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| number = ML18037A084
| number = ML18037A084
| issue date = 02/19/1993
| issue date = 02/19/1993
| title = Responds to NRC 930120 Ltr Re Violations Noted in Insp Repts 50-237/92-28 & 50-249/92-28.Corrective Actions:Lpci Fuse Changes Out on 930219 & One 40A DG Fuse Will Be Replaced W/ 30A Fuse by 930430
| title = Responds to NRC Re Violations Noted in Insp Repts 50-237/92-28 & 50-249/92-28.Corrective Actions:Lpci Fuse Changes Out on 930219 & One 40A DG Fuse Will Be Replaced W/ 30A Fuse by 930430
| author name = FARRAR D
| author name = Farrar D
| author affiliation = COMMONWEALTH EDISON CO.
| author affiliation = COMMONWEALTH EDISON CO.
| addressee name =  
| addressee name =  
Line 11: Line 11:
| contact person =  
| contact person =  
| document report number = NUDOCS 9302250251
| document report number = NUDOCS 9302250251
| title reference date = 01-20-1993
| document type = CORRESPONDENCE-LETTERS, INCOMING CORRESPONDENCE
| document type = CORRESPONDENCE-LETTERS, INCOMING CORRESPONDENCE
| page count = 16
| page count = 16
}}
}}
See also: [[followed by::IR 05000237/1992028]]


=Text=
=Text=
{{#Wiki_filter:.ACCELERATED
{{#Wiki_filter:. ACCELERATED DOCUMENT DISTRIBUTIONSYSTEM REGULATORY INFORMATION DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM (RIDS)
DOCUMENTDISTRIBUTION
CESSION NBR:9302250251 DOC.DATE: 93/02/19 NOTARIZED:
SYSTEMREGULATORY
NO DOCKET ¹ CIL:50-237 Dresden Nuclear Power Station, Unit 2, Commonwealth E
INFORMATION
05000237 50-24/ Dresden. Nuclear Power Station, Unit 3, Commonwealth E
DISTRIBUTION
05000249 AUTH.NAME AUTHOR AFFILIATION FARRAR,DE Commonwealth Edison Co.
SYSTEM(RIDS)CESSIONNBR:9302250251
RECIP.NAME RECIPIENT AFFILIATION Document Control Branch (Document Control Desk)
DOC.DATE:
 
93/02/19NOTARIZED:
==SUBJECT:==
NODOCKET¹CIL:50-237
Responds to NRC ltr re violations noted in insp rept 50-237/92-28 6 50-249/92-28.Corrective actions:Unit 2 LPCI fuse changed out on 930219.W/930219 ltr.
DresdenNuclearPowerStation,Unit2,Commonwealth
'I DISTRIBUTION CODE:
E0500023750-24/Dresden.NuclearPowerStation,Unit3,Commonwealth
IE01D COPIES RECEIVED:LTR ENCL SIZE:
E05000249AUTH.NAMEAUTHORAFFILIATION
TITLE: General (50 Dkt)-Insp Rept/Notice of Violation Response NOTES:License Exp date in accordance with 10CFR2,2.109(12/22/72).
FARRAR,DE
05000237 RECIPIENT ID CODE/NAME PD3-2 PD INTERNAL: ACRS AEOD/DEIB AEOD/TTC NRR MORISSEAUiD NRR/DOEA/OEAB NRR/DRIL/RPEB10 NRR/PMAS/ILPB 2 NUDOCS-ABSTRACT OGC/HDS2 RGN3 FILE 01 EXTERNAL: EG&G/BRYCEgJ.H.
Commonwealth
I NSIC COPIES LTTR ENCL 1
EdisonCo.RECIP.NAME
1 2
RECIPIENT
2 1
AFFILIATION
1 1
DocumentControlBranch(Document
1 1
ControlDesk)SUBJECT:RespondstoNRCltrreviolations
1 1
notedininsprept50-237/92-28
1 1
650-249/92-28.Corrective
1 1
actions:Unit
1 1
2LPCIfusechangedouton930219.W/930219
1 1
ltr.'IDISTRIBUTION
1 1
CODE:IE01DCOPIESRECEIVED:LTR
1 1
ENCLSIZE:TITLE:General(50Dkt)-Insp
1 1
Rept/Notice
1 RECIPIENT ID CODE/NAME STANGiJ AEOD AEOD/DSP/TPAB DEDRO NRR/DLPQ/LHFBPT NRR/DREP/PEPB9H NRR/PMAS/ILPB 1 NRR/PMAS/ILRB12 OE D
ofViolation
:E~LE 02 NRC PDR COPIES LTTR ENCL 1
ResponseNOTES:License
1 1
Expdateinaccordance
1 1
with10CFR2,2.109(12/22/72).
1 1
05000237RECIPIENT
1 1
IDCODE/NAME
1 1
PD3-2PDINTERNAL:
1 1
ACRSAEOD/DEIB
1 1
AEOD/TTCNRRMORISSEAUiD
1 1
NRR/DOEA/OEAB
1 1
NRR/DRIL/RPEB10
1 1
NRR/PMAS/ILPB
1 NOTE TO ALL"RIDS" RECIPIENTS:
2NUDOCS-ABSTRACT
PLEASE HELP US TO REDUCE WASTE! CONTACT THE DOCUMENT CONTROL DESK, ROOM Pl-37 (EXT. 504-2065) TO ELIMINATEYOUR NAME FROM DISTRIBUTION LISTS FOR DOCUMENTS YOU DON'T NEED!
OGC/HDS2RGN3FILE01EXTERNAL:
TOTAL NUMBER OF COPIES REQUIRED:
EG&G/BRYCEgJ.H.
LTTR 25 ENCL 25
INSICCOPIESLTTRENCL11221111111111111111111111RECIPIENT
 
