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| {{#Wiki_filter:SEABROOK STATION Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Appendix A Revision 19 | | {{#Wiki_filter:}} |
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| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev. 12 Appendix A STATION Table of Contents Page i A. INTRODUCTION A-1 B. FIRE PROTECTION SYSTEM DESCRIPTION
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| : 1. General B-1
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| : 2. Design Features B-1 Table 1 Fire Detection and Suppression Methods by Fire Area & Zone B-5 Figure 1.2-1 Station Layout Figure 9.5-4 Fire Protection Yard Piping Figure 9.5-5 Fire Protection Fire Pumphouse Detail C. SAFE SHUTDOWN SYSTEMS C-1 D. CRITERIA FOR EVALUATION AND COMPARISON D-1 E. ANALYSIS PROCEDURE
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| : 1. Methodology E-1 Figure I Fire Protection System Review Flow Diagram E-3
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| : 2. Review Assumptions E-4
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| : 3. Designation Of Fire Areas And Zones E-8 Table 1 Tab Index E-9 Table 2 Identification of Fire Area and Zones on Drawings E-10 F.
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| ==SUMMARY==
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| OF FINDINGS
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| : 1. Evaluation And Comparison Matrix F-1
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| : 2. Results Of Fire Hazard Analysis F-8 Containment Building (Tab 1) 9763-F-805051-FP 9763-F-805052-FP 9763-F-805053-FP Emergency Feedwater Pump Building (Tab 2) 9763-F-202065-FP Main Steam And Feedwater Pipe Enclosure (Tab 3) 9763-F-202063-FP 9763-F-202064-FP RHR, Containment Spray, SI Equipment Vault (Tab 4) 9763-F-805060-FP 9763-F-805078-FP
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| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev. 12 Appendix A STATION Table of Contents Page ii Control Building (Tab 5) 9763-F-310431-FP 9763-F-310452-FP 9763-F-310455-FP 9763-F-310461-FP 9763-F-500090-FP Electrical Tunnels (Tab 6) 9763-F-310453-FP 9763-F-310454-FP 9763-F-310465-FP 9763-F-310466-FP 9763-F-310468-FP 9763-F-310469-FP Diesel Generator Building (Tab 7) 9763-F-202068-FP 9763-F-202069-FP Primary Auxiliary Building (Tab 8) 9763-F-805060-FP 9763-F-805061-FP 9763-F-805062-FP 9763-F-805063-FP Fuel Storage Building (Tab 9) 9763-F-805058-FP 9763-F-805059-FP 9763-F-805084-FP Waste Processing Building (Tab 10) 9763-F-805661-FP 9763-F-805882-FP Service Water Pump House (Tab 11) 9763-F-202476-FP 9763-F-202478-FP 9763-F-300245-FP Service Water Cooling Tower (Tab 12) 9763-F-805068-FP Containment Enclosure Ventilation Area (Tab 13) 9763-F-805051-FP 9763-F-805052-FP 9763-F-805053-FP 9763-F-805055-FP 9763-F-805056-FP 9763-F-805059-FP
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| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev. 12 Appendix A STATION Table of Contents Page iii Fire Pump House (Tab 14) 9763-F-300831-FP Turbine Building (Tab 15) 9763-F-202052-FP 9763-F-202053-FP 9763-F-202054-FP Mechanical Penetration (Tab 16) 9763-F-311429-FP Non-Essential Switchgear Room (Tab 17) 9763-F-310289-FP Condensate Storage Tank (Tab 18) 9763-F-310828-FP Make-Up Air East And West (Tab 19) 9763-F-310248-FP Ductbanks (Tab 20) 9763-F-300245-FP 9763-F-310248-FP 9763-F-310249-FP 9763-F-310254-FP 9763-F-310828-FP 9763-F-320251-FP 9763-F-320252-FP
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| : 3. Responses To BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Appendix A F-14 A. Overall Requirements Of Nuclear Plant Fire Protection Program F-15 Personnel F-15 Design Bases F-17 Back-up F-17 Single Failure Criterion F-18 Fire Suppression System F-20 Fuel Storage Areas F-21 Fuel Loading F-21 Multiple-Reactor Sites F-22 Simultaneous Fires F-22
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| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev. 12 Appendix A STATION Table of Contents Page iv B. Administrative Procedures, Controls And Fire Brigade F-23 Fire Protection System And Personnel Administrative Procedures F-23 Bulk Storage Of Combustible Materials F-24 Normal/Abnormal Conditions Or Other Anticipated Operations F-24 Public Fire Department Support F-26 Plant Fire Brigade Guidance F-26 Coordination With Local Fire Department F-28 NFPA Standards F-29 C. Quality Assurance Program F-30 Design Control And Procurement Document Control F-30 Instructions, Procedures And Drawings F-31 Control Of Purchased Material, Equipment And Services F-31 Inspection F-32 Test And Test Control F-32 Inspection, Test And Operating Status F-33 Non-Conforming Items F-33 Corrective Action F-34 Records F-34 Audits F-35 D. General Guidelines For Plant Protection F-36 Building Design - Plant Layouts F-36 Building Design - Detailed Fire Hazard Analysis F-37 Building Design - Cable Spreading Room F-37 Building Design - Non-Combustibility Requirements For Interior Construction F-38 Building Design - Metal Deck Roof Construction F-39 Building Design - Suspended Ceilings F-39 Building Design - High Voltage, High Ampere Transformers F-40 Building Design - Oil-Filled Transformers F-40 Building Design - Floor Drains F-41
