ML082381091

IR 05000338-08-003, IR 05000339-08-003; 04/01/08 - 06/30/08; North Anna Power Station, Units 1 & 2, Routine Integrated Resident and Regional Report

ML082381091
Person / Time
Site:	North Anna
Issue date:	08/25/2008
From:	Bates M NRC/RGN-II/DRP/RPB5
To:	Christian D Virginia Electric & Power Co (VEPCO)
References
IR-08-003
Download: ML082381091 (26)

See also: IR 05000338/2008003

Text

UNITED STATES

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION II

SAM NUNN ATLANTA FEDERAL CENTER

61 FORSYTH STREET, SW, SUITE 23T85

ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30303-8931

August 25, 2008

Mr. David A. Christian

President and Chief Nuclear Officer

Virginia Electric and Power Company

Innsbrook Technical Center

5000 Dominion Boulevard

Glen Allen, VA 23060

SUBJECT:

NORTH ANNA POWER STATION - NRC INTEGRATED INSPECTION

REPORT 05000338/2008003, 05000339/2008003, AND 07200056/2008003

Dear Mr. Christian:

On June 30, 2008, the U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at

your North Anna Power Station Units 1 and 2. The enclosed integrated inspection report

documents the inspection findings which were discussed on July 9, 2008 and July 30, 2008 with

Mr. Daniel Stoddard, and on August 22, 2008 with other members of your staff.

The inspection examined activities conducted under your licenses as they related to safety and

compliance with the Commissions rules and regulations and with the conditions of your

licenses. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and

interviewed personnel.

Based on the results of this inspection, one self-revealing finding of very low safety significance

(Green) was identified which involved a violation of NRC requirements. Additionally, one

licensee-identified violation which was determined to be of very low safety significance is listed

in this report. NRC is treating these violations as non-cited violations (NCVs) consistent with

Section VI.A.1 of the NRC Enforcement Policy because of the very low safety significance of the

violations and because they were entered into your corrective action program. If you contest

these non-cited violations, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this

inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN.:

Document Control Desk, Washington DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional

Administrator, Region II, the Director, Office of Enforcement, United States Nuclear Regulatory

Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001; and the NRC Resident Inspector at the North Anna

Power Station.

VEPCO

2

In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRCs Rules of Practice, a copy of this letter, its

enclosure, and your response, if any, will be available electronically for public inspection in the

NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of the

NRCs document system (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at

http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).

Sincerely,

/RA/

Mark A. Bates, Acting Chief

Reactor Projects Branch 5

Division of Reactor Projects

Docket Nos. 50-338, 50-339

License Nos. NPF-4, NPF-7

Enclosure: Inspection Report 05000338/2008003, 05000339/2008003, and 07200056/2008003

w/Attachment: Supplemental Information

cc w/encl. (See next page)

___________________

OFFICE

RII:DRP

RII:DRP

RII:DRS

RII:DRS

RII:DRS

RII:DRS

RII:DRS

SIGNATURE

Non Concur

Non -Concur

/RA By BDesai/ /RA By BDesai/ /RA By BDesai/ /RA By BDesai/ /RA By BDesai/

NAME

JReece

RClagg

RMoore

CPeabody

CEven

GGardner

KMiller

DATE

8/25/08

8/25/08

7/28/08

7/28/08

7/22/08

7/28/08

7/28/087/28/08

E-MAIL COPY? YES

NO YES NO YES NO

YES NO

YES NO

YES NO

YES NO

OFFICE

RII:DRS

RII:DRP

RII:DRP

SIGNATURE

/RA/

/RA/

/RA/

NAME

JHelm

JDodson

JMoorman

DATE

8/25/08

8/25/08

E-MAIL COPY? YES

NO YES

NO YES

NO YES

NO YES

NO YES

NO YES

NO

VEPCO

3

cc w/encl:

Chris L. Funderburk

Director

Nuclear Licensing and Operations Support

Virginia Electric and Power Company

Electronic Mail Distribution

D. G. Stoddard

Site Vice President

North Anna Power Station

Electronic Mail Distribution

Executive Vice President

Old Dominion Electric Cooperative

Electronic Mail Distribution

County Administrator

Louisa County

P.O. Box 160

Louisa, VA 23093

Lillian M. Cuoco, Esq.

Senior Counsel

Dominion Resources Services, Inc.

Millstone Power Station

Electronic Mail Distribution

Attorney General

Supreme Court Building

900 East Main Street

Richmond, VA 23219

Senior Resident Inspector

Virginia Electric and Power Company

North Anna Power Station

U.S. NRC

P.O. Box 490

Mineral, VA 23117

Eugene S. Grecheck

Vice President - Nuclear Development

Dominion Resources Services, Inc.

Electronic Mail Distribution

Leslie N. Hartz

Vice President - Nuclear Support Services

Dominion Resources Services, Inc.

5000 Dominion Boulevard

Glen Allen, VA 23061

Eric Hendrixson

Director - Nuclear Safety and Licensing

Virginia Electric & Power Company

Electronic Mail Distribution

Michael M. Cline

Director

Virginia Department of Emergency

Services Management

Electronic Mail Distribution

VEPCO

4

Report to D. A. Christian from M. A. Bates dated August 25, 2008.

Distribution w/encl:

C. Evans, RII EICS (Part 72 Only)

L. Slack, RII EICS

OE Mail (email address if applicable)

RIDSNRRDIRS

PUBLIC

S. P. Lingam, NRR (PM: NA, SUR)

Richard Jervey, NRR

Enclosure

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION II

Docket Nos:

50-338, 50-339,72-056

License Nos:

NPF-4, NPF-7

Report No:

05000338/2008003, 05000339/2008003, 07200056/2008003

Licensee:

Virginia Electric and Power Company (VEPCO)

Facility:

North Anna Power Station, Units 1 & 2

Location:

1022 Haley Drive

Mineral, Virginia 23117

Dates:

April 1, 2008 to June 30, 2008

Inspectors:

J. Reece, Senior Resident Inspector

R. Clagg, Resident Inspector

R. Moore, Senior Reactor Inspector, Section 4OA5.1

C. Peabody, Reactor Inspection, Section 1R17

C. Even, Reactor Inspector, Section 1R17

G. Gardner, Reactor Inspector, Section 1R17

K. Miller, Reactor Inspector, Section 1R17

J. Helm, Reactor Inspector, Section 1R17

Approved by:

M. A. Bates, Acting Chief

Reactor Projects Branch 5

Division of Reactor Projects

CONTENTS

Summary of Plant Status...4

REACTOR SAFETY.......4

1R01

Adverse Weather Protection..4

1R04

Equipment Alignment..4

1R05

Fire Protection..5

1R11

Licensed Operator Requalification Program...6

1R12

Maintenance Effectiveness6

1R13

Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control....8

1R15

Operability Evaluations...9

1R17

Evaluations of Changes, Test, or Experiments and Permanent Plant

Modifications 9

1R19

Post-Maintenance Testing.. 12

1R22

Surveillance Testing 13

OTHER ACTIVITIES......13

4OA1

Performance Indicator Verification ... 13

4OA2

Identification and Resolution of Problems .. 14

4OA3

Event Followup.17

4OA5

Other Activities 18

4OA6

Meetings, Including Exit..20

4OA7

Licensee-Identified Violations.. 20

ATTACHMENT: SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION

Key Points of Contact.....A-1

List of Items Opened, Closed, and Discussed...A-1

List of Documents Reviewed.A-3

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

IR 05000338/2008-003, 05000339/2008-003; 04/01/2008 - 06/30/2008; North Anna Power

Station, Units 1 and 2. Routine Integrated Resident and Regional Report.