IDCODE/NAME
e Commonwealth Edison 1400 Opus Place Downers Grove, illinois 60515 February 19, 1993 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 Attention: Document Control Desk
STANGiJAEODAEOD/DSP/TPAB
 
DEDRONRR/DLPQ/LHFBPT
==Subject:==
NRR/DREP/PEPB9H
Dresden Nuclear Power Station Units 2 and 3 Response to Notice of Violation Inspection Report 50-237/92028; 50-249/92028 NRC Docket Numbers 50-237 and 50-249
NRR/PMAS/ILPB
 
1NRR/PMAS/ILRB12
==Reference:==
OED:E~LE02NRCPDRCOPIESLTTRENCL1111111111111111111111NOTETOALL"RIDS"RECIPIENTS:
T.O. Martin letter to L.O. Delseorge, dated January 20, 1993, transmitting Inspection Report 50-237/92028; 50-249/92028 Enclosed is Commonwealth Edison Company's (CECo) response to the Notice of Violation (NOV) which was transmitted with the referenced letter. The NOV cited two Severity Level IVviolations requiring a written response.
PLEASEHELPUSTOREDUCEWASTE!CONTACTTHEDOCUMENTCONTROLDESK,ROOMPl-37(EXT.504-2065)
The response to these violations is provided in the attachment.
TOELIMINATE
If your staff has any questions or comments concerning this letter, please refer them to Denise Saccomando, Compliance Engineer at (708) 663-7285.
YOURNAMEFROMDISTRIBUTION
Sincerely, cZ~A
LISTSFORDOCUMENTS
~
YOUDON'TNEED!TOTALNUMBEROFCOPIESREQUIRED:
D. Farrar Nuclear Regulatory Services Manager Attachment cc:
LTTR25ENCL25
A. B. Davis, Regional Administrator - Region III J.
Stand, Project Manager - NRR M. N. Leach, Senior Resident Inspector - Dresden 9302250251 930219 PDR ADOCK 05000237 Q
eCommonwealth
PDR ZNLD/2112/13
Edison1400OpusPlaceDownersGrove,illinois60515February19,1993U.S.NuclearRegulatory
 
Commission
ATIACHMENT RESPONSE TO NOTICE OF VlOLATION NRC INSPECTlON REPORT 50-237/92028, 50-249/92028 Vi l n:
Washington,
2 79202 1.2 2 2 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, requires that activities affecting quality shall be prescribed by document instructions, procedures, or drawings, of a type appropriate to the circumstances and shall be accomplished in accordance with these instructions, procedures, or drawings.
D.C.20555Attention:
Procedure DOP 6900-07, Revision 9, "125Vdc Ground Detections", required that the procedure be immediately performed at DC system grounds above 60Vdc, and a B1 Work Request be submitted once the ground was located.
DocumentControlDeskSubject:DresdenNuclearPowerStationUnits2and3ResponsetoNoticeofViolation
Furthermore, the procedure required, at grounds above 115Vdc, initiation of a 14 day time clock (administrative Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO)) to locate and remove the ground and preparation of a Justification for Continued Operation (JCO) if the ground could not be located or isolated within 14 days.
Inspection
Procedure DAP 07-05, Revision 9, "Operating Logs and Records", Paragraph B.5, required that when a LCO entry occurs, the event must be logged in the LCO Log.
Report50-237/92028;
Contrary to the above:
50-249/92028
1.
NRCDocketNumbers50-237and50-249Reference:
On September 26, 1992, when a 125Vdc system ground was present in Unit 3, the Licensee failed to initiate actions to locate and remove the ground.
T.O.MartinlettertoL.O.Delseorge,
In addition, the Licensee failed to initiate an administrative LCO and document the event in the LCO Log.
datedJanuary20,1993,transmitting
2.
Inspection
On November 3, 1992, when 125Vdc grounds were present in both Units 2 and 3, an administrative LCO was initiated and logged in the LCO Log for Unit 3 only. The Licensee could not provide evidence that actions were taken to identify and remove the grounds in either unit.
Report50-237/92028;
3.
50-249/92028
On November 12, 1992, when a 125Vdc ground was present in Unit 3, the licensee failed to initiate actions to locate and remove the ground.
EnclosedisCommonwealth
ZNLD/2112/14
EdisonCompany's
 
