ML18121A130: Difference between revisions
StriderTol (talk | contribs) (Created page by program invented by StriderTol) |
StriderTol (talk | contribs) (Created page by program invented by StriderTol) |
||
| Line 9: | Line 9: | ||
| docket = | | docket = | ||
| license number = | | license number = | ||
| contact person = Lee E | | contact person = Lee E | ||
| document type = Report, Miscellaneous | | document type = Report, Miscellaneous | ||
| page count = 4 | | page count = 4 | ||
Revision as of 08:31, 17 June 2019
| ML18121A130 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 05/01/2018 |
| From: | Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | |
| Lee E | |
| References | |
| Download: ML18121A130 (4) | |
Text
Information inhis report is provided for general informational purposes only and is subject to change without notice.) (For additional information contact Erika Lee at: erika.lee@nrc.gov)This RIS update is intended to clarify the guidance contained in previously issued RIS 2005-29. RIS 2005-29 was initially issued to discuss concerns with demonstrating that certain events would not escalate into more serious events. This RIS was initially intended to discuss technical specification definitions related to reactor coolant system pressure boundary leakage but was placed on hold pending industry development of Technical Specification Task Force (TSTF) Traveler 554, "Revise Reactor Coolant Leakage Requirements." The NRC was recently informed that industry no longer plans to submit TSTF Traveler 554 for review, therefore NRC is again evaluating whether to develop this RIS.
This RIS is intended to reiterate existing requirements related to dispositioning information pertaining to the capability of safety-related structures, systems, and components (SSC) to perform their safety functions. Also addressed are instances where a licensee becomes aware of information pertaining to the time period that a safety-related SSC is installed that may impact its ability to perform its safety function(s).This RIS is intended to remind licensees of the requirements regarding reporting human performance incidents under 10 CFR 50.73, "Licensee event report system," and how to properly report those matters. This RIS specifically focuses on 10 CFR 50.73 (b)(2)(ii)(J), which requires a narrative description for each human performance related root cause discussing the causes and circumstances. This RIS is intended to clarify the applicability of the single failure criterion as it relates to technical specification systems, structures and components with support systems not covered in technical specifications This supplement to RIS 2002-22 is intended to clarify the NRC's endorsement of NEI 01-01 by providing additional guidance for the qualitative assessment used to provide reasonable assurance that a digital modification will exhibit a low likelihood of failure. This RIS is intended to clarify the requirements for bare metal visual examination.
Information inhis report is provided for general informational purposes only and is subject to change without notice.) (For additional information contact Erika Lee at: erika.lee@nrc.gov)This IN is intended to inform addressees of recent operating experience related to numerous dryout indications which occurred over multiple cycles at the Leibstadt Nuclear Power Plant (NPP), a BWR/6 in Switzerland. This RIS is intended to supply information to assist medical use licensees in complying with the current NRC requirements related to the use of electronic signatures in internal licensee electronic documents and to clarify what constitutes a signature on electronic documents that medical use licensees are required to sign and maintain. This IN is intended to make addressees aware of recent experiences related inadequate oversight of suppliers that provide basic components to NRC-licensed facilities.This RIS is intended to clarify the reporting requirements for nuclear facilities and equipment as required by 10 CFR 110.54 and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in the United States.
This IN will highlight recent operating experience issues involving bearing oil sight classes and resulting in damaged pump or turbine bearings. This RIS is intended to inform addressees about recent NRC findings involving vendors that provide basic components to NRC-licensed facilities for not adequately imposing the requirements of Appendix B "Quality Assurance Program Criteria for Nuclear Power Plants and Fuel Reprocessing Plants," to 10 CFR Part 50 and 10 CFR Part 21, "Reporting of Defects and Noncompliance," to their suppliers in the procurement documents. This IN is intended to inform addressees of recent instances where operators of boiling water reactors allowed multiple contacts in the reactor protection system circuitry to be bypassed without entering the appropriate action statement required by the licensee's technical specifications. These conditions existed during quarterly surveillance testing of main steam isolation valve and turbine stop valve logic. This RIS clarifies the National Source Tracking System (NSTS) Reporting requirements involving Category 1 or Category 2 sealed sources that a manufacturer identifies as bulk material.
Information inhis report is provided for general informational purposes only and is subject to change without notice.) (For additional information contact Erika Lee at: erika.lee@nrc.gov)This information notice is being issued to reiterate the need for comprehensive evaluations of configuration changes to structures, systems and components (SSC). This information notice is being issued to notify addressees of incomplete documentation regarding armed responder duties and responsibilities.
This information notice is being issued to inform licensees of hazards from a high energy arc flash (HEAF) event resulting from the inadvertent introduction of foreign material to an energized switchgear bus during the application of fire protection material in the switchgear room. The force of the pressure wave caused by the HEAF breached the integrity of the fire door separating two safety-related switchgear rooms.
This was issued as IN 2018-05, "Long-Term Fissile Material Accumulation Due to Unanalyzed or Improperly Analyzed Conditions at Fuel Cycle Facilities," on March 26, 2018. This was issued as RIS 2018-02 on March 26, 2018. This was issued as IN 2018-06 on April 10, 2018.