.50E-03      RIGHT CH PANEL EC-08/CONTROL ROOM CAB FIRE (MOD)(IE Freq)
IE-FA-1-EC:106                9.50E-03      CLG TWR MASTER SUPRVISORY & CONT CABINET CAB FIRE (MOD)(IE Freq)
IE-FA-1-EC-11L                9.50E-03      LEFT CH RAD/TURBINE AUX MONITOR PANEL CAB FIRE (MOD)(IE Freq)
IE-FA-1-EC-11R                9.50E-03      RIGHT CH RAD/TURBINE AUX MONITOR PANEL CAB FIRE (MOD)(IE Freq)
IE-FA-1-EC-126                9.50E-03      CIRCULATION WATER & IODINE REMOVAL PANEL CAB FIRE (MOD)(IE Freq)
IE-FA-1-EC-12L                9.50E-03      LEFT CH PRIMARY SYSTEM CONTROL PANEL CAB FIRE (MOD)(IE Freq)
IE-FA-1-EC-12R                9.50E-03      RIGHT CH PRIMARY SYSTEM CONTROL PANEL CAB FIRE (MOD)(IE Freq)
IE-FA-1-EC-13L                9.50E-03      L CH DBNSHTDWN & MISC LOADS CNTRL PNL CAB FIRE (MOD)(IE Freq)
IE-FA-1-EC-13R                9.50E-03      R CH DBA/SHTDWN & MISC LOADS CNTRL PNL CAB FIRE (MOD)(IE Freq)
IE-FA-10                      2.36E-03      EAST ENGINEERED SAFEGUARDS EXP FIRE (MINIMAL)(IE Freq)
IE-FA-1 1                    1.60E-03      BATTERY ROOM 2 EXP FIRE (MODERATE)(IE Freq)
IE-FA-12                      1.60E-03      BATTERY ROOM 1 EXP FIRE (MODERATE)(IE Freq)
IE-FA-13-13A1                1.99E-03      AUX BLDNG 590' CORRIDR (CCW - CHARGING) EXP FIRE (MIN)(IE Freq)
IE-FA-13-13A2                5.37E-03      AUX BLDNG 590' CORRIDR (EXCEPT ZNE 13A1) EXP FIRE (MOD)(IE Freq)
IE-FA-13-13B                  2.06E-03      CHARGING PUMP ROOM EXP FIRE (MIN)(IE Freq)
IE-FA-13-13C                  1.15E-02      ALL OTHR AREAS AT 590' AUXI BUILDNG EXP FIRE (MIN-MOD)(IE Freq)
IE-FA-14                    1.00E+00        CONTAINMENT BUILDING (IE-Freq - N/A)
IE-FA-15                      1.50E-04      ENGINEERED SAFEGUARDS PANEL ROOM EXP FIRE (MOD)(IE Freq)
IE-FA-16                      2.36E-03      COMPONENT COOLING WATER ROOM EXP FIRE (MIN)(IE Freq)
IE-FA-18                    1.00E+00        DEMINERALIZER ROOM EXP FIRE (MIN)(IE-Freq - N/A)
IE-FA-2                      3.10E-03      CSR EXP FIRE (MOD)(IE Freq)
IE-FA-2-EB-01                3.20E-03      CSR 480 V MCC NO.1 CAB FIRE (MOD)(IE Freq)
IE-FA-2-EB-02                3.20E-03      CSR 480 V MCC NO.2 CAB FIRE (MOD)(IE Freq)
IE-FA-2-EB-11                3.20E-03      CSR 480 V BUS NO. 11 CAB FIRE (MOD)(IE Freq)
IE-FA-2-EB-12                3.20E-03      CSR 480 V BUS NO. 12 CAB FIRE (MOD)(IE Freq)
IE-FA-2-EB-21                3.20E-03      CSR 480 V MCC #21 CAB FIRE (MOD)(IE Freq)
IE-FA-2-EB-23                3.20E-03      CSR 480 V MCC #23 CAB FIRE (MOD)(IE Freq)
IE-FA-2-EB-24                3.20E-03      CSR 480 V MCC #24 CAB FIRE (MOD)(IE Freq)
IE-FA-2-ED-06                3.20E-03      CSR INVERTER NO. 1 CAB FIRE (MOD)(IE Freq)
IE-FA-2-ED-07                3.20E-03      CSR INVERTER NO. 2 CAB FIRE (MOD)(IE Freq)
IE-FA-2-ED-08                3.20E-03      CSR INVERTER NO. 3 CAB FIRE (MOD)(IE Freq)
IE-FA-2-ED-09                3.20E-03      CSR INVERTER NO. 4 CAB FIRE (MOD)(IE Freq)
IE-FA-2-ED-10                3.20E-03      CSR 125 V BUS NO. 1- LEFT SIDE - TIE BKR CAB FIRE (MOD)(IE Freq)
IE-FA-2-ED-1 1                3.20E-03      CSR 125 V BUS CAB FIRE (MOD)(IE Freq)
IE-FA-2-ED-15                3.20E-03      CSR BATTERY CHARGER NO. 1 CAB FIRE (MOD)(IE Freq)
IE-FA-2-ED-16                3.20E-03      CSR BATTERY CHARGER NO. 2 CAB FIRE (MOD)(IE Freq)
IE-FA-2-ED-17                3.20E-03      CSR BATTERY CHARGER NO. 3 CAB FIRE (MOD)(IE Freq)
IE-FA-2-ED-18                3.20E-03      CSR BATTERY CHARGER NO. 4 CAB FIRE (MOD)(IE Freq)
 
Table 3.3: Fire Area Assigned Logical Event and Frequency Fire Area Assigned Logical  Frequency/yr    Description Event IE-FA-2-ED-20                3.20E-03      CSR CSR 125 VDC BUS NO. 2 CAB FIRE (MOD)(IE Freq)
IE-FA-2-ED-21                3.20E-03      CSR CSR 125 VOLTS DC DISTRIBUTION PANEL CAB FIRE (MOD)(IE Freq)
IE-FA-2-EJ-14A                3.20E-03      CSR J BOX EJ-14A CAB FIRE (MOD)(IE Freq)
IE-FA-2-EJ-542                3.20E-03      CSR J BOX EJ-542 CAB FIRE (MOD)(IE Freq)
IE-FA-2-EJ-543                3.20E-03      CSR J BOX EJ-543 CAB FIRE (MOD)(IE Freq)
IE-FA-2-EJ-575                3.20E-03      CSR J BOX EJ-575 CAB FIRE (MOD)(IE Freq)
IE-FA-2-EJ-576                3.20E-03      CSR J BOX EJ-576 CAB FIRE (MOD)(IE Freq)
IE-FA-2-EY-01                3.20E-03      CSR INSTRUMENT AC PANEL CAB FIRE (MOD)(IE Freq)
IE-FA-2-EY-10                3.20E-03      CSR PREFERRED AC BUS NO. 1 INVERTER CAB FIRE (MOD)(IE Freq)
IE-FA-2-EY-20                3.20E-03      CSR PREFERRED AC BUS NO. 2 INVERTER CAB FIRE (MOD)(IE Freq)
IE-FA-2-EY-30                3.20E-03      CSR PREFERRED AC BUS NO. 3 INVERTER CAB FIRE (MOD)(IE Freq)
IE-FA-2-EY-40                3.20E-03      CSR PREFERRED AC BUS NO. 4 INVERTER CAB FIRE (MOD)(IE Freq)
IE-FA-2-EY-50                3.20E-03      CSR EY-01 PANEL TRANSFER SWITCH CAB FIRE (MOD)(IE Freq)
IE-FA-20                      6.02E-04      SPENT FUEL POOL EQUIPMENT ROOM EXP FIRE (MIN)(IE Freq)
IE-FA-21-21A                  3.80E-03      EEQUIP ROOM - EAST SIDE (BUS 19) EXP FIRE (LIGHT)(IE Freq)
IE-FA-21-21B                  3.80E-03      EEQUIP ROOM - WEST SIDE (BUS 20) EXP FIRE (LIGHT)(IE Freq)
IE-FA-23-23E                  2.94E-02      TURBINE BUILDING EAST SIDE EXP FIRE (MOD)(IE Freq)
IE-FA-23-23S                  6.42E-02      TURBINE BUILDING SOUTH SIDE EXP FIRE (HEAVY)(IE Freq)
IE-FA-23-23W                  1.55E-03      TURBINE BUILDING WEST SIDE EXP FIRE (MOD)(IE Freq)
IE-FA-24                      2.27E-04      AUXILIARY FEEDWATER PUMP ROOM EXP FIRE (MIN)(IE Freq)
IE-FA-25                      11.00E+00      HEATING BOILER ROOMS EXP FIRE (MOD)(IE-Freq - N/A)
IE-FA-26                      6.89E-05      SOUTHWEST CABLE PENETRATION ROOM EXP FIRE (MOD)(IE Freq)
IE-FA-28                      2.74E-03      WEST ENGINEERED SAFEGUARDS EXP FIRE (MIN)(IE Freq)
IE-FA-3                      1.OOE+00      1D SWITCHGR LOGICAL PLACEHOLDER IE-FA-3-EA-12                3.75E-03      1D SWITCHGR 2400 V BUS 1D CAB FIRE (MOD)(IE Freq)
IE-FA-3-EB-22                3.75E-03      1D SWITCHGR 4160 V BUS 1B CAB FIRE (MOD)(IE Freq)
IE-FA-3-EC-181                3.75E-03      1D SWITCHGR MSIV SOLENOID VALVE PANEL CAB FIRE (MOD)(IE Freq)
IE-FA-3-EC-187                3.75E-03      1D SWITCHGR AFW ACTUATION CABINET CAB FIRE (MOD)(IE Freq)
IE-FA-3-EJ-1005              3.75E-03      1D SWITCHGR J BOX J-1 005 CAB FIRE (MOD)(IE Freq)
IE-FA-3-EJ-1006              3.75E-03      ID SWITCHGR J BOX J-1006 CAB FIRE (MOD)(IE Freq)
IE-FA-3-EJ-1051              3.75E-03      1D SWITCHGR J BOX J-1 051 CAB FIRE (MOD)(IE Freq)
IE-FA-3-EJ-1052              3.75E-03      1D SWITCHGR J BOX J-1052 CAB FIRE (MOD)(IE Freq)
IE-FA-3-EJ-9401              3.75E-03      1D SWITCHGR J BOX J-9401 CAB FIRE (MOD)(IE Freq)
IE-FA-32                      4.85E-05      SIRW TANK/CCW ROOF AREA EXP FIRE (MIN)(IE Freq)
IE-FA-34                      3.97E-05      MAN HOLE #1, #2, #3 EXP FIRE (LIGHT)(IE Freq)
IE-FA-4                      1.OOE+00      IC SWITCHGR LOGICAL PLACEHOLDER IE-FA-4-EA-11                3.75E-03      1C SWITCHGR 2400 V BUS 1C CAB FIRE (IE Freq)
IE-FA-4-ED-11A                3.75E-03      1C SWITCHGR ED-1 1A 125 VOLTS DC DIST PANEL CAB FIRE (IE Freq)
IE-FA-4-EJ-9400              3.75E-03      1C SWITCHGR J BOX J-9400 CAB FIRE (MOD)(IE Freq)
IE-FA-5                      1.69E-02      DIESEL GENERATOR 1-1 (LOGICAL PLACEHOLDER)
IE-FA-6                      1.72E-02      DIESEL GENERATOR 1-2 (LOGICAL PLACEHOLDER)
IE-FA-7                      1.OOE+00      DIESEL GENERATOR 1-1 (LOGICAL PLACEHOLDER)
IE-FA-8                      1.OOE+00      DIESEL GENERATOR 1-2 (LOGICAL PLACEHOLDER)
IE-FA-9-9A                    7.20E-03      INTAKE STRUCTURE - EAST SIDE (SWS) EXP FIRE (LIGHT)(IE Freq)
IE-FA-9-9B                    7.20E-03      INTAKE STRUCTURE - WEST SIDE (FPS) EXP FIRE (LIGHT)(IE Freq)
IE-FA-9A                      1.OOE+00      LOGICAL PLACEHOLDER IE-FA-9B                      1.OOE+00      LOGICAL PLACEHOLDER
 
Table of Contents Pg Figure 4.1 - FAl Control Room Fires                                          2 Figure 4.2 - FA2 Cable Spreading Room Fires                                  3 Figure 4.3 - FA3 Bus 1D Switchgear Fires                                      4 Figure 4.4 - FA4 Bus 1C Switchgear Fires                                      5 Figure 4.5 - FA13 Aux Building Corri4or Fires                                6 Figure 4.6 - FA23 Turbine Building Fires                                      7 Figure 4.7 - Fires leading to ISLOCA                                          8 Figure 4.8 - Control Room Fire Accident Sequences                            9 Figure 4.9 - Cable Spreading Room, Bus 1C & 1D Fire Accident Sequences      10 Figure 4.10 - Aux Building Corridor and Turbine Bldg Fire Accident Sequences 11 Figure 4.11 - ATWS Accident Sequences                                        12 Table 4.1 - FA1 Event Tree Rules                                            13 Table 4.2 - FA2 Event Tree Rules                                            14 Table 4.3 - FA3 Event Tree Rules                                            15 Table 4.4 - FA4 Event Tree Rules                                            16 Table 4.5 - FA13 Event Tree Rules                                            17 Table 4.6 - FA23 Event Tree Rules                                            18 Table 4.7 - Control Room Fire Event Tree Rules                              19 Table 4.8 - Cable Spreading Room, Bus 1C & ID Rules                          20 Table 4.9 - Aux Building Corridor and Turbine Bldg Rules                    21 Table 4.10 - Rules for Transfers to ATWS Event Tree                          22
 
                      -%T  &#xfd;7 FA-I -                                    2005/08/12 Page 2 Figure 4.1 - FA1 Control Room Fires
 
FA FIRE IN THE CABLE SPREADING AREA                                        2005/12/11 Page 4 Figure 4.2 - Cable Spreading Room Fires
 
12~l 10 I3> 10 T4-  10 T5=> 10 T6=> 10 T7-1 10 TH-~ 10 T9> 10 10=1 10 T1-I 12 2005/08/06      Page 7 Figure 4.3 - Bus 1D Switchgear Room Fires
 
BUS IC        BUS CUBICLE        BUS CUBICLE    BUS CUBICLE ROOM            EA-1 I            ED-IIA          EJ-9400 FIRE            FIRE              FIRE            FIRE IEFIRE              FA-4          FA-4-EA-1 I        FA-4-ED-1 I      FA-4-EJ-94              END-STATE-NAMES OK T2=> 10      FIRE T3=> 10    FIRE T4=> 10    FIRE T5=> 12    FIRE-CS FA FIRE IN THE SWITCHGEAR ROOM IC                                                          2005/08/04  Page 8 Figure 4.4 - Bus 1C Switchgear Room Fires
 
AUX BLDG        AUX BLDG 590    CHARGING PUMP      AUX BLDG 590 590' ORRIDOR SOUT FI?' GERCORRIDOR          ROOM FIRE        ELEV FIRE FIRE        EXCEPT 13A1 FIRE IE FIRE          FA-13-13AI        FA-13-13A2        FA-13-13B        FA-13-13C                    END-STATE-NAMES OK T2=> 10      FIRE T3=> 10      FIRE T4=> 10      FIRE T5=> 10      FIRE FA FIRE IN THE AUX BLDG 590 CORRIDOR                                                          2005/08/08  Page 3 Figure 4.5 - Aux Building Corridor Fires
 
TURB BLDG    TURB BLDG        TURB BLDG SOUTH        EAST              WEST FIRE        FIRE              FIRE IEFIRE              FA-23-23S  FA-23-23E        FA-23-23W                          END-STATE-NAMES OK T2=> 10  FIRE T3=> 10 1 FIRE T4=> 10  FIRE FA FIRE IN THE TURINE BUILDING                                                            2005/08/05 Page 6 Figure 4.6 - Turbine Building Fires
 
iT._ISLOCA    FA-I          SUP      TAI-C03 T4-TC-3  TA--EU-IS TA-I-11-IS FA-2    SUP1-AUTO TA1-2-TB-Il A-S-Eli1-11 1A-NSI            WIMSOSTAE-NM OK
                                                                                                                                          -FRE-ISL FIUi-ISL OKE HIRE-ISL FA-ISL - Fires that could lead to ISLOCA                                                                                      2005/12/07  Page 14 Figure 4.7 - Fires Leading to ISLOCA
 
lo 11 FIRE-CR - UNSUPRESS CONTROL ROOM FIRE                                                  2005/12/03  Page 11 Figure 4.8 - Control Room Fire Accident Sequences
 
ALTEWCAIC S. y SOSO                          eSJI,~fl P~ Cw'SS., Cn~.,.
SIPPWSSJCS            ~4JSDOWS    H~PO,.              O~.1S.~flC~hS  SIRAS  SRP.~      ~
                                                                                                                            .A 0
                                                                                                                            .A IA
                                                                                                                            -S IA IA 1A FIRE-CS - FIRE IN THE CABLE SPREADING AND BUS 1E ROOMS                                                      2005/12/03 Page 12 Figure 4.9 - Cable Spreading Room and Emergency Switchgear Room Accident Sequences
 
FIRE        FXC      2PSoc                              P&#xfd;I 0FWCS    FUIS          PREC                  #nf OKSAMFE 0,,
OK OK 1B IA OK 11 1.
IA 12    IA T-  M  XFR--S FIRE - PLANT RESPONSE TREE TO FIRE                                                                      2005/12/03  Page 10 Figure 4.10 - Aux Building Corridor and Turbine Building Fire Accident Sequences
 
Siplt        F~1t~thi    T.,                        M&#xfd;d-w,      S~ftt-      I Chgmig P&#xfd;,,
op.          -fi6        Cl.-d MATWS      MX-ELEC-FALULTS RXC-IMECHFAULTS  TTF            RVO            WTC        PVC          CHRGWIPP            9  ND-STATE-NAMPS XFR-ATWS - ATWS                                                                                                    2005/12/03  Page 13 Figure 4.11 - Anticipated Transient Without Scram Accident Sequences
 
Table 4.1 Rules  for Fire Area 1 if init  (FIRE-CR) then eventree (FIRE-CR) =FALSE (HSE-NOTFAl);
endif if FA-1 then eventree( FA-l )=TRUE(IE-FA-I); endif if FA-1-EC-01L then eventree      FA- 1 =TRUE (IE-FA-1-EC-01L endif if FA-1-EC-01R then eventree      FA- 1 =TRUE (IE-FA-1-EC-01R endif if FA-1-EC-02L then eventree      FA- 1 =TRUE (IE-FA-1-EC-02L endif if FA-1-EC-02R then eventree      FA-1  =TRUE (IE-FA-1-EC-02R endif if FA-1-EC-03L then eventree      FA- 1 =TRUE (IE-FA-1-EC-03L endif if FA-1-EC-03R then eventree      FA- 1 =TRUE (IE-FA-1-EC-03R endif if FA-1-EC-04L then eventree      FA- 1 =TRUE (IE-FA-1-EC-04L endif if FA-l-EC-04R then eventree      FA-1  =TRUE (IE-FA-1-EC-04R endif if FA-1-EC-08L then eventree      FA- 1 =TRUE (IE-FA-1-EC-08L endif if FA-1-EC-08R then eventree      FA- 1 =TRUE (IE-FA-1-EC-08R endif if FA-1-EC-11L then eventree      FA-1  =TRUE (IE-FA-1-EC-11L endif if FA-1-EC-11R then eventree      FA-1  =TRUE (IE-FA-1-EC-11R endif if FA-1-EC-12L then eventree      FA- I =TRUE (IE-FA-1-EC-12L endif if FA-1-EC-12R then eventree      FA- 1 =TRUE (IE-FA-1-EC-12R endif if FA-1-EC-13L then eventree      FA- 1 =TRUE (IE-FA-1-EC-13L endif if FA-I-EC-13R then eventree      FA- 1 =TRUE (IE-FA-1-EC-13R endif if FA-i-EC-106 then eventree      FA- 1 =TRUE (IE-FA-1-EC-106 endif if FA-l-EC-126 then eventree      FA-1  =TRUE (IE-FA-1-EC-126 endif
 
Table 4.2 Rules  for Fire Area 2 if init(FIRE-CS)then eventree(FIRE-CS)=FALSE(HSE-NOTFA2);
endif if FA-2 then eventree(FA-2) = TRUE(IE-FA-2); endif if FA-2-EB-01 then eventree      FA-2  =TRUE (IE-FA-2-EB-01  endif if FA-2-EB-02 then eventree      FA-2  =TRUE (IE-FA-2-EB-02  endif if FA-2-EB-Il then eventree      FA-2  =TRUE (IE-FA-2-EB-11  endif if FA-2-EB-12 then eventree      FA-2  =TRUE (IE-FA-2-EB-12  endif if FA-2-EB-21 then eventree      FA-2  =TRUE (IE-FA-2-EB-21  endif if FA-2-EB-23 then eventree      FA-2  =TRUE (IE-FA-2-EB-23  endif if FA-2-EB-24 then eventree      FA-2  =TRUE (IE-FA-2-EB-24  endif if FA-2-ED-06 then eventree      FA-2  =TRUE (IE-FA-2-ED-06  endif if FA-2-ED-07 then eventree      FA-2  =TRUE (IE-FA-2-ED-07  endif if FA-2-ED-08 then eventree      FA-2  =TRUE (IE-FA-2-ED-08  endif if FA-2-ED-09 then eventree      FA-2  =TRUE (IE-FA-2-ED-09  endif if FA-2-ED-10 then eventree( FA-2 )=TRUE(IE-FA-2-ED-10 );
eventree (FA-2) =FALSE (HSE-NOTFA2-ED-10);
endif if FA-2-ED-1I then eventree( FA-2 )=TRUE(IE-F A-2-ED-11      endif if FA-2-ED-15 then eventree( FA-2 )=TRUE(IE-F A-2-ED-15      endif if FA-2-ED-16 then eventree( FA-2 )=TRUE(IE-F A-2-ED-16      endif if FA-2-ED-17 then eventree( FA-2 )=TRUE(IE-F A-2-ED-17      endif if FA-2-ED-18 then eventree( FA-2 )=TRUE(IE-F A-2-ED-18      endif if FA-2-ED-20 then eventree( FA-2 )=TRUE(IE-FA-2-ED-20 );
eventree (FA-2) = FALSE(HSE-NOTFA2-ED-20);
endif if FA-2-ED-21 then eventree( FA-2 )=TRUE(IE-FA-2-ED-21 );    endif if FA-2-EJ-14A then eventree( FA-2 )=TRUE(IE-FA-2-EJ-14A    ); endif if FA-2-EJ-542 then eventree( FA-2 )=TRUE(IE-FA-2-EJ-542    ); endif if FA-2-EJ-543 then eventree( FA-2 )=TRUE(IE-FA-2-EJ-543    ); endif if FA-2-EJ-575 then eventree( FA-2 )=TRUE(IE-FA-2-EJ-575    ); endif if FA-2-EJ-576 then eventree( FA-2 )=TRUE(IE-FA-2-EJ-576    ); endif if FA-2-EY-01 then eventree( FA-2 )=TRUE(IE-FA-2-EY-01 );    endif if FA-2-EY-10 then eventree( FA-2 )=TRUE(IE-FA-2-EY-10 );    endif if FA-2-EY-20 then eventree( FA-2 )=TRUE(IE-FA-2-EY-20 );    endif if FA-2-EY-30 then eventree( FA-2 )=TRUE(IE-FA-2-EY-30 );    endif if FA-2-EY-40 then eventree( FA-2 )=TRUE(IE-FA-2-EY-40 );    endif if FA-2-EY-50 then eventreeC FA-2 )=TRUE(IE-FA-2-EY-50 );    endif
 
Table 4.3 Rules for Fire Area 3 if FA-3 then eventree(FIRE-CS)=FALSE(HSE-NOTFA3);
endif if /FA-3 then eventree(FIRE)=FALSE(HSE-NOTFA3);
endif if FA-3-EA-12 then eventree( FA-3 )  =TRUE(IE-FA-3-EA-12 ); endif if FA-3-EB-22 then eventree( FA-3 )  =TRUE(IE-FA-3-EB-22 ); endif if FA-3-EC-181 then eventree( FA-3  )=TRUE(IE-FA-3-EC-181 ); endif if FA-3-EC-187 then eventree( FA-3  )=TRUE(IE-FA-3-EC-187 ); endif if FA-3-EJ-1005 then eventree( FA-3  )=TRUE(IE-FA-3-EJ-1005 ); endif if FA-3-EJ-1006 then eventree( FA-3  ):TRUE(IE-FA-3-EJ-1006 ); endif if FA-3-EJ-1051 then eventree( FA-3  )=TRUE(IE-FA-3-EJ-1051 ); endif if FA-3-EJ-1052 then eventree( FA-3  )=TRUE(IE-FA-3-EJ-1052 ); endif if FA-3-EJ-9401 then eventree( FA-3  )=TRUE(IE-FA-3-EJ-9401 ); endif
 
Table 4.4 Rules  for Fire Area 4 if FA-4 then eventree(FA-4) = TRUE(IE-FA-4);endif if FA-4 then eventree(FIRE-CS)=FALSE(HSE-NOTFA4);
endif if /FA-4 then eventree(FIRE)=FALSE(HSE-NOTFA4);
endif if FA-4-EA-11 then eventree( FA-4 )=TRUE(IE-FA-4-EA-l1  ); endif if FA-4-ED-11A then eventree( FA-4 )=TRUE(IE-FA-4-ED-IIA ); endif if FA-4-EJ-9400 then eventree( FA-4 )=TRUE(IE-FA-4-EJ-9400 ); endif
 
Table 4.5 Rules for Fire Area 13 if FA-13-13A1 then eventree( FA-13 )=TRUE(IE-FA-13-13AI );
eventree(FA-13) = FALSE (HSE-NOTFA13A);
endif if FA-13-13A2 then eventree( FA-13 )=TRUE(IE-FA-13-13A2 );
eventree(FA-13) = FALSE (HSE-NOTFA13A);
endif if FA-13-13B then eventree( FA-13 )=TRUE(IE-FA-13-13B ); endif if FA-13-13C then eventree( FA-13 )=TRUE(IE-FA-13-13C ); endif
 
Table 4.6 Rules for Fire Area 23 if FA-23-23E then eventree( FA-23 ) =TRUE(IE-FA-23-23E );
eventree (FA-23)  FALSE(HSE-NOTFA23);
eventree (FA-23) = FALSE(HSE-NOTFA23ES);
endif if FA-23-23S then eventree( FA-23 )=TRUE(IE-FA-23-23S );
eventree (FA-23) = FALSE(HSE-NOTFA23);
eventree (FA-23) = FALSE(HSE-NOTFA23ES);
endif if FA-23-23W then eventree( FA-23 )=TRUE(IE-FA-23-23W );
eventree (FA-23) = FALSE(HSE-NOTFA23);
endif
 
Table 4.7 Rules  for Transfers to Control Room Fire Event Tree I Set motor driven AFW      pumps and auto start of P8B to failure if 2HP then 12HP = AFW-CST; eventree (FIRE-CR) =TRUE  (A-PMMG-P-8A);
eventree (FIRE-CR) =TRUE  (A-PMME-P-8A);
eventree (FIRE-CR) =TRUE  (A-PMMG-P-8C);
eventree (FIRE-CR) =TRUE  (A-PMME-P-8C);
eventree (FIRE-CR) =TRUE  (A-REMB-62-2P8B);
endif if /2HP  then eventree  (FIRE-CR) =TRUE (A-PMMG-P-8A);
eventree  (FIRE-CR) =TRUE (A-PMME-P-8A);
eventree  (FIRE-CR) =TRUE (A-PMMG-P-8C);
eventree  (FIRE-CR) =TRUE (A-PMME-P-8C);
eventree  (FIRE-CR) =TRUE (A-REMB-62-2P8B);
endif
 
Table 4.8 Rules  for Transfers to Cable Spreading Room,  Bus 1C and Bus 1D Fire Event Tree I Set motor driven AFW pumps and P8B auto start    to failure if 2HP then eventree(FIRE-CS)=TRUE(A-PMMG-P-8A);
eventree(FIRE-CS)=TRUE(A-PMMG-P-8C);
eventree(FIRE-CS)=TRUE(A-REMB-62-2P8B);
endif if /2HP then eventree (FIRE-CS) =TRUE (A-PMMG-P-8A);
eventree (FIRE-CS) =TRUE (A-PMMG-P-8C);
eventree (FIRE-CS) =TRUE (A-REMB-62-2P8B);
endif
 
Table 4.9 Rules for Aux Building and Turbine Building Fires None
 
Table 4. 10 Rules  for Transfers to ATWS Event Tree IDefine Success Boundary Conditions I
if  /TTF  then
/MTC = MTC-TTRIP; MTC = MTC-TTRIP; endif I
IDefine Failure Boundary Conditions I
if  TTF then
/MTC = MTC-NOTTRIP; MTC = MTC-NOTTRIP; endif if RXC-ELEC-FAULTS then
/MTC = MTC-NOTTRIP; MTC = MTC-NOTTRIP; endif
 
Documentation of HEP (AFW-AVOA-AFWSTEAM) Updated for Consideration During Fire Events.
Section      Description 5.1          Discussion of review and revision of inputs to the HRA Calculator considering performance during a fire.
5.2          Discussion of Sensitivity Analysis Performed to Evaluate the Impact of the Availability of Additional Time and Recovery Considerations.
5.3          Conclusions 5.4          Output of the HRA Calculator after Corrections for Use in the Fire Analysis.
1
 
5.1  Discussion of review and revision of inputs to the HRA Calculator considering performance during a fire.
This Attachment documents the update to the HEP development for the Operator action to locally control pump P-8B via local operation of the steam admission valve per the procedure guidance in EOP Supplement 19 (Alternate Auxiliary Feedwater Methods) section 4 (P-8B NORMAL STEAM SUPPLY FROM 'A' S/G. The HEP development was reviewed and revised based on consideration of performing the action during a fire.
Changes from the internal events version include;
: 1) Identification of ONP-25.1 and ONP-25.2 as the fire response procedures and the procedures which direct the use of EOP Supplement 19. These impacts the time at which the action would be directed.
: 2) Cognitive element for 'Availability of information' (pca) was modified to reflect potential inaccuracy of control room indication,
: 3) The cues required by the cognitive work for this action were redefined based on the guidance implemented in the relevant fire scenarios,
: 4) Performance shaping factors for environment 'Heat/Humidity' and 'Atmosphere' were modified to account for the potential of additional heat and smoke to increase the stress impact on the HEP, and
: 5) Recovery factors were reduced to reflect the dependence levels recommended by the HRA Calculator (HRAC).
5.1.1 Execution Stress Factors The original HEP development for use in the full power internal events model was the basis for this review and update to generate an HEP for performing this action during a fire. A review of the current development determined that the action as developed was predicated on performing the action in response to a Station Blackout (SBO) event. Consequently the performance shaping factors for execution stress and lighting were already set to "HIGH" stress and "Emergency" was selected for lighting. The other performance shaping factors were reviewed.
Heat/Humidity was changed to Hot/Humid and the atmosphere was changed to Smoke.
The radiation stress factor was left unchanged as the area where the action takes place is in the AFW pump room and the surrounding area in the turbine building. The use of the Hot/Humid and Smoke settings if applied independently would be conservative. However, given the prior determination that emergency lighting was required, already precluded the use of 'optimal' stress and the application of additional stress factors do not further alter the stress factor going forward.
Therefore the application of the additional factors does not incur any additional negative impact and the application is considered neutral with respect to conservatism in the analysis.
5.1.2 Recovery Considerations The current full power internal events (FPIE) HEP did not credit recovery actions for the cognitive elements. In this calculation recovery via self checking was credited for cognitive errors for
      'Availability of information' (pca) and 'Skip a step in procedure' (pce). In addition, recovery by the 2
 
Entergy PSA                          EA-PSA-SDP-P8B-11-05          Rev. 1 Engineering Analysis                                    Attachment 05 - Page 3 of 18 Shift Engineer (STA in HRAC) was credited for 'Availability of information' (pca) and Misinterpret decision logic (pcg). The FPIE analysis included consideration of recovery for execution steps but assigned HIGH or COMPLETE dependence to these recovery actions. For this analysis, given the time available as discussed below, these dependency assignments were reduced to LOW dependence. Low is the recommended value of the HRA Calculator for the given inputs.
This action is included in training and is covered by an Operations Job Performance Measure (JPM). The JPM instructs the operator that he is to take local control of the turbine-driven pump (P-8B) as directed in EOP Supplement 19 [21]. This procedural guidance includes a step to verify that the turbine is latched and if NOT to reset the turbine (re-latch the trip lever) to allow local operation of the pump.
The operator being observed is prompted that the steam admission valve is closed to assess his actions to restore pump operation by locally opening the valve which would include verifying the turbine is latched and resetting if not. The JPM requires the actions to establish local control be completed within ten minutes for acceptable performance. The JPM was also included in the 2009 Initial License Exam and allowed fifteen minutes to complete the actions. Fifteen minutes were used as the execution time in this analysis.
This action is specifically directed to be accomplished in the Off Normal procedures that govern response to fires. For areas determined by the Appendix R analysis to be areas in which all Auxiliary Feedwater may be impacted by the fire, the operator is directed to implement EOP Supplement 19.
The Off Normal procedures also specify that AFW flow be established within twenty five minutes.
Therefore it is considered that during response to a fire there would be no ambiguity in taking prompt action to implement the EOP Supplement and establish local control of the pump. This analysis assumes ten minutes as a delay time to determine that AFW did not automatically start and attempt manual start of the pumps from the control room.
Currently the time available to complete actions related to the restoration to the recovery of AFW should the system fail on demand is limited to the time at which the steam generator level(s) lower to -84%. At this point the operators are directed to initiate once through cooling (PCS feed and bleed) if available.
The recent updates to the thermal hydraulic analyses [11] were considered in this update. The updated station blackout results show that the time to -84% is 84 minutes (1.4 hours), which is the time interval used in this analysis. The original analysis used an available time of 45 minutes and limited credit for recovery of the cognitive response.
Using these inputs the calculated HEP is 5.9E-03. The output of the HRA Calculator is shown in section 5.3.
5.2 Discussion of Sensitivity Analysis Performed to Evaluate the Impact of the Availability of Additional Time and Recovery Considerations.
The consideration of additional time for recovery of AFW if once through cooling (OTC) fails allows the system window to be extended to two hours. The extra time allows more opportunity for cognitive recovery and reduction of the dependency assigned to execution errors. In this sensitivity case the additional time allows the dependence factors for execution recovery to be lowered to zero dependence. The new result would be a reduction of the HEP to 1.7E-03. Given the time available, the emergency response organization would be in place and functioning.
3
 
