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{{Adams
{{Adams
| number = ML13350A195
| number = ML003739614
| issue date = 06/30/1973
| issue date = 06/30/1974
| title = Assumptions Used for Evaluating the Potential Radiological Consequences of a Loss of Coolant Accident for Pressurized Water Reactors
| title = Assumptions Used for Evaluating the Potential Radiological Consequences of a Loss of Coolant Accident for Pressurized Water Reactors
| author name =  
| author name =  
| author affiliation = US Atomic Energy Commission (AEC)
| author affiliation = NRC/RES
| addressee name =  
| addressee name =  
| addressee affiliation =  
| addressee affiliation =  
Line 10: Line 10:
| license number =  
| license number =  
| contact person =  
| contact person =  
| document report number = RG-1.004, Rev. 1
| document report number = RG-1.4, Rev 2
| document type = Regulatory Guide
| document type = Regulatory Guide
| page count = 6
| page count = 6
}}
}}
{{#Wiki_filter:Revision 1U.S. ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSIONREGULATORYDIRECTORATE OF REGULATORY STANDARDSRevision 1June 1973GUIDEREGULATORY GUIDE 1.4ASSUMPTIONS USED FOR EVALUATING THE POTENTIAL RADIOLOGICAL CONSEQUENCESOF A LOSS OF COOLANT ACf',DENT FOR PRESSURIZED WATER REACTORS'
{{#Wiki_filter:Revision 2 June 1974 U.S. ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION
REGULATORY
DIRECTORATE OF REGULATORY STANDARDS
GUIDE
REGULATORY GUIDE 1.4 ASSUMPTIONS USED FOR EVALUATING THE POTENTIAL RADIOLOGICAL CONSEQUENCES
OF A LOSS OF COOLANT ACCIDENT FOR PRESSURIZED WATER REACTORS


==A. INTRODUCTION==
==A. INTRODUCTION==
Sect ion 50.34 o1f 10 CFR Pairl 50 requires that eachapplicant fir a c(nstruiction permit or operating licenseprovid,: an analysis and cvalua3ion of the design andof structures. systems, and components oftile facility with [he objective of assessing fhe risk topublic health and safety resulting froim operation of thefacility. Tile design basis loss of" coolant accident(LOCA) is one of the postulated accidents Used toevaluate the adequacy of these structures, systems. andcomiponents with respect to the public ltealth and safety.This guide gives acceptable assumptions that may beused in evaluating tIle radiologcal consequences of thisaccident for a pressurized water reactor. In some cases.unusual site characteristics, platit design features. orother factors may require different assumptions whichwill be considered on an individual case basis. TheAdvisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards has beenconsulted concerning this guide and has concurred in theregulatory position.
Section 50.34 of 10 CFR Part 50 requires that each applicant for a construction permit or operating license provide an analysis and evaluation of the design and performance of structures, systems, and components of the facility with the objective of assessing the risk to public health and safety resulting from operation of the facility. The design basis loss of coolant accident (LOCA) is one of the postulated accidents used to evaluate the adequacy of these structures, systems, and components with respect to the public health and safety.
 
This guide gives acceptable assumptions that may be used in evaluating the radiological consequences of this accident for a pressurized water reactor. In some cases, unusual site characteristics, plant design features, or other factors may require different assumptions which will be considered on an individual case basis. The Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards has been consulted concerning this guide and has concurred in the regulatory position.


==B. DISCUSSION==
==B. DISCUSSION==
After reviewing a number of applications forconstruction permits and operating licenses forpressurized wateli power reactors, the AEC Regulatorystaff has developed a number of appropriatelyconservative assumptions, based on engineeringjudgment and on applicable experimental results fromsafety research programs conducted by the AEC and thenuclear industry, that are used to evaluate calculationsof the radioloocal consequences of various postulatedacciden ts.This guide lists acceptable assumptions that may beused to evaluate the design basis LOCA of a PressurizedWater Reactor (PWR). It should be shown that thcoffsite dose consequences will be within thie guidelinesof 10 CFR Part 100,'This guide is a revision of former Safety Guide 4.
After reviewing a number of applications for construction permits and operating licenses for pressurized water power reactors, the AEC Regulatory staff has developed a number of appropriately conservative assumptions, based on engineering judgment and on applicable experimental results from safety research programs conducted by the AEC and the nuclear industry, that are used to evaluate calculations of the radiological consequences of various postulated accidents.
 