The report covered a three month period of inspection by resident inspectors and reactor

inspectors from the region. One Green finding, which was a non-cited violation (NCV), was

Identified, and one licensee identified violation which was determined to be of very low safety

significance are listed in this report. The significance of most findings is identified by their color

(Green, White, Yellow, Red) using Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 0609, Significance

Determination Process (SDP). Findings for which the SDP does not apply may be Green or

be assigned a severity level after NRC management review. The NRCs program for

overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described in NUREG-

1649, Reactor Oversight Process Revision 4, dated December, 2006.

A.

NRC Identified and Self-Revealing Findings

Green. A Green self-revealing non-cited violation of Technical Specification (TS)

5.4.1.a was identified for failure to adequately establish procedural requirements for

repair of the Unit 1 1H emergency diesel generator (EDG) air start check valves. The

licensee entered this problem into their corrective action program as condition report

098146, revised the procedure, and successfully completed repairs to the '1H' EDG.

The finding was more than minor because it directly impacted the mitigating systems

cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems

that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences, and the related

attribute of procedure quality in that the procedure failed to ensure air start check

valves were properly assembled following maintenance. The inspectors reviewed IMC 0609, Appendix A, and determined that the finding was of very low safety significance

(Green) because it did not result in a loss of operability due to a design or qualification

deficiency, did not represent an actual loss of safety function, did not result in a train

being out of service longer than allowed by TS, and was not potentially risk significant

due to possible external events. (Section 1R12)

B.

Licensee-Identified Violations.

Violations of very low safety significance, which were identified by the licensee have

been reviewed by the inspectors. Corrective actions taken or planned by the licensee

have been entered into the licensees corrective action program. These violations and

corrective actions are listed in Section 4OA7 of this report.

REPORT DETAILS

Summary of Plant Status

Unit 1 and 2 began the period at full Rated Thermal Power (RTP) and operated at or near full

RTP for the entire report period.

1.

REACTOR SAFETY

Cornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, Barrier Integrity

1R01 Adverse Weather Protection

a.

Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the licensees adverse weather preparations for hot weather

operations, specified in 0-GOP-4.1, Rev 23, 07/10/08, Hot Weather Operations, and

the licensees correction action data base for hot weather related issues. The

inspectors walked down the two risk-significant areas listed below to verify compliance

with the procedural requirements and to verify that the specified actions provided the

necessary protection for the structures, systems, or components.

Unit 1 & 2 auxiliary feedwater (AFW) pump rooms;

Unit 1 & 2 quench spray (QS) pump rooms; and

Unit 1 outside recirculation spray (RS) and low head safety injection (LHSI)

pump room.

b.

Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R04 Equipment Alignment

.1

Partial Walkdown

a.

Inspection Scope

The inspectors conducted four equipment partial alignment walkdowns to evaluate the

operability of selected redundant trains or backup systems, listed below, with the other

train or system inoperable or out of service. The inspectors reviewed the functional

systems descriptions, Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR), system

operating procedures, and Technical Specifications (TS) to determine correct system

lineups for the current plant conditions. The inspectors performed walkdowns of the

systems to verify that critical components were properly aligned and to identify any

discrepancies which could affect operability of the redundant train or backup system.

5

Unit 2 '2J' Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) and support systems during

planned maintenance on '2H' EDG;

Unit 1 '1H' EDG during planned maintenance on '1J' EDG;

Unit 1 '1J' EDG and support systems during planned maintenance on '1H' EDG;

and,

Unit 1 'B' LHSI pump during planned maintenance on 'A' LHSI pump and related

valves.

b.

Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

.2

Complete Walkdown

a.

Inspection Scope

The inspectors performed a detailed walkdown and inspection of the Unit 1 'A' Train

outside RS system components external to containment to assess proper alignment and

to identify discrepancies that could impact its availability and functional capacity. The

inspectors assessed the physical condition and position of each recirculation spray and

casing cooling valve, whether manual, power operated or automatic to ensure correct

positioning of the valves. The inspection also included a review of the alignment and the

condition of support systems including fire protection, room ventilation, and emergency

lighting. Equipment deficiency tags were reviewed and the condition of the system was

discussed with the engineering personnel.

b.

Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R05 Fire Protection

a.

Inspection Scope

The inspectors conducted tours of the eight areas listed below that are important to

reactor safety to verify the licensees implementation of fire protection requirements as

described in Virginia Power Administrative Procedure VPAP-2401, Rev 28, 12/14/07,

Fire Protection Program. The inspectors evaluated, as appropriate, conditions related

to: (1) licensee control of transient combustibles and ignition sources; (2) the material

condition, operational status, and operational lineup of fire protection systems,

equipment, and features; and (3) the fire barriers used to prevent fire damage or fire

propagation.

Emergency Diesel Generator 2H Unit 2 (fire zone 9A-2a / EDG-2H);

Emergency Switchgear Room Unit 1 (fire zone 6-1a / ESR-1);

Emergency Switchgear Room Unit 2 (fire zone 6-2a / ESR-2);

Emergency Diesel Generator 2J Unit 2 (fire zone 9B-2a / EDG-2J);

6

Motor-Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Room Unit 1 (fire zone 14B-1a /

MDAFW-1);

Turbine-Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Room Unit 1 (fire zone 14A-1a /

TDAFW-1)

Turbine-Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Room Unit 2 (fire zone 14A-2a /

TDAFW-2); and,

Motor-Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Room Unit 2 (fire zone 14B-2a /

MDAFW-2).

b.

Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R11 Licensed Operator Requalification Program

a.

Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed a crew examination that involved a reactor coolant system

(RCS) leak with a partial loss of annunciators, a loss of instrument air outside

containment, a failure of 1-RC-PT-1554 that fails open a pressurizer power operated

relief valve (PORV), and a rod ejection resulting in a small break loss of coolant accident

(LOCA). The inspectors observed crew performance in terms of communications; ability

to take timely and proper actions; prioritizing, interpreting, and verifying alarms; correct

use and implementation of procedures, including the alarm response procedures; timely

control board operation and manipulation, including high-risk operator actions; and

oversight and direction provided by the shift supervisor, including the ability to identify

and implement appropriate TS actions. The inspectors observed the post training

critique to determine that weaknesses or improvement areas revealed by the training

were captured by the instructor and reviewed with the operators.

b.

Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R12 Maintenance Effectiveness

a.

Inspection Scope

For the four equipment issues listed below, the inspectors evaluated the effectiveness of

the corresponding licensee's preventive and corrective maintenance. The inspectors

performed walkdowns of the accessible portions of the systems, performed in-office

reviews of procedures and evaluations, and held discussions with system engineers.

The inspectors compared the licensees actions with the requirements of the

Maintenance Rule (10 CFR 50.65) using ER-AA-MRL-10, Rev 2, 12/18/07,

Maintenance Rule Program, and Engineering Transmittal CEP-97-0018, Rev 12,

08/04/99, North Anna Maintenance Rule Scoping and Performance Criteria Matrix.

7

Condition report (CR) 099531, A MRule Evaluation was not assigned for

CR091536 and respective MRE006778, MRule Eval to Eng for 1-EE-BKR-1J1-

1-F2 contactor failed;

CR096110, 1A leak to B water box vacuum breakers, for maintenance issues

concerning Unit 2 Condenser Outlet Waterbox vacuum break;

CR098146, During maintenance run #8 air start check valve supply pipe to

header melted at fitting, and respective MRE006709, MRule; #8 Air Start

Ckvalve Supply Pipe to header melted at fitting;" and,

CR091169, "2-SW-P-1B Automatically tripped," and respective MRE006467,

"MRule evaluation: 2-SW-P-1B Automatically tripped."

b.

Findings

Introduction: A self-revealing, Green, non-cited violation (NCV) of TS 5.4.1.a was

identified for the failure to adequately establish procedural requirements for repair of the

Unit 1 1H EDG air start check valves.

