IR 05000445/2005008: Difference between revisions

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//RA// CFOKeefe for Linda Joy Smith, Chief Plant Engineering Branch Division of Reactor Safety Dockets: 50-445; 50-446 Licenses: NPF-87; NPF-89
//RA// CFOKeefe for Linda Joy Smith, Chief Plant Engineering Branch Division of Reactor Safety Dockets: 50-445; 50-446 Licenses: NPF-87; NPF-89


TXU Power -2-
TXU Power-2-


===Enclosure:===
===Enclosure:===
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REGION IV==
REGION IV==
Dockets: 05000445; 05000446 Licenses: NPF-87; NPF-89 Report No.: 05000445/2005008; 05000446/2005008 Licensee: TXU Power Facility: Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station, Units 1 and 2 Location: FM-56 Glen Rose, Texas Dates: January 24 through May 17, 2005 Team Leader J. M. Mateychick, Senior Reactor Inspector, Plant Engineering Branch Inspectors: P. Goldberg, Reactor Inspector, Plant Engineering Branch T. McConnell, Reactor Inspector, Plant Engineering Branch D. Overland, Reactor Inspector, Plant Engineering Branch Accompanying R. Mullikin, Consultant Personnel:
Dockets:
Approved By: Linda Joy Smith, Chief Plant Engineering Branch Division of Reactor Safety Enclosure
05000445; 05000446 Licenses:
NPF-87; NPF-89 Report No.:
05000445/2005008; 05000446/2005008 Licensee:
TXU Power Facility:
Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station, Units 1 and 2 Location:
FM-56 Glen Rose, Texas Dates:
January 24 through May 17, 2005 Team Leader J. M. Mateychick, Senior Reactor Inspector, Plant Engineering Branch Inspectors:
P. Goldberg, Reactor Inspector, Plant Engineering Branch T. McConnell, Reactor Inspector, Plant Engineering Branch D. Overland, Reactor Inspector, Plant Engineering Branch Accompanying Personnel:
R. Mullikin, Consultant Approved By:
Linda Joy Smith, Chief Plant Engineering Branch Division of Reactor Safety
 
Enclosure


=SUMMARY OF FINDINGS=
=SUMMARY OF FINDINGS=
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==REACTOR SAFETY==
==REACTOR SAFETY==
{{a|1R05}}


{{a|1R05}}
==1R05 Fire Protection==
==1R05 Fire Protection==
The purpose of this inspection was to review the Comanche Peak Steam Electric Stations fire protection program for selected risk-significant fire areas. Emphasis was placed on verification of the licensee's post-fire safe shutdown capability. The inspection was performed in accordance with the NRC regulatory oversight process using a risk-informed approach for selecting the fire areas and attributes to be inspected. The team used the Individual Plant Examination for External Events for the Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station to choose risk-significant areas for detailed inspection and review. Inspection Procedure 71111.05T, Fire Protection (Triennial), requires selecting three to five fire areas for review. The three areas reviewed during this inspection were:
===1. Fire Area EC===
Electrical and Control Building Unit 1 and Unit 2 Train B Battery Rooms Elevation 792'-0"
===2. Fire Area SB===
Unit 2 Safeguards Building General Areas Elevations 790'-6", 810'-6" and 831'-6" (Fire Zone 2SB4)


The purpose of this inspection was to review the Comanche Peak Steam Electric Stations fire protection program for selected risk-significant fire areas. Emphasis was placed on verification of the licensee's post-fire safe shutdown capability. The inspection was performed in accordance with the NRC regulatory oversight process using a risk-informed approach for selecting the fire areas and attributes to be inspected. The team used the Individual Plant Examination for External Events for the Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station to choose risk-significant areas for detailed inspection and review. Inspection Procedure 71111.05T, Fire Protection (Triennial), requires selecting three to five fire areas for review. The three areas reviewed during this inspection were:
===3. Fire Area SE===
1. Fire Area EC            Electrical and Control Building Unit 1 and Unit 2 Train B Battery Rooms Elevation 792'-0" 2. Fire Area SB            Unit 2 Safeguards Building General Areas Elevations 790'-6",
Unit 2 Safeguards Building Train B Electrical Equipment Areas Elevations 831'-6" and 852'-6" (Fire Zones 2SE16 and 2SE18)
810'-6" and 831'-6" (Fire Zone 2SB4)3. Fire Area SE             Unit 2 Safeguards Building Train B Electrical Equipment Areas Elevations 831'-6" and 852'-6" (Fire Zones 2SE16 and 2SE18)
For each of these fire areas, the inspection focused on fire protection features, systems and equipment necessary to achieve and maintain safe shutdown conditions, and licensing basis commitments.
For each of these fire areas, the inspection focused on fire protection features, systems and equipment necessary to achieve and maintain safe shutdown conditions, and licensing basis commitments.


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===.1 Shutdown From Outside Main Control Room===
===.1 Shutdown From Outside Main Control Room===
====a. Inspection Scope====
====a. Inspection Scope====
The team reviewed the functional requirements identified by the licensee as necessary for achieving and maintaining hot shutdown conditions to ensure that at least one post-fire safe shutdown success path was available in the event of fire in each of the selected areas and alternative shutdown for the case of control room evacuation. The team reviewed piping and instrumentation diagrams of systems credited in accomplishing safe shutdown functions to independently verify whether licensees shutdown methodology had properly identified the required components. The team focused on the following functions that must be available to achieve and maintain safe shutdown conditions:
The team reviewed the functional requirements identified by the licensee as necessary for achieving and maintaining hot shutdown conditions to ensure that at least one post-fire safe shutdown success path was available in the event of fire in each of the selected areas and alternative shutdown for the case of control room evacuation. The team reviewed piping and instrumentation diagrams of systems credited in accomplishing safe shutdown functions to independently verify whether licensees shutdown methodology had properly identified the required components. The team focused on the following functions that must be available to achieve and maintain safe shutdown conditions:
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===.2 Protection of Safe Shutdown Capabilities===
===.2 Protection of Safe Shutdown Capabilities===
====a. Inspection Scope====
====a. Inspection Scope====
.
.
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===.3 Passive Fire Protection===
===.3 Passive Fire Protection===
====a. Inspection Scope====
====a. Inspection Scope====
.
.
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===.4 Active Fire Protection===
===.4 Active Fire Protection===
====a. Inspection Scope====
====a. Inspection Scope====
.
.
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===.5 Protection From Damage From Fire Suppression Activities===
===.5 Protection From Damage From Fire Suppression Activities===
====a. Inspection Scope====
====a. Inspection Scope====
For the sample areas, the team verified that redundant trains of systems required for hot shutdown were not subject to damage from fire suppression activities or from the rupture or inadvertent operation of fire suppression systems including the effects of flooding. The team also verified that where redundant trains of systems were located in the same fire area, the electrical cables of one train were protected.
For the sample areas, the team verified that redundant trains of systems required for hot shutdown were not subject to damage from fire suppression activities or from the rupture or inadvertent operation of fire suppression systems including the effects of flooding. The team also verified that where redundant trains of systems were located in the same fire area, the electrical cables of one train were protected.
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===.6 Alternative Shutdown Capability===
===.6 Alternative Shutdown Capability===
====a. Inspection Scope====
====a. Inspection Scope====
The team reviewed Procedure ABN-803B, Response To A Fire In The Control Room Or Cable Spreading Room, Revision 3. Procedure ABN-803B provided instructions for performing an alternative shutdown from the remote shutdown panel and for manipulating equipment locally in the plant. The team observed a timed walkthrough of the procedure with licensed and non-licensed operators to determine its adequacy to direct safe shutdown.
The team reviewed Procedure ABN-803B, Response To A Fire In The Control Room Or Cable Spreading Room, Revision 3. Procedure ABN-803B provided instructions for performing an alternative shutdown from the remote shutdown panel and for manipulating equipment locally in the plant. The team observed a timed walkthrough of the procedure with licensed and non-licensed operators to determine its adequacy to direct safe shutdown.
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====b. Findings====
====b. Findings====
=====Introduction.=====
=====Introduction.=====
The team identified several examples where simulated operator actions during a timed walkthrough of Procedure ABN-803B, Response To A Fire In The Control Room Or Cable Spreading Room, were not performed within the analyzed times of the Fire Safe Shutdown Analysis calculation, and that all actions were not able to be performed. This will be treated as an unresolved item (URI) pending a determination of significance and enforcement.
The team identified several examples where simulated operator actions during a timed walkthrough of Procedure ABN-803B, Response To A Fire In The Control Room Or Cable Spreading Room, were not performed within the analyzed times of the Fire Safe Shutdown Analysis calculation, and that all actions were not able to be performed. This will be treated as an unresolved item (URI) pending a determination of significance and enforcement.
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As a result, the crews of both units would have been delayed in transferring control.
As a result, the crews of both units would have been delayed in transferring control.


Without access to the Hot Shutdown Panel and the Transfer Switch Panel, the mitigation of spurious actuations due to fire damage would not have been accomplished. The Licensee has modified the Controlled Keys key locker to replace the locking mechanism with a door latch and provided additional labeling to aid in locating the safe shutdown keys. Operations Shift Orders were issued to train the operators on this issue and resulting changes.
Without access to the Hot Shutdown Panel and the Transfer Switch Panel, the mitigation of spurious actuations due to fire damage would not have been accomplished. The Licensee has modified the Controlled Keys key locker to replace the locking mechanism with a door latch and provided additional labeling to aid in locating the safe shutdown keys. Operations
 
Shift Orders were issued to train the operators on this issue and resulting changes.


During a timed performance of the alternate shutdown Procedure ABN-803B by NRC inspectors, approximately 1.5 minutes were required to perform the steps onside the control room prior to evacuation from the control room. The licensee verification and validation of Procedure ABN-803B did not account for the time that the operators need to perform their actions in the control room. This was inconsistent with the Fire Safe Shutdown
During a timed performance of the alternate shutdown Procedure ABN-803B by NRC inspectors, approximately 1.5 minutes were required to perform the steps onside the control room prior to evacuation from the control room. The licensee verification and validation of Procedure ABN-803B did not account for the time that the operators need to perform their actions in the control room. This was inconsistent with the Fire Safe Shutdown
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===.7 Circuit Analyses===
===.7 Circuit Analyses===
====a. Inspection Scope====
====a. Inspection Scope====
The team reviewed the licensees post-fire safe shutdown analysis to verify that the licensee had identified both required and associated circuits that may impact safe shutdown. The NRC inspection of associated circuits had been the subject of a moratorium since November 2000, but was reinitiated in January 2005.
The team reviewed the licensees post-fire safe shutdown analysis to verify that the licensee had identified both required and associated circuits that may impact safe shutdown. The NRC inspection of associated circuits had been the subject of a moratorium since November 2000, but was reinitiated in January 2005.
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In addition, on a sampling basis, the team reviewed the adequacy of selected electrical protective devices (e.g., circuit breakers, fuses, relays), breaker coordination, and the adequacy of electrical protection provided for nonessential cables which share a common enclosure (e.g., raceway, junction box, conduit, etc.) with cables of equipment required to achieve and maintain safe shutdown conditions.
In addition, on a sampling basis, the team reviewed the adequacy of selected electrical protective devices (e.g., circuit breakers, fuses, relays), breaker coordination, and the adequacy of electrical protection provided for nonessential cables which share a common enclosure (e.g., raceway, junction box, conduit, etc.) with cables of equipment required to achieve and maintain safe shutdown conditions.