This guide lists acceptable assumptions that may be used to evaluate the design basis LOCA of a Pressurized Water Reactor (PWR). It should be shown that the offsite dose consequences will be within the guidelines of 10 CFR Part 100. (During the construction permit review, guideline exposures of 20 rem whole body and
150 rem thyroid should be used rather than the values given in § 100.11 in order to allow for (a) uncertainties in final design details and meteorology or (b) new data and calculational techniques that might influence the final design of engineered safety features or the dose reduction factors allowed for these features.)


==C. REGULATORY POSITION==
==C. REGULATORY POSITION==
1. The assuimptions related io the release of radioactivematerial from the fuel and containment are as Ibllows:a. T we n t y -five percent of the equilibriutradioactive iodine inventory developed from imlaximu ifull power operation of the core should be assumtned tobe immediately available for leakage from the prinmaryreactor containment. Ninety-one percent of this 25percent is to be assumed ito he ill Ithe forma ofelenllelllaliodine. 5 percent of this 25 percent ill the form ofparticulate iodine. and 4 percent of this 25 percent inthe form of organic iodides.b. One hundred percent of the equilibriumradioactive noble gas inventory developed frontmaximum full power operation od the core should beassumed to be immediately available for leakage frontthe reactor containment.c. The effects of radiological decay during holdupin the containment or other buildings should be takeninto account.d. The reduction in the amotunt of radioactivematerial available for leakage to tile environment bycontainment sprays, recirculating filter systems, or otherengineered safety features may be taken into account.but the amount of reduction in concentration ofradioactive materials should be evaluated on anindividual case basis.e. The primary reactor containment should beassumed to leak at the leak rate incorporated or to leincorporated as a technical specification requirement atpeak accident pressure for the first 24 hours. and at 50percent of this leak rate for the remaining duration ofthe accideint.2 Peak accident pressure is the maximum1pressure defined in the technical specifications forcontainment leak testing.2Thte effect on coniainnmeni leakage tinder accidentconditions of features provided to reduce the leakage ot"radioactive materials from the containment will be evaluated onan individual case basis.USAEC REGULATORY GUIDES Coples of published guldes may be obtained by request Indicating the divisionsdesired to the US. Atomic Energy Commission. Washington. 0.1, 20545,Regulatory Guides are issued to describe and make avaliable to the public Attention: Director of Regulatory Standards. Comments and tuggrsilons formethods acceptable to the AEC Regulatory staff of Implementing specific parts of impfrovements In these guides ere encouraged end should be sent to the Secretarythe Commission's regulations, to delineate techniques used by the staff in of the Commission, US. Atomic Energy Commission, Washington. O.C. 20545.evaluating specific problems or postulated accid3nts. or to provide guidance to Attention: Chief, Public Proceedings Staff.applicants. Regulatory Guides are not substitutes for regulations and compliancewith them is not required. Methods and solutlons different from those set out in The guides are issued In the following ten broad divliions:the guides will be acceptable if they provide a basis for the findings requisite tothe issuance or continuance of a permit or license by the Comrrssion. 1. Power Reactors 8. Products2. Researcha nd Tast Reactors 7. Transportation3. Fuels and Materials Facilities 8. Occupational HealthPublished guides will be revised periodically, as appropriate, to accommodate 4. Environmental end Siting 9. Antlitrust Reviewcomments and to reflect new informatio" or experience. 5. Materials and Plant Protection 1
1. The assumptions related to the release of radioactive material from the fuel and containment are as follows:  
a.
 
Twenty-five percent of the equilibrium radioactive iodine inventory developed from maximum full power operation of the core should be assumed to be immediately available for leakage from the primary reactor containment. Ninety-one percent of this 25 percent is to be assumed to be in the form of elemental iodine, 5 percent of this 25 percent in the form of particulate iodine, and 4 percent of this 25 percent in the form of organic iodides.
 
b.
 
