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Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1 Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report Completion
	ML16350A329
Person / Time
Site:	Hatch
Issue date:	12/15/2016
From:	Pierce C; Southern Nuclear Operating Co
To:	; Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
	NL-16-2466
	Download: ML16350A329 (71)
	v • d • e

~ Southern Nuclear Charles R. Pierce Regulatory Affairs Director 40 Inverness Center Parkway Post Office Box 1295 Birmingham, AL 35242 205 992 7872 tel 205 992 7601 fax crpierce@ southernco.com December 15, 2016 Docket Nos.: 50-321 NL-16-2466 50-366 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Document Control Desk Washington, D. C. 20555-0001 Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant- Units 1 and 2 Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1 Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report Completion

References:

1. NRC Letter, Request for Information Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.54(f) Regarding Recommendations 2.1, 2.3, and 9.3 of the NTTF Review of Insights from the Fukushima Daiichi Accident, dated March 12, 2012.

2. NEI Letter to NRC, Proposed Path Forward for NTTF Recommendation 2. 1: Seismic Reevaluations, dated April 9, 2013.

3. NRC Letter, EPRI Final Draft Report XXXXXX, "Seismic Evaluation Guidance: Augmented Approach for the Resolution of Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2. 1:

Seismic" as an Acceptable Alternative to the March 12, 2012, Information Request for Seismic Reevaluations, dated May 7, 2013.

4. Letter to NRC, Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant, Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report -

Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1, December 30, 2014.

ML15049A502.

5. Letter to NRC, Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant, Request for Additional Information Regarding Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report, April 16, 2015. ML15106A549.

6. NRC letter, Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2- Staff Review of Interim Evaluation Associated with Reevaluated Seismic Hazard Implementation Associated with Reevaluated Seismic Hazard Implementation of the Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1, July 22,2015. ML15201A474.

Ladies and Gentlemen:

On March 12, 2012, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) issued a request for information pursuant to 10 CFR 50.54(f) associated with the recommendations of the Fukushima Near-Term Task Force (NTTF) (Reference 1). Enclosure 1 of Reference 1 requested each licensee to reevaluate the seismic hazards at their sites using present-day NRC requirements and guidance, and to identify actions taken or planned to address plant-specific vulnerabilities associated with the updated seismic hazards.

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission NL-16-2466 Page2 The NRC endorsed Reference 3 as an acceptable alternative to the information requested in Reference 1. Reference 3 also provided NRC staff approval of the schedule modifications requested by Reference 2. Based on the modified schedule, Central and Eastern United States (CEUS) licensees were required to submit the reports resulting from the Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) by December 2014. Reference 4 provided the Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant ESEP Report for Units 1 and 2.

Following the submittal of the Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant ESEP Report, Southern Nuclear Operating Company (SNC) received a request for additional information (transmitted electronically) by the NRC on April 7, 2015 and Reference 5 provided a SNC response to the NRC. In Reference 6, the NRC staff concluded that the licensee's implementation of the interim evaluation meets the intent of the guidance. Reference 4 contained regulatory commitments to complete walkdowns, evaluations and any necessary modifications not requiring an outage by December 2016 and submit results letters to NRC within 90 days following completion of ESEP activities. Accordingly, walkdowns and evaluations have been completed and no modifications were determined to be necessary. Revision 1 of the Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant ESEP Report is provided in Enclosure 1. An updated table of the actions associated with completion of the ESEP Activities, with an updated schedule for each, is provided in Enclosure 2.

This letter completes the NRC commitments described in Enclosure 3 and contains no new NRC Commitments. If you have any questions, please contact John Giddens at 205.992.7924.

Mr. C. R. Pierce states he is the Regulatory Affairs Director for Southern Nuclear Operating Company, is authorized to execute this oath on behalf of Southern Nuclear Operating Company and, to the best of his knowledge and belief, the facts set forth in this letter are true.

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Enclosures:

1. Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report- Revision 1

2. Required Actions and Schedule for Completion of ESEP Activities- Updated

3. Table of Regulatory Commitments

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission NL-16-2466 Page 3 cc: Southern Nuclear Operating Company Mr. S. E. Kuczynski, Chairman, President & CEO Mr. D. G. Bost, Executive Vice President & Chief Nuclear Officer Mr. D. R. Vineyard, Vice President- Hatch Mr. M. D. Meier, Vice President- Regulatory Affairs Mr. D. R. Madison, Vice President- Fleet Operations Mr. B. J. Adams, Vice President- Engineering Mr. G. L. Johnson, Regulatory Affairs Manager- Hatch RType: CHA02.004 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Ms. C. Haney, Regional Administrator Mr. M. D. Orenak, NRR Project Manager- Hatch Mr. D. H. Hardage, Senior Resident Inspector- Hatch State of Georgia Mr. R.E. Dunn, Director- Environmental Protection Division

Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant - Units 1 and 2 Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1 Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report Completion Enclosure 1 Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report Revision 1, dated December 1, 2016 (61 pages)

Plant Hatch Units 1 and 2 Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP)

Report MPR-4121 Revision 1 December 1, 20 16 QUALITY ASSURANCE DOCUMENT This document has been prepared, reviewed, and approved in accordance with the Quality Assurance requirements of 10CFR50 Appendix 8 and/or ASME NQA-1, as specified in the MPR Nuclear Quality Assurance Program.

Prepared by: '(~ Q 'I(~

Kimberly A. Keithline Reviewed by: H. o/'~

Mojtaba Oghbaei Approved by: ~d~

Caroline S. Schlaseman Prepared for Southern Nuclear Operating Company 320 KING STREET ALEXANDRIA, VA 22314-3230 703-519-0200 FAX: 703-519-0224 http:\\www.mpr.com

RECORD OF REVISIONS Revision Affected Pages Description 0 All Initial issue.

I i, ii, iii, 2, 3, 4, 5, 19, Updated to reflect revision of ESEL and completion of ESEP 23,24,25,27 for FLEX equipment installation.

Attachment A, Attachment B MPR-4121 Ill Revision I

Contents Executive Summary ...................................................................................................... 1 1 Purpose and Objective ......................................................................................... 2 2 Brief Summary of the FLEX Seismic Implementation Strategies ..................... 3 3 Equipment Selection Process and ESEL. ........................................................... 6 3.1 Equipment Selection Process and ESEL ...................................................................... 6 3.1.1 ESEL Development ............................................................................................. 6 3 .1.2 Power Operated Valves ....................................................................................... 7 3.1.3 Pull Boxes ........................................................................................................... 7 3.1.4 Termination Cabinets .......................................................................................... 8 3.1.5 Critical Instrumentation Indicators ..................................................................... 8 3.1.6 Phase 2 and Phase 3 Piping Connections ............................................................ 8 3.1.7 Inaccessible Valve Interlocks .............................................................................. 8 3.2 Justification for Use of Equipment that is not the Primary Means for FLEX Implementation ................................................ ....................................................................... 8 4 Ground Motion Response Spectrum (GMRS) .................................................... 9 4.1 Plot of GMRS Submitted by Licensee .......................................................................... 9 4.2 Comparison to SSE ..................................................................................................... I 0 5 Review Level Ground Motion (RLGM) ............................................................... 14 5.I Description of RLGM Selected .................................................................................. 14 5.2 Method to Estimate In-Structure Response Spectrum (ISRS) .................................... 16 6 Seismic Margin Evaluation Approach ............................................................... 17 6.1 Summary of Methodologies Used .............................................................................. 17 6.2 HCLPF Screening Process .......................................................................................... 17 6.3 Seismic Walkdown Approach .................................................................................... 18 6.3.1 Walkdown Approach ........................................................................................ 18 6.3.2 Application of Previous Walkdown Information .............................................. 19 6.3.3 Significant Walkdown Findings ........................................................................ 20 MPR-4121 Rev1sion I

6.4 HCLPF Calculation Process ....................................................................................... 20 6.5 Functional Evaluation of Relays ................................................................................. 20 6.6 Tabulated ESEL HCLPF Values (Including Key Failure Modes) ............................. 21 7 Inaccessible Items .............................................................................................. 22 7.1 Identification of ESEL Items Inaccessible for Walkdown ......................................... 22 7.2 Planned Walkdown/Evaluation Schedule/Close Out.. ................................................ 23 8 ESEP Conclusions and Results ........................................................................ 24 8.1 Supporting Information .............................................................................................. 24 8.2 Identification of Planned Modifications ..................................................................... 25 8.3 Modification Implementation Schedule ..................................................................... 25 8.4 Summary of Regulatory Commitments ...................................................................... 25 9 References .......................................................................................................... 26 Attachment A: Plant Hatch Unit 1 ESEL. .............................................................. A-1 Attachment B: Plant Hatch Unit 2 ESEL ............................................................... B-1 MPR*4121 v Revision I

Tables Table 4-1. GMRS for Plant Hatch Units 1 and 2 ........................................................................... 10 Table 4-2. Horizontal Design Basis Earthquake (DBE) for Plant Hatch Unit 1............................ 12 Table 4-3. Horizontal Design Basis Earthquake (DBE) for Plant Hatch Unit 2 ............................ 13 Table 5-1. Plant Hatch IPEEE RLE ............................................................................................... 15 Table A-1 . Plant Hatch Unit 1 ESEL Items and HCLPF Results ............................................... A-1 Table B-1. Plant Hatch Unit 2 ESEL Items and HCLPF Results ................................................ B-1 MPR-4121 VI Rev iston I

Figures Figure 2-1. Electrical Diagram for Plant Hatch FLEX Strategies (Reference 21) ......................... .4 Figure 2-2. Flow Diagram for Plant Hatch FLEX Strategies (Reference 21) ................................. 5 Figure 4-1. Plant Hatch GMRS ........................................................................................................ 9 Figure 4-2 . Horizontal Design Basis Earthquake (DBE) and GMRS for Plant Hatch .................. ]]

Figure 5-1. Hatch IPEEE RLE Compared to the Unit I and Unit 2 DBEs and the GMRS ........... l5 MPR-4121 vii Revis1on I

Executive Summary Plant Hatch Units I and 2 have performed the Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) as an interim action in response to the NRC's 50.54(f) letter (Reference 1). The purpose was to demonstrate seismic margin through a review of a subset of the plant equipment that can be relied upon to protect the reactor core following beyond design basis seismic events. The ESEP was performed using the methodologies in the NRC-endorsed industry guidance in EPRI 3002000704, Seismic Evaluation Guidance: Augmented Approach for the Resolution of Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1 - Seismic (Reference 2). As a result of the ESEP, no modifications have been identified as necessary to meet ESEP acceptance criteria specified in Reference 2.

MPR-4121 Rev ision I 1

1 Purpose and Objective Following the accident at the Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear power plant resulting from the March II, 20 II, Great Tohoku Earthquake and subsequent tsunami, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) established a Near Term Task Force (NTTF) to conduct a systematic review ofNRC processes and regulations and to determine if the agency should make additional improvements to its regulatory system. The NTTF developed a set of recommendations intended to clarify and strengthen the regulatory framework for protection against natural phenomena.

Subsequently, the NRC issued a 50.54(f) letter on March I2, 20I2 (Reference I), requesting information to assure that these recommendations are addressed by all U.S. nuclear power plants.

The 50.54(f) letter requests that licensees and holders of construction permits under I 0 CFR Part 50 reevaluate the seismic hazards at their sites against present-day NRC requirements and guidance. NRC has considered the need for further risk assessment based on a review of the re-evaluated hazard and available risk information and has concluded that a seismic probabilistic risk assessment (SPRA) is not warranted for Plant Hatch Units I and 2 (Reference I8).

This report describes the Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) undertaken for Plant Hatch Units I and 2. The intent of the ESEP is to perform an interim action in response to the NRC's 50.54(f) letter (Reference I) to demonstrate seismic margin through a review of a subset of the plant equipment that can be relied upon to protect the reactor core following beyond design basis seismic events.

The ESEP is implemented using the methodologies in the NRC-endorsed industry guidance in EPRI 3002000704, Seismic Evaluation Guidance: Augmented Approach for the Resolution of Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.I - Seismic (Reference 2).

The objective of this report is to provide summary information describing the ESEP evaluations and results. The level of detail provided in the report is intended to enable NRC to understand the inputs used, the evaluations performed, and the decisions made as a result of the interim evaluations.