For the selected fire areas, the team also reviewed the location and installation of diagnostic instrumentation that was necessary for achieving and maintaining safe shutdown conditions to ensure that in the event of a fire, this instrumentation would remain functional.
For the selected fire areas, the team also reviewed the location and installation of diagnostic instrumentation that was necessary for achieving and maintaining safe shutdown conditions
 
to ensure that in the event of a fire, this instrumentation would remain functional.


====b. Findings====
====b. Findings====
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===.8 Communications===
===.8 Communications===
====a. Inspection Scope====
====a. Inspection Scope====
The team reviewed the communication systems required to implement fire fighting and operations to achieve and maintain safe shutdown. The team verified the contents of the safe shutdown lockers, the availability of portable radios for the fire brigade and plant operators, the availability of the Gai-Tronics page/party system, the fire alarm tone generator system, and verified the adequacy of the radio repeater systems and ensured they would be available, operable, and adequate for the performance of safe shutdown functions. The team assessed the capability of the communication systems to support the operators in the conduct and coordination of their required actions.
The team reviewed the communication systems required to implement fire fighting and operations to achieve and maintain safe shutdown. The team verified the contents of the safe shutdown lockers, the availability of portable radios for the fire brigade and plant operators, the availability of the Gai-Tronics page/party system, the fire alarm tone generator system, and verified the adequacy of the radio repeater systems and ensured they would be available, operable, and adequate for the performance of safe shutdown functions. The team assessed the capability of the communication systems to support the operators in the conduct and coordination of their required actions.
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===.9 Emergency Lighting===
===.9 Emergency Lighting===
====a. Inspection Scope====
====a. Inspection Scope====
The team reviewed the emergency lighting system required for safe shutdown activities in the selected fire areas to verify it was adequate for supporting the performance of manual actions required to achieve and maintain hot shutdown conditions. The team evaluated the adequacy of emergency lighting for access and egress routes to the areas where manual actions were required in Procedure ABN-803B, Response to a Fire in the Control Room or Cable Spreading Room, Revision 3, at control stations and plant parameter monitoring locations. The team reviewed repetitive tasks for testing and test data trending to verify that the individual battery operated units were capable of supplying sufficient illumination. The team reviewed that the batteries had at least an 8-hour capacity. The team reviewed that the operability testing and maintenance of the lighting units followed licensee procedures and accepted industry practices and were consistent with the manufacturers recommendations.
The team reviewed the emergency lighting system required for safe shutdown activities in the selected fire areas to verify it was adequate for supporting the performance of manual actions required to achieve and maintain hot shutdown conditions. The team evaluated the adequacy of emergency lighting for access and egress routes to the areas where manual actions were required in Procedure ABN-803B, Response to a Fire in the Control Room or Cable Spreading Room, Revision 3, at control stations and plant parameter monitoring locations. The team reviewed repetitive tasks for testing and test data trending to verify that the individual battery operated units were capable of supplying sufficient illumination. The team reviewed that the batteries had at least an 8-hour capacity. The team reviewed that the operability testing and maintenance of the lighting units followed licensee procedures and accepted industry practices and were consistent with the manufacturers recommendations.
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===.10 Cold Shutdown Repairs===
===.10 Cold Shutdown Repairs===
====a. Inspection Scope====
====a. Inspection Scope====
The team reviewed licensee procedures to determine whether repairs were required to achieve cold shutdown and to verify that the repair material was available on the site. The team verified that the licensee had pre-staged equipment necessary to perform the repairs, as required by procedure. The team also evaluated whether cold shutdown could be achieved within the required time using the licensee's procedures and repair methods.
The team reviewed licensee procedures to determine whether repairs were required to achieve cold shutdown and to verify that the repair material was available on the site. The team verified that the licensee had pre-staged equipment necessary to perform the repairs, as required by procedure. The team also evaluated whether cold shutdown could be achieved within the required time using the licensee's procedures and repair methods.
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===.11 Compensatory Measures===
===.11 Compensatory Measures===
====a. Inspection Scope====
====a. Inspection Scope====
The team reviewed the licensees program with respect to compensatory measures in place for out-of-service, degraded, or inoperable fire protection and post-fire safe shutdown equipment, systems or features.
The team reviewed the licensees program with respect to compensatory measures in place for out-of-service, degraded, or inoperable fire protection and post-fire safe shutdown equipment, systems or features.
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====b. Findings====
====b. Findings====
=====Introduction.=====
=====Introduction.=====
The team identified an unresolved item involving the adequacy of assessing and managing increases in risk due to out-of-service, degraded, or inoperable post-fire safe shutdown equipment, systems or features.
The team identified an unresolved item involving the adequacy of assessing and managing increases in risk due to out-of-service, degraded, or inoperable post-fire safe shutdown equipment, systems or features.
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The team reviewed the licensees procedure STA-604, Configuration Risk Management and Work Scheduling, and Instruction Number WCI-203, Weekly Surveillances/Work Scheduling, for treatment of post-fire safe shutdown equipment.
The team reviewed the licensees procedure STA-604, Configuration Risk Management and Work Scheduling, and Instruction Number WCI-203, Weekly Surveillances/Work Scheduling, for treatment of post-fire safe shutdown equipment.


Procedure STA-604 defined the Configuration Risk Management Program for assessing the risk impact of taking equipment out-of-service. The program included requirements for developing Contingency Plans which are approved plans of compensatory measures.
Procedure STA-604 defined the Configuration Risk Management Program for assessing the
 
risk impact of taking equipment out-of-service. The program included requirements for developing Contingency Plans which are approved plans of compensatory measures.


Detailed implementing instructions were provided in the licensees Instruction Number WCI-203. The licensees Configuration Risk Management program followed the guidance of NUMARC 93-01 which was endorsed by the NRC in Regulatory Guide 1.182, Assessing and Managing Risk Before Maintenance Activities at Nuclear Power Plants.
Detailed implementing instructions were provided in the licensees Instruction Number WCI-203. The licensees Configuration Risk Management program followed the guidance of NUMARC 93-01 which was endorsed by the NRC in Regulatory Guide 1.182, Assessing and Managing Risk Before Maintenance Activities at Nuclear Power Plants.
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Section (a)(4) of 10 CFR 50.65, Requirements for Monitoring the Effectiveness of Maintenance at Nuclear Power Plants, states, Before performing maintenance activities (including but not limited to surveillance, post-maintenance testing, and corrective and preventive maintenance), the licensee shall assess and manage the increase in risk that may result from the proposed maintenance activities. The scope of the assessment may be limited to structures, systems, and components that a risk-informed evaluation process has shown to be significant to public health and safety.
Section (a)(4) of 10 CFR 50.65, Requirements for Monitoring the Effectiveness of Maintenance at Nuclear Power Plants, states, Before performing maintenance activities (including but not limited to surveillance, post-maintenance testing, and corrective and preventive maintenance), the licensee shall assess and manage the increase in risk that may result from the proposed maintenance activities. The scope of the assessment may be limited to structures, systems, and components that a risk-informed evaluation process has shown to be significant to public health and safety.


Technical Specification 5.5.18, Configuration Risk Management Program (CRMP), stated in part, The Configuration Risk Management Program (CRMP) provides a proceduralized risk-informed assessment to manage the risk associated with equipment inoperability. The program applies to technical specification structures, systems, or components for which a risk-informed Completion Time has been granted. The program shall include the following elements: .... e. Provisions for considering other applicable risk significant contributors such as Level 2 issues, and external events, qualitatively or quantitatively. The team noted that external events includes fires.
Technical Specification 5.5.18, Configuration Risk Management Program (CRMP), stated in part, The Configuration Risk Management Program (CRMP) provides a proceduralized risk-informed assessment to manage the risk associated with equipment inoperability. The program applies to technical specification structures, systems, or components for which a risk-informed Completion Time has been granted. The program shall include the following elements:.... e. Provisions for considering other applicable risk significant contributors such as Level 2 issues, and external events, qualitatively or quantitatively. The team noted that
 
external events includes fires.


Additional NRC staff review was needed to determine whether the licensees practices were in compliance with 10 CFR 50.65(a)(4). This will be tracked as an unresolved item pending completion of this review. URI 05000445,446/2005008-02, Assessing and Managing Maintenance Risk for Post-Fire Safe Shutdown Equipment.
Additional NRC staff review was needed to determine whether the licensees practices were in compliance with 10 CFR 50.65(a)(4). This will be tracked as an unresolved item pending completion of this review. URI 05000445,446/2005008-02, Assessing and Managing Maintenance Risk for Post-Fire Safe Shutdown Equipment.


{{a|4OA2}}
{{a|4OA2}}
==4OA2 Problem Identification and Resolution==
==4OA2 Problem Identification and Resolution==
====a. Inspection Scope====
====a. Inspection Scope====
The team reviewed a sample of SmartForms to verify that the licensee was identifying fire protection-related issues at an appropriate threshold and entering those issues into the corrective action program. A listing of Smart Forms reviewed is provided in the attachment to this report.
The team reviewed a sample of SmartForms to verify that the licensee was identifying fire protection-related issues at an appropriate threshold and entering those issues into the corrective action program. A listing of Smart Forms reviewed is provided in the attachment to this report.
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No findings of significance were identified.
No findings of significance were identified.
  {{a|4OA6}}
  {{a|4OA6}}
==4OA6 Management Meetings==
==4OA6 Management Meetings==
Debrief Meeting Summary The team leader presented the inspection results to Mr. R. Flores, Vice President Nuclear Operations, and other members of licensee management at the conclusion of the onsite inspection on February 11, 2005.
Debrief Meeting Summary The team leader presented the inspection results to Mr. R. Flores, Vice President Nuclear Operations, and other members of licensee management at the conclusion of the onsite inspection on February 11, 2005.