Entergy PSA                          EA-PSA-SDP-P8B-11-05          Rev. 1
  '-EnterW                              Engineering Analysis                                    Attachment 05 - Page 4 of 18 Allowing credit for ERF review for both 'Failure of attention' (pcb) and 'Skip a step in a procedure' (pce) would further reduce the HEP to 8.6E-4.
5.3  Use of the HEP in the quantification of risk significance.
This HFE was already included in the external events model used to quantify the impacts related to fire. In order to appropriately use the HEP to represent the assumed condition that P-8B would be failed at the time of an event due to the presence of grease; the HEP was combined with the probability of pump fail to run. This HEP was incorporated into the model by using the pump failure to run event as a surrogate.
Recognizing that the HEP is only applicable to a specific cause of pump failure to run, the HEP developed was combined with the existing probability of pump fail to run. This retains the risk associated with the probability of pump fail to run for other reasons. It also represents the implied assumption of pump failure. The pump failure to run probability used in the fire model is 1.75E-
: 03. The combined probability used as the surrogate probability is the current assigned probability of pump fail to run (1.75E-03) + the probability of pump fail to run (1.0) for the specific condition (grease)
* the probability of failure to recover pump operation (1.2E-02) = 1.38E-02 (1.75E-03 +
1.0
* 1.2E-02).
Clearly the change in risk will be dominated by the developed human error probability (HEP) for failure to recover pump operation under the assumption the pump failure was guaranteed (1.0).
Given the current premise that the application of grease was only a contributing factor and not sufficient to cause pump failure, then another (at least one) as yet not identified condition was required to result in pump failure. This other condition, if not pre-existing (currently appears to be the case) then represents a random contribution to the probability of pump fail to run (i.e. pump failure to run is not 1.0 but is some probability between 1.0 and the current probability of pump fail to run).
The unknown issue in the risk characterization is how much the presence of grease represents as a contributing factor to the probability (1.75E-03) of failure to run. If the application of grease is a contributing cause, then it is one of two or more factors that are required to be combined to determine the probability the pump would fail. If the probability of inappropriate application of grease had a value of 1.0E-02 as a random event, then another contributing factor with a probability of 1.75E-01 would be necessary for pump failure to run as a result of the existence of grease.
Therefore, if the presence of grease is a contributing cause and NOT a SINGULAR root cause then probability of pump failure would still retain an elevated random probability of failure. Using this example the development of the surrogate probability, given the premise, would be (1.75E-03
      + 1.75E-01
* 1.2E-02) = 3.85E-03 (slightly more than a factor of two increase over the probability of failure to run and less likely to result in a significant change in risk).
This analysis was completed assuming pump P-8B would fail given a demand. The risk change is characterized by the risk of failure to implement the recovery without considering the probability that recovery is required.
5.3  Conclusions.
The conclusion after considering the results of the baseline fire HEP quantification and the sensitivity analyses are that the HEP applied in the SDP analysis (1.2E-02) is conservative.
5.4  Output of the HRA Calculator after Corrections for Use in the Fire Analysis.
4
 
Entergy PSA  EA-PSA-SDP-P8B-11-05      Rev. 1 Analysis          Attachment 05 - Page 5 of 18 The HRA Calculator output is shown below.
5
 
Entergy PSA                    EA-PSA-SDP-P8B-11-05          Rev. 1
* EntergyEngineering        Analysis                              Attachment 05 - Page 6 of 18 AFW-A VOA-AFWSTEAM, OP FAILS TO OPERATE P-8B LOCALLY DURING A FIRE (HEP)
Basic Event Summary Analy~st:                  LMK (Updated by FJY)
Rev. Date,                09/20/11 Cognitive Method:          CBDTM/THERP AnalysisDatabase:o Palisades Post-mnit HRA Database Rev 00.HRA (09/20/11, 5767168
          ~Bytes)
Table 1: AFW-AVOA-AFWSTEAM
 
==SUMMARY==
 
Analysis Results:              without Recovery                with Recovery P___________________                  6.0e-03                      6.0e-04
__p  ________________                9.0e-02                      5.3e-03
;:Total' HEP                                                        5.9e-03
-ErrorFacdtor                                                          5 Assigned Basic Events:
Related Human Interactions:
AFW-PMOE-PPMAN, OPERATOR FAILS TO START AN AFW PUMP FROM THE CONTROL ROOM AFW-AVOA-AFWFLADJ, OPERATOR FAILS TO INCREASE AFW FLOW IN THE AVAILABLE SG PATH AFW-AVOA-THROT-FCV, OPERATOR FAILS TO THROTTLE AFW FCV'S GIVEN LOSS OF PNUEMATICS Initial Cue:
Action Specifically directed in fire areas in which all AFW pumps were determined to be unavailable due to fire.
Recovery Cue:
Low Steam Generator Level Cue:
Fire Alarm - Fire System Flow Scheme EK28 on panel EC-47 SG level decreasing AFW Pump status No AF flow to S/G AFAS (AFAS at 30% NR - EK-1601-05, AFAS ACTUATION CHNL TRIP)
EOP-1.0 (STANDARD POST TRIP ACTIONS) Attachment 1 EVENT DIAGNOSTIC FLOW CHART - The action to start the AFW pump is taken in EOP-1.0. The result is then verified during Attachment 1 performance prior to selecting the next appropriate EOP. Additional subsequent recovery steps are provided in EOP-7.0 (if no SBO) or EOP-9.0 (if an SBO is in progress.)
6
 
Degree of Clarity of Cues & Indications:
Very Good Procedures:
Cognitive: ONP-25.1 (FIRE WHICH THREATENS SAFETY RELATED EQUIPMENT) Revision:
19 Execution: EOP SUPPL 19 (ALTERNATE AUX FEEDWATER METHODS) Revision: 9 Other: EOP-7.0 (LOSS OF ALL FEEDWATER RECOVERY) Revision: 13 Cognitive Procedure:
Step: Per Fire Area Attachment Instruction: Operate P-8B Procedure Notes:
Given a fire is the initiating event; the operators would also be implementing Off Normal Procedure ONP-25.1 and ONP-25.2 (if required). For fire areas in which it was determined that all AFW pumps are not initially available the guidance in the ONPs specifically directs the operators to operate P-8B using EOP Supplement 19. Procedure ONP-25.1 in the attachment for each fire area includes a status check of 'Decay Heat Removal - Mode 3'. For fire areas in which the defined system status is 'all AFW pumps not initially available' the operators are direct to operate pump P-8B using the guidance of EOP Supplement 19.
NOTE: In parallel the operators would also be implementing applicable emergency operating procedures (EOPs).
EOP-1.0 Step 4.8 has the operator verify feedwater flow available to the S/Gs, and directs "ensuring" that there is at least 165 gpm to one S/G. If this flow rate is not met, EOP-7.0, (LOSS OF ALL FEEDWATER RECOVERY), would be entered or EOP-9.0 (FUNCTIONAL RECOVERY PROCEDURE) if a Station Blackout is also present. EOP-7.0 and EOP-9.0 both direct EOP Supplement 19 performance.
EOP-1.0 step 4.4.a.1) directs verification that buses 1C and 1D are energized. If a SBO also exists, these criteria are not met and EOP-1.0 Attachment 1 directs transition to EOP-9.0. Actions are delayed significantly if an SBO occurs coincidentally with another event (e.g. LOAF, SGTR, etc.) because of the transition to EOP-9.0 and the expectation/requirement that electrical problems be addressed before or along with lower hierarchy safety functions.
The following procedures also provide direction to use EOP Supplement 19 to operate P-8B.
EOP-3.0 STATION BLACKOUT RECOVERY EOP-7.0 LOSS OF ALL FEEDWATER RECOVERY EOP-9.0 FUNCTIONAL RECOVERY PROCEDURE HR-1, HR-2, HR-3 Training:
Classroom, Frequency: 0.5 per year Simulator, Frequency: 0.5 per year JPM Procedure:
PL-OPS-ONP-01OJ (START AFW PUMP P-8B LOCALLY USING CV-0522B) Revision: 3 Identification and Definition:
: 1. Initial Conditions: Steady state, full power operations 7
: 2. Initiating Event: Transient
: 3. Accident Sequence (preceding functional failures and successes):
Reactor successfully tripped.
PCPs trip.
AF fails to start.
TD AFW pump steam inlet valve (CV-0522B) fails to open due to loss of air supply [Backup N2 Station #2 is always valved in and available to supply CV-0522B's operator in the event of a loss of air. The dominant contributor to CV-0522B failure is from SBO. The remainder is an assortment of transient events dominated by controlled shutdown, transient with main condenser available, and loss of bus 1D.]
AFW flow control valves for P-8B have been verified closed.
"A" Steam Generator steam and feed paths to both Steam Generators are available.
Flow to "A" Steam generator cannot be maintained from the control room, or C-150, or C-33.
Subsequent failure to recover offsite power prior to steam generator level reaching the OTC setpoint is considered.
: 4. Preceding operator errors or successes in sequence: No operator errors or additional successes noted.
: 5. Operator action success criterion: Success is initiating or restoring AFW flow prior to the time at which once through cooling (OTC) is directed (steam generator level at -84%.
: 6. Consequences of failure: Initiation of once through cooling is currently assumed to preclude further action to recover AFW due to loss of natural circulation even though additional recovery may be available. Owners Group guidance exists to allow recovery from OTC and restore heat removal via steam generator when a feedwater is available.
Key Assumptions:
Operator Interview Insights:
For SBO conditions, there is insufficient time to complete this action prior to reaching the OTC setpoint as discussed in the Timing section. Actions are delayed significantly if an SBO occurs coincidentally with another event (e.g. LOAF, SGTR, etc.) because of the transition to EOP-9.0 and the expectation/requirement that electrical problems be addressed before or along with lower hierarchy safety functions.
A ladder is needed to access CV-0552B.
8
 
Manpower Requirements:
Operations:                        Shift Manager                      1                0 Shift Supervisor:                  1                1 STA:                              1                1 Reactor operators:                2                1 Plant operators:                  4                1 Maintenance:                      Mechanics:                        0                0 Electricians:                      0                0 I&C Technicians:                  0                0 Health Physics:                    Technicians:                      1                0 Chemistry:                        Technicians:                      1                0 Execution Performance Shaping Factors:
Environment:                      Lighting                          Emergency Heat/Humidity                      Normal Radiation                          Background Atmosphere                        Normal Special Requirements:              Tools                              Required Adequate Available Complexity of Response:            Cognitive                          Simple Execution                          Simple Equipment Accessibility:          Control Room                      Accessible Turbine Building 590' near FW      Accessible Heater E-4A and Aux Feed Pump Room, Turbine Building 570' Stress:                            High Plant Response As Expected:        Yes Workload:                          High Performance Shaping Factors:      Negative Performance Shaping Factor Notes:
Because the scenario for this action involves local actions taken during a fire, workload is considered high and the PSFs are less than optimal. A ladder is needed to access CV-0552B.
9
 
Timing:
t=0                            I                                                    I Timing Analysis:
The system window is based on the time available prior to reaching -84% steam generator level under station blackout conditions. At this time, operators are directed to initiate once through cooling (OTC). Once OTC is initiated, the current model assumes that decay heat removal via steam generators is no longer available as a result of the loss of natural circulation cooling via the steam generators.
MAAP case SBO-002-Base indicates that the steam generator level lower to -84% in 1.4 hours (84 minutes). MAAP case SBO-002-Rec indicates that with recovery of heat removal at three hours core damage does not occur and EA-PSA-SBOO1-MAAP indicates that with recovery of heat removal at 2.5 hours core damage does not occur. The MAAP case EA-PSA-SBO01-MAAP times are documented in EA-PSA-PSAR2c-06-10, Appendix D. MAAP cases SBO-002-Base and SBO-002-Rec are documented in the current PSA Thermal Hydraulics Notebook, revision 2, dated 10/20/2009, Appendix A.
Given a fire event the operators would enter ONP-25.1 concurrently with EOP 1.0. For those fire areas where the potential exists for a fire to result in all AFW pumps not initially available the operators are directed to 'Operate P-8B' by implementing EOP Supplement 19. The off normal procedure guidance requires assuring AFW operation by 25 minutes. The step that requires the establishment of heat removal via AFW in natural circulation is a continuous procedure step that is required in all fire areas. The cue time is assumed to be 10 minutes to account for the time required to determine that the AFW pumps did not automatically start and to attempt manual start of the AFW pumps from the control room.
Training for the execution of these steps includes a job performance measure (JPM) which requires completion of the EOP Supplement 19 actions including re-latching the turbine in 15 minutes.
Time available for recovery: 59.00 Minutes SPAR-H Available time (cognitive): 59.00 Minutes SPAR-H Available time (execution) ratio: 4.93 Minimum level of dependence for recovery: LD 10
 
Cognitive Unrecovered AFW-AVOA-AFWSTEAM Table 2: AFW-AVOA-AFWSTEAM COGNITIVE UNRECOVERED Pc Failure Mechanism                                            Branch                  HEP Pc,: Availability of Information                                  c                    neg.
Pcb: Failure of Attention                                          h                    neg.
Pc,: Misread/miscommunicate data                                  a                    neg.
Pcd: Information misleading                                        a                    neg.
PCe: Skip a step in procedure                                      9                  6.0e-03 Pcf: Misinterpret instruction                                      a                    neg.
Pc,: Misinterpret decision logic                                    k                    neg.
Pch: Deliberate violation                                          a                    neg.
Sum of PCa through PCh = Initial Pc =                    6.0e-03 pca: Availability of information Indication Avail in      CR Indication    WaminglAltemate        Training on CR                  Accurate          in Procedure          Indicators (a) neg.
                              .0e+.0                                                      (b) neg.
1.0e+00 f-- -- 01
                                                                            -------      - (c) neg.
1.0e+00              (d) 1.5e-03 Yes (e) 5.0e-02 No                                              1.0e+00                                  (f) 5.0e-01 1.0e+00 (g) 0.Oe+00 1.0e+00 This action is directed based on the determination that a fire is occurring in specific areas (unlike the FPIE action, which is based on other process information). In the important fire areas in which all auxiliary feedwater is considered unavailable due to the fire, the operator is directed by the off normal procedure for fire response to operate P-8B per the guidance of the EOP Supplement (local operation). Indications if available in the control room are accurate. The operators are trained on all control room indications. While the action does not require instrumentation to make a cognitive decision, it is recognized that the fire effects can result in misinformation regarding the status of plant equipment. Therefore the evaluation of this cognitive failure mechanism assumes that the potential inaccuracy of information from instrumentation can negatively impact the performance of this action.
11
 
pcb: Failure of attention Low vs. Hi        Check vs. Monitor          Front vs. Back        Alarmed vs.Not Woroad                                  i          Panel                Alarmed Check                    o.0en0t                                        (a) neg.
O.Oe+O0                  Back                                            (b) 1.5e-04 Low                                            3.0e-03                1l.0e+00                (c) 3.0e-03 1.0e+00                                        Front                15.0e-02                  (d) 1.5e-04 Monitor                  O.Oe+O0I.00+00                                  (e) 3.0e-03 3.0e-03                  Back                                            (f) 3.0e-04
: 1.        Ch-                      3.0e-03 oice1.0e+O00                                              (g) G.Oe-03
: 2. Ch ice                                              Front                  .0.2                -, (h) neg.
Check                    O.0e400                                        (i) neg.
o.'e+o                fBack                    1.0e00                  Cj)7.5e-04 Hi                                              3.0e-03                                        (k) 1.5e-02 5+Front                1.0e00                  (I) 7.5e-04 Monitor                  O.Oe+O0                1.0e+00                  (m) 1.5e-02 3.0e-03                  Back                                            (n) 1.5e-03 3.0e-03I                                        (o) 3.0e-02 1.0e+O0 Work load is considered high in the initial response to a fire. This action is directed based on the presence of a fire in a given area, which is a 'check' condition. The fire indication is from a control room annunciator. There is a control room alarm associated with the fire annunciator.
pcc: Misreadlmiscommunicate data Indicators Easy to          Good/Bad Indicator                Formal Locate            I                                Communications O.Oe+O0                  (a) neg.
S3.0e-03                (b) 3.0e-03 (c) 1.0e-03 3.0e-03                  (d)
NoI                                                          L  .0e+00                  (e) 4.0e-03 3.0e-03 Yees                                        3.0e-03 0.0e+00                        3.0e-03                  (f) 6.0e-03 3.0e-03                                                                              (g) 4.0e-O3 (h) 7.0e-03 3.0e-03 This is a procedurally directed action and control room indications beyond the fire alarm/indication are not required. However, the indications are easy to locate, they do not have human engineering deficiencies, and the operators practice formal three-way communications in the Palisades control room.
Loss of FW/AFW indications are easy to locate, they do not have human engineering deficiencies, and the operators practice formal 3-way communications in the Palisades control room.
12
 
Entergy PSA                                  EA-PSA-SDP-P8B-11-05      Rev. 1 Engineering
        %ntWAnalysis                                                                        Attachment 05 -Page 13 of 18 pcd: Information misleading All Cues as Stated  I    Warning of        Specific Traitnin f    enral Trainig I.Differences          I Ye-O.Oe,--                                                                              (a) neg.
(b) 3.0e-03 No.0e0              13.(c) 1.0e-02 1.0e-0            1.0e-&#xfd;01      &#xfd;    (d) 1.0e-01 1.0e+00            (e) 1.0e+00 The cues associated with this action are all as stated (fire indication).
pce: Skip a step in procedure Obvious vs.      Single vs. Multiple      Graphically      Placekeeping Aids Hidden                                    Distinct    I (a) I.Oe-03 (b) 3.0e-03 (c) 3.0e-03 (d)1.0e-02 (e)2.0e-03 (f) 4.0e-03 (g) 6.0e-03 (h) 1.3e-02 (i) 1.0e-01 The steps directing the operators to implement EOP Supplement 19 to operate P-8B locally are not hidden in any way. The operators are directed to implement the EOP supplement while still implementing the off normal procedure for fire mitigation. The EOP Supplement is only used for implementing local operation of pump P-8B. All other activities are controlled by the fire off normal procedure (ONP) and applicable emergency operating procedures (EOPs). The associated procedure steps are not graphically distinct. The operators keep place during implementation of the EOPs and ONPs. Therefore this cognitive failure mechanism was left unchanged.
13
 
pcf: Misinterpret instruction Standard or                All Required            Training on Step Ambiguous wording              Information      I 11.0e 1(b)                              3.0e 03 0e0i    -                                        --        (a) neg.
Yes                            3.0e-02                    1.0e+00                            (c) 3.0e-02 No1.0e-0                                                      (d) 3.0e-03 S1.0e+O03.-
3.0e--02                                            11t.0e-01                          (f) 6.0e-03 3.0e-02                    1.      0(g)                          6.0e-02 For fire response in important fire areas this is directed action. The operators are not provided with an option for diagnosis or determination of applicability of the action (except that there is a fire in the designated area). The applicable procedure steps use standard wording and the operators have all the procedural information they need to complete this action. Therefore this cognitive failure mechanism was left unchanged from the internal events HEP development.
pcg: Misinterpret decision logic "NOT" Statement        "AND" or "OR"        Both "AND" &        I Practiced Scenario Statement              "OR" 3.3e-01                        (a) 1.Se-02 3.0e02                  .0e0(b)                            4.9e-02 1.2e-02                                                                        (c) 6.0e-03 0.0e+00                                                (d) 1.9e-02 6.0e-03                                                              1.0e+00 13.3e-01                        (e) 2.0e-03 s0.0e+00                                        00(f)                              0e-03 o                                              30                      3(g)                                1.0e-02 1.0e-00                        (h) 3.1e-02
                              .0e--03                                                                      (I) 3.0e-04 0.0e+001.0e+00              0.0e+00                                                (j) 1.0e-03 3.3e-01                      - (k) neg.
                              .0                                            1.0e00                          (I) neg.
There are no AND, or OR statements in the decision logic for this action. Contrary to the process path for the internal events response there is NO implied NOT statement. The negative contribution for the implied NOT statement in the internal events version of the HEP has been removed from the fire assessment.
14
 
pch: Deliberate violation Belief in Adequacy        Adverse            Reasonable              Policy of of Instruction  IConsequence if I          Alternatives          "Verbatim"
      -6e.Oe+-                          ---                                              -  (a) neg.
YO.0e+00                                                                                      (b) 5.0e-01 No                      O'Oe  0                .Oe+00              O.Oe+0                (c) 1.0e+00 5.0e+0.0                                    O.Oe+O0                                      (d) neg.
(e) neg.
Based on operator interviews and ongoing discussions with operators, the Palisades operators believe in the adequacy of their instruction.
Cognitive Recovery AFW-AVOA-AFWSTEAM Table 3: AFW-AVOA-AFWSTEAM COGNITIVE RECOVERY InitialHEP        -- '        2        > !E              )              -of n*---
                                                                                      "-=                        Final Fina CU)    u)            a)            W                    5 w)                -)  Value Pca:            neg.          -      .        .        .        .        .          1.0e+O0 Pcb:            neg.          X      -        X          -        -        -          1.0e-02 Pc0:            neg.          -      .        .        .        .        .          1.0e+O0 PCd:            neg.                  .    -  ..                          .          1.0e+O0 Pce:          6.0e-03        X        .        .        .        .        .          1.0e-01              6.0e-04 Pcf:            neg.                  .    -  ..                          .          1.0e+O0 Pc0 :          neg.                  .    -  ..                          .          1.0e+O0 Pch:            neg.                  .    -  ..                          .          1.0e+00 Sum of Pc, through Pch = Initial Pc =    6.0e-04 Notes:
15
 
Entergy PSA                        EA-PSA-SDP-P8B-11-05                  Rev. I Engineering Analysis                                  Attachment 05 - Page 16 of 18 Execution Unrecovered AFW-AVOA-AFWSTEAM Table 4: AFW-AVOA-AFWSTEAM EXECUTION UNRECOVERED Procedure: EOP SUPPL 19, ALTERNATE AUX FEEDWATER METHODS                                                  Comment                              Stress    Over Ride Step No.                                    Instruction/Comment                            'Error              THERP              T  HEP          Factor
____Type                                                                                Table              Item      I                      _
CLOSE the following valves: MV-CA377, air supply to CV-0522B and        TB 590' level, near CV-0522B MV-N2/268, nitrogen supply to CV-0522B EOP Suppl 19,        --                                                                          EOM        20-7b                14.3E4                    5 4.2.a                                                                                              EOC        20-13                1        1.3E 3 EOC        20-13                1        1.C3ER Total Step HEP    1.5e-02 MANUALLY CLOSE CV-0552B, K-8 Normal Steam Supply EOM        20-7b                1        4.3E-4 Open MV-FW356, CV-0522B Bonnet Isolation.                                    EOC        20-13                1        1.3E-3 EOP Suppl 19,        Unscrew the coupling from manual override shaft.                            EOC        20-13                1        1.3E-3          5 4.2.b                Turn handwheel clockwise until the top of the actuator shaft is exposed      EOC        20-13                1        1.3E-3 sufficiently to engage the coupling.
Insert the fork of the coupling all the way onto actuator shaft.            EOC        20-13                1        1.3E-3 Remove lockwire from MV-FW356, CV-0522B Bonnet Isolation.                    EOC        20-13                1        1.3E-3 Total Step HEP    3.5e-02 Check Turbine Driver K-8 is latched by verifying that the knife edge of EOP Suppl 19,        the resetting lever is in contact with the hand trip lever.                  EOM        20-7b                1                        5 4.2.c                ______________________________                                              EM          2-b14.3E-4 EOC        20-13              1        1.3E-3 Total Step HEP    8.7e-03 OPEN MV-FW688, PI-0590 Root Valve                                      Downstream of CV-0522B, Turbine Building 590' EOP Supp 19,          --                                                                          EOM        20-7b              1        4.3E-4          2 Step 4.2 d            20-13 HEPs cover both selection and manipulation of local valves.            EOC        20-13              1        1.3E-3 Total Step HEP    3.5e-03 SLOWLY THROTTLE OPEN CV-0552B to maintain between 200-250              Pressure Indication listed - PI-0590 (just downstream psig steam pressure on any of the following PIs                        of CV-0552B), PI-0521A (CR Panel C-01), or PI-0521 B (at the K-8 turbine inlet).      USE OVERRIDE EOP Supp 19, step                                                                            ... INSUFFICIENT TIME TO COMPLETE THE AFW-4.2.e                                                                                        AVOA-AFWSTEAM ACTION.
EOM        20-7b              1        4.3E-4 EOC        20-13              1        1.3E-3 It is not known whether the local PI has limit marks.                        EOC        20-11              4        3.8E-3 16
 
Entergy PSA                    EA-PSA-SDP-P8B-11-05                Rev. 1 Engineering
                        %EntcaW                                  Analysis                              Attachment 05 - Page 17 of 18 Total Step HEP 2.8e-02 Evaluate availability of S/G inventory replenishment methods -    Additional subsequent recovery steps are provided in continuously applicable step                                      EOP-7.0 Safety Function Status Check (PCS Heat EOP-7.O PK step 8                                                                  Removal or in EOP-9.0 if an SBO is in progress.)            5 EOM            20-7b          1          4.3E-4 EOC            20-11          2          1.3E-3 Total Step HEP 8.7e-03 SI                            I                &#xfd;&#xfd;-
17
 
Execution Recovery AFW-AVOA-AFWSTEAM Table 5: AFW-AVOA-AFWSTEAM EXECUTION RECOVERY Cond. (Rec HEP  Total Critical Step No. Recovery Step No.                                Action                              HEP (Crit)  HEP (Rec) '- Dep.                  *' Steofor EOP Suppl 19,                      CLOSE the following valves: MV-CA377, air supply to CV-              1.5e-02                                        8.7e-04 4.2.a                              0522B and MV-N2/268, nitrogen supply to CV-0522B EOP-7.0 PK step 8 Evaluate availability of S/G inventory replenishment methods -                    8.7e-03      LD        5.8e-02 continuously applicable step EOP Suppl 19,                      MANUALLY CLOSE CV-0552B, K-8 Normal Steam Supply                    3.5e-02                                        2.0e-03 4.2.b EOP-7.0 PK step 8 Evaluate availability of S/G inventory replenishment methods -                    8.7e-03      LD        5.8e-02 continuously applicable step EOP Suppl 19,                      Check Turbine Driver K-8 is latched by verifying    that the knife 4.2.c                              edge of the resetting lever is in contact with the  hand trip      8.7e-03                                        5.1e-04 lever.
EOP-7.0 PK step 8 Evaluate availability of S/G inventory replenishment methods -                    8.7e-03      LD        5.8e-02 continuously applicable step EOP Supp 19, Step                  OPEN MV-FW688, PI-0590 Root Valve                                    3.5e-03                                        2.0e-04 4.2 d EOP-7.0 PK step 8 Evaluate availability of S/G inventory replenishment methods -                    8.7e-03      LD        5.8e-02 continuously applicable step EOP Supp 19, step                  SLOWLY THROTTLE OPEN CV-0552B to maintain between                    2.8e-02                                        1.6e-03 4.2.e                              200-250 psig steam pressure on any of the following PIs EOP-7.0 PK step 8 Evaluate availability of S/G inventory replenishment methods -                    8.7e-03      LD        5.8e-02 continuously applicable step
_ ___                                          Total Unrecovered:  9.0e-02  _                  Total Recovered: -'5.3e-03  _
18
 
Attachment 6: PRA Model Updates Since the Individual Plant Evaluation (IPE)
Palisades Model (date) Truncation      CDF/yr                Reference                              Hi Level Change Summary IPE (1993)                1.OE-9      5.07E-05  Palisades IPE (R-0481)C PSAR1 (1999)              1.OE-9      5.95E-05a  EA-PSA-SAPH-99-18                    Switchyard modifications to reduce potential for plant (R-0843)                              centered loss of offsite power Moved the internal events CDF model from SETS to SAPHIRE.
PSARla (2000)            1.OE-9      5.47E-05a  EA-PSA-SAPH-00-001 1                  The AFW alternate steam supply line to AFW pump P-(R-0479)                              8B was removed from the model as a result of a plant modification.
Updated selected Main Steam Line Break initiating event data as well as the SGTR initiating event value.
Selected human error probabilities (HEPs) were updated.
 
Attachment 6: PRA Model Updates Since the Individual Plant Evaluation (IPE)
Palisades Model (date) Truncation      CDF/yr              Reference                                  Hi Level Change Summary PSARlb (2000)            1.OE-9      6.18E-05a  EA-PSA-PSAR1B-00-22                  Selected common cause failure logic for control and (R-0472)                              solenoid valves was updated.
A plant modification that swapped High Pressure Air power supplies from MCC-7 to MCC-8 was incorporated.
Open circuit bus faults were added to the DC system logic.
The summertime EDG HVAC success criteria was set to True for all nominal baseline calculations.
The independent ATWS event trees were eliminated.
Transfers from all event trees to a single ATWS event tree was created, taking advantage of SAPHIRE's event tree linking options.
DC power demand logic was added.
PSARlb-Modified          1.0E-9      6.16E-05a  EA-PSA-PSAR1B-01-12                  Corrected a conservative Shutdown Cooling Heat (2001)                                          (R-0835)                              Exchanger modeling assumption.
Revision of ISLOCA model including realistic low pressure piping capacity.
PSARlb-Modified          1.0E-9      6.24E-05b  EA-PSA-CCW-HELB-02-17                The model was updated to account for main steam line w/HELB (2002)                                    (R-1452)                              breaks into the CCW room(s). Steam/feedwater line breaks in the CCW rooms with door 167 or door 167B to CCW room 123 open were included. A new initiating event (IE-MSLB-D-CCW) was created to represent the steam lines downstream of the MSIVs but in the CCW room as separate from remaining lines in the turbine building.
 
Attachment 6: PRA Model Updates Since the Individual Plant Evaluation (IPE)
Palisades Model (date) Truncation      CDF/yr              Reference                                  Hi Level Change Summary PSARlc (SAMA; 2004)      1.0E-9      4.05E-05b  EA-PSA-PSAR1C-01-003                  Diesel generator repair/recovery logic corrected.
(R-0703)                              PCP seal LOCA model added.
The Recirculation Actuation System plant modification was incorporated.
HEP dependency modeling was explicitly included.
Removed modeling conservatism in the critical SW header valve logic.
FPS makeup to P-8C was updated to include tank T-2 failure.
Traveling screen logic under FPS was updated.
The auto MSIV close logic 'CHP' and 'low SG pressure' were correlated to the correct initiating event categories.
Spurious bypass valve opening was added to both single and double steam generator blow down models.
The gland seal condenser or air ejector after condenser rupture logic was updated.
EQ logic was added to CCW pumps P-52A, P-52B and P-52C.
DC bus D 11-2 logic was corrected.
Diversion path failure modes were added to selected air/N2 sources.
Inadvertent PCS safety relief valve opening was added to the model.
Failure of the AFW flow control valves to close was added to the system logic.
The plant instrument air compressor modification was added to the model.
The common cause data were updated.
 
Attachment 6: PRA Model Updates Since the Individual Plant Evaluation (IPE)
Palisades Model (date) Truncation      CDF/yr              Reference                                  Hi Level Change Summary PSAR2 (2004)              1.0E-9      4.65E-05a  EA-PSA-PSAR2-04-02                    Updated turbine driven AFW pump failure data.
(R-1710)                              Addressed CST flow diversion.
Updated Initiating Event data.
Updated spurious actuation of MSIV model.
Updated of RPS and MTC data.
Re-assess the HEP stress evaluation in context of the accident sequences being recovered.
Reassessed the Load Shed logic.
PSAR2a (2006)            1.0E-9      4.49E-05a  EA-PSA-PSAR2a-05-18                  Added SW containment isolation valves to the SW fault (R-1822)                              tree to support MSPI.
Added additional logic for leg injection (HLI) to support MSPI.
Added logic for various equipment recoveries during loss of offsite power events to remove over-conservatism.
Modified EDG load/run failures to support MSPI.
Added instrument air dryer bypass to remove conservatism in EOOS model.
Improved fidelity for AFW model logic.
Improved fidelity for diesel start model logic.
Added control circuit contact pairs to support MSPI.
Added human error modeling to support logic additions above.
Added new failure rate and probability models to support the logic additions above.
 
Attachment 6: PRA Model Updates Since the Individual Plant Evaluation (IPE)
Palisades Model (date) Truncation      CDF/yr              Reference                                  Hi Level Change Summary PSAR2b (2006)            1.OE-9      4.36E-05a  EA-PSA-PSAR2b-06-07                  Added control room and C33 panel hand switches to (R-1 823)                            support MSPI.
Added CV-3001 and CV-3002 inline circuit scheme fuses for model improvement.
Added new failure rate and probability models to support the logic additions above.
PSAR2c (2006)            1.OE-9      2.49E-05a  EA-PSA-PSAR2c-06-10                  Added logic for the non-safety related diesel logic.
(R-1706)                              Addition of time phased offsite power recovery during SBO.
Separated the load/run and run logic in the LOOP event tree to better characterize failures.
Added operator action for diesel fuel oil recovery to address the proceduralized recovery of fuel oil to T-25A and B.
Added bypass regulator model to address AFW low suction pressure trip failure given station battery discharge at 4 hours.
Added plant modification automating switchover to RAS.
Added credit for containment backpressure for providing HPSI NPSH to reduce conservatism.
Added human error modeling to support logic additions above.
Added new failure rate and probability models to support the logic additions above.
Addition of sump strainer blockage.
 
