Regulatory Guide 1.153: Difference between revisions

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{{#Wiki_filter:U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY  
{{#Wiki_filter:U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION                                                                     Revision I
COMMISSION  
                                                                                                                                            June 1996 REGULATORY GUIDE
REGULATORY
                                    OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REGULATORY RESEARCH
Revision I June 1996 GUIDE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REGULATORY  
                                                          REGULATORY GUIDE 1.153 (Draft was issued as DG-1042)
RESEARCH REGULATORY  
                                                      CRITERIA FOR SAFETY SYSTEMS
GUIDE 1.153 (Draft was issued as DG-1042) CRITERIA FOR SAFETY SYSTEMS  


==A. INTRODUCTION==
==A. INTRODUCTION==
Appendix A, "General Design Criteria for Nuclear Power Plants," to 10 CFR Part 50, "Domestic Licens ing of Production and Utilization Facilities," contains, in part, requirements for the design, reliability, qualifi cation, and testability of safety systems. 1 The following General Design Criteria 2 are applicable to the power, instrumentation, and control portions of nuclear power plant safety systems.
*      Criterion 5, "Sharing of Structures, Systems, and Appendix A, "General Design Criteria for Nuclear                                   Components," requires that certain structures, Power Plants," to 10 CFR Part 50, "Domestic Licens                                       systems, and components important to safety not ing of Production and Utilization Facilities," contains,                                 be shared among nuclear power units unless it in part, requirements for the design, reliability, qualifi                               can be shown that such sharing will not signifi cation, and testability of safety systems. 1 The following                               cantly impair their ability to perform their safety General Design Criteria 2 are applicable to the power,                                   functions.


Criterion  
instrumentation, and control portions of nuclear power                          "*      Criterion 10, "Reactor Design," requires protec plant safety systems.                                                                    tion systems to be designed with margins to en Criterion 2, "Design Bases for Protection Against                                sure that fuel design limits are not exceeded.
2, "Design Bases for Protection Against Natural Phenomena," requires systems impor tant to safety to be designed to withstand the ef fects of natural phenomena without loss of capa bility to perform their safety functions.


0 Criterion
Natural Phenomena," requires systems impor                              "*      Criterion 12, "Suppression of Reactor Power Os tant to safety to be designed to withstand the ef                               cillations," requires protection systems to be de fects of natural phenomena without loss of capa                                  signed to prevent or detect and suppress power bility to perform their safety functions.                                        oscillations that can result in conditions exceed
4, "Environmental and Dynamic Ef fects Design Bases," requires systems important to safety to be designed to accommodate the ef fects of and to be compatible with the environ mental conditions associated with normal opera tion, maintenance, testing, and postulated accidents.
0      Criterion 4, "Environmental and Dynamic Ef                                      ing fuel design limits.


IThe term "safety systems" is synonymous with "safety-related" systems. The general design criteria cover structures, systems, and components "important to safety." The scope of this guide is, however, limited to "safety systems," which are a subset of "systems important to safety." 2 For the full text of the applicable General Design Criteria, see Appendix A to 10 CFR Part 5
fects Design Bases," requires systems important                          *      Criterion 13, "Instrumentation and Control," re to safety to be designed to accommodate the ef                                  quires that instrumentation be provided to moni fects of and to be compatible with the environ                                  tor variables and systems over their anticipated mental conditions associated with normal opera                                    ranges for normal operation, anticipated opera tion, maintenance, testing, and postulated                                        tional occurrences, and accident conditions to accidents.                                                                        assure adequate safety. Appropriate controls must be provided to maintain variables and sys tems within prescribed operating ranges.


===0. USNRC REGULATORY ===
IThe term "safety systems" is synonymous with "safety-related"                  0       Criterion 15, "Reactor Coolant System Design,"
GUIDES Regulatory Guides are issued to describe and make available to the public such information as methods acceptable to the NRC staff for implement Ing specific parts of the Commission's regulations, techniques used by the staff In evaluating specific problems or postulated accidents, and data needed by the NRC staff in Its review of applications for permits and licenses.
systems. The general design criteria cover structures, systems, and components "important to safety." The scope of this guide                          requires that the reactor coolant system and as is, however, limited to "safety systems," which are a subset of                        sociated auxiliary, control, and protection sys
  "systems important to safety."
2 tems be designed with sufficient margin to ensure For the full text of the applicable General Design Criteria, see                      that the design conditions of the reactor coolant Appendix A to 10 CFR Part 50.


