ML040060764

IR 05000206-03-010; 05000361-03-010; 05000362-03-010; 07200041-03-001; on 08/4/2003 - 10/01/2003; Southern California Edison Co., San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station; Units 1, 2, 3. ISFSI Report. No Violations. Cover Letter, 01/06/2004

ML040060764
Person / Time
Site:	San Onofre
Issue date:	01/06/2004
From:	Spitzberg D NRC/RGN-IV/DNMS/FCDB
To:	Ray H Southern California Edison Co
References
-RFPFR IR-03-001, IR-03-010
Download: ML040060764 (17)

See also: IR 05000206/2003010

Text

January 6, 2004

Mr. Harold B. Ray, Executive Vice President

Southern California Edison Co.

San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station

P.O. Box 128

San Clemente, California 92674-0128

SUBJECT:

NRC INSPECTION REPORT 50-206/03-10; 50-361/03-10; 50-362/03-10;

72-41/03-01 FOR THE PRE-OPERATIONAL TESTING AND FIRST CANISTER

LOADING AT THE INDEPENDENT SPENT FUEL STORAGE INSTALLATION

Dear Mr. Ray:

NRC inspections were conducted between June 26 and October 1, 2003, at your San Onofre

nuclear generating station to evaluate the dry cask storage activities for your Independent Spent

Fuel Storage Installation (ISFSI). These inspections included observation of activities associated

with your pre-operational testing program and the loading of your first canister. The inspections

were conducted to confirm compliance of your program and activities with the requirements

specified in the license, technical specifications, Final Safety Analysis Report, the NRCs Safety

Evaluation Report and 10 CFR Part 72. The enclosed report presents the results of these

inspections. The inspections found that activities were being performed in accordance with

procedural and regulatory requirements. No violations of NRC regulations were identified.

In accordance with 10 CFR 2.790 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter, its

enclosure, and your response (if any) will be made available electronically for public inspection in

the NRC Public Document Room or from the NRCs document system (ADAMS), accessible from

the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html. To the extent possible, your

response should not include any personal privacy, proprietary, or safeguards information so that it

can be made available to the Public without redaction.

Should you have any questions concerning this inspection, please contact the undersigned at

(817) 860-8191 or Mr. Vincent Everett, Senior Health Physicist, at (817) 860-8198.

Sincerely,

/RA/

D. Blair Spitzberg, Ph.D., Chief

Fuel Cycle and Decommissioning Branch

Docket Nos.: 50-206; 50-361; 50-362; 72-41

License Nos.: DPR-13; NPF-10; NPF-15

Southern California Edison Company

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Enclosure:

NRC Inspection Report

50-206/03-10; 50-361/03-10; 50-362/03-10; 72-41/03-01

cc w/enclosure:

Dwight E. Nunn, Vice President

Southern California Edison Company

San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station

P.O. Box 128

San Clemente, California 92674-0128

Michael R. Olson

San Onofre Liaison

San Diego Gas & Electric Company

P.O. Box 1831

San Diego, California 92112-4150

Mayor

City of San Clemente

100 Avenida Presidio

San Clemente, California 92672

Chairman, Board of Supervisors

County of San Diego

1600 Pacific Highway, Room 335

San Diego, California 92101

Ed Bailey, Radiation Program Director

Radiologic Health Branch

State Department of Health Services

P.O. Box 942732 (MS 178)

Sacramento, California 94327-7320

David Spath, Chief

Division of Drinking Water and

Environmental Management

P.O. Box 942732

Sacramento, California 94234-7320

James D. Boyd, Commissioner

California Energy Commission

1516 Ninth Street (MS 34)

Sacramento, California 95814

Southern California Edison Company

-3-

Douglas K. Porter, Esq.

Southern California Edison Company

2244 Walnut Grove Avenue

Rosemead, California 91770

Gary L. Nolff

Power Projects/Contracts Manager

Riverside Public Utilities

2911 Adams Street

Riverside, California 92504

Eileen M. Teichert, Esq.