Attachment 6: PRA Model Updates Since the Individual Plant Evaluation (IPE)
Palisades Model (date)      Truncation      CDF/yr              Reference                                Hi Level Change Summary
: a. subsumed cutset solution
: b. non-subsumed cutset solution
: c.  "R-" is an internal reference label
 
pg Table 7.1 Comparison of IPEEE, Reference [5] and This Analysis                            2 Table 7.2 Plant Damage State for FA-1 and FA-2 Comparison of IPEEE [3], Reference [5] and  8 This Analysis (EC-03R and EJ-575)
Table 7.3 Recreated IPEEE Fire Results (Base Case & P-8B Failed w/Recovery)              12 Table 7-4 P-8B Failed                                                                    11 All Fire Areas (Top 100 Cutsets)
Table 7-5 P-8B Failed w/Applied Recovery                                                  27 Fire Area 1 Control Room Cabinet EC-13L (Top 100 Cutsets)
Table 7.6 P-8B Failed w/Recovery                                                          38 Exposure Fires: Control Room, CSR, Bus 1C and Bus 1D w/ and w/o Suppression (Top 100 Cutsets)
 
Table 7.1: Comparison of IPEEE, Reference [5] and This Analysis IPEEE TABLE 4.1 I-I                                          Ref [5] Analysis Using IPEEE Cabinets          This Analysis Worst Case Cabinet Fires for FA- I, PALISADES PLANT RESPONSE TO SPECIFIC FIRE AREAS                                            for FA-I and FA-2            FA-2, and Exposure Fire for FA-9-9B (using updated P-8B Fail to start and fail to run random failure data)
IPEEE Cabinet/                    Cabinet                                                E          Cabinet +
Fire Area/      Fire Area        Ignition          Class      Class    Class    Total    IPEEE Total    Junction                        +                        Cabinet                        Fosure Exposure Zone      Description      Frequency            IA          IB      II    CDF/yr      CDF/yr          Box/          CDF/yr    Exposure  Fire Area        Junction                        Fire      Fire Fire Area    ________        DF/r Fire  __DF/yr____CDF/yr__                              CDF/yr CDF/yr Cabinet Control Room    Fire 9.50E-3      5.93E-7    7.12E-7    N/A    I.30E-6    8. I OE-06  EC-03R            8.13E-07    2.59E-06      FA-I            EC-13L        3.52E-0S    3.38E-07    3.SSE-05 Exp. Fire        4.33E-6    2.46E-6    N/A    6.79E-6 2.43E-3 Cabinet Cable      Fire 3.20E-3        1.9 1E-7  2.06E-7    N/A    3.98E-7 Spreading        Exp. Fire        7.48E-6    3.23E-6    N/A    1.07E-6    1.11 E-05  EJ-575            1.71 E-07  6.57E-06      FA-2            EB- II      4.09E-07    4.35E-07    8.44E-07 Room          3.19E-3 Cabinet ID Switchgear    Fire 3.75E-3      6.95E-7    6.1 OE-7    OE-7 3.1N/A    1.61 E-6 35Room              Exp. Ro FireEx.Fr 2.29E-06 2.E-6        98E7 9.83E-7    NA    332E6
                                                                                  .27E-6    4.88E-06 48E14      EJ-l1005          1.32E-06    2.00E-06      FA-3            EJ- 1005      1.29E-06    I. 19E-07  1.41E-06 9.81 E4 Cabinet 45      IC Switchgear    Fire 3.75E-3      4.84E-7    6.53E-7    N/A      I.14E-6  2.78E-06    EA-11            2.90E-07    5.64E-07      FA-4            EA- I        .57E-08    4.57E-08    1.01E-07 Room          Exp. Fire        9.60E-7    4.09E-7    N/A    1.37E-6 4.1SE-4 Diesel S      Generator I-I      1.69E-02        4.85E-8    4.69E-8    N/A    9.54E-8    9.54E-08    FA-S                          4.14E-08      FA-S                                    3.62E-08    3.62E-08 Room Diesel 6      Generator 1-2      1.72E-02        5.61E-8    7.56E-8    N/A    1.32E-7    1.32E-07  FA-6                          1.30E-06    FA-6                                      4.88E-07    4.88E-07 Room 7 &8        Diesel Day        N/A -            N/A        NIA      N/A      N/A Tanks        Screened Intake 9A        Structure -      7.20E-03        4.66E-8      4.12E-7    N/A    4.59E-7    4.59E-07    FA-9-9A          1.53E-08    1.53E-08 SWS
 
Table 7. 1: Comparison of IPEEE, Reference [5] and This Analysis PALISADES PLANT IPEEE  TABLE TO RESPONSE          -I 4.11SPECIFIC  FIRE AREAS                          Ref [5] Analysis for FA-IUsing  FA-2 Cabinets and IPEEE                    This Analysis Worst Case Cabinet Fires for FA- I, FA-2, and Exposure Fire for FA-9-9B (using updated P-81 Fail to start and fail to run random failure data)
IPEEE Cabinet/                      Cabinet                                                            Cabinet +
Fire Area/    Fire Area        Ignition      Class          Class    Class      Total  IPEEE Total    Junction        CDF/yr          +      Fire Area          junction      Cabinet        Fire    Exposure Zone      Description      Frequency          IA            IB        II      CDF/yr      CDF/yr        Box/                      Exposure                        Box        CDF/yr      CDF/yr        Fire Fire Area                        Fire                                                              CDF/yr CDF/yr Intake 9B      Structure -      7.20E-03        N/A            N/A        N/A        N/A                FA-9-9B            1.54E-08                FA-9-9B                                      1.46E-08    1.46E-08 FPS' East 10      Engineered        2.36E-3      7.58E-9        1.28E-8      N/A      2.04E-8    2.04E-08  FA-10            2.66E-08      2.66E-08    FA- 10                                    2.61 E-08  2.61E-08 Safeguards Battery#2 Room      1.60E-3      1.24E-7      1.53E-7      N/A      2.77E-7    2.77E-07  FA-1I            8.74E-08      8.74E-08    FA-II                                      2.21E-08    2.21E-08
                  #2 12    Battery Room        1.60E-3      7.77E-8        8.47E-8      N/A      1.62E-7  1.62E-07  FA- 12            7.37E-08      7.37E-08    FA- 12                                    8.65E-09    8.65E-09
                  #1 Auxiliary 13A I    Building 590        1.99E-3      5.50E-9        6.61E-7    6.OSE-9    6.73E-7    6.73E-07  FA- 13-13A I      2.67E-06      2.67E-06 FA- 13-13A I                                    1.26E-06    1.26E-06 (South Finger)
Auxiliary Building 590' 13A2      Corridor        5.37E-3      1.09E-8        1.17E-8      N/A      2.26E-8  2.26E-08    FA- 13-13A2      1.32E-08      1.32E-08 FA- 13-13A2                                    1.26E-08    1.26E-08 (Middle Finger)
Charging 13B    Pump Room          2.06E-3      2.68E-9        2.68E-9      N/A      5.36E-9  5.36E-09    FA- 13-13B        1.37E-08      1.37E-08  FA- 13-13B                                    1.36E-08    1.36E-08
 
Table 7.1: Comparison of IPEEE, Reference [5] and This Analysis IPEEETABLE4.11 -1                                          RThis                                              Analysis Worst Case Cabinet Fires for FA-1, IPEE
                                                        -IRefABL 4 I                                      [5] Analysis Using IPEEE Cabinets  FA-2, and Exposure Fire for FA-9-9B (using updated P-8B Fail to PALISADES PLANT RESPONSE TO SPECIFIC FIRE AREAS                                          for FA-I and FA-2 start and fail to run random failure data)
IPEEE Cabinet/                      Cabinet                                              E          Cabinet +
Fire Area/    Fire Area        Ignition        Class      Class      Class      Total  IPEEE Total    Junction                        +                      Cabinet                e      osure  Exposure Zone    Description      Frequency          IA        IB        II      CDF/yr    CDF/yr      FireBox/
Area        CDF/yr    Exposure Fire    Fire Area      Junction Box          Cabinet CDF/yr        Fire CDF/yr        Fire CDF/yr CDF/yr 590' Auxiliary Building 13C        (all not        I. 1SE-2      2.94E-8    1.31E-7    N/A      1.60E-7  1.60E-07  FA- 13-13C        1.94E-07    1.94E-07 FA- 13-13C                                1.88E-07    1.88E-07 included in other zones) 14    Containment            N/A          N/A        N/A      N/A        N/A        N/A          N/A            N/A          N/A        N/A            N/A            N/A          N/A        N/A Engineered is      Safeguards        1.SOE-4        N/A      3.35E-8    N/A      3.3SE-8    3.35E-B                      2.83E-08    2.83E-08    FA-1S                                  2.67E-08    2.67E-08 Panel Room Component 16    Cooling Pump        2.36E-3        3.07E-9    6.13E-9    N/A      9.20E-9    9.20E-09                      5.02E-07    5.02E-07    FA-16                                  4.53E-07    4.53E-07 Room Refueling and        N/A -
17      Spent Fuel      Screened          N/A        N/A      N/A        N/A        N/A          N/A            N/A          N/A        N/A            N/A            N/A          N/A        N/A Pool Room Demineralizer        N/A  -
18        Room Room                Ned Screened          N/A        N/A      N/A        N/A        N/A          N/A            N/A          N/A        N/A            N/A            N/A          N/A        N/A Compactor -          N/A -
19    Area Track        Screened          N/A        N/A      N/A        N/A        N/A          N/A            N/A          N/A        N/A            N/A            N/A          N/A        N/A Alley Spent Fuel Pool 20      Equipment        6.02E-4          N/A      2.19E-8    N/A      2.19E-8    2.19E-08  FA-20            7.84E-07    7.84E-07    FA-20                                  3.58E-07    3.58E-07 Room
 
Table 7. 1: Comparison of IPEEE, Reference [5] and This Analysis IPEEE TABLE 4.11 -1                                        Ref [5] Analysis Using IPEEE Cabinets          This Analysis Worst Case Cabinet Fires for FA- I, PALISADES PLANT RESPONSE TO SPECIFIC FIRE AREAS                                        for FA-I and FA-2            FA-2, and Exposure Fire for FA-9-9B (using updated P-8B Fail to start and fail to run random failure data)
IPEEE Cabinetl                    Cabinet                                              E          Cabinet +
Fire Area/    Fire Area        Ignition        Class      Class  Class      Total  IPEEE Total    Junction                        &#xf7;                      Cabinet'      Cabinet      xposure    Exposure Zone      Description      Frequency          IA        IB      II      CDF/yr    CDF/yr        Box/
Fire Area                  Exposure Fire  Fire Area        Junction Bx          CFy            FrFire CD/r        CDF/yr CDF/yr Electric 21A      Equipment          3.80E-3          NfA        N/A    N/A        N/A      N/A          N/A            N/A        N/A        N/A            N/A            N/A          N/A        N/A Room (Bus 19)2 Electric 21B      Equipment Room    (Bus      3.80E-3        3.50E-8    2.33E-8  N/A      5.83E-8    5.83E-08  FA-21-21B          1.71E-08    1.71E-08 FA-21-21B                                    1.63E-08    1.63E-08 20)
Turbine Lube          N/A  -
22      Oi Room Oil  Room            Ned Screened          N/A        N/A    N/A        N/A      N/A          N/A            N/A        N/A        N/A            N/A            N/A          N/A        N/A Turbine 23E    Building (East      2.94E-2        1.27E-6    8.46E-7 3.2 1E-8  2.1SE-6    2.15E-06  FA-23-23E        5.76E-06    5.76E-06  FA-23-23E                                  5.30E-06    5.30E-06 Side)
Turbine 23S        Building        6.42E-2        7.77E-7    8.74E-8  N/A      8.65E-7    8.64E-07  FA-23-23S        2.83E-06    2.83E-06  FA-23-23S                                  2.81 E-06  2.81 E-06 (South Side)
Turbine 23W    Building (West      1.55E-3        3.99E-8    3.29E-8  N/A      7.28E-8    7.28E-08  FA-23-23W        2.94E-07    2.94E-07  FA-23-23W                                  2.94E-07    2.94E-07 Side)
Auxiliary 24      Feedwater          2.27E-4        1.07E-7    8.50E-8  N/A        1.9E-07  1.92E-07  FA-24            3.02E-08    3.02E-08    FA-24                                    3.02E-08    3.02E-08 Pump Room N/A -
2S    Boiler Rooms            Ned          N/A        N/A    N/A        N/A        N/A          N/A            N/A        N/A        N/A            N/A            N/A          N/A        N/A i Screened    IIIIIIIIIIIIII
 
Table 7. I: Comparison of IPEEE, Reference [5] and This Analysis IPEEE TABLE 4.11 -I                                        Ref [5] Analysis Using IPEEE Cabinets        This Analysis Worst Case Cabinet Fires for FA- I, PALISADES PLANT RESPONSE TO SPECIFIC FIRE AREAS                                        for FA-I and FA-2          FA-2, and Exposure Fire for FA-9-9B (using updated P-8B Fail to start and fail to run random failure data)
IPEEE Cabinet/                    Cabinet                                                        Cabinet +
Fire Area/    Fire Area        Ignition        Class      Class  Class      Total  IPEEE Total    Junction                        +                                    Cabinet                Exposure Zone    Description      Frequency        IA          IB    II      CDF/yr    CDF/yr          Box/          CDF/yr    Exposure Fire Area        Junction      CDF/yr        Fire      Fire Fire Area                      Fire                      Box                      CDF/yr        Fir CDCF/yr Southwest 26          Cable          6.89E-5        N/A          N/A  N/A        N/A        N/A          N/A            N/A        N/A      N/A            N/A            N/A          N/A        N/A Penetration Room Radwaste          N/A -
27      Addition -      Screened        N/A          N/A  N/A        N/A        N/A          N/A            N/A        N/A      N/A            N/A            N/A          N/A        N/A VRS West 28      Engineered        2.74E-3        N/A        1.1IE-6 N/A        1.1 IE-6    1.1 IE-06    FA-28            3.63 E-06  3.63E-06  FA-28                                    1.68E-06    1.68E-06 Safeguards Center Mechanical          N/A  -
29          Ment Equipment            Ned Screened        N/A          N/A  N/A        N/A        N/A          N/A            N/A        N/A      N/A            N/A            N/A          N/A        N/A Room East Mechanical          N/A -
30      Equipment        Screened        N/A          N/A  N/A        N/A      N/A            N/A            N/A          N/A      N/A            N/A            N/A          N/A        N/A Room West Mechanical          N/A-31      Equipment        Screened        N/A          N/A  N/A        N/A      N/A            N/A            N/A          N/A      N/A            N/A            N/A          N/A        N/A Room SIRW 32      Tank/CCW          4.85E-5        N/A          N/A  N/A        N/A      N/A            N/A            N/A          N/A      N/A            N/A            N/A          N/A        N/A Roof Area Technical          N/A-33    Support Area      Screened        N/A          N/A  N/A        N/A      N/A            N/A            N/A          N/A      N/A            N/A            N/A        N/A        N/A
 
Table 7.1: Comparison of IPEEE, Reference          (5] and This Analysis This Analysis Worst Case Cabinet Fires for FA-1, IPEEE TABLE 4.11 -I                                                      Ref [5] Analysis Using IPEEE Cabinets FA-2, and Exposure Fire for FA-9-9B (using updated P-8B Fail to PALISADES PLANT RESPONSE TO SPECIFIC FIRE AREAS                                                        for FA-I and FA-2 start and fail to run random failure data)
NOTES:
I) Fire Zone 9A is the worst case fire for this fire area and, therefore, Fire Zone 9B is not included in the results since they are mutually exclusive events.
: 2) Fire Zone 21 B is the worst case fire for this fire area and, therefore, Fire Zone 21 A is not included in the results since they are mutually exclusive events.
: 3) FA-34 cutsets were truncated at E- 10.
: 4) Shaded results are differences between the IPEEE, reference [5] evaluation and this analysis.
: 5) Manual or automatic suppression credited for FA- I, FA-2, FA-3 and FA-4.
: 6) SIRW tank/CCW Roof screened given a 3 hour fire barrier, no combustibles and nearby firefighting equipment.
 
Table 7.2: Plant Damage State for FA- I and FA-2 Comparison of IPEEE [3], Reference [5] and This Analysis (EC-03R and EJ-575)
Fire IPEEE [3]                                              Updated PSAR2 Fire PSA [5]/his Analysis CDF/yr                                                                      CDF/yr IA            IB              II        IV                    IA                          IB              II                IV Exposure Fire      1.35E-06                                                4.38E-06/4.4E-6.                                                        17E-10 FA- I  (Unsuppressed)
Control    Exposure Fire    2.98E-06      2.46E-06                                      .4E-06I&#xfd;EO6            3.79E-07/:3327E-07j  2.18E-09 2.18E_09            3.33E_09 3.33E-09 (Suppressed)    __________    __________
Room Worst Cabinet      5.93E-07      7.12E-07                        -        3.48E-07/3.479E-07*        4.51 E-07/44E5    07                1.37E-08/1    9 Fire (EC-03R)  ____
Fire IPEEE [3]                                              Updated PSAR2 Fire PSA [s]Irhis Analysis CDF/yr                                                                      CDF/yr IA            IB            II          IV                    IA                          IB              II                IV Exposure Fire ExpsureFie        3.56E-06                                                    47 1-. E-OS/LI! 456E--05;                                              2.98E- 10 (Unsuppressed)___________                                                _____________________                              _____
FA-2      Exposure Fire    3.91 E-06    3.23E-06                                    1.77E-06/1 .75E-06'        4.86E-07/4.4E-01,    2.75E-09          4.33E-09 Cable    (Suppressed)                                                          I                  -------
Spreading      Worst Cabinet/junction    1.91 E-07    2.06E-07                                  1.0 1E-07/I.006E-0  3    6.58E-08/6.595E-08                  4.56E-09/4.56E-09 Box Fire (EJ-575)                                                                                    I
 
Table 7.3: Recreated IPEEE Fire Results (Base Case & P-8B Failed w/Recovery)
Base Case                                                                              P-8B Failed w/Recovery Cabinet]                                Cabinet +                    Exposure      Cabinet Exposure+
Fire Area/                                  Ignition                                            Cabinet      Exposure    Expsue        Cabinet Zone    Fire Area Description          Freuny FrqenyBox          Fire Area  Junction        CDF/yr      CDF/yr      Exposure CDF/yr      CDF/yr        CDF/yr          CDF/sr CDF/yr Control Room              Cabinet Fire 9.SOE-3              FA-I      EC-13L        3.52E-05    3.38E-07    3.55E-05      3.53E-05      6.26E-07        3.59E-05 Exp. Fire 2.43E-3 25    Cable Spreading Room      Cabinet Fire 3.20E-3              FA-2      EB-I I    4.09E-07      4.35E-07      8.44E-07    4.41 E-07      8.OOE-07        1.24E-06 I                  Exp. Fire 3.1 9E-3 35    ID Switchgear Room        Cabinet Fire 3.75E-3              FA-3      EJ-1005      1.29E-06      1.19E-07    1.41E-06      1.30E-06      2.29E-07        1.52E-06 Exp. Fire 9.81 E4 45                              Cabinet Fire 3.75E-3              FAA        EA-1 I    5.57E-08      4.57E-08        1.01E-07  9.65E-08        8.72E-08        1.84E-07 ieExp.
Fire 4.G1 5E-4 Generator I-I          1Diesel
                                            .69E-02                    FA-S                                3.62E-08    3.62E-08                    3.70E-08        3.70E-08 Room 6    Diesel Generator 1-2            1.72E-02                    FA-6                                4.88E-07      4.88E-07                    6.49E-07        6.49E-07 Room 7 &8    Diesel Day Tanks            N/A - Screened                  N/A        N/A            N/A          N/A          N/A          N/A            N/A            N/A 9A      Intake Structure - SWS        7.20E-03 9B      Intake Structure - FPS'        7.20E-03                  FA-9-9B                                  1.46E-08    1.46E-08                      1.48E-08        1.48E-08 10    East Engineered                2.36E-3                    FA-10                                2.61E-08      2.61E-08      2.61E-08      2.61E-08        2.61E-08 SafeguardsI II    Battery Room #2                  1.60E-3                  FA-1 I                                2.21E-08      2.21E-08      4.12E-08      3.32E-08        3.32E-08 12    Battery Room #1                1.60E-3                  FA-12                                8.65E-09      8.65E-09      2.69E-08      1.89E-08        1.89E-08 13AI    Auxiliary Building 590'          1.99E-3                  FA                              1.26E-06      1.26E-06      I .68E-06      1.55E-06        1.55E-06 Corridor (South Finger)                                    13AI 13A2    Auxiliary Building 590'                                    FA            Corridor (Middle Finger)        537E3                      13A2                                1.26E-08    1.26E-08  I  .27E-08      1.26E-08        1.26E-08 13B    Charging Pump Room              2.06E-3                FA- 13-13B                              1.36E-08      1.36E-08      1.36E-08      1.36E-08        1.36E-08 590' Auxiliary Building 13C    (all not included in other      1.15E-2                FA-13-13C                              1.88E-07      1.88E-07      1.90E-07      1.88E-07        1.88E-07 zones) 14    Containment                        N/A                      N/A        N/A          N/A          N/A          N/A          N/A            N/A            N/A
 
Table 7.3: Recreated IPEEE Fire Results (Base Case & P-81 Failed w/Recovery)
Base Case                                                                            P-8B Failed w/Recovery Cabined/                                Cabinet  +                              Cabinet +
Ignition                                            Cabinet      Exposure                Cabinet      Exposure Fire Area/
Zone    Fire Area Description      F                        Fire Area    Junction      Cabine      Exposr      Exposure    Cabine        Expoar        Exposure Box        CDF/yr        CDF/yr        CDF/      CDF/yr        CDF/yr          CDF/yr 15    Engineered Safeguards        1.50E-4                  FA-15                                  2.67E-08    2.67E-08  2.71E-08      2.69E-08        2.69E-08 Panel Room 16    Component Cooling          2.36E-3                    FA-16                                4.53E-07      4.53E-07  4.68E-07      4.62E-07        4.62E-07 Pump Room 17    Refueling and Spent Fuel N/A - Screened                N/A          N/A          N/A          N/A          N/A      N/A            N/A            N/A Pool Room 18    Demineralizer Room      N/A - Screened                N/A          N/A          N/A          N/A          N/A      N/A            N/A            N/A 19    Compactor - Area Track  N/A - Screened                N/A          N/A          N/A          N/A          N/A      N/A            N/A            N/A Alley 20    Spent Fuel Room Equipment  Pool            6.02E-4                    FA-20                                  3.58E-07    3.58E-07  4.85E-07      4.45E-07        4.45E-07 21A    Electric Equipment Room    3.80E-3                FA-21-21A (Bus 19)2 21B    Electric (Bus  20)Equipment Room    3.80E-3                FA-21-21B                                  1.63E-08      1.63E-08              1.63E-08        1.63E-08 22    Turbine Lube Oil Room    N/A - Screened                N/A        N/A            N/A          N/A          N/A      N/A            N/A            N/A 23E    Turbine Building (East      2.94E-2                FA-23-23E                                5.30E-06    5.30E-06  5.42E-06      5.37E-06        5.37E-06 Side) 23S    Turbine Building (South    6.42E-2                FA-23-23S                                2.81 E-06    2.81E-06  2.82E-06      2.82E-06        2.82E-06 Side) 23W    Side)                        1.55E-3                  23W                                  2.94E-07      2.94E-07  2.94E-07      2.94E-07        2.94E-07 24    Auxiliary Feedwater        2.27E-4                  FA-24                                  3.02E-08    3.02E-08  3.02E-08      3.02E-08      3.02E-08 Pump Room 25    Boiler Rooms            N/A - Screened                N/A        N/A          N/A            N/A          N/A      N/A            N/A            N/A Southwest Cable 26    Penetration Room            6.89E-5                    N/A        N/A          N/A            N/A          N/A      N/A            N/A            N/A 27    Radwaste Addition - VRS  N/A - Screened                N/A        N/A          N/A            N/A          N/A      N/A            N/A            N/A
 
Notes:
I) Fire Zone 9A is the worst case fire for this fire area and, therefore, Fire Zone 9B is not included in the results since they are mutually exclusive events.
: 2) Fire Zone 21 B is the worst case fire for this fire area and, therefore, Fire Zone 21A is not included in the results since they are mutually exclusive events.
: 3) FA 34 cutsets truncated at E- 10.
: 4) SIRW tankICCW Roof screened given a 3 hour fire barrier, no combustibles and nearby firefighting equipment
: 5) Manual or automatic suppression credited.
 
Table 7-4: P-8B Failed All Fire Areas (Top 100 Cutsets)
Cut    %Po.
Cu  t      l %,Cut Frequency Basic Event              Description                                                  Event Prob.
1    12.54  12.54  6.14E-05 IEFIRE                  FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER                          1.OOE+00 A-PMMG-P-8B              AFW TURBINE PUMP P-8B FAILS TO RUN                            1.OOE+00
                            /ASDP                    ALTERNATE SHUTDOWN PANEL FAILURE                              9.90E-01 FA-2                    CSR EXP FIRE (Fault Tree)                                      3.1OE-03 SUP-AUTO                AUTO FIRE SUPPRESSION FAILURE (Dev Event)                      2.00E-02 2    17.45  4.91  2.41E-05 IEFIRE                  FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER                          1.OOE+00 A-PMMG-P-8B              AFW TURBINE PUMP P-8B FAILS TO RUN                            1.OOE+00
                            /ASDP                    ALTERNATE SHUTDOWN PANEL FAILURE                              9.90E-01 FA-1                    GENERAL AREA FIRE (Fault Tree)                                2.43E-03 SUP                      MANUAL FIRE SUPPRESSION FAILURE (Dev Event)                    1.00E-02 3    21.75  4.3  2.11E-05 IEFIRE                  FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER                          1.OOE+00 A-OOOT-CSTMK-CDTNL-HEP-2 CND HEP-L-ZZOA-SDC-INIT
* A-OOOT-CSTMKUP
* P-CBOB-BUS1E (HEP)  1.43E-01 FA-1-EC-13L              CABINET EC-13L FIRE (Fault Tree)                              9.50E-03 L-ZZOA-SDC-INIT          OP FT INITIATE SDC (FP/FR-LOC) (HEP)                            1.55E-02 4    26.05  4.3  2.11E-05 IEFIRE                  FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER                          1.OOE+00 A-OOOT-CSTMK-CDTNL-HEP-2 CND HEP-L-ZZOA-SDC-INIT
* A-OOOT-CSTMKUP
* P-CBOB-BUS1E (HEP)  1.43E-01 FA-1-EC-13R              CABINET EC-13R FIRE (Fault Tree)                              9.50E-03 L-ZZOA-SDC-INIT          OP FT INITIATE SDC (FP/FR-LOC) (HEP)                            1.55E-02 5    30.02  3.97  1.94E-05 IEFIRE                  FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER                          1.OOE+00 A-PMMG-P-8B              AFW TURBINE PUMP P-8B FAILS TO RUN                            1.OOE+00
                            /ASDP                    ALTERNATE SHUTDOWN PANEL FAILURE                              9.90E-01 FA-3                    1D SWITCHGR LOGICAL PLACEHOLDER (Fault Tree)                  9.81E-04 SUP-AUTO                AUTO FIRE SUPPRESSION FAILURE (Dev Event)                      2.00E-02 6    32.55  2.53  1.24E-05 IEFIRE                  FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER                          1.OOE+00 A-PMMG-P-8B              AFW TURBINE PUMP P-8B FAILS TO RUN                            1.OOE+00 A-PMOO-P-8A              AFW PUMP P-8A OUT OF SERVICE                                  4.52E-03 FA-28                    WEST SAFEGUARDS RM FIRE                                        2.74E-03 7    34.39  1.84  8.99E-06 IEFIRE                  FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER                          1.OOE+00 A-PMMG-P-8B              AFW TURBINE PUMP P-8B FAILS TO RUN                            1.00E+00 A-PMOO-P-8A              AFW PUMP P-8A OUT OF SERVICE                                  4.52E-03
 
Table 7-4: P-8B Failed All Fire Areas (Top 100 Cutsets)
Cut  %  % Cut    Prob./ Basic Event    Description No. Total  Set  Frequency FA-13-13A1      AUX BLDNG 590' CORRIDR (CCW - CHARGING) EXP FIRE (Fault Tree) 1.99E-03 8  36.19  1.8  8.81E-06 IEFIRE          FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER                        1.OOE+00 A-PMMG-P-8B    AFW TURBINE PUMP P-8B FAILS TO RUN                            1.OOE+00 FA-2            CSR EXP FIRE (Fault Tree)                                    3.1OE-03 H-ZZOA-OTC-INIT OP FAILS TO INITIATE ONCE THROUGH COOLING (HEP)              2.90E-03
                          /SUP-AUTO      AUTO FIRE SUPPRESSION FAILURE (Dev Event)                    9.80E-01 9  37.87  1.68  8.22E-06 IEFIRE          FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER                        1.001E+00 A-PMMG-P-8B    AFW TURBINE PUMP P-8B FAILS TO RUN                            1.OOE+00
                          /ASDP          ALTERNATE SHUTDOWN PANEL FAILURE                              9.90E-01 FA-4            1C SWITCHGR LOGICAL PLACEHOLDER (Fault Tree)                  4.15E-04 SUP-AUTO        AUTO FIRE SUPPRESSION FAILURE (Dev Event)                    2.OOE-02 10  39.3  1.43  6.98E-06 IEFIRE          FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER                        1.00E+00 A-PMMG-P-8B    AFW TURBINE PUMP P-8B FAILS TO RUN                            1.OOE+00 FA-1            GENERAL AREA FIRE (Fault Tree)                                2.43E-03 H-ZZOA-OTC-INIT OP FAILS TO INITIATE ONCE THROUGH COOLING (HEP)              2.90E-03
                          /SUP            MANUAL FIRE SUPPRESSION FAILURE (Dev Event)                  9.90E-01 11  40.49  1.19  5.84E-06 IEFIRE          FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER                        1.00E+00 A-PMMG-P-8A    AFW PUMP P-8A FAILS TO RUN                                    2.13E-03 A-PMMG-P-8B    AFW TURBINE PUMP P-8B FAILS TO RUN                            1.OOE+00 FA-28          WEST SAFEGUARDS RM FIRE                                      2.74E-03 12  41.41 0.92  4.52E-06 IEFIRE          FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER                        1.OOE+00 A-PMME-P-8A    AFW PUMP P-8A FAILS TO START                                  1.65E-03 A-PMMG-P-8B    AFW TURBINE PUMP P-8B FAILS TO RUN                            1.OOE+00 FA-28          WEST SAFEGUARDS RM FIRE                                      2.74E-03 13  42.31  0.9  4.42E-06 IEFIRE          FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER                        1.OOE+00 A-AVOA-AFWSTEAM OP FAIL TO LOCALLY OPEN AFW STEAM SUPPLY CV-0522B (HEP)      7.20E-02
                          /ASDP          ALTERNATE SHUTDOWN PANEL FAILURE                              9.90E-01 FA-2            CSR EXP FIRE (Fault Tree)                                    3.10E-03 SUP-AUTO        AUTO FIRE SUPPRESSION FAILURE (Dev Event)                    2.OOE-02 14  43.21  0.9  4.41E-06 IEFIRE          FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER                        1.00E+00 A-C2MB-152-104  AFW PUMP P-8A CIRCUIT BREAKER 152-104 FAILS TO CLOSE          1.61 E-03
 
Table 7-4: P-8B Failed All Fire Areas (Top 100 Cutsets)
Cut  %  %Cut    Prob./ Basic Event            Description                                                  Event Prob.
No. Total  Set Frequency A-PMMG-P-8B            AFW TURBINE PUMP P-8B FAILS TO RUN                            1.OOE+00 FA-28                  WEST SAFEGUARDS RM FIRE                                        2.74E-03 15 44.08 0.87  4.24E-06 IEFIRE                FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER                          1.OOE+00 A-PMMG-P-8A            AFW PUMP P-8A FAILS TO RUN                                    2.13E-03 A-PMMG-P-8B            AFW TURBINE PUMP P-8B FAILS TO RUN                            1.OOE+00 FA-13-13A1            AUX BLDNG 590' CORRIDR (CCW - CHARGING) EXP FIRE (Fault Tree)  1.99E-03 16  44.75 0.67  3.28E-06 IEFIRE                FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER                          1.OOE+00 A-PMME-P-8A            AFW PUMP P-8A FAILS TO START                                    1.65E-03 A-PMMG-P-8B            AFW TURBINE PUMP P-8B FAILS TO RUN                            1.00E+00 FA-13-13A1            AUX BLDNG 590' CORRIDR (CCW - CHARGING) EXP FIRE (Fault Tree)  1.99E-03 17  45.4 0.65  3.20E-06 IEFIRE                FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER                          1.OOE+00 A-C2MB-152-104        AFW PUMP P-8A CIRCUIT BREAKER 152-104 FAILS TO CLOSE            1.61 E-03 A-PMMG-P-8B            AFW TURBINE PUMP P-8B FAILS TO RUN                            1.OOE+00 FA-13-13A1            AUX BLDNG 590' CORRIDR (CCW - CHARGING) EXP FIRE (Fault Tree)  1.99E-03 18  45.97 0.57  2.79E-06 IEFIRE                FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER                          1.OOE+00 A-PMMG-P-8B            AFW TURBINE PUMP P-8B FAILS TO RUN                            1.00E+00 FA-3                  1D SWITCHGR LOGICAL PLACEHOLDER (Fault Tree)                  9.81 E-04 H-ZZOA-OTC-INIT        OP FAILS TO INITIATE ONCE THROUGH COOLING (HEP)                2.90E-03
                        /SUP-AUTO              AUTO FIRE SUPPRESSION FAILURE (Dev Event)                      9.80E-01 19  46.53 0.56  2.72E-06 IEFIRE                FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER                          1.OOE+00 A-PMMG-P-8B            AFW TURBINE PUMP P-8B FAILS TO RUN                            1.OOE+00 A-PMOO-P-8A            AFW PUMP P-8A OUT OF SERVICE                                  4.52E-03 FA-20                  SPENT FUEL EQUIPMENT RM FIRE                                  6.02E-04 20  46.99 0.46  2.27E-06 IEFIRE                FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER                          1.OOE+00 A-PMMG-P-8B            AFW TURBINE PUMP P-8B FAILS TO RUN                            1.OOE+00 B-XVOB-ADVS-MAN        OP FT CLOSE MANUAL VALVES TO ISOLATE ADV (FP/FR-LOC) (HEP)    4.03E-02 FA-2                  CSR EXP FIRE (Fault Tree)                                      3.1OE-03 H-ZZOA-OTC-CDTNL-HEP-4 COND HEP: B-XVOB-ADVS-MAN
* H-ZZOA-OTC-INIT (HEP)              1.85E-02
                        /SU P-AUTO            AUTO FIRE SUPPRESSION FAILURE (Dev Event)                      9.80E-01 21  47.42 0.43  2.09E-06 IEFIRE                FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER                          1.OOE+00
                        /ASDP                  ALTERNATE SHUTDOWN PANEL FAILURE                              9.90E-01
 
Table 7-4: P-8B Failed All Fire Areas (Top 100 Cutsets)
Cut  %  %Cut    Prob./I Basic Event            Description                                                      Event Prob.
No. Total  Set  Fre uency        E                                                                              I F-PMOE-FPS            OP FAILS TO START P-9A (HEP)                                      3.40E-02 FA-2                  CSR EXP FIRE (Fault Tree)                                        3.10E-03 SUP-AUTO              AUTO FIRE SUPPRESSION FAILURE (Dev Event)                        2.00E-02 22  47.84  0.42  2.08E-06  IEFIRE                FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER                            1.OOE+00 A-PMOE-AFW-PPMAN      OP FT MANUALLY START AN AFW PUMP (FP/FR-CR) (HEP)                3.38E-02
                          /ASDP                  ALTERNATE SHUTDOWN PANEL FAILURE                                  9.90E-01 FA-2                  CSR EXP FIRE (Fault Tree)                                        3.1 OE-03 SUP-AUTO              AUTO FIRE SUPPRESSION FAILURE (Dev Event)                        2.OOE-02 23  48.21 0.37  1.81E-06  IEFIRE                FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER                            1.00E+00 A-PMMG-P-8B            AFW TURBINE PUMP P-8B FAILS TO RUN                                1.00E+00 FA-2                  CSR EXP FIRE (Fault Tree)                                        3.1OE-03 O-RVCC-PORVS-MA        COMMON CAUSE FAILURE OF BOTH PORVS TO NOT OPEN                    5.95E-04
                          /SUP-AUTO              AUTO FIRE SUPPRESSION FAILURE (Dev Event)                        9.80E-01 24  48.58 0.37  1.79E-06  IEFIRE                FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER                            1.OOE+00 A-PMMG-P-8B            AFW TURBINE PUMP P-8B FAILS TO RUN                                1.00E+00 B-XVOB-ADVS-MAN        OP FT CLOSE MANUAL VALVES TO ISOLATE ADV (FP/FR-LOC) (HEP)        4.03E-02 FA-1                  GENERAL AREA FIRE (Fault Tree)                                    2.43E-03 H-ZZOA-OTC-CDTNL-HEP-4 COND HEP: B-XVOB-ADVS-MAN
* H-ZZOA-OTC-INIT (HEP)                1.85E-02
                          /SUP                  MANUAL FIRE SUPPRESSION FAILURE (Dev Event)                      9.90E-01 25  48.91 0.33  1.61E-06  IEFIRE                FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER                            1.00E+00 A-AVOA-MISCALADJ      OP FT ADJ AFW FLOW GIVEN FLOW INSTRUMENT MISC (FP/FR-CR) (HEP)    1.45E-03 A-PMMG-P-8B            AFW TURBINE PUMP P-8B FAILS TO RUN                                1.OOE+00 FA-2                  CSR EXP FIRE (Fault Tree)                                        3.10E-03 H-ZZOA-OTC-CDTNL-HEP-2 CND HEP- A-AVOA-AFWFLADJ B-XVOB-ADVS-MAN H-ZZOA-OTC-INIT (HEP)    3.66E-01
                          /SUP-AUTO              AUTO FIRE SUPPRESSION FAILURE (Dev Event)                        9.80E-01 26  49.24 0.33  1.61E-06  IEFIRE                FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER                            1.OOE+00 A-AVOA-AFWFLADJ        OP FT ADJ AFW FLOW GIVEN FLOW INSTRUMENT MISC (FP/FR-CR) (HEP)    1.45E-03 A-PMMG-P-8B            AFW TURBINE PUMP P-8B FAILS TO RUN                                1.OOE+00 FA-2                  CSR EXP FIRE (Fault Tree)                                        3.10E-03 H-ZZOA-OTC-CDTNL-HEP-2 CND HEP- A-AVOA-AFWFLADJ B-XVOB-ADVS-MAN H-ZZOA-OTC-INIT (HEP)    3.66E-01
                          /SUP-AUTO              AUTO FIRE SUPPRESSION FAILURE (Dev Event)                        9.80E-01
 