Regulatory guides are not substitutes for regulations, and com pliance with them Is not required.
pressure boundary are not exceeded during any USNRC REGULATORY GUIDES                                  Written comments may be submitted to the Rules Review and Directives Regulatory Guides are issued to describe and make available to the public      Branch, DFIPS, ADM, U. S, Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washing such information as methods acceptable to the NRC staff for implement          ton, DC 20555-0001.


Methods and solutions different from those set out in the guides will be acceptable if they provide a basis for the findings requisite to the issuance or continuance of a permit or license by the Commission.
Ing specific parts of the Commission's regulations, techniques used by        The guides are issued in the following ten broad divisions:
the staff In evaluating specific problems or postulated accidents, and data needed by the NRC staff in Its review of applications for permits and      1. Power Reactors                    6. Products licenses. Regulatory guides are not substitutes for regulations, and com      2, Research and Test Reactors        7. Transportation pliance with them Is not required. Methods and solutions different from         3. Fuels and Materials Facilities    8. Occupational Health those set out in the guides will be acceptable if they provide a basis for the 4. Environmental and Siting          9. Antitrust and Financial Review findings requisite to the issuance or continuance of a permit or license by     5. Materials and Plant Protection 10. General the Commission.                                                                Single copies of regulatory guides may be obtained free of charge by writ ing the Office of Administration, Attention: Distribution and Services Section, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC
This guide was Issued after consideration of comments received from the        20555-0001; or by fax at (301)415-2260.


This guide was Issued after consideration of comments received from the public. Comments and suggestions for Improvements in these guides are encouraged at all times, and guides will be revised, as appropriate, to accommodate comments and to reflect new information or experience.
public. Comments and suggestions for Improvements in these guides are encouraged at all times, and guides will be revised, as appropriate, to         Issued guides may also be purchased from the National Technical Infor accommodate comments and to reflect new information or experience.              mation Service on a standing order basis. Details on this service may be obtained by writing NTIS, 5285 Port Royal Road, Springfield, VA 22161.


* Criterion  
condition of normal operation, including antici            "*     Criterion 25, "Protection System Requirements pated operational occurrences.                                      for Reactivity Control Malfunctions," requires that the protection system be designed to ensure
5, "Sharing of Structures, Systems, and Components," requires that certain structures, systems, and components important to safety not be shared among nuclear power units unless it can be shown that such sharing will not signifi cantly impair their ability to perform their safety functions.
*  Criterion 17, "Electric Power Systems," requires                   that specified acceptable fuel design limits will electric power systems to be provided to permit                    not be exceeded for any single malfunction of functioning of structures, systems, and compo                      the reactivity control systems.


"* Criterion  
nents important to safety.                                  "*     Criterion 29, "Protection Against Anticipated Operational Occurrences," requires that protec Criterion 18, "Inspection and Testing of Electric tion and reactivity control systems be designed to Power Systems," requires that electric power sys be highly reliable in accomplishing their safety tems important to safety be designed to permit functions in the event of anticipated operational periodic inspection and testing of such systems                    occurrences.
10, "Reactor Design," requires protec tion systems to be designed with margins to en sure that fuel design limits are not exceeded.


"* Criterion
for operability and functional performance.
12, "Suppression of Reactor Power Os cillations," requires protection systems to be de signed to prevent or detect and suppress power oscillations that can result in conditions exceed ing fuel design limits.


* Criterion  
"*     Criteria 34, "Residual Heat Removal"; 35,
13, "Instrumentation and Control," re quires that instrumentation be provided to moni tor variables and systems over their anticipated ranges for normal operation, anticipated opera tional occurrences, and accident conditions to assure adequate safety. Appropriate controls must be provided to maintain variables and sys tems within prescribed operating ranges.  0 Criterion
"*  Criterion 20, "Protection System Functions," re                     "Emergency Core Cooling"; 38, "Containment quires a protection system to sense accident con                    Heat Removal"; 41, "Containment Atmosphere ditions and initiate operation of systems impor                    Cleanup"; and 44, "Cooling Water," require tant to safety to ensure that acceptable fuel                        suitable redundancy, interconnections, and iso design limits are not exceeded.                                    lation capabilities to ensure that, for onsite and for offsite electric power system operation, the
15, "Reactor Coolant System Design," requires that the reactor coolant system and as sociated auxiliary, control, and protection sys tems be designed with sufficient margin to ensure that the design conditions of the reactor coolant pressure boundary are not exceeded during any Written comments may be submitted to the Rules Review and Directives Branch, DFIPS, ADM, U. S, Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washing ton, DC 20555-0001.
"*  Criterion 21, "Protection System Reliability and                    safety function can be accomplished.