One hundred percent of the equilibrium radioactive noble gas inventory developed from maximum full power operation of the core should be assumed to be immediately available for leakage from the reactor containment.
 
c.
 
The effects of radiological decay during holdup in the containment or other buildings should be taken into account.
 
d.
 
The reduction in the amount of radioactive material available for leakage to the environment by containment sprays, recirculating filter systems, or other engineered safety features may be taken into account, but the amount of reduction in concentration of radioactive materials should be evaluated on an individual case basis.
 
e.
 
The primary reactor containment should be assumed to leak at the leak rate incorporated or to be incorporated as a technical specification requirement at peak accident pressure for the first 24 hours, and at 50
percent of this leak rate for the remaining duration of USAEC REGULATORY GUIDES  
Copies of published guide may. be obtained by request indicating the divisions desired to the US.
 
Atomic Enemgy Commilss*o, Washlngton. D.C. 20646, Regulatory Guides we issuad to describe and make available to the public Attention: Director of Regulatory Standards. Comments and suggestions for methods acceptable to the AEC Regulatory staff of implementing specific parts of Impr°
ments In theose uldes we encouraged and should be sent to the Secretary the Commission's regulations, to delineate techniques used by the staff in of the Commislion, U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, Washington, D.C. 20645, eanluating specific problems or postulated accidents, or to provide guidance to Attention: Chief, Public ProcoedlnglStaff.
 
applicants. Regulatory Guides are not substitutes for regulations and compliance with them is not required. Methods and solutions different from those set out in The guides are issued in the following ten broad divisions:  
the guides will be acceptable if they provide a basis for the findings requisite to the Issuance or continuance of a permit or )iconse by the Commission.
 
===1. PeOWrd Reactors ===
 
===6. Products ===
2. Research end Test Reactors  
 
===7. Transportation ===
3. Fuels end Materials Facilities EL Occupatlonal Health Published guides will be revised periodically, as appropriate, to accommodate  
4. Environmental and Siting  
9. Antitrust Review comments and to reflect new information or experienca.
 
5. Materials and Plant Protection  
1
 
===0. General===
 
the accident., Peak accident pressure is the maximum pressure defined in the technical specifications for containment leak testing.
 
2.
 
Acceptable assumptions for atmospheric diffusion and dose conversion are:
a.
 
The
0-8 hour ground level release concentrations may be reduced by a factor ranging from one to a maximum of three (see Figure 1) for additional dispersion produced by the turbulent wake of the reactor building in calculating potential exposures. The volumetric building wake correction, as defined in section 3-3.5.2 of Meteorology and Atomic Energy
1968, should be used only in the 0-8 hour period; it is used with a shape factor of 1/2 and the minimum cross-sectional area of the reactor building only.
 
b.
 
No correction should be made for depletion of the effluent plume of radioactive iodine due to deposition on the ground, or for the radiological decay of iodine in transit.
 
c.
 
For the first 8 hours, the breathing rate of persons offsite should be assumed to be 3.47 x 10"4 cubic meters per second. From 8 to 24 hours following the accident, the breathing rate should be assumed to be
1.75 x 104 cubic meters per second. After that until the end of the accident, the rate should be assumed to be
1.75 x 10-4 cubic meters per second. After that until the end of the accident, the rate should be assumed to be
2.32 x 104 cubic meters per second. (These values were developed from the average daily breathing rate [2 x 107 cm3/day] assumed in the report of ICRP, Committee
11-1959.)
d.
 
The iodine dose conversion factors are given in ICRP Publication
2, Report of Committee II,
"Permissible Dose for Internal Radiation," 1959.
 
e.
 
External whole body doses should be calculated using "Infinite Cloud" assumptions, i.e., the dimensions of the cloud are assumed to be large compared to the distance that the gamma rays and beta particles travel.
 