Supervising Deputy City Attorney

City of Riverside

3900 Main Street

Riverside, California 92522

Dr. Raymond Waldo

Southern California Edison Company

San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station

P.O. Box 128

San Clemente, California 92674-0128

A. Edward Scherer

Southern California Edison

San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station

P.O. Box 128

San Clemente, California 92674-0128

Joseph J. Wambold, Vice President

Southern California Edison Company

San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station

P.O. Box 128

San Clemente, California 92764-0128

Southern California Edison Company

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bcc w/enclosure (via ADAMS e-mail distribution):

EECollins

DBSpitzberg

KMKennedy

SCOConnor

ERZiegler

CCOsterholtz

MASitek

RRTemps

ABBarto

JFMelfi

JDParrott

RJEvans

WCSifre

RVAzua

TWDexter

EMGarcia

FCDB

NBHolbrook

RIV Materials Docket Files - 5th Floor

ADAMS: :Yes

9No Initials: JVE

Publicly Available 9Non-Publicly Available

9Sensitive

Non-Sensitive

DOCUMENT NAME: s:\\dnms\\fcdb\\jve\\So1-2003-010 jve.wpd final r:\\_so1\\So1-2003-10.wpd

RIV:DNMS:FCDB

FCDB

FCDB

FCDB

JVEverett

EMGarcia

RJEvans

TWDexter

/RA/

/RA JVEverett via E/

/RA JVEverett via E/

/RA JVEverett via E/

12/18/03

12/22/03

12/18/03

12/18/03

NMSS:DWM:HLWB

NMSS:SFPO

DRP:PBC

DRP:PBC

JDParrott

RRTemps

JFMelfi

MASitek

/RA JVEverett via E/

/RA JVEverett via E/

/RA JVEverett via E/

/RA JVEverett via E/

12/16/03

12/17/03

12/15/03

1/6/04

DRP:PBC

DRS:EMB

NMSS:SFPO

C:FCDB

RVAzua

WCSifre

ABBarto

DBSpitzberg

/RA JVEverett via E/

/RA JVEverett via E/

/RA JVEverett via E/

/RA/

12/29/03

12/18/03

12/30/03

1/6/04

OFFICIAL RECORD COPY

T=Telephone E=E-mail F=Fax

ENCLOSURE

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION IV

Docket Nos.:

50-206; 50-361; 50-362; 72-41

License Nos.: DPR-13; NPF-10; NPF-15

Report No:

50-206/03-10; 50-361/03-10; 50-362/03-10; 72-41/03-01

Licensee:

Southern California Edison Co.

P.O. Box 128

San Clemente, California 92674

Facility:

San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station

Location:

San Clemente, California

Dates:

June 26 - 28, 2003 (Heavy loads demonstration)

August 4 - 8, 2003 (Pre-operational demonstration - Initial Inspection)

August 18 - 19, 2003 (Pre-operational demonstration - Final)

September 10 - 15, 2003 (First cask loading - Initial Inspection)

September 28 - October 1, 2003 (First cask loading - Final)

Inspectors:

J. V. Everett, Team Leader, Region IV

R. R. Temps, Safety Inspector, NRC Spent Fuel Project Office

J. F. Melfi, Resident Inspector, Palo Verde Nuclear Station

R. J. Evans, P.E., C.H.P, Senior Health Physicist, Region IV

J. D. Parrott, Senior On-Site Representative, NRC Las Vegas Office

M. A. Sitek, Resident Inspector, San Onofre Nuclear Station

W. C. Sifre, Reactor Inspector, Region IV

A. B. Barto, Nuclear Engineer, NRC Spent Fuel Project Office

R. V. Azua, Project Engineer, Region IV

T. W. Dexter, Security Consultant

E. M. Garcia, Health Physicist, Region IV

Approved By: D. Blair Spitzberg, Ph.D., Chief Fuel Cycle/Decommissioning Branch

Attachment 1: Supplemental Information

Attachment 2: Inspector Notes

ADAMS Entry: IR05000206-03-010; 05000361-03-010; 05000362-03-010; 072000041-03-

01 on 08/4/2003 - 10/01/2003; Southern California Edison Co., San Onofre

Nuclear Generating Station; Units 1, 2, 3. ISFSI Report. No violations.