Table 7-4: P-8B Failed All Fire Areas (Top 100 Cutsets)
Cut  %  % Cut    Prob./ Basic Event        Description                                                      Event Prob.
No. Total  Set  Frequency  I              I                                                                I 27  49.55 0.31  1.50E-06 IEFIRE            FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER                            1.OOE+00 A-PMMG-P-8B        AFW TURBINE PUMP P-8B FAILS TO RUN                                1.OOE+00 FA-23-23E          TURBINE BUILDING EAST SIDE EXP FIRE (Fault Tree)                  2.94E-02 Y-PMCC-P8C66ABME  COMMON CAUSE FAILURE OF P-8C                                      5.1OE-05 28  49.85  0.3  1.45E-06 IEFIRE            FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER                            1.OOE+00 A-PMMG-P-8B        AFW TURBINE PUMP P-8B FAILS TO RUN                                1.OOE+00 A-PMOE-AFW-PPMAN  OP FT MANUALLY START AN AFW PUMP (FP/FR-CR) (HEP)                3.38E-02 A-PMOO-P-8A        AFW PUMP P-8A OUT OF SERVICE                                      4.52E-03 FA-1-EC-11R        CABINET EC-1 1R FIRE (Fault Tree)                                9.50E-03 29  50.15  0.3  1.45E-06 IEFIRE            FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER                            1.OOE+00 A-PMMG-P-8B        AFW TURBINE PUMP P-8B FAILS TO RUN                                1.OOE+00 A-PMOE-AFW-PPMAN  OP FT MANUALLY START AN AFW PUMP (FP/FR-CR) (HEP)                  3.38E-02 A-PMOO-P-8A        AFW PUMP P-8A OUT OF SERVICE                                      4.52E-03 FA-1-EC-13R        CABINET EC-13R FIRE (Fault Tree)                                  9.50E-03 30  50.44 0.29  1.43E-06 IEFIRE            FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER                            1.OOE+00 A-PMMG-P-8B        AFW TURBINE PUMP P-8B FAILS TO RUN                                1.00E+00 FA-1              GENERAL AREA FIRE (Fault Tree)                                    2.43E-03 O-RVCC-PORVS-MA    COMMON CAUSE FAILURE OF BOTH PORVS TO NOT OPEN                    5.95E-04
                          /SUP              MANUAL FIRE SUPPRESSION FAILURE (Dev Event)                      9.90E-01 31  50.73 0.29  1.41E-06 IEFIRE            FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER                            1.OOE+00 A-PMMG-P-8B        AFW TURBINE PUMP P-8B FAILS TO RUN                                1.OOE+00 FA-2-ED-10        CSR 125 V BUS NO. 1- LEFT SIDE - TIE BKR CAB FIRE (Fault Tree)    3.20E-03 P-IVMT-ED-07      INVERTER #2 FAILS TO FUNCTION                                    4.39E-04 32  51.01 0.28  1.35E-06 IEFIRE            FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER                            1.00E+00 A-PMMG-P-8B        AFW TURBINE PUMP P-8B FAILS TO RUN                                1.OOE+00 FA-2              CSR EXP FIRE (Fault Tree)                                        3.1OE-03
                          /SUP-AUTO          AUTO FIRE SUPPRESSION FAILURE (Dev Event)                        9.80E-01 Y-AVMD-CV-3027    AIR OPERATED VALVE CV-3027 FAILS TO REMAIN OPEN                  4.44E-04 33  51.29 0.28  1.35E-06 IEFIRE            FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER                            1.OOE+00 A-PMMG-P-8B        AFW TURBINE PUMP P-8B FAILS TO RUN                                1.OOE+00 FA-2              CSR EXP FIRE (Fault Tree)                                        3.10E-03
 
Table 7-4: P-8B Failed All Fire Areas (Top 100 Cutsets)
Cut    %    %Cut    Prob./I                                                                                      En Ne    Frequency  Basic Event            Description                                                    Event Prob.
No. ITotal  ISelt  Fr uenc
                              /SUP-AUTO              AUTO FIRE SUPPRESSION FAILURE (Dev Event)                      9.80E-01 Y-AVMD-CV-3056        AIR OPERATED VALVE CV-3056 FAILS TO REMAIN OPEN                4.44E-04 34    51.55  0.26  1.28E-06  IEFIRE                FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER                          1.00E+00 A-PMMG-P-8A            AFW PUMP P-8A FAILS TO RUN                                      2.13E-03 A-PMMG-P-8B            AFW TURBINE PUMP P-8B FAILS TO RUN                              1.OOE+00 FA-20                  SPENT FUEL EQUIPMENT RM FIRE                                    6.02E-04 35    51.81  0.26  1.28E-06  IEFIRE                FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER                          1.OOE+00 A-AVOA-MISCALADJ      OP FT ADJ AFW FLOW GIVEN FLOW INSTRUMENT MISC (FP/FR-CR) (HEP)  1.45E-03 A-PMMG-P-8B            AFW TURBINE PUMP P-8B FAILS TO RUN                              1.OOE+00 FA-1                  GENERAL AREA FIRE (Fault Tree)                                  2.43E-03 H-ZZOA-OTC-CDTNL-HEP-2 CND HEP- A-AVOA-AFWFLADJ B-XVOB-ADVS-MAN H-ZZOA-OTC-INIT (HEP)  3.66E-01
                              /SUP                  MANUAL FIRE SUPPRESSION FAILURE (Dev Event)                    9.90E-01 36    52.07  0.26  1.28E-06  IEFIRE                FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER                          1.OOE+00 A-AVOA-AFWFLADJ        OP FT ADJ AFW FLOW GIVEN FLOW INSTRUMENT MISC (FPIFR-CR) (HEP)  1.45E-03 A-PMMG-P-8B            AFW TURBINE PUMP P-8B FAILS TO RUN                              1.OOE+00 FA-1                  GENERAL AREA FIRE (Fault Tree)                                  2.43E-03 H-ZZOA-OTC-CDTNL-HEP-2 CND HEP-A-AVOA-AFWFLADJ B-XVOB-ADVS-MAN H-ZZOA-OTC-INIT (HEP)  3.66E-01
                              /SUP                  MANUAL FIRE SUPPRESSION FAILURE (Dev Event)                    9.90E-01 37    52.32  0.25  1.24E-06  IEFIRE                FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER                          1.OOE+00 A-PMMG-P-8B            AFW TURBINE PUMP P-8B FAILS TO RUN                              1.OOE+00 A-PSOH-AFWLOSUC        MISCALIBRATION OF ALL AFW LOW SUCTION PRESSURE SWITCHES (HEP)  1.30E-04 FA-1-EC-13L            CABINET EC-13L FIRE (Fault Tree)                                9.50E-03 38    52.57  0.25  1.24E-06  IEFIRE                FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER                          1.OOE+00 A-PMMG-P-8B            AFW TURBINE PUMP P-8B FAILS TO RUN                              1.OOE+00 A-PSOH-AFWLOSUC        MISCALIBRATION OF ALL AFW LOW SUCTION PRESSURE SWITCHES (HEP)  1.30E-04 FA-1-EC-13R            CABINET EC-13R FIRE (Fault Tree)                                9.50E-03 39    52.82  0.25  1.24E-06  IEFIRE                FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER                          1.OOE+00 A-PMMG-P-8B            AFW TURBINE PUMP P-8B FAILS TO RUN                              1.OOE+00 A-PSOH-AFWLOSUC        MISCALIBRATION OF ALL AFW LOW SUCTION PRESSURE SWITCHES (HEP)  1.30E-04 FA-1-EC-11R            CABINET EC-11R FIRE (Fault Tree)                                9.50E-03 40  53.07    0.25  1.24E-06  IE FIRE                FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER                          1.OOE+00
 
Table 7-4: P-8B Failed All Fire Areas (Top 100 Cutsets)
No.
Cut Total
      %      Set 1%Cut  Frequency Prob./ Basic Event      Description                                                  Evn Prob.
Event  rb A-PMMG-P-8B      AFW TURBINE PUMP P-8B FAILS TO RUN                            1.00E+00 A-PSOH-AFWLOSUC  MISCALIBRATION OF ALL AFW LOW SUCTION PRESSURE SWITCHES (HEP)  1.30E-04 FA-1-EC-1 1L    CABINET EC-1 1L FIRE (Fault Tree)                              9.50E-03 41  53.31  0.24  1.18E-06 IEFIRE          FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER                          1.OOE+00 A-PMMG-P-8B      AFW TURBINE PUMP P-8B FAILS TO RUN                            1.OOE+00 FA-4            1C SWITCHGR LOGICAL PLACEHOLDER (Fault Tree)                  4.15E-04 H-ZZOA-OTC-INIT  OP FAILS TO INITIATE ONCE THROUGH COOLING (HEP)                2.90E-03
                          /SUP-AUTO        AUTO FIRE SUPPRESSION FAILURE (Dev Event)                      9.80E-01 42  53.53  0.22  1.08E-06 IEFIRE          FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER                          1.OOE+00 A-PMMG-P-8B      AFW TURBINE PUMP P-8B FAILS TO RUN                            1.OOE+00 A-PMOE-AFW-PPMAN OP FT MANUALLY START AN AFW PUMP (FP/FR-CR) (HEP)              3.38E-02 A-PMOO-P-8C      AFW PUMP P-8C OUT OF SERVICE                                  3.35E-03 FA-1-EC-11L      CABINET EC-1 1 L FIRE (Fault Tree)                            9.50E-03 43  53.75  0.22  1.08E-06 IEFIRE          FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER                          1.OOE+00 A-PMMG-P-8B      AFW TURBINE PUMP P-8B FAILS TO RUN                            1.OOE+00 A-PMOE-AFW-PPMAN OP FT MANUALLY START AN AFW PUMP (FP/FR-CR) (HEP)              3.38E-02 A-PMOO-P-8C      AFW PUMP P-8C OUT OF SERVICE                                  3.35E-03 FA-1-EC-13L      CABINET EC-13L FIRE (Fault Tree)                              9.50E-03 44  53.97  0.22  1.07E-06 IEFIRE          FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER                          1.00E+00 A-PMMG-P-8B      AFW TURBINE PUMP P-8B FAILS TO RUN                            1.OOE+00 FA-1            GENERAL AREA FIRE (Fault Tree)                                2.43E-03
                          /SUP            MANUAL FIRE SUPPRESSION FAILURE (Dev Event)                    9.90E-01 Y-AVMD-CV-3027  AIR OPERATED VALVE CV-3027 FAILS TO REMAIN OPEN                4.44E-04 45  54.19  0.22  1.07E-06 IEFIRE          FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER                          1.OOE+00 A-PMMG-P-8B      AFW TURBINE PUMP P-8B FAILS TO RUN                            1.OOE+00 FA-1            GENERAL AREA FIRE (Fault Tree)                                2.43E-03
                          /SUP            MANUAL FIRE SUPPRESSION FAILURE (Dev Event)                    9.90E-01 Y-AVMD-CV-3056  AIR OPERATED VALVE CV-3056 FAILS TO REMAIN OPEN                4.44E-04 46  54.39    0.2  9.93E-07 IEFIRE          FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER                          1.OOE+00 A-PMME-P-8A      AFW PUMP P-8A FAILS TO START                                  1.65E-03 A-PMMG-P-8B      AFW TURBINE PUMP P-8B FAILS TO RUN                            1.00E+00
 
Table 7-4: P-8B Failed All Fire Areas (Top 100 Cutsets)
Cut No.Basic  %  I % Cut  Prob./I                                                                          Event Prob.
Event      Description                                                    Pro FA-20            SPENT FUEL EQUIPMENT RM FIRE                            6.02E-04 47      54.59    0.2  9.86E-07  IEFIRE          FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER                    1.OOE+00 A-PMMG-P-8B      AFW TURBINE PUMP P-8B FAILS TO RUN-                      1.OOE+00 A-REMD-PSX-P8A  AFW PUMP P-8A/B LOW SUCTION PRESS RELAY PSX-P8A FTRD    3.60E-04 FA-28            WEST SAFEGUARDS RM FIRE                                  2.74E-03 48      54.79    0.2  9.86E-07  IEFIRE          FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER                    1.OOE+00 A-PMMG-P-8B      AFW TURBINE PUMP P-8B FAILS TO RUN                      1.OOE+00 A-REMD-PSX-0741  AFW PUMP P-8A LOW SUCTION PRESS RELAY PSX-0741 FTRD      3.60E-04 FA-28            WEST SAFEGUARDS RM FIRE                                  2.74E-03 49      54.99    0.2  9.86E-07  IEFIRE          FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER                    1.OOE+00 A-PMMG-P-8B      AFW TURBINE PUMP P-8B FAILS TO RUN                      1.OOE+00 A-REMD-62-3P8A  AFW PUMP P-8A/B LOW SUCTION PRESS RELAY 62-3/P8A FTRD    3.60E-04 FA-28            WEST SAFEGUARDS RM FIRE                                  2.74E-03 50      55.19    0.2  9.69E-07  IEFIRE          FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER                    1.00E+00 A-C2MB-152-104  AFW PUMP P-8A CIRCUIT BREAKER 152-104 FAILS TO CLOSE      1.61E-03 A-PMMG-P-8B      AFW TURBINE PUMP P-8B FAILS TO RUN                      1.OOE+00 FA-20            SPENT FUEL EQUIPMENT RM FIRE                            6.02E-04 51      55.39    0.2  9.57E-07  IEFIRE          FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER                    1.OOE+00 A-CSMD-152-104CS 152-104/CS FAILS TO REMAIN IN NORMAL POS (XFRS TO TRIP)  3.49E-04 A-PMMG-P-8B      AFW TURBINE PUMP P-8B FAILS TO RUN                      1.OOE+00 FA-28            WEST SAFEGUARDS RM FIRE                                  2.74E-03 52      55.56  0.17  8.18E-07  IEFIRE          FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER                    1.OOE+00
                                /ASDP            ALTERNATE SHUTDOWN PANEL FAILURE                        9.90E-01 F-PMOE-FPS      OP FAILS TO START P-9A (HEP)                            3.40E-02 FA-1            GENERAL AREA FIRE (Fault Tree)                          2.43E-03 SUP              MANUAL FIRE SUPPRESSION FAILURE (Dev Event)              1.OOE-02 53      55.73  0.17  8.13E-07  IEFIRE          FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER                    1.OOE+00 A-PMOE-AFW-PPMAN OP FT MANUALLY START AN AFW PUMP (FP/FR-CR) (HEP)        3.38E-02
                                /ASDP            ALTERNATE SHUTDOWN PANEL FAILURE                        9.90E-01 FA-1            GENERAL AREA FIRE (Fault Tree)                          2.43E-03 SUP              MANUAL FIRE SUPPRESSION FAILURE (Dev Event)              1.00E-02
 
Table 7-4: P-8B Failed All Fire Areas (Top 100 Cutsets)
Cut No.Basic  %  I %Cut    Prob./I      Event            Description                                                    Event Prob.
Prob, 54      55.89    0.16 7.90E-07  IEFIRE                FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER                            1.OOE+00 A-PMMG-P-8B            AFW TURBINE PUMP P-8B FAILS TO RUN                              1.OOE+00 FA-2                  CSR EXP FIRE (Fault Tree)                                        3.1OE-03
                                /SUP-AUTO              AUTO FIRE SUPPRESSION FAILURE (Dev Event)                        9.80E-01 Y-AVOB-RAS-VLVS        OP FT ENABLE ESS RECIRC VALVES TO CLOSE ON RAS (FP/FR-CR) (HEP)  2.60E-04 55      56.04  0.15  7.17E-07  IEFIRE                FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER                            1.OOE+00 A-PMMG-P-8B            AFW TURBINE PUMP P-8B FAILS TO RUN                              1.00E+00 B-XVOB-ADVS-MAN        OP FT CLOSE MANUAL VALVES TO ISOLATE ADV (FP/FR-LOC) (HEP)      4.03E-02 FA-3                  1D SWITCHGR LOGICAL PLACEHOLDER (Fault Tree)                    9.81 E-04 H-ZZOA-OTC-CDTNL-HEP-4 COND HEP: B-XVOB-ADVS-MAN
* H-ZZOA-OTC-INIT (HEP)                1.85E-02
                                /SUP-AUTO              AUTO FIRE SUPPRESSION FAILURE (Dev Event)                        9.80E-01 56      56.19  0.15  7.16E-07  IEFIRE                FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER                            1.OOE+00 A-PMMG-P-8B            AFW TURBINE PUMP P-8B FAILS TO RUN                              1.OOE+00 A-REMD-PSX-0741        AFW PUMP P-8A LOW SUCTION PRESS RELAY PSX-0741 FTRD              3.60E-04 FA-13-13A1            AUX BLDNG 590' CORRIDR (CCW - CHARGING) EXP FIRE (Fault Tree)    1.99E-03 57      56.34  0.15  7.16E-07  IEFIRE                FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER                            1.OOE+00 A-PMMG-P-8B            AFW TURBINE PUMP P-8B FAILS TO RUN                              1.OOE+00 A-REMD-62-3P8A        AFW PUMP P-8A/B LOW SUCTION PRESS RELAY 62-3/P8A FTRD            3.60E-04 FA-13-13A1            AUX BLDNG 590' CORRIDR (CCW - CHARGING) EXP FIRE (Fault Tree)    1.99E-03 58      56.49  0.15  7.16E-07  IEFIRE                FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER                            1.OOE+00 A-PMMG-P-8B            AFW TURBINE PUMP P-8B FAILS TO RUN                              1.OOE+00 A-REMD-PSX-P8A        AFW PUMP P-8A/B LOW SUCTION PRESS RELAY PSX-P8A FTRD            3.60E-04 FA-13-13A1            AUX BLDNG 590' CORRIDR (CCW - CHARGING) EXP FIRE (Fault Tree)    1.99E-03 59      56.63  0.14  6.95E-07  IEFIRE                FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER                            1.OOE+00 A-CSMD-152-104CS      152-104/CS FAILS TO REMAIN IN NORMAL POS (XFRS TO TRIP)          3.49E-04 A-PMMG-P-8B            AFW TURBINE PUMP P-8B FAILS TO RUN                              1.OOE+00 FA-13-13A1            AUX BLDNG 590' CORRIDR (CCW - CHARGING) EXP FIRE (Fault Tree)    1.99E-03 60      56.77  0.14  6.84E-07  IEFIRE                FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER                            1.OOE+00 A-PMMG-P-8A            AFW PUMP P-8A FAILS TO RUN                                      2.13E-03 A-PMMG-P-8B            AFW TURBINE PUMP P-8B FAILS TO RUN                              1.OOE+00 A-PMOE-AFW-PPMAN      OP FT MANUALLY START AN AFW PUMP (FP/FR-CR) (HEP)                3.38E-02
 
Table 7-4: P-8B Failed All Fire Areas (Top 100 Cutsets)
Cut  %  % Cut    Prob./                                                                                  Event Prob.
No. Total  SetI Frequency Basic Event      Description FA-1 -EC-1 1R    CABINET EC-11R FIRE (Fault Tree)                                9.50E-03 61 56.91  0.14  6.84E-07 IEFIRE          FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER                            1.OOE+00 A-PMMG-P-8A      AFW PUMP P-8A FAILS TO RUN                                      2.13E-03 A-PMMG-P-8B      AFW TURBINE PUMP P-8B FAILS TO RUN                              1.OOE+00 A-PMOE-AFW-PPMAN OP FT MANUALLY START AN AFW PUMP (FP/FR-CR) (HEP)                3.38E-02 FA-1-EC-13R      CABINET EC-13R FIRE (Fault Tree)                                9.50E-03 62  57.04 0.13  6.57E-07 IEFIRE          FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER                            1.OOE+00 A-PMOE-AFW-PPMAN OP FT MANUALLY START AN AFW PUMP (FP/FR-CR) (HEP)                3.38E-02
                          /ASDP            ALTERNATE SHUTDOWN PANEL FAILURE                                9.90E-01 FA-3            1D SWITCHGR LOGICAL PLACEHOLDER (Fault Tree)                    9.81 E-04 SUP-AUTO        AUTO FIRE SUPPRESSION FAILURE (Dev Event)                        2.OOE-02 63  57.17 0.13  6.26E-07 IEFIRE          FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER                            1.00E+00 A-PMMG-P-8B      AFW TURBINE PUMP P-8B FAILS TO RUN                              1.00E+00 FA-1            GENERAL AREA FIRE (Fault Tree)                                  2.43E-03
                          /SUP            MANUAL FIRE SUPPRESSION FAILURE (Dev Event)                      9.90E-01 Y-AVOB-RAS-VLVS  OP FT ENABLE ESS RECIRC VALVES TO CLOSE ON RAS (FP/FR-CR) (HEP)  2.60E-04 64  57.3  0.13  6.20E-07 IEFIRE          FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER                            1.OOE+00 ASDP            ALTERNATE SHUTDOWN PANEL FAILURE                                1.00E-02 FA-2            CSR EXP FIRE (Fault Tree)                                        3.1OE-03 SUP-AUTO        AUTO FIRE SUPPRESSION FAILURE (Dev Event)                        2.OOE-02 65  57.43 0.13  6.19E-07 IEFIRE          FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER                            1.OOE+00 A-OOOT-CSTMKUP  OP FT MAKEUP TO CST (T-2) (FP/FR-LOC) (HEP)                      2.66E-03 FA-1-EC-13L      CABINET EC-13L FIRE (Fault Tree)                                9.50E-03 L-TPMT-PT-0104A  PRESSURE TRANSMITTER PT-0104A FAILS TO FUNCTION                  2.45E-02 66  57.56 0.13  6.19E-07 IE_FIRE          FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER                            1.00E+00 A-OOOT-CSTMKUP  OP FT MAKEUP TO CST (T-2) (FP/FR-LOC) (HEP)                      2.66E-03 FA-1-EC-13R      CABINET EC-13R FIRE (Fault Tree)                                9.50E-03 L-TPMT-PT-0104A  PRESSURE TRANSMITTER PT-0104A FAILS TO FUNCTION                  2.45E-02 67  57.69 0.13  6.19E-07 IEFIRE          FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER                            11.00E+00 A-OOOT-CSTMKUP  OP FT MAKEUP TO CST (T-2) (FP/FR-LOC) (HEP)                      2.66E-03 FA-1-EC-13L      CABINET EC-13L FIRE (Fault Tree)                                9.50E-03
 
Table 7-4: P-8B Failed All Fire Areas (Top 100 Cutsets)
Cut  %  % Cut    Prob./I Basic Event            Decription                                                          Event Prob.
No. Total  Set  Frequency                                                                                          I L-TPMT-PT-0104B        PRESSURE TRANSMITTER PT-0104B FAILS TO FUNCTION                      2.45E-02 68  57.82 0.13  6.19E-07  IEFIRE                FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER                                1.OOE+00 A-OOOT-CSTMKUP        OP FT MAKEUP TO CST (T-2) (FP/FR-LOC) (HEP)                          2.66E-03 FA-1-EC-13R            CABINET EC-13R FIRE (Fault Tree)                                      9.50E-03 L-TPMT-PT-0104B        PRESSURE TRANSMITTER PT-0104B FAILS TO FUNCTION                      2.45E-02 69  57.94 0.12  5.92E-07  IEFIRE                FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER                                1.OOE+00 A-AVOA-AFWSTEAM        OP FAIL TO LOCALLY OPEN AFW STEAM SUPPLY CV-0522B (HEP)              7.20E-02
                          /ASDP                  ALTERNATE SHUTDOWN PANEL FAILURE                                      9.90E-01 FA-4                  1C SWITCHGR LOGICAL PLACEHOLDER (Fault Tree)                        4.15E-04 SUP-AUTO              AUTO FIRE SUPPRESSION FAILURE (Dev Event)                            2.OOE-02 70  58.06 0.12  5.73E-07  IEFIRE                FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER                                1.OOE+00 A-AVOA-MISCALADJ      OP FT ADJ AFW FLOW GIVEN FLOW INSTRUMENT MISC (FP/FR-CR) (HEP)        1.45E-03 A-PMMG-P-8B            AFW TURBINE PUMP P-8B FAILS TO RUN                                  1.OOE+00 FA-2                  CSR EXP FIRE (Fault Tree)                                            3.1OE-03 H-ZZOA-OTC-CDTNL-HEP-3 CND HEP- A-AVOA-MISCALADJ M-OOOT-LPF-INIT H-ZZOA-OTC-INIT (HEP)      5.44E-01 M-OOOT-LPF-CDTNL-HEP-1 CND HEP-A-AVOA-MISCALADJ/ M-OOOT-LPF-INIT/ H-AVOA-HPISUBCLG (HEP)    2.39E-01
                          /SUP-AUTO              AUTO FIRE SUPPRESSION FAILURE (Dev Event)                            9.80E-01 71  58.18 0.12  5.72E-07  IEFIRE                FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER                                1.OOE+00 A-PMMG-P-8B            AFW TURBINE PUMP P-8B FAILS TO RUN                                  1.00E+00 FA-3                  1D SWITCHGR LOGICAL PLACEHOLDER (Fault Tree)                        9.81 E-04 O-RVCC-PORVS-MA        COMMON CAUSE FAILURE OF BOTH PORVS TO NOT OPEN                      5.95E-04
                          /SUP-AUTO              AUTO FIRE SUPPRESSION FAILURE (Dev Event)                            9.80E-01 72  58.29 0.11  5.30E-07  IEFIRE                FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER                                1.OOE+00 A-PMME-P-8C            AFW PUMP P-8C FAILS TO START                                          1.65E-03 A-PMMG-P-8B            AFW TURBINE PUMP P-8B FAILS TO RUN                                  1.OOE+00 A-PMOE-AFW-PPMAN      OP FT MANUALLY START AN AFW PUMP (FP/FR-CR) (HEP)                    3.38E-02 FA-1-EC-11L            CABINET EC-11L FIRE (Fault Tree)                                    9.50E-03 73  58.4 0.11  5.30E-07  IEFIRE                FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER                                1.00E+00 A-PMME-P-8A            AFW PUMP P-8A FAILS TO START                                          1.65E-03 A-PMMG-P-8B            AFW TURBINE PUMP P-8B FAILS TO RUN                                  1.OOE+00 A-PMOE-AFW-PPMAN      OP FT MANUALLY START AN AFW PUMP (FP/FR-CR) (HEP)                    3.38E-02
 
Table 7-4: P-8B Failed All Fire Areas (Top 100 Cutsets)
Cut  %  % Cut    Prob./  Basic Event    Description                                                Event Prob.
No. Total  Set  FrequencyI                                                                            I FA-1 -EC-1 1R    CABINET EC-1 1 R FIRE (Fault Tree)                          9.50E-03 74  58.51 0.11  5.30E-07  IEFIRE          FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER                        1.OOE+00 A-PMME-P-8A      AFW PUMP P-BA FAILS TO START                                  1.65E-03 A-PMMG-P-8B      AFW TURBINE PUMP P-8B FAILS TO RUN                          1.OOE+00 A-PMOE-AFW-PPMAN OP FT MANUALLY START AN AFW PUMP (FP/FR-CR) (HEP)            3.38E-02 FA-1-EC-13R      CABINET EC-13R FIRE (Fault Tree)                            9.50E-03 75  58.62 0.11  5.30E-07  IEFIRE          FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER                        1.00E+00 A-PMME-P-8C      AFW PUMP P-8C FAILS TO START                                  1.65E-03 A-PMMG-P-8B      AFW TURBINE PUMP P-8B FAILS TO RUN                          1.OOE+00 A-PMOE-AFW-PPMAN OP FT MANUALLY START AN AFW PUMP (FP/FR-CR) (HEP)            3.38E-02 FA-1-EC-13L      CABINET EC-13L FIRE (Fault Tree)                            9.50E-03 76  58.73 0.11  5.17E-07  IEFIRE          FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER                        1.OOE+00 A-PMCC-P8ABC-ME  COMMON CAUSE FAILURE OF ALL 3 AFW PUMPS P-8A/B/C TO START    5.45E-05 FA-1-EC-11L      CABINET EC-11L FIRE (Fault Tree)                            9.50E-03 77  58.84 0.11  5.17E-07  IEFIRE          FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER                        1.OOE+00 A-PMCC-P8ABC-ME  COMMON CAUSE FAILURE OF ALL 3 AFW PUMPS P-8A/B/C TO START    5.45E-05 FA-1-EC-11R      CABINET EC-11R FIRE (Fault Tree)                            9.50E-03 78  58.95 0.11  5.17E-07  IEFIRE          FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER                        1.OOE+00 A-PMCC-P8ABC-ME  COMMON CAUSE FAILURE OF ALL 3 AFW PUMPS P-8A/B/C TO START    5.45E-05 FA-1-EC-13L      CABINET EC-13L FIRE (Fault Tree)                            9.50E-03 79  59.06 0.11  5.17E-07  IEFIRE          FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER                        1.OOE+00 A-PMCC-P8ABC-ME  COMMON CAUSE FAILURE OF ALL 3 AFW PUMPS P-8A/B/C TO START    5.45E-05 FA-1-EC-13R      CABINET EC-13R FIRE (Fault Tree)                            9.50E-03 80  59.17 0.11  5.17E-07  IEFIRE          FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER                        1.OOE+00 A-PMMG-P-8B      AFW TURBINE PUMP P-8B FAILS TO RUN                          1.OOE+00 FA-2            CSR EXP FIRE (Fault Tree)                                    3.1OE-03 O-MVCC-BLKVLV-MA COMMON CAUSE FAILURE OF BOTH ISOLATION VALVES TO OPEN        1.70E-04
                          /SUP-AUTO        AUTO FIRE SUPPRESSION FAILURE (Dev Event)                    9.80E-01 81  59.28 0.11  5.17E-07  IEFIRE          FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER                        1.OOE+00 A-C2MB-152-209  AFW PUMP P-8C CIRCUIT BREAKER 152-209 FAILS TO CLOSE        1.61 E-03 A-PMMG-P-8B      AFW TURBINE PUMP P-8B FAILS TO RUN                          1.OOE+00
 
Table 7-4: P-8B Failed All Fire Areas (Top 100 Cutsets)
Cut    %        %Cut    Prob./I                                                                                        Event Prob.
otaBasic                        Event            Description No. ITotal        Set IFr                                Ienc A-PMOE-AFW-PPMAN        OP FT MANUALLY START AN AFW PUMP (FP/FR-CR) (HEP)                3.38E-02 FA-1-EC-1 1L            CABINET EC-1 1L FIRE (Fault Tree)                                9.50E-03 82  59.39      0.11  5.17E-07  IEFIRE                  FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER                          1.OOE+00 A-C2MB-152-104          AFW PUMP P-8A CIRCUIT BREAKER 152-104 FAILS TO CLOSE            1.61E-03 A-PMMG-P-8B              AFW TURBINE PUMP P-8B FAILS TO RUN                              1.OOE+00 A-PMOE-AFW-PPMAN        OP FT MANUALLY START AN AFW PUMP (FP/FR-CR) (HEP)                3.38E-02 FA-1-EC-11R              CABINET EC-1 1R FIRE (Fault Tree)                                9.50E-03 83    59.5      0.11  5.17E-07  IE. FIRE                FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER                          1.OOE+00 A-C2MB-152-104          AFW PUMP P-8A CIRCUIT BREAKER 152-104 FAILS TO CLOSE            1.61 E-03 A-PMMG-P-8B              AFW TURBINE PUMP P-8B FAILS TO RUN                              1.OOE+00 A-PMOE-AFW-PPMAN        OP FT MANUALLY START AN AFW PUMP (FP/FR-CR) (HEP)                3.38E-02 FA-1-EC-13R              CABINET EC-13R FIRE (Fault Tree)                                9.50E-03 84    59.61      0.11  5.17E-07  IEFIRE                  FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER                          1.OOE+00 A-C2MB-152-209          AFW PUMP P-8C CIRCUIT BREAKER 152-209 FAILS TO CLOSE            1.61 E-03 A-PMMG-P-8B              AFW TURBINE PUMP P-8B FAILS TO RUN                              1.OOE+00 A-PMOE-AFW-PPMAN        OP FT MANUALLY START AN AFW PUMP (FP/FR-CR) (HEP)              3.38E-02 FA-1-EC-13L              CABINET EC-13L FIRE (Fault Tree)                                9.50E-03 85    59.71      0.1  5.10E-07  IEFIRE                  FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER                          1.OOE+00 A-OOOT-CSTMKUP          OP FT MAKEUP TO CST (T-2) (FP/FR-LOC) (HEP)                    2.66E-03 FA-1-EC-13L              CABINET EC-13L FIRE (Fault Tree)                                9.50E-03 L-TFMT-FT-0306          SDC INJECTION LINE FLOW TRANSMITTER FT-0306 FAILURE            2.02E-02 86    59.81      0.1  5.10E-07  IEFIRE                  FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER                          1.00E+00 A-OOOT-CSTMKUP          OP FT MAKEUP TO CST (T-2) (FP/FR-LOC) (HEP)                    2.66E-03 FA-1-EC-13R              CABINET EC-1 3R FIRE (Fault Tree)                              9.50E-03 L-TFMT-FT-0306          SDC INJECTION LINE FLOW TRANSMITTER FT-0306 FAILURE            2.02E-02 87    59.91      0.1  5.1OE-07  IEFIRE                  FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER                          1.00E+00 A-AVOA-AFWFLADJ          OP FT ADJ AFW FLOW GIVEN FLOW INSTRUMENT MISC (FP/FR-CR) (HEP)  1.45E-03 A-PMMG-P-8B              AFW TURBINE PUMP P-8B FAILS TO RUN                              1.OOE+00 FA-3                    1D SWITCHGR LOGICAL PLACEHOLDER (Fault Tree)                    9.81 E-04 H-ZZOA-OTC-CDTNL-HEP-2  CND HEP- A-AVOA-AFWFLADJ B-XVOB-ADVS-MAN H-ZZOA-OTC-INIT (HEP)  3.66E-01
                                  /SUP-AUTO                AUTO FIRE SUPPRESSION FAILURE (Dev Event)                      9.80E-01
 
Table 7-4: P-8B Failed All Fire Areas (Top 100 Cutsets)
Cut  %  % Cut    Prob./                                                                                          Event Prob.
No. Tota  Set  FrequencyBasic Event            Description 88  60.01  0.1  5.1OE-07 IEFIRE                FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER                              1.OOE+00 A-AVOA-MISCALADJ      OP FT ADJ AFW FLOW GIVEN FLOW INSTRUMENT MISC (FP/FR-CR) (HEP)    1.45E-03 A-PMMG-P-8B            AFW TURBINE PUMP P-8B FAILS TO RUN                                1.OOE+00 FA-3                  1D SWITCHGR LOGICAL PLACEHOLDER (Fault Tree)                      9.81 E-04 H-ZZOA-OTC-CDTNL-HEP-2 CND HEP- A-AVOA-AFWFLADJ B-XVOB-ADVS-MAN H-ZZOA-OTC-INIT (HEP)    3.66E-01
                          /SUP-AUTO              AUTO FIRE SUPPRESSION FAILURE (Dev Event)                          9.80E-01 89  60.11  0.1  5.04E-07 IEFIRE                FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER                              1.00E+00 A-CVMA-CK-FW741        AFW PUMP P-8A DISCHARGE CHECK VALVE CK-FW0741 FAILS TO OPEN        1.84E-04 A-PMMG-P-8B            AFW TURBINE PUMP P-8B FAILS TO RUN                                1.OOE+00 FA-28                  WEST SAFEGUARDS RM FIRE                                            2.74E-03 90  60.21  0.1  4.84E-07 IEFIRE                FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER                              1.OOE+00 A-PMMG-P-8B            AFW TURBINE PUMP P-8B FAILS TO RUN                                1.OOE+00 FA-1-EC-04L            CABINET EC-04L FIRE (Fault Tree)                                  9.50E-03 Y-PMCC-P8C66ABME      COMMON CAUSE FAILURE OF P-8C                                      5.1OE-05 91  60.31  0.1  4.84E-07 IEFIRE                FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER                              1.OOE+00 A-PMMG-P-8B            AFW TURBINE PUMP P-8B FAILS TO RUN                                1.00E+00 FA-1-EC-01L            CABINET EC-01L FIRE (Fault Tree)                                  9.50E-03 Y-PMCC-P8C66ABME      COMMON CAUSE FAILURE OF P-8C                                      5.1OE-05 92  60.4 0.09  4.54E-07 IEFIRE                FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER                              1.OOE+00 A-AVOA-MISCALADJ      OP FT ADJ AFW FLOW GIVEN FLOW INSTRUMENT MISC (FP/FR-CR) (HEP)    1.45E-03 A-PMMG-P-8B            AFW TURBINE PUMP P-8B FAILS TO RUN                                1.00E+00 FA-1                  GENERAL AREA FIRE (Fault Tree)                                    2.43E-03 H-ZZOA-OTC-CDTNL-HEP-3 CND HEP- A-AVOA-MISCALADJ M-OOOT-LPF-INIT H-ZZOA-OTC-INIT (HEP)    5.44E-01 M-OOOT-LPF-CDTNL-HEP-1 CND HEP-A-AVOA-MISCALADJ/ M-OOOT-LPF-INIT/ H-AVOA-HPISUBCLG (HEP)  2.39E-01
                          /SUP                  MANUAL FIRE SUPPRESSION FAILURE (Dev Event)                        9.90E-01 93  60.49 0.09  4.29E-07 IEFIRE                FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER                              1.OOE+00 A-OOOT-CSTMKUP        OP FT MAKEUP TO CST (T-2) (FP/FR-LOC) (HEP)                        2.66E-03 FA-1-EC-13L            CABINET EC-13L FIRE (Fault Tree)                                  9.50E-03 L-HCMT-HIC-3025B      SDC HX DISCHRG VALVE HAND INDIC CONTROLLER HIC-3025B FAIL          1.70E-02 94  60.58 0.09  4.29E-07 IEFIRE                FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER                              11.00E+00 A-OOOT-CSTMKUP        OP FT MAKEUP TO CST (T-2) (FP/FR-LOC) (HEP)                        2.66E-03
 