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| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev. 12 Appendix A STATION Table of Contents Page v Building Design - Floors, Walls And Ceilings F-43 Control Of Combustibles F-44 Protection Of Safety-Related Systems F-44 Bulk Gas Storage F-45 Use Of Plastic Materials F-48 Storage Of Flammable Liquids F-49 Electric Cable Construction, Cable Trays And Cable Penetrations F-50 Cable Tray Construction F-50 Cable Spreading Rooms F-50 Cable Trays Outside Cable Spreading Rooms F-51 Cable And Cable Tray Penetration Of Fire Barriers F-52 Fire Breaks F-52 Flame Test Of Electric Cables F-53 Corrosive Gases From Cables F-54 Content Of Cable Trays, Raceways, Conduit, Trenches And Culverts F-54 Smoke Venting Of Cable Tunnels, Culverts And Spreading Rooms F-55 Control Room Cables F-55 Ventilation F-56 Discharge Of Products Of Combustion F-56 Evaluation Of Inadvertent Operation Or Single Failures F-57 Power Supply And Controls F-58 Protection Of Charcoal Filters F-59 Fresh Air Supply Intakes F-60 Stairwells F-60 Smoke And Heat Vents F-61 Self-Contained Breathing Apparatus F-62 Total Flooding Gas Extinguishing Systems F-63 Lighting And Communication F-63 E. Fire Detection And Suppression F-66 Fire Detection F-66
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| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev. 12 Appendix A STATION Table of Contents Page vi Fire Protection Water Supply Systems F-67 Yard Fire Main Loop F-67 Multiple Units Fire Protection Water Supply Systems F-68 Fire Pump Installation F-69 Fire Water Supplies F-70 Fire Water Supply Design Bases F-71 Lakes Or Ponds As Sources F-72 Outside Hose Installations F-73 Water Sprinklers And Hose Standpipe Systems F-74 Sprinkler And Standpipe Layout F-74 Supervision Of Valves F-75 Automatic Sprinkler Systems F-75 Fire Protection Water Supply System F-76 Hose Nozzles F-78 Foam Suppression F-78 Halon Suppression Systems F-79 Carbon Dioxide Suppression Systems F-80 Portable Extinguishers F-81 F. Guidelines For Specific Plant Areas F-82 Primary And Secondary Containment - Normal Operation F-82 Primary And Secondary Containment - Refueling And Maintenance F-84 Control Room F-85 Cable Spreading Room F-87 Plant Computer Room F-89 Switchgear Rooms F-90 Remote Safety-Related Panels F-91 Station Battery Rooms F-92 Turbine Lubrication And Control Oil Storage And Use Areas F-93 Diesel Generator Areas F-94
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| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev. 12 Appendix A STATION Table of Contents Page vii Diesel Fuel Oil Storage Areas F-96 Safety-Related Pumps F-97 New Fuel Area F-98 Spent Fuel Pool Area F-99 Radwaste Building F-100 Decontamination Areas F-101 Safety-Related Water Tanks F-101 Cooling Towers F-102 Miscellaneous Areas F-102 G. Special Protection Guidelines F-103 Welding And Cutting Acetylene - Oxygen Fuel Gas Systems F-103 Storage Areas For Dry Ion Exchange Resins F-104 Hazardous Chemicals F-104 Materials Containing Radioactivity F-105 H. Deviations from National Fire Protection Association (NFPA)
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| Code/Underwriters Laboratory (UL) Listing F-106 I. Fire Proofing For Structural Steel F-110 Table 1, Structural Steel Fire Proofing Analysis Chart F-111 APPENDICES A - Diesel Fuel Storage Room Fire Analysis B - Reactor Coolant Pump Fire Analysis C - Resumes D - Charcoal Filter Units Hazard Analysis
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| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev 6 Appendix A Section A STATION Introduction Page 1 On September 30, 1976, the NRC requested the Public Service Company of New Hampshire to conduct a re-evaluation of the fire protection program proposed for Seabrook Units 1 & 2, and to compare in detail the fire protection provisions proposed for Seabrook with the guidelines in Appendix A to Branch Technical Position APCSB 9.5-1. The request also stated that the re-evaluation would require the preparation of a fire hazards analysis, with assistance and technical direction from a qualified fire protection engineer.