The guides are issued in the following ten broad divisions:
Testability," requires the protection system to be designed with high functional reliability and in            "*      Criteria 37, "Testing of Emergency Core Cooling service testability. This criterion also requires re                System"; 40, "Testing of Containment Heat Re dundancy and independence sufficient to pro                        moval System"; 43, "Testing of Containment At vide protection against single failures and loss of                mosphere Cleanup Systems"; and 46, "Testing redundancy, except where justified, in the event                    of Cooling Water System," require designs to equipment is removed for service. On-line testing                  permit periodic functional testing of these sys is required.                                                       tems, the operability and performance of the ac tive components of the system, and the operabil
1. Power Reactors 6. Products 2, Research and Test Reactors
0--  Criterion 22, "Protection System Indepen                            ity of each of these systems as a whole, including dence," requires that the effects of natural phe                    the full operational sequence that brings each nomena, normal operation, maintenance, test                          system into operation.


===7. Transportation ===
ing, and postulated accident conditions on
3. Fuels and Materials Facilities
                                                                "*      Criterion 54, "Piping Systems Penetrating Con redundant channels not result in loss of the pro                    tainment," requires redundancy, reliability, and tection function. Functional diversity or diversity                  performance capabilities that reflect the impor in component design and principles of operation                      tance to safety of isolating these systems. Capa must be used to the extent practical to prevent bility for periodic testing is also required.
8. Occupational Health 4. Environmental and Siting 9. Antitrust and Financial Review 5. Materials and Plant Protection
10. General Single copies of regulatory guides may be obtained free of charge by writ ing the Office of Administration, Attention:
Distribution and Services Section, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001;
or by fax at (301)415-2260.


Issued guides may also be purchased from the National Technical Infor mation Service on a standing order basis. Details on this service may be obtained by writing NTIS, 5285 Port Royal Road, Springfield, VA 22161.
loss of the protection function.


condition of normal operation, including antici pated operational occurrences.
In addition, 10 CFR 50.55a, "Codes and Stan
"  Criterion 23, "Protection System Failure                    dards," requires in paragraph (h) that protection sys Modes," requires that the protection system be              tems meet the requirements set forth in IEEE Std 279 designed to fail into a safe state or into a state          1971 (ANSI N42.7-1972), "Criteria for Protection
                                                                                                                            3 demonstrated to be acceptable on some other                Systems for Nuclear Power Generating Stations."
    defined basis if conditions such as disconnection Further, 10 CFR 50.49, "Environmental Qualifi of the system, loss of energy, or postulated ad cation of Electric Equipment Important to Safety for verse environments are experienced.


* Criterion  
Nuclear Power Plants," requires that a program be es
17, "Electric Power Systems," requires electric power systems to be provided to permit functioning of structures, systems, and compo nents important to safet
"*   Criterion 24, "Separation of Protection and Con            tablished for qualifying safety-related electric equip trol Systems," requires separation of protection            ment, nonsafety-related electric equipment whose fail and control systems to the extent that failure of           ure under postulated environmental conditions could any single control system component or channel,             prevent satisfactory accomplishment of its safety or failure or removal from service of any single            functions, and certain post-accident monitoring protection system component or channel that is              equipment.


====y. Criterion ====
common to the control and protection systems,                    This guide describes a method acceptable to the leaves intact a system satisfying all reliability, re      NRC staff for complying with the Commission's regula dundancy, and independence requirements of the protection system. Interconnection of the              3 Copies may be obtained from the Institute of Electrical and protection and control systems is to be limited to            Electronics Engineers Service Center, 445 Hoes Lane, Piscat ensure that safety is not significantly impaired.            away, NJ 08855.
18, "Inspection and Testing of Electric Power Systems," requires that electric power sys tems important to safety be designed to permit periodic inspection and testing of such systems for operability and functional performance.


"* Criterion
1.153-2
20, "Protection System Functions," re quires a protection system to sense accident con ditions and initiate operation of systems impor tant to safety to ensure that acceptable fuel design limits are not exceeded.


"* Criterion
tions with respect to the design, reliability, qualifica        ing and Following an Accident," provides an accept tion, and testability of the power, instrumentation, and        able method to meet the regulations for accident moni control portions of safety systems of nuclear plants.          toring instrumentation.
21, "Protection System Reliability and Testability," requires the protection system to be designed with high functional reliability and in service testability.


