IR 05000321/2008004

IR 05000321-08-004, 05000366-08-004; 05000321-08-501, 05000366-08-501, on 07/01/2008 - 09/30/2008, Edwin I. Hatch, Units 1 and 2, Routine Integrated Report

ML083020164
Person / Time
Site:	Hatch, 07200036
Issue date:	10/28/2008
From:	Scott Shaeffer NRC/RGN-II/DRP/RPB2
To:	Madison D Southern Nuclear Operating Co
References
IR-08-004, IR-08-501
Download: ML083020164 (28)

Text

October 28, 2008

SUBJECT:

EDWIN I. HATCH NUCLEAR PLANT - NRC INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000321/2008004, 05000366/2008004, 05000321/2008501 AND, 05000366/2008501

Dear Mr. Madison:

On September 30, 2008, U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at your Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2. The enclosed integrated inspection report documents the inspection results, which were discussed on October 20, 2008, with you and other members of your staff.

The inspection examined activities conducted under your license as they relate to safety and compliance with the Commissions rules and regulations and with the conditions of your license.

The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel.

Based on the results of this inspection, no findings of significance were identified. However, licensee-identified violations, which were determined to be of very low safety significance, are listed in this report. The NRC is treating these violations as a non-cited violations (NCVs)

consistent with Section VI.A.1 of the NRC Enforcement Policy because of the very low safety significance of the violations and because they were entered into your corrective action program. If you contest these NCVs, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN.: Document Control Desk, Washington DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region II; the Director, Office of Enforcement, United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001; and the NRC resident inspector at the Edwin I.

Hatch Nuclear Plant.

SNC

In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRCs Rules of Practice, a copy of this letter, its enclosures, and your response (if any) will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of the NRCs document system (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).

Sincerely,

/RA/

Scott M. Shaeffer, Chief Reactor Projects Branch 2 Division of Reactor Projects

Docket Nos.: 50-321, 50-366, 72-36 License Nos.: DPR-57, NPF-5

Enclosures:

Inspection Report 05000321/2008004, 05000366/2008004,

05000321/2008501, 05000366/2008501 w/Attachment: Supplemental Information

REGION II==

Docket Nos.:

50-321, 50-366,72-036

License Nos.:

DPR-57 and NPF-5

Report Nos.:

05000321/2008004, 05000366/2008004

05000321/2008501, 05000366/2008501

Licensee:

Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc.

Facility:

Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant

Location:

Baxley, Georgia 31513

Dates:

July 1 - September 30, 2008

Inspectors:

J. Hickey, Senior Resident Inspector P. Niebaum, Resident Inspector A. Rao, Reactor Inspector B. Caballero, Operations Engineer (Section 1R11)

P. Capehart, Operations Engineer (Section 1R11)

L Miller, Senior Emergency Preparedness Inspector, (Sections 1EP2, 1EP3, 1EP4, 1EP5, 4OA1, and 4OA5)

E. Michel, Senior Reactor Inspector (Section 4OA5)

Approved by:

Scott M. Shaeffer, Chief

Reactor Projects Branch 2

Division of Reactor Projects

Enclosure

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

IR 05000321/2008-004, 05000366/2008-004; 05000321/2008501, 05000366/2008501; 07/01/2008-09/30/2008; Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2, Routine integrated report

The report covered a three-month period of inspection by resident inspectors, two reactor inspectors, two operations engineers, and a senior emergency preparedness inspector. The NRC's program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described in NUREG-1649, Reactor Oversight Process (ROP),

Revision 4, dated December 2006.

NRC-Identified and Self-Revealing Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

Licensee-Identified Violations

A violation of very low safety significance, which was identified by the licensee, has been reviewed by the inspectors. Corrective actions taken or planned by the licensee have been entered into the licensees corrective action program. This violation and corrective actions are listed in Section 4OA7 of this report.

REPORT DETAILS

Summary of Plant Status

Unit 1 began the period at 100% Rated Thermal Power (RTP). On July 4, a reactor scram occurred during testing of the hydraulic system that controls the main turbine control valves. Unit 1 was returned to 100% RTP on July 11. On September 6, reactor power was reduced to 13% RTP while the main generator was taken off line for stator cooling water system repairs. Unit 1 was returned to 100% RTP on September 11 and remained there through the end of the reporting period.