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| The above request resulted in a report which included an evaluation and fire hazards analysis originally performed by United Engineers and Constructors under the direction of UE&Cs Mr.
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| Alfred S. Bocchino, P. E. Mr. Bocchinos resume is included in Appendix C of this report. The operational aspects of the re-evaluation were conducted by a Yankee Atomic Electric Company task force under the direction of Mr. E. A. Sawyer, whose resume is also included in Appendix C.
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| The above evaluation of the fire protection provisions was based on the guidelines contained in Appendix A to BTP APCSB 9.5-1 (plants for which applications for construction permits were docketed prior to July 1, 1976, but have not received a construction permit) and fully addressed the issues, criteria and concerns presented by the NRC.
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| The major changes incorporated in the above evaluation included:
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| : 1. Various changes resulting from the review and evaluation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix R.
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| : 2. Incorporation of Safety Evaluation Report (SER) commitments.
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| In the course of the above evaluation, the concept of defense-in-depth was applied and fire protection was treated from this viewpoint. Simply stated, this concept is:
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| : 1. Preventing fires from starting;
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| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev 6 Appendix A Section A STATION Introduction Page 2
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| : 2. Detecting fires quickly, suppressing those fires that occur, putting them out quickly, and limiting their damage; and
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| : 3. Designing plant safety systems so that a fire that starts in spite of the fire prevention program and burns for a considerable time in spite of fire protection activities will not prevent essential plant safety functions from being performed.
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| When this report is updated, the philosophy of the methodology remains unchanged. The following discussion describes the philosophy of the above report and any subsequent updates.
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| Plant design was reviewed and design provisions were included to provide protection of essential plant safety systems by physical barriers or spatial separation. Combustibles were identified and minimized as much as is practicable. Additionally, provisions were included for early detection of possible fires, with primary systems and back-up fire fighting systems available in the safety-related plant areas. The plant was designed to be constructed of non-combustible materials, where practical.
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| The fire protection systems described in this report are those required for protection of structures, systems and components required for safe reactor shutdown and safety-related systems. Other fire protection systems not described in this report are available for protection of non-safety-related structures, systems and components.
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| For prompt extinguishing of the fires associated with major electrical cables, efficient use of water is made from fixed systems spraying directly on the fires, as well as manual application with fire hoses.
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| A description of the fire protection system is provided in Section B. Included are pertinent general arrangement and P&ID system drawings, and a plot plan, as well as a tabulation of suppression and detection means by area and zone.
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| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev 6 Appendix A Section A STATION Introduction Page 3 A brief discussion on safe shutdown systems and procedures is presented in the Fire Protection of Safe Shutdown Capability (10 CFR, Appendix R) Report.
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| The criteria used in the evaluation program are presented in Section D of the report, and include the applicable general design criteria as well as criteria for single failure, defense-in-depth, fire suppression systems capacity and capability, and occurrence of fire coincident with other accidents, events or phenomena.