This criterion also requires re dundancy and independence sufficient to pro vide protection against single failures and loss of redundancy, except where justified, in the event equipment is removed for service. On-line testing is required.
The Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards has been consulted concerning this guide and has con                       


0-- Criterion
==C. REGULATORY POSITION==
22, "Protection System Indepen dence," requires that the effects of natural phe nomena, normal operation, maintenance, test ing, and postulated accident conditions on redundant channels not result in loss of the pro tection function.
curred in the regulatory position.


Functional diversity or diversity in component design and principles of operation must be used to the extent practical to prevent loss of the protection function.  " Criterion
Conformance with the requirements of IEEE Std.
23, "Protection System Failure Modes," requires that the protection system be designed to fail into a safe state or into a state demonstrated to be acceptable on some other defined basis if conditions such as disconnection of the system, loss of energy, or postulated ad verse environments are experienced.


"* Criterion
The information collections mentioned in this reg          603-1991, "Criteria for Safety Systems for Nuclear ulatory guide are covered by the requirements of                Power Generating Stations" (including the correction
24, "Separation of Protection and Con trol Systems," requires separation of protection and control systems to the extent that failure of any single control system component or channel, or failure or removal from service of any single protection system component or channel that is common to the control and protection systems, leaves intact a system satisfying all reliability, re dundancy, and independence requirements of the protection system. Interconnection of the protection and control systems is to be limited to ensure that safety is not significantly impaired."* Criterion
10 CFR Part 50, which were approved by the Office of           sheet dated January 30, 1995), provides a method ac Management and Budget, approval number 3150                    ceptable to the NRC staff for satisfying the Commis
25, "Protection System Requirements for Reactivity Control Malfunctions," requires that the protection system be designed to ensure that specified acceptable fuel design limits will not be exceeded for any single malfunction of the reactivity control systems.
0011. The NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a                sion's regulations with respect to the design, reliability, person is not required to respond to, a collection of            qualification, and testability of the power, instrumenta information unless it displays a currently valid OMB            tion, and control portions of the safety systems of nu control number.                                                clear power plants.


"* Criterion
Section 3 of IEEE Std. 603-1991 references sev
29, "Protection Against Anticipated Operational Occurrences," requires that protec tion and reactivity control systems be designed to be highly reliable in accomplishing their safety functions in the event of anticipated operational occurrences.


"* Criteria 34, "Residual Heat Removal";
==B. DISCUSSION==
35, "Emergency Core Cooling";
eral industry codes and standards. If a referenced stan IEEE Std. 603-1991, "Criteria for Safety Systems          dard has been incorporated separately into the Com for Nuclear Power Generating Stations,"' 3 was pre              mission's regulations, licensees and applicants must pared by the Safety Systems Working Group SC 6.3 of              comply with that standard as set forth in the regulation.
38, "Containment Heat Removal";
41, "Containment Atmosphere Cleanup";
and 44, "Cooling Water," require suitable redundancy, interconnections, and iso lation capabilities to ensure that, for onsite and for offsite electric power system operation, the safety function can be accomplished.


"* Criteria 37, "Testing of Emergency Core Cooling System"; 40, "Testing of Containment Heat Re moval System"; 43, "Testing of Containment At mosphere Cleanup Systems";
the IEEE Nuclear Power Engineering Committee, and               If the referenced standard has been endorsed in a reg it was approved by the IEEE Standards Board on                  ulatory guide, the standard constitutes a method ac June 27, 1991. A correction sheet was issued on Jan              ceptable to the NRC staff of meeting a regulatory re uary 30, 1995.                                                  quirement as described in the regulatory guide. If a IEEE Std. 603-1991 establishes minimum func                referenced standard has been neither incorporated tional and design requirements for the power, instru            into the Commission's regulations nor endorsed in a mentation, and control portions of safety systems for          regulatory guide, licensees and applicants may consid nuclear power plants.                                          er and use the information in the referenced standard if appropriately justified, consistent with current regu Section 1.2 of IEEE Std. 603-1991 references              latory practice.
and 46, "Testing of Cooling Water System," require designs to permit periodic functional testing of these sys tems, the operability and performance of the ac tive components of the system, and the operabil ity of each of these systems as a whole, including the full operational sequence that brings each system into operation.


"* Criterion
IEEE/ANS 7.4.3.2-1982. Revision 1 to Regulatory Guide 1.152, "Criteria for Digital Computers in Safety Systems of Nuclear Power Plants," endorses the 1993                           
54, "Piping Systems Penetrating Con tainment," requires redundancy, reliability, and performance capabilities that reflect the impor tance to safety of isolating these systems. Capa bility for periodic testing is also required.