Table 7-4: P-8B Failed All Fire Areas (Top 100 Cutsets)
Cut  %  % Cut  Prob.,                                                                            Event Prob.
No. Tota  Set  FrequencyBasic Event      Description FA-1-EC-13R      CABINET EC-13R FIRE (Fault Tree)                          9.50E-03 L-HCMT-HIC-3025B SDC HX DISCHRG VALVE HAND INDIC CONTROLLER HIC-3025B FAIL  1.70E-02 95 60.67  0.09  4.29E-07 IEFIRE          FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER                      1.OOE+00 A-OOOT-CSTMKUP  OP FT MAKEUP TO CST (T-2) (FP/FR-LOC) (HEP)                2.66E-03 FA-1-EC-13L      CABINET EC-13L FIRE (Fault Tree)                          9.50E-03 L-HCMT-HIC-0306  SDC HX BYPASS VALVE HIC-0306B FAILS TO FUNCTION            1.70E-02 96 60.76 0.09  4.29E-07 IEFIRE          FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER                      1.00E+00 A-OOOT-CSTMKUP  OP FT MAKEUP TO CST (T-2) (FP/FR-LOC) (HEP)                2.66E-03 FA-1-EC-13R      CABINET EC-13R FIRE (Fault Tree)                          9.50E-03 L-HCMT-HIC-0306  SDC HX BYPASS VALVE HIC-0306B FAILS TO FUNCTION            1.70E-02 97 60.85 0.09  4.29E-07 IEFIRE          FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER                      1.OOE+00 A-OOOT-CSTMKUP  OP FT MAKEUP TO CST (T-2) (FP/FR-LOC) (HEP)                2.66E-03 FA-1-EC-13L      CABINET EC-13L FIRE (Fault Tree)                          9.50E-03 L-HCMT-HIC-3025A SDC HX DISCHRG VALVE HAND INDIC CONTROLLER HIC-3025A FAIL  1.70E-02 98 60.94 0.09  4.29E-07 IEFIRE          FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER                      1.OOE+00 A-OOOT-CSTMKUP  OP FT MAKEUP TO CST (T-2) (FP/FR-LOC) (HEP)                2.66E-03 FA-1-EC-13R      CABINET EC-13R FIRE (Fault Tree)                          9.50E-03 L-HCMT-HIC-3025A SDC HX DISCHRG VALVE HAND INDIC CONTROLLER HIC-3025A FAIL  1.70E-02 99 61.03 0.09  4.29E-07 IEFIRE          FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER                      1.OOE+00 A-OOOT-CSTMKUP  OP FT MAKEUP TO CST (T-2) (FP/FR-LOC) (HEP)                2.66E-03 FA-1-EC-13L      CABINET EC-13L FIRE (Fault Tree)                          9.50E-03 L-CEPO-POC-3025  SDC HX DISCHARGE POSITION CONTROLLER POC-3025 FAILS        1.70E-02 100 61.12 0.09  4.29E-07 IEFIRE          FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER                      1.OOE+00 A-OOOT-CSTMKUP  OP FT MAKEUP TO CST (T-2) (FP/FR-LOC) (HEP)                2.66E-03 FA-1-EC-13R      CABINET EC-13R FIRE (Fault Tree)                          9.50E-03 L-CEPO-POC-3025  SDC HX DISCHARGE POSITION CONTROLLER POC-3025 FAILS        1.70F-02
 
Table 7.5: P-8B Failed w/Recovery Fire Area I Control Room Cabinet EC-13L (Top 100 Cutsets)
Cut  %  % Cut    Prob./ Basic Event                      Description                                                    Event Prob.
No. Total  Set  Frequency  I                            I                                                              I E 1  26.12 26.12  2.11E-05 IEFIRE                          FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER                            1.OOE+00 A-OOOT-CSTMK-CDTNL-HEP-2        CND HEP-L-ZZOA-SDC-INIT
* A-OOOT-CSTMKUP
* P-CBOB-BUS1E (HEP)    1.43E-01 FA-1-EC-13L                      CABINET EC-13L FIRE (Fault Tree)                                  9.50E-03 L-ZZOA-SDC-INIT                  OP FT INITIATE SDC (FP/FR-LOC) (HEP)                              1.55E-02 2  26.89 0.77  6.19E-07 IEFIRE                          FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER                            1.OOE+00 A-OOOT-CSTMKUP                  OP FT MAKEUP TO CST (T-2) (FP/FR-LOC) (HEP)                      2.66E-03 FA-1-EC-13L                      CABINET EC-13L FIRE (Fault Tree)                                  9.50E-03 L-TPMT-PT-0104A                  PRESSURE TRANSMITTER PT-0104A FAILS TO FUNCTION                  2.45E-02 3  27.66 0.77  6.19E-07 IEFIRE                          FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER                            1.OOE+00 A-OOOT-CSTMKUP                  OP FT MAKEUP TO CST (T-2) (FP/FR-LOC) (HEP)                      2.66E-03 FA-1-EC-13L                      CABINET EC-13L FIRE (Fault Tree)                                  9.50E-03 L-TPMT-PT-0104B                  PRESSURE TRANSMITTER PT-0104B FAILS TO FUNCTION                  2.45E-02 4  28.3  0.64  5.17E-07 IEFIRE                          FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER                            1.OOE+00 A-PMCC-P8ABC-ME                  COMMON CAUSE FAILURE OF ALL 3 AFW PUMPS P-8A/B/C TO START        5.45E-05 FA-1-EC-13L                      CABINET EC-13L FIRE (Fault Tree)                                  9.50E-03 5  28.93 0.63  5.1OE-07 IEFIRE                          FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER                            1.OOE+00 A-OOOT-CSTMKUP                  OP FT MAKEUP TO CST (T-2) (FP/FR-LOC) (HEP)                      2.66E-03 FA-1-EC-13L                      CABINET EC-13L FIRE (Fault Tree)                                  9.50E-03 L-TFMT-FT-0306                  SDC INJECTION LINE FLOW TRANSMITTER FT-0306 FAILURE              2.02E-02 6  29.46 0.53  4.29E-07 IEFIRE                          FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER                            1.OOE+00 A-OOOT-CSTMKUP                  OP FT MAKEUP TO CST (T-2) (FP/FR-LOC) (HEP)                      2.66E-03 FA-1-EC-13L                      CABINET EC-13L FIRE (Fault Tree)                                  9.50E-03 L-HCMT-HIC-3025B                SDC HX DISCHRG VALVE HAND INDIC CONTROLLER HIC-3025B FAIL        1.70E-02 7  29.99 0.53  4.29E-07 IEFIRE                          FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER                            1.OOE+00 A-OOOT-CSTMKUP                  OP FT MAKEUP TO CST (T-2) (FP/FR-LOC) (HEP)                      2.66E-03 FA-1-EC-13L                      CABINET EC-13L FIRE (Fault Tree)                                  9.50E-03 L-HCMT-HIC-0306                  SDC HX BYPASS VALVE HIC-0306B FAILS TO FUNCTION                  1.70E-02 8  30.52 0.53  4.29E-07 IEFIRE                          FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER                            1.OOE+00 A-OOOT-CSTMKUP                  OP FT MAKEUP TO CST (T-2) (FP/FR-LOC) (HEP)                      2.66E-03 FA-1-EC-13L                      CABINET EC-13L FIRE (Fault Tree)                                  9.50E-03 L-HCMT-HIC-3025A                SDC HX DISCHRG VALVE HAND INDIC CONTROLLER HIC-3025A FAIL        11.70E-02 9  31.05 0.53  4.29E-07  IEFIRE                          FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER                            1.OOE+00 A-OOOT-CSTMKUP                  OP FT MAKEUP TO CST (T-2) (FP/FR-LOC) (HEP)                      2.66E-03 FA-1-EC-13L                      CABINET EC-1 3L FIRE (Fault Tree)                                9.50E-03 L-CEPO-POC-3025                  SDC HX DISCHARGE POSITION CONTROLLER POC-3025 FAILS              1.70E-02 10  31.58 0.53  4.29E-07  IEFIRE                          FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER                            1.00E+00 A-OOOT-CSTMKUP                  OP FT MAKEUP TO CST (T-2) (FP/FR-LOC) (HEP)                      2.66E-03 FA-1-EC-13L                      CABINET EC-13L FIRE (Fault Tree)                                  9.50E-03 L-CEPO-POC-0306                  SDC HX BYPASS POSITION CONTROLLER POC-0306 FAILS                  1.70E-02 11  32.08  0.5  4.OOE-07  IEFIRE                          FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER                            1.OOE+00 A-OOOT-CSTMKUP                  OP FT MAKEUP TO CST (T-2) (FP/FR-LOC) (HEP)                      2.66E-03
 
Table 7.5: P-8B Failed w/Recovery Fire Area 1 Control Room Cabinet EC-13L (Top 100 Cutsets)
Cut  %  % Cut    Prob. Basic Event                    Description No. Total  Set  Frequency  I                          I                                                                I FA-1-EC-13L                    CABINET EC-1 3L FIRE (Fault Tree)                                  9.50E-03 Q-FLMK-F-310                    SDC HX INLET VALVE HPA SUPPLY FILTER F-310 PLUGGED                1.58E-02 12 32.58  0.5  4.00E-07 IEFIRE                          FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER                              1.OOE+00 A-OOOT-CSTMKUP                  OP FT MAKEUP TO CST (T-2) (FP/FR-LOC) (HEP)                        2.66E-03 FA-1-EC-13L                    CABINET EC-13L FIRE (Fault Tree)                                  9.50E-03 I-FLMK-F-28                    CV-3025 LOCAL IA SUPPLY FILTER F28 PLUGGED                        1.58E-02 13 33.07 0.49  3.92E-07 IEFIRE                          FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER                              1.OOE+00 A-OOOT-CSTMKUP                  OP FT MAKEUP TO CST (T-2) (FP/FR-LOC) (HEP)                        2.66E-03 FA-1-EC-13L                    CABINET EC-1 3L FIRE (Fault Tree)                                  9.50E-03 L-ZZOA-SDC-INIT                OP FT INITIATE SDC (FP/FR-LOC) (HEP)                              1.55E-02 14 33.44 0.37  3.01E-07 IEFIRE                          FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER                            1.OOE+00 A-AVOA-CV-201 0                OP FT OPEN CV-2010 FOR T-939 MAKEUP TO CST (FP/FR-CR) (HEP)        2.59E-03 A-OOOT-CSTMK-CDTNL-HEP-1        CND HEP-A-AVOA-CV-2010
* A-OOOT-CSTMKUP
* Y-AVOB-RAS-VLVS (HEP)    4.99E-01 FA-1-EC-13L                    CABINET EC-13L FIRE (Fault Tree)                                  9.50E-03 L-TPMT-PT-0104A                PRESSURE TRANSMITTER PT-0104A FAILS TO FUNCTION                    2.45E-02 15 33.81 0.37  3.01E-07 IEFIRE                          FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER                            1.OOE+00 A-AVOA-CV-201 0                OP FT OPEN CV-2010 FOR T-939 MAKEUP TO CST (FP/FR-CR) (HEP)        2.59E-03 A-OOOT-CSTMK-CDTNL-HEP-1        CND HEP-A-AVOA-CV-2010
* A-OOOT-CSTMKUP
* Y-AVOB-RAS-VLVS (HEP)    4.99E-01 FA-1-EC-13L                    CABINET EC-13L FIRE (Fault Tree)                                  9.50E-03 L-TPMT-PT-0104B                PRESSURE TRANSMITTER PT-0104B FAILS TO FUNCTION                    2.45E-02 16 34.12 0.31  2.48E-07 IEFIRE                          FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER                            1.OOE+00 A-AVOA-CV-201 0                OP FT OPEN CV-2010 FOR T-939 MAKEUP TO CST (FP/FR-CR) (HEP)        2.59E-03 A-OOOT-CSTMK-CDTNL-HEP-1        CND HEP-A-AVOA-CV-2010
* A-OOOT-CSTMKUP
* Y-AVOB-RAS-VLVS (HEP)  4.99E-01 FA-1-EC-13L                    CABINET EC-13L FIRE (Fault Tree)                                  9.50E-03 L-TFMT-FT-0306                  SDC INJECTION LINE FLOW TRANSMITTER FT-0306 FAILURE              2.02E-02 17  34.38 0.26  2.08E-07 IEFIRE                          FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER                            1.OOE+00 A-AVOA-CV-201 0                OP FT OPEN CV-2010 FOR T-939 MAKEUP TO CST (FP/FR-CR) (HEP)      2.59E-03 A-OOOT-CSTMK-CDTNL-HEP-1        CND HEP-A-AVOA-CV-2010
* A-OOOT-CSTMKUP
* Y-AVOB-RAS-VLVS (HEP)  4.99E-01 FA-1-EC-13L                    CABINET EC-13L FIRE (Fault Tree)                                  9.50E-03 L-CEPO-POC-3025                SDC HX DISCHARGE POSITION CONTROLLER POC-3025 FAILS                1.70E-02 18  34.64 0.26  2.08E-07 IEFIRE                          FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER                            1.OOE+00 A-AVOA-CV-2010                  OP FT OPEN CV-2010 FOR T-939 MAKEUP TO CST (FP/FR-CR) (HEP)      2.59E-03 A-OOOT-CSTMK-CDTNL-HEP-1        CND HEP-A-AVOA-CV-2010 *A-OOOT-CSTMKUP
* Y-AVOB-RAS-VLVS (HEP)    4.99E-01 FA-1-EC-13L                    CABINET EC-1 3L FIRE (Fault Tree)                                9.50E-03 L-CEPO-POC-0306                SDC HX BYPASS POSITION CONTROLLER POC-0306 FAILS                  1.70E-02 19  34.9 0.26  2.08E-07  IEFIRE                          FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER                            1.OOE+00 A-AVOA-CV-2010                  OP FT OPEN CV-2010 FOR T-939 MAKEUP TO CST (FP/FR-CR) (HEP)      2.59E-03 A-OOOT-CSTMK-CDTNL-HEP-1        CND HEP-A-AVOA-CV-2010
* A-OOOT-CSTMKUP
* Y-AVOB-RAS-VLVS (HEP)  4.99E-01 FA-1-EC-13L                    CABINET EC-1 3L FIRE (Fault Tree)                                9.50E-03 L-HCMT-HIC-3025B                SDC HX DISCHRG VALVE HAND INDIC CONTROLLER HIC-3025B FAIL        1.70E-02 20  35.16 0.26  2.08E-07  IE FIRE                        FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER                            1.OOE+00
 
Table 7.5: P-8B Failed w/Recovery Fire Area 1 Control Room Cabinet EC-13L (Top 100 Cutsets)
Cut  %  / Cut    Prob./ Basic Event                      Description                                                    Event Prob.
No. Total  Set  Frequency                                    I A-AVOA-CV-201 0                  OP FT OPEN CV-2010 FOR T-939 MAKEUP TO CST (FP/FR-CR) (HEP)      2.59E-03 A-OOOT-CSTMK-CDTNL-HEP-1        CND HEP-A-AVOA-CV-2010 *A-OOOT-CSTMKUP
* Y-AVOB-RAS-VLVS (HEP)  4.99E-01 FA-1-EC-13L                      CABINET EC-13L FIRE (Fault Tree)                                9.50E-03 L-HCMT-HIC-0306                  SDC HX BYPASS VALVE HIC-0306B FAILS TO FUNCTION                  1.70E-02 21  35.42  0.26  2.08E-07 IEFIRE                          FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER                            1.OOE+00 A-AVOA-CV-201 0                  OP FT OPEN CV-2010 FOR T-939 MAKEUP TO CST (FP/FR-CR) (HEP)      2.59E-03 A-OOOT-CSTMK-CDTNL-HEP-1        CND HEP-A-AVOA-CV-2010
* A-OOOT-CSTMKUP
* Y-AVOB-RAS-VLVS (HEP)  4.99E-01 FA-1-EC-13L                      CABINET EC-13L FIRE (Fault Tree)                                9.50E-03 L-HCMT-HIC-3025A                SDC HX DISCHRG VALVE HAND INDIC CONTROLLER HIC-3025A FAIL        1.70E-02 22  35.66  0.24  1.94E-07 IEFIRE                          FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER                            1.OOE+00 A-AVOA-CV-201 0                  OP FT OPEN CV-2010 FOR T-939 MAKEUP TO CST (FP/FR-CR) (HEP)      2.59E-03 A-OOOT-CSTMK-CDTNL-HEP-1        CND HEP-A-AVOA-CV-2010
* A-OOOT-CSTMKUP
* Y-AVOB-RAS-VLVS (HEP)  4.99E-01 FA-1-EC-13L                      CABINET EC-13L FIRE (Fault Tree)                                9.50E-03 I-FLMK-F-28                      CV-3025 LOCAL IA SUPPLY FILTER F28 PLUGGED                        1.58E-02 23  35.9  0.24  1.94E-07 IEFIRE                          FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER                            1.OOE+00 A-AVOA-CV-201 0                  OP FT OPEN CV-2010 FOR T-939 MAKEUP TO CST (FP/FR-CR) (HEP)      2.59E-03 A-OOOT-CSTMK-CDTNL-HEP-1        CND HEP-A-AVOA-CV-2010 *A-OOOT-CSTMKUP
* Y-AVOB-RAS-VLVS (HEP)  4.99E-01 FA-1-EC-13L                      CABINET EC-13L FIRE (Fault Tree)                                9.50E-03 Q-FLMK-F-310                    SDC HX INLET VALVE HPA SUPPLY FILTER F-310 PLUGGED                1.58E-02 24  36.08  0.18  1.48E-07 IEFIRE                          FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER                            1.OOE+00 A-OOOT-CSTMKUP                  OP FT MAKEUP TO CST (T-2) (FP/FR-LOC) (HEP)                      2.66E-03 B-XVOB-ADVS-MAN                  OP FT CLOSE MANUAL VALVES TO ISOLATE ADV (FP/FR-LOC) (HEP)      4.03E-02 FA-1-EC-13L                      CABINET EC-13L FIRE (Fault Tree)                                9.50E-03 L-ZZOA-SDC-CDTNL-HEP-2          CONDITIONAL HEP: B-XVOB-ADVS-MAN
* L-ZZOA-SDC-INIT (HEP)          1.45E-01 25  36.24  0.16  1.25E-07 IEFIRE                          FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER                            1.00E+00 A-OOOT-CSTMKUP                  OP FT MAKEUP TO CST (T-2) (FP/FR-LOC) (HEP)                      2.66E-03 FA-1-EC-13L                      CABINET EC-13L FIRE (Fault Tree)                                9.50E-03 Q-XVMD-MV-CA234                  SDC HX INLET VALVE HPA MANUAL ISOLATION VLVE MV-CA234 FTRO      4.96E-03 26  36.4  0.16  1.25E-07 IEFIRE                          FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER                            1.OOE+00 A-OOOT-CSTMKUP                  OP FT MAKEUP TO CST (T-2) (FP/FR-LOC) (HEP)                      2.66E-03 FA-1-EC-13L                      CABINET EC-1 3L FIRE (Fault Tree)                                9.50E-03 I-XVMD-MV-CA341                  CV-3025 LOCAL IA SUPPLY MANUAL VALVE MV-CA341 FTRO              4.96E-03 27  36.56  0.16  1.25E-07 IEFIRE                          FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER                            1.OOE+00 A-OOOT-CSTMKUP                  OP FT MAKEUP TO CST (T-2) (FP/FR-LOC) (HEP)                      2.66E-03 FA-1-EC-13L                      CABINET EC-1 3L FIRE (Fault Tree)                                9.50E-03 I-XVMD-MV-CA340                  CV-3025 LOCAL IA SUPPLY MANUAL VALVE MV-CA340 FTRO              4.96E-03 28  36.71 0.15  1.25E-07 IEFIRE                          FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER                            1.OOE+00 A-OOOT-CSTMKUP                  OP FT MAKEUP TO CST (T-2) (FP/FR-LOC) (HEP)                      2.66E-03 FA-1-EC-13L                      CABINET EC-1 3L FIRE (Fault Tree)                                9.50E-03 L-IEMT-IE-0104B                  I/E-0104B FAILS TO FUNCTION                                      4.93E-03 29  36.86 0.15  1.25E-07 IE FIRE                          FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER                            1.OOE+00
 
Table 7.5: P-8B Failed w/Recovery Fire Area 1 Control Room Cabinet EC-13L (Top 100 Cutsets)
Cut  %  %Cut      rbI                                                                                                    E vet No. Total  Set  Frequency  Basic Event                  Description                                                      Event Prob.
A-OOOT-CSTMKUP                OP FT MAKEUP TO CST (T-2) (FP/FR-LOC) (HEP)                        2.66E-03 FA-1-EC-13L                  CABINET EC-13L FIRE (Fault Tree)                                    9.50E-03 L-IEMT-IE-0104A              I/E-0104A FAILS TO FUNCTION                                        4.93E-03 30  36.99  0.13  1.01E-07  IEFIRE                        FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER                              1.OOE+00 A-CVCC-AFWPP3-MA              3 AFW PP CK DSCHRGE CKS-CK-FW726 & CK-FW741 & CK-FW743 CCAUSE FTO  1.07E-05 FA-1-EC-13L                  CABINET EC-13L FIRE (Fault Tree)                                    9.50E-03 31  37.11 0.12  9.93E-08  IEFIRE                        FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER                              1.OOE+00 A-OOOT-CSTMKUP                OP FT MAKEUP TO CST (T-2) (FP/FR-LOC) (HEP)                        2.66E-03 FA-1-EC-13L                  CABINET EC-13L FIRE (Fault Tree)                                    9.50E-03 I-KVMB-SV-1202                C-2C UNLOADING VALVE SV-1202 FTE                                    3.93E-03 32  37.23 0.12  9.93E-08  IEFIRE                        FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER                              1.OOE+00 A-OOOT-CSTMKUP                OP FT MAKEUP TO CST (T-2) (FP/FR-LOC) (HEP)                        2.66E-03 FA-1-EC-13L                  CABINET EC-13L FIRE (Fault Tree)                                    9.50E-03 I-KVMA-SV-1 202              C-2C UNLOADING VALVE SV-1202 FTD                                    3.93E-03 33  37.35 0.12  9.93E-08  IEFIRE                        FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER                              1.OOE+00 A-OOOT-CSTM KU P              OP FT MAKEUP TO CST (T-2) (FP/FR-LOC) (HEP)                        2.66E-03 FA-1-EC-13L                  CABINET EC-13L FIRE (Fault Tree)                                    9.50E-03 L-KVMB-SV-3055B              SDC TO HEAT EXCHANGERS AIR SUPPLY SV-3055B FTE                      3.93E-03 34  37.47 0.12  9.93E-08  IEFIRE                        FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER                              1.OOE+00 A-OOOT-CSTMKUP                OP FT MAKEUP TO CST (T-2) (FP/FR-LOC) (HEP)                        2.66E-03 FA-1-EC-13L                  CABINET EC-13L FIRE (Fault Tree)                                    9.50E-03 L-KVMB-SV-3055A              SDC TO HEAT EXCHANGERS AIR SUPPLY SV-3055A FTE                      3.93E-03 35  37.59 0.12  9.93E-08  IEFIRE                        FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER                              1.OOE+00 A-OOOT-CSTMKUP                OP FT MAKEUP TO CST (T-2) (FP/FR-LOC) (HEP)                        2.66E-03 C-KVMA-SV-0944A              SFP ISOLATION VALVE CV-0944A AIR SUPPLY SV-0944A FTD                3.93E-03 FA-1-EC-13L                  CABINET EC-13L FIRE (Fault Tree)                                    9.50E-03 36  37.69  0.1  8.22E-08  IEFIRE                        FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER                              1.OOE+00 A-CVCC-AFWINJ-MA              4 AFW INJ CK-FW703 & CK-FW704 & CK-FW728 & CK-FW729 VLVS CC FTO    8.65E-06 FA-1-EC-13L                  CABINET EC-13L FIRE (Fault Tree)                                    9.50E-03 37  37.79  0.1  8.01E-08  IEFIRE                        FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER                              1.OOE+00 A-OOOT-CSTMKUP                OP FT MAKEUP TO CST (T-2) (FP/FR-LOC) (HEP)                        2.66E-03 FA-1-EC-13L                  CABINET EC-1 3L FIRE (Fault Tree)                                  9.50E-03 L-LMMC-MO-3199                SDC PUMP P-67A SUCTION VALVE MO-3199 LIMIT SWITCH FTRC              3.17E-03 L-MVOA-SDCLOCAL              OP FT INITIATE SDC (HEP)                                            1.OOE+00 38  37.89  0.1  8.01E-08  IEFIRE                        FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER                              1.OOE+00 A-OOOT-CSTMKUP                OP FT MAKEUP TO CST (T-2) (FP/FR-LOC) (HEP)                        2.66E-03 FA-1-EC-13L                  CABINET EC-1 3L FIRE (Fault Tree)                                  9.50E-03 L-LMMC-LMS-3016              LIMIT SWITCH FOR SDC VALVE MO-3016 FAILS TO REMAIN CLOSED          3.17E-03 39  37.99  0.1  8.01 E-08 IEFIRE                        FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER                              1.OOE+00 A-OOOT-CSTMKUP                OP FT MAKEUP TO CST (T-2) (FP/FR-LOC) (HEP)                        2.66E-03 FA-1-EC-13L                  CABINET EC-13L FIRE (Fault Tree)                                    9.50E-03
 
Table 7.5: P-8B Failed w/Recovery Fire Area 1 Control Room Cabinet EC-13L (Top 100 Cutsets)
Cut  %    %Cu    Prob. Basic Event                  DescriptionF No. Total  Set Frequenc                                                                                            Event Prob.
L-LMMC-LMS-3015              LIMIT SWITCH FOR SDC VALVE MO-3015 FAILS TO REMAIN CLOSED      3.17E-03 40  38.09  0.1  7.78E-08 IEFIRE                      FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER                          11.00E+00 A-OOOT-CSTMKUP              OP FT MAKEUP TO CST (T-2) (FP/FR-LOC) (HEP)                    2.66E-03 FA-1-EC-13L                  CABINET EC-13L FIRE (Fault Tree)                              9.50E-03 L-AVMB-CV-3006              SDHX BYPASS VALVE CV-3006 FAILS TO CLOSE/CONTROL BYPASS FLOW  3.08E-03 41  38.18  0.09  7.65E-08 IEFIRE                      FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER                          1.OOE+00 A-AVCC-AFW-4-MA              4 AFW AOV'S CCAUSE FTO CV-0727 & CV-0736 & CV-0736A & CV-0749  8.06E-06 FA-1-EC-13L                  CABINET EC-13L FIRE (Fault Tree)                              9.50E-03 42  38.27  0.09  7.60E-08 IEFIRE                      FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER                          1.OOE+00 A-OOOT-CSTMKUP              OP FT MAKEUP TO CST (T-2) (FP/FR-LOC) (HEP)                    2.66E-03 FA-1-EC-13L                  CABINET EC-13L FIRE (Fault Tree)                              9.50E-03 L-FUMK-B2439-1              FUSE FUZ/B2439-1 FAILS                                        3.01E-03 L-MVOA-SDCLOCAL              OP FT INITIATE SDC (HEP)                                      1.OOE+00 43  38.36  0.09  7.60E-08 IEFIRE                      FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER                          1.OOE+00 A-OOOT-CSTMKUP              OP FT MAKEUP TO CST (T-2) (FP/FR-LOC) (HEP)                    2.66E-03 FA-1-EC-13L                  CABINET EC-13L FIRE (Fault Tree)                              9.50E-03 L-OLMK-49-271                LPSI INJ VLVE MO-3016 1OF3 THERM OVERLOAD CONTACTS FAIL FTRC  3.01 E-03 44  38.45  0.09  7.60E-08 IEFIRE                      FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER                          1.00E+00 A-OOOT-CSTMKUP              OP FT MAKEUP TO CST (T-2) (FP/FR-LOC) (HEP)                    2.66E-03 FA-1-EC-13L                  CABINET EC-13L FIRE (Fault Tree)                              9.50E-03 L-OLMK-49-167                SDC SUCT VLV MO-3015 THERM OVERLOAD CONTACTS FTRC              3.01E-03 45  38.54  0.09  7.60E-08 IEFIRE                      FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER                          1.00E+00 A-OOOT-CSTMKUP              OP FT MAKEUP TO CST (T-2) (FP/FR-LOC) (HEP)                    2.66E-03 FA-1-EC-13L                  CABINET EC-13L FIRE (Fault Tree)                              9.50E-03 L-FUMK-B271-1                FUSE FUZ/B271-1 FAILS                                          3.01E-03 46  38.63  0.09  7.60E-08 IEFIRE                      FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER                          1.OOE+00 A-OOOT-CSTMKUP              OP FT MAKEUP TO CST (T-2) (FP/FR-LOC) (HEP)                    2.66E-03 FA-1-EC-13L                  CABINET EC-13L FIRE (Fault Tree)                              9.50E-03 L-FUMK-B167-1                FUSE FUZ/B167-1 FAILS                                          3.01 E-03 47  38.72  0.09 7.60E-08  IEFIRE                      FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER                          1.OOE+00 A-OOOT-CSTMKUP              OP FT MAKEUP TO CST (T-2) (FP/FR-LOC) (HEP)                    2.66E-03 FA-1-EC-13L                  CABINET EC-13L FIRE (Fault Tree)                              9.50E-03 L-MVOA-SDCLOCAL              OP FT INITIATE SDC (HEP)                                      1.OOE+00 L-OLMK-49-2439              SDC P-67A SUCT VLV MO-3199 THERM OVERLOAD CONTACTS FTRC        3.01 E-03 48  38.81  0.09 7.53E-08  IEFIRE                      FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER                          1.OOE+00 A-OOOT-CSTMKUP              OP FT MAKEUP TO CST (T-2) (FP/FR-LOC) (HEP)                    2.66E-03 FA-1-EC-13L                  CABINET EC-13L FIRE (Fault Tree)                              9.50E-03 L-AVMA-CV-3055              PUMP SUPPLY TO SDC HEAT EXCHANGERS CV-3055 FAILS TO OPEN      2.98E-03 49  38.9  0.09 7.53E-08  IEFIRE                      FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER                          11.00E+00 A-OOOT-CSTMKUP              OP FT MAKEUP TO CST (T-2) (FP/FR-LOC) (HEP)                    2.66E-03 FA-1-EC-13L                  CABINET EC-13L FIRE (Fault Tree)                              9.50E-03
 
Table 7.5: P-8B Failed w/Recovery Fire Area 1 Control Room Cabinet EC-13L (Top 100 Cutsets)
Cut 1  %    % Cut      Prob./                                                                                                  Evn rb No      ot
        %a      e        re    c Basic Event                      Description                                                    Event Prob.
No. ITotal  I Setu  I Frequency L-AVMA-CV-3025                  SDC HEAT EXCHANGER DISCHARGE CV-3025 FAILS TO OPEN              2.98E-03 50    38.99  0.09    7.18E-08  IEFIRE                          FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER                            1.OOE+00 A-AVOA-CV-2010                  OP FT OPEN CV-2010 FOR T-939 MAKEUP TO CST (FP/FR-CR) (HEP)      2.59E-03 A-OOOT-CSTMK-CDTNL-HEP-1        CND HEP-A-AVOA-CV-2010 *A-OOOT-CSTMKUP
* Y-AVOB-RAS-VLVS (HEP)  4.99E-01 B-XVOB-ADVS-MAN                  OP FT CLOSE MANUAL VALVES TO ISOLATE ADV (FP/FR-LOC) (HEP)      4.03E-02 FA-1-EC-13L                      CABINET EC-13L FIRE (Fault Tree)                                9.50E-03 L-77OA-SDC-CDTNL-HEP-2          CONDITIONAL HEP: B-XVOB-ADVS-MAN
* L-ZZOA-SDC-INIT (HEP)        1.45E-01 51    39.07  0.08    6.84E-08  IEFIRE                          FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER                            1.OOE+00 A-OOOT-CSTMKUP                  OP FT MAKEUP TO CST (T-2) (FP/FR-LOC) (HEP)                      2.66E-03 FA-1-EC-13L                      CABINET EC-13L FIRE (Fault Tree)                                9.50E-03 L-C2MC-52-2439                  SDC P-67A SUCTION VALVE MO-3199 CIRCUIT BRKR 52-2439 FTRE        2.71E-03 L-MVOA-SDCLOCAL                  OP FT INITIATE SDC (HEP)                                        1.OOE+00 52    39.15  0.08    6.84E-08  IEFIRE                          FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER                            1.OOE+00 A-OOOT-CSTMKUP                  OP FT MAKEUP TO CST (T-2) (FP/FR-LOC) (HEP)                      2.66E-03 FA-1-EC-13L                      CABINET EC-13L FIRE (Fault Tree)                                9.50E-03 L-C2MC-52-167                    SDC SUCTION VALVE MO-3015 CIRCUIT BREAKER 52-167 FTRC            2.71 E-03 53    39.23  0.08    6.84E-08  IEFIRE                          FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER                            1.OOE+00 A-OOOT-CSTMKUP                  OP FT MAKEUP TO CST (T-2) (FP/FR-LOC) (HEP)                      2.66E-03 FA-1-EC-13L                      CABINET EC-13L FIRE (Fault Tree)                                9.50E-03 L-C2MC-52-271                    SDC SUCTION VALVE MO-3016 CIRCUIT BREAKER 52-271 FTRC            2.71 E-03 54    39.31  0.08    6.26E-08  IEFIRE                          FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER                            1.OOE+00 A-OOOT-CSTMKUP                  OP FT MAKEUP TO CST (T-2) (FP/FR-LOC) (HEP)                      2.66E-03 FA-1-EC-13L                      CABINET EC-13L FIRE (Fault Tree)                                9.50E-03 L-PMOO-P-67A                    LPSI PUMP P-67A OUT OF SERVICE FOR TESTING OR MAINTENENCE        2.48E-03 55    39.39  0.08    6.20E-08  IEFIRE                          FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER                            1.OOE+00 A-PMCC-P8ABC-MG                  COMMON CAUSE FAILURE OF ALL 3 AFW PUMPS P-8A/B/C TO RUN          6.53E-06 FA-1-EC-13L                      CABINET EC-13L FIRE (Fault Tree)                                9.50E-03 56    39.47  0.08    6.11E-08  IEFIRE                          FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER                            1.OOE+00 A-OOOT-CSTMK-CDTNL-HEP-2        CND HEP-L-ZZOA-SDC-INIT
* A-OOOT-CSTMKUP
* P-CBOB-BUS1E (HEP)    1.43E-01 FA-1-EC-13L                      CABINET EC-13L FIRE (Fault Tree)                                9.50E-03 H-ZZOA-OTC-INIT                  OP FAILS TO INITIATE ONCE THROUGH COOLING (HEP)                  2.90E-03 L-ZZOA-S DC-IN IT                OP FT INITIATE SDC (FP/FR-LOC) (HEP)                            1.55E-02 57    39.55  0.08    6.09E-08  IEFIRE                          FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER                            1.OOE+00 A-AVOA-CV-201 0                  OP FT OPEN CV-2010 FOR T-939 MAKEUP TO CST (FP/FR-CR) (HEP)      2.59E-03 A-OOOT-CSTMK-CDTNL-HEP-1        CND HEP-A-AVOA-CV-2010 *A-OOOT-CSTMKUP
* Y-AVOB-RAS-VLVS (HEP)  4.99E-01 FA-1-EC-13L                      CABINET EC-13L FIRE (Fault Tree)                                9.50E-03 I-XVMD-MV-CA341                  CV-3025 LOCAL IA SUPPLY MANUAL VALVE MV-CA341 FTRO              4.96E-03 58    39.63  0.08    6.09E-08  IEFIRE                          FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER                            1.OOE+00 A-AVOA-CV-201 0                  OP FT OPEN CV-2010 FOR T-939 MAKEUP TO CST (FP/FR-CR) (HEP)      2.59E-03 A-OOOT-CSTMK-CDTNL-HEP-1        CND HEP-A-AVOA-CV-2010
* A-OOOT-CSTMKUP
* Y-AVOB-RAS-VLVS (HEP)  4.99E-01 FA-1-EC-13L                      CABINET EC-13L FIRE (Fault Tree)                                9.50E-03
 