Unit 2 began the inspection period at full RTP and remained at or near 100% for the remainder of the inspection period.

REACTOR SAFETY

Cornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, and Barrier Integrity

==1R01 Adverse Weather

a. Inspection Scope

External Flooding.==

The inspectors performed a review of the licensees readiness to cope with external flooding and performed walk downs of the intake structure to verify that equipment was in place to mitigate the potential impacts from external flooding. The inspectors reviewed licensee procedure 34AB-Y22-002-0, Naturally Occurring Phenomena, to verify guidance existed to cope with an external flood. Additionally, the inspectors reviewed licensee documentation that shows design flood levels for area containing safety-related equipment. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.

Imminent Weather Conditions. The inspectors performed a review of the licensees readiness to cope with the following two adverse weather events. The inspectors performed walk downs to verify that equipment and materials stored on the site were properly secured. The inspectors responded to the control room during the tornado warning event to verify implementation of station adverse weather procedures.

Additionally, the inspectors reviewed licensee procedure 34AB-Y22-002-0, Naturally Occurring Phenomena to verify guidance existed to cope with impending adverse weather. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.

• Tropical Storm Fay preparations, August 19-20

• Tornado Warning for Toombs County, August 22

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

==1R04 Equipment Alignment

a. Inspection Scope

Partial Walkdowns.==

The inspectors performed partial walkdowns of the following three systems when the opposite trains were removed from service or after completing maintenance. The inspectors checked system valve positions, electrical breaker positions, and operating switch positions to evaluate the operability of the opposite trains or components by comparing the position listed in the system operating procedure to the actual position. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.

• Unit 2 B train of the Residual Heat Removal (RHR) system

• Unit 2 A train of the Core Spray (CS) system

• Unit 2 B train of the CS system

Complete System Walkdown. The inspectors performed a complete walkdown of the following system. The inspectors performed a detailed check of electrical breaker positions, and operating switch positions to evaluate the operability of the system or components by comparing the required position in the system operating procedure to the actual position. The inspectors also interviewed personnel and reviewed control room logs to verify that alignment and equipment discrepancies were being identified and appropriately resolved. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.

• Unit 1 600 volt Safety Related Buses C and D.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

==1R05 Fire Protection

a. Inspection Scope

Fire Area Tours.==

The inspectors toured the following four risk significant plant areas to assess the material condition of the fire protection and detection equipment, verify fire protection equipment was not obstructed and that transient combustibles were properly controlled. The inspectors reviewed the Fire Hazards Analysis drawings H-11846 and H-11847 to verify that the necessary fire fighting equipment, such as fire extinguishers, hose stations, ladders, and communications equipment, was in place. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.

• Unit 1 Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) Rooms

• Unit 1 Vital Area Switchgear Rooms

• Unit 2 EDG Rooms

• Unit 2 Vital Area Switchgear Rooms Fire Drill Observation. The inspectors observed a fire drill conducted on August 28. The inspectors reviewed licensee procedure 34AB-X43-001-1, Fire Procedure, and the drill scenario to verify proper response of the on-shift fire brigade to a simulated fire. The inspectors checked proper use of protective clothing, self contained breathing apparatus, fire fighting equipment, fire pre-plans, proper fire fighting strategy including smoke removal and fire propagation checks, communications, command and control, and coordination with offsite fire company support. In addition, the inspectors attended the post-drill critique to assess if the licensee identified performance issues were comparable to those identified by the inspectors.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

==1R11 Licensed Operator Requalification

a. Inspection Scope

Resident Quarterly Observation.==

The inspectors observed the performance of licensee simulator scenario LT-SG-51083-05, which included a recirculation pump speed decrease, a Main Steam Line break resulting in a Group 1 isolation and reactor scram, an inadvertent start signal to the High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) system; and an unisolable HPCI steam leak requiring an emergency depressurization of the reactor vessel. The inspectors reviewed licensee procedures 10AC-MGR-019-0, Procedure Use and Adherence, and DI-OPS-59-0896, Operations Management Expectations, to verify formality of communication, procedure usage, alarm response, control board manipulations, group dynamics, and supervisory oversight. The inspectors attended the post-exercise critique of operator performance to assess if the licensee identified performance issues were comparable to those identified by the inspectors. In addition, the inspectors reviewed the critique results from previous training sessions to assess performance improvement.