In July 2015, NRC concluded that Plant Hatch Units I and 2 had responded appropriately to Enclosure I, Item (6) of the 50.54(f) letter (Reference I9). This conclusion was based on NRC's review of Revision 0 ofthis report and NRC's Aprii20I5 response to NRC requests for additional information (Reference 20). Revision I of this report documents completion ofESEP activities in accordance with References I9 and 20.

MPR-4121 Revision I 2

2 Brief Summary of the FLEX Seismic Implementation Strategies The Plant Hatch FLEX strategies for Reactor Core Cooling and Containment Function are summarized below. This summary is derived from the Plant Hatch Overall Integrated Plan (OIP) in Response to the March 12, 2012, Commission Order EA-12-049 (Reference 3).

During FLEX Phase 1, the primary strategy for reactor core cooling is to supply high quality water via reactor core isolation cooling (RCIC) with suction from the Condensate Storage Tank (CST). lfthe CST is depleted (in approximately 6-7 hours by analysis), suction will be taken from the torus. Reactor pressure is controlled using safety reliefvalves (SRVs) with DC control power and pneumatic pressure supplied by the station batteries and accumulators for each SRV.

As torus temperature increases, operators reduce reactor pressure to provide margin to the heat capacity temperature limit curve.

During FLEX Phase 2, reactor core cooling will continue to be maintained using RCIC. After depletion of the initial CST inventory and while RCIC is taking suction from the torus, the CST will be replenished using the portable FLEX pump and water from the Ultimate Heat Sink (Aitamaha River). RCIC will continue to inject water from the torus until the torus level reaches the low level limit and suction must be re-aligned to the CST. The torus water level drops due to evaporation through the Hardened Containment Vent System (HCVS), which is operated to maintain containment parameters below design limits and RCIC operating parameters within acceptable limits. Reactor pressure will continue to be controlled using the SRVs. The 125V DC batteries will provide power for more than 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months without recharging. As shown in Figure 2-1 (Reference 21 ), the FLEX 600 VDC diesel generators will be connected at approximately 10-12 hours to power two 125/250 VDC Battery Chargers per division, RCIC Controls, and other loads necessary for event mitigation and monitoring.

The FLEX Phase 3 coping strategy is to continue reactor core cooling up to and beyond 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months using FLEX Phase 2 on-site equipment with no immediate reliance on equipment from the National SAFER Response Center. RCIC will be used to cool the core until reactor pressure is insufficient to drive the RCIC turbine, at which time the Phase 2 FLEX pump will be used to inject directly to the reactor using the RHRSW-RHR cross tie valves as shown in Figure 2-2 (Reference 21 ).

MPR-4121 Revision I 3

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MPR-4121 Rev is1on I 5

3 Equipment Selection Process and ESEL The selection of equipment for the Expedited Seismic Equipment List (ESEL) followed the guidelines of EPRI 3002000704 (Reference 2). The ESELs for Units I and 2, presented in Attachments A and B, respectively, are based on SNCH106-PR-001 and SNCH106-PR-002 (References 4 and 5).

3.1 EQUIPMENT SELECTION PROCESS AND ESEL The ESEL component selection followed the EPRI guidance outlined in Section 3.2 of Reference 2. The selection of equipment to be included on the ESEL was based on installed plant equipment credited in the FLEX strategies during Phase I, 2, and 3 mitigation of a Beyond Design Basis External Event (BDBEE), as outlined in the Plant Hatch Overall Integrated Plan (OIP) in Response to the March 12, 2012, Commission Order EA-12-049 (Reference 3). The OIP provides the Plant Hatch FLEX mitigation strategy and serves as the basis for equipment selected for the ESEP.

The Plant Hatch ESEL includes permanently installed plant equipment that could be relied upon to accomplish the core cooling and containment safety functions identified in Table 3-1 of Reference 2 in response to a beyond-design-basis earthquake. Per Reference 2, the ESEL does not include portable or pre-staged FLEX equipment (not permanently installed) or equipment that is used only for recovery strategies. The scope of equipment on the ESEL includes that required to support a single FLEX success path. Instrumentation monitoring requirements for core cooling and containment integrity functions are limited to those discussed in Reference 2.

In accordance with Reference 2, the following structures, systems, and components were excluded from the ESEL:

Structures (e.g., reactor building and control building)

Piping, cabling, conduit, HV AC, and their supports

Manual valves and check valves

Power-operated valves not required to change state as part of the FLEX mitigation strategies

Nuclear steam supply system components (e.g., reactor pressure vessel and internals)

3. 1. 1 ESEL Development The ESEL was developed by reviewing the Plant Hatch FLEX OIP (Reference 3) to determine the major equipment involved in the FLEX strategies. Plant drawings (e.g., Process and MPR-4121 Revisaon I 6

Instrumentation Diagrams (P&IDs) and electrical one-line diagrams) were reviewed to specify the boundaries of the flow paths used in the FLEX strategies and to identify other components needed to support operation of the systems credited in the FLEX strategies. Boundaries were established at an electrical or mechanical isolation device (e.g., isolation amplifier or valve) in branch circuits/branch lines off the defined strategy electrical or fluid flowpath. P&IDs were the primary reference documents used to identify mechanical components and instrumentation needed for FLEX. Once the flow paths were identified, specific components were selected using the guidance in Reference 2. Electrical components needed to support FLEX were identified using one-line diagrams and schematics. Based on this review, base list tables of components were developed for each of the methods credited with accomplishing key functions in the FLEX strategies.

The base list tables were then reviewed to determine which equipment should be included on the ESEL. Most of the equipment decisions were clearly outlined in the Reference 2 guidance; however, some judgments were necessary as discussed below.

3. 1.2 Power Operated Valves Per the Reference 2 EPRI guidance, the ESEL does not need to include power-operated valves that are not required to change state as part of the FLEX mitigating strategies. However, Reference 2 also states, "In addition to the physical failure modes (load path and anchorage) of specific pieces of installed equipment, functional failure modes of electrical and mechanical portions of the installed Phase I equipment should be considered (e.g., RCIC)." Because relay chatter could cause a functional failure, the following criteria were used to determine whether specific power-operated valves should be included on the ESEL:

Power operated valves in the primary success path will be included on the ESEL if they need to remain energized during Phase I in order to maintain core cooling and containment integrity (e.g., certain DC-powered valves).

Power operated valves not required to change state as part of the FLEX mitigation strategies may be excluded from the ESEL if they would be de-energized by the event that causes the Extended Loss of all AC Power (ELAP) event.

AC power-operated valves not required to change state as part of the Phase I FLEX mitigation strategies may be excluded from the ESEP if they are re-energized and operated during Phase 2 or 3 activities.

3.1.3 Pull Boxes Pull boxes were deemed unnecessary to add to the ESELs as these components provide completely passive locations for pulling or installing cables. No breaks or connections in the cabling are included in pull boxes. Pull boxes were considered part of the conduit and cabling, which are excluded in accordance with Reference 2.

MPR-4121 Rev1sion I 7

3. 1.4 Termination Cabinets Although termination cabinets and junction boxes provide a passive function similar to pull boxes, they were included on the ESEL to ensure industry knowledge on panel/anchorage failure vulnerabilities is addressed.

3.1.5 Critical Instrumentation Indicators Critical indicators and recorders are typically physically located on panels/cabinets and are included as separate components; however, seismic evaluation of the instrument indication may be included in the panel/cabinet seismic evaluation (rule-of-the-box).

3.1.6 Phase 2 and Phase 3 Piping Connections As noted in Section 3.2 of Reference 2, "the scope of the ESEL is limited to installed plant equipment and FLEX equipment connections" and "the selection process for the ESEL should assume the FLEX strategies (modifications, equipment, procedures, etc.) have been implemented." Section 3.2 of Reference 2 also explains that "piping, cabling, conduit, HVAC, and their supports" are excluded from the ESEL scope. Therefore, piping and pipe supports associated with FLEX Phase 2 and Phase 3 connections are excluded from the scope of the ESEP evaluation. Except as described in Sections 3.1 and 3.1.2 above, valves required to change position to establish/maintain FLEX Phase 2 and Phase 3 flow paths (i.e., active valves) are included in the ESEL.

3. 1. ]Inaccessible Valve Interlocks Some components have interlocks that could potentially inhibit valve operation during Phase 2 or 3 of FLEX. Reference 2 specifically allows exclusion of interlock failures from the ESEL if plant procedures provide instructions for manual operation to ensure performance of the required FLEX function . For valves that cannot be operated locally due to location in containment or high radiation areas, this statement is interpreted as allowing the interlocks in the control circuit to be bypassed to allow remote manual operation. Therefore, these interlocks are excluded in Phase 3.

3.2 JUSTIFICATION FOR USE OF EQUIPMENT THAT IS NOT THE PRIMARY MEANS FOR FLEX IMPLEMENTATION All components on the ESEL for Plant Hatch Units 1 and 2 are associated with the primary FLEX strategies. Therefore, since no alternate equipment is being used, no justification is needed.

MPR-4 121 Rev1sion I 8

4 Ground Motion Response Spectrum (GMRS)

In response to the 50.54(f) letter (Reference I), SNC reevaluated the Plant Hatch seismic hazard in accordance with the NRC-endorsed industry guidance (Reference 6).

4.1 PLOT OF GMRS SUBMITTED BY LICENSEE The plot of the Plant Hatch GMRS submitted by SNC to the NRC in Reference 7 is shown in Figure 4- I. Table 4- I contains the corresponding numerical values that were also included in Reference 7. The GMRS and Design Basis Earthquake (DBE) control point elevation is defined at Elevation I 29 feet, which is general plant grade.

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Figure 4-1. Plant Hatch GMRS MPR-4121 Rev1sion 1 9

Table 4-1. GMRS for Plant Hatch Units 1 and 2 Frequency Spectral Frequency Spectral Frequency Spectral (Hz) Acceleration (Hz) Acceleration (Hz) Acceleration (g) (g) (g) 100 0.1422 12.5 0.2744 1.00 0.2206 90.0 0.1422 10.0 0.3039 0.900 0.2171 80.0 0.1427 9.00 0.3111 0.800 0.2009 70.0 0.1438 8.00 0.3142 0.700 0.1696 60.0 0.1452 7.00 0.3164 0.600 0.1452 50.0 0.1478 6.00 0.3203 0.500 0.1113 45.0 0.1508 5.00 0.3118 0.400 0.0737 40.0 0.1532 4.00 0.3080 0.300 0.0580 35.0 0.1583 3.00 0.3029 0.200 0.0437 30.0 0.1666 2.50 0.3096 0.167 0.0346 25.0 0.1790 2.00 0.3158 0.125 0.0203 20.0 0.2027 1.50 0.2844 0.100 0.0145 15.0 0.2459 1.25 0.2654 4.2 COMPARISON TO SSE The plots of the Plant Hatch Unit I DBE and Unit 2 DBE submitted by SNC to the NRC in Reference 7 are shown in Figure 4-2 along with the GMRS. Tables 4-2 and 4-3 contain the corresponding numerical values that were also included in Reference 7. Note that Reference 7 uses DBE and SSE interchangeably for Plant Hatch.

MPR-4121 Revis1on I 10

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Table 4-2. Horizontal Design Basis Earthquake (DBE) for Plant Hatch Unit 1 Frequency (Hz) Spectral Frequency (Hz) Spectral Acceleration (g) Acceleration (g) 33.33 0.150 3.33 0.221 28.67 0.150 2.86 0.225 25.00 0.150 2.50 0.221 22.22 0.150 2.22 0.216 20.00 0.150 2.00 0.206 16.67 0.150 1.67 0.178 14.29 0.150 1.43 0.165 12.50 0.156 1.25 0.150 11.11 0.163 1.11 0.133 10.00 0.169 1.00 0.128 8.00 0.188 0.67 0.092 6.67 0.206 0.50 0.069 5.00 0.216 0.33 0.051 4.00 0.221 0.10 0.015 MPR-4 121 Revision I 12

Table 4-3. Horizontal Design Basis Earthquake (DBE) for Plant Hatch Unit 2 Frequency (Hz) Spectral Frequency (Hz) Spectral Acceleration (g) Acceleration (g) 100.00 0.150 2.50 0.320 16.00 0.150 2.00 0.320 14.30 0.165 1.50 0.240 12.50 0.180 1.25 0.200 11.10 0.200 1.00 0.160 10.00 0.210 0.70 0.110 8.30 0.240 0.50 0.080 7.70 0.260 0.33 0.050 6.00 0.320 0.22 0.036 5.00 0.320 0.14 0.015 4.00 0.320 0.10 0.007 3.00 0.320 MPR-4121 13 Revision I

5 Review Level Ground Motion (RLGM)

Section 4 of Reference 2 states that the ESEP may be performed using either the GMRS or a linearly scaled version of the SSE (DBE for Plant Hatch) that bounds the GMRS between I and I 0 Hz. In many cases, scaling the SSE facilitates a more expedient evaluation by allowing use of existing SSE-based in-structure response spectra (ISRS) that are simply scaled by the same factor (Scenarios 2 and 3 in Figure 1-2 of Reference 2). However, for surface-mounted items (where ISRS estimates are not necessary), plants may decide to use the GMRS instead of the scaled SSE (Scenario 4 in Figure 1-2 of Reference 2).