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station

NRC Inspection Report 50-206/03-10; 50-361/03-10; 50-362/03-10; 72-41/03-01

On October 3, 2003, Southern California Edison loaded the first canister of San Onofre Nuclear

Generating Station (SONGS) Unit 1 spent fuel into their Independent Spent Fuel Storage

Installation (ISFSI). The ISFSI was located at the SONGS site adjacent to the Unit 1 reactor

facility. The Advanced NUHOMS Horizontal Modular Storage System was selected by Southern

California Edison to store the SONGS spent fuel under a general license. This cask system had

been approved for storage of irradiated nuclear fuel by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC)

under Certificate of Compliance No. 72-1029. Transnuclear, Inc., was the cask vendor for this

system.

Southern California Edison planned to move all Unit 1 spent fuel to the ISFSI by the spring

of 2005. This will involve moving 207 spent fuel assemblies from the Unit 1 spent fuel pool,

70 assemblies from the Unit 2 pool and 118 assemblies from the Unit 3 pool. Seventeen canisters

will be needed to hold the 395 Unit 1 spent fuel assemblies. The first five canisters to be loaded

into the ISFSI would remove all the Unit 1 spent fuel from the Unit 3 pool. The ISFSI pad currently

constructed at SONGS can accommodate 31 canisters. Each canister can hold 24 spent fuel

assemblies. The ISFSI pad will be expanded as additional space is needed and as dismantlement

activities at Unit 1 provide more space for ISFSI construction.

The inspections conducted by the NRC of Southern California Edisons dry cask storage project

provided a comprehensive evaluation of the licensees compliance with the requirements in the

NUHOMS Certificate of Compliance No. 72-1029, Technical Specifications, Final Safety Analysis

Report, NRCs Safety Evaluation Report and 10 CFR Part 72. The inspection consisted of a team

of eleven NRC inspectors performing inspections of various phases of activities over a period from

June 26 through October 1, 2003. Sixteen technical areas were reviewed during the inspections

including such topical areas as fuel verification, security, radiological programs, quality assurance,

training, and heavy loads. During the inspections, the licensee conducted numerous

demonstrations for NRC observance related to the operations of equipment and the

implementation of procedures to verify that all required aspects of the use of the NUHOMS cask

system at the SONGS site had been adequately incorporated into site programs and procedures.

The licensee had integrated together many of the programs for the Part 50 reactor operations and

the Part 72 ISFSI operations to allow for an efficient use of site resources.

During the various pre-operational demonstrations and during the loading of the first canister, the

SONGS workers demonstrated a comprehensive knowledge of the technical requirements related

to the loading and operations of an ISFSI and for compliance with 10 CFR Part 72. Much of this

advanced knowledge of ISFSI operations was a result of experience gained by Southern

California Edison personnel who provided manpower support to the Rancho Seco

decommissioned reactor for their ISFSI project. Rancho Seco completed the loading of

21 canisters on August 2002. Southern California Edison personnel were a key part of that

successful program. The knowledge and experience gained by the Southern California Edison

personnel while at Rancho Seco was brought back and integrated into the SONGS program. This

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was obvious during discussions and interviews of the SONGS personnel which demonstrated

actual experience and knowledge of the issues that must be addressed in order to successfully

load spent fuel into the ISFSI.