"Such a cloud would be considered an infinite cloud for a receptor at the center because any additional [gamma and]
beta emitting material beyond the cloud dimensions would not alter the flux of [gamma rays and] beta particles to the receptor" (Meteorology and Atomic Energy, Section 7.4.1.1 -editorial additions made so that gamma and beta emitting material could be considered). Under these conditions the rate of energy absorption per unit volume is equal to the rate of energy released per unit volume. For an infinite uniform cloud containing X curies of beta radioactivity per cubic meter the beta dose in air at the cloud center is:
SD4 = 0.457 fEX
The effect on containment leakage under accident conditions of features provided to reduce the leakage of radioactive materials from the containment will be evaluated on an individual case basis.
 
The surface body dose rate from beta emitters in the infinite cloud can be approximated as being one-half this amount (i.e., PD-1 = 0.23 Eox). 
For gamma emitting material the dose rate in air at the cloud center is:
^/DL = 0.507 E&x From a semi-infinite cloud, the gamma dose rate in air is:
7D = 0.25EYx Where
0 , = beta dose rate from an infinite cloudi(rad/sec)
DI= gamma dose rate from an infinite cloud (rad/sec)
E3 average beta energy per disintegration (Mev/dis)
EF" = average gamma energy per disintegration (Mev/dis)
X
= concentration of beta or gamma emitting isotope in the cloud (curie/m 3)
f.
 
The following specific
'assumptions are acceptable with respect to the radioactive cloud dose calculations:
(1) The dose at any distance from the reactor should be calculated based on the maximum concentration in the plume at that distance taking into account specific meteorological, topographical, and other characteristics which may affect the maximum plume concentration. These site related characteristics must be evaluated on an individual case basis. In the case of beta radiation, the receptor is assumed to be exposed to an infinite cloud at the maximum ground level concentration at that distance from the reactor. In the case of gamma radiation, the receptor is assumed to be exposed to only one-half the cloud owing to the presence of the ground.
 
The maximum cloud concentration always should be assumed to be at ground level.
 
(2) The appropriate average beta and gamma energies emitted per disintegration, as given in the Table of Isotopes, Sixth Edition, by C. M. Lederer, J. M.
 
Hollander, I. Perlman; University of California, Berkeley;
Lawrence Radiation Laboratory; should be used.
 
g.
 
The atmospheric diffusion model should be as follows:
(1) The basic equation for atmospheric diffusion from a ground level point source is:
1 XIQ =
u SrUayoz
1.4-2
 
Where X
= the short term average centerline value of the ground level concentration (curie/meter 3 )
Q
= amount of material released (curie/sec)
u
= windspeed (meter/sec)
ay = the horizontal standard deviation of the plume (meters) [See Figure V-i, Page 48, Nuclear Safety, June 1961. Volume 2, Number 4, "Use of Routine Meteorological Observations for Estimating Atmospheric Dispersion," F. A. Gifford, Jr.]
z= the vertical standard deviation of the plume (meters) [See Figure V-2, Page 48, Nudear Safety, June 1961, Volume 2, Number 4,
"Use of Routine Meteorological Observations for Estimating Atmospheric Dispersion," F. A. Gifford, Jr.]
(2) For time periods of greater than 8 hours the plume should be assumed to meander and spread uniformly over a 22.50 sector. The resultant equation is:
2.032 x/Q =
uu OzU
Where x
= distance from point of release to the receptor;
other variables are as given in g(l). 
(3) The atmospheric diffusion model 2 for ground level releases is based on the information in the following table.
 
2 This model should be used until adequate site meteorological data are obtained. In some cases, available information, such as meteorology, topography and geographical location, may dictate the use of a more restrictive model to insure a conservative estimate of potential offsite exposures.
 
Time Following Accident Atmospheric Conditions
0-8 hours Pasquill Type F, windspeed
1 meter/see, uniform direction
8.24 hours Pasquill Type F, windspeed 1 meter/sec, variable direction within a 22.50 sector
1-4 days (a) 40% Pasquill Type D, windspeed
3 meter/sec (b) 60% Pasquill Type F, windspeed 2 meter/sec (c) wind direction variable within a 22.50
sector
4-30 days (a) 33.3% Pasquill Type C, windspeed
3 meter/sec (b) 33.3% Pasquill meter/sec (c) 33.3% Pasquill meter/sec (d) Wind direction
22.50 sector Type D, windspeed 3 Type F, windspeed 2
33.3% frequency in a
(4) Figures 2A and 2B give the ground level release atmospheric diffusion factors based on the parameters given in g(3). 
 