The Plant Hatch ESEP was performed using either the GMRS (for two surface-mounted items) or the RLGM used previously by the combined A-46/IPEEE Program at Plant Hatch as discussed below, which is consistent with the guidance in Reference 2.

5.1 DESCRIPTION

OF RLGM SELECTED As discussed in Reference 7 and documented in the 1991 EPRI Report NP-7217 (Reference 8) a full EPRI Seismic Margin Assessment (SMA) was previously performed for Plant Hatch Unit I as a trial BWR assessment of the EPRI SMA methodology. That SMA project included a soil failure evaluation and a full relay evaluation and was peer reviewed by several review panels.

As part of the Independent Plant Examination of External Events (IPEEE), a focused scope SMA and a full SQUG GIP relay review were performed for Plant Hatch Unit 2 (Reference 9). The Review Level Earthquake (RLE) for both of those SMAs was a median NUREG/CR-0098 type ground response spectrum anchored to 0.3g peak ground acceleration (PGA) as shown in Table 5-1 (Reference 7). As described in Reference 8, a soil-structure interaction analysis was performed and new ISRS were developed for the IPEEE RLE. For comparison purposes, Figure 5-1 includes the Hatch IPEEE RLE, the Hatch Unit I DBE, the Hatch Unit 2 DBE, and the Hatch GMRS. Above I Hz, the Hatch Units I and 2 IPEEE RLE spectrum is at least two times or larger than the Hatch Unit I DBE and the Hatch Unit 2 DBE, and is about twice the Hatch GMRS.

To facilitate an early start (prior to obtaining the GMRS) and timely completion of the ESEP, the IPEEE RLE was used as the ESEP review level ground motion (RLGM) for most of the equipment in Plant Hatch Units I and 2. Only the surface-mounted condensate storage tanks (CSTs), which did not require ISRS, were evaluated to the GMRS.

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1

- IPEEERLE

- GMRS 0.8

- Unit 2DBE

§ - Unit 1DBE I

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Figure 5-1. Hatch IPEEE RLE Compared to the Unit 1 and Unit 2 DBEs and the GMRS Table 5-1. Plant Hatch IPEEE RLE Frequency {Hz) Spectral Acceleration (g) 100 0.3 33 0.3 20 0.38 12.5 0.45 10 0.54 8 0.637 2 0.637 1 0.3 0.5 0.15 MPR-4121 Revision I 15

5.2 METHOD TO ESTIMATE IN-STRUCTURE RESPONSE SPECTRUM (ISRS)

For structure-mounted equipment, the ESEP used the IPEEE RLE in-structure response spectra (ISRS). As stated in Section 5. I, the IPEEE ISRS are based on ground motion equal to or larger than twice the Hatch Unit I and Hatch Unit 2 DBEs.

MPR-4121 16 Revision I

6 Seismic Margin Evaluation Approach The objective of the ESEP is to demonstrate that the ESEL items have sufficient seismic capacity to meet or exceed the seismic demand associated with the RLGM. Section 5 of Reference 2 provides guidance for characterizing the seismic capacity by determining a high confidence of low probability of failure (HCLPF) using either the Seismic Margin Assessment (SMA) methodology of EPRI NP-6041-SL (Reference I 0) or the fragility analysis methodology of EPRI TR-1 03959 (Reference I2). The Plant Hatch ESEP used the EPRI NP-604I-SL SMA approach, consistent with the earlier combined A-46/IPEEE Program.

The HCLPF capacity is based on the weakest or most seismically limiting attribute of the equipment (structural, anchorage, or functional). The HCLPF evaluation considers the dynamic response of the equipment, but the HCLPF value is expressed in terms of a peak ground acceleration (PGA) to provide a common point of reference relative to the RLGM. Per Reference 2, ESEL items have sufficient seismic capacity if the HCLPF capacity is equal to or greater than the RLGM PGA.

6.1

SUMMARY

OF METHODOLOGIES USED Seismic Margin Assessments (SMAs) were performed for Plant Hatch Units I and 2 in the early I990s and are documented in References 8 and 9. Those SMAs were performed as part of the combined A-46/IPEEE program at Plant Hatch and included many of the items on the ESEL. As part of the ESEP, the Seismic Review Team (SRT) evaluated each accessible item on the ESEL for seismic capacity, anchorage, and relay functionality (when a FLEX methodology relay was identified in the ESEL). (Inaccessible items are discussed in Section 7.1.) The ESEP walkdowns and evaluations were documented in Screening and Evaluation Work Sheets (SEWS), which include checklists that were developed from Appendix F of EPRI NP-604I-SL (Reference 10).

Each member of the SRT was trained as a SQUG Seismic Capability Engineer in accordance with the Generic Implementation Procedure (GIP) and trained in the use of EPRI NP-6041-SL.

Selected team members also took the EPRI HCLPF course, which was developed for the ESEP implementation and is based on EPRI NP-604I-SL.

6.2 HCLPF SCREENING PROCESS ESEL items were evaluated for the Hatch IPEEE RLE, which is a median NUREG/CR-0098 type ground response spectrum anchored to 0.3g PGA, as shown in Figure 5-I. The only exception to this approach was used for the CSTs, as described below. The 5 percent damped Peak Spectral Acceleration of the Hatch IPEEE RLE allowed the use of the first column (<0.8g PSA) of Reference I 0 Table 2-4 "Summary of Equipment and Subsystems Screening Criteria for Seismic Margin Evaluation" in establishing HCLPFs greater than or equal to the RLE for ESEL MPR-4121 17 Revision I

items. Anchorage evaluations were performed using the in-structure response spectra developed for the A-46/IPEEE program's RLE (shown in Figure 5- I).

For the CSTs, the HCLPFs were established using the rigorous methodology of Reference I 0 Appendix H "Flat-Bottom Vertical Fluid Storage Tanks" and additional information provided during the EPRI HCLPF course (Reference 11 ). The review level earthquake for the CST HCLPF evaluations was the GMRS.

6.3 SEISMIC WALKDOWN APPROACH 6.3.1 Walkdown Approach ESEP walkdowns were performed in accordance with the criteria provided in Section 5 of Reference 2, which refers to Reference 10 for the Seismic Margin Assessment process. Pages 2-26 through 2-30 of Reference I 0 describe the seismic walkdown guidance, including the following key points.

"The SRT {Seismic Review Team] should "walk by" 100% of all components which are reasonably accessible and in non-radioactive or low radioactive environments. Seismic capability assessment of components which are inaccessible, in high-radioactive environments, or possibly within contaminated containment, will have to rely more on alternate means such as photographic inspection, more reliance on seismic reanalysis, and possibly, smaller inspection teams and more hurried inspections. A 100% "walk by" does not mean complete inspection of each component, nor does it mean requiring an electrician or other technician to de-energize and open cabinets or panels for detailed inspection of all components. This walkdown is not intended to be a QA or QC review or a review of the adequacy of the component at the SSE level.

If the SRT has a reasonable basis for assuming that the group of components are similar and are similarly anchored, then it is only necessary to inspect one component out of this group. The "similarity-basis" should be developed before the walkdown during the seismic capability preparatory work (Step 3) by reference to drawings, calculations or specifications. The one component or each type which is selected should be thoroughly inspected which probably does mean de-energizing and opening cabinets or panels for this very limited sample. Generally, a spare representative component can be found so as to enable the inspection to be performed while the plant is in operation. At least for the one component of each type which is selected, anchorage should be thoroughly inspected.

The walkdown procedure should be performed in an ad hoc manner. For each class of components the SRT should look closely at the first items and compare the field configurations with the construction drawings and/or specifications. If a one-to-one correspondence is found, then subsequent items do not have to be inspected in as great a detail. Ultimately the walkdown becomes a "walk by" of the component class as the SRT becomes MPR-4121 Revision I I8

confident that the construction pattern is typical. This procedure for inspection should be repeated for each component class; although, during the actual walkdown the SRT may be inspecting several classes of components in parallel. If serious exceptions to the drawings or questionable construction practices are found then the system or component class must be inspected in closer detail until the systematic deficiency is defined.

The 100% "walk by" is to look for outliers, lack of similarity, anchorage which is different from that shown on drmvings or prescribed in criteria for that component, potential Sf [Seismic Interaction 1] problems, situations that are at odds with the team members' past experience, and any other areas of serious seismic concern. If any such concerns surface, then the limited sample size of one component of each type for thorough inspection will have to be increased. The increase in sample size which should be inspected will depend upon the number of outliers and different anchorages, etc., which are observed. It is up to the SRT to ultimately select the sample size since they are the ones who are responsible for the seismic adequacy of all elements which they screen from the margin review. Appendix D gives guidance for sampling selection. "

6.3.2 Application of Previous Walkdown Information Many ESEL items were previously walked down during the Plant Hatch A-46/IPEEE program using an IPEEE RLE that was equal to or greater than twice the DBEs. Consistent with the guidance in References 2 and 10, the A-46/IPEEE documentation for some electrical items was used to eliminate the need for electrical bus outages and minimize the risk of tripping the plant by not opening some energized electrical equipment that had been opened during the A-46/

IPEEE program.

Specifically, some ESEL items evaluated during the A-46/IPEEE program and shown to have a seismic capacity greater than or equal to the IPEEE RLE were evaluated but not opened to view anchorage. The ESEP walkdowns were performed to confirm consistency of these items with their A-46/IPEEE condition and address seismic capacity questions that could be answered without opening the equipment. Based on this information, which included documentation from the A-46/IPEEE SEWS, NTTF 2.3 seismic information, drawings, and calculations, the SRTs were able to evaluate the equipment capacity and anchorage without electrical bus outages or risk of tripping the plant by opening these items.

Previous walkdown information was also used for evaluation of inaccessible equipment, as discussed in Section 7.1.

1 EPRI 3002000704 (Reference 2) page 5-4 limits the ESEP seismic interaction reviews to "nearby block walls" and "piping attached to tanks" which are reviewed "to address the possibility of failures due to differential displacements."

MPR-4121 Rev1s1on I 19

6.3.3 Significant Walkdown Findings Consistent with guidance from Reference I 0, no significant seismic issues were identified at Plant Hatch during the final ESEP seismic walkdowns.

During initial ESEP seismic walkdowns, one significant seismic issue was identified:

Anchorage for the nitrogen ambient vaporizer for each unit (I T48-B004 and 2T48-8002) was degraded at the time of the initial walkdown and condition reports (CRs) were written to resolve the problem. These components were re-evaluated after repairs were made and the HCLPFs for the anchorages now meet or exceed the Hatch IPEEE RLE.

Smaller issues identified during the initial walkdowns (e.g., corrosion on anchor bolts for the Unit I outside nitrogen storage tank (I T48-AOO I)) were entered as condition reports, resolved, and then re-evaluated to confirm that the components have HCLPFs that meet or exceed the Hatch IPEEE RLE.

Some block walls were identified in the proximity of ESEL equipment. During the A-46/IPEEE combined program, these block walls were assessed for their structural adequacy to withstand the seismic loads resulting from the Hatch IPEEE RLE.

6.4 HCLPF CALCULATION PROCESS Consistent with the Reference I 0 deterministic/SMA methodology, the Plant Hatch ESEP acceptance criteria were that the equipment's structural/functional capacity, anchorage capacity, and relay functional capacity (when required) exceeded the seismic demand of the Hatch IPEEE RLE. Therefore, when these criteria were met, the HCLPF was defined as being at least as high as the IPEEE RLE (0.3g PGA), and calculation of specific HCLPF values in excess of0.3g PGA was not warranted. Specific HCLPF values were calculated for the CSTs so that both the tank capacities (e.g., shell failure modes) and anchorage capacities (e.g., cast-in-place L-bolts and anchor chairs) could be evaluated using the CDFM methodology in Appendix H of Reference 10 and additional information provided during the EPRI HCLPF course (Reference II). The CSTs were evaluated using the GMRS instead of the IPEEE RLE.