(CECo)responsetotheNoticeofViolation
ATIACHMENT RESPONSE TO NOTICE OF VIOLATION NRC INSPECTION REPORT 50-237/92028, 50-249/92028 REA ON F VI LATION:
(NOV)whichwastransmitted
Dresden Station concurs with item 1 of the violation as written. Dresden Station procedures provide clear guidance on required actions upon identification of dc grounds.
withthereferenced
It is clear that personnel failed to meet management's expectations.
letter.TheNOVcitedtwoSeverityLevelIVviolations
Investigation of the events indicated that personnel failed to follow established station procedures.
requiring
With the issuance of the violation Dresden Station initiated an investigation which revealed that station did take appropriate actions on November 3 and November 12th In regard to the November 3, 1992, ground involving Unit 3 (example 2), action was taken to identify and remove the ground. The Unit 3 Log entry states that a ground check was performed at 1857 hours for a -155V ground on the 125Vdc system.
awrittenresponse.
The ground was identified on bus 3A-2 circuit number 16 and Work Request D-13836 was written for investigation and repair of the circuit. Electrical Maintenance identified and replaced a broken terminal block. Further testing revealed that the auxiliary transformer 31 fire protection circuit was grounded.
Theresponsetotheseviolations
Work Request 15077 was written to implement repairs.
isprovidedintheattachment.
ln regard to the November 3, 1992, ground involving Unit 2 (example 2), action was taken to identify and remove the ground. Work Request D-13806 was written for investigation of the ground; however, the ground cleared before Electrical Maintenance personnel could begin work. The Unit 2 ground was not documented in the LCO Log since it never reached the required 115 volts, as specified in DOP 6900-06, '125Vdc Ground Detection".
Ifyourstaffhasanyquestions
In regard to the November 12, 1992, ground involvinq Unit 3 (example 3), action was taken to locate and remove the ground. The Unit Operator logged the -115V ground, the ground checking, and the LCO in the Unit Log Book. The ground was located on bus 3A-2. No work request was written since Work Requests D-13836 and D-15077 were already open to investigate the ground on bus 3A-2. On November 16, 1992, Work Request D-14129 was written to document a -90V ground on the Unit 3 125Vdc system.
orcommentsconcerning
Electrical Maintenance personnel investigated and resolved the ground under work requests D-13836 and D-15077. The ground was monitored until January 2, 1993, and never returned.
thisletter,pleasereferthemtoDeniseSaccomando,
RREC N AND I VED For example 1, the identified ground has cleared without any action by station personnel.
Compliance
Operations personnel involved in the September 26, 1992, event were counseled by Operations's senior management with regards to the importance of procedure adherence.
Engineerat(708)663-7285.
ZNLD/2112/15
Sincerely,
 
cZ~A~D.FarrarNuclearRegulatory
ATTACHMENT RESPONSE TO NOTICE OF VIOLATION NRC INSPECTION REPORT 50-237/92028, 50-249/92028 QQQQE VE TE D
ServicesManagerAttachment
RTHE V
cc:A.B.Davis,RegionalAdministrator
N The Operations Manager has discussed failure to followestablished procedures with the Shift Engineers.
-RegionIIIJ.Stand,ProjectManager-NRRM.N.Leach,SeniorResidentInspector
Beginning on February 10, 1993, the Shift Engineers tailgated with their respective crews the importance of following procedures.
-Dresden9302250251
They were reminded that adherence to procedures is a basic expectation and is required to ensure safe, reliable operations.
930219PDRADOCK05000237QPDRZNLD/2112/13  
DATE F
LL MPLIAN E Full compliance was achieved when the individual was counseled.
ATIACHMENTRESPONSETONOTICEOFVlOLATION
ZNLO/2112/16
NRCINSPECTlON
 
REPORT50-237/92028,
ATIACHMENT RESPONSE TO NOTICE OF VIOLATION NRC INSPECT(ON REPORT 50-237/92028, 50-249/92028, TION:
50-249/92028
24 2
.Viln:2792021.22210CFR50,AppendixB,Criterion
2 10CFR50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, requires that measures shall be established to assure that conditions adverse to quality, such as failures, malfunctions, deficiencies, deviations, defective material and equipment, and nonconformance are promptly identified and corrected.
V,requiresthatactivities
Contrary to the above, in February and April 1992, the licensee identified oversized fuses in various safety related circuits including the Emergency Diesel Generator exciters and Low Pressure Coolant circuitry. As of December,
affecting
: 1992, this condition adverse to quality had not been corrected.
qualityshallbeprescribed
REAS NF RTHEVI TI N The fuse verification program identified fuses that were inadequately sized.
bydocumentinstructions,
These discrepancies were noted on Technical Problem Reports (TPRs) and forwarded to Corporate Engineering for resolution. The Engineering evaluation of the fuse in the Unit 2 Low Pressure Coolant Injection (LPCI) circuitry states that, "the currently installed 20A fuse, Bussmann Type MIN, in Panel 902-32, provides adequate protection for the circuit," and that the "existing installed 20A fuse protects the circuit." The evaluation also indicated that the fuse may not coordinate with the upstream 30A circuit breaker.
procedures,
No safety significance or operability concerns were attributed to this potential lack of fuse coordination.
ordrawings,
Engineering did, however, recommend replacement of the fuse. When the evaluation arrived at Dresden, the fuse coordinator prioritized replacement of the LPCI fuse commensurate with its lack of safety significance and operability concerns.
ofatypeappropriate
No specific due date was assigned for the fuse replacement.
tothecircumstances
Engineering's operability assessment of the fuses in the Unit 2 diesel generator excitation cabinets recommended no compensatory actions to ensure operability (i.e. the system is operable with the currently installed fuses).
andshallbeaccomplished
Two 30A fuses and one 40A fuse were installed in the Unit 2 excitation cabinet, instead of the 25A fuses presented in the system drawing. The evaluation again included a recommendation to replace the subject fuses.
inaccordance
It stated that during an abnormal fault condition, the fuses may not protect the primary windings of control transformers.
withtheseinstructions,
The recommendation was based on guidance from GE Bulletin GET-30396, "How to Select an Apply Power Fuses, Types EJ-1 and EJ0-1." An Action Due Date for fuse replacement of February 28, 1993, was assigned by Engineering.
procedures,
The reasoning behind the assigned due date was based upon the engineering judgment that any expected fault condition that a 25A fuse could protect against would also be protected by a 30A or 40A fuse.
ordrawings.
ZNLD/2112/17
Procedure
 