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Exit Meeting On May 17, 2005, a telephone exit meeting was held with Mr. T. Hope, Manager, Regulatory Performance, and other licensee staff members, during which the team leader characterized the results of the inspection.
Exit Meeting On May 17, 2005, a telephone exit meeting was held with Mr. T. Hope, Manager, Regulatory Performance, and other licensee staff members, during which the team leader characterized the results of the inspection.


KEY POINTS OF CONTACT Licensee K. Apple, Fire Protection Maintenance Supervisor H. Beck, Fire Safe Shutdown Analysis O. Bhatty, IST Program R. Calder, Executive Assistant R. Flores, Vice President Nuclear Operations S. Harvey, Work Control Manager A. Hall, Operations Support Manager J. Hicks, Regulatory Affairs T. Hope, Regulatory Performance Manager V. Kaldenbach, AREVA - Fire Protection M. Killgore, Reactor Engineering Manager M. Lucas, Vice President Nuclear Engineering F. Madden, Director, Regulatory Affairs J. Meyer, Tech Support Manager W. Morrison, Maint Smart Team Manager D. Pendleton, Assistant to Senior Vice President L. Slaughter, INPO Project Coordinator R. Smith, Operations Manager S. Smith, System Engineering Manager J. Stone, Operations Procedures J. Taylor, Engineering Smart Team Manager C. Tran, Engineering Programs Manager R. Wakeman, Fire Protection Engineer M. Wisdom, Fire Protection System Engineer NRC D. Allen, Senior Resident Inspector ITEMS OPENED AND CLOSED Opened and Closed 05000445,446/2005008-01         URI   Operators Unable to Meet Some Critical Action Times During Alternative Shutdown Walkthrough (Section 1R05.6)05000445,446/2005008-02         URI   Assessing and Managing Maintenance Risk for Post-Fire Safe Shutdown Equipment (Section 1R05.11)
KEY POINTS OF CONTACT Licensee K. Apple, Fire Protection Maintenance Supervisor H. Beck, Fire Safe Shutdown Analysis O. Bhatty, IST Program R. Calder, Executive Assistant R. Flores, Vice President Nuclear Operations S. Harvey, Work Control Manager A. Hall, Operations Support Manager J. Hicks, Regulatory Affairs T. Hope, Regulatory Performance Manager V. Kaldenbach, AREVA - Fire Protection M. Killgore, Reactor Engineering Manager M. Lucas, Vice President Nuclear Engineering F. Madden, Director, Regulatory Affairs J. Meyer, Tech Support Manager W. Morrison, Maint Smart Team Manager D. Pendleton, Assistant to Senior Vice President L. Slaughter, INPO Project Coordinator R. Smith, Operations Manager S. Smith, System Engineering Manager J. Stone, Operations Procedures J. Taylor, Engineering Smart Team Manager C. Tran, Engineering Programs Manager R. Wakeman, Fire Protection Engineer M. Wisdom, Fire Protection System Engineer NRC D. Allen, Senior Resident Inspector ITEMS OPENED AND CLOSED Opened and Closed 05000445,446/2005008-01 URI Operators Unable to Meet Some Critical Action Times During Alternative Shutdown Walkthrough (Section
 
{{a|1R05}}
 
==1R05.6) 05000445,446/2005008-02 URI Assessing and Managing Maintenance Risk for Post-==
Fire Safe Shutdown Equipment (Section 1R05.11)
LIST OF  
LIST OF  


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and scope of the inspection.
and scope of the inspection.
CABLE ROUTING DATA
CABLE ROUTING DATA
Component               Component               Component             Component
Component
2-8701A                 2-8701B                 2-8702A               2-8702B
Component
2-8811A                 2-8811B                 2-8812A               2-8812B
Component
2-FI-4536A             2-FI-4537A               2-HV4776             2-LCV-0112B
Component
2-LCV-0112C             2-TE-0443A               2-TE-0413A             2-TE-0423A
2-8701A
2-8701B
2-8702A
2-8702B
2-8811A
2-8811B
2-8812A
2-8812B
2-FI-4536A
2-FI-4537A
2-HV4776
2-LCV-0112B
2-LCV-0112C
2-TE-0443A
2-TE-0413A
2-TE-0423A
CALCULATIONS
CALCULATIONS
Number                                     Title                           Revision
Number
2-FP-0006               Determination of the Pressure and Flow at the Fire             1
Title
Revision
2-FP-0006
Determination of the Pressure and Flow at the Fire
Pump Discharge
Pump Discharge
2-FP-0031               Hydraulic design calculation for the Unit 2 Safeguards         1
2-FP-0031
Hydraulic design calculation for the Unit 2 Safeguards
Building, 852' 6" Elevation, Electrical Equipment Room
Building, 852' 6" Elevation, Electrical Equipment Room
                        (2-103) Fire Protection System 334.783-4221
(2-103) Fire Protection System 334.783-4221
2-FP-0036               Hydraulic design calculation for the Unit 2 Safeguards         1
2-FP-0036
Hydraulic design calculation for the Unit 2 Safeguards
Building, 790' 6" (Rooms (2-063, 2-064, 2-070 and 2-
Building, 790' 6" (Rooms (2-063, 2-064, 2-070 and 2-
071), Fire Protection System 334.783-4101
071), Fire Protection System 334.783-4101
2-FP-0081               As-Built Combustible Loading Calculation Unit 2                2
2-FP-0081
As-Built Combustible Loading Calculation Unit 2
Safeguards Building
Safeguards Building
2-EE-0041               Ampacity of Firezone R Cable in Randomly Filled Tray           0
2-EE-0041
2-ME-0282               Fire Safe Shutdown Analysis CPSES Unit 2                       1
Ampacity of Firezone R Cable in Randomly Filled Tray
2-ME-0282
Fire Safe Shutdown Analysis CPSES Unit 2
CCN# 1
CCN# 1
EE-1E-2EB2-1           480 VAC Motor Control Center CP2-EPMCB-02 (2EB2-               4
EE-1E-2EB2-1
480 VAC Motor Control Center CP2-EPMCB-02 (2EB2-
1) Bus Based Calculation
1) Bus Based Calculation
TNE-EE-CA-0008-         Coordination Study - 480V Class IE Switchgear Buses            3
TNE-EE-CA-0008-
163
163
WCAP-11331             CPSES Thermal/Hydraulic Analysis of Fire Safe               31714
Coordination Study - 480V Class IE Switchgear Buses
WCAP-11331
CPSES Thermal/Hydraulic Analysis of Fire Safe
Shutdown Scenario
Shutdown Scenario
31714
DESIGN BASIS DOCUMENTS
DESIGN BASIS DOCUMENTS
Attachment
 
DBD-ME-001       CPSES Fire Protection Program                         6
DBD-ME-001
DBD-ME-020       Fire Safe Shutdown Analysis                           7
CPSES Fire Protection Program
DBD-EE-047       Lighting System                                       7
DBD-ME-020
DBD-EE-048       Communication System                                 11
Fire Safe Shutdown Analysis
DBD-ME-215       Diesel Fuel Oil Storage and Transfer System         11
DBD-EE-047
DBD-ME-311       Safety Chilled Water System                           1
Lighting System
DBD-EE-048
Communication System
DBD-ME-215
Diesel Fuel Oil Storage and Transfer System
DBD-ME-311
Safety Chilled Water System
DRAWINGS
DRAWINGS
Number                               Title                     Revision
Number
E1-0159           BOP Auxiliary Relay Rack 5 CP1-ECPRCR-14 External   CP-17
Title
Revision
E1-0159
BOP Auxiliary Relay Rack 5 CP1-ECPRCR-14 External
Connection Diagram
Connection Diagram
E2-0004, Sheet A 6.9 KV Auxiliaries One Line Diagram Safeguards     CP-18
CP-17
E2-0004, Sheet A
6.9 KV Auxiliaries One Line Diagram Safeguards
Buses
Buses
E2-0005           480V Auxiliaries - One Line Diagram - Safeguards   CP-12
CP-18
E2-0005
480V Auxiliaries - One Line Diagram - Safeguards
Buses
Buses
E2-0005, Sheet A 480V Auxiliaries - One Line Diagram - Safeguards   CP-14
CP-12
E2-0005, Sheet A
480V Auxiliaries - One Line Diagram - Safeguards
Buses
Buses
E2-0006           480V Auxiliaries - One Line Diagram - Normal Buses CP-10
CP-14
E2-0006, Sheet A 480V Auxiliaries - One Line Diagram - Normal Buses CP-11
E2-0006
E2-0007           Safeguard And Auxiliary Buildings - Safeguard 480V CP-24
480V Auxiliaries - One Line Diagram - Normal Buses
CP-10
E2-0006, Sheet A
480V Auxiliaries - One Line Diagram - Normal Buses
CP-11
E2-0007
Safeguard And Auxiliary Buildings - Safeguard 480V
MCCs - One Line Diagram
MCCs - One Line Diagram
E2-0007, Sheet A Safeguard And Auxiliary Buildings - Safeguard 480V CP-21
CP-24
E2-0007, Sheet A
Safeguard And Auxiliary Buildings - Safeguard 480V
MCCs - One Line Diagram
MCCs - One Line Diagram
E2-0007, Sheet B Safeguards and Auxiliary Buildings Safeguard 480V   CP-18
CP-21
E2-0007, Sheet B
Safeguards and Auxiliary Buildings Safeguard 480V
MCCs One Line Diagram
MCCs One Line Diagram
E2-0007, Sheet C Safeguard And Auxiliary Buildings - Safeguard 480V CP-25
CP-18
E2-0007, Sheet C
Safeguard And Auxiliary Buildings - Safeguard 480V
MCCs - One Line Diagram
MCCs - One Line Diagram
E2-0011           Safeguard And Auxiliary Buildings - Normal 480V     CP-15
CP-25
E2-0011
Safeguard And Auxiliary Buildings - Normal 480V
MCCs - One Line Diagram
MCCs - One Line Diagram
E2-0031, Sheet 07 6.9 KV Switchgear Bus 2EA2 Breaker 2EA2-2           CP-7
CP-15
E2-0031, Sheet 07
6.9 KV Switchgear Bus 2EA2 Breaker 2EA2-2
Schematic Diagram
Schematic Diagram
E2-0031, Sheet 08 6.9 KV Switchgear Bus 2EA2 Breaker 2EA2-2 Switch     CP-6
CP-7
E2-0031, Sheet 08
6.9 KV Switchgear Bus 2EA2 Breaker 2EA2-2 Switch
Development and Connection Diagram
Development and Connection Diagram
Attachment
CP-6
E2-0037, Sheet 05   Solenoid Operated Valve 2-FV-2456, Motor Driven         CP-4
 
