On May 28, 2015, patrols by Susquehanna personnel identified that the panel doors on 2C664, located in the Unit 2 upper relay room, were left open and unattended following troubleshooting by station personnel. Susquehannas Unit 2 operating license condition 2.C.(6), requires, in part, that Susquehanna implement and maintain in effect all provisions of the approved
fire protection program as described in the fire protection review report for the facility. Unit 2 Technical Requirements Manual (
TRM) directs compensatory measures as required by the
fire protection program for fire suppression system impairments.
TRM bases for 3.7.3.4, halon systems, states the opening of any relay room panel door causes the affected Halon system to become
inoperable if the panel door is unattended.
TRM 3.7.3.4 requires a
continuous fire watch with backup fire suppression equipment be established for
inoperable halon systems. Contrary to the above, panel doors were left open and unattended without a
continuous fire watch for a period of five hours and 35 minutes. Susquehanna entered this issue into the
CAP as CR-2015-15709. The inspectors determined that the finding was more than minor because it was associated with the protection against external factors attribute of the
Mitigating Systems cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the capability of systems that respond to
initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences (i.e., core damage). The inspectors determined through a review of
IMC 0609.04, Initial Characterization of Findings, and
IMC 0609, Appendix F, Fire Protection
Significance Determination Process, issued September 20, 2013, the finding to be of very low safety significance (Green) based on the reactor maintaining the ability to reach and maintain
safe shutdown condition. Specifically,
safe shutdown path 3 systems and components would be available for
safe shutdown in the event of a fire in the Unit 2 upper relay room.