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| The method of review and analysis is described in Section E of the report.
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| The basis for the fire hazards analysis is defined and the scope of the evaluation, including assumptions and design basis fire conditions, is provided. Designation of fire areas and zones is also discussed here.
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| The summary of the results of the evaluation program is set forth in Section F of the report.
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| Subsection F.l presents a brief tabular summary indicating compliance, partial compliance or non-compliance with the BTP positions and page number of the partial compliance and non-compliance items. The bulk of the report is contained in Subsection F.2 which comprises the detailed analyses of the consequences of a fire in each of the designated fire areas/zones, as well as selected general arrangement drawings of the plant areas housing the safety-related equipment and equipment required for safe shutdown of the plant, with the designated fire areas/zones and ingress/egress routes from these areas 5 superimposed. Section F.3 presents the detailed responses to each of the positions of Branch Technical Position APCSB 9.5-1, Appendix A.
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| This review indicates criteria that are satisfied, partially satisfied and those not satisfied, with an explanation in each instance.
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| This report is applicable only to Unit 1. The construction to Unit 2 has been halted and the fire protection program evaluation for Unit 2 has been deleted from this report.
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| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev. 13 Appendix A Section B STATION Fire Protection System Description Page 1
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| : 1. General The plant fire protection system is a non-safety-related system designed to detect, control and extinguish potential fires, and to minimize their effect.
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| The relative location of the various plant buildings is shown on the station layout drawing, UFSAR Figure 1.2-1, sh. 1. The fire protection yard piping system is depicted on UFSAR Figure 9.5-4 and the fire pump house fire protection piping system is depicted on UFSAR Figure 9.5-5.
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| Fire detection is provided at locations determined by the fire hazard analysis as having significant fire hazards resulting from the presence of combustible liquids, solids or other flammable materials. Detection is also provided in other areas on a case basis.
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| Fire protection system piping and components in the area of safety-related systems required for safe shutdown of the plant are designed so that neither piping failure, seismic event, nor inadvertent operation of the system components, could result in the loss of safety related systems.
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| : 2. Design Features
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| : a. Water Supply and Pumping Arrangements The water supply for the plant fire protection system is obtained from two (2) 500,000-gallon water storage tanks. 300,000 gallons of water from each tank is dedicated for fire protection; the remainder is available for other plant use.
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| During the winter months, the fire protection water is heated to prevent freezing.
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| Two (2) diesel-driven and one (1) electric motor-driven fire pumps are provided to guarantee an uninterrupted supply of water.
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| Two (2) diesel-driven or one (1) diesel-driven and one (1) electric motor-driven fire pumps have the capacity to serve the maximum predicted demand for a safety related area suppression purposes, plus 500 gpm for hose streams through the yard hydrants or standpipe hose reels. (Reference Deviation No. 9, SBN 932, dated January 24, 1986). Deviation No. 9 of SBN-932 indicated that the largest demand safety related area was the Diesel Generator Room. Per EC274103, it has since been determined that the largest demand safety related area is the PAB.
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| Electric motor-driven jockey pumps normally will maintain system pressure.
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| A diesel fuel storage tank is provided for each diesel engine to supply fuel for a minimum of eight (8) hours.
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| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev. 13 Appendix A Section B STATION Fire Protection System Description Page 2 A flow meter is included with the pump installation for the purpose of testing pump performance.
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| Piping is so arranged that any or all fire pumps can take suction from either water storage tank. The buildings within the protected area are encircled by a 12 underground cement-lined, welded steel pipe fire loop to supply yard fire hydrants and the various fire protection systems in the plant.
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| Post indicator isolation valves are provided at strategic locations in the underground loop header to allow for sectionalization during maintenance and repair, and to provide flow from the pumping facilities in either of two different directions in the event of a line break. Post indicator valves are also positioned in the loop header to isolate the loop between the take-offs for primary suppression and secondary systems.
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| Fire hydrants, spaced approximately 250 feet apart and having individual isolation valves, are provided on branches off the underground loop. Hose houses and associated equipment are located at alternate hydrants.