E2-0037, Sheet 05
Solenoid Operated Valve 2-FV-2456, Motor Driven
Auxiliary Feedwater Pump-01 Recirculation Valve
Auxiliary Feedwater Pump-01 Recirculation Valve
E2-0037, Sheet 06   Solenoid Operated Valve 2-FV-2457, Motor Driven
CP-4
Auxiliary Feedwater Pump-02 Recirculation Valve         CP-1
E2-0037, Sheet 06
E2-0037, Sheet 12   Motor Operated Valve 2-HV-2480 - Service Water to       CP-2
Solenoid Operated Valve 2-FV-2457, Motor Driven
Auxiliary Feedwater Pump-02 Recirculation Valve
CP-1
E2-0037, Sheet 12
Motor Operated Valve 2-HV-2480 - Service Water to
Motor Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump-01
Motor Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump-01
E2-0037, Sheet 13   Motor Operated Valve 2-HV-2481 - Service Water to       CP-3
CP-2
E2-0037, Sheet 13
Motor Operated Valve 2-HV-2481 - Service Water to
Motor Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump-02
Motor Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump-02
E2-0053, Sheet 42A RHR Pump Room Fan 02 Tag CP2-VAAUSE-02                 CP-1
CP-3
E2-0061, Sheet 14   Motor Operated Valve 2-LCV-0112B - Volume Control       CP-4
E2-0053, Sheet 42A
RHR Pump Room Fan 02 Tag CP2-VAAUSE-02
CP-1
E2-0061, Sheet 14
Motor Operated Valve 2-LCV-0112B - Volume Control
Tank Outlet Isolation Valve
Tank Outlet Isolation Valve
E2-0061, Sheet 15   Motor Operated Valve 2-LCV-0112C - Volume Control       CP-5
CP-4
E2-0061, Sheet 15
Motor Operated Valve 2-LCV-0112C - Volume Control
Tank Outlet Isolation Valve
Tank Outlet Isolation Valve
E2-0061, Sheet 19   Air Operated Valve 2-LCV-0459 - Letdown Line           CP-5
CP-5
E2-0061, Sheet 19
Air Operated Valve 2-LCV-0459 - Letdown Line
Isolation Valve
Isolation Valve
E2-0061, Sheet 20   Air Operated Valve 2-LCV-0460 - Letdown Line           CP-4
CP-5
E2-0061, Sheet 20
Air Operated Valve 2-LCV-0460 - Letdown Line
Isolation Valve
Isolation Valve
E2-0061, Sheet 30   Air Operated Valve 2-8153 - Excess Letdown Line         CP-5
CP-4
E2-0061, Sheet 30
Air Operated Valve 2-8153 - Excess Letdown Line
Isolation
Isolation
E2-0061, Sheet 31   Air Operated Valve 2-8154 - Excess Letdown Line         CP-4
CP-5
E2-0061, Sheet 31
Air Operated Valve 2-8154 - Excess Letdown Line
Isolation
Isolation
E2-0062, Sheet 14   Motor Operated Valve 2-8807A - Suction Header Cross     CP-3
CP-4
E2-0062, Sheet 14
Motor Operated Valve 2-8807A - Suction Header Cross
Connect
Connect
E2-0062, Sheet 16   Motor Operated Valve 2-8808A - Accumulator Isolation   CP-3
CP-3
E2-0062, Sheet 16
Motor Operated Valve 2-8808A - Accumulator Isolation
Valve
Valve
E2-0063, Sheets 01 Motor Operated Valve 2-8701A - Residual Heat           CP-4
CP-3
& 01A              Removal Loop 1 Inlet Isolation Valve Connection
E2-0063, Sheets 01
& 01A
Motor Operated Valve 2-8701A - Residual Heat
Removal Loop 1 Inlet Isolation Valve Connection
Diagram
Diagram
E2-0063, Sheets 03, Motor Operated Valve 2-8702A - Residual Heat         CP-4, CP-
CP-4
03A, & 12          Removal Loop 1 Inlet Isolation Valve Connection     2, & CP-2
E2-0063, Sheets 03,
03A, & 12
Motor Operated Valve 2-8702A - Residual Heat
Removal Loop 1 Inlet Isolation Valve Connection
Diagram
Diagram
E2-0063, Sheets 02, Motor Operated Valve 2-8701B - Residual Heat         CP-4, CP-
CP-4, CP-
2A, & 11          Removal Loop 2 Inlet Isolation Valve Connection     2, & CP-2
2, & CP-2
E2-0063, Sheets 02,
2A, & 11
Motor Operated Valve 2-8701B - Residual Heat
Removal Loop 2 Inlet Isolation Valve Connection
Diagram
Diagram
E2-0063, Sheet 04   Motor Operated Valve 2-8702B - Residual Heat           CP-4
CP-4, CP-
2, & CP-2
E2-0063, Sheet 04
Motor Operated Valve 2-8702B - Residual Heat
Removal Loop 2 Inlet Isolation Valve Connection
Removal Loop 2 Inlet Isolation Valve Connection
Diagram
Diagram
Attachment
CP-4
E2-0192           Hot Shutdown Panel CP2-ECPRLV-01                     CP-3
 
M2-0206           Flow Diagram - Auxiliary Feedwater System           CP-14
E2-0192
M2-0206, Sheet 01 Flow Diagram - Auxiliary Feedwater System Pump       CP-9
Hot Shutdown Panel CP2-ECPRLV-01
CP-3
M2-0206
Flow Diagram - Auxiliary Feedwater System
CP-14
M2-0206, Sheet 01
Flow Diagram - Auxiliary Feedwater System Pump
Trains
Trains
M2-0206, Sheet 02 Flow Diagram - Auxiliary Feedwater System Yard       CP-6
CP-9
M2-0206, Sheet 02
Flow Diagram - Auxiliary Feedwater System Yard
Layout
Layout
M2-0229           Flow Diagram - Component Cooling Water System       CP-18
CP-6
M2-0232           Flow Diagram - Containment Spray System             CP-17
M2-0229
M2-0232, Sheet A Flow Diagram - Containment Spray System             CP-15
Flow Diagram - Component Cooling Water System
M2-0250           Flow Diagram - Reactor Coolant System               CP-17
CP-18
M2-0251           Flow Diagram - Reactor Coolant System               CP-18
M2-0232
M2-0253           Flow Diagram - Chemical and Volume Control System     CP-6
Flow Diagram - Containment Spray System
M2-0254           Flow Diagram - Chemical and Volume Control System - CP-19
CP-17
M2-0232, Sheet A
Flow Diagram - Containment Spray System
CP-15
M2-0250
Flow Diagram - Reactor Coolant System
CP-17
M2-0251
Flow Diagram - Reactor Coolant System
CP-18
M2-0253
Flow Diagram - Chemical and Volume Control System
CP-6
M2-0254
Flow Diagram - Chemical and Volume Control System -
Volume Control Tank Loop
Volume Control Tank Loop
M2-0255           Flow Diagram - Chemical and Volume Control System   CP-11
CP-19
M2-0260           Flow Diagram - Residual Heat Removal System         CP-16
M2-0255
M2-0261           Flow Diagram - Safety Injection System               CP-14
Flow Diagram - Chemical and Volume Control System
M2-0262           Flow Diagram - Safety Injection System               CP-17
CP-11
M2-0263           Flow Diagram - Safety Injection System               CP-12
M2-0260
M2-0263, Sheet A Flow Diagram - Safety Injection System               CP-7
Flow Diagram - Residual Heat Removal System
16345-EE(B)-099   Appendix R and Personnel Egress Emergency Lighting     0
CP-16
Attachment
M2-0261
Flow Diagram - Safety Injection System
CP-14
M2-0262
Flow Diagram - Safety Injection System
CP-17
M2-0263
Flow Diagram - Safety Injection System
CP-12
M2-0263, Sheet A
Flow Diagram - Safety Injection System
CP-7
16345-EE(B)-099
Appendix R and Personnel Egress Emergency Lighting
 
ENGINEERING REPORTS
ENGINEERING REPORTS
Number                                     Title                         Revision
Number
ER-EE-005             Assessment of Rockbestos One Hour Fire Rated Cable           0
Title
Revision
ER-EE-005
Assessment of Rockbestos One Hour Fire Rated Cable
at CPSES (Firezone R Cable)
at CPSES (Firezone R Cable)
ER-ME-067             Evaluation of Thermo-Lag Fire Barrier Systems               1
ER-ME-067
ER-ME-089             Resolution of NRC Information Notice IN-92-018,             0
Evaluation of Thermo-Lag Fire Barrier Systems
ER-ME-089
Resolution of NRC Information Notice IN-92-018,
Potential Loss of Remote Shutdown Capability
Potential Loss of Remote Shutdown Capability
Following Control Room Fire
Following Control Room Fire
PROBLEM IDENTIFICATION REPORTS - SmartForms (SMFs)
PROBLEM IDENTIFICATION REPORTS - SmartForms (SMFs)
SMF-2002-000395-00               SMF-2004-000622-00             SMF-2005-000316-00*
SMF-2002-000395-00
SMF-2002-002656-00               SMF-2004-002718-00             SMF-2005-000318-00*
SMF-2004-000622-00
SMF-2002-002874-00               SMF-2004-004095-00             SMF-2005-000335-00*
SMF-2005-000316-00*
SMF-2002-002937-00               SMF-2005-000197-01*           SMF-2005-000504-00*
SMF-2002-002656-00
SMF-2003-002620-00               SMF-2005-000251-00*           SMF-2005-000507-00*
SMF-2004-002718-00
SMF-2004-003908-00               SMF-2005-000263-00*           SMF-2005-000509-00*
SMF-2005-000318-00*
SMF-2003-003979-00               SMF-2005-000271-00*           SMF-2005-000515-00*
SMF-2002-002874-00
SMF-2004-004095-00
SMF-2005-000335-00*
SMF-2002-002937-00
SMF-2005-000197-01*
SMF-2005-000504-00*
SMF-2003-002620-00
SMF-2005-000251-00*
SMF-2005-000507-00*
SMF-2004-003908-00
SMF-2005-000263-00*
SMF-2005-000509-00*
SMF-2003-003979-00
SMF-2005-000271-00*
SMF-2005-000515-00*
SMF-2004-000048-00
SMF-2004-000048-00
* Issued due to inspection activities.
* Issued due to inspection activities.
PROCEDURES
PROCEDURES
Number                                     Title                         Revision
Number
ABN-301               Instrument Air System Malfunction                         10
Title
ABN-803B               Response To A Fire In The Control Room Or Cable             3
Revision
ABN-301
Instrument Air System Malfunction
ABN-803B
Response To A Fire In The Control Room Or Cable
Spreading Room
Spreading Room
ABN-804B               Response to Fire in the Safeguards Building                 2
ABN-804B
ABN-806B               Response To Fire In The Electrical Control Building         2
Response to Fire in the Safeguards Building
EOP-0.0B               Reactor Trip of Safety Injection                             1
ABN-806B
FIR-202               Fire Protection Inspections                                 4
Response To Fire In The Electrical Control Building
FPI-102B               Fire Preplan Instruction Manual - Unit 2 Safeguards         2
EOP-0.0B
Reactor Trip of Safety Injection
FIR-202
Fire Protection Inspections
FPI-102B
Fire Preplan Instruction Manual - Unit 2 Safeguards
Building - Elevation 790'-0"
Building - Elevation 790'-0"
Attachment
 