In addition, 10 CFR 50.55a, "Codes and Stan dards," requires in paragraph (h) that protection sys tems meet the requirements set forth in IEEE Std 279 1971 (ANSI N42.7-1972), "Criteria for Protection Systems for Nuclear Power Generating Stations." 3 Further, 10 CFR 50.49, "Environmental Qualifi cation of Electric Equipment Important to Safety for Nuclear Power Plants," requires that a program be es tablished for qualifying safety-related electric equip ment, nonsafety-related electric equipment whose fail ure under postulated environmental conditions could prevent satisfactory accomplishment of its safety functions, and certain post-accident monitoring equipment.
==D. IMPLEMENTATION==
version, IEEE Std. 7-4.3.2-1993, "Standard Criteria                   The purpose of this section is to provide informa for Digital Computers in Safety Systems of Nuclear             tion to applicants and licensees regarding the NRC
Power Generating Stations." Thus, Revision I to Regu            staff's plans for using this guide.


This guide describes a method acceptable to the NRC staff for complying with the Commission's regula 3 Copies may be obtained from the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Service Center, 445 Hoes Lane, Piscat away, NJ 08855.1.153-2 tions with respect to the design, reliability, qualifica tion, and testability of the power, instrumentation, and control portions of safety systems of nuclear plants.  The Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards has been consulted concerning this guide and has con curred in the regulatory position.
latory Guide 1.152 constitutes an acceptable method of meeting the regulatory requirements for digital                    Except in those cases in which an applicant or li computers.                                                      censee proposes an acceptable alternative method for complying with specified portions of the Commission's It should be noted that Section 5.8.1 of IEEE Std.        regulations, the methods described in this guide will be
603-1991 references IEEE Std. 497-1981, "IEEE                  used in the evaluation of submittals in connection with Standard Criteria for Accident Monitoring Instrumen            applications for construction permits and operating li tation for Nuclear Power Generating Stations." In this          censes. It will also be used to evaluate submittals from area, Revision 3 of Regulatory Guide 1.97, "Instru              operating reactor licensees who voluntarily propose to mentation for Light-Water-Cooled Nuclear Power                  initiate system modifications if there is a clear nexus Plants To Assess Plant and Environs Conditions Dur-            between the proposed modifications and this guidance.


The information collections mentioned in this reg ulatory guide are covered by the requirements of 10 CFR Part 50, which were approved by the Office of Management and Budget, approval number 3150 0011. The NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, a collection of information unless it displays a currently valid OMB control number.
VALUE/IMPACT STATEMENT
                      A draft Value/Impact Statement was published with the draft of this guide, Task DG-1042, when it was published for public comment in November 1995.


==B. DISCUSSION==
No changes were necessary, so a separate value/impact statement for this final guide has not been prepared. A copy of the draft Value/Impact Statement is available for inspection or copying for a fee in the Commission's Public Document Room at 2120 L Street NW., Washington, DC, under Task DG-1042.
IEEE Std. 603-1991, "Criteria for Safety Systems for Nuclear Power Generating Stations,"'
3 was pre pared by the Safety Systems Working Group SC 6.3 of the IEEE Nuclear Power Engineering Committee, and it was approved by the IEEE Standards Board on June 27, 1991. A correction sheet was issued on Jan uary 30, 1995.  IEEE Std. 603-1991 establishes minimum func tional and design requirements for the power, instru mentation, and control portions of safety systems for nuclear power plants.  Section 1.2 of IEEE Std. 603-1991 references IEEE/ANS 7.4.3.2-1982.


Revision 1 to Regulatory Guide 1.152, "Criteria for Digital Computers in Safety Systems of Nuclear Power Plants," endorses the 1993 version, IEEE Std. 7-4.3.2-1993, "Standard Criteria for Digital Computers in Safety Systems of Nuclear Power Generating Stations." Thus, Revision I to Regu latory Guide 1.152 constitutes an acceptable method of meeting the regulatory requirements for digital computers.
1.153-3
 
It should be noted that Section 5.8.1 of IEEE Std.  603-1991 references IEEE Std. 497-1981, "IEEE Standard Criteria for Accident Monitoring Instrumen tation for Nuclear Power Generating Stations." In this area, Revision 3 of Regulatory Guide 1.97, "Instru mentation for Light-Water-Cooled Nuclear Power Plants To Assess Plant and Environs Conditions Dur-ing and Following an Accident," provides an accept able method to meet the regulations for accident moni toring instrumentation.
 
C. REGULATORY
POSITION Conformance with the requirements of IEEE Std.  603-1991, "Criteria for Safety Systems for Nuclear Power Generating Stations" (including the correction sheet dated January 30, 1995), provides a method ac ceptable to the NRC staff for satisfying the Commis sion's regulations with respect to the design, reliability, qualification, and testability of the power, instrumenta tion, and control portions of the safety systems of nu clear power plants.  Section 3 of IEEE Std. 603-1991 references sev eral industry codes and standards.
 