During the loading of the first SONGS canister, the NRC provided 24-hour coverage of loading

operations for all critical tasks at the Unit 3 fuel handling building. This included fuel movement,

heavy lifts of the loaded canister, initial radiation surveys of the loaded cask, welding of the lids,

vacuum drying and helium backfill of the canister. Workers were knowledgeable of their assigned

tasks and had been well trained. Problems and issues were quickly identified and effectively

resolved. Shift supervision provided good oversight of work activities and workers always knew

who was in charge. Procedures were closely followed and a good questioning attitude was

demonstrated by all employees. There was good communications between the workers. Overall,

the licensees staff was well trained and highly motivated to perform work safely and in compliance

with the procedural requirements. The management team responsible for the ISFSI project had

worked hard to develop and implement a comprehensive program that would provide for the safe

operations of moving spent fuel at the SONGS site.

Details related to the 16 technical areas reviewed during this inspection are provided as

Attachment 2 to this inspection report. The following provides a summary of the findings of this

inspection.

Vacuum Drying, Helium Backfill and Helium Testing

!

Vacuum drying time limits established in Technical Specification 3.1.1 had been

incorporated into the licensees procedures. Canisters with a heat load greater than

12 kW were required to be vacuum dried within a specific time frame. The licensees

procedure included provisions for establishing a helium environment in the canister or re-

flooding the canister, as required by the technical specification, if the time limit was not

met.

!

The licensee had implemented a stepped vacuum drying process consistent with the

requirements in Technical Specification 3.1.1. This stepped process of lowering the

pressure in the canister to certain predetermined levels and holding at that level for a

period of time was intended to reduce the likelihood of ice blockage in the system lines.

The final vacuum drying pressure requirement for the canister was 3 torr. The licensees

procedures specified a value of 2.8 torr to account for instrument error and to provide an

extra margin for compliance.

!

Helium backfill pressure requirements established in Technical Specification 3.1.2 had

been incorporated into the licensees procedures. Provisions for documenting the final

helium backfill pressure reading was provided in the procedure, including independent

verification and sign-off by quality control personnel.

!

Helium leak rate testing of the inner lid weld and the vent/siphon port cover welds required

by Technical Specification 3.1.3 had been incorporated into the licensees procedures.

Procedural requirements included specifications for the helium to be $99 percent pure and

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the leak rate to be #10-7 standard cubic centimeters/second. Procedures also required

helium leak test personnel to be qualified to the standards in SNT-TC-1 Personnel

Qualification and Certification of Nondestructive Testing.

Emergency Planning

!

Emergency planning provisions for the ISFSI had been incorporated into the site-wide

emergency plan. This included specific emergency action levels for fires, loss of canister

integrity and security events.

!

The ISFSI design provided for accessability by emergency personnel and vehicles. The

licensee maintained their own site fire and medical response capability. Offsite fire,

security and medical support organizations were available to augment the site emergency

organization.

Fire Protection

!

The ISFSI had been incorporated into the San Onofre Updated Fire Hazards Analysis.

Administrative controls were established to limit the quantity of combustible and flammable

liquids around the ISFSI and near the transport path during movement of the canister.

!

Analysis had been completed to evaluate the effect on the ISFSI of site specific explosive

hazards and to confirm that the design of the ISFSI was adequate for the postulated

external pressure levels that could result from an explosion.

Fuel Verification

!

The SONGS Unit 1 spent fuel was stored in four locations: 270 assemblies at the General

Electric spent fuel storage pool located in Morris, Illinois; 207 assemblies in the SONGS

Unit 1 spent fuel pool; 70 assemblies in the SONGS Unit 2 spent fuel pool; and 118

assemblies in the SONGS Unit 3 spent fuel pool. The first loading campaign will load the

Unit 1 spent fuel stored in the Unit 3 spent fuel pool. This will require five canisters.

!

The requirements in Certificate of Compliance No. 1029 for the type of fuel that can be

stored in the Advanced NUHOMS 24PT1 canisters was evaluated against the SONGS

Unit 1 spent fuel planned for loading in the first five canisters. Criteria included type of

fuel, cladding, decay heat, burn-up, neutron/gamma source strength, cooling time and

enrichment. All spent fuel assemblies met the technical specification requirements.

!