Description: On May 7, 2008, during a maintenance run of the '1H' EDG following

activities associated with a scheduled 80 hour9.259259e-4 days <br />0.0222 hours <br />1.322751e-4 weeks <br />3.044e-5 months <br /> maintenance outage, the air start check

valve associated with the #8 cylinder stuck open. This allowed combustion gas into the

air start header, subsequently causing it to rupture due to heating of the soldered joints.

An evaluation by the licensee determined that the self-locking nut associated with the #8

cylinder air start check valve had disengaged from the threaded check valve shaft and

was oriented in such a way as to prevent the check valve from reseating. Further

evaluation by the licensee determined that the self locking nuts were consumable items

that were intended to be replaced with new self-locking nuts after each use. The

licensee determined that maintenance procedure O-MCM-0701-14, Rev 5, 05/12/06,

Repair of Emergency Diesel Generator Air Start Check Valves, was inadequate in that

it did not include guidance to treat the self locking nuts as consumable items. The

licensee revised maintenance procedure, 0-MCM-0701-14 and completed repairs to the

air start check valve and air start header. The licensee also conducted inspections of

the remaining air start check valves and returned the '1H' EDG to an operable status on

May 10, 2008.

Analysis: The inspectors determined that the failure to adequately establish procedural

requirements for repair of the 1H EDG air start check valves was a performance

deficiency. The finding was more than minor because it impacted the mitigating systems

cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that

respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences, and the related

attribute of procedure quality in that the procedure failed to ensure air start check valves

were properly assembled following maintenance. The inspectors reviewed IMC 0609,

Appendix A, and determined that the finding was of very low safety significance (Green)

because it did not result in a loss of operability due to a design or qualification

deficiency, did not represent an actual loss of safety function, did not result in a train

being out of service longer than allowed by TS, and was not potentially risk significant

due to possible external events.

8

Enforcement: TS 5.4.1.a, requires, in part, that written procedures shall be established,

implemented and maintained covering the applicable procedures recommended in

Regulatory Guide 1.33, Revision 2, Appendix A. Specifically, Section 9 requires, in part,

that maintenance that can affect the performance of safety-related equipment should be

properly performed in accordance with written procedures and documented instructions

appropriate to the circumstances. Licensee procedure O-MCM-0701-14, Repair of

Emergency Diesel Generator Air Start Check Valves, Rev 5, 05/12/06, contains

instructions for rebuilding EDG air start check valves. Contrary to this, the licensee

failed to adequately establish appropriate procedural requirements in 0-MCM-0701-14 in

that the procedure did not contain instructions to replace the consumable, self-locking

nuts for the air start check valves. Because the finding is of very low safety significance

and because it has been entered into the licensees corrective action program (CAP) as

CR098146, this violation is being treated as an NCV, consistent with Section VI.A.1 of

the NRC Enforcement Policy: NCV 05000338/2008003-01, Failure to Adequately

Establish Procedural Requirements for Air Start Check Valve Maintenance for the '1H'

EDG.

1R13 Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control

a.

Inspection Scope

The inspectors evaluated, as appropriate, the four activities listed below for the following:

(1) effectiveness of the risk assessments performed before maintenance activities were

conducted; (2) management of risk; (3) upon identification of an unforeseen situation,

necessary steps were taken to plan and control the resulting emergent work activities;

and (4) maintenance risk assessments and emergent work problems were adequately

identified and resolved. The inspectors verified that the licensee was complying with the

requirements of 10 CFR 50.65 (a)(4) and the data output from the licensees safety

monitor associated with the risk profile of Units 1 and 2.

Emergent work on 1H EDG due to #8 cylinder air start check valve failure

resulting in the extension of a maintenance outage, but overall risk remained

Green;

Emergent work for instrument air leak to 'B' water box vacuum breakers; overall

risk remained Green;

Emergent entry into 0-AP-41, Rev 39, 06/06/08, Severe Weather Conditions,

due to a tornado watch which when combined with other unavailable equipment

resulted in a yellow risk condition;

Emergent work due to failure of '1H' EDG battery charger; overall risk remained

Green.

b.

Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

9

1R15 Operability Evaluations

a.

Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed six operability evaluations affecting the risk-significant

mitigating system, listed below, to assess, as appropriate: (1) the technical adequacy of

the evaluations; (2) whether continued system operability was warranted; (3) whether

other existing degraded conditions were considered as compensating measures; (4)

whether the compensatory measures, if involved, were in place, would work as intended,

and were appropriately controlled; and (5) where continued operability was considered

unjustified, the impact on TS Limiting Conditions for Operation and the risk significance

in accordance with the Significance Determination Process (SDP). The inspectors

review included a verification that determinations of operability were made as specified

by procedure VPAP-1408, Rev 4, 05/28/08, System Operability.

CR093429, review of OD000158, Evaluate leak by of terry turbine steam supply

valve;

CR092489, review of OD000154, Deflected Control Rods on 2-SW-REJ-24E;

CR092894, review of OD000156, Evaluate wall thickness;

CR091976, review of OD000152, Perform OD for required actions on battery

chargers, relative to EDGs during high winds and cold ambient conditions;

CR098251, 1H EDG air stop check valve supply fitting failure - common cause

failure review; and,

CR091896, review of OD000151, #1 seal o-rings installed in 1-B RCP exceeded

6 year life on o-rings.

b.

Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R17 Evaluations of Changes, Tests, or Experiments and Permanent Plant Modifications

a.

Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed selected samples of evaluations to confirm that the licensee

had appropriately considered the conditions under which changes to the facility, UFSAR,

or procedures may be made, and tests conducted, without prior NRC approval. The

inspectors reviewed evaluations for eight changes and additional information, such as

drawings, calculations, supporting analyses, the UFSAR, and TS to confirm that the

licensee had appropriately concluded that the changes could be accomplished without

obtaining a license amendment. The eight evaluations reviewed are listed in the

Attachment to this report.

The inspectors reviewed samples of changes for which the licensee had determined that

evaluations were not required, to confirm that the licensees conclusions to screen out

these changes were correct and consistent with 10 CFR 50.59. The twenty-three

screened out changes reviewed are listed in the Attachment to this report.

10

The inspectors evaluated engineering design change packages (DCPs) for fourteen

material and design based modifications to evaluate the modifications for adverse

effects on system availability, reliability, and functional capability. The fourteen

modifications and the associated attributes reviewed are as follows:

DCP-99-003, Fuel Assembly Repair, 4/15/1999 (Barrier Integrity)

- Materials/Replacement Components

- Structural

- Licensing Basis

- Failure Modes

DCP-99-169, Charging Pump Upgrades, 1/27/2000 (Mitigating Systems)

- Materials/Replacement Components

- Failure Modes

- Licensing Basis

- Operations

DCP-01-160, Replacement of Vital Bus Inverters 1-III & 1-IV, 12/02/2005 (Mitigating

Systems)

- Energy Needs

- Control Signals

- Operations

- Licensing Basis

DCP-01-162, Replacement of Vital Bus Inverters 2-III and 2-IV, 4/28/05, (Mitigating

Systems)

- Energy Needs

- Material/Replacement Components

- Operations

- Structural

- Licensing Basis

DCP-02-015, Pump Modifications to Support Operation with Low Lake Anna Level,

10/24/2002 (Mitigating Systems)

- Process Medium

- Operations

DCP-02-016, Revision to Lake Anna Minimum Level, 3/24/2004 (Mitigating Systems)

- Operations

- Licensing Basis

- Structural

DCP-02-161, Emergency Diesel Fuel Oil Drain Header Replacement, 10/2/2002

- Energy Needs

- Materials/Replacement Components

- Structural

11

DCP 04-150, Install Manual Switch to Close Fire Protection Dampers in Unit 1&2

Emergency Switchgear Rooms, 1/13/05 (Mitigating Systems)