If a referenced stan dard has been incorporated separately into the Com mission's regulations, licensees and applicants must comply with that standard as set forth in the regulation.
 
If the referenced standard has been endorsed in a reg ulatory guide, the standard constitutes a method ac ceptable to the NRC staff of meeting a regulatory re quirement as described in the regulatory guide. If a referenced standard has been neither incorporated into the Commission's regulations nor endorsed in a regulatory guide, licensees and applicants may consid er and use the information in the referenced standard if appropriately justified, consistent with current regu latory practice.
 
==D. IMPLEMENTATION==
The purpose of this section is to provide informa tion to applicants and licensees regarding the NRC staff's plans for using this guide.  Except in those cases in which an applicant or li censee proposes an acceptable alternative method for complying with specified portions of the Commission's regulations, the methods described in this guide will be used in the evaluation of submittals in connection with applications for construction permits and operating li censes. It will also be used to evaluate submittals from operating reactor licensees who voluntarily propose to initiate system modifications if there is a clear nexus between the proposed modifications and this guidance.VALUE/IMPACT
STATEMENT
A draft Value/Impact Statement was published with the draft of this guide, Task DG-1042, when it was published for public comment in November 1995.  No changes were necessary, so a separate value/impact statement for this final guide has not been prepared.


A copy of the draft Value/Impact Statement is available for inspection or copying for a fee in the Commission's Public Document Room at 2120 L Street NW., Washington, DC, under Task DG-1042.1.153-3 UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY
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Revision as of 05:22, 24 November 2019

(Draft Issued as DG-1042) Revision 1, Criteria for Safety Systems
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Issue date: 06/30/1996
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Revision I

June 1996 REGULATORY GUIDE

OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REGULATORY RESEARCH

REGULATORY GUIDE 1.153 (Draft was issued as DG-1042)

CRITERIA FOR SAFETY SYSTEMS

A. INTRODUCTION

  • Criterion 5, "Sharing of Structures, Systems, and Appendix A, "General Design Criteria for Nuclear Components," requires that certain structures, Power Plants," to 10 CFR Part 50, "Domestic Licens systems, and components important to safety not ing of Production and Utilization Facilities," contains, be shared among nuclear power units unless it in part, requirements for the design, reliability, qualifi can be shown that such sharing will not signifi cation, and testability of safety systems. 1 The following cantly impair their ability to perform their safety General Design Criteria 2 are applicable to the power, functions.

instrumentation, and control portions of nuclear power "* Criterion 10, "Reactor Design," requires protec plant safety systems. tion systems to be designed with margins to en Criterion 2, "Design Bases for Protection Against sure that fuel design limits are not exceeded.

Natural Phenomena," requires systems impor "* Criterion 12, "Suppression of Reactor Power Os tant to safety to be designed to withstand the ef cillations," requires protection systems to be de fects of natural phenomena without loss of capa signed to prevent or detect and suppress power bility to perform their safety functions. oscillations that can result in conditions exceed

0 Criterion 4, "Environmental and Dynamic Ef ing fuel design limits.

fects Design Bases," requires systems important * Criterion 13, "Instrumentation and Control," re to safety to be designed to accommodate the ef quires that instrumentation be provided to moni fects of and to be compatible with the environ tor variables and systems over their anticipated mental conditions associated with normal opera ranges for normal operation, anticipated opera tion, maintenance, testing, and postulated tional occurrences, and accident conditions to accidents. assure adequate safety. Appropriate controls must be provided to maintain variables and sys tems within prescribed operating ranges.

IThe term "safety systems" is synonymous with "safety-related" 0 Criterion 15, "Reactor Coolant System Design,"

systems. The general design criteria cover structures, systems, and components "important to safety." The scope of this guide requires that the reactor coolant system and as is, however, limited to "safety systems," which are a subset of sociated auxiliary, control, and protection sys

"systems important to safety."

2 tems be designed with sufficient margin to ensure For the full text of the applicable General Design Criteria, see that the design conditions of the reactor coolant Appendix A to 10 CFR Part 50.

pressure boundary are not exceeded during any USNRC REGULATORY GUIDES Written comments may be submitted to the Rules Review and Directives Regulatory Guides are issued to describe and make available to the public Branch, DFIPS, ADM, U. S, Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washing such information as methods acceptable to the NRC staff for implement ton, DC 20555-0001.