6.5 FUNCTIONAL EVALUATION OF RELAYS Relays in four cabinets and three motor control centers (total for both units) required functional evaluations. Each relay was evaluated using the SMA relay evaluation criteria in Section 3 of Reference I 0.

Seismic qualification test-based capacities were available for these specific relays in Plant Hatch documentation. For the twelve relays contained in four cabinets, capacity to demand evaluations were performed using the Plant Hatch relay seismic capacities and the IPEEE RLE ISRS scaled with the Reference I 0 in-cabinet amplification factors. The four relays contained in the three MCCs were qualified during dynamic testing of the MCCs; therefore, the in-cabinet amplification was included within the testing. In each case, the capacity exceeded the demand.

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The ESEP relay functional evaluations were documented in the SEWS packages for these four cabinets and three motor control centers.

6.6 TABULATED ESEL HCLPF VALUES (INCLUDING KEY FAILURE MODES)

Tabulated ESEL HCLPF values are provided in Attachment A for Unit I and in Attachment B for Unit 2. The following notes apply to the information in the tables.

Items which screened out of an explicit functional capacity analysis using EPRI NP-604 I-SL (Reference I 0) Table 2-4 have a HCLPF greater than or equal to the RLGM; therefore, the HCLPF is shown as "~RLGM" in Tables A- I and 8- I. This is consistent with the SMA methodology of not calculating an explicit HCLPF capacity if the criteria for functional capacity (e.g., EPRI NP-604 I -SL Table 2-4) are met and instead providing results as meeting or exceeding the seismic input level selected as the RLGM.

It is unknown whether anchorage is the controlling failure mode for items that were screened for their functional capacity because the functional capacity may or may not be higher than the anchorage capacity. The one exception to this is that large, flat-bottom vertical tanks (e.g., the Condensate Storage Tanks (CSTs)) were evaluated using a methodology that includes all failure modes (i.e., anchorage failure modes and tank shell failure modes). The HCLPF values for these tanks are reported in Tables A- I and 8- I.

Equipment containing FLEX Methodology ("FM") relays was assessed for relay functional capacity as described in Section 6.5 of this report. Because it is not known whether the capacity of the equipment containing the relay, the equipment's anchorage, or the relay's capacity is the controlling HCLPF, the HCLPF is shown as "~RLGM" in Tables A-I and 8- I, and the "Notes/Comments" column identifies the presence of FM relay(s).

MPR-4121 21 Rev iston I

7 Inaccessible Items 7.1 IDENTIFICATION OF ESEL ITEMS INACCESSIBLE FOR WALKDOWN The Plant Hatch ESELs contain about 70 items (total for both units) that are located in either the Drywells or Locked High Radiation Areas. In order to avoid dose (i.e., maintaining radiation exposure ALARA) and to reduce impact on refueling outages scheduled in 2015 and 2016, these ESEL items were evaluated to determine whether a walkdown was necessary. The inaccessible/high dose equipment includes the following classes:

Accumulators (for the SRVs)

Air-Operated Valves (SRVs)

MOVs

Temperature Elements

Junction Boxes

Pneumatic System Filters and PCV (Unit 2 only)

Appendix D of Reference 10 provides information regarding "Sampling." Specifically, on page D-1, "sampling is technically valid for identical or similar components if there is evidence that the components are manufactured and installed in a consistent manner .... In some instances access is severely limited by radioactive environments and limited sampling is the only practical method of conducting a walkdown."

Much of the inaccessible/high dose equipment was previously evaluated during the A-46/IPEEE program. Although 6 of the 18 SRV accumulators on the ESEL were not previously evaluated for the Plant Hatch IPEEE RLE, sampling is a practical approach for concluding that they also have HCLPFs that meet or exceed the ESEP RLGM.

Like the SRV accumulators, most of the SRVs were also evaluated during the A-46/IPEEE program, and were found to meet SMA criteria for the IPEEE RLE. The SRVs, however, have been replaced since the A-46/IPEEE, or they are scheduled to be replaced in the next refueling outage (RFO). The replacement valves should be at least as robust as the SRVs that were evaluated during the A-46/IPEEE program. Additionally, in accordance with Reference 10, Table 2-4, active valves screen out from further SMA evaluations at the five percent-damped peak spectral acceleration for the Hatch IPEEE RLE (<0.8g). Therefore, additional ESEP walkdowns and the associated dose are not warranted.

A similar argument is made for the 8 MOVs (total for both units), where half of the MOVs were explicitly included in the A-46/IPEEE program. In accordance with Reference 10, Table 2-4, MPR-4121 22 Revision I

active valves screen out from further SMA evaluations at the five percent-damped peak spectral acceleration for the Hatch IPEEE RLE (<0.8g). Therefore, additional ESEP walkdowns and the associated dose are not warranted.

The temperature elements in the Drywell are considered to be represented by the ten temperature elements that were walked down (total for both units) and no seismic issues were identified; therefore, the inaccessible temperature elements do not merit specific walkdowns.

Junction boxes were not part of the A-46/IPEEE program, but dozens have been walked down during the ESEP, and no seismic issues have been identified; therefore, junction boxes in the drywell do not merit walkdowns.

Finally, there are three inaccessible/high dose devices related to the Unit 2 Drywell pneumatic system: two filters and one pressure control valve (PCV). Filters are passive devices and considered seismically rugged, as are typical PCVs. The Unit 1 pneumatic system filters and the PCV are in a Reactor Building diagonal (outside the drywell) and were walked down; no seismic issues were identified for these small passive devices. None of these devices merit a Drywell entry and the dose associated with performing walkdowns for the ESEP.

7.2 PLANNED WALKDOWN/EVALUATlON SCHEDULE/CLOSE OUT Walkdowns have been completed for installed accessible items on the ESELs. Section 7.1 discusses the disposition for inaccessible items.

MPR-4 121 Revision I 23

8 ESEP Conclusions and Results 8.1 SUPPORTING INFORMATION Plant Hatch has performed the ESEP as an interim action in response to the NRC's 50.54(f) letter (Reference 1). It was performed using the methodologies in the NRC endorsed guidance in EPRI 3002000704 (Reference 2).

The ESEP provides an important demonstration of seismic margin and expedites plant safety enhancements through evaluations and potential near-term modifications of plant equipment that can be relied upon to protect the reactor core following beyond design basis seismic events.

The ESEP is part of the overall Plant Hatch response to NRC's 50.54(f) letter (Reference 1). On March 12, 2014, NEI submitted to the NRC results of a study (Reference 13) of seismic core damage risk estimates based on updated seismic hazard information as it applies to operating nuclear reactors in the Central and Eastern United States (CEUS). The study concluded that site-specific seismic hazards show that there has not been an overall increase in seismic risk for the fleet of U.S. plants based on the re-evaluated hazard. As such, the "current seismic design of operating reactors continues to provide a safety margin to withstand potential earthquakes exceeding the seismic design basis."

The NRC's May 9, 2014 NTTF 2.1 Screening and Prioritization letter (Reference 14) concluded that the "fleetwide seismic risk estimates are consistent with the approach and results used in the GI-199 safety/risk assessment." The letter also stated that "As a result, the staff has confirmed that the conclusions reached in GI-199 safety/risk assessment remain valid and that the plants can continue to operate while additional evaluations are conducted."

An assessment of the change in seismic risk for Plant Hatch was included in the fleet risk evaluation submitted in the March 12, 2014 NEI letter (Reference 13); therefore, the conclusions in the NRC's May 9 letter (Reference 14) also apply to Plant Hatch.

In addition, the March 12, 2014 NEI letter (Reference 13) provided an attached "Perspectives on the Seismic Capacity of Operating Plants," which (I) assessed a number of qualitative reasons why the design of SSCs inherently contain margin beyond their design level, (2) discussed industrial seismic experience databases of performance of industry facility components similar to nuclear SSCs, and (3) discussed earthquake experience at operating plants.

The fleet of currently operating nuclear power plants was designed using conservative practices, such that the plants have significant margin to withstand large ground motions safely. This has been borne out for those plants that have actually experienced significant earthquakes. The seismic design process has inherent (and intentional) conservatisms which result in significant seismic margins within structures, systems and components (SSCs). These conservatisms are reflected in several key aspects of the seismic design process, including:

MPR-4121 Revision I 24

Safety factors applied in design calculations

Damping values used in dynamic analysis of SSCs

Bounding synthetic time histories for in-structure response spectra calculations

Broadening criteria for in-structure response spectra

Response spectra enveloping criteria typically used in SSC analysis and testing applications

Response spectra based frequency domain analysis rather than explicit time history based time domain analysis

Bounding requirements in codes and standards

Use of minimum strength requirements of structural components (concrete and steel)

Bounding testing requirements, and

Ductile behavior of the primary materials (that is, not crediting the additional capacity of materials such as steel and reinforced concrete beyond the essentially elastic range, etc.).

These design practices combine to result in margins such that the SSCs will continue to fulfill their functions at ground motions well above the SSE.

8.2 IDENTIFICATION OF PLANNED MODIFICATIONS No modifications have been identified as necessary to meet ESEP acceptance criteria.

8.3 MODIFICATION IMPLEMENTATION SCHEDULE No modifications have been identified for the items that have been evaluated.

8.4

SUMMARY

OF REGULATORY COMMITMENTS Please refer to the Table of Regulatory Commitments that will accompany this report.

MPR-4121 Revision 1 25

9 References

1. NRC Letter to All Power Reactor Licensees et al., "Request for Information Pursuant to Title IO ofthe Code ofFederal Regulations 50.54(f) Regarding Recommendations 2.I, 2.3, and 9.3 ofthe Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima Dai-ichi Accident," dated March 12, 2012 [ADAMS Accession Number ML12053A340].

2. EPRI Report 3002000704, "Seismic Evaluation Guidance: Augmented Approach for the Resolution of Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.I - Seismic," Electric Power Research Institute, May 20 I3.

3. SNC Nuclear Letter NL-I4-0593, "Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant Units I and 2 Third Six-Month Status Report of the Implementation ofthe Requirements of the Commission Order with Regard to Mitigation Strategies for Beyond-Design-Basis External Events (EA-I2-049)," dated August 26, 20I4.

4. ENERCON Engineering Report SNCH 106-PR-00 I, Rev. 4, "Equipment Selection for the Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process for Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc.,

Hatch Nuclear Plant Unit No. I."

5. ENERCON Engineering Report SNCH 106-PR-002, Rev. 4, "Equipment Selection for the Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process for Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc.,

Hatch Nuclear Plant Unit No. 2."

6. EPRI Report I 025287, "Seismic Evaluation Guidance: Screening, Prioritization and Implementation Details (SPID) for the Resolution of Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.I: Seismic," Electric Power Research Institute, February 20I3.

7. SNC Nuclear Letter NL-I4-0343, "Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant Units I and 2 Seismic Hazard and Screening Report for CEUS Sites," dated March 3I, 20I4.

8. EPRI Report NP-72I7, "Seismic Margin Assessment of the Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant, Unit I," Electric Power Research Institute, June I991.

9. "Individual Plant Examination for External Events, Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2" (Response to Generic Letter 88-20, Supplement 4).

10. EPRI NP-604I-SL, "A Methodology for Assessment ofNuclear Power Plant Seismic Margin, Revision I," Electric Power Research Institute, August I99I.

11. Hardy, Greg and Dr. Robert Kennedy, "High Confidence of a Low Probability of Failure (HCLPF) Calculation Training," EPRI, (August 20I3).

MPR-4121 Rev1s1on I 26

12. EPRI TR-1 03959, "Methodology for Developing Seismic Fragilities," Electric Power Research Institute, 1999.

13. NEI (A. Pietrangelo) letter to NRC (E. Leeds) dated March 12, 2014, "Seismic Risk Evaluations for Plants in the Central and Eastern United States."

14. NRC (E. Leeds) letter dated May 9, 2014, "Screening and Prioritization Results Regarding Information Pursuant to Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 50.54(f) Regarding Seismic Hazard Re-Evaluations for Recommendation 2.1 ofthe Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima Dai-ichi Accident."