FPI-107B         Fire Preplan Instruction Manual - Unit 2 Safeguards           2
FPI-107B
Fire Preplan Instruction Manual - Unit 2 Safeguards
Building - Elevation 852' - Electrical Equipment Area &
Building - Elevation 852' - Electrical Equipment Area &
Feedwater Penetration Area
Feedwater Penetration Area
FPI-502           Fire Preplan Instruction Manual - Electrical & Control       1
FPI-502
Fire Preplan Instruction Manual - Electrical & Control
Building Unit 1 & 2 Battery Rooms, 792'-0" Elevations
Building Unit 1 & 2 Battery Rooms, 792'-0" Elevations
MSE-P0-5306       Emergency Lighting Unit Inspection                           6
MSE-P0-5306
OPT-216B         Remote Shutdown Operability Test                             8
Emergency Lighting Unit Inspection
OWI-203           Operations Department Management Periodic Reviews           10
OPT-216B
SOP-802           Control Room Ventilation                                     10
Remote Shutdown Operability Test
STA-604           Configuration Risk Management and Work Scheduling             6
OWI-203
STA-661           Non-Plant Equipment Storage and Use Inside Seismic           4
Operations Department Management Periodic Reviews
SOP-802
Control Room Ventilation
STA-604
Configuration Risk Management and Work Scheduling
STA-661
Non-Plant Equipment Storage and Use Inside Seismic
Category I Structures
Category I Structures
STA-722           Fire Protection Program                                       6
STA-722
STA-723           Fire Protection Systems/Equipment Requirements               5
Fire Protection Program
STA-729           Control of Transient Combustibles, Ignition Sources           7
STA-723
Fire Protection Systems/Equipment Requirements
STA-729
Control of Transient Combustibles, Ignition Sources
and Fire Watches
and Fire Watches
STA-738           Fire Protection /Systems/Equipment Impairments               6
STA-738
Fire Protection /Systems/Equipment Impairments
MISCELLANEOUS DOCUMENTS
MISCELLANEOUS DOCUMENTS
Number                               Title                           Revision
Number
Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station Fire                 36052
Title
Revision
Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station Fire
Protection Report Unit 1 and Unit 2
Protection Report Unit 1 and Unit 2
Comanche Peak Fire Induced Circuit Failure               -2004
36052
Comanche Peak Fire Induced Circuit Failure
Assessment
Assessment
Comanche Peak Performance Report                       December
-2004
Comanche Peak Performance Report
December
2004
2004
CPSES Self-       RIS 2004-03 Impact Assessment                            38244
CPSES Self-
Assessment Number
Assessment Number
SA-2004-058
SA-2004-058
LO44.SYS.FP1     CPSES Simulator Training Scenario                         38335
RIS 2004-03 Impact Assessment
244
LO44.SYS.FP1
CPSES Simulator Training Scenario
ABN-803 Scenario
ABN-803 Scenario
PO48.SYS.FP1     Instructor Lesson Plan                                   37384
38335
PO48.SYS.FP1
Instructor Lesson Plan
ABN-803/Fire in Control Room/Cable Spread Room
ABN-803/Fire in Control Room/Cable Spread Room
Attachment
37384
ER-EA-006           Individual Plant Examination of External Events       April 1995
 
ER-EA-006
Individual Plant Examination of External Events
Fire Evaluation for Comanche Peak Steam Electric
Fire Evaluation for Comanche Peak Steam Electric
Station
Station
ER-EA-008           Individual Plant Examination of External Events for   34870
April 1995
Severe Accident Vulnerabilities- Comanche Peak
ER-EA-008
Individual Plant Examination of External Events for
Severe Accident Vulnerabilities-Comanche Peak
Steam Electric Station
Steam Electric Station
EVAL-2004-003908-   Management and Control of Combustible Storage             0
34870
2-00                Areas
EVAL-2004-003908-
EVAL-2005-000263-   White Paper Addressing Post-Fire Safe Shutdown             0
2-00
01-00                Equipment Compensatory Actions
Management and Control of Combustible Storage
FSAR Section 9.5.1   Fire Protection System                               Amendment
Areas
Instruction No. FPI- U-1, Train A Diesel Generator & Equipment Elev.         3
EVAL-2005-000263-
104A                810' and Fuel Oil Day Tank Room Elev. 844'
01-00
Instruction No. WCI- CPSES Work Control Instruction Manual                     18
White Paper Addressing Post-Fire Safe Shutdown
203                  Weekly Surveillances / Work Scheduling
Equipment Compensatory Actions
Instruction No. WCI- Fluid Leak Management Process                              0
FSAR Section 9.5.1
Fire Protection System
Amendment
Instruction No. FPI-
104A
U-1, Train A Diesel Generator & Equipment Elev.
810' and Fuel Oil Day Tank Room Elev. 844'
Instruction No. WCI-
203
CPSES Work Control Instruction Manual
Weekly Surveillances / Work Scheduling
Instruction No. WCI-
607
607
NUMARC 93-01         Industry Guidelines for Monitoring the Effectiveness       3
Fluid Leak Management Process
NUMARC 93-01
Industry Guidelines for Monitoring the Effectiveness
of Maintenance at Nuclear Power Plants
of Maintenance at Nuclear Power Plants
Vendor Catalog W-1   Electroswitch Type W and W-2 Switches                 36038
Vendor Catalog W-1
50-445/87-22         NRC Inspection Report                                 32153
Electroswitch Type W and W-2 Switches
50-445/92-49         NRC Inspection Report                                 33973
36038
50-445;50-446/93-08 NRC Inspection Report                                 34022
50-445/87-22
23-ES-100         Appendix C Cable and Raceway Data System                 59
NRC Inspection Report
Attachment
2153
50-445/92-49
NRC Inspection Report
33973
50-445;50-446/93-08
NRC Inspection Report
34022
23-ES-100
Appendix C Cable and Raceway Data System
59
}}
}}

Latest revision as of 18:40, 15 January 2025

IR 05000445-05-008, IR 05000446-05-008; on 01/24/2005-05/17/2005; for Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station; Units 1 and 2, Fire Protection (Triennial)
ML051400145
Person / Time
Site: Comanche Peak  Luminant icon.png
Issue date: 05/19/2005
From: Laura Smith
Division of Reactor Safety IV
To: Blevins M
TXU Power
References
IR-05-008
Download: ML051400145 (24)
v • d • e


Text

May 19, 2005

SUBJECT:

COMANCHE PEAK STEAM ELECTRIC STATION, UNITS 1 and 2 - INSPECTION REPORT 05000445/2005008; 05000446/2005008

Dear Mr. Blevins:

On May 17, 2005, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at the Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station, Units 1 and 2. The enclosed report documents the inspection findings, which were discussed in a debrief meeting at the end of the onsite inspection on February 11, 2005, with Mr. R. Flores, Vice President Nuclear Operations, and other members of your staff and in a telephonic exit meeting with Mr. T. Hope, Manager, Regulatory Performance, and other members of your staff on May 17, 2005.

During this triennial fire protection inspection, the inspection team examined activities conducted under your license as they relate to safety and compliance with the Commissions rules and regulations and the conditions of your license. The inspection consisted of selected examination of procedures and records, observations of activities and installed plant systems, and interviews with personnel.

No findings of significance were identified during this inspection.

In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter, its enclosure, and your response will be made available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of NRCs document system (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).

Sincerely,

//RA// CFOKeefe for Linda Joy Smith, Chief Plant Engineering Branch Division of Reactor Safety Dockets: 50-445; 50-446 Licenses: NPF-87; NPF-89

TXU Power-2-

Enclosure:

NRC Inspection Report 50-445/05-08; 50-446/05-08

REGION IV==

Dockets:

05000445; 05000446 Licenses:

NPF-87; NPF-89 Report No.:

05000445/2005008; 05000446/2005008 Licensee:

TXU Power Facility:

Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station, Units 1 and 2 Location:

FM-56 Glen Rose, Texas Dates:

January 24 through May 17, 2005 Team Leader J. M. Mateychick, Senior Reactor Inspector, Plant Engineering Branch Inspectors:

P. Goldberg, Reactor Inspector, Plant Engineering Branch T. McConnell, Reactor Inspector, Plant Engineering Branch D. Overland, Reactor Inspector, Plant Engineering Branch Accompanying Personnel:

R. Mullikin, Consultant Approved By:

Linda Joy Smith, Chief Plant Engineering Branch Division of Reactor Safety

Enclosure

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

IR 05000445/05-08, IR 05000446/05-08; 01/11/2005-05/17/2005; Comanche Peak Steam

Electric Station; Units 1 and 2; Fire Protection (Triennial)

The NRC conducted an inspection with a team of five regional inspectors. The inspection identified two unresolved items. The significance of most findings is indicated by their color (Green, White, Yellow, Red) using IMC 0609 "Significance Determination Process." Findings for which the significance determination process does not apply are indicated by "No Color" or by the severity level of the applicable violation. The NRC described its program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors in NUREG-1649, "Reactor Oversight Process," Revision 3, dated July 2000.

Cornerstones: Initiating Events and Mitigating Systems No findings of significance were identified.