Licensed Operator Requalification. The inspectors reviewed documentation, interviewed licensee personnel, and observed the administration of operating tests associated with the licensees operator requalification program to assess the effectiveness of the licensee in implementing requalification requirements identified in 10 CFR Part 55, Operators Licenses. The evaluations were also performed to determine if the licensee effectively implemented operator requalification guidelines established in NUREG-1021, Operator Licensing Examination Standards for Power Reactors. The inspectors also evaluated the licensees simulation facility for adequacy for use in operator licensing examinations using ANSI/ANS-3.5-1985, American National Standard for Nuclear Power Plant Simulators for use in Operator Training and Examination. The inspectors observed four crews during the performance of the operating tests. Documentation reviewed included written examinations, job performance measures, simulator scenarios, licensee procedures, on-shift records, simulator change request records and performance test records, the feedback process, licensed operator qualification records, remediation plans, watch standing records, and medical records. The records were inspected using the criteria listed in Inspection Procedure 71111.11. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

==1R12 Maintenance Effectiveness

a. Inspection Scope

==

The inspectors reviewed the following two samples associated with structures, systems, and components to assess the licensees implementation of the Maintenance Rule (10 CFR 50.65) with respect to the characterization of failures and the appropriateness of the associated (a)

(1) or (a)

(2) classification. The inspectors reviewed operator logs, associated CRs, Maintenance Work Orders (MWO), and the licensees procedures for implementing the Maintenance Rule to determine if equipment failures were being identified, properly assessed, and corrective actions established to return the equipment to a satisfactory condition. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.

• Unit 1 Reactor Core Isolation Cooling System

• Unit 2 Train A RHR System

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

==1R13 Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Evaluation

a. Inspection Scope

==

The inspectors reviewed the following Plan of the Day documents listed below to verify that risk assessments were performed prior to components being removed from service.

The inspectors reviewed the risk assessment and risk management controls implemented for these activities to verify they were completed in accordance with licensee procedure 90AC-OAM-002-0, Scheduling Maintenance, and 10 CFR 50.65 (a)(4). For emergent work, the inspectors assessed whether any increase in risk was promptly assessed and that appropriate risk management actions were implemented.

• July 26 through August 1, 1B Reactor Building Closed Cooling Water (RBCCW) Heat Exchanger maintenance, 2B RBCCW Heat Exchanger maintenance, Low River Level Intake plugging risk, Unit-1 RCIC Outage

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

==1R15 Operability Evaluations

a. Inspection Scope

==

The inspectors reviewed the following five operability evaluations and compared the evaluations to the system requirements identified in the Technical Specification (TS) and the Final Safety Analysis Report to ensure operability was adequately assessed and the system or component remained available to perform its intended function. Also, the inspectors assessed the adequacy of compensatory measures implemented as a result of the condition. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.

• Unit 2 HPCI room cooler accumulated dust in discharge

• Unit 2 B EDG sequencer timing card failure

• Unit 2 A RHR Pump degraded flow

• Unit 1 Control room Air Handling Unit 1Z41B003C blown fuse

• EDG speed droop set at 50 during testing

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

==1R18 Plant Modifications

a. Inspection Scope

==

The inspectors reviewed the following three plant modifications to ensure that safety functions of important safety systems have not been affected. Also, the inspectors verified that the design bases, licensing bases and performance capability of risk significant structures, systems and components have not been degraded through modifications. The inspectors verified that any modifications performed during increased risk-significant configurations did not place the plant in an unsafe condition. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.

Permanent Plant Modification

• ED 2081618501, Replacement Bus Bars and Insulators For RHR Service Water (RHRSW) Pump Motor Surgepack

Temporary Plant Modifications

• 2-08-003, Non-standard lifting lug baseplate dimensions due to rebar interference to support lifting the 2A EDG inner cooler covers

• 1-08-016, 1E11F031A 1A RHR Pump Discharge Check Valve disc modification

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

==1R19 Post Maintenance Testing

a. Inspection Scope

==

For the following six post maintenance tests, the inspectors reviewed the test scope to verify the test demonstrated the work performed was completed correctly and the affected equipment was functional and operable in accordance with TS requirements.