DOP6900-07,Revision9,"125VdcGroundDetections",
ATTACHMENT RESPONSE TO NOTICE OF VIOLATION NRC INSPECTION REPORT 50-237/92028, 50-249/92028 Since identification of the diesel fuse discrepancy in April, 1992, Dresden Station has taken numerous actions to address Engineering's fuse replacement recommendation.
requiredthattheprocedure
Most significant of these actions was a more detailed engineering calculation that supported continued operation with the currently installed diesel generator fuses.
beimmediately
This calculation states that "GE 25A, 30A, and 40A fuses, Type EJ0-1, willclear the fault before any damage is done to the primary windtngs of the transformer or the circuit." This evaluation confirmed Engineering's previous operability assessment and the engineering judgment of the fuse coordinator.
performed
Dresden Station believes that the LPCI fuses were not replaced prior to the inspection period because no safety or operability concern exists with the currently installed fuse.
atDCsystemgroundsabove60Vdc,andaB1WorkRequestbesubmitted
For the diesel generator fuses, numerous actions were taken to replace and procure the fuses and fuse clips prior to the assigned Action Due Date of February 28, 1993.
oncethegroundwaslocated.Furthermore,
Dresden does acknowledge, however, that Engineering's recommendations should have been dispositioned in a more timely manner.
theprocedure
Dresden identified the need for additional administrative controls for fuses identified for replacement under the fuse upgrade program, Examination of the current Dresden Administrative Procedure (DAP) 11-27, "Control and Maintenance of Fuses and the Fuse List," indicated that it did not provide direction for dispositioning of TPRs issued prior to October, 1992.
required,
C RRE TIVE TEP T
atgroundsabove115Vdc,initiation
E LT D
ofa14daytimeclock(administrative
The Unit 2 LPCI fuse was changed out on February 19, 1993. The Unit 3 LPCI system has also been inspected.
LimitingCondition
The Unit 3 LPCI fuse has the correct amperage, but is a MIN-type fuse rather than the recommended KTN-type fuse.
forOperation
While no operability concerns have been raised, Dresden willstill replace the Unit 3 LPCI fuse the next time LPCI is out-of-service.
(LCO))tolocateandremovethegroundandpreparation
For good engineering practice, the one 40A diesel generator fuse on Unit 2 will be replaced with a 30A fuse by April30, 1993. A Document Change Request was submitted on February 19, 1993 to update the amperage on all related drawings to 30 amps.
ofaJustification
To augment administrative controls until DAP 11-27 is revised, the Modification Implementation Sup'ervisor has issued a memorandum to the fuse coordinator incorporating direction for fuse replacements identified in Technical Problem Reports issued prior to October, 1992.
forContinued
ZNLD/2112/18
Operation
 