Ing specific parts of the Commission's regulations, techniques used by The guides are issued in the following ten broad divisions:

the staff In evaluating specific problems or postulated accidents, and data needed by the NRC staff in Its review of applications for permits and 1. Power Reactors 6. Products licenses. Regulatory guides are not substitutes for regulations, and com 2, Research and Test Reactors 7. Transportation pliance with them Is not required. Methods and solutions different from 3. Fuels and Materials Facilities 8. Occupational Health those set out in the guides will be acceptable if they provide a basis for the 4. Environmental and Siting 9. Antitrust and Financial Review findings requisite to the issuance or continuance of a permit or license by 5. Materials and Plant Protection 10. General the Commission. Single copies of regulatory guides may be obtained free of charge by writ ing the Office of Administration, Attention: Distribution and Services Section, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC

This guide was Issued after consideration of comments received from the 20555-0001; or by fax at (301)415-2260.

public. Comments and suggestions for Improvements in these guides are encouraged at all times, and guides will be revised, as appropriate, to Issued guides may also be purchased from the National Technical Infor accommodate comments and to reflect new information or experience. mation Service on a standing order basis. Details on this service may be obtained by writing NTIS, 5285 Port Royal Road, Springfield, VA 22161.

condition of normal operation, including antici "* Criterion 25, "Protection System Requirements pated operational occurrences. for Reactivity Control Malfunctions," requires that the protection system be designed to ensure

  • Criterion 17, "Electric Power Systems," requires that specified acceptable fuel design limits will electric power systems to be provided to permit not be exceeded for any single malfunction of functioning of structures, systems, and compo the reactivity control systems.

nents important to safety. "* Criterion 29, "Protection Against Anticipated Operational Occurrences," requires that protec Criterion 18, "Inspection and Testing of Electric tion and reactivity control systems be designed to Power Systems," requires that electric power sys be highly reliable in accomplishing their safety tems important to safety be designed to permit functions in the event of anticipated operational periodic inspection and testing of such systems occurrences.

for operability and functional performance.

"* Criteria 34, "Residual Heat Removal"; 35,

"* Criterion 20, "Protection System Functions," re "Emergency Core Cooling"; 38, "Containment quires a protection system to sense accident con Heat Removal"; 41, "Containment Atmosphere ditions and initiate operation of systems impor Cleanup"; and 44, "Cooling Water," require tant to safety to ensure that acceptable fuel suitable redundancy, interconnections, and iso design limits are not exceeded. lation capabilities to ensure that, for onsite and for offsite electric power system operation, the

"* Criterion 21, "Protection System Reliability and safety function can be accomplished.

Testability," requires the protection system to be designed with high functional reliability and in "* Criteria 37, "Testing of Emergency Core Cooling service testability. This criterion also requires re System"; 40, "Testing of Containment Heat Re dundancy and independence sufficient to pro moval System"; 43, "Testing of Containment At vide protection against single failures and loss of mosphere Cleanup Systems"; and 46, "Testing redundancy, except where justified, in the event of Cooling Water System," require designs to equipment is removed for service. On-line testing permit periodic functional testing of these sys is required. tems, the operability and performance of the ac tive components of the system, and the operabil

0-- Criterion 22, "Protection System Indepen ity of each of these systems as a whole, including dence," requires that the effects of natural phe the full operational sequence that brings each nomena, normal operation, maintenance, test system into operation.

ing, and postulated accident conditions on

"* Criterion 54, "Piping Systems Penetrating Con redundant channels not result in loss of the pro tainment," requires redundancy, reliability, and tection function. Functional diversity or diversity performance capabilities that reflect the impor in component design and principles of operation tance to safety of isolating these systems. Capa must be used to the extent practical to prevent bility for periodic testing is also required.

loss of the protection function.

In addition, 10 CFR 50.55a, "Codes and Stan

" Criterion 23, "Protection System Failure dards," requires in paragraph (h) that protection sys Modes," requires that the protection system be tems meet the requirements set forth in IEEE Std 279 designed to fail into a safe state or into a state 1971 (ANSI N42.7-1972), "Criteria for Protection

3 demonstrated to be acceptable on some other Systems for Nuclear Power Generating Stations."

defined basis if conditions such as disconnection Further, 10 CFR 50.49, "Environmental Qualifi of the system, loss of energy, or postulated ad cation of Electric Equipment Important to Safety for verse environments are experienced.