- Materials/Replacement Components

- Energy Needs

- Operations

DCP-05-007, Design Basis for North Anna Spent Fuel 100-hour Core Offload, 10/6/2005

(Barrier Integrity, Mitigating Systems)

- Heat Removal

- Licensing Basis

DCP-05-112, Replace FW Temperature RTDs and Re-scale Loop, 01/11/2006

(Mitigating Systems)

- Energy Needs

- Control Signals

- Process Medium

- Licensing Basis

DCP-05-117, Removal of Spare 7300 Process Cards, 6/1/05, (Initiating Events)

- Control Signals

- Licensing Basis

- Failure Modes

DCP-05-143, Relocation of Switchyard Breaker H502, and Replacement of Switchyard

Breakers G1TH5 and G102, 02/07/2006 (Mitigating Systems)

- Energy Needs

- Timing

- Materials/Replacement Components

- Licensing Basis

DCP-06-138, Control Room Recorder Replacement, 12/14/2006 (Mitigating Systems)

- Energy Needs

- Process Medium

- Licensing Basis

DCP-07-155, CO2 Fire Protection System Design Zone 2-2 Nozzle Replacement

(Mitigating Systems)

- Materials/Replacement Components

- Energy Needs

- Equipment Protection

- Operations

- Licensing Basis

Documents reviewed included procedures, engineering calculations, modification design

and implementation packages, work orders, site drawings, corrective action documents,

applicable sections of the updated UFSAR, supporting analyses, Technical

Specifications, and design basis information. The inspectors additionally reviewed test

documentation to ensure adequacy in scope and conclusion. The inspectors verified

12

that all changes were incorporated in licensing and design basis documents and

associated plant procedures.

The inspectors also reviewed selected corrective action documents and the licensees

recent self-assessments associated with modifications and 10 CFR 50.59 screening /

evaluation issues to verify that problems were identified at an appropriate threshold,

were entered into the corrective action process, and appropriate corrective actions had

been initiated and tracked to completion.

b.

Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R19 Post Maintenance Testing

a.

Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed six post maintenance test procedures and/or test activities, as

appropriate, for selected risk-significant mitigating systems to assess whether: (1) the

effect of testing on the plant had been adequately addressed by control room and/or

engineering personnel; (2) testing was adequate for the maintenance performed; (3)

acceptance criteria were clear and adequately demonstrated operational readiness

consistent with design and licensing basis documents; (4) test instrumentation had

current calibrations, range, and accuracy consistent with the application; (5) test were

performed as written with applicable prerequisites satisfied; (6) jumpers installed or

leads lifted were properly controlled; (7) test equipment was removed following testing;

and (8) equipment was returned to the status required to perform in accordance with

licensee procedure VPAP-2003, Rev 12, 05/01/07, Post Maintenance Testing

Program.

WO 00798652-01, Obtain samples per engineering 3A Heat and Vent Exhaust

Filter Bank;

WO 00767749-01, Replace pump/motor assembly;

WO 00804803-01 & 01A, Clean contacts on K1 relay;

WO 00801938, Unit 2 2-SW-P-1A uncouple, couple replace seal;

WO 00782951, Unit 2 1C Charging Pump Lube Flex Couplings - Clean Lube Oil

Coolers; and,

WO 00790617-01, Replace MOT on 1J EDG.

b.

Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

13

1R22 Surveillance Testing

a.

Inspection Scope

For the eight surveillance tests listed below, the inspectors examined the test procedure,

witnessed testing, reviewed test records and data packages, to determine whether the

scope of testing adequately demonstrated that the affected equipment was functional

and operable, and that the surveillance requirements of TS were met. The inspectors

also determined whether the testing effectively demonstrated that the systems or

components were operationally ready and capable of performing their intended safety

functions. The inspectors reviewed four in-service testing activities for a risk significant

pump or valve as part of the surveillance activities.

In-Service Test:

1-PT-63.1A.2, Quench Spray System - A Subsystem Comprehensive Pump

Test, Revision 12;

2-PT-213.7B, Valve Inservice Inspection (B Train of Recirc Spray System),

Revision 12;

2-PT-64.4B.2, Casing Cooling Pump (2-RS-P-3B) Biennial IST Comprehensive

Pump Test, Revision 3;

1-PT-71.3Q.1, 1-FW-P-3B, B Motor-Driven AFW Pump IST Comprehensive

Pump Test and Valve Testing, Revision 3;

2-PT-75.2B, Service Water Pump (2-SW-P-1B) Quarterly Test, Revision 48;

and,

2-PT-14.1, Charging Pump 2-CH-P-1A, Revision 44.

Other Surveillance Tests:

2-PT-33.10, Reactor Trip System Channel Operational Test for Reactor Coolant

Pump Bus 2A Underfrequency, Revision 9; and,

2-PT-33.7, Reactor Trip System Channel Operational Test for Reactor Coolant

Pump Bus 2A Undervoltage, Revision 10.

b.

Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

4.

OTHER ACTIVITIES

4OA1 Performance Indicator (PI) Verification

a.

Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the licensees procedures for developing the data for the

Barrier Integrity PI which are: (1) RCS Specific Activity; and (2) RCS Leakage. The

inspectors examined data reported to the NRC for the period April 2007 through March

14

2008. Procedural guidance for reporting PI information and records used by the

licensee to identify potential PI occurrences were also reviewed for both units. The

inspectors reviewed the licensee event reports, corrective action program documents,

and maintenance rules records as part of the verification process. The inspection was

conducted in accordance with NRC Inspection Procedure 71151, Performance Indicator

Verification. The applicable planning standards, 10 CFR 50.0 and NEI 99-02,

Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator Guidelines, were used as reference

criteria.

b.

Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

4OA2 Identification and Resolution of Problems

.1

Review of items Entered into the Corrective Action Program:

As required by Inspection Procedure 71152, Identification and Resolution of Problems,

and in order to help identify repetitive equipment failures or specific human performance

issues for follow-up, the inspectors performed a daily screening of items entered into the

licensees CAP. This review was accomplished by reviewing daily CR report summaries

and periodically attending daily CR Review Team meetings.

.2

Semi-Annual Review to Identify Trends

a.

Inspection Scope

As required by Inspection Procedure 71152, Identification and Resolution of Problems,

the inspectors performed a review of the licensees corrective action program and

associated documents to identify trends that could indicate the existence of a more

significant safety issue. The inspectors review was focused on repetitive equipment and

corrective maintenance issues but also considered the results of daily inspector

corrective action program item screening. The review also included issues documented

outside the normal correction action program in system health reports, corrective

maintenance works orders, component status reports, site monthly meeting reports and

maintenance rule assessments. The inspectors review nominally considered the six-

month period of January 1, 2008 through June 30, 2008. The inspectors compared and

contrasted their results with the results contained in the licensees latest integrated

quarterly assessment report. Corrective actions associated with a sample of the issues

identified in the licensees trend report were reviewed for adequacy.

b.

Assessments and Observations

No findings of significance were identified. In general, the licensee has identified trends

and has appropriately addressed the trends with their CAP. However, the inspectors

identified an adverse trend in the completion quality of safety-related work order

packages which may contain procedures used for performing maintenance or post-

maintenance tests (PMT). Specifically, the following deficiencies are indicated below:

15

WO 00787908-01: NRC identified incomplete foreign material exclusion (FME)

checklist; incorrect date, incorrect step completion.

WO 00796258-01: NRC identified no radiation work permit identified; incomplete

FME checklist, incorrect dates; incorrect step completion.

WO 00801525-01: NRC identified that PMT for motor heater operability test was

not performed.