(JCO)ifthegroundcouldnotbelocatedorisolatedwithin14days.Procedure
ATlACHMENT RESPONSE TO NOTICE OF VIOLATION NRC INSPECTION REPORT 50-237/92028, 50-249/92028 RRECTIVE TEP EN T AV ID ER VI LATION:
DAP07-05,Revision9,"Operating
DAP 11-27, will be revised by March 31, 1993, to incorporate the interim directions described in the above memorandum.
LogsandRecords",
DATE OF FULL MP Full compliance was achieved with the issuance a memorandum to the fuse coordinator incorporating direction for fuse replacements identified in Technical Problem Reports issued prior to October, 1992.
Paragraph
ZNLD/2112/19}}
B.5,requiredthatwhenaLCOentryoccurs,theeventmustbeloggedintheLCOLog.Contrarytotheabove:1.OnSeptember
26,1992,whena125VdcsystemgroundwaspresentinUnit3,theLicenseefailedtoinitiateactionstolocateandremovetheground.Inaddition,
theLicenseefailedtoinitiateanadministrative
LCOanddocumenttheeventintheLCOLog.2.OnNovember3,1992,when125VdcgroundswerepresentinbothUnits2and3,anadministrative
LCOwasinitiated
andloggedintheLCOLogforUnit3only.TheLicenseecouldnotprovideevidencethatactionsweretakentoidentifyandremovethegroundsineitherunit.3.OnNovember12,1992,whena125VdcgroundwaspresentinUnit3,thelicenseefailedtoinitiateactionstolocateandremovetheground.ZNLD/2112/14  
ATIACHMENTRESPONSETONOTICEOFVIOLATION
NRCINSPECTION
REPORT50-237/92028,
50-249/92028
.REAONFVILATION:DresdenStationconcurswithitem1oftheviolation
aswritten.DresdenStationprocedures
provideclearguidanceonrequiredactionsuponidentification
ofdcgrounds.Itisclearthatpersonnel
failedtomeetmanagement's
expectations.
Investigation
oftheeventsindicated
thatpersonnel
failedtofollowestablished
stationprocedures.
Withtheissuanceoftheviolation
DresdenStationinitiated
aninvestigation
whichrevealedthatstationdidtakeappropriate
actionsonNovember3andNovember12thInregardtotheNovember3,1992,groundinvolving
Unit3(example2),actionwastakentoidentifyandremovetheground.TheUnit3Logentrystatesthatagroundcheckwasperformed
at1857hoursfora-155Vgroundonthe125Vdcsystem.Thegroundwasidentified
onbus3A-2circuitnumber16andWorkRequestD-13836waswrittenforinvestigation
andrepairofthecircuit.Electrical
Maintenance
identified
andreplacedabrokenterminalblock.Furthertestingrevealedthattheauxiliary
transformer
31fireprotection
circuitwasgrounded.
WorkRequest15077waswrittentoimplement
repairs.lnregardtotheNovember3,1992,groundinvolving
Unit2(example2),actionwastakentoidentifyandremovetheground.WorkRequestD-13806waswrittenforinvestigation
oftheground;however,thegroundclearedbeforeElectrical
Maintenance
personnel
couldbeginwork.TheUnit2groundwasnotdocumented
intheLCOLogsinceitneverreachedtherequired115volts,asspecified
inDOP6900-06,'125VdcGroundDetection".
InregardtotheNovember12,1992,groundinvolvinq
Unit3(example3),actionwastakentolocateandremovetheground.TheUnitOperatorloggedthe-115Vground,thegroundchecking,
andtheLCOintheUnitLogBook.Thegroundwaslocatedonbus3A-2.NoworkrequestwaswrittensinceWorkRequestsD-13836andD-15077werealreadyopentoinvestigate
thegroundonbus3A-2.OnNovember16,1992,WorkRequestD-14129waswrittentodocumenta-90VgroundontheUnit3125Vdcsystem.Electrical
Maintenance
personnel
investigated
andresolvedthegroundunderworkrequestsD-13836andD-15077.Thegroundwasmonitored
untilJanuary2,1993,andneverreturned.
RRECNANDIVEDForexample1,theidentified
groundhasclearedwithoutanyactionbystationpersonnel.
Operations
personnel
involvedintheSeptember
26,1992,eventwerecounseled
byOperations's
seniormanagement
withregardstotheimportance
ofprocedure
adherence.
ZNLD/2112/15  
ATTACHMENT
RESPONSETONOTICEOFVIOLATION
NRCINSPECTION
REPORT50-237/92028,
50-249/92028
.QQQQEVETEDRTHEVNTheOperations
Managerhasdiscussed
failuretofollowestablished
procedures
withtheShiftEngineers.
Beginning
onFebruary10,1993,theShiftEngineers
tailgated
withtheirrespective
crewstheimportance
offollowing
procedures.
Theywereremindedthatadherence
toprocedures
isabasicexpectation
andisrequiredtoensuresafe,reliableoperations.
DATEFLLMPLIANEFullcompliance
wasachievedwhentheindividual
wascounseled.
ZNLO/2112/16  
ATIACHMENTRESPONSETONOTICEOFVIOLATION
NRCINSPECT(ON
REPORT50-237/92028,
50-249/92028,
TION:242210CFR50,AppendixB,Criterion
XVI,requiresthatmeasuresshallbeestablished
toassurethatconditions
adversetoquality,suchasfailures,
malfunctions,
deficiencies,
deviations,
defective
materialandequipment,
andnonconformance
arepromptlyidentified
andcorrected.
Contrarytotheabove,inFebruaryandApril1992,thelicenseeidentified
oversized
fusesinvarioussafetyrelatedcircuitsincluding
theEmergency
DieselGenerator
excitersandLowPressureCoolantcircuitry.
AsofDecember,
1992,thiscondition
adversetoqualityhadnotbeencorrected.
REASNFRTHEVITINThefuseverification
programidentified
fusesthatwereinadequately
sized.Thesediscrepancies
werenotedonTechnical
ProblemReports(TPRs)andforwarded
toCorporate
Engineering
forresolution.
TheEngineering
evaluation
ofthefuseintheUnit2LowPressureCoolantInjection
(LPCI)circuitry
statesthat,"thecurrently
installed
20Afuse,BussmannTypeMIN,inPanel902-32,providesadequateprotection
forthecircuit,"
andthatthe"existing
installed
20Afuseprotectsthecircuit."
Theevaluation
alsoindicated
thatthefusemaynotcoordinate
withtheupstream30Acircuitbreaker.Nosafetysignificance
oroperability
concernswereattributed
tothispotential
lackoffusecoordination.
Engineering
did,however,recommend
replacement
ofthefuse.Whentheevaluation
arrivedatDresden,thefusecoordinator
prioritized
replacement
oftheLPCIfusecommensurate
withitslackofsafetysignificance
andoperability
concerns.
Nospecificduedatewasassignedforthefusereplacement.
Engineering's
operability
assessment
ofthefusesintheUnit2dieselgenerator
excitation
cabinetsrecommended
nocompensatory
actionstoensureoperability
(i.e.thesystemisoperablewiththecurrently
installed
fuses).Two30Afusesandone40Afusewereinstalled
intheUnit2excitation
cabinet,insteadofthe25Afusespresented
inthesystemdrawing.Theevaluation
againincludedarecommendation
toreplacethesubjectfuses.Itstatedthatduringanabnormalfaultcondition,
thefusesmaynotprotecttheprimarywindingsofcontroltransformers.
Therecommendation
wasbasedonguidancefromGEBulletinGET-30396,
"HowtoSelectanApplyPowerFuses,TypesEJ-1andEJ0-1."AnActionDueDateforfusereplacement
ofFebruary28,1993,wasassignedbyEngineering.
Thereasoning
behindtheassignedduedatewasbasedupontheengineering
judgmentthatanyexpectedfaultcondition
thata25Afusecouldprotectagainstwouldalsobeprotected
bya30Aor40Afuse.ZNLD/2112/17  
ATTACHMENT
RESPONSETONOTICEOFVIOLATION
NRCINSPECTION
REPORT50-237/92028,
50-249/92028
Sinceidentification
ofthedieselfusediscrepancy
inApril,1992,DresdenStationhastakennumerousactionstoaddressEngineering's
fusereplacement
recommendation.
Mostsignificant
oftheseactionswasamoredetailedengineering
calculation
thatsupported
continued
operation
withthecurrently
installed
dieselgenerator
fuses.Thiscalculation
statesthat"GE25A,30A,and40Afuses,TypeEJ0-1,willclearthefaultbeforeanydamageisdonetotheprimarywindtngsofthetransformer
orthecircuit."
Thisevaluation
confirmed
Engineering's
previousoperability
assessment
andtheengineering
judgmentofthefusecoordinator.
DresdenStationbelievesthattheLPCIfuseswerenotreplacedpriortotheinspection
periodbecausenosafetyoroperability
concernexistswiththecurrently
installed
fuse.Forthedieselgenerator
fuses,numerousactionsweretakentoreplaceandprocurethefusesandfuseclipspriortotheassignedActionDueDateofFebruary28,1993.Dresdendoesacknowledge,
however,thatEngineering's
recommendations
shouldhavebeendispositioned
inamoretimelymanner.Dresdenidentified
theneedforadditional
administrative
controlsforfusesidentified
forreplacement
underthefuseupgradeprogram,Examination
ofthecurrentDresdenAdministrative
Procedure
(DAP)11-27,"ControlandMaintenance
ofFusesandtheFuseList,"indicated
thatitdidnotprovidedirection
fordispositioning
ofTPRsissuedpriortoOctober,1992.CRRETIVETEPTELTDTheUnit2LPCIfusewaschangedoutonFebruary19,1993.TheUnit3LPCIsystemhasalsobeeninspected.
TheUnit3LPCIfusehasthecorrectamperage,
butisaMIN-typefuseratherthantherecommended
KTN-typefuse.Whilenooperability
concernshavebeenraised,DresdenwillstillreplacetheUnit3LPCIfusethenexttimeLPCIisout-of-service.
Forgoodengineering
practice,
theone40Adieselgenerator
fuseonUnit2willbereplacedwitha30AfusebyApril30,1993.ADocumentChangeRequestwassubmitted
onFebruary19,1993toupdatetheamperageonallrelateddrawingsto30amps.Toaugmentadministrative
controlsuntilDAP11-27isrevised,theModification
Implementation
Sup'ervisor
hasissuedamemorandum
tothefusecoordinator
incorporating
direction
forfusereplacements
identified
inTechnical
ProblemReportsissuedpriortoOctober,1992.ZNLD/2112/18  
ATlACHMENTRESPONSETONOTICEOFVIOLATION
NRCINSPECTION
REPORT50-237/92028,
50-249/92028
.RRECTIVETEPENTAVIDERVILATION:DAP11-27,willberevisedbyMarch31,1993,toincorporate
theinterimdirections
described
intheabovememorandum.
DATEOFFULLMPFullcompliance
wasachievedwiththeissuanceamemorandum
tothefusecoordinator
incorporating
direction
forfusereplacements
identified
inTechnical
ProblemReportsissuedpriortoOctober,1992.ZNLD/2112/19
}}