The inspectors also reviewed equipment status and alignment to verify the system or component was available to perform the required safety function. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.

• 1B21F022D, Main Steam Isolation Valve hydraulic accumulator repair

• 2P41F036B, RHR/CS Room Cooler Plant Service Water Supply Valve replacement

• 2E11N007B, RHRSW Heat Exchanger B Inlet Flow Transmitter replacement

• 1C11D001-126, Scram Valve Seat replacement

• 2E11F005C, RHRSW Pump Discharge Check Valve inspection

• 2P41F339A, 2A EDG PSW Supply Valve rebuild

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

==1R20 Refueling and Outage Activities

a. Inspection Scope

==

On July 4, a Unit 1 reactor scram occurred during turbine hydraulic control system testing. The inspectors reviewed the licensees forced outage plan, monitored shutdown activities, licensee control of outage activities, and monitored the activities listed below.

Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.

• Reactor Coolant System cooldown following shutdown to verify the cooldown rate did not exceed TS limits

• TS and licensee procedures to verify mode change requirements were met

• Plant startup, heatup, and power ascension

• Licensee identification and resolution of problems related to outage activities

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

==1R22 Surveillance Testing

a. Inspection Scope

==

The inspectors reviewed licensee surveillance test procedures and either witnessed the test or reviewed test records for the following five surveillances to determine if the scope of the test adequately demonstrated the affected equipment was operable. The inspectors reviewed these activities to assess for preconditioning of equipment, procedure adherence, and equipment alignment following completion of the surveillance.

The inspectors reviewed licensee procedure AG-MGR-21-0386, Evolution and Pre-and Post-Job Brief Guidance, and attended selected briefings to determine if procedure requirements were met. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.

Surveillance Tests

• 34SV-E41-002-2, Unit-2 HPCI Pump Operability Test

• 34SV-E11-001-2, Unit-2 B Loop RHR Pump Operability Test

• 34SV-C11-006-1S, Control Rod Drive (CRD) Withdraw Stall Flow Test

In-Service Test

• 34SV-E41-002-1, Unit-1 HPCI Pump Operability Test

Reactor Coolant Leakage Test

• 34SV-SUV-019-2, Drywell Floor-drain Leakage Surveillance Checks

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

Cornerstone: Emergency Preparedness

1EP2 Alert and Notification System Testing

a. Inspection Scope

The inspector evaluated the adequacy of licensee=s methods for testing the alert and notification system in accordance with NRC Inspection Procedure 71114, Attachment 02, AAlert and Notification System Evaluation@. The applicable planning standard 10 CFR Part 50.47(b)(5) and its related 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.D requirements were used as reference criteria. The criteria contained in NUREG-0654, Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power Plants, Revision 1, was also used as a reference. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment. This inspection activity satisfied one inspection sample for the alert and notification system on a biennial basis.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1EP3 Emergency Response Organization Augmentation

a. Inspection Scope

The inspector reviewed the licensee=s Emergency Response Organization (ERO)augmentation staffing requirements and process for notifying the ERO to ensure the readiness of key staff for responding to an event and timely facility activation. The qualification records of key position ERO personnel were reviewed to ensure all ERO qualifications were current. A sample of problems identified from augmentation drills or system tests performed since the last inspection were reviewed to assess the effectiveness of corrective actions. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.

The inspection was conducted in accordance with NRC Inspection Procedure 71114, 03, Emergency Response Organization Staffing and Augmentation System.

The applicable planning standard (PS), 10 CFR 50.47(b)(2) and its related 10 CFR 50, Appendix E requirements were used as reference criteria. This inspection activity satisfied one inspection sample for the ERO staffing and augmentation system on a biennial basis.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1EP4 Emergency Action Level and Emergency Plan Changes

a. Inspection Scope

Since the last NRC inspection of this program area, Revision 27 of the Hatch Emergency Plan was implemented based on the licensees determination, in accordance with 10 CFR 50.54(q), that the changes resulted in no decrease in the effectiveness of the Plan, and that the revised Plan continued to meet the requirements of 10 CFR 50.47(b) and Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50. The inspector conducted a sampling review of the Plan changes and implementing procedure changes made between September 2007 and June 2008 to evaluate for potential decreases in effectiveness of the Plan. However, this review was not documented in a Safety Evaluation Report and does not constitute formal NRC approval of the changes. Therefore, these changes remain subject to future NRC inspection in their entirety. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.