WO 00801935-01: NRC identified missing signatures for work completion.

WO 00797498-01: Licensee identified missing FME checklist; missing Lift/Land

Lead sheet.

WO 00767749-01: NRC identified missing page of FME checklist; incorrect step

completion.

WO 00783887-02: NRC identified that PMT for motor heater operability test was

not performed.

WO 00790617-01: NRC identified missing FME checklist.

The licensee acknowledged the identified trend and entered all of the above

discrepancies into their CAP for appropriate corrective action.

.3

Annual Samples

CR091896, #1 Seal O-rings Installed on 1-B-RCP

a.

Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the licensees assessments and corrective actions for

CR091896, #1 Seal O-rings installed in 1-B RCP seal reach the end of qualified life.

The condition report was reviewed to ensure that the full extent of the issue was

identified, an appropriate evaluation was performed, and appropriate corrective actions

were specified and prioritized. The inspectors also evaluated the CR against the

requirements of the licensees CAP as specified in procedure, PI-AA-200, Rev 2,

05/06/08, "Corrective Action Program," and 10 CFR 50, Appendix B.

b.

Findings

No findings of significance were identified. On February 2, 2008, Unit 2 was removed

from service because of degrading seal performance on the A RCP. During the

licensees root cause evaluation, RCE000219, a procedural error was discovered in

preventative maintenance procedure for RCP seals, 0-MPM-0110-01, Rev 19, 03/06/06,

Reactor Coolant Pump Seal Injection, that involved replacement of the #1 seal high

temperature o-rings. Specifically, the procedure states that the applicable o-ring service

history and current leak data must be reviewed, and if the o-rings have been installed

greater than 9 years or the #1 seal leak rate changes by greater than 0.3 gallons per

minute, then component engineering must perform an evaluation to determine

requirements for inspection or seal replacement. However, the seal vendor technical

manual recommends replacement of the #1 seal ring and runner o-rings every 45,000

hours of operation or 6 years. The licensee reviewed seal replacement history for both

16

units and determined that the Unit 2 B RCP #1 seal high temperature o-rings were

installed in October, 2001, but were not replaced during a subsequent refueling outage

in 2007. The licensee initiated CR091896 for corrective action and performed an

apparent cause evaluation, ACE013661, which determined a cause category of

inadequate written instructions.

The inspectors reviewed ACE013661 and verified the cause and related corrective

actions. The inspectors also noted and reviewed compensatory measures, described

below, initiated by the licensee due to the potential impact of a seal failure on the

licensees 10 CFR 50, Appendix R analysis.

Initiate trending of Unit 2 B RCP #1 seal parameters for indications of degrading

performance.

Establish a twice per shift fire watch in the auxiliary building areas involving the

charging pumps, component cooling (CC) pumps and respective power supply

cables to reduce the risk of an fire resulting in a loss of normal and backup seal

cooling.

Establish zones prohibiting transient combustibles within 20 feet of Unit 1

charging pump power cables and reschedule any hot work involving

components in the areas of the charging pumps, CC pumps and respective

power cables. This protects the unit charging cross-tie function.

The inspectors will continue to monitor the licensees compensatory actions. The

inspectors also verified initiation of WO 00802328-01 to replace all o-rings in the Unit 2

B RCP #1 seal and actions to correct 0-MPM-0110-01.

CR094772, 2H EDG Oil Leakage Increasing and CR101714, Technical Specification

Violation for Two Service Water Pumps Inoperable for Greater Than Allowed Completion

Time

a.

Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed CR094772, "2H diesel oil leakage increasing," and related CRs

to ensure that the full extent of the issue was identified, an appropriate evaluation was

performed, and appropriate corrective actions were specified and prioritized. The

inspectors also evaluated the CR against the requirements of the licensees CAP as

specified in procedure, PI-AA-200, Rev 2, 05/06/08, "Corrective Action Program," and

10 CFR 50, Appendix B.

b.

Findings

No findings of significance were identified. On April 5, 2008, the licensee identified

increasing oil leakage on the '2H' EDG exhaust manifolds and performed an air roll of

the EDG which indicated the cylinders had excessive oil accumulation. The licensee

subsequently determined that the wrong size impeller had been installed in the standby

lube oil pump during a maintenance outage that occurred from March 24, 2008, through

March 29, 2008. The enforcement aspects are discussed in section 4OA7 of this report.

When the licensee declared '2H' EDG inoperable, they also declared the Unit 2 A SW

17

pump inoperable on April 5, 2008, in accordance with TS 3.8.1, due to inoperability of

the Unit 1 B SW pump, which was removed from service on April 1, 2008, and entered

a 72 hour8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> LCO under TS 3.7.8. The Unit 1 B SW pump was subsequently returned to

service on April 6, 2008, and 2H EDG was returned to service on April 9, 2008. The

inspectors determined that the licensee correctly implemented Technical Specifications

from the time the service water pumps and EDG were declared inoperable; therefore,

there was no performance deficiency.

The inspectors reviewed the completed root cause evaluation, RCE000225, and related

documents including the licensees probabilistic risk analysis. The inspectors

determined that the installation of the incorrect impeller affected the EDG operability,

which also affected the operability of the associated service water pump. The inspectors

noted that although the Unit 2 A SW pump was technically inoperable, it remained

available based on the availability of its normal power supply. The licensee entered this

problem into their CAP as CR101714 and submitted Licensee Event Report 05000338,

339/2008-001-00 to document the problem.

4OA3 Event Followup

.1

(Closed) Licensee Event Report (LER) 05000339/2007-004-00 and Revised LER

05000339/2007-004-01: Automatic Reactor Trip Due to Loss of Coolant Flow with

Power Greater Than 30 Percent

On December 25, 2007, at 2110 hours0.0244 days <br />0.586 hours <br />0.00349 weeks <br />8.02855e-4 months <br />, with Unit 2 at approximately full rated thermal

power an automatic reactor trip occurred due to loss of coolant flow in the B loop. The

cause was determined to be a trip of the B RCP motor due to actuation of the neutral

over current protection relay. The licensee installed a spare motor in order to return the

unit to service. The licensee documented the corrective actions associated with this

event in CR027748. The inspectors reviewed the LER and related cause evaluations.

This LER is closed.

.2

(Closed) LER 05000338, 339/2008-001-00: Two Service Water Pumps Inoperable

Greater Than Technical Specification Allowed Completion Time.

On April 1, 2008, the Unit 1 B SW pump was removed from service for motor

maintenance. On April 5, 2008, the Unit 2 2H EDG was declared inoperable due to

excessive oil leakage from the exhaust manifolds. In compliance with TS, inoperability

of the 2H EDG also rendered the Unit 2 A SW pump inoperable resulting in a 72 hour8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />

LCO per TS 3.7.8 for the SW system. Subsequently, the cause of the 2H EDG

inoperability was identified as an incorrect impeller installed in the associated standby

lube oil pump during a maintenance outage for the 2H EDG from March 24 through

March 29, 2008. Consequently, the two SW pumps were inoperable for greater than the

TS allowed completion time. The inspectors completed a review of the LER and related

corrective action documents.

18

4OA5 Other Activities

.1

(Closed) Temporary Instruction (TI) 2515/166, Pressurized Water reactor Containment

Sump Blockage (NRC Generic Letter 2004-02) Units 1 & 2

a.

Inspection Scope

The inspector reviewed the status of the implementation of the licensees actions in

response to Generic Letter (GL) 2004-02, Potential Impact of Debris Blockage on

Emergency Recirculation During Design Basis Accidents at Pressurized Water Reactors,

for Units 1 and 2. The onsite inspections which verified the installation of modifications

were performed in April and October of 2007 (NRC Report Nos.: 50-338,339/2007003

and 50-338,339/2007005). The licensees GL 2004-02 commitments which were

incomplete at the time of the on-site inspections included chemical effects and

downstream effects analyses to support the installed strainer design and program

changes to assure the assumptions of the GL 2004-02 /GSI-191 design basis

assumptions remained valid. The inspector requested information to review the status of

the incomplete commitment items and performed an in-office review during the week of

May 5-9, 2008, to verify completion of the outstanding commitment items.