Latest revision as of 01:28, 7 January 2025

Responds to NRC Re Violations Noted in Insp Repts 50-237/92-28 & 50-249/92-28.Corrective Actions:Lpci Fuse Changes Out on 930219 & One 40A DG Fuse Will Be Replaced W/ 30A Fuse by 930430
ML18037A084
Person / Time
Site: Dresden  Constellation icon.png
Issue date: 02/19/1993
From: Farrar D
COMMONWEALTH EDISON CO.
To:
NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
References
NUDOCS 9302250251
Download: ML18037A084 (16)


Text

. ACCELERATED DOCUMENT DISTRIBUTIONSYSTEM REGULATORY INFORMATION DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM (RIDS)

CESSION NBR:9302250251 DOC.DATE: 93/02/19 NOTARIZED:

NO DOCKET ¹ CIL:50-237 Dresden Nuclear Power Station, Unit 2, Commonwealth E

05000237 50-24/ Dresden. Nuclear Power Station, Unit 3, Commonwealth E

05000249 AUTH.NAME AUTHOR AFFILIATION FARRAR,DE Commonwealth Edison Co.

RECIP.NAME RECIPIENT AFFILIATION Document Control Branch (Document Control Desk)

SUBJECT:

Responds to NRC ltr re violations noted in insp rept 50-237/92-28 6 50-249/92-28.Corrective actions:Unit 2 LPCI fuse changed out on 930219.W/930219 ltr.

'I DISTRIBUTION CODE:

IE01D COPIES RECEIVED:LTR ENCL SIZE:

TITLE: General (50 Dkt)-Insp Rept/Notice of Violation Response NOTES:License Exp date in accordance with 10CFR2,2.109(12/22/72).

05000237 RECIPIENT ID CODE/NAME PD3-2 PD INTERNAL: ACRS AEOD/DEIB AEOD/TTC NRR MORISSEAUiD NRR/DOEA/OEAB NRR/DRIL/RPEB10 NRR/PMAS/ILPB 2 NUDOCS-ABSTRACT OGC/HDS2 RGN3 FILE 01 EXTERNAL: EG&G/BRYCEgJ.H.

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1 RECIPIENT ID CODE/NAME STANGiJ AEOD AEOD/DSP/TPAB DEDRO NRR/DLPQ/LHFBPT NRR/DREP/PEPB9H NRR/PMAS/ILPB 1 NRR/PMAS/ILRB12 OE D

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1 NOTE TO ALL"RIDS" RECIPIENTS:

PLEASE HELP US TO REDUCE WASTE! CONTACT THE DOCUMENT CONTROL DESK, ROOM Pl-37 (EXT. 504-2065) TO ELIMINATEYOUR NAME FROM DISTRIBUTION LISTS FOR DOCUMENTS YOU DON'T NEED!