15. NEI (A. Pietrangelo) letter to NRC (D. Skeen) dated April9, 2013, "Proposed Path Forward for NTTF Recommendation 2.1: Seismic Reevaluations."

16. Dr. Robert Kennedy letter to Southern Company Services (D. Moore) dated August 13, 1993, "Re: Hatch Condensate Water Tank."

17. MPR Calculation No. 0380-0050-01, "Hatch Unit 2 Condensate Storage Tank,"

Revision 0, December 15, 2014.

18. NRC Letter to All Power Reactor Licensees et at., "Final Determination of Licensee Seismic Probabilistic Risk Assessments Under the Request for Information Pursuant to Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 50.54(f) Regarding Recommendation 2.1 "Seismic" ofthe Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima Dai-ichi Accident," dated October 27,2015 [ADAMS Accession Number ML15194A015].

19. NRC Letter to SNC, "Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2 - Staff Review of Interim Evaluation Associated with Reevaluated Seismic Hazard Implementation ofNear-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1 (TAC Nos. MF5243 and MF5244)," dated July 22, 2015 [ML1520IA474].

20. SNC Nuclear Letter NL-15-0705 , "Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant - Units 1 and 2 Request for Additional Information Regarding Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report,'

dated April 16, 2015 [ML15106A549].

21. Final Integrated Plan, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Order EA-12-049, Strategies for Beyond Design Basis External Events Hatch Nuclear Plant Units 1 and 2, Draft Rev. D, October 2016.

MPR-4 121 RevisiOn I 27

Attachment A: Plant Hatch Unit 1 ESEL Table A-1. Plant Hatch Unit 1 ESEL Items and HCLPF Results Equipment Operating State HCLPF Screening Notes/Comments ID Description Normal Desired Results Inaccessible/High 1621-SRV AIR ACCUMULATOR Available Available N/A Dose; See Section A0036 7.1 Inaccessible/High 1621-SRV AIR ACCUMULATOR Available Available N/A Dose; See Section A003D 7.1 Inaccessible/High 1621-SRV AIR ACCUMULATOR Available Available N/A Dose; See Section A003E 7.1 Inaccessible/High 1621-SRV AIR ACCUMULATOR Available Available N/A Dose; See Section A003F 7.1 Inaccessible/High 1621-SRV AIR ACCUMULATOR Available Available N/A Dose; See Section A003G 7.1 Inaccessible/High 1621-SRV AIR ACCUMULATOR Available Available N/A Dose; See Section A003H 7.1 Inaccessible/High 1621-SRV AIR ACCUMULATOR Available Available N/A Dose; See Section A003J 7.1 Inaccessible/High 1621-SRV AIR ACCUMULATOR Available Available N/A Dose; See Section A003K 7.1 Inaccessible/High 1621-SRV AIR ACCUMULATOR Available Available N/A Dose; See Section A003L 7.1 MPR-4121 Rev ision I A-1

Equipment Operating State HCLPF Screening Notes/Comments ID Description Normal Desired Results Inaccessible/High 1B21-MSL "A" RPV SRV (ADS) Closed Closed/Open N/A Dose; See Section F013B 7.1 Inaccessible/High 1B21-MSL "B" RPV SRV (ADS) Closed Closed/Open N/A Dose; See Section F013D 7.1 Inaccessible/High 1B21-MSL "B" RPV SRV (ADS) Closed Closed/Open N/A Dose; See Section F013E 7.1 Inaccessible/High 1B21-MSL "C' RPV SRV (ADS) Closed Closed/Open N/A Dose; See Section F013F 7.1 Inaccessible/High 1B21-MSL "C" RPV SRV (LLSL) Closed Closed/Open N/A Dose; See Section F013G 7.1 Inaccessible/High 1B21-MSL "D" RPV SRV (LLSL) Closed Closed/Open N/A Dose; See Section F013H 7.1 Inaccessible/High 1B21-MSL "D" RPV SRV (ADS) Closed Closed/Open N/A Dose; See Section F013J 7.1 Inaccessible/High 1B21-MSL "B" RPV SRV (ADS) Closed Closed/Open N/A Dose; See Section F013K 7.1 Inaccessible/High 1B21-MSL 'C' RPV SRV (ADS) Closed Closed/Open N/A Dose; See Section F013L 7.1 1B21- RPV Levels 2 & 1 LT- Div II -

Operating Operating <!: RLGM N091B Batt 1B21- LPCI RX Water Level MTU LIS Operating Operating <!: RLGM N691B - Div II - Batt 1B21- RPV Level (Hot Leg) L1 - Div II -

Operating Operating <!:RLGM R604B Batt MPR-4121 A-2 Rev1s1on I

Equipment Operating State HCLPF Screening Notes/Comments ID Description Normal Desired Results 1C32- FWC RX Pressure Transmitter Operating Operating <!:RLGM K655C C- Div II - Batt 1C32-RX WTR LVL RFP TRIP C Operating Operating <!: RLGM K902 1C32- FWC RX Water Level PT- Div Operating Operating <!: RLGM NOOSC II- Batt 1C32-FWC RX PI- Div II- Batt Operating Operating <!: RLGM R605C 1C82- REMOTE SHUTDOWN PANEL-Available Available <!:RLGM POOl ESl 1C82-REMOTE SHUTDOWN PANEL Available Available <!:RLGM P002 lEll-RHR HEAT EXCHANGER Available Available <!:RLGM BOOlA lEll- RHR HX OUTLT 16" GATE Open Closed <!: RLGM F003A MOV Inaccessible/High lEll- Shutdown Cooling Outboard Closed Closed N/A Dose; See Section F008 Iso 7.1 Inaccessible/High lEll- Inboard Injection Gate MOV Closed Open N/A Dose; See Section FOlSA (RHR lnbd lnj Vlv) 7.1 Inaccessible/High lEU- Outboard Injection Gate MOV Open Throttled N/A Dose; See Section F017A (RHR Outbd lnj Vlv) 7.1 lEll- RHR HX Bypass Globe MOV Open Closed <!:RLGM F048A (Hx Bypass Vlv) lEU- HX SW FLOW CONTROLLER Closed Closed <!: RLGM F068A MOV lEll- RHRSW TO RHR CROSSTIE Closed Closed/Open <!: RLGM F073A MOV MPR-4121 A-3 Revtsion I

Equipment Operating State HCLPF Screening Notes/Comments ID Description Normal Desired Results lEU- RHRSW TO RHR CROSSTIE Closed Closed/Open ;;:: RLGM F075A MOV lEU-RHR HX Discharge TE- Div II Operating Ope rating <!: RLGM N027B lESl- RCIC BAROMETRIC Standby Operating ;;:: RLGM AOOl CONDENSER lESl-RCIC LUBE OIL COOLER Standby Operating <!:RLGM BOOl lESl- RCIC REACTOR MAKEUP Standby Operating ;;:: RLGM COOl PUMP lESl-RCIC TURBINE Standby Operating ;;:: RLGM C002 Inaccessible/High lESl-STEAM SUPPLY ISO GATE VLV Open Open N/A Dose; See Section F008 7.1 lESl- Pump Suction 6" Gate MOV Open Open/Closed <!: RLGM FOlD (CST Suction Valve) lESl- RCIC PUMP DISCHARGE GATE Open Open <!:RLGM F012 MOV lESl- Pump Disch 4" Gate MOV Closed Open ;;:: RLGM F013 (Pump Discharge Valve) lESl-RCIC COOLING WATER PCV Open Operating <!: RLGM FOlS lESl- Min Flow 2" Bypass MOV Closed Closed/Open ~ RLGM F019 (RCIC Min-Flow Valve) lESl- PUMP SUCTION GATE VALVE Closed Closed/Open ~ RLGM F029 (Suppression Pool Suction) lESl- PUMP SUCTION GATE VALVE Closed Closed/Open ~ RLGM F031 (Suppression Pool Suction)

MPR-4121 Revision I A-4

Equipment Operating State HCLPF Screening Notes/Comments ID Description Normal Desired Results lESl- RCIC BAROMETRIC Standby Standby <!: RLGM F033 CONDENSER RELIEF VALVE lESl- RCIC STEAM SUPPLY GLB Closed Open <!: RLGM F045 MOV COOLING WATER GLOBE lESl-VALVE MOV (From Pump Closed Open <!: RLGM F046 Discharge)

Steam Supply 3" Governing lESl-Gate HOV Open Operating <!:RLGM F523 (RCIC Governor Valve)

Steam Supply 3" Trip Throttle lESl-MOV {RCIC Open Open <!: RLGM F524 Trip & Throttle Valve) lESl-RCIC CST LO LS- Div I - Batt Operating Operating <!: RLGM N060 lESl-RCIC CST LO LS - Div I - Batt Operating Operating <!: RLGM N061 lHll-RX & CTMT CLG & ISO PNL Available Available <!: RLGM P601 lHll-RWCU & RECIRC PNL Available Available <!: RLGM P602 lHll-Reac Control BN BD - Panel Available Available <!: RLGM P603 lHll-FW/Recirc INST Panel Available Available <!: RLGM P612 Includes FM lHll-RCIC RELAY VB Available Available <!: RLGM Relays; See P621 Section 6.5 lHll-Inboard lso Valve Vert Panel Available Available <!: RLGM P622 MPR-4121 ReVISIOn I A-5

Equipment Operating State HCLPF Screening Notes/Comments ID Description Normal Desired Results Includes FM 1H11- Outboard lso Valve Vert Available Available ~RLGM Relays; See P623 Panel Section 6.5 1H11-AUTO DEPRESS RELAY VB Available Available ~RLGM P628 1H11- Gas Treat Vent Vert BD -

Available Available <!: RLGM P654 Panel 1H11- BEARING TEMP & BAT MON Available Available ~RLGM P655 VB 1H11-VENT & DRYWELL INERTING V Available Available <!: RLGM P657 1H11- Analog Signal Converter Available Available <!:RLGM P691B Panel 1H11-ANAL/VENT & LEAK DET PNL Available Available ~RLGM P700 1H11-ATIS ECCS MCR Panel Available Available <!: RLGM P925 1H11-ATIS ECCS MCR Panel Available Available ~RLGM P926 1H11- ATIS ECCS Trip Unit Cabinet-Available Available ~ RLGM P927 Panel 1H11- ATIS ECCS Trip Unit Cabinet-Available Available <!:RLGM P928 Panel 1H21-RV LEVEL/PRESS LOC PNL A Available Available <!: RLGM P004 1H21-RCIC SYSTEM ESl PANEL Available Available <!:RLGM P0 51 1H21- SHUTDOWN INSTRUMENT Available Available <!: RLGM P173 PANEL MPR-4121 A-6 Revision I

Equipment Operating State HCLPF Screening Notes/Comments ID Description Normal Desired Results 1H21-MOV AND FUEL PMP CP 1A Available Available ~ RLGM P255 1H21-RX VESSEL INST RACK Available Available ~RLGM P40SA Screened to GMRS 1P11-Condensate Storage Tank Available Available 0.15g instead of IPEEE A100 RLE; Reference 16 1P52- AIR ACC (BKUP AIR Available Available ~ RLGM A027A ACCUMULATOR TANK A) 1P52- AIR ACC (BKUP AIR Available Available ~RLGM A027B ACCUMULATOR TANK B)

Relief Valve N2 Cylinder 1P52-Supply Manifold Standby Standby ~ RLGM F1312 Overpressure Protection 1P70-D/W N2 SYSTEM RECEIVER Available Available ~ RLGM A001 1P70-100 MICRON NOM FILTER Available Available ~ RLGM DOOBA 1P70-5 MICRON NOM FILTER Available Available ~RLGM D009A 1P70- D/W PNEUMATIC N2 SPLY Closed Open ~RLGM F001A AOV 1P70- D/W PNEUMATIC HEADER Operating Operating ~ RLGM F103A PCV 1R11-600-120/208V LGT&MSC XFM Energized Energized ~ RLGM S004 1R22-125/250VDC Switchgear 1A Energized Energized ~ RLGM 5016 1R22-125/2SOVDC Switchgear 1B Energized Energized ~ RLGM S017 MPR-4121 Revis1on I A-7

Equipment Operating State HCLPF Screening Notes/Comments ID Description Normal Desired Results 1R23- 600VAC Bus 1C -