The inspector reviewed the licensee design and licensing documentation to verify that

the GL 2004-02 modifications and program changes were complete and to determine

the status of GL 2004-02 commitments which were not completed during the previous

onsite inspections

b.

Findings

No findings of significance were identified. Plant physical modifications and program

changes identified in the licensees initial and supplemental responses to GL 2004-02

were complete.

The chemical effects and downstream analyses were not complete. A completion date

extension for these analyses was granted until May 31, 2008 (USNRC letter to VEPCO,

dated 12/13/07). The licensee requested additional extension to September 30, 2008

(Dominion letter to USNRC, dated May 22, 2008). Any additional plant changes

identified as a result of these analyses will be reviewed via the routine design control

inspection activity implemented by the existing reactor oversight program.

A violation was identified and documented in a previous NRC inspection report related to

implementation of the GL 2004-02 strainer modification, NCV 05000339/2008002-04,

Inadequate Design Control Involving Unit 2 Containment Sump Strainer Gaps.

This documentation of TI-2515/166 completion as well as any results of sampling audits

of licensee actions will be reviewed by the NRC staff (Office of Nuclear Reactor

Regulation - NRR) as input along with the GL 2004-02 Potential Impact of Debris

Blockage on Emergency Recirculation During Design Basis Accidents at Pressurized-

Water Reactors responses to support closure of GL 2004-02 and Generic Safety Issue

(GSI)-191 Assessment of Debris Accumulation on Pressurized-Water Reactor (PWR)

19

Sump Performance." The NRC will notify each licensee by letter of the results of the

overall assessment as to whether GSI-191 and GL 2004-02 have been satisfactorily

addressed at that licensees plant(s). Completion of TI-2515/166 does not necessarily

indicate that a licensee has finished all testing and analyses needed to demonstrate the

adequacy of their modifications and procedure changes. Licensees may also have

obtained approval of plant-specific extensions that allow for later implementation of plant

modifications. Licensees will confirm completion of all corrective actions to the NRC.

The NRC will track all such yet-to-be-performed items identified in the TI-2515/166

inspection reports to completion and may choose to inspect implementation of some or

all of them.

.2

Quarterly Resident Inspector Observations of Security Personnel and Activities

a.

Inspection Scope

During the inspection period, the inspectors conducted observations of security force

personnel and activities to ensure that the activities were consistent with the licensee

security procedures and regulatory requirements relating to nuclear plant security.

These observations took place during both normal and off-normal plant working hours.

These quarterly resident inspector observations of security force personnel and activities

did not constitute additional inspection samples. They were considered an integral part

of the inspectors normal plant status review.

b.

Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

.3

Review of the Operation of an Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation

(Inspection Procedure 60855.1)

a.

Inspection Scope

Inspectors reviewed the normal operations of the ISFSI. The inspectors walked down

the ISFSI pad to assess the material condition of the casks, the installation of security

equipment, and the performance of the monitoring systems. In preparation for an

upcoming cask load involving the NUHOMS design the inspectors reviewed licensee

cask loading and handling procedures and reviewed previous cask loading and ISFSI

related plant issues and corrective actions status. Additionally, the inspectors observed

cask loading during the week of June 2, 2008, to verify that work was performed in

accordance with approved procedures and that loaded fuel assemblies were identified

and recorded in a controlled document.

b.

Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

20

4OA6 Meetings, Including Exit

.1

Exit Meeting Summary

On July 9, 2008 and July 30, 2008, the senior resident inspector presented the

inspection results for the routine integrated quarterly report to Mr. Dan Stoddard and

other members of the staff. The licensee acknowledged the findings. The inspectors

asked the licensee whether any of the material examined during the inspection should

be considered proprietary. No proprietary information was identified.

On August 22, 2008, the Acting Chief, Reactor Projects Branch 5 presented the revised

inspection results for the routine integrated quarterly report to Mr. Page Kemp.

.2

Temporary Instruction 2515/166 Exit Meeting

An interim meeting was conducted via telephone on May 27, 2008 with Mr. P. Kemp.

.3

10 CFR 50.59, Modifications Exit Meeting

An interim exit meeting with licensee management and staff was conducted on June 4,

2008, to discuss the results of this inspection. Proprietary information, reviewed by the

team as part of routine inspection activities, was returned to the licensee in accordance

with prescribed controls.

4OA7 Licensee Identified Violations

The following violation of very low safety significance (Green) was identified by the

licensee and is a violation of NRC requirements which meet the criteria of Section VI of

the NRC Enforcement Policy, NUREG-1600 for characterization as a NCV:

10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, requires in part that activities affecting quality

shall be prescribed and accomplished by documented instructions of a type

appropriate to the circumstances. Contrary to this, on April 5, 2008, the instructions

involving a part number for a pump impeller in a work order to repair the standby

lube oil pump were incorrectly prescribed and accomplished. This issue is in the

licensees CAP as CR094772 (4OA3).

ATTACHMENT: SUPPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION

Attachment

SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION

KEY POINTS OF CONTACT

Licensee personnel:

V. Armentrout, SG Programs, ISI Corporate

J. Bailey, Manager Vendor Quality

J. Breeden, Supervisor, Radioactive Analysis and Material Control

W. Corbin, Director, Nuclear Engineering

R. Evans, Manager, Radiological Protection and Chemistry

R. Foster, Supply Chain Manager

E. Hendrixson, Director, Nuclear Safety and Licensing

S. Hughes, Manager, Nuclear Operations

P. Kemp, Supervisor, Station Licensing

J. Kirkpatrick, Manager, Nuclear Maintenance

L. Lane, Plant Manager

G. Lear, Manager, Organizational Effectiveness

J. Leberstien, Licensing Technical Consultant

T. Maddy, Manager, Nuclear Protection Services

M. Main, Component Engineer

G. Marshall, Manager, Nuclear Outage and Planning

C. McClain, Manager, Nuclear Training

J. McHale, Engineering Supervisor

F. Mladen, Manager, Nuclear Site Services

B. Morrison, Supervisor Nuclear Engineering

J. Rayman, Nuclear Emergency Preparedness

J. Scott, Supervisor, Nuclear Training (operations)

D. Stoddard, Site Vice President

R. Williams, Component Engineer

LIST OF ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED AND DISCUSSED

Opened and Closed 05000338/2008003-01

NCV

Failure to Adequately Establish Procedural Requirements

for Air Start Check Valve Maintenance for the '1H' EDG

(1R12)

Closed

2515/166

TI

Pressurized Water Reactor Containment Sump Blockage

(NRC Generic Letter 2004-02) Units 1 & 2 (Section

4OA5.1)

A-2

Attachment

05000339/2007-004-00

LER

Automatic Reactor Trip Due to Loss of Coolant Flow With

Power Greater Than 30 Percent

05000339/2007-004-01

LER

Automatic Reactor Trip Due to Loss of Coolant Flow With

Power Greater Than 30 Percent (Revised)