The inspection was conducted in accordance with NRC Inspection Procedure 71114, 04, Emergency Action Level and Emergency Plan Changes. The applicable PS, 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4) and its related 10 CFR 50, Appendix E requirements were used as reference criteria. This inspection activity satisfied one inspection sample for the emergency action level and emergency plan changes on an annual basis.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1EP5 Correction of Emergency Preparedness Weaknesses and Deficiencies

a. Inspection Scope

The inspector reviewed the corrective actions identified through the Emergency Preparedness program to determine the significance of the issues and to determine if repeat problems were occurring. The facility=s self-assessments and audits were reviewed to assess the licensee=s ability to be self-critical, thus avoiding complacency and degradation of their emergency preparedness program. In addition, inspector reviewed licensee=s self-assessments and audits to assess the completeness and effectiveness of all emergency preparedness related corrective actions. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.

The inspection was conducted in accordance with NRC Inspection Procedure 71114, 05, Correction of Emergency Preparedness Weaknesses. The applicable planning standard, 10 CFR 50.47(b)(14) and its related 10 CFR 50, Appendix E requirements were used as reference criteria. This inspection activity satisfied one inspection sample for the correction of emergency preparedness weaknesses on a biennial basis.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1EP6 Drill Evaluation

a. Inspection Scope

During the following drill, the inspectors observed licensee activities in the simulator, Technical Support Center and Operations Support Center to verify implementation of licensee procedure 10AC-MGR-006-0, Hatch Emergency Plan. The inspectors reviewed the classification of the simulated events and the development of protective action recommendations to verify these activities were conducted in accordance with licensee procedure 73EP-EIP-001-0, Emergency Classification and Initial Actions. The inspectors also reviewed licensee procedure 73EP-EIP-073-0, Onsite Emergency Notification, to verify the proper offsite notifications were made. The inspectors attended the post-exercise critique to assess the licensees effectiveness in identifying areas of improvement. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.

• Emergency Plan Drill conducted on July 23, 2008

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

4OA1 Performance Indicator Verification

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed a sample of the licensee submittals for the performance indicators (PIs) listed below to verify the accuracy of the data reported. The PI definitions and the guidance contained in NEI 99-02, Regulatory Assessment Indicator Guideline, Rev. 2 and licensee procedure 00AC-REG-005-0S, Preparation and Reporting of NRC PI Data, were used to verify procedure and reporting requirements were met.

Cornerstone: Initiating Events

• Unplanned Scrams per 7000 Critical Hours

• Unplanned Scrams with Complications

• Unplanned Transients per 7000 Critical Hours

Cornerstone: Barrier Integrity

• Reactor Coolant System Leakage

• Reactor Coolant System Activity

The inspectors reviewed raw PI data collected since September 2007 for the Initiating Events and Barrier Integrity indicators identified. The inspectors compared graphical representations from the most recent PI report to the raw data to verify the data was included in the report. The inspectors also examined a sampling of operations logs and procedures to verify the PI data was appropriately captured for inclusion into the PI report, and the individual PIs were calculated correctly. The inspectors observed a chemistry technician perform a sample of the reactor coolant system and a portion of the analysis in accordance with licensee procedure 64CH-SAM-025-0, Reactor Coolant Sampling and

Analysis.

Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.

Cornerstone: Emergency Preparedness

• Emergency Response Organization Drill/Exercise Performance

• Emergency Response Organization Readiness

• Alert and Notification System Reliability

The inspectors reviewed portions of the raw PI data developed from monthly performance indicator reports and discussed the methods for compiling and reporting the PIs with cognizant emergency preparedness personnel. The inspector also independently screened drill and exercise opportunity evaluations, drill participation reports, and drill evaluations. Selected reported values were calculated to verify their accuracy. The inspectors compared graphical representations from the most recent PI report to the raw data to verify that the data was correctly reflected in the report.

Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment to this report.