Twenty-seven Unit 1 fuel assemblies had been identified as damaged. Of these, four

were in the Unit 3 spent fuel pool and will be included in the first loading campaign of five

canisters. Damaged fuel assembles were required to be placed in special failed fuel cans

inside the canisters. Criteria used by the licensee for identifying which fuel assemblies

were damaged was consistent with NRC guidance.

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!

The licensee had established provisions for independent verification of the correct loading

of the canister. This included videotaping the location of the spent fuel after loading in the

canister.

!

Because the NUHOMS canisters were inserted into the concrete storage modules

horizontally, special center of gravity considerations for the canisters were necessary to

prevent rotation of the canister during insertion into the concrete storage module.

Technical specifications required the center of gravity of the loaded canister to be within

0.1" of the canisters radial center of gravity. Licensee calculations for the first five

canisters demonstrated compliance with this limit. The largest deviation from the radial

center of gravity was 0.0042".

Compliance with 10 CFR Part 72 General License Requirements

!

The licensee evaluated the bounding environmental conditions specified in the NUHOMS

Final Safety Analysis Report and Certificate of Compliance No. 1029 technical

specifications against the conditions at the SONGS site. This included: tornados/high

winds, flood, seismic events, snow/ice loading, tsunami, lightning, burial under debris,

normal and abnormal temperatures, and fires/explosions. The site environmental

conditions at the SONGS ISFSI were bounded by the NUHOMS cask design parameters.

!

Radiation levels at the ISFSI were calculated for workers during loading operations and

routine surveillance activities. Doses were calculated for the controlled area boundary.

Doses at the controlled area boundary were projected to be 1 mrem/year, well below the

10 CFR 72.104 limit of 25 mrem/year. Projected worker doses to conduct the daily visual

inspection were 172 millirem/year. Weekly radiation surveys of the ISFSI could add

49 millirem/year. A conservative estimate for loading a cask was determined to be

3117 millirem per canister loading.

!

The licensee performed an evaluation of the site programs that could be impacted by the

addition of an ISFSI. The evaluation included the radiation protection program, emergency

planning program, quality assurance program, training program and the reactor technical

specifications and Part 50 license. Revisions to the programs to incorporate the ISFSI

were identified and implemented.

!

The NUHOMS Certificate of Compliance and Final Safety Analysis Report had been

reviewed by the licensee to verify that the design basis for the NUHOMS cask system and

the conditions and requirements in the Certificate of Compliance and Final Safety Analysis

Report were met.

Heavy Loads

!

The licensee had incorporated the special requirements related to the ISFSI project into

the site heavy loads programs and procedures. Crane operators interviewed during the

ISFSI inspections were knowledgeable of the special handling requirements related to the

heavy spent fuel casks.

-6-

!

Special lifting device height limits and temperature restrictions during movement of the

casks had been incorporated into the licensees procedures consistent with the

requirements in the Certificate of Compliance. This included the requirement to perform

an inspection of the cask for damage after any drop of 15" or higher.

!

The maximum weight of the loaded transfer cask had been determined by the licensee to

verify the adequacy of the lift capability of the cranes planned for use in moving the spent

fuel. A loaded cask being removed from the spent fuel pool represented the maximum

weight to be lifted and exceeded the lifting capacity of the current Unit 1 crane. The

licensee had purchased new single failure proof cranes for installation and use during the

cask loading operations. The Unit 3 crane was rated at 125 tons. The Unit 1 crane would

be up-rated from 100 tons to 105 tons to account for the estimated 104.1 ton weight of the

loaded cask.

!

A safe loads path had been identified and analyzed for moving the spent fuel from the

spent fuel pool to the ISFSI. Provisions were established in procedures and through the

use of limit switches to prevent the crane from moving the loaded cask outside the

boundaries of the safe load path while in the fuel building. Calculations were performed

for the roadway between the plant and the ISFSI to verify that the path was structurally

capable of handling the weight of the loaded transfer cask and trailer.