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| : b. Stand-Pipe System Wet and dry standpipe systems are installed in the various buildings of the plant, including stair towers and other points of normally accessible areas. Dry standpipes are installed in the containment. Wet standpipes are installed in the control building, primary auxiliary building, fuel storage building, equipment vault, emergency feedwater pump building, diesel generator building and waste processing building. Wet standpipes are also installed in the administration building and turbine building. Hose stations are strategically located throughout the buildings. Hose stations are located in each building or section of building, such that all portions of each elevation of the building are adequately covered.
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| : c. Sprinkler and Spray Systems Wet pipe automatic sprinkler systems are installed in the administration and service building, turbine building, guardhouse, chlorination building, fire pump house, Alternate RP Checkpoint and Mechanical Maintenance Storage Facility.
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| Pre-action sprinkler systems are installed in the electrical tunnels from control building to containment, including penetrations, from the control building to primary auxiliary building (PAB), El. 25-0 and the electrical chase of the PAB, the diesel generator fuel oil storage tanks, fuel oil piping in floor trenches in the diesel generator building, diesel generator engine rooms, the PAB (component cooling area), Turbine Generator bearings and oil piping (bearings to guard pipe).
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| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev. 13 Appendix A Section B STATION Fire Protection System Description Page 3 The following equipment are provided with deluge systems:
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| Oil - filled Transformers Lube Oil Storage Tanks Lube Oil Conditioning Equipment Hydraulic Oil Pumping Unit Hydrogen Seal Oil Unit Oil Day Tanks in the Diesel Generator Building Cable Spreading Room Turbine Feedpump Lube Oil Conditioning Equipment Waste Process Bldg. Equipment (Asphalt Metering Pump; Extr./Evap.;
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| Turn Table Area; Full Drum Conveyor)
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| An Automatic fixed Halon 1301 fire suppression systems is provided for the main computer room adjacent to the main control room. Fire barrier walls are provided between the main unit, start-up and station service transformers to limit the spread of fire from one transformer to another. The turbine building wall adjacent to the transformers is also a fire barrier wall.
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| : d. Fire Detection and Alarm Thermal, ultraviolet, smoke (i.e. photoelectric and ionization) and beam type fire detectors are located throughout the plant, as required by the fire hazard analysis.
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| All fire detectors provide alarm at its local control panel and a visual and an audible alarm in the main control room. Carbon monoxide detectors have been installed at certain charcoal filters. See Table 1 for fire detection and suppression methods employed in the various safety-related fire areas and zones.
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| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev. 13 Appendix A Section B STATION Fire Protection System Description Page 4
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| : e. Miscellaneous Fire Protection Portable hand-held extinguishers, primarily dry chemical, C02, Halon 1211 and water are provided at strategic locations throughout the various buildings to provide protection against small local fire hazards.
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| Note: The term Halon or Halon 1211 is used to identify any of a family of Halon fire extinguishing gases: Halon 1211 or any of the Halon 1211 replacement gases such as hydrofluorocarbons (HFC's), hydrochlorofluorocarbons (HCFC) or blended agents such as Halotron.