TOTAL NUMBER OF COPIES REQUIRED:

LTTR 25 ENCL 25

e Commonwealth Edison 1400 Opus Place Downers Grove, illinois 60515 February 19, 1993 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 Attention: Document Control Desk

Subject:

Dresden Nuclear Power Station Units 2 and 3 Response to Notice of Violation Inspection Report 50-237/92028; 50-249/92028 NRC Docket Numbers 50-237 and 50-249

Reference:

T.O. Martin letter to L.O. Delseorge, dated January 20, 1993, transmitting Inspection Report 50-237/92028; 50-249/92028 Enclosed is Commonwealth Edison Company's (CECo) response to the Notice of Violation (NOV) which was transmitted with the referenced letter. The NOV cited two Severity Level IVviolations requiring a written response.

The response to these violations is provided in the attachment.

If your staff has any questions or comments concerning this letter, please refer them to Denise Saccomando, Compliance Engineer at (708) 663-7285.

Sincerely, cZ~A

~

D. Farrar Nuclear Regulatory Services Manager Attachment cc:

A. B. Davis, Regional Administrator - Region III J.

Stand, Project Manager - NRR M. N. Leach, Senior Resident Inspector - Dresden 9302250251 930219 PDR ADOCK 05000237 Q

PDR ZNLD/2112/13

ATIACHMENT RESPONSE TO NOTICE OF VlOLATION NRC INSPECTlON REPORT 50-237/92028, 50-249/92028 Vi l n:

2 79202 1.2 2 2 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, requires that activities affecting quality shall be prescribed by document instructions, procedures, or drawings, of a type appropriate to the circumstances and shall be accomplished in accordance with these instructions, procedures, or drawings.

Procedure DOP 6900-07, Revision 9, "125Vdc Ground Detections", required that the procedure be immediately performed at DC system grounds above 60Vdc, and a B1 Work Request be submitted once the ground was located.

Furthermore, the procedure required, at grounds above 115Vdc, initiation of a 14 day time clock (administrative Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO)) to locate and remove the ground and preparation of a Justification for Continued Operation (JCO) if the ground could not be located or isolated within 14 days.

Procedure DAP 07-05, Revision 9, "Operating Logs and Records", Paragraph B.5, required that when a LCO entry occurs, the event must be logged in the LCO Log.

Contrary to the above:

1.

On September 26, 1992, when a 125Vdc system ground was present in Unit 3, the Licensee failed to initiate actions to locate and remove the ground.

In addition, the Licensee failed to initiate an administrative LCO and document the event in the LCO Log.

2.

On November 3, 1992, when 125Vdc grounds were present in both Units 2 and 3, an administrative LCO was initiated and logged in the LCO Log for Unit 3 only. The Licensee could not provide evidence that actions were taken to identify and remove the grounds in either unit.

3.

On November 12, 1992, when a 125Vdc ground was present in Unit 3, the licensee failed to initiate actions to locate and remove the ground.

ZNLD/2112/14

ATIACHMENT RESPONSE TO NOTICE OF VIOLATION NRC INSPECTION REPORT 50-237/92028, 50-249/92028 REA ON F VI LATION:

Dresden Station concurs with item 1 of the violation as written. Dresden Station procedures provide clear guidance on required actions upon identification of dc grounds.

It is clear that personnel failed to meet management's expectations.

Investigation of the events indicated that personnel failed to follow established station procedures.

With the issuance of the violation Dresden Station initiated an investigation which revealed that station did take appropriate actions on November 3 and November 12th In regard to the November 3, 1992, ground involving Unit 3 (example 2), action was taken to identify and remove the ground. The Unit 3 Log entry states that a ground check was performed at 1857 hours0.0215 days <br />0.516 hours <br />0.00307 weeks <br />7.065885e-4 months <br /> for a -155V ground on the 125Vdc system.

The ground was identified on bus 3A-2 circuit number 16 and Work Request D-13836 was written for investigation and repair of the circuit. Electrical Maintenance identified and replaced a broken terminal block. Further testing revealed that the auxiliary transformer 31 fire protection circuit was grounded.

Work Request 15077 was written to implement repairs.

ln regard to the November 3, 1992, ground involving Unit 2 (example 2), action was taken to identify and remove the ground. Work Request D-13806 was written for investigation of the ground; however, the ground cleared before Electrical Maintenance personnel could begin work. The Unit 2 ground was not documented in the LCO Log since it never reached the required 115 volts, as specified in DOP 6900-06, '125Vdc Ground Detection".

In regard to the November 12, 1992, ground involvinq Unit 3 (example 3), action was taken to locate and remove the ground. The Unit Operator logged the -115V ground, the ground checking, and the LCO in the Unit Log Book. The ground was located on bus 3A-2. No work request was written since Work Requests D-13836 and D-15077 were already open to investigate the ground on bus 3A-2. On November 16, 1992, Work Request D-14129 was written to document a -90V ground on the Unit 3 125Vdc system.

Electrical Maintenance personnel investigated and resolved the ground under work requests D-13836 and D-15077. The ground was monitored until January 2, 1993, and never returned.

RREC N AND I VED For example 1, the identified ground has cleared without any action by station personnel.

Operations personnel involved in the September 26, 1992, event were counseled by Operations's senior management with regards to the importance of procedure adherence.

ZNLD/2112/15

ATTACHMENT RESPONSE TO NOTICE OF VIOLATION NRC INSPECTION REPORT 50-237/92028, 50-249/92028 QQQQE VE TE D

RTHE V

N The Operations Manager has discussed failure to followestablished procedures with the Shift Engineers.