Energized Energized ~RLGM S003 Switchgear/XFMR 1R23- 600VAC Bus 1D-Energized Energized ~ RLGM S004 Switchgear/XFMR Includes FM 1R24-250VDC MCC lA Energized Energized ~ RLGM Relays; See S021 Section 6.5 Includes FM 1R24-250VDC MCC 1A-1 Energized Energized ~ RLGM Relays; See S021A Section 6.5 1R24- Energized/

250VDC MCC 1B Energized ~RLGM S022 De-Energized 1R24-600/208V MCC lA ESS DIV 1 Energized Energized ~ RLGM S025 1R25- 125VDC Distribution Cabinet Energized Energized ~ RLGM S001 lA 1R25- 125VDC Distribution Cabinet Energized Energized ~ RLGM S002 1B 1R25-120/208V AC CABINET 1J Energized Energized ~ RLGM S029 1R25- 120/208VAC Instrument Bus Available Available ~ RLGM S064 1A- Div I 1R25- 120/208VAC Instrument Bus Available Available ~ RLGM S065 1B- Div II 1R25- 120VAC CRITICAL Energized Energized ~ RLGM S066 INSTRUMENT CABINET 1A 1R25- 120VAC CRITICAL Energized Energized ~ RLGM S067 INSTRUMENT CABINET 1B 1R25- Emergency Lighting Cabinet-Energized Energized ~RLGM S069 Div II MPR-4121 A-8 Revis1on I

Equipment Operating State HCLPF Screening Notes/Comments ID Description Normal Desired Results 1R25- Emergency Lighting Cabinet -

Energized Energized ;:: RLGM S094 Divll 1R25- 12SVDC Distribution Cabinet Energized Energized ;:: RLGM S106 1E 1R25-FUSE BOX Available Available ;:: RLGM S112 1R26- Standby/ Standby/

12SVDC THROWOVER SW 1A <::RLGM M031A Closed Closed 1R26- Standby/ Standby/

125VDC THROWOVER SW 1B <::RLGM M031B Closed Closed 1R26- Standby/ Standby/

125VDC THROWOVER SW 1C <::RLGM M031C Closed Closed 1R26- Standby/ Standby/

12SVDC THROWOVER SW 1D ;:: RLGM M031D Closed Closed 1R26- DC INPUT SWITCH FOR Normal Normal ;:: RLGM Ml34 INVERTER 1A 1R26- DC INPUT SWITCH FOR Normal Normal ;:: RLGM M135 INVERTER 1B 1R26-FLEX TRANSFER SWITCH 1A Normal Normal ;:: RLGM M136 1R26-FLEX TRANSFER SWITCH 1B Normal Normal <::RLGM M137 1R26-FLEX TRANSFER SWITCH 1D Normal Normal <::RLGM Ml39 1R26-FLEX TRANSFER SWITCH 1E Normal Normal ;:: RLGM M140 1R26- BYPASS SWITCH FOR Normal Normal ;:: RLGM M144 INVERTER 1A 1R26- BYPASS SWITCH FOR Normal Normal ;:: RLGM M145 INVERTER 1B MPR-4121 A-9 Rev1s1on I

Equipment Operating State HCLPF Screening Notes/Comments ID Description Normal Desired Results 1R42- 125/250VDC Station Battery Energized Energized 2: RLGM SOOlA lA 1R42- 125/250VDC Station Battery Energized Energized 2: RLGM SOOlB 18 1R42-Battery Charger lA- Div I Energized Energized 2: RLGM S026 1R42-Battery Charger lB - Div I Energized Energized 2: RLGM S027 1R42-Battery Charger lD- Div II Energized Energized 2: RLGM S029 1R42-Battery Charger lE- Div II Energized Energized 2: RLGM S030 1R43-DSL FO STOR TANK lC Available Available 2: RLGM A002C 1R44- 250VDC/120VAC INVERTER Energized Energized 2: RLGM S006 lA 1R44- 250VDC/120VAC INVERTER Energized Energized 2: RLGM S007 lB 1T46-SBGT ISOL TO MAIN STACK Open Closed 2: RLGM FOOS 1T47-SIGNAL CONVERTER R/V Operating Operating 2: RLGM K600 1T47-NOOlA,B SIGNAL CONV R/V Operating Operating 2: RLGM K602 1T47-NOOlM, N003 SIG CONV R/V Operating Operating 2: RLGM K603 1T47-NOOS, N007 SIG CONV R/V Operating Operating 2: RLGM K604 MPR-4121 Revision I A-10

Equipment Operating State HCLPF Screening Notes/Comments ID Description Normal Desired Results 1T47-NOlO SIGNAL CONV R/V Operating Operating ~ RLGM K605 Inaccessible/High 1T47-B009A Inlet Air TE- Div II Operating Operating N/A Dose; See Section NOOlA 7.1 Inaccessible/High 1T47-OW CLG Dome Area TE- Div II Operating Operating N/A Dose; See Section NOOlB 7.1 Inaccessible/High 1T47-B009A&B Inlet Air TE- Div II Operating Operating N/A Dose; See Section NOOlM 7.1 Inaccessible/High 1T47- OW CLG Midlevel Area TE-Operating Operating N/A Dose; See Section N003 Div II 7.1 Inaccessible/High 1T47- OW Lower Level Area TE- Div Operating Operating N/A Dose; See Section NOOS II 7.1 Inaccessible/High 1T47- OW Lower Level Area TE- Div Operating Operating N/A Dose; See Section N007 II 7.1 Inaccessible/High 1T47-Sacrificial Shield Top TE- Div II Operating Operating N/A Dose; See Section NOlO 7.1 1T47- OW CLG CRD/Torus Area TR-Operating Operating ~RLGM R612 Divll Repaired under 1T48- CAP and re-walked NITROGEN STORAGE TANK Available Available ~ RLGM AOOl down; See Section 6.3.3.

Repaired under 1T48- N2 TANK AMBIENT CAP and re-walked Available Available ~RLGM 8004 VAPORIZER down; See Section 6.3.3.

MPR-4121 Rev1s1on I A-ll

Equipment Operating State HCLPF Screening Notes/Comments ID Description Normal Desired Results 1T48- 8004 DISCH LINE RELIEF Standby Standby 2: RLGM F072 VALVE 1T48- 8004 DISCHARGE PCV (N2 Operating Operating 2: RLGM F075 system) 1T48-TORUS VENT SGTS ISO VLV Open Closed 2: RLGM F081 1T48-HCVS Vent Control AOV Closed Closed/Open 2: RLGM F082 1T48- HCVS Containment Isolation Closed Closed/Open 2: RLGM F318 AOV 1T48- HCVS Containment Isolation Closed Closed 2: RLGM F319 AOV 1T48- HCVS Containment Isolation Closed Closed 2: RLGM F320 AOV 1T48- HCVS Containment Isolation Closed Closed/Open 2: RLGM F326 AOV 1T48- Relief Valve Argon Supply Standby Standby 2: RLGM F408 Overpressure Protection 1T48-DW Pressure lnst 1/V- Div II Operating Operating 2: RLGM K6088 1T48- OW/Torus Pressure lnst 1/V-Operating Operating 2: RLGM K6098 Div II 1T48-Torus Levellnst 1/V- Div II Operating Operating 2: RLGM K6238 1T48-Torus Midrange PT- Div II Operating Operating 2: RLGM N0088 1T48-Torus Water TE- Div II Operating Operating 2: RLGM N0098 1T48-Torus Water TE- Div II Operating Operating 2: RLGM N009D MPR-4121 Revis1on I A-12

Equipment Operating State HCLPF Screening Notes/Comments ID Description Normal Desired Results 1T48-Torus Air TE- Div II Operating Operating 2: RLGM N009F 1T48-Torus Air TE- Div II Operating Operating 2: RLGM N009H 1T48-DW Narrow Range PT- Div II Operating Operating 2: RLGM N020B 1T48- Narrow Range Torus LT- Div Operating Operating 2: RLGM N021B II 1T48-DW Midrange PT- Div II Operating Operating 2: RLGM N023B 1T48- DW and Torus Narrow Range Operating Operating 2: RLGM R607B L/PR- Div II 1T48- OW/Torus Midrange PR- Div Operating Operating 2: RLGM R609 II 1X86- 600V FLEX Diesel Generator Standby Standby 2: RLGM S003 (FLEX Connection Box lA) 1X86- 600V FLEX Diesel Generator Standby Standby 2: RLGM S004 (FLEX Connection Box lB) 1Y52-FUEL OIL PMP lCl DSL lC Available Available ~RLGM COOlC ESS JUNCTION BOX Available Available ~ RLGM J379 ESS JUNCTION BOX Available Available ~ RLGM J423 ESS JUNCTION BOX Available Available ~ RLGM J422 Inaccessible/High J614 JUNCTION BOX Available Available N/A Dose; See Section 7.1 MPR-4121 A-13 Revis10n I

Equipment Operating State HCLPF Screening Notes/Comments ID Description Normal Desired Results Inaccessible/High J615 JUNCTION BOX Available Available N/A Dose; See Section 7.1 Inaccessible/High J617 JUNCTION BOX Available Available N/A Dose; See Section 7.1 Inaccessible/High J618 JUNCTION BOX Available Available N/A Dose; See Section 7.1 Inaccessible/High J619 JUNCTION BOX Available Available N/A Dose; See Section 7.1 Inaccessible/High J620 JUNCTION BOX Available Available N/A Dose; See Section 7.1 Inaccessible/High J621 JUNCTION BOX Available Available N/A Dose; See Section 7.1 Inaccessible/High J647 JUNCTION BOX Available Available N/A Dose; See Section 7.1 Inaccessible/High J648 JUNCTION BOX Available Available N/A Dose; See Section 7.1 TB1-TERMINATION BOX Available Available ~ RLGM 1529-7 MPR-4121 Revis1on I A-14

Plant Hatch Unit 2 ESEL Table B-1. Plant Hatch Unit 2 ESEL Items and HCLPF Results Equipment Operating State HCLPF Screening Notes/Comments ID Description Normal Desired Results Inaccessible/High 2821-SRV AIR ACCUMULATOR Available Available N/A Dose; See Section A003A 7.1 Inaccessible/High 2821-SRV AIR ACCUMULATOR Available Available N/A Dose; See Section A0038 7.1 Inaccessible/High 2621-SRV AIR ACCUMULATOR Available Available N/A Dose; See Section A003C 7.1 Inaccessible/High 2821-SRV AIR ACCUMULATOR Available Available N/A Dose; See Section A003E 7.1 Inaccessible/High 2621-SRV AIR ACCUMULATOR Available Available N/A Dose; See Section A003F 7.1 Inaccessible/High 2821-SRV AIR ACCUMULATOR Available Available N/A Dose; See Section A003H 7.1 Inaccessible/High 2621-SRV AIR ACCUMULATOR Available Available N/A Dose; See Section A003K 7.1 Inaccessible/High 2821-SRV AIR ACCUMULATOR Available Available N/A Dose; See Section A003L 7.1 Inaccessible/High 2821-SRV AIR ACCUMULATOR Available Available N/A Dose; See Section A003M 7.1 MPR-4121 B-1 Rev1s1on I

Equipment Operating State HCLPF Screening Notes/Comments ID Description Normal Desired Results Inaccessible/High 2B21-MSL "A" RPV SRV (ADS) Closed Closed/Open N/A Dose; See Section F013A 7.1 Inaccessible/High 2B21-MSL "B" RPV SRV (LLSL) Closed Closed/Open N/A Dose; See Section F013B 7.1 Inaccessible/High 2B21-MSL "C" RPV SRV (ADS) Closed Closed/Open N/A Dose; See Section F013C 7.1 Inaccessible/High 2B21-MSL "A" RPV SRV (ADS) Closed Closed/Open N/A Dose; See Section F013E 7.1 Inaccessible/High 2B21-MSL "B" RPV SRV (LLSL) Closed Closed/Open N/A Dose; See Section F013F 7.1 Inaccessible/High 2B21-MSL "D" RPV SRV (ADS) Closed Closed/Open N/A Dose; See Section F013H 7.1 Inaccessible/High 2B21-MSL "B" RPV SRV (ADS) Closed Closed/Open N/A Dose; See Section F013K 7.1 Inaccessible/High 2B21-MSL "B" RPV SRV (ADS) Closed Closed/Open N/A Dose; See Section F013L 7.1 Inaccessible/High 2B21-MSL 'C' RPV SRV (ADS) Closed Closed/Open N/A Dose; See Section F013M 7.1 2B21- RPV Levels 2 & 1 LT- Div II Operating Operating ~ RLGM N091B -Batt 2B21- LPCI RX Water Level MTU Operating Operating ~ RLGM N691B LIS - Div II - Batt 2B21- RPV Level (Hot Leg) L1- Div Operating Operating ~RLGM R604B II - Batt MPR-4121 Revision I B-2