==D. IMPLEMENTATION==
The revision to this guide (indicated by a line in the margin) reflects current Regulatory staff practice in the review of construction permit applications; therefore, this revision is effective immediately.
 
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===0. General ===
+
.12. Acceptable assumptions for atmospheric diffusionand dose conversion are:a. The 0-8 hour ground level releaseconcentrations may be reduced by a factor ranging fromone to a maximum of three (.see Figure I) for additionaldispersion produced by the turbulent wake of thereactor building in calculating potential exposures. Thevolumetric building wake correction, as defined insection 3.3.5.2 of Meteorology and Atomic Energy1968. should be used only in the 0-8 hour period: it isused with a shape factor of 112 and the minimumcross-sectional area of the reactor building only.b. No correction should be made for depletion of'the effluent plume of radioactive iodine due todeposition on the ground, or for the radiological decayof iodine in transit.c. For the first 8 hours, the breathing rate ofpersons offsite should be assumed to be 3.47 x 10'cubic meters per second. From 8 to 24 hours followingthe accident, the breathing rate should be assumed to be1.75 x 104 cubic meters per second. After that until theend of the accident, the rate should be assumed to be2.32 x 104 cubic meters per second. (These values weredeveloped from the average daily breathing rate [2 x 107cnv'/dayJ assumed in the report of ICRP, Committee11-1959.)d. The iodine dose conversion factors are given inICRP Publication 2, Report of Committee 11,"Permissible Dose for Internal Radiation," 1959.e. External whole body doses should be calculatedusing "Infinite Cloud" assumptions, i.e., the dimensionsof the cloud are assumed to be large compared to thedistance that the gamma rays and beta particles travel."Such a cloud would be considered an infinite cloud fora receptor at the center because any additional [gammaand] beta emitting material beyond the clouddimensions would not alter the flux of [gamma raysand] beta particles to the receptor" (Meteorology andAtomic Energy, Section 7.4. .1.-editorial additionsmade so that gamma and beta emitting material could beconsidered). Under these conditions the rate of energyabsorption per unit volume is equal to the rate of energyreleased per unit volume. For an infinite uniform cloudcontaining X curies of beta radioactivity per cubic meterthe beta dose in air at the cloud center is:From a semi-infinite cloud, the gamma dose rate in airis:,D = 0,25EWherebeta dose rate from an infinite cloud (rad/sec)gamma dose rate from an infinite cloud(rad/sec)EO3 = average beta energy per disintegration(Mev/dis)E = average gamma energy per disintegration(Mev/dis)X = concentration of beta or gamma emillingisotope in the cloud (curie/m3)f. The following specific assumptions areacceptable with respect to the radioactive cloud dosecalculations:(1) The dose at any distance from the reactorshould be calculated based on the maximumconcentration in the plume at that distance taking intoaccount specific meteorological, topographical, andother characteristics which may affect the maximumplume concentration. These site related characteristicsmust be evaluated on an individual case basis. In the caseof beta radiation, the receptor is assumed to be exposedto an infinite cloud at the maximum ground levelconcentration at that distance from the reactor. In thecase of gamma radiation, the receptor is assumed to beexposed to only one-half the cloud owing to thepresence of the ground. The maximum cloudconcentration always should be assumed to be at groundlevel.(2) The appropriate average beta and gammaenergies emitted per disintegration, as given in the Tableof Isotopes, Sixth Edition, by C. M. Lederer, J. M.Hollander, I. Perlman; University of California, Berkeley,Lawrence Radiation Laboratory; should be used.g. The atmospheric diffusion model should be asfollows:(1) The basic equation for atmosphericdiffusion from a ground level point source is:X/Q= ruayaWhereX = the short term average centerline value of theground level concentration (curie/meter3)Q = amount of material released (curie/see)u = windspeed (meter/see)y = the horizontal standard deviation of theplume (meters) [See Figure V-I. Page 48.Nuclear Safety, June 1961, Volume 2.D! = 0.457 EOXThe surface body dose rate from beta emitters in theinfinite cloud can be approximated as being one-half thisamount (i.e., 0DD' = 0.23 E'X).For gamma emitting material the dose rate in air at theuloud center is:7.D = 0.507 Ey(1.4-2 Number 4, "Use of Routine Meteorolo-icalObservations for Estimating AtmospchericDispersion," F. A. Gifford. Jrj..o" = the vertical standard deviation cf the pluii.e(meters) ISee Figure V-2, Page 48, NuclearSafqev', June 19(1. Volume 2. Number 4."Use of Routlinc Me leorologicalOh,'ervations for Estimating AtmosphericDispersion," F. A. G;ifford. Jr.I(.2) For lime periods of greater than 8 hoursthe plume shouid hI assumed to meander and spreadovcr a 22.i" sector. The resultlant e'quaition is:2.032x/Q = lx\Vhicrcx distance from point of release to the receptor;.other variables are as given in g( 1).(3) Tlhe at mospheric diffusion model" forground level releases is based on the information in thefollowing lable.-' 'This niIdo.l' %liould be useud until adequate sitemetcorologic'al d:ta are obtained. 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Latest revision as of 02:09, 17 January 2025