REPORT DETAILS

REACTOR SAFETY

1R05 Fire Protection

The purpose of this inspection was to review the Comanche Peak Steam Electric Stations fire protection program for selected risk-significant fire areas. Emphasis was placed on verification of the licensee's post-fire safe shutdown capability. The inspection was performed in accordance with the NRC regulatory oversight process using a risk-informed approach for selecting the fire areas and attributes to be inspected. The team used the Individual Plant Examination for External Events for the Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station to choose risk-significant areas for detailed inspection and review. Inspection Procedure 71111.05T, Fire Protection (Triennial), requires selecting three to five fire areas for review. The three areas reviewed during this inspection were:

1. Fire Area EC

Electrical and Control Building Unit 1 and Unit 2 Train B Battery Rooms Elevation 792'-0"

2. Fire Area SB

Unit 2 Safeguards Building General Areas Elevations 790'-6", 810'-6" and 831'-6" (Fire Zone 2SB4)

3. Fire Area SE

Unit 2 Safeguards Building Train B Electrical Equipment Areas Elevations 831'-6" and 852'-6" (Fire Zones 2SE16 and 2SE18)

For each of these fire areas, the inspection focused on fire protection features, systems and equipment necessary to achieve and maintain safe shutdown conditions, and licensing basis commitments.

Documents reviewed by the team are listed in the attachment.

.1 Shutdown From Outside Main Control Room

a. Inspection Scope

The team reviewed the functional requirements identified by the licensee as necessary for achieving and maintaining hot shutdown conditions to ensure that at least one post-fire safe shutdown success path was available in the event of fire in each of the selected areas and alternative shutdown for the case of control room evacuation. The team reviewed piping and instrumentation diagrams of systems credited in accomplishing safe shutdown functions to independently verify whether licensees shutdown methodology had properly identified the required components. The team focused on the following functions that must be available to achieve and maintain safe shutdown conditions:

  • Reactivity control capable of achieving and maintaining cold shutdown reactivity conditions,
  • Supporting systems capable of providing other services necessary to permit extended operation of equipment necessary to achieve and maintain hot shutdown conditions,
  • Verify that a safe shutdown can be achieved and maintained with and without off-site power.

A review was also conducted to ensure that all required components in the selected systems were included in the licensees safe shutdown analysis. The team identified the systems required for each of the primary safety functions necessary to achieve and maintain shutdown conditions. These systems were then evaluated to identify the systems that interfaced with the selected fire areas and were the most risk significant systems required for reaching hot shutdown conditions.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

.2 Protection of Safe Shutdown Capabilities

a. Inspection Scope

.

The team verified that at least one post-fire safe shutdown success path was free of fire damage in the event of a fire in the selected fire areas. Specifically, the team examined the separation of safe shutdown cables, equipment, and components within the same fire areas, and reviewed the licensee's methodology for meeting the requirements of 10 CFR 50.48, Appendix A to NRC Branch Technical Position 9.5-1, and 10 CFR 50, Appendix R Sections III.G, III.J, and III.O. In addition, the team reviewed license documentation, such as NRC safety evaluation reports, the Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station Updated Final Safety Evaluation Report, submittals made to the NRC by the licensee in support of the NRC's review of their fire protection program, and deviations from NRC regulations to verify that the licensee met license commitments.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

.3 Passive Fire Protection

a. Inspection Scope

.

For the selected fire areas, the team evaluated the adequacy of fire area barriers, penetration seals, fire doors, electrical raceway fire barriers and fire rated electrical cables.

The team observed the material condition and configuration of the installed barriers, seals, doors, and cables. The team compared the as-installed configurations to the approved construction details and supporting fire tests. In addition, the team reviewed license documentation, such as NRC safety evaluation reports, and deviations from NRC regulations and the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) code to verify that fire protection features met license commitments.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

.4 Active Fire Protection

a. Inspection Scope

.

For the selected fire areas, the team evaluated the adequacy of fire suppression and detection systems. The team observed the material condition and configuration of the installed fire detection and suppression systems. The team reviewed design documents and supporting calculations. In addition, the team reviewed license basis documentation, such as NRC safety evaluation reports, and deviations from NRC regulations and the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) codes to verify that fire suppression and detection systems met license commitments.

The team also observed an announced site fire brigade drill. Team members observed the fire brigade turnout, donning of protective gear, simulated fire fighting activities in the plant, communications between the fire brigade members and with operations personnel, operations support of fire brigade activities, and the licensees critique of the drill performance.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

.5 Protection From Damage From Fire Suppression Activities

a. Inspection Scope

For the sample areas, the team verified that redundant trains of systems required for hot shutdown were not subject to damage from fire suppression activities or from the rupture or inadvertent operation of fire suppression systems including the effects of flooding. The team also verified that where redundant trains of systems were located in the same fire area, the electrical cables of one train were protected.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

.6 Alternative Shutdown Capability

a. Inspection Scope

The team reviewed Procedure ABN-803B, Response To A Fire In The Control Room Or Cable Spreading Room, Revision 3. Procedure ABN-803B provided instructions for performing an alternative shutdown from the remote shutdown panel and for manipulating equipment locally in the plant. The team observed a timed walkthrough of the procedure with licensed and non-licensed operators to determine its adequacy to direct safe shutdown.

The team verified that the minimum number of available operators, exclusive of those required for the fire brigade, could reasonably be expected to perform the procedure actions within the applicable plant shutdown time requirements, and that equipment labeling was consistent with the procedure. The team verified that procedures, tools, dosimetry, keys, lighting, and communications equipment were available to support successfully performing the procedure as intended. The team also reviewed records for training conducted on this procedure.

The team reviewed the time-critical manual actions identified by the licensee as being necessary to support alternate shutdown from outside the control room. Calculations and analyses, which provided the bases for these critical times, were also reviewed. The simulated completion times recorded during the procedure walk-through were then compared to the analytical values to verify that the procedure could be implemented as intended.

b. Findings

Introduction.

The team identified several examples where simulated operator actions during a timed walkthrough of Procedure ABN-803B, Response To A Fire In The Control Room Or Cable Spreading Room, were not performed within the analyzed times of the Fire Safe Shutdown Analysis calculation, and that all actions were not able to be performed. This will be treated as an unresolved item (URI) pending a determination of significance and enforcement.

Description.

The team identified the following examples of inadequate procedural guidance for achieving post-fire safe shutdown following evacation of the control room by performing reviews and timed walkthroughs of Procedure ABN-803B.

A walkthrough of Procedure ABN-803B was timed by the NRC regional inspectors to observe the actions of the Shift Manager/Unit Supervisor, licensed control room operators and non-licensed plant equipment operators. The Shift Manager was unfamiliar with the location of keys needed to gain access to the Transfer Panels and Hot Shutdown Panels.

As a result, the crews of both units would have been delayed in transferring control.

Without access to the Hot Shutdown Panel and the Transfer Switch Panel, the mitigation of spurious actuations due to fire damage would not have been accomplished. The Licensee has modified the Controlled Keys key locker to replace the locking mechanism with a door latch and provided additional labeling to aid in locating the safe shutdown keys. Operations

Shift Orders were issued to train the operators on this issue and resulting changes.

During a timed performance of the alternate shutdown Procedure ABN-803B by NRC inspectors, approximately 1.5 minutes were required to perform the steps onside the control room prior to evacuation from the control room. The licensee verification and validation of Procedure ABN-803B did not account for the time that the operators need to perform their actions in the control room. This was inconsistent with the Fire Safe Shutdown

Analysis.

The safe shutdown analysis specified that operators must take actions to mitigate a spuriously open Power Operated Relief Valve within 3 minutes. However, the team observed that it took 4 minutes to accomplish these actions (not accounting for the delay in obtaining keys).

During the timed walkdown of Procedure ABN-803B with plant operators, it was noted that in Procedure ABN-803B attachment 4, step l, required the plant operator to ensure that the safety chiller was operating. The procedure did not provide the operator specific directions for restarting the safety chiller if not already running. The team observed that the equpment operator was unable to perform that step due to the lack of procedural detail.

Without the chiller operating, all personnel, all running Emergency Core Cooling System motors, and the sole operating emergency diesel generator would be subjected to elevated temperatures due to ventilation without cooling.

Procedure ABN-803B also did not adequately address potential fire damage to the public address and fire alarm systems in the event of a fire in the control room. The design basis document for the communication system stated that for a control room fire, the Gai-Tronics system could become inoperable. Procedure ABN-803B required the Shift Manager to make an announcement using the All Page function of the Gai-Tronics station in the control room, and to sound the fire alarm from the same location. The alternate station for the All Page function was the Technical Support Center (TSC). However, the TSC would be uninhabitable during a control room fire because it used the same ventilation system.

Licensee policy required the donning of flash protective gear when operating energized breakers in high voltage switchgear. The plant equipment operators were required to open the four reactor coolant pump breakers and to open the startup transformer breaker to mitigate the effects of spurious actuations. These were 6.9 kV breakers and would be energized and loaded during the performance of this procedure. The inspectors determined that the 3.5 minutes required for the plant equipment operator to don the protective gear and continue with the procedure did not allow accomplishment of subsequent actions within the times defined by the safe shutdown analysis.

Analysis.

The team determined that this finding had more than minor significance because the inadequate procedure impacted the mitigating systems cornerstone and affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of the system that responds to the event to prevent undesirable consequences. Additional analysis was needed from the licensee to determine the impact on plant conditions caused by not being able to meet some of the critical times specified in the safe shutdown analysis. This will be tracked as an unresolved item (URI) pending completion of that analysis and review by the NRC.

Enforcement.

The enforcement implications of this finding will be determined upon review of the additional analysis needed to determine the safety significance. This finding is identified as an unresolved item (URI 05000445,446/2005008-01, Operators Unable to Meet Some Critical Action Times During Alternative Shutdown Walkthrough).

.7 Circuit Analyses

a. Inspection Scope

The team reviewed the licensees post-fire safe shutdown analysis to verify that the licensee had identified both required and associated circuits that may impact safe shutdown. The NRC inspection of associated circuits had been the subject of a moratorium since November 2000, but was reinitiated in January 2005.

On a sample basis, the team verified that cables for equipment required to achieve and maintain hot shutdown conditions in the event of fire in selected fire zones had been properly identified. In addition, the team verified that these cables had either been adequately protected from the potentially adverse effects of fire damage, mitigated with approved manual operator actions, or analyzed to show that fire-induced faults (e.g., hot shorts, open circuits, and shorts to ground) would not prevent safe shutdown. In order to accomplish this, the team reviewed electrical schematics and cable routing data for power and control cables associated with each of the selected components.

Since the licensee utilized thermoset cables, the team reviewed the following cable failure modes for selected required and associated circuits:

  • Spurious actuations due to any combination of conductors within a single multiconductor cable
  • A maximum of two cables considered where multiple individual cables may be damaged by the same fire
  • For cases involving direct current control circuits, the potential spurious operation due to failures of the control cables.
  • For cases involving decay heat removal system isolation valves at high-pressure/low-pressure interfaces, the vulnerability of three-phase power cables due to three-phase proper polarity hot shorts.