Table 7.5: P-8B Failed w/Recovery Fire Area I Control Room Cabinet EC-13L (Top 100 Cutsets)
Cut  %  %Cut    Prob.I Basic Event                    Description                                                    Event Prob.
No. Total  Set  Frequency I-XVMD-MV-CA340                CV-3025 LOCAL IA SUPPLY MANUAL VALVE MV-CA340 FTRO              4.96E-03 59  39.71  0.08  6.09E-08 IEFIRE                          FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER                            1.00E+00 A-AVOA-CV-201 0                OP FT OPEN CV-2010 FOR T-939 MAKEUP TO CST (FP/FR-CR) (HEP)      2.59E-03 A-OOOT-CSTMK-CDTNL-HEP-1        CND HEP-A-AVOA-CV-2010
* A-OOOT-CSTMKUP
* Y-AVOB-RAS-VLVS (HEP)  4.99E-01 FA-1-EC-13L                    CABINET EC-13L FIRE (Fault Tree)                                9.50E-03 Q-XVMD-MV-CA234                SDC HX INLET VALVE HPA MANUAL ISOLATION VLVE MV-CA234 FTRO      4.96E-03 60  39.79 0.08  6.05E-08 IEFIRE                          FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER                            1.OOE+00 A-AVOA-CV-201 0                OP FT OPEN CV-2010 FOR T-939 MAKEUP TO CST (FP/FR-CR) (HEP)      2.59E-03 A-OOOT-CSTMK-CDTNL-HEP-1        CND HEP-A-AVOA-CV-2010 *A-OOOT-CSTMKUP
* Y-AVOB-RAS-VLVS (HEP)  4.99E-01 FA-1-EC-13L                    CABINET EC-13L FIRE (Fault Tree)                                9.50E-03 L-IEMT-IE-0104B                I/E-0104B FAILS TO FUNCTION                                      4.93E-03 61  39.87 0.08  6.05E-08 IEFIRE                          FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER                            1.OOE+00 A-AVOA-CV-201 0                OP FT OPEN CV-2010 FOR T-939 MAKEUP TO CST (FP/FR-CR) (HEP)      2.59E-03 A-OOOT-CSTMK-CDTNL-HEP-1        CND HEP-A-AVOA-CV-2010 *A-OOOT-CSTMKUP
* Y-AVOB-RAS-VLVS (HEP)  4.99E-01 FA-1-EC-13L                    CABINET EC-13L FIRE (Fault Tree)                                9.50E-03 L-IEMT-IE-0104A                I/E-0104A FAILS TO FUNCTION                                      4.93E-03 62  39.94 0.07  5.73E-08 IEFIRE                          FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER                            1.OOE+00 A-OOOT-CSTMKUP                  OP FT MAKEUP TO CST (T-2) (FP/FR-LOC) (HEP)                      2.66E-03 FA-1-EC-13L                    CABINET EC-13L FIRE (Fault Tree)                                9.50E-03 I-PVMD-PCV-3025                CV-3025 LOCAL IA SUPPLY PRESSURE CONTROL VALVE PCV-3025 FTRO    2.27E-03 63  40.01 0.07  5.73E-08 IEFIRE                          FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER                            1.OOE+00 A-OOOT-CSTMKUP                  OP FT MAKEUP TO CST (T-2) (FP/FR-LOC) (HEP)                      2.66E-03 FA-1-EC-13L                    CABINET EC-13L FIRE (Fault Tree)                                9.50E-03 Q-PVMD-PCV-3055                SDC HX INLET VALVE HPA PR CNTRL VALVE PCV-3055 FTRO              2.27E-03 64  40.08 0.07  5.53E-08 IEFIRE                          FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER                            1.OOE+00 A-OOOT-CSTMK-CDTNL-HEP-2        CND HEP-L-ZZOA-SDC-INIT
* A-OOOT-CSTMKUP
* P-CBOB-BUS1E (HEP)    1.43E-01 FA-1-EC-13L                    CABINET EC-13L FIRE (Fault Tree)                                9.50E-03 H-PMOO-P-66A                    HPSI PUMP P-66A OUT OF SERVICE FOR MAINTENANCE                  2.63E-03 L-ZZOA-SDC-INIT                OP FT INITIATE SDC (FP/FR-LOC) (HEP)                            1.55E-02 65  40.14 0.06  5.16E-08 IEFIRE                          FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER                            1.OOE+00 A-OOOT-CSTMKUP                  OP FT MAKEUP TO CST (T-2) (FP/FR-LOC) (HEP)                      2.66E-03 FA-1-EC-13L                    CABINET EC-13L FIRE (Fault Tree)                                9.50E-03 L-MVMA-MO-3199                  SDC PUMP P-67A SUCTION VALVE MO-3199 FAILS TO OPEN              2.04E-03 66  40.2 0.06  5.16E-08 IEFIRE                          FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER                            1.OOE+00 A-OOOT-CSTMKUP                  OP FT MAKEUP TO CST (T-2) (FP/FR-LOC) (HEP)                      2.66E-03 FA-1-EC-13L                    CABINET EC-13L FIRE (Fault Tree)                                9.50E-03 L-MVMA-MO-3015                  SDC SUCTION VALVE MO-3015 FAILS TO OPEN                          2.04E-03 67  40.26 0.06  5.16E-08 IEFIRE                          FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER                            1.OOE+00 A-OOOT-CSTMKUP                  OP FT MAKEUP TO CST (T-2) (FP/FR-LOC) (HEP)                      2.66E-03 FA-1-EC-13L                    CABINET EC-13L FIRE (Fault Tree)                                9.50E-03 L-MVMA-MO-3016                  SDC SUCTION VALVE MO-3016 FAILS TO OPEN                          2.04E-03
 
Table 7.5: P-8B Failed w/Recovery Fire Area I Control Room Cabinet EC-13L (Top 100 Cutsets) cut No. Total
      % %cut Set PrbIEenrb Freouenc  Basic Event                    Description                                                    Event Prob.
68 40.32 0.06  4.83E-08  IEFIRE                        FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER                            1.OOE+00 A-AVOA-CV-201 0                OP FT OPEN CV-2010 FOR T-939 MAKEUP TO CST (FP/FR-CR) (HEP)      2.59E-03 A-OOOT-CSTMK-CDTNL-HEP-1        CND HEP-A-AVOA-CV-2010
* A-OOOT-CSTMKUP
* Y-AVOB-RAS-VLVS (HEP)  4.99E-01 FA-1-EC-13L                    CABINET EC-13L FIRE (Fault Tree)                                  9.50E-03 L-KVMB-SV-3055B                SDC TO HEAT EXCHANGERS AIR SUPPLY SV-3055B FTE                    3.93E-03 69  40.38 0.06  4.83E-08  IEFIRE                        FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER                            1.OOE+00 A-AVOA-CV-201 0                OP FT OPEN CV-2010 FOR T-939 MAKEUP TO CST (FP/FR-CR) (HEP)      2.59E-03 A-OOOT-CSTMK-CDTNL-HEP-1        CND HEP-A-AVOA-CV-2010
* A-OOOT-CSTMKUP
* Y-AVOB-RAS-VLVS (HEP)  4.99E-01 FA-1-EC-13L                    CABINET EC-13L FIRE (Fault Tree)                                  9.50E-03 L-KVMB-SV-3055A                SDC TO HEAT EXCHANGERS AIR SUPPLY SV-3055A FTE                    3.93E-03 70  40.44 0.06  4.83E-08  IEFIRE                        FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER                            1.OOE+00 A-AVOA-CV-201 0                OP FT OPEN CV-2010 FOR T-939 MAKEUP TO CST (FP/FR-CR) (HEP)      2.59E-03 A-OOOT-CSTMK-CDTNL-HEP-1        CND HEP-A-AVOA-CV-2010 *A-OOOT-CSTMKUP
* Y-AVOB-RAS-VLVS (HEP)    4.99E-01 FA-1-EC-13L                    CABINET EC-13L FIRE (Fault Tree)                                  9.50E-03 I-KVMB-SV-1202                C-2C UNLOADING VALVE SV-1202 FTE                                  3.93E-03 71  40.5 0.06  4.83E-08  IEFIRE                        FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER                            1.00E+00 A-AVOA-CV-2010                  OP FT OPEN CV-2010 FOR T-939 MAKEUP TO CST (FP/FR-CR) (HEP)      2.59E-03 A-OOOT-CSTMK-CDTNL-HEP-1        CND HEP-A-AVOA-CV-2010 *A-OOOT-CSTMKUP
* Y-AVOB-RAS-VLVS (HEP)    4.99E-01 FA-1-EC-13L                    CABINET EC-13L FIRE (Fault Tree)                                  9.50E-03 I-KVMA-SV- 1202                C-2C UNLOADING VALVE SV-1202 FTD                                  3.93E-03 72  40.56 0.06 4.83E-08  IEFIRE                          FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER                            1.OOE+00 A-AVOA-CV-201 0                OP FT OPEN CV-2010 FOR T-939 MAKEUP TO CST (FP/FR-CR) (HEP)      2.59E-03 A-OOOT-CSTMK-CDTNL-HEP-1        CND HEP-A-AVOA-CV-2010
* A-OOOT-CSTMKUP
* Y-AVOB-RAS-VLVS (HEP)  4.99E-01 C-KVMA-SV-0944A                SFP ISOLATION VALVE CV-0944A AIR SUPPLY SV-0944A FTD            3.93E-03 FA-1-EC-13L                    CABINET EC-13L FIRE (Fault Tree)                                9.50E-03 73  40.62 0.06 4.57E-08  IEFIRE                          FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER                            1.00E+00 A-OOOT-CSTMKUP                  OP FT MAKEUP TO CST (T-2) (FP/FR-LOC) (HEP)                      2.66E-03 FA-1-EC-13L                    CABINET EC-13L FIRE (Fault Tree)                                9.50E-03 L-PMME-P-67A                    LPSI PUMP P-67A FAILS TO START                                    1.81E-03 74  40.68 0.06 4.53E-08  IEFIRE                          FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER                            1.OOE+00 FA-1-EC-13L                    CABINET EC-13L FIRE (Fault Tree)                                9.50E-03
                        /RVC                            PRESSURIZER SAFETIES CLOSED (FT Top - Dev Event)                9.91E-01
                        /RVO                            PRESSURIZER SAFETIES OPEN (FT Top - Dev Event)                  9.99E-01 RXC-ELEC-FAULTS                ELECTRICAL SCRAM FAULTS (FTree Top - Dev Event)                  4.81 E-06 75  40.73 0.05 4.42E-08  IEFIRE                          FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER                            1.OOE+00 A-OOOT-CSTMKUP                  OP FT MAKEUP TO CST (T-2) (FP/FR-LOC) (HEP)                      2.66E-03 C-PMOO-P-52B                    P-52B OUT OF SERVICE FOR MAINTENANCE                              1.75E-03 FA-1-EC-13L                    CABINET EC-13L FIRE (Fault Tree)                                9.50E-03 76  40.78 0.05 4.30E-08  IEFIRE                          FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER                            1.00E+00 A-OOOT-CSTMK-CDTNL-HEP-2        CND HEP-L-ZZOA-SDC-INIT
* A-OOOT-CSTMKUP
* P-CBOB-BUS1E (HEP)    1.43E-01 FA-1-EC-13L                    CABINET EC-13L FIRE (Fault Tree)                                9.50E-03
 
Table 7.5: P-8B Failed w/Recovery Fire Area 1 Control Room Cabinet EC-13L (Top 100 Cutsets)
Cut Cut
        %oa Se C
              '&deg;ut      PobI re    y IBasic Event EvntPrb Description                                                    Event Prob.
No. ITotal  I  Set  IFreguency H-PMME-P-66A                    HPSI PUMP P-66A FAILS TO START                                  2.04E-03 L-ZZOA-SDC-INIT                OP FT INITIATE SDC (FP/FR-LOC) (HEP)                              1.55E-02 77  40.83    0.05  4.19E-08    IEFIRE                          FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER                            1.OOE+00 A-OOOT-CSTM KU P                OP FT MAKEUP TO CST (T-2) (FP/FR-LOC) (HEP)                      2.66E-03 FA-1-EC-13L                    CABINET EC-13L FIRE (Fault Tree)                                9.50E-03 L-XVMD-MV-CC3276                CCW COOLING INLET TO LPSI PUMP P-67A VALVE MV-CC3276 FTRO        1.66E-03 78    40.88    0.05  4.19E-08    IEFIRE                          FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER                            1.OOE+00 A-OOOT-CSTMKUP                  OP FT MAKEUP TO CST (T-2) (FP/FR-LOC) (HEP)                      2.66E-03 FA-l-EC-13L                    CABINET EC-13L FIRE (Fault Tree)                                9.50E-03 L-XVMD-MV-CC 144                CCW COOLING INLET TO LPSI PUMP P-67A VALVE MV-CC144 FRTO        1.66E-03 79    40.93    0.05  4.19E-08    IEFIRE                          FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER                            1.OOE+00 A-OOOT-CSTMKUP                  OP FT MAKEUP TO CST (T-2) (FP/FR-LOC) (HEP)                      2.66E-03 FA-l-EC-13L                    CABINET EC-13L FIRE (Fault Tree)                                9.50E-03 L-XVMD-MV-CC152                CCW COOLING DISCH FROM LPSI PUMP P-67A VALVE MV-CC152 FTRO        1.66E-03 80    40.98    0.05  4.19E-08    IEFIRE                          FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER                            1.OOE+00 A-OOOT-CSTMKUP                  OP FT MAKEUP TO CST (T-2) (FP/FR-LOC) (HEP)                      2.66E-03 FA-l-EC-13L                    CABINET EC-13L FIRE (Fault Tree)                                9.50E-03 Q-XVMD-MV-CA290                MANUAL VALVE MV-CA290 FAILS TO REMAIN OPEN                      1.66E-03 81    41.03    0.05  4.14E-08    IEFIRE                          FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER                            1.OOE+00 A-OOOT-CSTMKUP                  OP FT MAKEUP TO CST (T-2) (FP/FR-LOC) (HEP)                      2.66E-03 C-AVMB-CV-0944A                SFP ISOLATION AIR OPERATED CONTROL VALVE CV-0944A FTC            1.64E-03 FA-l-EC-13L                    CABINET EC-13L FIRE (Fault Tree)                                9.50E-03 82    41.08    0.05  4.07E-08    IEFIRE                          FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER                            1.00E+00 A-OOOT-CSTMKUP                  OP FT MAKEUP TO CST (T-2) (FP/FR-LOC) (HEP)                      2.66E-03 FA-i-EC-13L                    CABINET EC-13L FIRE (Fault Tree)                                9.50E-03 L-C2MB-152-206                  LPSI PUMP P-67A 2400VAC BREAKER 152-206 FTC                      1.61 E-03 83    41.13  0.05    4.07E-08    IEFIRE                          FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER                            1.OOE+00 A-OOOT-CSTMKUP                  OP FT MAKEUP TO CST (T-2) (FP/FR-LOC) (HEP)                      2.66E-03 C-C2MB-152-208                  2400VAC BREAKER 152-208 TO P-52B FTC                            1.61E-03 FA-l-EC-13L                    CABINET EC-13L FIRE (Fault Tree)                                9.50E-03 84    41.18  0.05    3.89E-08    IEFIRE                          FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER                            1.OOE+00 A-AVOA-CV-201 0                OP FT OPEN CV-2010 FOR T-939 MAKEUP TO CST (FP/FR-CR) (HEP)      2.59E-03 A-OOOT-CSTMK-CDTNL-HEP-1        CND HEP-A-AVOA-CV-2010
* A-OOOT-CSTMKUP
* Y-AVOB-RAS-VLVS (HEP)  4.99E-01 FA-1-EC-13L                    CABINET EC-13L FIRE (Fault Tree)                                9.50E-03 L-LMMC-MO-3199                  SDC PUMP P-67A SUCTION VALVE MO-3199 LIMIT SWITCH FTRC          3.17E-03 L-MVOA-SDCLOCAL                OP FT INITIATE SDC (HEP)                                        1.OOE+00 85    41.23  0.05    3.89E-08    IEFIRE                          FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER                            1.OOE+00 A-AVOA-CV-201 0                OP FT OPEN CV-2010 FOR T-939 MAKEUP TO CST (FP/FR-CR) (HEP)      2.59E-03 A-OOOT-CSTMK-CDTNL-HEP-1        CND HEP-A-AVOA-CV-2010
* A-OOOT-CSTMKUP
* Y-AVOB-RAS-VLVS (HEP)  4.99E-01 FA-i-EC-13L                    CABINET EC-13L FIRE (Fault Tree)                                9.50E-03 L-LMMC-LMS-3016                LIMIT SWITCH FOR SDC VALVE MO-3016 FAILS TO REMAIN CLOSED        3.17E-03
 
Table 7.5: P-8B Failed wlRecovery Fire Area I Control Room Cabinet EC-13L (Top 100 Cutsets)
Cut    %a  SCut FrProb. I Basic Event                    Description                                                    Event Prob.
No. ITotal  Set  Feun 86    41.28 0.05  3.89E-08 IEFIRE                          FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER                            1.OOE+00 A-AVOA-CV-201 0                OP FT OPEN CV-2010 FOR T-939 MAKEUP TO CST (FP/FR-CR) (HEP)      2.59E-03 A-OOOT-CSTMK-CDTNL-HEP-1        CND HEP-A-AVOA-CV-2010
* A-OOOT-CSTMKUP
* Y-AVOB-RAS-VLVS (HEP)  4.99E-01 FA-1-EC-13L                    CABINET EC-13L FIRE (Fault Tree)                                9.50E-03 L-LMMC-LMS-3015                LIMIT SWITCH FOR SDC VALVE MO-3015 FAILS TO REMAIN CLOSED        3.17E-03 87    41.33 0.05  3.78E-08 IEFIRE                          FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER                            1.00E+00 A-AVOA-CV-201 0                OP FT OPEN CV-2010 FOR T-939 MAKEUP TO CST (FP/FR-CR) (HEP)      2.59E-03 A-OOOT-CSTMK-CDTNL-HEP-1        CND HEP-A-AVOA-CV-2010
* A-OOOT-CSTMKUP
* Y-AVOB-RAS-VLVS (HEP)  4.99E-01 FA-1-EC-13L                    CABINET EC-13L FIRE (Fault Tree)                                  9.50E-03 L-AVMB-CV-3006                  SDHX BYPASS VALVE CV-3006 FAILS TO CLOSE/CONTROL BYPASS FLOW    3.08E-03 88    41.38 0.05  3.69E-08 IEFIRE                          FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER                            1.OOE+00 A-AVOA-CV-201 0                OP FT OPEN CV-2010 FOR T-939 MAKEUP TO CST (FP/FR-CR) (HEP)      2.59E-03 A-OOOT-CSTMK-CDTNL-HEP-1        CND HEP-A-AVOA-CV-2010
* A-OOOT-CSTMKUP
* Y-AVOB-RAS-VLVS (HEP)  4.99E-01 FA-1-EC-13L                    CABINET EC-13L FIRE (Fault Tree)                                9.50E-03 L-MVOA-SDCLOCAL                OP FT INITIATE SDC (HEP)                                        1.OOE+00 L-OLMK-49-2439                  SDC P-67A SUCT VLV MO-3199 THERM OVERLOAD CONTACTS FTRC          3.01 E-03 89    41.43 0.05  3.69E-08 IEFIRE                          FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER                            1.OOE+00 A-AVOA-CV-201 0                OP FT OPEN CV-2010 FOR T-939 MAKEUP TO CST (FP/FR-CR) (HEP)      2.59E-03 A-OOOT-CSTMK-CDTNL-HEP-1        CND HEP-A-AVOA-CV-2010
* A-OOOT-CSTMKUP
* Y-AVOB-RAS-VLVS (HEP)  4.99E-01 FA-1-EC-13L                    CABINET EC-13L FIRE (Fault Tree)                                9.50E-03 L-FUMK-B2439-1                  FUSE FUZ/B2439-1 FAILS                                          3.01 E-03 L-MVOA-SDCLOCAL                OP FT INITIATE SDC (HEP)                                        1.OOE+00 90    41.48 0.05  3.69E-08 IEFIRE                          FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER                            1.OOE+00 A-AVOA-CV-201 0                OP FT OPEN CV-2010 FOR T-939 MAKEUP TO CST (FP/FR-CR) (HEP)      2.59E-03 A-OOOT-CSTMK-CDTNL-HEP-1        CND HEP-A-AVOA-CV-2010
* A-OOOT-CSTMKUP
* Y-AVOB-RAS-VLVS (HEP)  4.99E-01 FA-1-EC-13L                    CABINET EC-13L FIRE (Fault Tree)                                9.50E-03 L-FUMK-B167-1                  FUSE FUZ/B167-1 FAILS                                            3.01 E-03 91    41.53 0.05  3.69E-08 IEFIRE                          FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER                            1.OOE+00 A-AVOA-CV-201 0                OP FT OPEN CV-2010 FOR T-939 MAKEUP TO CST (FP/FR-CR) (HEP)      2.59E-03 A-OOOT-CSTMK-CDTNL-HEP-1        CND HEP-A-AVOA-CV-2010 *A-OOOT-CSTMKUP
* Y-AVOB-RAS-VLVS (HEP)  4.99E-01 FA-1-EC-13L                    CABINET EC-1 3L FIRE (Fault Tree)                                9.50E-03 L-FUMK-B271-1                  FUSE FUZ/B271-1 FAILS                                            3.01 E-03 92  41.58  0.05  3.69E-08 IEFIRE                          FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER                            1.OOE+00 A-AVOA-CV-201 0                OP FT OPEN CV-2010 FOR T-939 MAKEUP TO CST (FP/FR-CR) (HEP)      2.59E-03 A-OOOT-CSTMK-CDTNL-HEP-1        CND HEP-A-AVOA-CV-2010 *A-OOOT-CSTMKUP
* Y-AVOB-RAS-VLVS (HEP)  4.99E-01 FA-1-EC-13L                    CABINET EC-13L FIRE (Fault Tree)                                9.50E-03 L-OLMK-49-271                  LPSI INJ VLVE MO-3016 10F3 THERM OVERLOAD CONTACTS FAIL FTRC    3.01 E-03 93  41.63  0.05 3.69E-08  IEFIRE                          FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER                            1.OOE+00 A-AVOA-CV-201 0                OP FT OPEN CV-2010 FOR T-939 MAKEUP TO CST (FP/FR-CR) (HEP)      2.59E-03 A-OOOT-CSTMK-CDTNL-HEP-1        CND HEP-A-AVOA-CV-2010
* A-OOOT-CSTMKUP
* Y-AVOB-RAS-VLVS (HEP)  4.99E-01 FA-1-EC-13L                    CABINET EC-1 3L FIRE (Fault Tree)                                9.50E-03
 
Table 7.5: P-8B Failed w/Recovery Fire Area 1 Control Room Cabinet EC-13L (Top 100 Cutsets)
Cut    %        C    Prob./ Basic Event                        Description                                                    Event Prob.
No. ITotal  ISe      IFreun                    %Cuven                                                                                    Prob.enc L-OLMK-49-167                      SDC SUCT VLV MO-3015 THERM OVERLOAD CONTACTS FTRC                3.01E-03 94  41.68    0.05  3.66E-08 IEFIRE                              FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER                            1.00E+00 A-AVOA-CV-201 0                    OP FT OPEN CV-2010 FOR T-939 MAKEUP TO CST (FP/FR-CR) (HEP)      2.59E-03 A-OOOT-CSTMK-CDTNL-HEP-1            CND HEP-A-AVOA-CV-2010
* A-OOOT-CSTMKUP
* Y-AVOB-RAS-VLVS (HEP)  4.99E-01 FA-l-EC-13L                        CABINET EC-13L FIRE (Fault Tree)                                9.50E-03 L-AVMA-CV-3055                      PUMP SUPPLY TO SDC HEAT EXCHANGERS CV-3055 FAILS TO OPEN        2.98E-03 95  41.73    0.05  3.66E-08 IE_FIRE                            FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER                            1.OOE+00 A-AVOA-CV-201 0                    OP FT OPEN CV-2010 FOR T-939 MAKEUP TO CST (FP/FR-CR) (HEP)      2.59E-03 A-OOOT-CSTMK-CDTN L-HE P-1          CND HEP-A-AVOA-CV-2010
* A-OOOT-CSTMKUP
* Y-AVOB-RAS-VLVS (HEP)  4.99E-01 FA-1-EC-13L                        CABINET EC-13L FIRE (Fault Tree)                                9.50E-03 L-AVMA-CV-3025                      SDC HEAT EXCHANGER DISCHARGE CV-3025 FAILS TO OPEN              2.98E-03 96  41.77    0.04  3.39E-08 IEFIRE                              FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER                            1.OOE+00 A-OOOT-CSTMK-CDTNL-HEP-2            CND HEP-L-ZZOA-SDC-INIT
* A-OOOT-CSTMKUP
* P-CBOB-BUSIE (HEP)    1.43E-01 FA-1-EC-13L                        CABINET EC-13L FIRE (Fault Tree)                                9.50E-03 H-C2MB-152-207                      AC CIRCUIT BREAKER 152-207 (2400V) FAILS TO CLOSE                1.61E-03 L-ZZOA-SDC-INIT                    OP FT INITIATE SDC (FP/FR-LOC) (HEP)                              1.55E-02 97  41.81    0.04  3.32E-08 IEFIRE                              FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER                            1.00E+00 A-AVOA-CV-201 0                    OP FT OPEN CV-2010 FOR T-939 MAKEUP TO CST (FP/FR-CR) (HEP)      2.59E-03 A-OOOT-CSTMK-CDTNL-HEP-1            CND HEP-A-AVOA-CV-2010 *A-OOOT-CSTMKUP
* Y-AVOB-RAS-VLVS (HEP)  4.99E-01 FA-1-EC-13L                        CABINET EC-13L FIRE (Fault Tree)                                9.50E-03 L-C2MC-52-2439                      SDC P-67A SUCTION VALVE MO-3199 CIRCUIT BRKR 52-2439 FTRE        2.71 E-03 L-MVOA-SDCLOCAL                    OP FT INITIATE SDC (HEP)                                        1.OOE+00 98  41.85    0.04  3.32E-08 IEFIRE                              FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER                            1.OOE+00 A-AVOA-CV-201 0                    OP FT OPEN CV-2010 FOR T-939 MAKEUP TO CST (FP/FR-CR) (HEP)      2.59E-03 A-OOOT-CSTMK-CDTNL-HEP-1            CND HEP-A-AVOA-CV-2010
* A-OOOT-CSTMKUP
* Y-AVOB-RAS-VLVS (HEP)  4.99E-01 FA-1-EC-13L                        CABINET EC-13L FIRE (Fault Tree)                                9.50E-03 L-C2MC-52-271                      SDC SUCTION VALVE MO-3016 CIRCUIT BREAKER 52-271 FTRC            2.71 E-03 99  41.89    0.04  3.32E-08 IEFIRE                              FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER                            1.OOE+00 A-AVOA-CV-201 0                    OP FT OPEN CV-2010 FOR T-939 MAKEUP TO CST (FP/FR-CR) (HEP)      2.59E-03 A-OOOT-CSTMK-CDTNL-HEP-1            CND HEP-A-AVOA-CV-2010
* A-OOOT-CSTMKUP
* Y-AVOB-RAS-VLVS (HEP)  4.99E-01 FA-1-EC-13L                        CABINET EC-13L FIRE (Fault Tree)                                9.50E-03 L-C2MC-52-167                      SDC SUCTION VALVE MO-3015 CIRCUIT BREAKER 52-167 FTRC            2.71 E-03 100  41.93    0.04  3.23E-08 IEFIRE                              FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER                            1.00E+00 A-OOOT-CSTMKUP                      OP FT MAKEUP TO CST (T-2) (FP/FR-LOC) (HEP)                      2.66E-03 FA-1-EC-13L                        CABINET EC-13L FIRE (Fault Tree)                                9.50E-03 P-DCPO-PS-0550                      POWER SUPPLY P/S-0550 FAILS TO PROVIDE PROPER OUTPUT            1.28E-03
 
Table 7.6: P-8B Failed w/Recovery Exposure Fires: Control Room, CSR, Bus IC and Bus ID w/ and w/o Suppression (Top 100 Cutsets)
Cut    %  % Cut    Prob./  Basic Event                      Description                                                      Event Prob.
No. Total  Set  Frequency 1  3.89 3.89  4.42E-06  IEFIRE                          FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER                              1.OOE+00 A-AVOA-AFWSTEAM                  OP FAIL TO LOCALLY OPEN AFW STEAM SUPPLY CV-0522B (HEP)            7.20E-02
                          /ASDP                            ALTERNATE SHUTDOWN PANEL FAILURE                                  9.90E-01 FA-2                            CSR EXP FIRE (Fault Tree)                                          3.10E-03 SUP-AUTO                        AUTO FIRE SUPPRESSION FAILURE (Dev Event)                          2.OOE-02 2  5.72  1.83  2.09E-06  IEFIRE                          FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER                              1.00E+00
                          /ASDP                            ALTERNATE SHUTDOWN PANEL FAILURE                                  9.90E-01 F-PMOE-FPS                      OP FAILS TO START P-9A (HEP)                                      3.40E-02 FA-2                            CSR EXP FIRE (Fault Tree)                                          3.10E-03 SUP-AUTO                          AUTO FIRE SUPPRESSION FAILURE (Dev Event)                          2.OOE-02 3  7.54  1.82  2.08E-06  IEFIRE                          FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER                              1.OOE+00 A-PMOE-AFW-PPMAN                  OP FT MANUALLY START AN AFW PUMP (FP/FR-CR) (HEP)                  3.38E-02
                          /ASDP                            ALTERNATE SHUTDOWN PANEL FAILURE                                  9.90E-01 FA-2                            CSR EXP FIRE (Fault Tree)                                          3.10E-03 SUP-AUTO                          AUTO FIRE SUPPRESSION FAILURE (Dev Event)                          2.OOE-02 4  8.28 0.74  8.47E-07  IEFIRE                          FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER                              1.00E+00 A-PMMG-P-8B                      AFW TURBINE PUMP P-8B FAILS TO RUN                                1.38E-02
                          /ASDP                            ALTERNATE SHUTDOWN PANEL FAILURE                                  9.90E-01 FA-2                            CSR EXP FIRE (Fault Tree)                                          3.10E-03 SUP-AUTO                          AUTO FIRE SUPPRESSION FAILURE (Dev Event)                          2.OOE-02 5    9  0.72  8.18E-07  IEFIRE                          FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER                              1.00E+00
                          /ASDP                            ALTERNATE SHUTDOWN PANEL FAILURE                                  9.90E-01 F-PMOE-FPS                      OP FAILS TO START P-9A (HEP)                                      3.40E-02 FA-1                            GENERAL AREA FIRE (Fault Tree)                                    2.43E-03 SUP                              MANUAL FIRE SUPPRESSION FAILURE (Dev Event)                        1.OOE-02 6  9.71 0.71  8.13E-07  IEFIRE                          FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER                              1.OOE+00 A-PMOE-AFW-PPMAN                  OP FT MANUALLY START AN AFW PUMP (FP/FR-CR) (HEP)                  3.38E-02
                          /ASDP                            ALTERNATE SHUTDOWN PANEL FAILURE                                  9.90E-01 FA-1                              GENERAL AREA FIRE (Fault Tree)                                    2.43E-03 SUP                              MANUAL FIRE SUPPRESSION FAILURE (Dev Event)                        1.OOE-02 7  10.29 0.58  6.57E-07 IEFIRE                            FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER                              1.00E+00 A-PMOE-AFW-PPMAN                  OP FT MANUALLY START AN AFW PUMP (FP/FR-CR) (HEP)                  3.38E-02
                          /ASDP                            ALTERNATE SHUTDOWN PANEL FAILURE                                  9.90E-01 FA-3                              1D SWITCHGR LOGICAL PLACEHOLDER (Fault Tree)                      9.81 E-04 SUP-AUTO                          AUTO FIRE SUPPRESSION FAILURE (Dev Event)                          2.OOE-02 8  10.84 0.55  6.20E-07 IEFIRE                            FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER                              1.OOE+00 ASDP                              ALTERNATE SHUTDOWN PANEL FAILURE                                  1.OOE-02 FA-2                              CSR EXP FIRE (Fault Tree)                                          3.10E-03 SUP-AUTO                          AUTO FIRE SUPPRESSION FAILURE (Dev Event)                          2.OOE-02 9  11.36 0.52  5.92E-07 IEFIRE                            FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER                              1.OOE+00 A-AVOA-AFWSTEAM                  OP FAIL TO LOCALLY OPEN AFW STEAM SUPPLY CV-0522B (HEP)            7.20E-02
 