Equipment Operating State HCLPF Screening Notes/Comments ID Description Normal Desired Results 2C32-RX WTR LVL RFP TRIP C Operating Operating <!:RLGM IN02 2C32- FWC RX Pressure Operating Operating <!: RLGM K655C Transmitter C- Div II - Batt 2C32- FWC RX Water level PT-Operating Operating <!: RLGM NOOSC Div II- Batt 2C32-FWC RX PI - Div II - Batt Operating Operating <!: RLGM R60SC 2C82-REMOTE S/D PANEL Available Available <!: RLGM POOl 2Ell-RHR HEAT EXCHANGER Available Available <!: RLGM BOOlA 2Ell- RHR HX OUTLT 16" GATE Open Closed <!:RLGM F003A MOV Inaccessible/High 2Ell- Shutdown Cooling Closed Closed N/A Dose; See Section F008 Outboard lso 7.1 Inaccessible/High 2Ell- Inboard Injection Gate Closed Open N/A Dose; See Section FOlSA MOV (RHR lnbd lnj Vlv) 7.1 Inaccessible/High 2Ell- Outboard Injection Gate Open Throttled N/A Dose; See Section F017A MOV (RHR Outbd lnj Vlv) 7.1 2Ell- RHR HX Bypass Globe MOV Open Closed <!: RLGM F048A (Hx Bypass Vlv) 2Ell- HX SW FLOW CONTROLLER Closed Closed <!: RLGM F068A MOV 2Ell-RHRSW CROSSTIE VALVE Closed Closed/Open <!:RLGM F073A 2Ell-RHRSW CROSSTIE VALVE Closed Closed/Open <!: RLGM F07SA MPR-4121 B-3 Rev1s1on I

Equipment Operating State HCLPF Screening Notes/Comments ID Description Normal Desired Results 2E11-RHR HX Discharge TE- Div II Operating Operating <!: RLGM N027B 2E51- RCIC BAROMETRIC Standby Operating <!: RLGM AOOl CONDENSER 2E51-RCIC LUBE OIL COOLER Standby Operating <!: RLGM BOOl 2E51- RCIC REACTOR MAKEUP Standby Operating <!:RLGM COOl PUMP 2E51-RCIC TURBINE Standby Operating <!: RLGM C002 Inaccessible/High 2E51- STEAM SUPPLY ISO GATE Open Open N/A Dose; See Section F008 VLV 7.1 2E51- Pump Suction 6" Gate MOV Open Open/Closed <!:RLGM FOlO (CST Suction Valve) 2E51- RCIC PUMP DISCHARGE Open Open <!:RLGM F012 GATE MOV 2E51- Pump Disch 4" Gate MOV Closed Open <!:RLGM F013 (Pump Discharge Valve) 2E51-RCIC COOLING WATER PCV Open Operating <!:RLGM FOlS Min Flow 2" Bypass MOV 2E51-(RCIC Min-Flow Closed Closed/Open <!:RLGM F019 Valve) 2E51- TESTTHROTILE GLOBE Closed Closed <!:RLGM F022 VALVE 2E51- PUMP SUCTION GATE Closed Closed/Open <!:RLGM F029 VALVE 2E51- PUMP SUCTION GATE Closed Closed/Open <!:RLGM F031 VALVE MPR-4121 Revision I B-4

Equipment Operating State HCLPF Screening Notes/Comments ID Description Normal Desired Results 2E51- RCIC BAROMETRIC Standby Standby <!: RLGM F033 CONDENSER RELIEF VALVE 2E51- RCIC STEAM SUPPLY GLB Closed Open <!: RLGM F045 MOV COOLING WATER GLOBE 2E51-VALVE MOV (RHR Suction Closed Open <!: RLGM F046 Valve)

Steam Supply 3" Governing 2E51-Gate HOV Open Operating <!: RLGM F523 (RCIC Governor Valve)

Steam Supply 3" Trip 2E51-Throttle MOV (RCIC Open Open <!: RLGM F524 Trip & Throttle Valve) 2E51-RCIC CST LO LS - Div I - Batt Operating Operating <!:RLGM NOGO 2E51-RCIC CST LO LS - Div I - Batt Operating Operating <!: RLGM N061 2H11-RX & CTMT CLG & ISO PNL Available Available <!: RLGM P601 2H11-RWCU & RECIRC PNL Available Available <!: RLGM P602 2H11-Reac Control BN BD- Panel Available Available <!: RLGM P603 2H11- CLS lE Analog Signal Available Available <!: RLGM PGOSB Converter/IS Panel 2H11-FW/Recirc INST Panel Available Available <!: RLGM P612 Includes FM 2H11-RCIC RELAY VB Available Available <!: RLGM Relays; See P621 Section 6.5 MPR-4121 Rev1sion I B-5

Equipment Operating State HCLPF Screening Notes/Comments ID Description Normal Desired Results 2H11-INBD ISO VLV VERT PNL Available Available ~ RLGM P622 Includes FM 2H11- Outboard lso Valve Vert Available Available ~ RLGM Relays; See P623 Panel Section 6.5 2H11-AUTO DEPRESS RELAY VB Available Available ~ RLGM P628 2H11- TURB FDWTR & COND CON Available Available ~ RLGM PGSO PNL 2H11- Gas Treat Vent Vert BD -

Available Available ~ RLGM P654 Panel 2H11- BEARING TEMP & BAT Available Available ~ RLGM PGSS MONVB 2H11- STARTUP BOILER VERT Available Available ~ RLGM P656 PANEL 2H11- VENT & DRYWELL INERT Available Available ~ RLGM P657 VER 2H11- Analog Signal Converter Available Available ~ RLGM P691B Panel 2H11- ATTS ECCS Trip Unit Available Available ~ RLGM P925 Cabinet - Panel 2H11-ATTS ECCS MCR Panel Available Available ~ RLGM P926 2H11- ATTS ECCS Trip Unit Available Available ~ RLGM P927 Cabinet- Panel 2H11- ATTS ECCS Trip Unit Available Available ~ RLGM P928 Cabinet- Panel 2H21-RV LEVEL/PRESS LOC PNL A Available Available ~ RLGM P004 MPR-4121 Revision I B-6

Equipment Operating State HCLPF Screening Notes/Comments ID Description Normal Desired Results 2H21-RCIC SYSTEM 2E51 PANEL Available Available ~RLGM P0 51 2H21-RCIC TEST VALVE PI PANEL Available Available ~RLGM P0 53 2H21-RX VESSELINST RACK Available Available ~RLGM P405A 2JE1891 JUNCTION BOX Available Available ~RLGM 2JE2712 JUNCTION BOX Available Available ~ RLGM 2JE2798 JUNCTION BOX Available Available ~ RLGM Inaccessible/High 2JM7873 JUNCTION BOX Available Available N/A Dose; See Section 7.1 Screened to GMRS 2P11-Condensate Storage Tank Available Available 0.18g instead of IPEEE A001 RLE; Ref. 17 2P52- BKUP AIR ACCUMULATOR Available Available ~ RLGM A027A TANKA 2P52- BKUP AIR ACCUMULATOR Available Available ~RLGM A027B TANKB Relief Valve N2 Cylinder 2P52-Supply Manifold Standby Standby ~ RLGM F1228 Overpressure Protection Inaccessible/High 2P70-100 MICRON NOM FILTER Available Available N/A Dose; See Section DOOBA 7.1 Inaccessible/High 2P70-5 MICRON NOM FILTER Available Available N/A Dose; See Section D009A 7.1 Inaccessible/High 2P70- D/W PNEUMATIC HEADER Operating Operating N/A Dose; See Section F103A PCV 7.1 MPR-4121 Rev1s1on I B-7

Equipment Operating State HCLPF Screening Notes/Comments ID Description Normal Desired Results 2R22-125/250VDC Switchgear 2A Energized Energized ~ RLGM S016 2R22-125/250VDC Switchgear 2B Energized Energized ~ RLGM 5017 2R23- 600VAC Bus 2C-Energized Energized ~ RLGM S003 Switchgear/XFMR 2R23- 600VAC Bus 2D-Energized Energized ~ RLGM S004 Switchgear/XFMR Includes FM 2R24-250VDC MCC 2A Energized Energized ~ RLGM Relays; See S021 Section 6.5 2R24- Energized/

250VDC MCC 2B Energized ~ RLGM S022 De-Energized 2R25- 125VDC Distribution Energized Energized ~ RLGM SOOl Cabinet 2A 2R25- 125VDC Distribution Energized Energized ~ RLGM S002 Cabinet 2B 2R25- 120/208VAC Instrument Available Available ~ RLGM S064 Bus 2A- Div I 2R25- 120/208VAC Instrument Available Available ~ RLGM S065 Bus 2B- Div II 2R25- 120VAC Critical Instrument Energized Energized ~ RLGM S066 Cabinet 2A 2R25- 120VAC Critical Instrument Energized Energized ~ RLGM S067 Cabinet 2B 2R25- Emergency Lighting Cabinet Energized Energized ~ RLGM S069 - Div II 2R25- Emergency Lighting Cabinet Energized Energized ~ RLGM S094 - Div II MPR-4121 Revision I B-8

Equipment Operating State HCLPF

- Screening Notes/Comments ID Description Normal Desired Results 2R25- 125VDC Distribution Energized Energized 2: RLGM Sl30 Cabinet 2E 2R26- 125VDC THROWOVER SW Standby/ Standby/

2: RLGM M031A 2A Closed Closed 2R26- 125VDC THROWOVER SW Standby/ Standby/

2: RLGM M031B 2B Closed Closed 2R26- 125VDC THROWOVER SW Standby/ Standby/

2: RLGM M031C 2C Closed Closed 2R26- 125VDC THROWOVER SW Standby/ Standby/

2: RLGM M031D 20 Closed Closed 2R26-FLEX Transfer Switch 2A Normal Normal 2: RLGM M126 2R26-FLEX Transfer Switch 2B Normal Normal 2: RLGM M127 2R26-FLEX Transfer Switch 2D Normal Normal 2: RLGM M129 2R26-FLEX Transfer Switch 2E Normal Normal 2: RLGM M130 2R26- DC INPUT SWITCH FOR Normal Normal 2: RLGM M135 INVERTER 2A 2R26- BYPASS SWITCH FOR Normal Normal <:: RLGM M136 INVERTER 2A 2R26- DC INPUT SWITCH FOR Normal Normal 2: RLGM M137 INVERTER 2B 2R26- BYPASS SWITCH FOR Normal Normal 2: RLGM Ml38 INVERTER 2B 2R27-LOCAL STARTER 2Ell-F008 Energized De-Energized <::RLGM S096 2R42- 125/250VDC Station Energized Energized 2: RLGM SOOlA Battery 2A MPR-4121 B-9 Rev1s1on I

Equipment Operating State HCLPF Screening Notes/Comments ID Description Normal Desired Results 2R42- 125/250VDC Station Energized Energized ~ RLGM SOOlB Battery 2B 2R42-Battery Charger 2A- Div I Energized Energized ~RLGM S026 2R42-Battery Charger 2B- Div I Energized Energized ~ RLGM S027 2R42-Battery Charger 20 - Div II Energized Energized ~ RLGM S029 2R42-Battery Charger 2E - Div II Energized Energized ~ RLGM S030 2R44- 250VDC/120VAC FLEX Energized Energized ~ RLGM SOOG Inverter 2A 2R44- 250VDC/120VAC FLEX Energized Energized ~ RLGM S007 Inverter 2B 2T46- FLTR TRAIN OUT Open Closed ~ RLGM F002A BUTIERFLY 2T46- FLTR TRAIN OUT Open Closed ~ RLGM F002B BUTIERFLY 2T47-SIGNAL CONVERTER R/V Operating Operating ~RLGM KGOO 2T47-NOOlJ,K SIGNAL CONV R/V Operating Operating ~ RLGM K602 2T47- NOOlM, N003 SIG CONV Operating Operating ~ RLGM K603 R/V 2T47-NOOS, N007 SIG CONV R/V Operating Operating ~RLGM K604 2T47-NOlO SIGNAL CONV R/V Operating Operating ~RLGM KGOS MPR-4121 B-10 Rev ision I

Equipment Operating State HCLPF Screening Notes/Comments ID Description Normal Desired Results Inaccessible/High 2T47-B009A Inlet Air TE- Div II Operating Operating N/A Dose; See Section NOOlJ 7.1 Inaccessible/High 2T47- OW CLG Dome Area TE- Div Operating Operating N/A Dose; See Section NOOlK II 7.1 Inaccessible/High 2T47-B009A&B Inlet Air TE- Div II Operating Operating N/A Dose; See Section NOOlM 7.1 Inaccessible/High 2T47- OW CLG Midlevel Area TE-Operating Operating N/A Dose; See Section N003 Div II 7.1 Inaccessible/High 2T47- OW Lower Level Area TE-Operating Operating N/A Dose; See Section NOOS Div II 7.1 Inaccessible/High 2T47- OW Lower Level Area TE-Operating Operating N/A Dose; See Section N007 Div II 7.1 Inaccessible/High 2T47- Sacrificial Shield Top TE-Operating Operating N/A Dose; See Section NOlO Div II 7.1 2T47- OW CLG CRD/Torus Area TR Operating Operating <!: RLGM R627 - Div II 2T48-NITROGEN STORAGE TANK Available Available <!: RLGM AOOl Repaired under 2T48- N2 TANK AMBIENT CAP and re-walked Available Available <!: RLGM 8002 VAPORIZER down; See Section 6.3.3.