Assumptions Used for Evaluating the Potential Radiological Consequences of a Loss of Coolant Accident for Pressurized Water Reactors
ML003739614
Person / Time
Issue date: 06/30/1974
From:
Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research
To:
References
RG-1.4, Rev 2
Download: ML003739614 (6)


Revision 2 June 1974 U.S. ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION

REGULATORY

DIRECTORATE OF REGULATORY STANDARDS

GUIDE

REGULATORY GUIDE 1.4 ASSUMPTIONS USED FOR EVALUATING THE POTENTIAL RADIOLOGICAL CONSEQUENCES

OF A LOSS OF COOLANT ACCIDENT FOR PRESSURIZED WATER REACTORS

A. INTRODUCTION

Section 50.34 of 10 CFR Part 50 requires that each applicant for a construction permit or operating license provide an analysis and evaluation of the design and performance of structures, systems, and components of the facility with the objective of assessing the risk to public health and safety resulting from operation of the facility. The design basis loss of coolant accident (LOCA) is one of the postulated accidents used to evaluate the adequacy of these structures, systems, and components with respect to the public health and safety.

This guide gives acceptable assumptions that may be used in evaluating the radiological consequences of this accident for a pressurized water reactor. In some cases, unusual site characteristics, plant design features, or other factors may require different assumptions which will be considered on an individual case basis. The Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards has been consulted concerning this guide and has concurred in the regulatory position.

B. DISCUSSION

After reviewing a number of applications for construction permits and operating licenses for pressurized water power reactors, the AEC Regulatory staff has developed a number of appropriately conservative assumptions, based on engineering judgment and on applicable experimental results from safety research programs conducted by the AEC and the nuclear industry, that are used to evaluate calculations of the radiological consequences of various postulated accidents.

This guide lists acceptable assumptions that may be used to evaluate the design basis LOCA of a Pressurized Water Reactor (PWR). It should be shown that the offsite dose consequences will be within the guidelines of 10 CFR Part 100. (During the construction permit review, guideline exposures of 20 rem whole body and

150 rem thyroid should be used rather than the values given in § 100.11 in order to allow for (a) uncertainties in final design details and meteorology or (b) new data and calculational techniques that might influence the final design of engineered safety features or the dose reduction factors allowed for these features.)

C. REGULATORY POSITION

1. The assumptions related to the release of radioactive material from the fuel and containment are as follows:

a.

Twenty-five percent of the equilibrium radioactive iodine inventory developed from maximum full power operation of the core should be assumed to be immediately available for leakage from the primary reactor containment. Ninety-one percent of this 25 percent is to be assumed to be in the form of elemental iodine, 5 percent of this 25 percent in the form of particulate iodine, and 4 percent of this 25 percent in the form of organic iodides.

b.