Table 7.6: P-8B Failed w/Recovery Exposure Fires: Control Room, CSR, Bus 1C and Bus 1D w/ and w/o Suppression (Top 100 Cutsets)
Cut    %  % Cut    Prob./I Cut    %            Prob./  Basic Event                      Description                                                      Event Prob.
No. ITotal  Set  Freguency (ASDP                            ALTERNATE SHUTDOWN PANEL FAILURE                                  9.90E-01 FA-4                            1C SWITCHGR LOGICAL PLACEHOLDER (Fault Tree)                      4.15E-04 SUP-AUTO                        AUTO FIRE SUPPRESSION FAILURE (Dev Event)                          2.OOE-02 10    11.67 0.31  3.49E-07  IEFIRE                          FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER                              1.OOE+00 A-PMOO-P-8B                      AFW TURBINE PUMP P-8B OUT OF SERVICE                              5.68E-03
                            /ASDP                            ALTERNATE SHUTDOWN PANEL FAILURE                                  9.90E-01 FA-2                            CSR EXP FIRE (Fault Tree)                                          3.10E-03 SUP-AUTO                        AUTO FIRE SUPPRESSION FAILURE (Dev Event)                          2.OOE-02 11    11.96 0.29  3.32E-07  IEFIRE                          FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER                              1.OOE+00 A-PMMG-P-8B                      AFW TURBINE PUMP P-8B FAILS TO RUN                                  1.38E-02
                            /ASDP                            ALTERNATE SHUTDOWN PANEL FAILURE                                  9.90E-01 FA-1                            GENERAL AREA FIRE (Fault Tree)                                    2.43E-03 SUP                              MANUAL FIRE SUPPRESSION FAILURE (Dev Event)                        1.OOE-02 12    12.21 0.25  2.79E-07  IEFIRE                          FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER                              1.OOE+00 1ASDP                            ALTERNATE SHUTDOWN PANEL FAILURE                                  9.90E-01 F-PMOE-FPS                      OP FAILS TO START P-9A (HEP)                                      3.40E-02 FA-4                            1C SWITCHGR LOGICAL PLACEHOLDER (Fault Tree)                      4.15E-04 SUP-AUTO                        AUTO FIRE SUPPRESSION FAILURE (Dev Event)                          2.OOE-02 13    12.45 0.24  2.78E-07  IEFIRE                          FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER                              1.OOE+00 A-PMOE-AFW-PPMAN                OP FT MANUALLY START AN AFW PUMP (FP/FR-CR) (HEP)                  3.38E-02
                            /ASDP                            ALTERNATE SHUTDOWN PANEL FAILURE                                  9.90E-01 FA-4                            lC SWITCHGR LOGICAL PLACEHOLDER (Fault Tree)                      4.15E-04 SUP-AUTO                        AUTO FIRE SUPPRESSION FAILURE (Dev Event)                          2.OOE-02 14    12.69 0.24  2.68E-07  IEFIRE                          FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER                              1.OOE+00 A-PMMG-P-8B                      AFW TURBINE PUMP P-8B FAILS TO RUN                                1.38E-02
                            /ASDP                            ALTERNATE SHUTDOWN PANEL FAILURE                                  9.90E-01 FA-3                            1D SWITCHGR LOGICAL PLACEHOLDER (Fault Tree)                      9.81 E-04 SUP-AUTO                        AUTO FIRE SUPPRESSION FAILURE (Dev Event)                          2.OOE-02 15    12.9 0.21  2.43E-07  IE_FIRE                          FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER                              1.00E+00 ASDP                            ALTERNATE SHUTDOWN PANEL FAILURE                                  1.00E-02 FA-1                            GENERAL AREA FIRE (Fault Tree)                                    2.43E-03 SUP                              MANUAL FIRE SUPPRESSION FAILURE (Dev Event)                        1.OOE-02 16    13.1  0.2  2.27E-07  IEFIRE                          FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER                              1.OOE+00
                            /ASDP                            ALTERNATE SHUTDOWN PANEL FAILURE                                  9.90E-01 B-RVMB-SRV-SGA                  ONE SAFETY RELIEF VALVE ON SG A FTC                                3.69E-03 FA-2                            CSR EXP FIRE (Fault Tree)                                          3.10E-03 SUP-AUTO                        AUTO FIRE SUPPRESSION FAILURE (Dev Event)                          2.OOE-02 X-HSE-SGA-BLDN                  SET TO "1" - ESDE ON SG E-50A (House Event)                        1.OOE+00 17    13.27 0.17  1.96E-07  IEFIRE                          FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER                              1.OOE+00 ASDP                            ALTERNATE SHUTDOWN PANEL FAILURE                                  1.OOE-02 FA-3                            1 D SWITCHGR LOGICAL PLACEHOLDER (Fault Tree)                      9.81 E-04
 
Table 7.6: P-8B Failed w/Recovery Exposure Fires: Control Room, CSR, Bus IC and Bus 1D w/ and w/o Suppression (Top 100 Cutsets)
Cut  %  %Cut    Cut Prob./Basic Event Prob.I                                    Description                                                      Event Prob.
No. Toa    Set Frequency SUP-AUTO                          AUTO FIRE SUPPRESSION FAILURE (Dev Event)                          2.OOE-02 18 13.42 0.15  1.74E-07    IEFIRE                          FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER                              1.00E+00 A-PMME-P-8B                        AFW TURBINE PUMP P-8B FAILS TO START                              2.84E-03
                          /ASDP                              ALTERNATE SHUTDOWN PANEL FAILURE                                  9.90E-01 FA-2                              CSR EXP FIRE (Fault Tree)                                          3.10E-03 SUP-AUTO                          AUTO FIRE SUPPRESSION FAILURE (Dev Event)                          2.OOE-02 19 13.57 0.15  1.73E-07    IE_FIRE                          FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER                              1.OOE+00 A-AVOA-AFWSTEAM                    OP FAIL TO LOCALLY OPEN AFW STEAM SUPPLY CV-0522B (HEP)            7.20E-02 A-PMOE-EC-150XFR                  OP FT XFR AFW PP START TO C-150 PNL (SCRNING VAL) (FR-LOC) (HEP)  1.O0E-01
                          /ASDP                              ALTERNATE SHUTDOWN PANEL FAILURE                                  9.90E-01 FA-1                              GENERAL AREA FIRE (Fault Tree)                                    2.43E-03 SUP                                MANUAL FIRE SUPPRESSION FAILURE (Dev Event)                        1.OOE-02 20  13.71 0.14  1.63E-07    IEFIRE                          FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER                              1.OOE+00 A-OOOT-CSTMKUP                    OP FT MAKEUP TO CST (T-2) (FP/FR-LOC) (HEP)                        2.66E-03
                          /ASDP                              ALTERNATE SHUTDOWN PANEL FAILURE                                  9.90E-01 FA-2                              CSR EXP FIRE (Fault Tree)                                          3.10E-03 SUP-AUTO                          AUTO FIRE SUPPRESSION FAILURE (Dev Event)                          2.OOE-02 21 13.83 0.12  1.40E-07    IEFIRE                          FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER                              1.OOE+00 A-AVOA-AFWSTEAM                    OP FAIL TO LOCALLY OPEN AFW STEAM SUPPLY CV-0522B (HEP)            7.20E-02 A-PMOE-EC-15OXFR                  OP FT XFR AFW PP START TO C-150 PNL (SCRNING VAL) (FR-LOC) (HEP)  1.O0E-01
                          /ASDP                              ALTERNATE SHUTDOWN PANEL FAILURE                                  9.90E-01 FA-3                              1D SWITCHGR LOGICAL PLACEHOLDER (Fault Tree)                      9.81 E-04 SUP-AUTO                          AUTO FIRE SUPPRESSION FAILURE (Dev Event)                          2.OOE-02 22  13.95 0.12  1.37E-07  IEFIRE                            FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER                              1.OOE+00 A-PMOO-P-8B                        AFW TURBINE PUMP P-8B OUT OF SERVICE                              5.68E-03
                          /ASDP                              ALTERNATE SHUTDOWN PANEL FAILURE                                  9.90E-01 FA-1                              GENERAL AREA FIRE (Fault Tree)                                    2.43E-03 SUP                                MANUAL FIRE SUPPRESSION FAILURE (Dev Event)                        1.OOE-02 23  14.07 0.12  1.36E-07  IE_FIRE                            FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER                              1.OOE+00 A-OOOT-CSTMK-CDTNL-HEP-2          CND HEP-L-ZZOA-SDC-INIT
* A-OOOT-CSTMKUP
* P-CBOB-BUS1 E (HEP)    1.43E-01
                          /ASDP                              ALTERNATE SHUTDOWN PANEL FAILURE                                  9.90E-01 FA-2                              CSR EXP FIRE (Fault Tree)                                          3.10E-03 L-ZZOA-SDC-INIT                    OP FT INITIATE SDC (FP/FR-LOC) (HEP)                              1.55E-02 SUP-AUTO                          AUTO FIRE SUPPRESSION FAILURE (Dev Event)                          2.OOE-02 24  14.18 0.11  1.22E-07  IEFIRE                            FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER                              1.OOE+00 A-PMMG-P-8B                        AFW TURBINE PUMP P-8B FAILS TO RUN                                1.38E-02 FA-2                              CSR EXP FIRE (Fault Tree)                                          3.10E-03 H-ZZOA-OTC-IN IT                  OP FAILS TO INITIATE ONCE THROUGH COOLING (HEP)                    2.90E-03
                          /SUP-AUTO                          AUTO FIRE SUPPRESSION FAILURE (Dev Event)                          9.80E-01 25  14.28  0.1  1.13E-07  IEFIRE                            FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER                              1.OOE+00 A-PMMG-P-8B                        AFW TURBINE PUMP P-8B FAILS TO RUN                                1.38E-02
 
Table 7.6: P-8B Failed w/Recovery Exposure Fires: Control Room, CSR, Bus 1C and Bus ID w/ and w/o Suppression (Top 100 Cutsets)
Cut      %    % Cut    Prob.I CuBasic                              Event                      Description                                                      Event Prob.
-No. TotalI  Set  FrequencIBaiEvnII
                                /ASDP                            ALTERNATE SHUTDOWN PANEL FAILURE                                  9.90E-01 FA-4                            1C SWITCHGR LOGICAL PLACEHOLDER (Fault Tree)                      4.15E-04 SUP-AUTO                        AUTO FIRE SUPPRESSION FAILURE (Dev Event)                          2.OOE-02 26    14.38  0.1  1.10E-07  IEFIRE                          FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER                              1.OOE+00 A-PMOO-P-8B                      AFW TURBINE PUMP P-8B OUT OF SERVICE                              5.68E-03
                                /ASDP                            ALTERNATE SHUTDOWN PANEL FAILURE                                  9.90E-01 FA-3                            1D SWITCHGR LOGICAL PLACEHOLDER (Fault Tree)                      9.81 E-04 SUP-AUTO                        AUTO FIRE SUPPRESSION FAILURE (Dev Event)                          2.OOE-02 27    14.46  0.08  9.63E-08  IEFIRE                          FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER                              1.OOE+00 A-PMMG-P-8B                      AFW TURBINE PUMP P-8B FAILS TO RUN                                  1.38E-02 FA-1                            GENERAL AREA FIRE (Fault Tree)                                    2.43E-03 H-ZZOA-OTC-INIT                  OP FAILS TO INITIATE ONCE THROUGH COOLING (HEP)                    2.90E-03
                                /SUP                            MANUAL FIRE SUPPRESSION FAILURE (Dev Event)                        9.90E-01 28    14.54  0.08  9.21E-08  IEFIRE                          FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER                              1.OOE+00 A-AVOA-THROTTLE-FCV              OP FT THRTTLE AFW FCV'S GIVEN LOSS OF PNUEMTICS (FP/FR-LOC) (HEP)  1.50E-03
                                /ASDP                            ALTERNATE SHUTDOWN PANEL FAILURE                                  9.90E-01 FA-2                            CSR EXP FIRE (Fault Tree)                                          3.10E-03 SUP-AUTO                        AUTO FIRE SUPPRESSION FAILURE (Dev Event)                          2.OOE-02 29    14.62  0.08  8.88E-08  IEFIRE                          FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER                              1.OOE+00
                                /ASDP                            ALTERNATE SHUTDOWN PANEL FAILURE                                  9.90E-01 B-RVMB-SRV-SGA                  ONE SAFETY RELIEF VALVE ON SG A FTC                                3.69E-03 FA-1                            GENERAL AREA FIRE (Fault Tree)                                    2.43E-03 SUP                              MANUAL FIRE SUPPRESSION FAILURE (Dev Event)                        1.00E-02 X-HSE-SGA-BLDN                  SET TO "1" - ESDE ON SG E-50A (House Event)                        1.OOE+00 30    14.69  0.07  8.30E-08  IEFIRE                          FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER                              1.OOE+00 ASDP                            ALTERNATE SHUTDOWN PANEL FAILURE                                  1.OOE-02 FA-4                            1C SWITCHGR LOGICAL PLACEHOLDER (Fault Tree)                      4.15E-04 SUP-AUTO                        AUTO FIRE SUPPRESSION FAILURE (Dev Event)                          2.OOE-02 31    14.76  0.07  7.93E-08  IEFIRE                          FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER                              1.OOE+00 A-AVOA-CV-201 0                  OP FT OPEN CV-2010 FOR T-939 MAKEUP TO CST (FP/FR-CR) (HEP)        2.59E-03 A-OOOT-CSTMK-CDTNL-HEP-1        CND HEP-A-AVOA-CV-2010
* A-OOOT-CSTMKUP
* Y-AVOB-RAS-VLVS (HEP)    4.99E-01
                                /ASDP                            ALTERNATE SHUTDOWN PANEL FAILURE                                  9.90E-01 FA-2                            CSR EXP FIRE (Fault Tree)                                          3.10E-03 SUP-AUTO                        AUTO FIRE SUPPRESSION FAILURE (Dev Event)                          2.OOE-02 32    14.83  0.07  7.49E-08  IEFIRE                          FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER                              1.OOE+00 A-XVMA-MV-FW775                  FPS TO AFW MANUAL VALVE MV-FW775 FAILS TO OPEN                    1.22E-03
                                /ASDP                            ALTERNATE SHUTDOWN PANEL FAILURE                                  9.90E-01 FA-2                            CSR EXP FIRE (Fault Tree)                                          3.10E-03 SUP-AUTO                        AUTO FIRE SUPPRESSION FAILURE (Dev Event)                          2.OOE-02 33    14.9  0.07  7.49E-08  IEFIRE                          FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER                              1.OOE+00 A-XVMA-MV-FW774                  FPS TO AFW MANUAL VALVE MV-FW774 FAILS TO OPEN                    1.22E-03
 
Table 7.6: P-8B Failed wlRecovery Exposure Fires: Control Room, CSR, Bus IC and Bus ID w/ and w/o Suppression (Top 100 Cutsets)
Cut  %  % Cut    Prob.I No. Total  Set  Freouenc  Basic Event                      Description                                                      Event Prob.
                          /ASDP                            ALTERNATE SHUTDOWN PANEL FAILURE                                  9.90E-01 FA-2                              CSR EXP FIRE (Fault Tree)                                          3.10E-03 SUP-AUTO                          AUTO FIRE SUPPRESSION FAILURE (Dev Event)                          2.OOE-02 34  14.96 0.06  7.17E-08 IE_FIRE                          FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER                              1.OOE+00
                          /ASDP                            ALTERNATE SHUTDOWN PANEL FAILURE                                  9.90E-01 B-RVMB-SRV-SGA                    ONE SAFETY RELIEF VALVE ON SGA FTC                                3.69E-03 FA-3                              1D SWITCHGR LOGICAL PLACEHOLDER (Fault Tree)                      9.81 E-04 SUP-AUTO                          AUTO FIRE SUPPRESSION FAILURE (Dev Event)                          2.OOE-02 X-HSE-SGA-BLDN                    SET TO "1"- ESDE ON SG E-50A (House Event)                        1.OOE+00 35  15.02 0.06  6.83E-08 IEFIRE                            FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER                              1.OOE+00 A-PMME-P-8B                      AFW TURBINE PUMP P-8B FAILS TO START                              2.84E-03
                          /ASDP                            ALTERNATE SHUTDOWN PANEL FAILURE                                  9.90E-01 FA-1                              GENERAL AREA FIRE (Fault Tree)                                    2.43E-03 SUP                              MANUAL FIRE SUPPRESSION FAILURE (Dev Event)                        1.OOE-02 36  15.08 0.06  6.40E-08 IEFIRE                            FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER                              1.00E+00 A-OOOT-CSTM KU P                  OP FT MAKEUP TO CST (T-2) (FP/FR-LOC) (HEP)                        2.66E-03
                          /ASDP                            ALTERNATE SHUTDOWN PANEL FAILURE                                  9.90E-01 FA-1                              GENERAL AREA FIRE (Fault Tree)                                    2.43E-03 SUP                              MANUAL FIRE SUPPRESSION FAILURE (Dev Event)                        1.OOE-02 37  15.13 0.05  5.52E-08 IEFIRE                            FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER                              1.OOE+00 A-PMME-P-8B                      AFW TURBINE PUMP P-8B FAILS TO START                              2.84E-03
                          /ASDP                            ALTERNATE SHUTDOWN PANEL FAILURE                                  9.90E-01 FA-3                              1D SWITCHGR LOGICAL PLACEHOLDER (Fault Tree)                      9.81 E-04 SUP-AUTO                          AUTO FIRE SUPPRESSION FAILURE (Dev Event)                          2.OOE-02 38  15.18 0.05  5.33E-08 IEFIRE                            FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER                              11.00E+00 A-OOOT-CSTMK-CDTNL-HEP-2          CND HEP-L-ZZOA-SDC-INIT
* A-OOOT-CSTMKUP
* P-CBOB-BUS1E (HEP)      1.43E-01
                          /ASDP                            ALTERNATE SHUTDOWN PANEL FAILURE                                  9.90E-01 FA-1                              GENERAL AREA FIRE (Fault Tree)                                    2.43E-03 L-ZZOA-SDC-INIT                  OP FT INITIATE SDC (FP/FR-LOC) (HEP)                              1.55E-02 SUP                              MANUAL FIRE SUPPRESSION FAILURE (Dev Event)                        1.OOE-02 39  15.23 0.05  5.19E-08 IEFIRE                            FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER                              1.OOE+00 A-AVMA-CV-0522B                  AFW STEAM SUPPLY FROM SG A CV-0522B FAILS TO OPEN                  8.46E-04
                          /ASDP                            ALTERNATE SHUTDOWN PANEL FAILURE                                  9.90E-01 FA-2                              CSR EXP FIRE (Fault Tree)                                          3.10E-03 SUP-AUTO                          AUTO FIRE SUPPRESSION FAILURE (Dev Event)                          2.OOE-02 40  15.27 0.04  5.OOE-08 IEFIRE                            FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER                              11.00E+00 A-PMOO-P-8B                      AFW TURBINE PUMP P-8B OUT OF SERVICE                              5.68E-03 FA-2                              CSR EXP FIRE (Fault Tree)                                          3.10E-03 H-ZZOA-OTC-INIT                  OP FAILS TO INITIATE ONCE THROUGH COOLING (HEP)                    2.90E-03
                          /SU P-AUTO                        AUTO FIRE SUPPRESSION FAILURE (Dev Event)                          9.80E-01 41  15.31 0.04  4.67E-08  IEFIRE                            FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER                              1.OOE+00
 
Table 7.6: P-8B Failed w/Recovery Exposure Fires: Control Room, CSR, Bus 1C and Bus ID w/ and w/o Suppression (Top 100 Cutsets)
Cu      %  % Cut  Prob./
Cut                          Basic Event                      Description                                                      vent Prob.
No.'oa    Se  Frequenc A-PMOO-P-8B                      AFW TURBINE PUMP P-8B OUT OF SERVICE                              5.68E-03
                            /ASDP                            ALTERNATE SHUTDOWN PANEL FAILURE                                  9.90E-01 FA-4                            1C SWITCHGR LOGICAL PLACEHOLDER (Fault Tree)                      4.15E-04 SUP-AUTO                          AUTO FIRE SUPPRESSION FAILURE (Dev Event)                        2.OOE-02 42    15.34  0.03  3.96E-08  IEFIRE                          FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER                            1.00E+00 A-PMOO-P-8B                      AFW TURBINE PUMP P-8B OUT OF SERVICE                              5.68E-03 FA-1                            GENERAL AREA FIRE (Fault Tree)                                    2.43E-03 H-ZZOA-OTC-INIT                  OP FAILS TO INITIATE ONCE THROUGH COOLING (HEP)                  2.90E-03
                            /SUP                              MANUAL FIRE SUPPRESSION FAILURE (Dev Event)                      9.90E-01 43    15.37  0.03  3.85E-08  IEFIRE                          FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER                            1.00E+00 A-PMMG-P-8B                      AFW TURBINE PUMP P-8B FAILS TO RUN                                1.38E-02 FA-3                              1D SWITCHGR LOGICAL PLACEHOLDER (Fault Tree)                      9.81 E-04 H-ZZOA-OTC-INIT                  OP FAILS TO INITIATE ONCE THROUGH COOLING (HEP)                  2.90E-03
                            /SUP-AUTO                        AUTO FIRE SUPPRESSION FAILURE (Dev Event)                        9.80E-01 44      15.4  0.03  3.13E-08  IEFIRE                          FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER                            1.OOE+00 A-PMMG-P-8B                      AFW TURBINE PUMP P-8B FAILS TO RUN                                1.38E-02 B-XVOB-ADVS-MAN                  OP FT CLOSE MANUAL VALVES TO ISOLATE ADV (FP/FR-LOC) (HEP)        4.03E-02 FA-2                            CSR EXP FIRE (Fault Tree)                                        3.10E-03 H-ZZOA-OTC-CDTNL-HEP-4            COND HEP: B-XVOB-ADVS-MAN
* H-ZZOA-OTC-INIT (HEP)                1.85E-02
                            /SUP-AUTO                        AUTO FIRE SUPPRESSION FAILURE (Dev Event)                        9.80E-01 45    15.43  0.03  3.11E-08  IEFIRE                          FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER                            1.OOE+00 A-AVOA-CV-2010                    OP FT OPEN CV-2010 FOR T-939 MAKEUP TO CST (FP/FR-CR) (HEP)      2.59E-03 A-OOOT-CSTMK-CDTNL-HEP-1          CND HEP-A-AVOA-CV-2010
* A-OOOT-CSTMKUP
* Y-AVOB-RAS-VLVS (HEP)  4.99E-01
                            /ASDP                            ALTERNATE SHUTDOWN PANEL FAILURE                                  9.90E-01 FA-1                              GENERAL AREA FIRE (Fault Tree)                                    2.43E-03 SUP                              MANUAL FIRE SUPPRESSION FAILURE (Dev Event)                      1.OOE-02 46    15.46 0.03  3.03E-08 IEFIRE                            FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER                            1.OOE+00
                            /ASDP                            ALTERNATE SHUTDOWN PANEL FAILURE                                  9.90E-01 B-RVMB-SRV-SGA                    ONE SAFETY RELIEF VALVE ON SG A FTC                              3.69E-03 FA-4                              1C SWITCHGR LOGICAL PLACEHOLDER (Fault Tree)                      4.15E-04 SUP-AUTO                          AUTO FIRE SUPPRESSION FAILURE (Dev Event)                        2.OOE-02 X-HSE-SGA-BLDN                    SET TO "1"- ESDE ON SG E-50A (House Event)                        1.OOE+00 47    15.49 0.03  2.94E-08 IEFIRE                            FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER                            1.OOE+00 A-XVMA-MV-FW775                  FPS TO AFW MANUAL VALVE MV-FW775 FAILS TO OPEN                    1.22E-03
                            /ASDP                            ALTERNATE SHUTDOWN PANEL FAILURE                                  9.90E-01 FA-1                              GENERAL AREA FIRE (Fault Tree)                                    2.43E-03 SUP                              MANUAL FIRE SUPPRESSION FAILURE (Dev Event)                      1.OOE-02 48    15.52 0.03  2.94E-08 IEFIRE                            FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER                            1.OOE+00 A-XVMA-MV-FW774                  FPS TO AFW MANUAL VALVE MV-FW774 FAILS TO OPEN                    1.22E-03
                            /ASDP                            ALTERNATE SHUTDOWN PANEL FAILURE                                  9.90E-01 FA-1                              GENERAL AREA FIRE (Fault Tree)                                    2.43E-03
 
Table 7.6: P-8B Failed wlRecovery Exposure Fires: Control Room, CSR, Bus IC and Bus 1D w/ and w/o Suppression (Top 100 Cutsets)
Cut  %  % Cut    Prob./  Basic Event                      Description                                                        Event Prob.
No. Total  Set  Frequenc    I                            I                                                                  I SUP                              MANUAL FIRE SUPPRESSION FAILURE (Dev Event)                        1.OOE-02 49  15.54  0.02  2.81E-08  IEFIRE                          FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER                              1.OOE+00
                          /ASDP                            ALTERNATE SHUTDOWN PANEL FAILURE                                    9.90E-01 B-HCMA-HIC-0780A                  SDCR CONTROLLER HIC-0780A FAILS TO DE-ENERGIZE                      1.14E-02 B-XVOB-ADVS-MAN                  OP FT CLOSE MANUAL VALVES TO ISOLATE ADV (FP/FR-LOC) (HEP)          4.03E-02 FA-2                              CSR EXP FIRE (Fault Tree)                                          3.10E-03 SUP-AUTO                          AUTO FIRE SUPPRESSION FAILURE (Dev Event)                          2.OOE-02 X-HSE-SGA-BLDN                    SET TO "1"- ESDE ON SG E-50A (House Event)                          1.OOE+00 50  15.56  0.02  2.57E-08  IEFIRE                          FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER                              1.OOE+00 B-HCMA-HIC-0780A                SDCR CONTROLLER HIC-0780A FAILS TO DE-ENERGIZE                      1.14E-02 B-XVOB-ADVS-MAN                  OP FT CLOSE MANUAL VALVES TO ISOLATE ADV (FP/FR-LOC) (HEP)          4.03E-02 FA-2                              CSR EXP FIRE (Fault Tree)                                          3.10E-03 H-ZZOA-OTC-CDTNL-HEP-4            COND HEP: B-XVOB-ADVS-MAN
* H-ZZOA-OTC-INIT (HEP)                  1.85E-02
                          /SUP-AUTO                        AUTO FIRE SUPPRESSION FAILURE (Dev Event)                          9.80E-01 X-HSE-SGA-BLDN                    SET TO "1" - ESDE ON SG E-50A (House Event)                        1.OOE+00 51  15.58  0.02  2.50E-08  IEFIRE                          FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER                              1.OOE+00 A-PMME-P-8B                      AFW TURBINE PUMP P-8B FAILS TO START                                2.84E-03 FA-2                              CSR EXP FIRE (Fault Tree)                                          3.10E-03 H-ZZOA-OTC-INIT                  OP FAILS TO INITIATE ONCE THROUGH COOLING (HEP)                    2.90E-03
                          /SUP-AUTO                        AUTO FIRE SUPPRESSION FAILURE (Dev Event)                          9.80E-01 52  15.6 0.02  2.49E-08  IEFIRE                          FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER                              1.OOE+00 A-PMMG-P-8B                      AFW TURBINE PUMP P-8B FAILS TO RUN                                  1.38E-02 FA-2                              CSR EXP FIRE (Fault Tree)                                          3.10E-03 O-RVCC-PORVS-MA                  COMMON CAUSE FAILURE OF BOTH PORVS TO NOT OPEN                      5.95E-04
                          /SUP-AUTO                        AUTO FIRE SUPPRESSION FAILURE (Dev Event)                          9.80E-01 53  15.62 0.02  2.48E-08 IEFIRE                            FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER                              1.OOE+00 A-PMMG-P-8B                      AFW TURBINE PUMP P-8B FAILS TO RUN                                  1.38E-02 B-XVOB-ADVS-MAN                  OP FT CLOSE MANUAL VALVES TO ISOLATE ADV (FP/FR-LOC) (HEP)          4.03E-02 FA-1                              GENERAL AREA FIRE (Fault Tree)                                      2.43E-03 H-ZZOA-OTC-CDTNL-HEP-4            COND HEP: B-XVOB-ADVS-MAN
* H-ZZOA-OTC-INIT (HEP)                  1.85E-02
                          /SUP                              MANUAL FIRE SUPPRESSION FAILURE (Dev Event)                        9.90E-01 54  15.64 0.02  2.33E-08 IEFIRE                            FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER                              1.OOE+00 A-PMME-P-8B                      AFW TURBINE PUMP P-8B FAILS TO START                                2.84E-03
                          /ASDP                            ALTERNATE SHUTDOWN PANEL FAILURE                                    9.90E-01 FA-4                              1C SWITCHGR LOGICAL PLACEHOLDER (Fault Tree)                        4.15E-04 SUP-AUTO                          AUTO FIRE SUPPRESSION FAILURE (Dev Event)                          2.OOE-02 55  15.66 0.02  2.27E-08 IEFIRE                            FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER                              1.OOE+00
                          /ASDP                            ALTERNATE SHUTDOWN PANEL FAILURE                                    9.90E-01 B-RVMB-SRV-SGB                    ONE SAFETY RELIEF VALVE ON SG B FTC                                3.69E-03 FA-2                              CSR EXP FIRE (Fault Tree)                                          3.10E-03 M-CVOA-MSIVLOCAL                  OPERATOR FAILS TO TRIP CLOSED MSIVS LOCALLY (HEP)                  1.OOE-01
 
Table 7.6: P-8B Failed w/Recovery Exposure Fires: Control Room, CSR, Bus 1C and Bus 1D w/ and w/o Suppression (Top 100 Cutsets)
Ct %    % Cut    Prob.I/vn                                                                                                          rb Cut                Frob./      Basic Event                      Description                                                      Event Prob.
No. ITotal  %Set IFrequency SUP-AUTO                        AUTO FIRE SUPPRESSION FAILURE (Dev Event)                          2.OOE-02 X-HSE-SGA-BLDN                  SET TO "1" - ESDE ON SG E-50A (House Event)                        1.OOE+00 56    15.68 0.02  2.23E-08    IEFIRE                          FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER                              1.00E+00
                              /ASDP                            ALTERNATE SHUTDOWN PANEL FAILURE                                  9.90E-01 B-AVMB-CV-0511                  TURBINE BYPASS VALVE CV-0511 FTC                                  3.64E-03 FA-2                            CSR EXP FIRE (Fault Tree)                                          3.10E-03 M-CVOA-MSIVLOCAL                OPERATOR FAILS TO TRIP CLOSED MSIVS LOCALLY (HEP)                  1.OOE-01 SUP-AUTO                        AUTO FIRE SUPPRESSION FAILURE (Dev Event)                          2.OOE-02 X-HSE-SGA-BLDN                  SET TO "1" - ESDE ON SG E-50A (House Event)                        1.OOE+00 57    15.7 0.02  2.23E-08    IE_FIRE                          FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER                              1.00E+00 A-AVOA-MISCALADJ                OP FT ADJ AFW FLOW GIVEN FLOW INSTRUMENT MISC (FP/FR-CR) (HEP)    1.45E-03 A-PMMG-P-8B                      AFW TURBINE PUMP P-8B FAILS TO RUN                                1.38E-02 FA-2                            CSR EXP FIRE (Fault Tree)                                          3.10E-03 H-ZZOA-OTC-CDTNL-HEP-2          CND HEP- A-AVOA-AFWFLADJ B-XVOB-ADVS-MAN H-ZZOA-OTC-INIT (HEP)    3.66E-01
                              /SUP-AUTO                        AUTO FIRE SUPPRESSION FAILURE (Dev Event)                          9.80E-01 58    15.72 0.02  2.23E-08    IEFIRE                          FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER                              1.OOE+00 A-AVOA-AFWFLADJ                  OP FT ADJ AFW FLOW GIVEN FLOW INSTRUMENT MISC (FP/FR-CR) (HEP)    1.45E-03 A-PMMG-P-8B                      AFW TURBINE PUMP P-8B FAILS TO RUN                                1.38E-02 FA-2                            CSR EXP FIRE (Fault Tree)                                          3.1OE-03 H-ZZOA-OTC-CDTNL-HEP-2          CND HEP- A-AVOA-AFWFLADJ B-XVOB-ADVS-MAN H-ZZOA-OTC-INIT (HEP)    3.66E-01
                              /SUP-AUTO                        AUTO FIRE SUPPRESSION FAILURE (Dev Event)                          9.80E-01 59    15.74 0.02  2.19E-08    IEFIRE                          FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER                              1.OOE+00 A-OOOT-CSTMKUP                  OP FT MAKEUP TO CST (T-2) (FP/FR-LOC) (HEP)                        2.66E-03
                              /ASDP                            ALTERNATE SHUTDOWN PANEL FAILURE                                  9.90E-01 FA-4                            1C SWITCHGR LOGICAL PLACEHOLDER (Fault Tree)                      4.15E-04 SUP-AUTO                        AUTO FIRE SUPPRESSION FAILURE (Dev Event)                          2.OOE-02 60    15.76 0.02  2.04E-08    IEFIRE                          FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER                              1.00E+00 B-HCMA-HIC-0780A                SDCR CONTROLLER HIC-0780A FAILS TO DE-ENERGIZE                    1.14E-02 B-XVOB-ADVS-MAN                  OP FT CLOSE MANUAL VALVES TO ISOLATE ADV (FP/FR-LOC) (HEP)        4.03E-02 FA-1                            GENERAL AREA FIRE (Fault Tree)                                    2.43E-03 H-ZZOA-OTC-CDTNL-HEP-4          COND HEP: B-XVOB-ADVS-MAN
* H-ZZOA-OTC-INIT (HEP)                  1.85E-02
                              /SUP                            MANUAL FIRE SUPPRESSION FAILURE (Dev Event)                        9.90E-01 X-HSE-SGA-BLDN                  SET TO "1" - ESDE ON SG E-50A (House Event)                        1.OOE+00 61    15.78 0.02  2.04E-08    IEFIRE                          FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER                              1.00E+00 A-AVMA-CV-0522B                  AFW STEAM SUPPLY FROM SG A CV-0522B FAILS TO OPEN                  8.46E-04
                              /ASDP                            ALTERNATE SHUTDOWN PANEL FAILURE                                  9.90E-01 FA-1                            GENERAL AREA FIRE (Fault Tree)                                    2.43E-03 SUP                              MANUAL FIRE SUPPRESSION FAILURE (Dev Event)                        1.OOE-02 62    15.8 0.02  1.98E-08    IEFIRE                          FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER                              1.OOE+00 A-PMME-P-8B                      AFW TURBINE PUMP P-8B FAILS TO START                              2.84E-03 FA-1                            GENERAL AREA FIRE (Fault Tree)                                    2.43E-03
 