!

The licensees heavy loads procedural requirements related to the transfer cask trunnions

and the slings used for lifting the canister lid were verified against industry standards and

manufacturer requirements for load tests, safety margins and inspection/maintenance.

!

The adequacy of the transport trailer for the expected weight of a loaded canister and the

ability of the transport trailer to safely secure and move the cask to the ISFSI was verified.

Pad/Storage Modules

!

Requirements in the Final Safety Analysis Report related to the placement of the storage

modules on the ISFSI pad and the module-to-module connections required for the high

seismic conditions at the SONGS site were being implemented.

!

The concrete storage module thermal monitoring program had been incorporated into

procedures. This included the daily monitoring of the storage module temperature and the

daily verification that the air inlets and outlets were free from debris.

!

The thickness requirements for the concrete storage module roof and shield walls to

ensure radiological levels would be below regulatory limits were verified by direct

observation of the storage modules under construction and a review of the design

drawings.

!

The seismic design of the ISFSI pad to meet the potential earthquake intensity at the

SONGS site and to address liquefaction of the soil under the pad was inspected by the

-7-

NRC on April 9, 2002, and documented in Inspection Report 50-206/02-07;72-41/02-01

issued May 21, 2002 (NRC Adams Document ML021410532).

Pre-Operational Testing

!

The licensee successfully completed all the required pre-operational test requirements

specified by the Certificate of Compliance. This include the loading, welding, drying, and

backfilling of a canister and the unloading of a sealed canister. A weighted canister was

used to demonstrate heavy load activities, transport between the Unit 3 facility and the

ISFSI and insertion/removal of a canister into the concrete storage module.

Procedures and Technical Specification Requirements

!

The licensee had developed the required operating procedures and programs required by

the Certificate of Compliance.

!

The adequacy of the level of detail in the procedures was verified by reviewing

requirements in the Final Safety Analysis Report related to handling the cask at the spent

fuel pool. All requirements reviewed had been incorporated as operational steps in the

licensees procedures.

Quality Assurance

!

The licensee had implemented their approved reactor facility Part 50 quality assurance

program for the activities associated with the ISFSI. Effective implementation of the

program was observed for all phases of ISFSI activities including procurement, control of

measuring equipment, corrective actions, design control, receipt inspections, storage and

audits.

!

Southern California Edison was constructing their canisters onsite as a fabricator to

Transnuclear, Inc. An inspection conducted by the NRCs Spent Fuel Project Office on

March 3-6, 2003, and documented in Inspection Report 72-1029/2003201 issued March 6,

2003, found all work activities were being properly controlled under the Southern

California Edison quality assurance program (NRC Adams Document ML030940163).

!

The licensees quality assurance organization had implemented a comprehensive quality

assurance audit and inspection program that was responsive to applying additional

oversight to selected work activities where problems were being identified. This was most

evident in the decision to place onsite quality assurance inspectors at one of the vendors

to ensure the quality of the concrete storage modules.

Radiation Protection

!

Requirements for radiological and contamination surveys described in the Final Safety

Analysis Report had been incorporated into the licensees health physics program for the

-8-

loading of the casks. This included special precautions related to potential high dose rate

work activities.

!

Calculations performed by the licensee to evaluate the potential radiological doses during

normal operations at the ISFSI and during an accident demonstrated compliance with the

limits specified in 10 CFR 72.104 and 10 CFR 72.106.

!

The licensee had identified the reactor Part 50 exclusion area as the controlled area for

the ISFSI. The distance from the ISFSI to the exclusion area boundary met the required

minimum distance for a controlled area around an ISFSI specified in 10 CFR 72.106.

Southern California Edison was authorized, through a signed easement, to remove

personnel from the exclusion area in the event of an emergency.

!

The licensee had determined a dose conversion factor for neutron doses to workers to

account for the neutron spectrum expected with the loaded canisters.

!