One hundred percent of the equilibrium radioactive noble gas inventory developed from maximum full power operation of the core should be assumed to be immediately available for leakage from the reactor containment.

c.

The effects of radiological decay during holdup in the containment or other buildings should be taken into account.

d.

The reduction in the amount of radioactive material available for leakage to the environment by containment sprays, recirculating filter systems, or other engineered safety features may be taken into account, but the amount of reduction in concentration of radioactive materials should be evaluated on an individual case basis.

e.

The primary reactor containment should be assumed to leak at the leak rate incorporated or to be incorporated as a technical specification requirement at peak accident pressure for the first 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />, and at 50

percent of this leak rate for the remaining duration of USAEC REGULATORY GUIDES

Copies of published guide may. be obtained by request indicating the divisions desired to the US.

Atomic Enemgy Commilss*o, Washlngton. D.C. 20646, Regulatory Guides we issuad to describe and make available to the public Attention: Director of Regulatory Standards. Comments and suggestions for methods acceptable to the AEC Regulatory staff of implementing specific parts of Impr°

ments In theose uldes we encouraged and should be sent to the Secretary the Commission's regulations, to delineate techniques used by the staff in of the Commislion, U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, Washington, D.C. 20645, eanluating specific problems or postulated accidents, or to provide guidance to Attention: Chief, Public ProcoedlnglStaff.

applicants. Regulatory Guides are not substitutes for regulations and compliance with them is not required. Methods and solutions different from those set out in The guides are issued in the following ten broad divisions:

the guides will be acceptable if they provide a basis for the findings requisite to the Issuance or continuance of a permit or )iconse by the Commission.

1. PeOWrd Reactors

6. Products

2. Research end Test Reactors

7. Transportation

3. Fuels end Materials Facilities EL Occupatlonal Health Published guides will be revised periodically, as appropriate, to accommodate

4. Environmental and Siting

9. Antitrust Review comments and to reflect new information or experienca.

5. Materials and Plant Protection

1

0. General

the accident., Peak accident pressure is the maximum pressure defined in the technical specifications for containment leak testing.

2.

Acceptable assumptions for atmospheric diffusion and dose conversion are:

a.

The

0-8 hour ground level release concentrations may be reduced by a factor ranging from one to a maximum of three (see Figure 1) for additional dispersion produced by the turbulent wake of the reactor building in calculating potential exposures. The volumetric building wake correction, as defined in section 3-3.5.2 of Meteorology and Atomic Energy

1968, should be used only in the 0-8 hour period; it is used with a shape factor of 1/2 and the minimum cross-sectional area of the reactor building only.

b.

No correction should be made for depletion of the effluent plume of radioactive iodine due to deposition on the ground, or for the radiological decay of iodine in transit.

c.

For the first 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br />, the breathing rate of persons offsite should be assumed to be 3.47 x 10"4 cubic meters per second. From 8 to 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> following the accident, the breathing rate should be assumed to be

1.75 x 104 cubic meters per second. After that until the end of the accident, the rate should be assumed to be

1.75 x 10-4 cubic meters per second. After that until the end of the accident, the rate should be assumed to be

2.32 x 104 cubic meters per second. (These values were developed from the average daily breathing rate [2 x 107 cm3/day] assumed in the report of ICRP, Committee

11-1959.)

d.

The iodine dose conversion factors are given in ICRP Publication

2, Report of Committee II,

"Permissible Dose for Internal Radiation," 1959.

e.

External whole body doses should be calculated using "Infinite Cloud" assumptions, i.e., the dimensions of the cloud are assumed to be large compared to the distance that the gamma rays and beta particles travel.

"Such a cloud would be considered an infinite cloud for a receptor at the center because any additional [gamma and]

beta emitting material beyond the cloud dimensions would not alter the flux of [gamma rays and] beta particles to the receptor" (Meteorology and Atomic Energy, Section 7.4.1.1 -editorial additions made so that gamma and beta emitting material could be considered). Under these conditions the rate of energy absorption per unit volume is equal to the rate of energy released per unit volume. For an infinite uniform cloud containing X curies of beta radioactivity per cubic meter the beta dose in air at the cloud center is:

SD4 = 0.457 fEX

The effect on containment leakage under accident conditions of features provided to reduce the leakage of radioactive materials from the containment will be evaluated on an individual case basis.