2T48-TORUS VENT SGTS ISO VLV Open Closed <!: RLGM F081 2T48-HCVS Vent Control AOV Closed Closed/Open <!: RLGM F082 MPR-4121 B-11 Rev1sion I

Equipment Operating State HCLPF Screening Notes/Comments 10 Description Normal Desired Results 2T48- HCVS Containment Closed Closed/Open <!:RLGM F318 Isolation AOV 2T48- HCVS Containment Closed Closed <!: RLGM F319 Isolation AOV 2T48- HCVS Containment Closed Closed <!: RLGM F320 Isolation AOV 2T48- HCVS Containment Closed Closed/Open <!:RLGM F326 Isolation AOV 2T48- Relief Valve Argon Supply Standby Standby <!: RLGM F408 Overpressure Protection 2T48-8002 DISCH LINE SRV Standby Standby <!: RLGM F465 2T48- 8002 DISCHARGE PCV (N2 Operating Operating <!:RLGM F468 system) 2T48-DW Pressure lnst 1/V- Div II Operating Operating <!: RLGM K6088 2T48- OW/Torus Pressure lnst 1/V Operating Operating <!:RLGM K6208 - Div II 2T48-Torus Levellnst 1/V- Div II Operating Operating <!: RLGM K6218 2T48-Torus Midrange PT- Div II Operating Operating <!: RLGM N0088 2T48-Torus Water TE- Div II Operating Operating <!: RLGM N0098 2T48-Torus Water TE- Div II Operating Operating <!:RLGM N009D 2T48-Torus Air TE- Div II Operating Operating <!: RLGM N009E 2T48-Torus Air TE- Div II Operating Operating <!:RLGM N009H MPR-4121 Revision I B-12

Equipment Operating State HCLPF Screening Notes/Comments ID Description Normal Desired Results 2T48- OW Narrow Range PT- Div Operating Operating 2: RLGM N020B II 2T48- Narrow Range Torus LT-Operating Operating 2: RLGM N021B Divll 2T48-OW Midrange PT- Div II Operating Operating 2: RLGM N023B 2T48- OW and Torus Narrow Operating Operating 2: RLGM R607B Range L/PR - Div II 2T48- OW/Torus Midrange PR-Operating Operating 2: RLGM R609 Div II 2T48-0/W MIDRANGE PI Operating Operating 2: RLGM R631B 2T48-TORUS MIDRANGE PI Operating Operating 2: RLGM R632B 2X86-FLEX Connection Box 2A Standby Standby 2: RLGM S003 2X86-FLEX Connection Box 2B Standby Standby 2: RLGM S004 MPR-4121 B-13 Revis1on I

Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant- Units 1 and 2 Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1 Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report Completion Enclosure 2 Required Actions and Schedule for Completion of ESEP Activities (Updated) to NL-16-2466 Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant- Units 1 and 2 Required Actions and Schedule for Completion of ESEP Activities Hatch Unit 1 Required Actions and Schedule for ESEL Items Not Installed as of Walkdowns/Report Issuance

Equipment Outage Required Scheduled Number Required Action Completion Date 1

1R26-M136 FLEX Transfer Switch 1A After the items were December 2016

1R26-M 137 FLEX Transfer Switch 1B installed, ESEP activities

1R26-M139 FLEX Transfer Switch 1D Did NOT require outage to were completed, HCLPF (2 years after ESEP

1R26-M140 FLEX Transfer Switch 1E walk down. Walkdowns are evaluations were Report submittal)

1T48-F408 Relief Argon Supply Overpressure complete. No modifications were necessary.

generated in accordance Protection with EPRI 3002000704 Actual Completion:

1X86-S003 600V FLEX Diesel Generator (FLEX and EPRI NP-6041-SL. December 2016 Connection Box 1A) No modifications

1X86-S004 600V FLEX Diesel Generator (FLEX necessary to meet ESEP Connection Box 1B) requirements Note: 1R26-M132 and 1R26-M133 are no longer on the ESEL 2

1P52-A027 A BKUP Air Accumulator Tank A After the items were Spring outage 2018

1P52-A027B BKUP Air Accumulator Tank B Took advantage of outages installed, ESEP activities (2 outages after

1P52-F1312 Relief Valve N2 Cylinder Supply and other opportunities to were completed, HCLPF December 2014)

Manifold Overpressure Protection evaluations were perform walkdowns.

1R25-S066 120VAC Critical instrument Cabinet 1A Walkdowns are complete.

generated in accordance Actual Completion:

with EPRI 3002000704

1R25-S067 120VAC Critical instrument Cabinet 1B No modifications were and EPRI NP-6041-SL. No December 2016

1R42-S026 Battery Charger 1A- Div I necessary.

modifications necessary to

1R42-S027 Battery Charger 1B - Div I meet ESEP requirements.

1R44-S006 250VDC/120VAC Inverter 1A

1R44-S007 250VDC/120VAC Inverter 1B

- - - -

E2-1 to NL-16-2466 Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant - Units 1 and 2 Required Actions and Schedule for Completion of ESEP Activities Hatch Unit 1 Required Actions and Schedule for ESEL Items Not Installed as of Walkdowns/Report Issuance

Equipment Outage Required Scheduled Number Required Action Completion Date 3 N/A N/A This letter to NRC 90 days following summarizes results of Unit completion of ESEP 1 Items 1 and 2 and activities, no later than provides confirmation that 90 days after Spring no plant modifications 2018 outage (if an associations with Items 1 outage is required) .

and 2 were necessary.

Actual Completion:

December 2016

-

Continued on next page for Unit 2 E2-2 to NL-16-2466 Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant- Units 1 and 2 Required Actions and Schedule for Completion of ESEP Activities Hatch Unit 2 Required Actions and Schedule for ESEL Items Not Installed as of Walkdowns/Report Issuance

Equipment Description Remaining Completion Date Number Scope 1

2R26-M126 FLEX Transfer Switch 2A After the items were December 2016

2R26-M127 FLEX Transfer Switch 2B installed, ESEP activities Did NOT require outage to (2 years after ESEP were completed, HCLPF

2R26-M129 FLEX Transfer Switch 2D walk down. Walkdowns are Report submittals) evaluations were generated

2R26-M130 FLEX Transfer Switch 2E complete. No modifications in accordance with EPRI were necessary. Actual Completion:

2R42-S026 Battery Charger 2A - Div I 3002000704 and EPRI NP-December 2016

2R42-S027 Battery Charger 2B - Div I 6041-SL. No modifications necessary to meet ESEP

2T4B-F40B Relief Argon Supply Overpressure Protection requirements.

2X86-S003 600V FLEX Diesel Generator (FLEX Connection Box 2A)

2XB6-S004 600V FLEX Diesel Generator (FLEX Connection Box 2B) 2

2P52-A027A BKUP Air Accumulator Tank A Took advantage of outages After the items were Spring outage 2017

2P52-A027B BKUP Air Accumulator Tank B and other opportunities to installed, ESEP activities (2 outages after perform walkdowns. were completed, HCLPF

2P52-F122B Relief Valve N2 Cylinder Supply December 2014)

Walkdowns are complete. evaluations were generated Manifold Overpressure Protection No modifications were in accordance with EPRI Actual Completion:

2R25-S066 120VAC Critical instrument Cabinet 2A necessary. 3002000704 and EPRI NP- December 2016

2R25-S067 120VAC Critical instrument Cabinet 2B 6041-SL. No modifications

2R44-S006 250VDC/120VAC Inverter 2A necessary to meet ESEP requirements.

2R44-S007 250VDC/120VAC Inverter 2B Note: 2R26-M132 and 2R26-M133 are no longer on the ESEL

- - ---- -

E2-3 to NL-16-2466 Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant - Units 1 and 2 Required Actions and Schedule for Completion of ESEP Activities Hatch Unit 2 Required Actions and Schedule for ESEL Items Not Installed as of Walkdowns/Report Issuance

Equipment Description Remaining Completion Date Number Scope 3 NA NA This letter to NRC 90 days following summarizes results of Unit 2 completion of ESEP Items 1 and 2 and provides activities, no later than confirmation that no plant 90 days after Spring modifications associations 2017 outage (if an with Items 1 and 2 were outage is required) .

necessary.

Actual Completion:

December 2016 E2-4

Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant - Units 1 and 2 Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1 Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report Completion Enclosure 3 Table of Regulatory Commitments to NL-16-2466 Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant - Units 1 and 2 Table of Regulatory Commitments Type Actual Commitment One- Continuing Completion Date Time Compliance (If Required)

Action Hatch Unit 1 Complete the remaining NTTF 2.1 X Work is complete with this Unit 1 ESEL walkdowns transmittal - December, 2016

/evaluations for items that are not currently installed. These items are Note:

identified in Attachment A of the 1R26-M 132 and 1R26-M 133 Hatch Units 1 and 2 ESEP Report are no longer on the ESEL 1 (Enclosure 1 of this letter) and and therefore no summarized in Enclosure 2. walkdowns/evaluations were necessary.

Hatch Unit 2 Complete the remaining NTTF 2.1 X Work is complete with this Unit 2 ESEL walkdowns/evaluations transmittal- December, 2016 for items that are not currently installed. These items are identified Note:

in Attachment B of the Hatch 2R26-M132 and 2R26-M133 Units 1 and 2 ESEP Report are no longer on the ESEL (Enclosure 1 of this letter) and and therefore no summarized in Enclosure 2. walkdowns/evaluations were necessary.

E3-1

@@ Line 13: / Line 13: @@
 | document type = Letter type:NL, Report, Technical
 | page count = 71
+| project =
+| stage = Other
 }}
@@ Line 59: / Line 61: @@
 Plant Hatch Units 1 and 2 Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP)
-Report MPR-4121 Revision 1 December 1, 20 16 QUALITY ASSURANCE DOCUMENT This document has been prepared, reviewed, and approved in accordance with the Quality Assurance requirements of 1OCFR50 Appendix 8 and/or ASME NQA-1, as specified in the MPR Nuclear Quality Assurance Program.
+Report MPR-4121 Revision 1 December 1, 20 16 QUALITY ASSURANCE DOCUMENT This document has been prepared, reviewed, and approved in accordance with the Quality Assurance requirements of 10CFR50 Appendix 8 and/or ASME NQA-1, as specified in the MPR Nuclear Quality Assurance Program.
 Prepared by:    '(~ Q 'I(~
 Kimberly A. Keithline Reviewed by:    H. o/'~

NL-16-2466, Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1 Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report Completion: Difference between revisions

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5.1 DESCRIPTION

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NL-16-2466, Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1 Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report Completion: Difference between revisions

Revision as of 14:19, 10 November 2019

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References:

Enclosures:

5.1 DESCRIPTION

SUMMARY

SUMMARY

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