Environmental monitoring for the ISFSI had been incorporated into the existing reactor

environmental monitoring program. Additional thermoluminescent dosimeters had been

placed around the ISFSI to monitor the increase in radiation levels expected due to the

storage of the spent fuel. Dosimeters had been placed in service in 2001 and had been

used to collect background data that could be compared with the ongoing monitoring after

spent fuel was placed in the ISFSI to determine the level of increase in radiation levels.

Records

!

A records system had been established by the licensee under their reactor Part 50 quality

assurance program. Records required for retention by 10 CFR 72.174, 10 CFR 72.212,

10 CFR 72.234 and the Final Safety Analysis Report had been identified in the licensees

program as required records for retention.

!

An optical disk system was being used for permanent storage of the records. The quality

assurance plan required that ISFSI related records be retained for the duration of the

license or certificate of compliance.

!

The required 90-day notification prior to loading the first cask had been made to the NRC

on May 5, 2003. The requirement to provide notice to the NRC within 30 days of use of a

cask had been incorporated into the appropriate procedure.

Safety Reviews

!

Changes to the site related to the construction and operation of the ISFSI were being

evaluated in accordance with 10 CFR 72.48 and 10 CFR 50.59 requirements. No issues

were identified during the review of selected safety screenings.

-9-

Security

!

Security for the ISFSI had been integrated into the overall site security program. The

security plan and procedures had been revised to incorporate specific provisions for

responding to a security threat at the ISFSI. Arrangements had been established to obtain

support from local law enforcement agencies during a security event.

!

Security force personnel were trained on security requirements for the ISFSI including the

implementation of access controls, key controls and compensatory actions.

!

Physical security systems had been installed and were operational. This included the

protected area fence, lighting systems, intrusion detection systems and backup power.

!

Arrangements had been made for a moving protected area around the cask during

transport from Unit 3 to the ISFSI.

Training

!

The licensee had implemented a training program for workers assigned to the ISFSI that

incorporated the topics listed in the technical specifications and provided for

documentation of completion of training and job task qualification.

!

Specific training needs had been identified and incorporated into training for operations,

maintenance and health physics personnel as required by the Final Safety Analysis

Report.

!

A computerized training records system had been established by the licensee to track

completion of training by individuals.

Welding/Nondestructive Testing

!

Requirements for hydrogen monitoring during welding of the inner cask lid had been

incorporated into the procedures. The alarm set point had been established at 50 percent

of a lower explosive limit for hydrogen. During welding of the inner lid welds, hydrogen

levels were measured from 3 percent to 8.4 percent of the lower explosive limit.

!

The licensee was performing the required dye penetrant examinations of welds on the

canister in accordance with the Final Safety Analysis Report. Dye penetrant examination

procedures had been developed for both normal temperatures and for the higher

temperatures that could be encountered with the hotter casks.

!

Nondestructive examination requirements for welds were adequately specified in

procedures and on drawings.

!

Nondestructive examination personnel were qualified to the requirements in SNT-TC-1A

for performing weld examinations of the type required on the canisters.

-10-

Exit Meetings

The inspectors presented the inspection results to members of licensee management at the

conclusion of the various key stages of the inspection on August 8, August 19 and October 1,

2003. The licensee acknowledged the findings presented. The licensee did not identify as

proprietary any information provided to, or reviewed by, the inspectors that had been incorporated

into the inspection effort.