The surface body dose rate from beta emitters in the infinite cloud can be approximated as being one-half this amount (i.e., PD-1 = 0.23 Eox).

For gamma emitting material the dose rate in air at the cloud center is:

^/DL = 0.507 E&x From a semi-infinite cloud, the gamma dose rate in air is:

7D = 0.25EYx Where

0 , = beta dose rate from an infinite cloudi(rad/sec)

DI= gamma dose rate from an infinite cloud (rad/sec)

E3 average beta energy per disintegration (Mev/dis)

EF" = average gamma energy per disintegration (Mev/dis)

X

= concentration of beta or gamma emitting isotope in the cloud (curie/m 3)

f.

The following specific

'assumptions are acceptable with respect to the radioactive cloud dose calculations:

(1) The dose at any distance from the reactor should be calculated based on the maximum concentration in the plume at that distance taking into account specific meteorological, topographical, and other characteristics which may affect the maximum plume concentration. These site related characteristics must be evaluated on an individual case basis. In the case of beta radiation, the receptor is assumed to be exposed to an infinite cloud at the maximum ground level concentration at that distance from the reactor. In the case of gamma radiation, the receptor is assumed to be exposed to only one-half the cloud owing to the presence of the ground.

The maximum cloud concentration always should be assumed to be at ground level.

(2) The appropriate average beta and gamma energies emitted per disintegration, as given in the Table of Isotopes, Sixth Edition, by C. M. Lederer, J. M.

Hollander, I. Perlman; University of California, Berkeley;

Lawrence Radiation Laboratory; should be used.

g.

The atmospheric diffusion model should be as follows:

(1) The basic equation for atmospheric diffusion from a ground level point source is:

1 XIQ =

u SrUayoz

1.4-2

Where X

= the short term average centerline value of the ground level concentration (curie/meter 3 )

Q

= amount of material released (curie/sec)

u

= windspeed (meter/sec)

ay = the horizontal standard deviation of the plume (meters) [See Figure V-i, Page 48, Nuclear Safety, June 1961. Volume 2, Number 4, "Use of Routine Meteorological Observations for Estimating Atmospheric Dispersion," F. A. Gifford, Jr.]

z= the vertical standard deviation of the plume (meters) [See Figure V-2, Page 48, Nudear Safety, June 1961, Volume 2, Number 4,

"Use of Routine Meteorological Observations for Estimating Atmospheric Dispersion," F. A. Gifford, Jr.]

(2) For time periods of greater than 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> the plume should be assumed to meander and spread uniformly over a 22.50 sector. The resultant equation is:

2.032 x/Q =

uu OzU

Where x

= distance from point of release to the receptor;

other variables are as given in g(l).

(3) The atmospheric diffusion model 2 for ground level releases is based on the information in the following table.

2 This model should be used until adequate site meteorological data are obtained. In some cases, available information, such as meteorology, topography and geographical location, may dictate the use of a more restrictive model to insure a conservative estimate of potential offsite exposures.

Time Following Accident Atmospheric Conditions

0-8 hours Pasquill Type F, windspeed

1 meter/see, uniform direction

8.24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> Pasquill Type F, windspeed 1 meter/sec, variable direction within a 22.50 sector

1-4 days (a) 40% Pasquill Type D, windspeed

3 meter/sec (b) 60% Pasquill Type F, windspeed 2 meter/sec (c) wind direction variable within a 22.50

sector

4-30 days (a) 33.3% Pasquill Type C, windspeed

3 meter/sec (b) 33.3% Pasquill meter/sec (c) 33.3% Pasquill meter/sec (d) Wind direction

22.50 sector Type D, windspeed 3 Type F, windspeed 2

33.3% frequency in a

(4) Figures 2A and 2B give the ground level release atmospheric diffusion factors based on the parameters given in g(3).

D. IMPLEMENTATION

The revision to this guide (indicated by a line in the margin) reflects current Regulatory staff practice in the review of construction permit applications; therefore, this revision is effective immediately.

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