4OA2 Identification and Resolution of Problems

.1 Daily Screening of Corrective Action Items

As required by Inspection Procedure 71152, Identification and Resolution of Problems, and in order to help identify repetitive equipment failures or specific human performance issues for follow-up, the inspectors performed a daily screening of items entered into the licensees corrective action program. This review was accomplished by either attending daily screening meetings that briefly discussed major Condition Reports (CR), or accessing the licensees computerized corrective action database and reviewing each CR that was initiated.

.2 Annual Sample

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors performed a detailed review of the following CR to verify the full extent of the issue was identified, an appropriate evaluation was performed, and appropriate corrective actions were specified and prioritized. The inspectors evaluated the CR against the licensees corrective action program as delineated in licensee procedure NMP-GM-002, Corrective Action Program, and 10 CFR 50, Appendix B. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.

• CR 2008105108 2A RHRSW Pump degraded flow on two separate occasions due to a snake becoming entangled in the pump impeller.

b. Findings and Observations

No findings of significance were identified. The root cause was comprehensive and thorough. Six causes were identified and six corrective actions have either been taken or are planned. The extent of condition review included previous events related to river debris and other foreign material being ingested into the RHRSW Pumps.

4OA3 Event Follow-up

.1 (Closed) Licensee Event Report (LER) 05000366/2007-003 Excessive Leakage on

Secondary containment Bypass Valves Due to Foreign Material

On March 1, 2007 both the inboard and outboard drywell floor drain sump isolation valves failed local leakrate testing (LLRT). This resulted in a bypass of the secondary containment boundary. The cause of the LLRT failure was foreign material intrusion into the valves. This condition was documented in CR 2007102669. A licensee-identified violation is described in Section 4OA7.

.2 (Closed) LER 05000366/2008-002 Reactor Scram on Low Water Level due to loss of

Condensate System

The contents of this LER have been withheld from disclosure in accordance with 10 CFR 2.390(d). The residents reviewed this LER and no findings of significance were identified.

.3 Unit 2 Reactor Scram during testing of the hydraulic turbine control system

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors responded to the site on July 4, 2008, and verified the licensee actions in response to the reactor scram were in accordance with Emergency, Abnormal, and Normal Operating Procedures. The inspectors verified the cause of the scram was understood, reviewed chart recorders, operating logs and attended event response meetings.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

4OA5 Other Activities

.1 Quarterly Resident Inspector Observations of Security Personnel and Activities

a. Inspection Scope

During the inspection period, the inspectors conducted observations of security force personnel and activities to ensure that the activities were consistent with licensee security procedures and regulatory requirements relating to nuclear plant security.

These observations took place during both normal and off-normal plant working hours.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

.2 Operation of an Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation (ISFSI)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed selected ISFSI operations to verify that the licensee performed ISFSI activities safely and in compliance with approved procedures. The inspectors reviewed records to verify that the licensee had properly identified the parameter of each fuel assembly loaded, and that a physical inventory had been performed on all spent fuel in the ISFSI on a frequency of at least every 12 months. The inspectors also reviewed the TS to verify that the fuel placed in these casks met the requirements. The inspectors walked down the ISFSI pads to assess the material condition of the casks, the installation of security equipment, and the performance of monitoring systems. The inspectors also reviewed ISFSI document control practices to verify that any changes to the required ISFSI procedures were performed in accordance with guidelines established in local procedures and 10CFR72.48. Documents reviewed are listed in the

.

• Licensing Document Change Request 2008-022 DC, Dry Cask Storage - 10 CFR 72.212 Report - Revision for 2008 Loading Campaign

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

.3 (Discussed) Temporary Instruction (TI) 2515/176, Emergency Diesel Generator

Technical Specification Surveillance Requirements Regarding Endurance and Margin Testing

a. Inspection Scope

The objective of this TI was to gather information to assess the adequacy of nuclear power plant emergency diesel generator (EDG) endurance and margin testing as prescribed by plant-specific technical specifications (TS). The inspector interfaced with the appropriate station staff to obtain the information specified in Attachment 1 of the TI Worksheet. The TI applies to all operating nuclear power reactor licensees that use EDGs as the onsite standby power supply. The inspector verified the accuracy of the information by review of TS, EDG Design Basis Event (DBE) loading calculations, EDG endurance run test procedures, test data from the last three endurance tests performed on each EDG, EDG ratings, and EDG operating history. The information gathered will be forwarded to Nuclear Reactor Regulation/Division of Engineering/Electrical Engineering Branch (NRR/DE/EEEB) for further review to assess the adequacy and consistency of EDG testing at nuclear stations.

b. Findings and Observations

The TI is presently scheduled to be open until August 31, 2009, pending completion of the NRR/DE/EEEB review.