Nuclear Power Plants," requires that a program be es

"* Criterion 24, "Separation of Protection and Con tablished for qualifying safety-related electric equip trol Systems," requires separation of protection ment, nonsafety-related electric equipment whose fail and control systems to the extent that failure of ure under postulated environmental conditions could any single control system component or channel, prevent satisfactory accomplishment of its safety or failure or removal from service of any single functions, and certain post-accident monitoring protection system component or channel that is equipment.

common to the control and protection systems, This guide describes a method acceptable to the leaves intact a system satisfying all reliability, re NRC staff for complying with the Commission's regula dundancy, and independence requirements of the protection system. Interconnection of the 3 Copies may be obtained from the Institute of Electrical and protection and control systems is to be limited to Electronics Engineers Service Center, 445 Hoes Lane, Piscat ensure that safety is not significantly impaired. away, NJ 08855.

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tions with respect to the design, reliability, qualifica ing and Following an Accident," provides an accept tion, and testability of the power, instrumentation, and able method to meet the regulations for accident moni control portions of safety systems of nuclear plants. toring instrumentation.

The Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards has been consulted concerning this guide and has con

C. REGULATORY POSITION

curred in the regulatory position.

Conformance with the requirements of IEEE Std.

The information collections mentioned in this reg 603-1991, "Criteria for Safety Systems for Nuclear ulatory guide are covered by the requirements of Power Generating Stations" (including the correction

10 CFR Part 50, which were approved by the Office of sheet dated January 30, 1995), provides a method ac Management and Budget, approval number 3150 ceptable to the NRC staff for satisfying the Commis

0011. The NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a sion's regulations with respect to the design, reliability, person is not required to respond to, a collection of qualification, and testability of the power, instrumenta information unless it displays a currently valid OMB tion, and control portions of the safety systems of nu control number. clear power plants.

Section 3 of IEEE Std. 603-1991 references sev

B. DISCUSSION

eral industry codes and standards. If a referenced stan IEEE Std. 603-1991, "Criteria for Safety Systems dard has been incorporated separately into the Com for Nuclear Power Generating Stations,"' 3 was pre mission's regulations, licensees and applicants must pared by the Safety Systems Working Group SC 6.3 of comply with that standard as set forth in the regulation.

the IEEE Nuclear Power Engineering Committee, and If the referenced standard has been endorsed in a reg it was approved by the IEEE Standards Board on ulatory guide, the standard constitutes a method ac June 27, 1991. A correction sheet was issued on Jan ceptable to the NRC staff of meeting a regulatory re uary 30, 1995. quirement as described in the regulatory guide. If a IEEE Std. 603-1991 establishes minimum func referenced standard has been neither incorporated tional and design requirements for the power, instru into the Commission's regulations nor endorsed in a mentation, and control portions of safety systems for regulatory guide, licensees and applicants may consid nuclear power plants. er and use the information in the referenced standard if appropriately justified, consistent with current regu Section 1.2 of IEEE Std. 603-1991 references latory practice.

IEEE/ANS 7.4.3.2-1982. Revision 1 to Regulatory Guide 1.152, "Criteria for Digital Computers in Safety Systems of Nuclear Power Plants," endorses the 1993

D. IMPLEMENTATION

version, IEEE Std. 7-4.3.2-1993, "Standard Criteria The purpose of this section is to provide informa for Digital Computers in Safety Systems of Nuclear tion to applicants and licensees regarding the NRC

Power Generating Stations." Thus, Revision I to Regu staff's plans for using this guide.

latory Guide 1.152 constitutes an acceptable method of meeting the regulatory requirements for digital Except in those cases in which an applicant or li computers. censee proposes an acceptable alternative method for complying with specified portions of the Commission's It should be noted that Section 5.8.1 of IEEE Std. regulations, the methods described in this guide will be

603-1991 references IEEE Std. 497-1981, "IEEE used in the evaluation of submittals in connection with Standard Criteria for Accident Monitoring Instrumen applications for construction permits and operating li tation for Nuclear Power Generating Stations." In this censes. It will also be used to evaluate submittals from area, Revision 3 of Regulatory Guide 1.97, "Instru operating reactor licensees who voluntarily propose to mentation for Light-Water-Cooled Nuclear Power initiate system modifications if there is a clear nexus Plants To Assess Plant and Environs Conditions Dur- between the proposed modifications and this guidance.

VALUE/IMPACT STATEMENT

A draft Value/Impact Statement was published with the draft of this guide, Task DG-1042, when it was published for public comment in November 1995.

No changes were necessary, so a separate value/impact statement for this final guide has not been prepared. A copy of the draft Value/Impact Statement is available for inspection or copying for a fee in the Commission's Public Document Room at 2120 L Street NW., Washington, DC, under Task DG-1042.

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