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| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev. 13 Appendix A Section B STATION Fire Protection System Description Page 5 TABLE 1 FIRE DETECTION AND SUPPRESSION METHODS BY FIRE AREA AND ZONE FIRE SUPPRESSION SYSTEM FIRE AREA AREA NAME DETECTION Primary Secondary
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| : 1. CONTAINMENT C-F-l-Z Containment Floor Port. Exting. Hose Station Smoke C-F-2-Z Containment Floor Port. Exting. Hose Station Smoke C-F-3-Z Containment Floor Port. Exting. Hose Station None CAH-F-8 Port. Exting. Hose Station Temp Elements
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| & Carbon Monoxide Detection in Filter
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| : 2. EMERGENCY FEEDWATER PUMP BUILDING EFP-F-l-A Feedwater Pump Room Port. Exting. Hose Station Smoke
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| : 3. MAIN STEAM AND FEEDWATER PIPE CHASE MS-F-lA-Z Lower Level Port. Exting. Yard Hydrant Smoke MS-F-lB-Z Lower Level Port. Exting. Hose Station Smoke MS-F-2A-Z Upper Level Port. Exting. Hose Station Beam MS-F-2B-Z Upper Level Port. Exting. Hose Station Beam MS-F-3A-Z Electrical Room Port. Exting. Yard Hydrant Smoke MS-F-3B-Z Personnel Hatch Area Port. Exting. Yard Hydrant Smoke MS-F-4A-Z H2 Analyzer Room Port. Exting. Yard Hydrant Smoke MS-F-5A-Z Cable Tunnel Port. Exting. Hose Station Smoke
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| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev. 13 Appendix A Section B STATION Fire Protection System Description Page 6 TABLE 1 FIRE DETECTION AND SUPPRESSION METHODS BY FIRE AREA AND ZONE FIRE SUPPRESSION SYSTEM FIRE AREA AREA NAME DETECTION Primary Secondary
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| : 4. RHR. S.I. EQUIPMENT VAULT RHR-F-1A-Z Containment Spray 9B Port. Exting. Hose Station Smoke RHR-F-1B-Z Containment Spray 9A Port. Exting. Hose Station Smoke RHR-F-1C-Z RHR Pump 8B Port. Exting. Hose Station Smoke RHR-F-1D-Z RHR Pump 8A Port. Exting. Hose Station Smoke RHR-F-2A-Z Safety Injection Pump 6B Port. Exting. Hose Station Smoke RHR-F-2B-Z Safety Injection Pump 6A Port. Exting. Hose Station Smoke RHR-F-3A-Z RHR Ht. Exch. 9B Port. Exting. Hose Station Smoke RHR-F-3B-Z RHR Ht. Exch. 9A Port. Exting. Hose Station Smoke RHR-F-4A-Z Stairway & Manlift Area - Port. Exting. Hose Station Smoke South RHR-F-4B-Z Stairway & Hatch Area - Port. Exting. Hose Station Smoke North
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| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev. 13 Appendix A Section B STATION Fire Protection System Description Page 7 TABLE 1 FIRE DETECTION AND SUPPRESSION METHODS BY FIRE AREA AND ZONE FIRE SUPPRESSION SYSTEM FIRE AREA AREA NAME DETECTION Primary Secondary
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| : 5. CONTROL BUILDING CB-F-1A-A Switchgear Room A Port. Exting. Hose Station Smoke (Includes MG Set Rod Drive Rooms)
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| CB-F-lB-A Switchgear Room B" Port. Exting. Hose Station Smoke CB-F-1D-A Battery Room A Port. Exting. Hose Station Smoke CB-F-1E-A Battery Room C Port. Exting. Hose Station Smoke CB-F-1F-A Battery Room B Port. Exting. Hose Station Smoke CB-F-1G-A Battery Room D Port. Exting. Hose Station Smoke CB-F-2A-A Cable Spreading Room Auto. Deluge Port. Exting Smoke CB-F-2B-A Mechanical Rm. North Port. Exting. Hose Station Smoke CB-F-2C-A Mechanical Rm. South Port. Exting. Hose Station Smoke CB-F-3A-A Control Room Port. Exting. Hose Station Smoke
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| & Thermal CB-F-3A-A Computer Engineer's Port. Exting. Hose Station Smoke Work Space CB-F-3B-A HVAC Eqpt. & Duct Rm. Port. Exting. Hose Station Smoke CB-F-3B-A Emerg. Clean-Up Air Unit Port. Exting. Hose Station Carbon
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| - CBA-F-38, -8038 Monoxide Detect Monitored Temp.