In addition, on a sampling basis, the team reviewed the adequacy of selected electrical protective devices (e.g., circuit breakers, fuses, relays), breaker coordination, and the adequacy of electrical protection provided for nonessential cables which share a common enclosure (e.g., raceway, junction box, conduit, etc.) with cables of equipment required to achieve and maintain safe shutdown conditions.

For the selected fire areas, the team also reviewed the location and installation of diagnostic instrumentation that was necessary for achieving and maintaining safe shutdown conditions

to ensure that in the event of a fire, this instrumentation would remain functional.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

.8 Communications

a. Inspection Scope

The team reviewed the communication systems required to implement fire fighting and operations to achieve and maintain safe shutdown. The team verified the contents of the safe shutdown lockers, the availability of portable radios for the fire brigade and plant operators, the availability of the Gai-Tronics page/party system, the fire alarm tone generator system, and verified the adequacy of the radio repeater systems and ensured they would be available, operable, and adequate for the performance of safe shutdown functions. The team assessed the capability of the communication systems to support the operators in the conduct and coordination of their required actions.

b. Findings

Procedure ABN-803B, Response To A Fire In The Control Room Or Cable Spreading Room, required that the Shift Manager/ Unit Supervisor to make an All Page announcement in the event of a control room fire requiring evacuation of the control room.

The design basis document for the communications system, DBD-EE-048, identified that the Gai-Tronics system could be damaged by a control room fire. This finding is discussed in Section 1R05.6.

.9 Emergency Lighting

a. Inspection Scope

The team reviewed the emergency lighting system required for safe shutdown activities in the selected fire areas to verify it was adequate for supporting the performance of manual actions required to achieve and maintain hot shutdown conditions. The team evaluated the adequacy of emergency lighting for access and egress routes to the areas where manual actions were required in Procedure ABN-803B, Response to a Fire in the Control Room or Cable Spreading Room, Revision 3, at control stations and plant parameter monitoring locations. The team reviewed repetitive tasks for testing and test data trending to verify that the individual battery operated units were capable of supplying sufficient illumination. The team reviewed that the batteries had at least an 8-hour capacity. The team reviewed that the operability testing and maintenance of the lighting units followed licensee procedures and accepted industry practices and were consistent with the manufacturers recommendations.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

.10 Cold Shutdown Repairs

a. Inspection Scope

The team reviewed licensee procedures to determine whether repairs were required to achieve cold shutdown and to verify that the repair material was available on the site. The team verified that the licensee had pre-staged equipment necessary to perform the repairs, as required by procedure. The team also evaluated whether cold shutdown could be achieved within the required time using the licensee's procedures and repair methods.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

.11 Compensatory Measures

a. Inspection Scope

The team reviewed the licensees program with respect to compensatory measures in place for out-of-service, degraded, or inoperable fire protection and post-fire safe shutdown equipment, systems or features.

The team reviewed Procedures STA-722, Fire Protection Program; STA-723, Fire Protection Systems/Equipment Requirements; and STA-738, Fire Protection/Systems/Equipment Impairments to determine whether the procedures adequately controlled compensatory measures for fire protection systems, equipment and features (e.g., detection and suppression systems and equipment, and passive fire barriers).

The team reviewed Procedure STA-604, Configuration Risk Management and Work Scheduling, and Instruction Number WCI-203, Weekly Surveillances/Work Scheduling, to determine whether the procedures adequately controlled compensatory measures for out-of-service, degraded, or inoperable post-fire safe shutdown equipment, systems or features.

b. Findings

Introduction.

The team identified an unresolved item involving the adequacy of assessing and managing increases in risk due to out-of-service, degraded, or inoperable post-fire safe shutdown equipment, systems or features.

Description.

The team reviewed the licensees procedure STA-604, Configuration Risk Management and Work Scheduling, and Instruction Number WCI-203, Weekly Surveillances/Work Scheduling, for treatment of post-fire safe shutdown equipment.

Procedure STA-604 defined the Configuration Risk Management Program for assessing the

risk impact of taking equipment out-of-service. The program included requirements for developing Contingency Plans which are approved plans of compensatory measures.

Detailed implementing instructions were provided in the licensees Instruction Number WCI-203. The licensees Configuration Risk Management program followed the guidance of NUMARC 93-01 which was endorsed by the NRC in Regulatory Guide 1.182, Assessing and Managing Risk Before Maintenance Activities at Nuclear Power Plants.

The licensee considered that the fire protection program minimized the risk of a significant fire. Therefore, potential fire events were neither imminent nor have a high probability of occurring during the planned out-of-service duration and do not have to be considered in the risk assessment. The licensee entered the issue into their corrective action program for further evaluation as SmartForm SMF-2005-000263-00.

The licensee identified the equipment to be used for the post-fire safe shutdown and demonstrated by analysis that one train of the required equipment would remain free from fire damage in each fire area. For multiple fire areas, only one train of equipment would be available to perform the post-fire safe shutdown function, therefore, taking that equipment out-of-service would increase the risk of core damage due to fire events above that estimated in the IPEEE.

As an example, consider a plan to remove Centrifugal Charging Pump 2-01 from service for maintenance. Technical Specification 3.5.2, ECCS-Operating, allows a centrifugal charging pump to be inoperable for 7 days. The required action is to restore the pump to operable status within 7 days. For Fire Areas EM, EN and EO, which include the control room, the only high pressure makeup source assured to be free from fire damage and available for the post-fire safe shutdown is Centrifugal Charging Pump 2-01. There would be some increase in risk due to possible fires in these areas, since this was the only high pressure makeup source available. This increase in risk should be assessed and managed.

Analysis.

The safety significance of this issue will be determined upon completion of the enforcement assesment.

Enforcement.

Section (a)(4) of 10 CFR 50.65, Requirements for Monitoring the Effectiveness of Maintenance at Nuclear Power Plants, states, Before performing maintenance activities (including but not limited to surveillance, post-maintenance testing, and corrective and preventive maintenance), the licensee shall assess and manage the increase in risk that may result from the proposed maintenance activities. The scope of the assessment may be limited to structures, systems, and components that a risk-informed evaluation process has shown to be significant to public health and safety.

Technical Specification 5.5.18, Configuration Risk Management Program (CRMP), stated in part, The Configuration Risk Management Program (CRMP) provides a proceduralized risk-informed assessment to manage the risk associated with equipment inoperability. The program applies to technical specification structures, systems, or components for which a risk-informed Completion Time has been granted. The program shall include the following elements:.... e. Provisions for considering other applicable risk significant contributors such as Level 2 issues, and external events, qualitatively or quantitatively. The team noted that

external events includes fires.

Additional NRC staff review was needed to determine whether the licensees practices were in compliance with 10 CFR 50.65(a)(4). This will be tracked as an unresolved item pending completion of this review. URI 05000445,446/2005008-02, Assessing and Managing Maintenance Risk for Post-Fire Safe Shutdown Equipment.

4OA2 Problem Identification and Resolution

a. Inspection Scope

The team reviewed a sample of SmartForms to verify that the licensee was identifying fire protection-related issues at an appropriate threshold and entering those issues into the corrective action program. A listing of Smart Forms reviewed is provided in the attachment to this report.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

4OA6 Management Meetings

Debrief Meeting Summary The team leader presented the inspection results to Mr. R. Flores, Vice President Nuclear Operations, and other members of licensee management at the conclusion of the onsite inspection on February 11, 2005.

At the conclusion of this meeting, the team leader confirmed to the licensee's management that materials examined during the inspection considered to be proprietary had been returned to the licensee.

Exit Meeting On May 17, 2005, a telephone exit meeting was held with Mr. T. Hope, Manager, Regulatory Performance, and other licensee staff members, during which the team leader characterized the results of the inspection.

KEY POINTS OF CONTACT Licensee K. Apple, Fire Protection Maintenance Supervisor H. Beck, Fire Safe Shutdown Analysis O. Bhatty, IST Program R. Calder, Executive Assistant R. Flores, Vice President Nuclear Operations S. Harvey, Work Control Manager A. Hall, Operations Support Manager J. Hicks, Regulatory Affairs T. Hope, Regulatory Performance Manager V. Kaldenbach, AREVA - Fire Protection M. Killgore, Reactor Engineering Manager M. Lucas, Vice President Nuclear Engineering F. Madden, Director, Regulatory Affairs J. Meyer, Tech Support Manager W. Morrison, Maint Smart Team Manager D. Pendleton, Assistant to Senior Vice President L. Slaughter, INPO Project Coordinator R. Smith, Operations Manager S. Smith, System Engineering Manager J. Stone, Operations Procedures J. Taylor, Engineering Smart Team Manager C. Tran, Engineering Programs Manager R. Wakeman, Fire Protection Engineer M. Wisdom, Fire Protection System Engineer NRC D. Allen, Senior Resident Inspector ITEMS OPENED AND CLOSED Opened and Closed 05000445,446/2005008-01 URI Operators Unable to Meet Some Critical Action Times During Alternative Shutdown Walkthrough (Section

1R05.6) 05000445,446/2005008-02 URI Assessing and Managing Maintenance Risk for Post-

Fire Safe Shutdown Equipment (Section 1R05.11)

LIST OF

DOCUMENTS REVIEWED

The following documents were selected and reviewed by the team to accomplish the objectives

and scope of the inspection.