Beginning on February 10, 1993, the Shift Engineers tailgated with their respective crews the importance of following procedures.

They were reminded that adherence to procedures is a basic expectation and is required to ensure safe, reliable operations.

DATE F

LL MPLIAN E Full compliance was achieved when the individual was counseled.

ZNLO/2112/16

ATIACHMENT RESPONSE TO NOTICE OF VIOLATION NRC INSPECT(ON REPORT 50-237/92028, 50-249/92028, TION:

24 2

2 10CFR50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, requires that measures shall be established to assure that conditions adverse to quality, such as failures, malfunctions, deficiencies, deviations, defective material and equipment, and nonconformance are promptly identified and corrected.

Contrary to the above, in February and April 1992, the licensee identified oversized fuses in various safety related circuits including the Emergency Diesel Generator exciters and Low Pressure Coolant circuitry. As of December,

1992, this condition adverse to quality had not been corrected.

REAS NF RTHEVI TI N The fuse verification program identified fuses that were inadequately sized.

These discrepancies were noted on Technical Problem Reports (TPRs) and forwarded to Corporate Engineering for resolution. The Engineering evaluation of the fuse in the Unit 2 Low Pressure Coolant Injection (LPCI) circuitry states that, "the currently installed 20A fuse, Bussmann Type MIN, in Panel 902-32, provides adequate protection for the circuit," and that the "existing installed 20A fuse protects the circuit." The evaluation also indicated that the fuse may not coordinate with the upstream 30A circuit breaker.

No safety significance or operability concerns were attributed to this potential lack of fuse coordination.

Engineering did, however, recommend replacement of the fuse. When the evaluation arrived at Dresden, the fuse coordinator prioritized replacement of the LPCI fuse commensurate with its lack of safety significance and operability concerns.

No specific due date was assigned for the fuse replacement.

Engineering's operability assessment of the fuses in the Unit 2 diesel generator excitation cabinets recommended no compensatory actions to ensure operability (i.e. the system is operable with the currently installed fuses).

Two 30A fuses and one 40A fuse were installed in the Unit 2 excitation cabinet, instead of the 25A fuses presented in the system drawing. The evaluation again included a recommendation to replace the subject fuses.

It stated that during an abnormal fault condition, the fuses may not protect the primary windings of control transformers.

The recommendation was based on guidance from GE Bulletin GET-30396, "How to Select an Apply Power Fuses, Types EJ-1 and EJ0-1." An Action Due Date for fuse replacement of February 28, 1993, was assigned by Engineering.

The reasoning behind the assigned due date was based upon the engineering judgment that any expected fault condition that a 25A fuse could protect against would also be protected by a 30A or 40A fuse.

ZNLD/2112/17

ATTACHMENT RESPONSE TO NOTICE OF VIOLATION NRC INSPECTION REPORT 50-237/92028, 50-249/92028 Since identification of the diesel fuse discrepancy in April, 1992, Dresden Station has taken numerous actions to address Engineering's fuse replacement recommendation.

Most significant of these actions was a more detailed engineering calculation that supported continued operation with the currently installed diesel generator fuses.

This calculation states that "GE 25A, 30A, and 40A fuses, Type EJ0-1, willclear the fault before any damage is done to the primary windtngs of the transformer or the circuit." This evaluation confirmed Engineering's previous operability assessment and the engineering judgment of the fuse coordinator.

Dresden Station believes that the LPCI fuses were not replaced prior to the inspection period because no safety or operability concern exists with the currently installed fuse.

For the diesel generator fuses, numerous actions were taken to replace and procure the fuses and fuse clips prior to the assigned Action Due Date of February 28, 1993.

Dresden does acknowledge, however, that Engineering's recommendations should have been dispositioned in a more timely manner.

Dresden identified the need for additional administrative controls for fuses identified for replacement under the fuse upgrade program, Examination of the current Dresden Administrative Procedure (DAP) 11-27, "Control and Maintenance of Fuses and the Fuse List," indicated that it did not provide direction for dispositioning of TPRs issued prior to October, 1992.

C RRE TIVE TEP T

E LT D

The Unit 2 LPCI fuse was changed out on February 19, 1993. The Unit 3 LPCI system has also been inspected.

The Unit 3 LPCI fuse has the correct amperage, but is a MIN-type fuse rather than the recommended KTN-type fuse.

While no operability concerns have been raised, Dresden willstill replace the Unit 3 LPCI fuse the next time LPCI is out-of-service.

For good engineering practice, the one 40A diesel generator fuse on Unit 2 will be replaced with a 30A fuse by April30, 1993. A Document Change Request was submitted on February 19, 1993 to update the amperage on all related drawings to 30 amps.

To augment administrative controls until DAP 11-27 is revised, the Modification Implementation Sup'ervisor has issued a memorandum to the fuse coordinator incorporating direction for fuse replacements identified in Technical Problem Reports issued prior to October, 1992.

ZNLD/2112/18

ATlACHMENT RESPONSE TO NOTICE OF VIOLATION NRC INSPECTION REPORT 50-237/92028, 50-249/92028 RRECTIVE TEP EN T AV ID ER VI LATION:

DAP 11-27, will be revised by March 31, 1993, to incorporate the interim directions described in the above memorandum.

DATE OF FULL MP Full compliance was achieved with the issuance a memorandum to the fuse coordinator incorporating direction for fuse replacements identified in Technical Problem Reports issued prior to October, 1992.

ZNLD/2112/19