Table 7.6: P-8B Failed w/Recovery Exposure Fires: Control Room, CSR, Bus 1C and Bus 1D w/ and w/o Suppression (Top 100 Cutsets)
Cut  %  % Cut I    Prob./  Basic Event No. Total  SetI  Frequency                                  Description                                                      Event Prob.
H-ZZOA-OTC-INIT                  OP FAILS TO INITIATE ONCE THROUGH COOLING (HEP)                    2.90E-03
                            /SUP                              MANUAL FIRE SUPPRESSION FAILURE (Dev Event)                        9.90E-01 63  15.82  0.02    1.97E-08  IEFIRE                          FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER                              1.OOE+00 A-PMMG-P-8B                      AFW TURBINE PUMP P-8B FAILS TO RUN                                1.38E-02 FA-1                            GENERAL AREA FIRE (Fault Tree)                                    2.43E-03 O-RVCC-PORVS-MA                  COMMON CAUSE FAILURE OF BOTH PORVS TO NOT OPEN                    5.95E-04
                            /SUP                              MANUAL FIRE SUPPRESSION FAILURE (Dev Event)                        9.90E-01 64  15.84 0.02    1.86E-08  IEFIRE                          FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER                              1.00E+00 A-PMMG-P-8B                      AFW TURBINE PUMP P-8B FAILS TO RUN                                1.38E-02 FA-2                            CSR EXP FIRE (Fault Tree)                                          3.10E-03
                            /SUP-AUTO                        AUTO FIRE SUPPRESSION FAILURE (Dev Event)                          9.80E-01 Y-AVMD-CV-3027                    AIR OPERATED VALVE CV-3027 FAILS TO REMAIN OPEN                    4.44E-04 65  15.86 0.02    1,86E-08  IEFIRE                          FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER                              1.OOE+00 A-PMMG-P-8B                      AFW TURBINE PUMP P-8B FAILS TO RUN                                1.38E-02 FA-2                              CSR EXP FIRE (Fault Tree)                                          3.10E-03
                            /SUP-AUTO                        AUTO FIRE SUPPRESSION FAILURE (Dev Event)                          9.80E-01 Y-AVMD-CV-3056                    AIR OPERATED VALVE CV-3056 FAILS TO REMAIN OPEN                    4.44E-04 66  15.88 0.02    1.82E-08  IEFIRE                          FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER                              1.OOE+00 A-OOOT-CSTMK-CDTNL-HEP-2          CND HEP-L-ZZOA-SDC-INIT
* A-OOOT-CSTMKUP
* P-CBOB-BUS1E (HEP)      1.43E-01
                            /ASDP                            ALTERNATE SHUTDOWN PANEL FAILURE                                  9.90E-01 FA-4                              1C SWITCHGR LOGICAL PLACEHOLDER (Fault Tree)                      4.15E-04 L-ZZOA-S DC-IN IT                OP FT INITIATE SDC (FP/FR-LOC) (HEP)                              1.55E-02 SUP-AUTO                          AUTO FIRE SUPPRESSION FAILURE (Dev Event)                          2.OOE-02 67  15.9  0.02    1.76E-08 IEFIRE                            FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER                              1.OOE+00 A-AVOA-M ISCALADJ                OP FT ADJ AFW FLOW GIVEN FLOW INSTRUMENT MISC (FP/FR-CR) (HEP)    1.45E-03 A-PMMG-P-8B                      AFW TURBINE PUMP P-8B FAILS TO RUN                                1.38E-02 FA-1                              GENERAL AREA FIRE (Fault Tree)                                    2.43E-03 H-ZZOA-OTC-CDTNL-HEP-2            CND HEP-A-AVOA-AFWFLADJ B-XVOB-ADVS-MAN H-ZZOA-OTC-INIT (HEP)      3.66E-01
                            /SUP                              MANUAL FIRE SUPPRESSION FAILURE (Dev Event)                        9.90E-01 68  15.92 0.02    1.76E-08 IEFIRE                            FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER                              1.00E+00 A-AVOA-AFWFLADJ                  OP FT ADJ AFW FLOW GIVEN FLOW INSTRUMENT MISC (FP/FR-CR) (HEP)    1.45E-03 A-PMMG-P-8B                      AFW TURBINE PUMP P-8B FAILS TO RUN                                1.38E-02 FA-1                              GENERAL AREA FIRE (Fault Tree)                                    2.43E-03 H-ZZOA-OTC-CDTNL-HEP-2            CND HEP-A-AVOA-AFWFLADJ B-XVOB-ADVS-MAN H-ZZOA-OTC-INIT (HEP)      3.66E-01
                            /SUP                              MANUAL FIRE SUPPRESSION FAILURE (Dev Event)                        9.90E-01 69  15.93 0.01    1.64E-08 IEFIRE                            FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER                              1.00E+00 A-AVMA-CV-0522B                  AFW STEAM SUPPLY FROM SG A CV-0522B FAILS TO OPEN                  8.46E-04
                            /ASDP                            ALTERNATE SHUTDOWN PANEL FAILURE                                  9.90E-01 FA-3                              1D SWITCHGR LOGICAL PLACEHOLDER (Fault Tree)                      9.81 E-04 SUP-AUTO                          AUTO FIRE SUPPRESSION FAILURE (Dev Event)                          2.OOE-02 70  15.94 0.01    1.63E-08 IE FIRE                          FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER                              1.OOE+00
 
Table 7.6: P-8B Failed w/Recovery Exposure Fires: Control Room, CSR, Bus 1C and Bus 1D w/ and w/o Suppression (Top 100 Cutsets)
Cut  %              ProbI  Basic Event                      Description                                                      Event Prob.
No. Total ISt      Frequenc A-PMMG-P-8B                      AFW TURBINE PUMP P-8B FAILS TO RUN                                  1.38E-02 FA-4                            1C SWITCHGR LOGICAL PLACEHOLDER (Fault Tree)                      4.15E-04 H-ZZOA-OTC-IN IT                OP FAILS TO INITIATE ONCE THROUGH COOLING (HEP)                    2.90E-03
                            /SUP-AUTO                        AUTO FIRE SUPPRESSION FAILURE (Dev Event)                          9.80E-01 71  15.95    0.01  1.58E-08 IEFIRE                          FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER                              1.OOE+00 A-PMOO-P-8B                      AFW TURBINE PUMP P-8B OUT OF SERVICE                              5.68E-03 FA-3                            1D SWITCHGR LOGICAL PLACEHOLDER (Fault Tree)                      9.81 E-04 H-ZZOA-OTC-INIT                  OP FAILS TO INITIATE ONCE THROUGH COOLING (HEP)                    2.90E-03
                            /SUP-AUTO                        AUTO FIRE SUPPRESSION FAILURE (Dev Event)                          9.80E-01 72  15.96    0.01  1.47E-08 IEFIRE                          FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER                              1.OOE+00 A-PMMG-P-8B                      AFW TURBINE PUMP P-8B FAILS TO RUN                                  1.38E-02 FA-1                            GENERAL AREA FIRE (Fault Tree)                                    2.43E-03
                            /SUP                            MANUAL FIRE SUPPRESSION FAILURE (Dev Event)                        9.90E-01 Y-AVMD-CV-3027                  AIR OPERATED VALVE CV-3027 FAILS TO REMAIN OPEN                    4.44E-04 73  15.97    0.01  1.47E-08 IEFIRE                          FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER                              1.OOE+00 A-PMMG-P-8B                      AFW TURBINE PUMP P-8B FAILS TO RUN                                  1.38E-02 FA-1                            GENERAL AREA FIRE (Fault Tree)                                    2.43E-03
                            /SUP                            MANUAL FIRE SUPPRESSION FAILURE (Dev Event)                        9.90E-01 Y-AVMD-CV-3056                  AIR OPERATED VALVE CV-3056 FAILS TO REMAIN OPEN                    4.44E-04 74  15.98    0.01  1.29E-08 IEFIRE                          FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER                              1.OOE+00 A-PMOO-P-8B                      AFW TURBINE PUMP P-8B OUT OF SERVICE                              5.68E-03 B-XVOB-ADVS-MAN                  OP FT CLOSE MANUAL VALVES TO ISOLATE ADV (FP/FR-LOC) (HEP)        4.03E-02 FA-2                            CSR EXP FIRE (Fault Tree)                                          3.10E-03 H-ZZOA-OTC-CDTNL-HEP-4          COND HEP: B-XVOB-ADVS-MAN
* H-ZZOA-OTC-INIT (HEP)                  1.85E-02
                            /SUP-AUTO                        AUTO FIRE SUPPRESSION FAILURE (Dev Event)                          9.80E-01 75  15.99    0.01  1.23E-08 IEFIRE                          FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER                              1.OOE+00 A-AVOA-THROT-LE-FCV              OP FT THRTTLE AFW FCV'S GIVEN LOSS OF PNUEMTICS (FP/FR-LOC) (HEP)  1.50E-03
                            /ASDP                            ALTERNATE SHUTDOWN PANEL FAILURE                                  9.90E-01 FA-4                            1C SWITCHGR LOGICAL PLACEHOLDER (Fault Tree)                      4.15E-04 SUP-AUTO                        AUTO FIRE SUPPRESSION FAILURE (Dev Event)                          2.OOE-02 76    16      0.01  1.13E-08 IEFIRE                          FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER                              1.OOE+00 A-CVMA-CK-MS402                  AFW STEAM SUPPLY FROM SG A CHECK VALVE CK-MS402 FTO                1.84E-04
                            /ASDP                            ALTERNATE SHUTDOWN PANEL FAILURE                                  9.90E-01 FA-2                            CSR EXP FIRE (Fault Tree)                                          3.10E-03 SUP-AUTO                        AUTO FIRE SUPPRESSION FAILURE (Dev Event)                          2.OOE-02 77  16.01    0.01  1.13E-08 IEFIRE                          FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER                              1.00E+00 A-CVMA-CK-FW743                  AFW PUMP P-8B DISCHARGE CHECK VALVE CK-FW0743 FAILS TO OPEN        1.84E-04
                            /ASDP                            ALTERNATE SHUTDOWN PANEL FAILURE                                  9.90E-01 FA-2                            CSR EXP FIRE (Fault Tree)                                          3.1 OE-03 SUP-AUTO                        AUTO FIRE SUPPRESSION FAILURE (Dev Event)                          2.OOE-02 78  16.02    0.01  1.10E-08 IE FIRE                          FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER                              1.OOE+00
 
Table 7.6: P-8B Failed w/Recovery Exposure Fires: Control Room, CSR, Bus IC and Bus 1D w/and w/o Suppression (Top 100 Cutsets)
Cut  %  %Cut    Prob.I Cu                Pr b/  Basic Event                      Description                                                      Event Prob.
No. Total %SetuIFrequen~c
                          /ASDP                            ALTERNATE SHUTDOWN PANEL FAILURE                                  9.90E-01 B-HCMA-HIC-0780A                SDCR CONTROLLER HIC-0780A FAILS TO DE-ENERGIZE                    1.14E-02 B-XVOB-ADVS-MAN                  OP FT CLOSE MANUAL VALVES TO ISOLATE ADV (FP/FR-LOC) (HEP)        4.03E-02 FA-1                            GENERAL AREA FIRE (Fault Tree)                                    2.43E-03 SUP                              MANUAL FIRE SUPPRESSION FAILURE (Dev Event)                      1.00E-02 X-HSE-SGA-BLDN                    SET TO "1" - ESDE ON SG E-50A (House Event)                      1.OOE+00 79  16.03 0.01  1.09E-08  IEFIRE                          FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER                            1.OOE+00 A-PMMG-P-8B                      AFW TURBINE PUMP P-8B FAILS TO RUN                                1.38E-02 FA-2                            CSR EXP FIRE (Fault Tree)                                        3.10E-03
                          /SUP-AUTO                        AUTO FIRE SUPPRESSION FAILURE (Dev Event)                        9.80E-01 Y-AVOB-RAS-VLVS                  OP FT ENABLE ESS RECIRC VALVES TO CLOSE ON RAS (FP/FR-CR) (HEP)  2.60E-04 80  16.04 0.01  1.06E-08  IEFIRE                          FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER                            1.00E+00 A-AVOA-CV-201 0                  OP FT OPEN CV-2010 FOR T-939 MAKEUP TO CST (FP/FR-CR) (HEP)      2.59E-03 A-OOOT-CSTMK-CDTNL-HEP-1          CND HEP-A-AVOA-CV-2010
* A-OOOT-CSTMKUP
* Y-AVOB-RAS-VLVS (HEP)  4.99E-01
                          /ASDP                            ALTERNATE SHUTDOWN PANEL FAILURE                                  9.90E-01 FA-4                              1C SWITCHGR LOGICAL PLACEHOLDER (Fault Tree)                      4.15E-04 SUP-AUTO                          AUTO FIRE SUPPRESSION FAILURE (Dev Event)                        2.OOE-02 81  16.05 0.01  1.03E-08  IEFIRE                          FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER                            1.OOE+00 A-PMOO-P-8B                      AFW TURBINE PUMP P-8B OUT OF SERVICE                              5.68E-03 FA-2                            CSR EXP FIRE (Fault Tree)                                        3.10E-03 O-RVCC-PORVS-MA                  COMMON CAUSE FAILURE OF BOTH PORVS TO NOT OPEN                    5.95E-04
                          /SUP-AUTO                        AUTO FIRE SUPPRESSION FAILURE (Dev Event)                        9.80E-01 82  16.06 0.01  1.02E-08  IEFIRE                          FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER                            1.00E+00 A-PMOO-P-8B                      AFW TURBINE PUMP P-8B OUT OF SERVICE                              5.68E-03 B-XVOB-ADVS-MAN                  OP FT CLOSE MANUAL VALVES TO ISOLATE ADV (FP/FR-LOC) (HEP)        4.03E-02 FA-1                              GENERAL AREA FIRE (Fault Tree)                                    2.43E-03 H-ZZOA-OTC-CDTNL-HEP-4            COND HEP: B-XVOB-ADVS-MAN
* H-ZZOA-OTC-INIT (HEP)                1.85E-02
                          /SUP                              MANUAL FIRE SUPPRESSION FAILURE (Dev Event)                      9.90E-01 83  16.07 0.01  1.OOE-08 IEFIRE                            FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER                            1.OOE+00 A-XVMA-MV-FW775                  FPS TO AFW MANUAL VALVE MV-FW775 FAILS TO OPEN                    1.22E-03
                          /ASDP                            ALTERNATE SHUTDOWN PANEL FAILURE                                  9.90E-01 FA-4                              1C SWITCHGR LOGICAL PLACEHOLDER (Fault Tree)                      4.15E-04 SUP-AUTO                          AUTO FIRE SUPPRESSION FAILURE (Dev Event)                        2.OOE-02 84  16.08 0.01  1.00E-08 IEFIRE                            FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER                            1.00E+00 A-XVMA-MV-FW774                  FPS TO AFW MANUAL VALVE MV-FW774 FAILS TO OPEN                    1.22E-03
                          /ASDP                            ALTERNATE SHUTDOWN PANEL FAILURE                                  9.90E-01 FA-4                              1C SWITCHGR LOGICAL PLACEHOLDER (Fault Tree)                      4.15E-04 SUP-AUTO                          AUTO FIRE SUPPRESSION FAILURE (Dev Event)                        2.OOE-02 85  16.09 0.01  9.89E-09 IEFIRE                            FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER                            1.OOE+00 A-PMMG-P-8B                      AFW TURBINE PUMP P-8B FAILS TO RUN                                1.38E-02 B-XVOB-ADVS-MAN                  OP FT CLOSE MANUAL VALVES TO ISOLATE ADV (FP/FR-LOC) (HEP)        4.03E-02
 
Table 7.6: P-8B Failed w/Recovery Exposure Fires: Control Room, CSR, Bus IC and Bus 1D w/ and w/o Suppression (Top 100 Cutsets)
Cut  %      %
            %Cut    Prob./  I Cu    %        Set    Prob./    Basic Event                      Description                                                      Event Prob.
No. Total ISet      Frequency FA-3                            1D SWITCHGR LOGICAL PLACEHOLDER (Fault Tree)                      9.81 E-04 H-ZZOA-OTC-CDTNL-HEP-4          COND HEP: B-XVOB-ADVS-MAN
* H-ZZOA-OTC-INIT (HEP)                  1.85E-02
                                /SUP-AUTO                        AUTO FIRE SUPPRESSION FAILURE (Dev Event)                          9.80E-01 86  16.1      0.01  9.72E-09  IEFIRE                          FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER                              1.OOE+00
                                /ASDP                            ALTERNATE SHUTDOWN PANEL FAILURE                                  9.90E-01 B-KVMA-SV-0781 B                ADV CV-0781 AIR SUPPLY SV-0781B FTD                                3.93E-03 B-XVOB-ADVS-MAN                  OP FT CLOSE MANUAL VALVES TO ISOLATE ADV (FP/FR-LOC) (HEP)        4.03E-02 FA-2                            CSR EXP FIRE (Fault Tree)                                          3.10E-03 SUP-AUTO                        AUTO FIRE SUPPRESSION FAILURE (Dev Event)                          2.OOE-02 X-HSE-SGA-BLDN                  SET TO "1"- ESDE ON SG E-50A (House Event)                        1.OOE+00 87  16.11      0.01  9.72E-09  IEFIRE                          FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER                              1.OOE+00
                                /ASDP                            ALTERNATE SHUTDOWN PANEL FAILURE                                  9.90E-01 B-KVMA-SV-0782C                  ADV CV-0782 AIR SUPPLY SV-0782C FTD                                3.93E-03 B-XVOB-ADVS-MAN                  OP FT CLOSE MANUAL VALVES TO ISOLATE ADV (FP/FR-LOC) (HEP)        4.03E-02 FA-2                            CSR EXP FIRE (Fault Tree)                                          3.10E-03 SUP-AUTO                        AUTO FIRE SUPPRESSION FAILURE (Dev Event)                          2.OOE-02 X-HSE-SGA-BLDN                  SET TO "1'"- ESDE ON SG E-50A (House Event)                        1.OOE+00 88  16.12    0.01  9.72E-09  IEFIRE                          FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER                              1.OOE+00
                                /ASDP                            ALTERNATE SHUTDOWN PANEL FAILURE                                  9.90E-01 B-KVMA-SV-0781 C                ADV CV-0781 AIR SUPPLY SV-0781C FTD                                3.93E-03 B-XVOB-ADVS-MAN                  OP FT CLOSE MANUAL VALVES TO ISOLATE ADV (FP/FR-LOC) (HEP)        4.03E-02 FA-2                            CSR EXP FIRE (Fault Tree)                                          3.10E-03 SUP-AUTO                        AUTO FIRE SUPPRESSION FAILURE (Dev Event)                          2.OOE-02 X-HSE-SGA-BLDN                  SET TO "1" - ESDE ON SG E-50A (House Event)                        1.OOE+00 89  16.13    0.01  9.72E-09  IEFIRE                          FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER                              1.OOE+00
                                /ASDP                            ALTERNATE SHUTDOWN PANEL FAILURE                                  9.90E-01 B-KVMA-SV-0782B                  ADV CV-0782 AIR SUPPLY SV-0782B FTD                                3.93E-03 B-XVOB-ADVS-MAN                  OP FT CLOSE MANUAL VALVES TO ISOLATE ADV (FP/FR-LOC) (HEP)        4.03E-02 FA-2                            CSR EXP FIRE (Fault Tree)                                          3.10E-03 SUP-AUTO                        AUTO FIRE SUPPRESSION FAILURE (Dev Event)                          2.OOE-02 X-HSE-SGA-BLDN                  SET TO "1"- ESDE ON SG E-50A (House Event)                        1.00E+00 90  16.14    0.01  9.15E-09  IEFIRE                          FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER                              1.OOE+00 A-AVOA-MISCALADJ                OP FT ADJ AFW FLOW GIVEN FLOW INSTRUMENT MISC (FP/FR-CR) (HEP)    1.45E-03 A-PMOO-P-8B                      AFW TURBINE PUMP P-8B OUT OF SERVICE                              5.68E-03 FA-2                            CSR EXP FIRE (Fault Tree)                                          3.10E-03 H-ZZOA-OTC-CDTNL-HEP-2          CND HEP-A-AVOA-AFWFLADJ B-XVOB-ADVS-MAN H-ZZOA-OTC-INIT (HEP)      3.66E-01
                                /SUP-AUTO                        AUTO FIRE SUPPRESSION FAILURE (Dev Event)                          9.80E-01 91  16.15    0.01  9.15E-09  IEFIRE                          FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER                              1.OOE+00 A-AVOA-AFWFLADJ                  OP FT ADJ AFW FLOW GIVEN FLOW INSTRUMENT MISC (FP/FR-CR) (HEP)    1.45E-03 A-PMOO-P-8B                      AFW TURBINE PUMP P-8B OUT OF SERVICE                              5.68E-03 FA-2                            CSR EXP FIRE (Fault Tree)                                          3.10E-03
 
Table 7.6: P-8B Failed w/Recovery Exposure Fires: Control Room, CSR, Bus IC and Bus 1D wl and w/o Suppression (Top 100 Cutsets)
Cu        % Cut    Prob./ Basic Event                      Description                                                      Event Prob.
No. Total  Set  Frequency H-ZZOA-OTC-CDTNL-HEP-2          CND HEP- A-AVOA-AFWFLADJ B-XVOB-ADVS-MAN H-ZZOA-OTC-INIT (HEP)    3.66E-01
                          /SUP-AUTO                        AUTO FIRE SUPPRESSION FAILURE (Dev Event)                          9.80E-01 92  16.16 0.01  8.90E-09 IEFIRE                          FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER                              1.OOE+00 B-KVMA-SV-0782C                  ADV CV-0782 AIR SUPPLY SV-0782C FTD                                3.93E-03 B-XVOB-ADVS-MAN                  OP FT CLOSE MANUAL VALVES TO ISOLATE ADV (FP/FR-LOC) (HEP)        4.03E-02 FA-2                            CSR EXP FIRE (Fault Tree)                                          3. 1OE-03 H-ZZOA-OTC-CDTNL-HEP-4          COND HEP: B-XVOB-ADVS-MAN
* H-ZZOA-OTC-INIT (HEP)                  1.85E-02
                          /SUP-AUTO                        AUTO FIRE SUPPRESSION FAILURE (Dev Event)                          9.80E-01 X-HSE-SGA-BLDN                  SET TO "1"- ESDE ON SG E-50A (House Event)                        1.OOE+00 93  16.17 0.01  8.90E-09 IEFIRE                          FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER                              11.00E+00 B-KVMA-SV-0781 C                ADV CV-0781 AIR SUPPLY SV-0781C FTD                                3.93E-03 B-XVOB-ADVS-MAN                  OP FT CLOSE MANUAL VALVES TO ISOLATE ADV (FP/FR-LOC) (HEP)        4.03E-02 FA-2                            CSR EXP FIRE (Fault Tree)                                          3. 1OE-03 H-ZZOA-OTC-CDTNL-HEP-4          COND HEP: B-XVOB-ADVS-MAN
* H-ZZOA-OTC-INIT (HEP)                  1.85E-02
                          /SUP-AUTO                        AUTO FIRE SUPPRESSION FAILURE (Dev Event)                          9.80E-01 X-HSE-SGA-BLDN                  SET TO "'1"- ESDE ON SG E-50A (House Event)                        1.00E+00 94  16.18 0.01  8.90E-09 IEFIRE                          FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER                              1.OOE+00 B-KVMA-SV-0782B                  ADV CV-0782 AIR SUPPLY SV-0782B FTD                                3.93E-03 B-XVOB-ADVS-MAN                  OP FT CLOSE MANUAL VALVES TO ISOLATE ADV (FP/FR-LOC) (HEP)        4.03E-02 FA-2                            CSR EXP FIRE (Fault Tree)                                          3.10E-03 H-ZZOA-OTC-CDTNL-HEP-4          COND HEP: B-XVOB-ADVS-MAN
* H-ZZOA-OTC-INIT (HEP)                  1.85E-02
                          /SUP-AUTO                        AUTO FIRE SUPPRESSION FAILURE (Dev Event)                          9.80E-01 X-HSE-SGA-BLDN                  SET TO "1"- ESDE ON SG E-50A (House Event)                        1.OOE+00 95  16.19 0,01  8.90E-09 IEFIRE                          FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER                              1.OOE+00 B-KVMA-SV-0781 B                ADV CV-0781 AIR SUPPLY SV-0781 B FTD                              3.93E-03 B-XVOB-ADVS-MAN                  OP FT CLOSE MANUAL VALVES TO ISOLATE ADV (FP/FR-LOC) (HEP)        4.03E-02 FA-2                            CSR EXP FIRE (Fault Tree)                                          3.1OE-03 H-ZZOA-OTC-CDTNL-HEP-4          COND HEP: B-XVOB-ADVS-MAN
* H-ZZOA-OTC-INIT (HEP)                  1.85E-02
                          /SUP-AUTO                        AUTO FIRE SUPPRESSION FAILURE (Dev Event)                          9.80E-01 X-HSE-SGA-BLDN                  SET TO "1" - ESDE ON SG E-50A (House Event)                        1.OOE+00 96  16.2 0,01  8.89E-09 IEFIRE                          FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER                              1.00E+00
                          /ASDP                            ALTERNATE SHUTDOWN PANEL FAILURE                                  9.90E-01 B-HCMA-HIC-0780A                SDCR CONTROLLER HIC-0780A FAILS TO DE-ENERGIZE                    1.14E-02 B-XVOB-ADVS-MAN                  OP FT CLOSE MANUAL VALVES TO ISOLATE ADV (FP/FR-LOC) (HEP)        4.03E-02 FA-3                            1D SWITCHGR LOGICAL PLACEHOLDER (Fault Tree)                      9.81 E-04 SUP-AUTO                        AUTO FIRE SUPPRESSION FAILURE (Dev Event)                          2.OOE-02 X-HSE-SGA-BLDN                  SET TO "1" - ESDE ON SG E-50A (House Event)                        1.OOE+00 97  16.21 0,01  8.88E-09 IEFIRE                          FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER                              1.00E+00
                          /ASDP                            ALTERNATE SHUTDOWN PANEL FAILURE                                  9.90E-01 B-RVMB-SRV-SGB                  ONE SAFETY RELIEF VALVE ON SG B FTC                                3.69E-03 FA-1                            GENERAL AREA FIRE (Fault Tree)                                    2.43E-03
 
Table 7.6: P-8B Failed w/Recovery Exposure Fires: Control Room, CSR, Bus 1C and Bus ID w/ and w/o Suppression (Top 100 Cutsets)
Cut      %  Cut    Prob. Basic Event                      Description                                                        Event Prob.
No. Total    Set  Frequency  I                            I                                                                  I            I M-CVOA-MSIVLOCAL                  OPERATOR FAILS TO TRIP CLOSED MSIVS LOCALLY (HEP)                    1.O0E-01 SUP                              MANUAL FIRE SUPPRESSION FAILURE (Dev Event)                        1.00E-02 X-HSE-SGA-BLDN                    SET TO "1" - ESDE ON SG E-50A (House Event)                        1.OOE+00 98 16.22  0.01  8.76E-09 IE_FIRE                          FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER                              1.OOE+00
                            /ASDP                            ALTERNATE SHUTDOWN PANEL FAILURE                                    9.90E-01 B-AVMB-CV-0511                    TURBINE BYPASS VALVE CV-0511 FTC                                    3.64E-03 FA-1                              GENERAL AREA FIRE (Fault Tree)                                      2.43E-03 M-CVOA-MSIVLOCAL                  OPERATOR FAILS TO TRIP CLOSED MSIVS LOCALLY (HEP)                  1.O0E-01 SUP                              MANUAL FIRE SUPPRESSION FAILURE (Dev Event)                        1.OOE-02 X-HSE-SGA-BLDN                    SET TO "1"- ESDE ON SG E-50A (House Event)                          1.OOE+00 99 16.23  0.01  8.63E-09 IEFIRE                            FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER                              1.OOE+00 A-PMMG-P-8B                      AFW TURBINE PUMP P-8B FAILS TO RUN                                  1.38E-02 FA-1                              GENERAL AREA FIRE (Fault Tree)                                      2.43E-03
                            /SUP                              MANUAL FIRE SUPPRESSION FAILURE (Dev Event)                        9.90E-01 Y-AVOB-RAS-VLVS                  OP FT ENABLE ESS RECIRC VALVES TO CLOSE ON RAS (FP/FR-CR) (HEP)    2.60E-04 100 16.24  0.01  8.26E-09 IEFIRE                            FA EVENT TREE LOGICAL IE PLACE HOLDER                              1.OOE+00
                            /ASDP                            ALTERNATE SHUTDOWN PANEL FAILURE                                    9.90E-01 B-AVMB-CV-0781                    ADV ON SG A CV-0781 FAILS TO CLOSE                                  3.34E-03 B-XVOB-ADVS-MAN                  OP FT CLOSE MANUAL VALVES TO ISOLATE ADV (FP/FR-LOC) (HEP)          4.03E-02 FA-2                              CSR EXP FIRE (Fault Tree)                                          3.10E-03 SUP-AUTO                          AUTO FIRE SUPPRESSION FAILURE (Dev Event)                          2.OOE-02 X-HSE-SGA-BLDN                    SET TO "1'"- ESDE ON SG E-50A (House Event)                        1.OOE+00
 
EI                                                            EA-PSA-SDP-P8B-11-05              Rev. 0 11
            ,Attachment
              &#xfd;ff                                                                                8 - Page 1 of 4 iV~ E.-mail MEMORANDUM TO:              Brian Brogan                                        DATE:          November 14, 2011 Frank Yanik FROM:            Don MacLeod                                          DOC NO:        P0247100005-4028
 
==SUBJECT:==
Local AFW Operation HRA Evaluation for Palisades SDP Cc:              Don Vanover Lynn Kolonauski Review of the assessment of the operator action to locally control the turbine driven AFW pump (AFW-AVOA-AFWSTEAM) indicates that the current quantification is potentially conservative in that it does not credit multiple factors allowed by the HRA methodologies employed by Palisades. Conversely, there are some assumptions made in the evaluation that are potentially non-conservative. These issues are summarized below followed by some editorial suggestions for Section 5 of EA-PSA-SDP-P8B-11-05.
Summary of Potential Conservatisms CBDTM Recovery Mechanisms: No recovery mechanisms are applied to the initial probabilities derived from the CBDTs; however, multiple valid mechanisms exist:
o PcB - Both self review (0.1) and STA review are valid recoveries for this failure mechanism. Some analysts/reviewers attest that only one recovery per failure mechanism should be used while other attest that the recovery mechanisms should be credited if they exist and would be functioning for the relevant scenarios. Even if only one recovery factor is chosen, it represents an order of magnitude reduction the PcB contribution.
o  PcE - Self review is a valid recovery for this failure mechanism and its use would reduce the PcE contribution by an order of magnitude.
o  TSC recovery: This is a recovery mechanism that is potentially available, but for the timing conditions applied in this scenario, it is not clear that credit is appropriate. If the TSC is manned at 60 minutes, then there would be about 9 minutes for them to identify (610) 431-8260 Fax (610) 431-8270 ERIN Engineering and Research, Inc.
158 West Gay Street, Suite 400 West Chester, PA 19380 Complex Needs, PracticalSolutions                                              www.enneng.com
 
EA-PSA-SDP-P8B-11-05      I    Rev. 0 il CbmMWny SKFG ,m C
Attachment 8 - Page 2 of 4 Brian Brogan, Palisades September 9, 2011 Page 2 a problem and tell the MCR to perform the action (60min TSC ready + 15 minute manip time + 9 min TSC diagnosis = 84 minutes) . That is not much time to become familiar with the situation and begin providing directions. If there was a delay and it was not manned until 90 minutes or they were not ready until 90 minutes, then it would clearly be too late. This appears to only be an issue for this action due to the definition of the system window, which is discussed under the "timing" bullet below.
              "  Execution recovery dependence level: This HRAC, which uses diagnosis time to determine allowable recovery dependence levels, indicates that the minimum recovery dependence level is LD. MD is used, but no reason is provided for using it in place of LD. Because the recovery is based on a separate procedure step that would be reviewed by a person other than the one taking the action, use of MD is conservative. SG level is a highly visible parameter in the MCR and there would clearly be some independent checking of SG status such that LD would be defendable.
* Sensitivity cases: There are sensitivity cases presented in section 5.2 that separately account for crediting CBDTM recovery and the use of a lower execution dependence level. While Palisades may chose not to take these credits in the base case quantification, a typical analysis would credit both of them simultaneously. The sensitivity analysis should present the results of applying both of these credits together to demonstrate that typical recovery applications could result in a much lower HEP.
* Timing : The quantification appears to be based on a system window that is defined to end at the point where SG level reaches -84% (as stated in section 5.1.2 and by the time used for Tsw in the timing analysis section). There is text in the timing analysis section that appears to indicate that 2 hours, and maybe 3 hours (using an updated MAAP run), would be available prior to core damage; however, no credit is taken for this extended time. I am not familiar with how the operators would approach AFW operation once the cue to start feed and bleed is reached, but if resources would remain committed to starting AFW, expanding the system window would be appropriate. This would make a better case for crediting TSC review in the CBDT analysis and make an even better case for a low or zero execution recovery dependence level.
              "  The critical task list includes a step to clear all non-essential personnel from the area. While this is an important task, failing to perform it is not a failure mode for this action and it should be removed from the analysis. Retaining it may raise unwanted questions.
* For step 4.2.e, there is a comment that it is not known if the local PI has limit marks and the error for using an unmarked gauge is used. Determining the nature of the local gauge could allow the use of a lower HEP and closing this issue out is recommended. Further, identifying that this information is not known in an evaluation submitted for an SDP may send the NRC the wrong message.
 
~ERE                  I11_0              I                              Lrurr                      Rev. 0 Attachment 8 -
Page 3 of 4 Brian Brogan, Palisades September 9, 2011 Page 3 Summary of Potential Non-Conservatisms
* Stress-Factors: This issue is qualitative rather than quantitative, but Section 5.1.1 characterizes the selection of "hot/humid" conditions and a "smoke" atmosphere as "conservative". While it may be true that these conditions would probably not apply to the action, it is not quantitatively conservative because it has no impact on the HRAC quantification. Once a single "off-normal" PSF is chose in the HRAC, the stress tree eliminates "optimal stress" as a choice and addition "off-normal" PSF selections have no additional impact. For the SBO evaluation upon which the fire evaluation was based, "emergency lighting" was selected a as PSF and it was retained for the fire evaluation. Selection of "hot/humid" and "smoke" should, therefore, probably not be characterized as conservative elements of the evaluation.
        "  PcA: For fires that impact AFW, are you certain that the MCR indication used for this action is accurate? Will some indicators be failed while others are OK? If some are failed, you might consider taking the "no" path on the accuracy question. If the fire procedures say that the indicators could be impacted for the scenario, which they may, then crediting that warning would still yield a "negligible" value for this failure mechanism. This may ultimately not change the HEP, but identifying any instrumentation issue could help avoid some questions.
* PcB: Credit is taken for an alarm for this action, but often, the circuitry associated with the alarms is not traced and the alarms can't be credited. Can you confirm that the alarms credited would be available? If not, the choice of "not alarmed" would be more appropriate. Also, has it been confirmed that the AFW flow indication would be available?
        "  PcD: For fire, the EPRI guidance for this failure mechanism may be lacking in that it appears to be directed and instruments directly used in the action's diagnosis and execution. PcA generally addresses the instrumentation issues related to the action such that PcD may be better suited to addressing the impacts on other MCR instrumentation (otherwise, the evaluation is double counting impacts on the primary indicators). If there are failures not related to the action specific instruments, a choice of "no" may be more appropriate for the "All Cues as Stated" node.
o  Note: this is an area that is still open to interpretation.
Editorial Remarks
        " Section 5.1.1: The title for this section is "stress factors", but it may be more appropriate to call it "Execution Stress Factors". The HRAC stress evaluation only impacts the quantification of the execution contributions.
        "    Section 5.1.1: Add the word "is" in the second to last sentence: "...where the action takes place is in the AFW pump room ..."
 
====
N,                                                          EA-PSA-SDP-P8B-11-05        &#xfd;    Rev. 0 Aftachment 8 - Page 4 of 4 Brian Brogan, Palisades September 9, 2011 Page 4
* Section 5.1.2, second paragraph, third sentence: Including the underlined changes may improve clarity: "This procedural guidance includes steps to verify that the turbine is latched and,_if it is not, to reset the turbine..."
* Section 5.1.2, third paragraph, second and fourth sentences: Including the underlined changes may improve clarity: "For areas determined by the Appendix R analysis to occur in areas in which all Auxiliary Feedwater may be impacted by the fire, the operator is directed to implement EOP Supplement 19. The Off Normal procedures also specify that AFW flow be established within twenty five minutes. Therefore it is considered that during..."
* In the "Identification and Definition" section of the HRAC output, there is a bulleted list under "Reactor successfully tripped." The entry for the second to last bullet does not appear to be complete.
* In the "Identification and Definition" section of the HRAC output, item number 6 indicates the consequence of failing to perform the action is core damage. If the system window is defined to be -84% SG level, would the consequence actually be transition to OTC, instead?
* Manpower Requirements: These are now understood to be manpower requirements for execution, so they could be adjusted, if desired.
* Timing analysis section: This section is confusing regarding the MAAP cases that are used to support the evaluation and what defines the system window. It would be helpful to clarify what is used and what are only used as points of comparison.
"    Execution evaluation, step 4.2.e: Delete the text that indicates there is insufficient time to complete the action.}}

Latest revision as of 21:44, 12 January 2025

Redirect to:

Retrieved from "https://kanterella.com/w/index.php?title=ML11339A101&oldid=5268601"