ATTACHMENT 1

SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION

PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED

Licensee

J. Agosti, Lead Auditor, Procurement Quality

A. Alexander, Security Lock and Key Specialist

J. Appel, Engineer, Design Engineering

R. Ashe-Everest, Project Manager, Spent Fuel Cask Transfer Operations

V. Barone, Cognizant Engineer, Dry Cask Storage

R. Beatty, Supervisor, Unit 1 Security

M. Bise, Program Analyst

J. Bock, Project Manager, Project Management and Engineering Support

R. Bordon, Surveillance Team Supervisor, Nuclear Oversight and Assessment

G. Broussard, Manager, Security Operations and Equipment Performance

R. Brown, ISFSI Support

R. Busnardo, Project Manager for Canister Fabrication, Nuclear Generation Maintenance

G. Cook, Supervisor, Regulatory Compliance

T. Cook, Shift Commander, Security

P. Coughlin, QA/QC Vendor Oversight, Nuclear Oversight and Assessment

J. Custer, Manager, ISFSI Operations

D. Czapski, Quality Control Inspector, Nuclear Oversight and Assessment

S. Davis, Nuclear Security Officer, Security

D. Faasamala, Security Lock and Key Specialist

G. Ferrigno, Health Physics Planner

B. Gossett, Engineer, Nuclear Fuel Services

R. Granaas, Engineer, Nuclear Fuel Services

K. Gribble, Maintenance Supervisor

P. Gyswyt, Design Engineering

N. Hansen, Radiological Environmental Monitoring Program Specialist

S. Hunn, Administrative Manager

N. Jervis, Supervisor, Security Operations

W. Kotteakos, Supervisor, Quality Control/Nondestructive Examinations

J. Larson, Supervisor, Procurement Quality

J. Linville, Acting Shift Commander, Security

M. Mason, Supervisor, Fabrication

M. McBrearty, Engineer, Nuclear Regulatory Affairs

A. Meichler, Supervisor, Weld Engineering

D. Miller, Fuel Team Leader, Training

G. Moore, Manager, Decommissioning Oversight

J. Morales, Manager, Dry Cask Storage

M. Mullen, Nuclear Security Officer, Security

S. Ordorica, Nondestructive Examination Inspector

A. Ockert, Fire Protection Engineer

M. Orewyler, Maintenance Supervisor

R. Osborne, Manager, 72.48 Program

D. Pilmer, Manager, Dry Cask Fuel Storage Licensing

-2-

D. Ripley, Manager, Maintenance Training

M. Russell, Technical Specialist

S. Salwach, Nuclear Engineer, Maintenance Engineering

D. Schell, Supervisor, Fabrication Welding

J. Scott, Emergency Planning Engineer

M. Speer, Maintenance Supervisor

D. Stoeckel, Technical Specialist, Maintenance Engineering

T. Swindle, Shift Commander, Security

R. Todd, Supervisor, Security Equipment Performance

J. Valsvig, Welding Technician

M. Watson, Shift Commander, Security

S. Wong, Nondestructive Examination Inspector

H. Wood, Surveillance Team Member, Nuclear Oversight and Assessment

T. Yee, Consulting Engineer, Design Engineering

G. Zwissler, Manager, Administration

Leak Test Specialists

D. Hecksel, Leak Testing Specialist

Transnuclear, Inc.

U. Farradj, Project Manager

INSPECTION PROCEDURES USED

60854

Pre-operational Testing of an ISFSI

60855

Operations of an ISFSI

60856

Review of 10 CFR 72.212(b) Evaluations

60857

Review of 10 CFR 72.48 Evaluations

81001

ISFSI Security

ITEMS OPENED AND CLOSED

Opened

None

Closed

None

Discussed

None

-3-

LIST OF ACRONYMS USED

ALARA

as low as reasonably achievable

ANSI

American National Standards Institute, Inc

CFR

code of federal regulations

DAC

derived air concentration

DSC

dry shielded canister

FSAR

final safety analysis report

GWd/MTU

gigawatt days/metric ton uranium

ISFSI

independent spent fuel storage installation

kW

kilowatt

MOX

mixed-oxide fuel

NDE

nondestructive examinations

NRC

Nuclear Regulatory Commission

psi

pounds/in2

psig

pounds/in2 (gauge)

QA

quality assurance

SAR

safety analysis report (same as final safety analysis report)

SNT-TC

Society of Nondestructive Testing-Technical Council

SONGS

San Onofre Generating Station

std-cc/sec

standard cubic centimeters/second

Tech Specs

technical specifications

UFSAR

updated final safety analysis report