.4 (Closed) Temporary Instruction (TI) 2515/175, Emergency Response Organization,

Drill/Exercise Performance Indicator, Program Review

The inspector completed Temporary Instruction TI 2515/175, Emergency Response Organization, Drill/Exercise Performance Indicator, Program Review. Appropriate documentation of the results was provided to the NRC, as required by the TI.

.5 (Closed) Unresolved Item (URI)05000321/2008002-01, RHRSW Hanger Failures

The inspectors reviewed the licensees Root Cause Evaluation as documented in CR2008102081, RCCA Version 1.0, 03-31-08; and the Failure Analysis Report for RHRSW hangers H98 and H291 as documented in Log Number 08-MR-023. The regulatory aspects are dispositioned in Section 4OA7.

4OA6 Meetings, Including Exit

On October 20, 2008, the inspectors presented the inspection results to Mr. Dennis Madison and the other members of his staff who acknowledged the observations. The inspectors confirmed proprietary information was not provided or examined during the inspection.

4OA7 Licensee-Identified Violations

The following violations of very low safety significance (Green) were identified by the licensee and are violations of NRC requirements which meet the criteria of Section VI of the NRC Enforcement Policy, NUREG-1600, for being dispositioned as NCVs.

• 10 CFR 50 Appendix B Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings states in part that Activities affecting quality shall be prescribed by documented instructions, procedures,.. appropriate to the circumstances and shall be accomplished in accordance with these instructions, procedures, Contrary to this on March 1, 2007, the licensee determined both the inboard and outboard drywell floordrain sump isolation valves failed their LLRT due to foreign material intrusion. This finding is of very low safety significance because the overall penetration leakage was small compared to the primary containment volume. This finding was entered in the licensees corrective action program under CR 2007102669.

• 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control states, in part, that the design control measures shall provide for verifying or checking the adequacy of design, such as by the performance of design reviews, by the use of alternate or simplified calculation methods, or by the performance of a suitable testing program. Contrary to the above, the licensee did not adequately evaluate, or use other means to demonstrate, that the RHRSW flow control valves operating in the normal flow regimes would not cause cavitation and subsequent vibration such that the RHRSW piping hangers would remain functional. This finding is of very low safety significance because a subsequent operability determination demonstrated that there was no loss of RHRSW system safety function capability. This finding was entered into the licensees corrective action program as CR2008101568.

ATTACHMENT:

SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION

KEY POINTS OF CONTACT

Licensee personnel

S. Bargeron, Plant Manager

G Brinson, Operations Manager

J. Dixon, Health Physics Manager

B. Goodwin, Design Manager

S. Grantham, Operations Training Supervisor

J. Hammond, Training Manager

G. Johnson, Site Engineering Manager

J. Lewis, Site Support Manager

D. Madison, Hatch Vice President

R. Ott, Emergency Preparedness Supervisor

S. Soper, Engineering Support Manager

J. Thompson, Nuclear Security Manager

S. Tipps, Licensing Principal Engineer

K. Underwood, Performance Improvement Supervisor

R. Varnadore, Maintenance Manager

LIST OF ITEMS

DISCCUSED AND CLOSED

Discussed

2515/176

TI Emergency Diesel Generator Technical Specification Surveillance Requirements Regarding Endurance and Margin Testing (Section 4OA5.3)

Closed

05000366/2007-003 LER Excessive Leakage on Secondary Containment Bypass Valves due to Foreign Material (Section 4OA3.1)

05000366/2008-002 LER Reactor Scram on Low Water Level due to loss of Condensate System (Section 4OA3.2)

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TI Emergency Response Organization, Drill/Exercise Performance Indicator, Program Review (Section 4OA5.4)

05000321/2008002-01 URI RHRSW Hanger Failures (Section 4OA5.5)