05000338, 339/2008-001-00 LER

Two Service Water Pumps Inoperable Greater Than

Technical Specification Allowed Completion Time

Discussed

None

A-3

Attachment

LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED

Section 1R17: Evaluations of Changes, Tests, or Experiments and Permanent Plant

Modifications

Full Evaluations

99-SE-MOD-04, Fuel Assembly Repair 4/15/1999

06-SE-MOD-01, Abandonment of Incore Thermocouples, 3/29/2006

06-SE-OT-01, Reload Safety Evaluation, 3/31/2006

06-SE-OT-02, Technical Report NE-1453, Rev. 0, Addendum 002, Reload Safety

Evaluation, North Anna 2 Cycle 18 Pattern MOE, 3/31/2006

07-SE-OT-01, Reduced Recirculation Spray Pump Flowrates, 9/3/2007

07-SE-ST-01, Special Test Procedure, 0-ST-FP-001, Low Pressure CO2 Blower Door

Test, 8/27/2007

DCP-99-003, Fuel Assembly Repair, 4/15/1999 (associated with 99-SE-MOD-04)

DCP-99-169, Charging Pump Upgrades, 1/27/2000

TSCR N-018, Eliminate Transmitter Response Time Testing Requirements, 9/11/2007

Screened Out Items - Modifications

DCP 01-121, Safety Injection (SI) Accumulator Nozzle Replacement, 3/17/2001

DCP 01-160, Replacement of Vital Bus Inverters 1-III & 1-IV, 12/02/2005

DCP 01-162, Replacement of Vital Bus Inverters 2-III and 2-IV, 4/28/2005

DCP 02-015, Pump Modifications to Support Operations with Low Lake Anna Level,

10/24/2002

DCP 02-016, Revision to Lake Anna Minimum Level, 3/24/2004

DCP 02-161, Emergency Diesel Fuel Oil Drain Header Replacement, 10/2/2002

DCP 04-150, Install Manual Switch to Close FP Dampers in Unit 1&2 Emergency

Switchgear Rooms, 12/16/2004

DCP 05-007, Design Basis for North Anna Spent Fuel 100 hr Core Offload, 10/6/2005

DCP 05-112, Replace FW Temperature RTDs and Re-Scale Loop, 01/11/2006

DCP 05-117, Removal of Spare 7300 Process Cards, 6/1/2005

DCP 05-143, Relocation of Switchyard Breaker H502, and Replacement of Switchyard

Breakers G1th% and G102, 02/07/2006

DCP 05-152, HV Motor Replacement, 1/26/06

DCP 06-138, Control Room Recorder Replacement, 12/14/2006

Screened Out Items - Item Equivalency Evaluation Review (Like for Like)

IEER NOM00163-000, Mechanical Seal 01-SW-P-22A/B-Pump, Chesterton 180 Seal

Replacing Chesterton 123 Seal, 10/23/2006

IEER 10000001417, Installation of Chesterton 180 Seal Replacing Chesterton 123 on

1-SW-P-22A/B, 5/7/2008

IEER NEL00950-000, RCS Temperature Transmitter, 6/7/2006

IEER NEL00984-000, Emergency Diesel Generator Battery, 11/29/2006

IEER NEL00961-000, Transient Event Recorder Power Supply - Replace Filter

Capacitor; Model 53D to Model 066151U400JS2, 05/09/2006

IEER NEL01012-000, Circuit Breaker - Eaton Model, 4/20/2007

IEER NVL 0009-002, 3 Globe Valve 1500#, 6/12/2006

A-4

Attachment

IEER NVL 0175-000, 1/2 in. brass valve with Stainless Steel Trim, Air Operated valve,

Powers Flowrite 593ss in lieu of 591-7971, 9/6/2006

Screened Out Items Procurement Technical Evaluation (Commercial Grade Dedication)

PTE 000 NOM00020-A03, Pump W/Motor, Service Water Radiation Monitoring,

01-SW-P-10, 4/18/2002

PTE 42057909, 1 Inch brass relief valve for Control Room Chillers, 7/30/2007

Design Basis Documents

SDBD-NAPS-EA, North Anna Power Generation System, Revision 10

SDBD-NAPS-FP, System Design Basis Document for Fire Protection System North

Anna Power Station, Revision 9

SDBD-NAPS-FP, DBD Change Request NFP-2007-06

SDBD-NAPS-FP, DBD Change Request NFP-2008-01

SDBD-NAPS-FP, System Design Basis Document for Control Room Ventilation System

North Anna Power Station, Revision 8

SDBD-NAPS-HC, DBD Change Request NHC-2005-03

Licensing Basis Documents

Technical Specifications, Current

Updated Final Safety Analysis Report, Current

Corrective Actions

N-2005-4372-R1, Initial Load Bank Testing on Inverter 2-IV Failed, 10/13/2005

Procedures

VPAP-3001, Safety and Regulatory Reviews, Revision 15

DNAP-3004, Dominion Program for 10 CFR 50.59 and 10 CFR 72.48 - Changes,

Tests, and Experiments, Revision2

0-AP-10, Loss of Electrical Power, Revision 59

1-AP-20, Operation From the Auxiliary Shutdown Panel, Revision 23

2-AP-20, Operation From the Auxiliary Shutdown Panel, Revision 21

0-FS-CR-1, Control Room - Units 1 and 2 Safe Shutdown Equipment, Revision 0

1-OP-26.5, 120 V Vital Bus Distribution Revision 27

0-FCA-1, Mitigation of Spurious Valve Operation, Revision 34

0-NAT-E-001, Revision 0, Electrical Loop Functional Checkout Action Sheet, 10/13/2005

1-PT-138.3B, Combined Charging Pump 1B Head curve Verification and HHSI Branch

Flow Verification, Revision 6 and Revision 8

2-PT-138.AB, Combined Charging Pump 1A Head curve Verification and HHSI Branch

Flow Verification, Revision 5

0-ST-FP-001, Low Pressure CO2 Blower Door Test, Revision 0

1-ICP-RC-L-1460, Revision 3, Pressurizer Level Protection Channel II Calibration,

9/13/2007

NASES 6.20, Revision 1, Test Plan for DCP 01-162, 4/26/2005

47241, Test Procedure for Seismic Testing of One DC Inverter, 5/20/2002

A-5

Attachment

Work Orders

1-PT-31.8.2-779573-01, Pressurizer Level Protection Channel II Calibration

Calculations

131035-Z2-2, Low Pressure CO2 Hydraulic Calculations, Unit 2, Revision 1

EE-0057, DC Equipment Sizing, Revision 1

EE-0718, North Anna Feedwater Temperature Uncertainty, Revision 0

EE-0718, North Anna Feedwater Temperature Uncertainty, Revision 1

14258.79-E-4, Short Circuit Currents 120 V AC Vital Buses and Misc. Circuits-App. R

Evaluation, Revision 1

ME-0491, Spent Fuel Pit Cooling System Analysis, Revision 0

NE-0154, Minimum Quantity for Fire Protection Low Pressure CO2 Tanks 1-FP-TK-06

and 1-FP-TK-5, Revision 002

NE-0165, Volume Calculation of North Anna Fire Zones Protected by Low Pressure CO2

Revision 000

Drawings

N-04150-0-1FE12AR, Wiring Diagram - Emergency Switchgear Room - Halon 1301

Aux Relay & Abort / Lockout Panels - North Anna Power Station - Units 1 & 2, Revision

0

N-04150-0-1FP089, Sheet 1, Fire Protection System - Unit 1 Emergency Switchgear

Room Halon Control & Alarm, Revision 0

N-04150-0-2FP041, Sheet 1, Fire Protection System - Unit 2 Emergency Switchgear

Room Halon Control & Alarm, Revision 0

N-051430101FE1BD, One Line Switching Diagram Switchyard, Revision 0

N-05143-1-FE1BB, One Line Diagram Electrical Distribution System, Revision 0

N-05143-1-1ESK4CC-1-A, Outline Switchyard Monitor Panel, Revision 0

N-05143-1-1ESK4CC-1-B, Outline Switchyard Monitor Panel, Revision1

11715-FE-1BB, One Line Diagram Electrical Distribution System, Revision 39

11715-FE-1BD, One Line Switching Diagram Switchyard, Revision 11

11715-FE-1BD, One Line Switching Diagram Switchyard, Revision 27

11715-FH-32A, Treatment Lagoon Discharge Structure Dike III SH-1 North Anna Power