CABLE ROUTING DATA

Component

Component

Component

Component

2-8701A

2-8701B

2-8702A

2-8702B

2-8811A

2-8811B

2-8812A

2-8812B

2-FI-4536A

2-FI-4537A

2-HV4776

2-LCV-0112B

2-LCV-0112C

2-TE-0443A

2-TE-0413A

2-TE-0423A

CALCULATIONS

Number

Title

Revision

2-FP-0006

Determination of the Pressure and Flow at the Fire

Pump Discharge

2-FP-0031

Hydraulic design calculation for the Unit 2 Safeguards

Building, 852' 6" Elevation, Electrical Equipment Room

(2-103) Fire Protection System 334.783-4221

2-FP-0036

Hydraulic design calculation for the Unit 2 Safeguards

Building, 790' 6" (Rooms (2-063, 2-064, 2-070 and 2-

071), Fire Protection System 334.783-4101

2-FP-0081

As-Built Combustible Loading Calculation Unit 2

Safeguards Building

2-EE-0041

Ampacity of Firezone R Cable in Randomly Filled Tray

2-ME-0282

Fire Safe Shutdown Analysis CPSES Unit 2

CCN# 1

EE-1E-2EB2-1

480 VAC Motor Control Center CP2-EPMCB-02 (2EB2-

1) Bus Based Calculation

TNE-EE-CA-0008-

163

Coordination Study - 480V Class IE Switchgear Buses

WCAP-11331

CPSES Thermal/Hydraulic Analysis of Fire Safe

Shutdown Scenario

31714

DESIGN BASIS DOCUMENTS

DBD-ME-001

CPSES Fire Protection Program

DBD-ME-020

Fire Safe Shutdown Analysis

DBD-EE-047

Lighting System

DBD-EE-048

Communication System

DBD-ME-215

Diesel Fuel Oil Storage and Transfer System

DBD-ME-311

Safety Chilled Water System

DRAWINGS

Number

Title

Revision

E1-0159

BOP Auxiliary Relay Rack 5 CP1-ECPRCR-14 External

Connection Diagram

CP-17

E2-0004, Sheet A

6.9 KV Auxiliaries One Line Diagram Safeguards

Buses

CP-18

E2-0005

480V Auxiliaries - One Line Diagram - Safeguards

Buses

CP-12

E2-0005, Sheet A

480V Auxiliaries - One Line Diagram - Safeguards

Buses

CP-14

E2-0006

480V Auxiliaries - One Line Diagram - Normal Buses

CP-10

E2-0006, Sheet A

480V Auxiliaries - One Line Diagram - Normal Buses

CP-11

E2-0007

Safeguard And Auxiliary Buildings - Safeguard 480V

MCCs - One Line Diagram

CP-24

E2-0007, Sheet A

Safeguard And Auxiliary Buildings - Safeguard 480V

MCCs - One Line Diagram

CP-21

E2-0007, Sheet B

Safeguards and Auxiliary Buildings Safeguard 480V

MCCs One Line Diagram

CP-18

E2-0007, Sheet C

Safeguard And Auxiliary Buildings - Safeguard 480V

MCCs - One Line Diagram

CP-25

E2-0011

Safeguard And Auxiliary Buildings - Normal 480V

MCCs - One Line Diagram

CP-15

E2-0031, Sheet 07

6.9 KV Switchgear Bus 2EA2 Breaker 2EA2-2

Schematic Diagram

CP-7

E2-0031, Sheet 08

6.9 KV Switchgear Bus 2EA2 Breaker 2EA2-2 Switch

Development and Connection Diagram

CP-6

E2-0037, Sheet 05

Solenoid Operated Valve 2-FV-2456, Motor Driven

Auxiliary Feedwater Pump-01 Recirculation Valve

CP-4

E2-0037, Sheet 06

Solenoid Operated Valve 2-FV-2457, Motor Driven

Auxiliary Feedwater Pump-02 Recirculation Valve

CP-1

E2-0037, Sheet 12

Motor Operated Valve 2-HV-2480 - Service Water to

Motor Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump-01

CP-2

E2-0037, Sheet 13

Motor Operated Valve 2-HV-2481 - Service Water to

Motor Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump-02

CP-3

E2-0053, Sheet 42A

RHR Pump Room Fan 02 Tag CP2-VAAUSE-02

CP-1

E2-0061, Sheet 14

Motor Operated Valve 2-LCV-0112B - Volume Control

Tank Outlet Isolation Valve

CP-4

E2-0061, Sheet 15

Motor Operated Valve 2-LCV-0112C - Volume Control

Tank Outlet Isolation Valve

CP-5

E2-0061, Sheet 19

Air Operated Valve 2-LCV-0459 - Letdown Line

Isolation Valve

CP-5

E2-0061, Sheet 20

Air Operated Valve 2-LCV-0460 - Letdown Line

Isolation Valve

CP-4

E2-0061, Sheet 30

Air Operated Valve 2-8153 - Excess Letdown Line

Isolation

CP-5

E2-0061, Sheet 31

Air Operated Valve 2-8154 - Excess Letdown Line

Isolation

CP-4

E2-0062, Sheet 14

Motor Operated Valve 2-8807A - Suction Header Cross

Connect

CP-3

E2-0062, Sheet 16

Motor Operated Valve 2-8808A - Accumulator Isolation

Valve

CP-3

E2-0063, Sheets 01

& 01A

Motor Operated Valve 2-8701A - Residual Heat

Removal Loop 1 Inlet Isolation Valve Connection

Diagram

CP-4

E2-0063, Sheets 03,

03A, & 12

Motor Operated Valve 2-8702A - Residual Heat

Removal Loop 1 Inlet Isolation Valve Connection

Diagram

CP-4, CP-

2, & CP-2

E2-0063, Sheets 02,

2A, & 11

Motor Operated Valve 2-8701B - Residual Heat

Removal Loop 2 Inlet Isolation Valve Connection

Diagram

CP-4, CP-

2, & CP-2

E2-0063, Sheet 04

Motor Operated Valve 2-8702B - Residual Heat

Removal Loop 2 Inlet Isolation Valve Connection

Diagram

CP-4

E2-0192

Hot Shutdown Panel CP2-ECPRLV-01

CP-3

M2-0206

Flow Diagram - Auxiliary Feedwater System

CP-14

M2-0206, Sheet 01

Flow Diagram - Auxiliary Feedwater System Pump

Trains

CP-9

M2-0206, Sheet 02

Flow Diagram - Auxiliary Feedwater System Yard

Layout

CP-6

M2-0229

Flow Diagram - Component Cooling Water System

CP-18

M2-0232

Flow Diagram - Containment Spray System

CP-17

M2-0232, Sheet A

Flow Diagram - Containment Spray System

CP-15

M2-0250

Flow Diagram - Reactor Coolant System

CP-17

M2-0251

Flow Diagram - Reactor Coolant System

CP-18

M2-0253

Flow Diagram - Chemical and Volume Control System

CP-6

M2-0254

Flow Diagram - Chemical and Volume Control System -

Volume Control Tank Loop

CP-19

M2-0255

Flow Diagram - Chemical and Volume Control System

CP-11

M2-0260

Flow Diagram - Residual Heat Removal System

CP-16

M2-0261

Flow Diagram - Safety Injection System

CP-14

M2-0262

Flow Diagram - Safety Injection System

CP-17

M2-0263

Flow Diagram - Safety Injection System

CP-12

M2-0263, Sheet A

Flow Diagram - Safety Injection System

CP-7

16345-EE(B)-099

Appendix R and Personnel Egress Emergency Lighting

ENGINEERING REPORTS

Number

Title

Revision

ER-EE-005

Assessment of Rockbestos One Hour Fire Rated Cable

at CPSES (Firezone R Cable)

ER-ME-067

Evaluation of Thermo-Lag Fire Barrier Systems

ER-ME-089

Resolution of NRC Information Notice IN-92-018,

Potential Loss of Remote Shutdown Capability

Following Control Room Fire

PROBLEM IDENTIFICATION REPORTS - SmartForms (SMFs)

SMF-2002-000395-00

SMF-2004-000622-00

SMF-2005-000316-00*

SMF-2002-002656-00

SMF-2004-002718-00

SMF-2005-000318-00*

SMF-2002-002874-00

SMF-2004-004095-00

SMF-2005-000335-00*

SMF-2002-002937-00

SMF-2005-000197-01*

SMF-2005-000504-00*

SMF-2003-002620-00

SMF-2005-000251-00*

SMF-2005-000507-00*

SMF-2004-003908-00

SMF-2005-000263-00*

SMF-2005-000509-00*

SMF-2003-003979-00

SMF-2005-000271-00*

SMF-2005-000515-00*

SMF-2004-000048-00

  • Issued due to inspection activities.

PROCEDURES

Number

Title

Revision

ABN-301

Instrument Air System Malfunction

ABN-803B

Response To A Fire In The Control Room Or Cable

Spreading Room

ABN-804B

Response to Fire in the Safeguards Building

ABN-806B

Response To Fire In The Electrical Control Building

EOP-0.0B

Reactor Trip of Safety Injection

FIR-202

Fire Protection Inspections

FPI-102B

Fire Preplan Instruction Manual - Unit 2 Safeguards

Building - Elevation 790'-0"

FPI-107B

Fire Preplan Instruction Manual - Unit 2 Safeguards

Building - Elevation 852' - Electrical Equipment Area &

Feedwater Penetration Area

FPI-502

Fire Preplan Instruction Manual - Electrical & Control

Building Unit 1 & 2 Battery Rooms, 792'-0" Elevations

MSE-P0-5306

Emergency Lighting Unit Inspection

OPT-216B

Remote Shutdown Operability Test

OWI-203

Operations Department Management Periodic Reviews

SOP-802

Control Room Ventilation

STA-604

Configuration Risk Management and Work Scheduling

STA-661

Non-Plant Equipment Storage and Use Inside Seismic

Category I Structures

STA-722

Fire Protection Program

STA-723

Fire Protection Systems/Equipment Requirements

STA-729

Control of Transient Combustibles, Ignition Sources

and Fire Watches

STA-738

Fire Protection /Systems/Equipment Impairments

MISCELLANEOUS DOCUMENTS

Number

Title

Revision

Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station Fire

Protection Report Unit 1 and Unit 2

36052

Comanche Peak Fire Induced Circuit Failure

Assessment

-2004

Comanche Peak Performance Report

December

2004

CPSES Self-

Assessment Number

SA-2004-058

RIS 2004-03 Impact Assessment

244

LO44.SYS.FP1

CPSES Simulator Training Scenario

ABN-803 Scenario

38335

PO48.SYS.FP1

Instructor Lesson Plan

ABN-803/Fire in Control Room/Cable Spread Room

37384

ER-EA-006

Individual Plant Examination of External Events

Fire Evaluation for Comanche Peak Steam Electric

Station

April 1995

ER-EA-008

Individual Plant Examination of External Events for

Severe Accident Vulnerabilities-Comanche Peak

Steam Electric Station

34870

EVAL-2004-003908-

2-00

Management and Control of Combustible Storage

Areas

EVAL-2005-000263-

01-00

White Paper Addressing Post-Fire Safe Shutdown

Equipment Compensatory Actions

FSAR Section 9.5.1

Fire Protection System

Amendment

Instruction No. FPI-

104A

U-1, Train A Diesel Generator & Equipment Elev.

810' and Fuel Oil Day Tank Room Elev. 844'

Instruction No. WCI-

203

CPSES Work Control Instruction Manual

Weekly Surveillances / Work Scheduling

Instruction No. WCI-

607

Fluid Leak Management Process

NUMARC 93-01

Industry Guidelines for Monitoring the Effectiveness

of Maintenance at Nuclear Power Plants

Vendor Catalog W-1

Electroswitch Type W and W-2 Switches

36038

50-445/87-22

NRC Inspection Report

2153

50-445/92-49

NRC Inspection Report

33973

50-445;50-446/93-08

NRC Inspection Report

34022

23-ES-100

Appendix C Cable and Raceway Data System

59

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