ENS 50080: Difference between revisions
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StriderTol (talk | contribs) (Created page by program invented by Mark Hawes) |
StriderTol (talk | contribs) (Created page by program invented by StriderTol) |
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| event date = 05/01/2014 20:45 EDT | | event date = 05/01/2014 20:45 EDT | ||
| last update date = 05/02/2014 | | last update date = 05/02/2014 | ||
| title = Loss | | title = Loss of Hpci Operability Due to Water Accumulation in the Hpci Turbine | ||
| event text = While investigating a Unit 1 high pressure coolant injection (HPCI) room instrument sump level high alarm, condensation was observed dripping out around the HPCI turbine shaft gland seals. A steady stream of water was also observed coming out of the governor end gland seal along with a slight leak coming from the coupling end. Observation revealed that leakage through the 'closed' steam admission valve (1E41-F001) was apparently resulting in water accumulation in the HPCI turbine. A blown fuse that prevented the associated HPCI exhaust drain pot from draining in conjunction with the leakage by the steam admission valve was determined to be sufficient to impact HPCI operability. Required actions were taken in accordance with the Technical Specifications. | | event text = While investigating a Unit 1 high pressure coolant injection (HPCI) room instrument sump level high alarm, condensation was observed dripping out around the HPCI turbine shaft gland seals. A steady stream of water was also observed coming out of the governor end gland seal along with a slight leak coming from the coupling end. Observation revealed that leakage through the 'closed' steam admission valve (1E41-F001) was apparently resulting in water accumulation in the HPCI turbine. A blown fuse that prevented the associated HPCI exhaust drain pot from draining in conjunction with the leakage by the steam admission valve was determined to be sufficient to impact HPCI operability. Required actions were taken in accordance with the Technical Specifications. | ||
Efforts are underway to determine the actions needed to restore the HPCI system to operable status. | Efforts are underway to determine the actions needed to restore the HPCI system to operable status. | ||
Latest revision as of 20:50, 1 March 2018
| Where | |
|---|---|
Hatch  Georgia (NRC Region 2) | |
| Reporting | |
| 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), Loss of Safety Function - Mitigate the Consequences of an Accident | |
| Time - Person (Reporting Time:+-2.2 h-0.0917 days <br />-0.0131 weeks <br />-0.00301 months <br />) | |
| Opened: | John Sellers 22:33 May 1, 2014 |
| NRC Officer: | Jeff Rotton |
| Last Updated: | May 2, 2014 |
| 50080 - NRC Website
| |
Hatch with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), Loss of Safety Function - Mitigate the Consequences of an Accident | |