Station, Revision 5

NA-DW-6008D13, Loop #1 Feedwater Control System, Revision 0

NA-DW-6008D49, Loop #2 Feedwater Control System, Revision 0

NA-DW-6008D63, Loop #3 Feedwater Control System, Revision 0

Post Modification Testing

NASES 6.20 Attachment 2, Test Plan for DCP 05-112, Revision 1

NASES 6.22 Attachment 2, Testing and Inspection of FW RTDs for DCP 05-112,

Revision 0

Testing Release for 1-RC-LR-1310A, 02/19/2007

Testing Release for 2-RC-LR-2310A, 02/15/2007

Testing Release for 1-LM-PR-110B, 02/13/2007

Testing Release for 1-RH-TR-1604, 01/31/2007

Testing Release for 2-FW-LR-2477, 01/31/2007

Testing Release for 2-RH-TR-2604, 01/31/2007

Testing Release for 1-LW-FR-104, 01/10/2007

A-6

Attachment

Testing Release for 1-L0-XR-SGVRP, 01/31/2007

Testing Release for 2-LO-XR-SGVRP, 02/05/2007

Testing Release for 2-LM-PR-210B, 02/12/2007

Testing Release for 1-HC-H2R-101-1, 02/22/2007

Testing Release for 2-HC-H2R-201-2, 01/10/2007

Testing Release for 2-FW-FR-2478, 02/26/2007

Testing Release for 2-FW-FR-2488, 02/26/2007

Testing Release for 2-FW-FR-2498, 02/27/2007

Calibration Data

Calibration Data Record for NQC-0496, 06/02/2006

Calibration Data Record for NQC-0496, 11/30/2005

Calibration Data Record for NQC-0496, 01/02/2008

Calibration Data Record for NQC-0496, 06/04/2007

Calibration Data Record for NQC-0496, 12/01/2006

Technical Reports

NE-1401, Rev. 0, Operational Impact of Framatome Fuel and use of the

CASMO/SIMULATE Code Package at North Anna, April 2, 2004

NE-1452, Rev. 0, Reload Safety Analysis Checklist North Anna 2 Cycle 18 Pattern MOE,

September 22, 2005

NE-1453, Rev. 0, Addendum 002, Reload Safety Evaluation, North Anna 2 Cycle 18

Pattern MOE, April 2006

Engineering Transmittals

ET-SE-99-086, Evaluation of Hydraulic Performance of CH/HHSI Rotating Assembly

Ingersoll-Dresser serial Number NE012911-01 - North Anna Power Station, Unit 1 and 2,

Revision 0

ET-N-01-122, Evaluation of Hydraulic Performance of CH/HHSI Rotating Assembly

Flowserve BR/Order 7029-2673 - North Anna Power Station, Unit 1 and 2, Revision 0

ET-N-02-068, Evaluation of Replacement Rotating Element for Charging Pump

2-CH-P-1B - North Anna Power Station, Unit 2, Revision 0

ET- N-03-0144, Evaluation of Replacement Rotating Element for Charging Pump

2-CH-P-1A - North Anna Power Station, Unit 2, Revision 0

ET- N-04-0057, Evaluation of Replacement Rotating Element for Charging Pump

2-CH-P-1C - North Anna Power Station, Unit 1, Revision 0

ET- N-05-0072, Evaluation of Replacement Rotating Element for Charging Pump

2-CH-P-1B - North Anna Power Station, Unit 1, Revision 0

ET-N-07-0049, Revision to North Anna Technical Specifications Bases to Eliminate

Periodic Pressure Sensor Response Time Tests and Periodic Protection Channel

Response Time Tests, Revision 0

ET-N-07-0077, Evaluation of Low Pressure CO2 System Vendor Calculation and Blower

Test, Revision 1

ET-N-07-0109, Estimating Water Flow Rate through Dike 3, Revision 0

A-7

Attachment

Vendor Manuals

59-W813-00006, Vendor Technical Manual for Weed Instrument RTD Temperature

Sensors

59-5984-00004, Component List For A Bill of Material, 3/20/02

Miscellaneous documents

AREVA Letter FAB06-226, North Anna Advanced Mark-BW Top Nozzle Change

Evaluation, March 29, 2006

Request for Engineering Assistance - Tracking No. R2003-128, 8/27/2003

NCRODP-6, Fire Protection System, 5/2/2007

Procurement Engineering Inspection Plan 208, 4/18/2002

Purchase Order no. 45526645, 7/18/2007

O-MAT-E-001, Electrical Loop Functional Checkout Sheet

Short Circuit Simulation Results for G102-1 and G102-2

NAP-0111, Specification for Vital Bus Static Inverters, Revision 0

CM-NA-FCI-0213, Enhanced Surveillance Program for Rosemount Transmitters IAW

CB 90-01: Loss of Oil-Fill in Transmitters Manufactured by Rosemount, Revison 0

LBDCR N-018, TS Bases Change Eliminate Periodic Pressure Sensor Response Time

Tests and Periodic Protection Channel Response Time Tests, Revision 0

WCAP-14036-P-A, Elimination of Periodic Protection Channel Response Time Tests,

Revision 1

Corrective Actions Written as a Result of this Inspection

CR100465, Receipt Inspection Package contains typographical error, 6/3/2008

Section 4OA5: Other Activities

Temporary Instruction (TI) 2515/166

Procedure VPAP-0301, Design Change Process, Revision 26

Procedure VPAP-0905, Insulation Control Program, Revision 4

DNES-VA-MAT-1007, Protective Coating Requirements for procured Equipment to be

Installed Inside Containment, Revision 0

Letter, VEPCO to USNRC, North Anna Power Station Units 1 and 2, Supplemental

Response to NRC GL 2004-02 Potential Impact of Debris Blockage on Emergency

Recirculation During Design Basis Accidents at PWRs, dated February 29, 2008

Letter, USNRC to VEPCO, Kewaunee Power Station, Millstone Power Station, Units 2

and 3, North Anna Power Station Unit 1 and 2, Request for Extension of Completion

Dates for GL 2004-02 Corrective Actions, dated December 13, 2007

Design Change Package DCP-06015, NRC GSI-191, RWST Level ESFAS Function to

Support Containment Sump Modification, 08/14/07

Design Change Package DCP-07005, NRC GSI-191, Containment Sump Strainer

Interferences, 08/08/07

Design Change Package DCP-07129, NRC GSI-191, Piping Isulation Modifications,

08/08/07

A-8

Attachment

LIST OF ACRONYMS

ADAMS

Agency-wide Document Access and Management System

CA

Corrective Action

CAP

Corrective Action Program

CFR

Code of Federal Regulations

CR

Condition Report

EDG

Emergency Diesel Generator

IMC

Inspection Manual Chapter

JPM

Job Performance Measures

LHSI

Low Head Safety Injection

NCV

Non-cited Violation

NRC

Nuclear Regulatory Commission

OD

Operability Determination

PARS

Publicly Available Records

PI

Performance Indicator

QS

Quench Spray

RCE

Root Cause Evaluation

RCP

Reactor Coolant Pump

RCS

Reactor Coolant System

RTP

Rated Thermal Power

SDP

Significance Determination Process

SR

Surveillance Requirements

TDAFWP

Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump

TS

Technical Specifications

UFSAR

Updated Final Safety Analysis Report

URI

Unresolved Item

VEPCO

Virginia Electric and Power Company

VPAP

Virginia Power Administrative Procedure

WO

Work Order