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| Indication CB-F-3C-A Computer Room Fixed Port. Exting. Smoke Halon1301 System CB-F-S1-0 Stairwell Port. Exting. Hose Station None CB-F-S2-0 Stairwell Port. Exting. Hose Station None
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| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev. 13 Appendix A Section B STATION Fire Protection System Description Page 8 TABLE 1 FIRE DETECTION AND SUPPRESSION METHODS BY FIRE AREA AND ZONE FIRE SUPPRESSION SYSTEM FIRE AREA AREA NAME DETECTION Primary Secondary
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| : 6. ELECTRICAL TUNNELS ET-F-1A-A Upper Electrical Tunnel Pre-Action Port. Exting. Smoke Train "A" ET-F-1B-A Electrical Tunnel Train Pre-Action Port. Exting. Smoke "A"
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| ET-F-1C-A Lower Electrical Tunnel Pre-Action Port. Exting. Smoke Train "B" ET-F-1D-A Electrical Tunnel, Train Pre-Action Port. Exting. Smoke "B"
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| ET-F-S1-0 Stairwell Port. Exting. Hose Station None
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| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev. 13 Appendix A Section B STATION Fire Protection System Description Page 9 TABLE 1 FIRE DETECTION AND SUPPRESSION METHODS BY FIRE AREA AND ZONE FIRE SUPPRESSION SYSTEM FIRE AREA AREA NAME DETECTION Primary Secondary
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| : 7. DIESEL GENERATOR BUILDING DG-F-1A-A Fuel Oil Storage Tank Auto. Preaction Port. Exting. Smoke &
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| Area - North Thermal DG-F-1B-A Fuel Oil Storage Tank Auto. Preaction Port. Exting. Smoke &
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| Area - South Thermal DG-F-2A-A Engine Room North Auto Preaction Port. Exting. Thermal (on Oil Piping)
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| Smoke Manual Ultraviolet Preaction (area wide for room)
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| DG-F-2B-A Engine Room South Auto Port. Exting. Thermal Preaction(on Oil Smoke Piping) Manual Ultraviolet Preaction(area wide for room)
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| DG-F-3A-Z HVAC Equipment Area Port. Exting. Hose Station Smoke DG-F-3B-Z HVAC Equipment Area Port. Exting. Hose Station Smoke DG-F-3C-A Fuel Oil Day Tank Area Auto. Deluge Port. Exting. Smoke
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| & Thermal DG-F-3D-A Fuel Oil Day Tank Area Auto. Deluge Port. Exting. Smoke
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| & Thermal DG-F-3E-A Train A, DG Air Intake Port. Exting. Hose Station None Area DG-F-3F-A Train A, DG Air Intake Port. Exting. Hose Station None Area DG-F-S1-0 Stairwell Port. Exting. Hose Station None DG-F-S2-0 Stairwell Port. Exting. Hose Station None
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| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev. 13 Appendix A Section B STATION Fire Protection System Description Page 10 TABLE 1 FIRE DETECTION AND SUPPRESSION METHODS BY FIRE AREA AND ZONE FIRE SUPPRESSION SYSTEM FIRE AREA AREA NAME DETECTION Primary Secondary
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| : 8. PRIMARY AUXILIARY BUILDING PAB-F-1A-Z Chiller Pump Area Port. Exting. Hose Station Smoke PAB-F-1B-Z Demin. Filter & Vlv. Port. Exting. Hose Station None Maintenance Area PAB-F-1C-A Charging Pmp-2A Area Port. Exting. Hose Station Smoke PAB-F-1D-A Charging Pmp-2B Area Port. Exting. Hose Station Smoke PAB-F-1E-A Reciprocating Charging Port. Exting. Hose Station Smoke Pump Area PAB-F-1F-Z Letdown Degasifier Port. Exting. Hose Station Smoke PAB-F-1G-A Electrical Chase Pre-Action Dry Hose Station Smoke Pipe PAB-F-1J-Z Aux. Steam Cond. Tank Port. Exting. Hose Station Smoke Area PAB-F-1K-Z RCA Walkway and Port. Exting. Hose Station None Non-Rad. Pipe Tunnel PAB-F-2A-Z Resin Fill Tank Area Port. Exting. Hose Station Smoke PAB-F-2B-Z Boric Acid Tank Area Port. Exting. Hose Station Smoke PAB-F-2C-Z Primary Component Pre-Action Dry Port. Exting. Smoke Cooling Pump Area Pipe PAB-F-3A-Z Water Cooler Heat Exch. Port. Exting. Hose Station Smoke Area Port. Exting. Hose Station Temp Elements CAP-F-40 & Carbon Monoxide Detection in Filter PAB-F-3B-Z PAB Supply & Exhaust Port. Exting. Hose Station Smoke Fan Area
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| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev. 13 Appendix A Section B STATION Fire Protection System Description Page 11 TABLE 1 FIRE DETECTION AND SUPPRESSION METHODS BY FIRE AREA AND ZONE FIRE SUPPRESSION SYSTEM FIRE AREA AREA NAME DETECTION Primary Secondary PAB-F-4-Z Filter Area Port. Exting. Hose Station Smoke PAH-F-16 Port. Exting. Hose Station Temp Elements
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| & Carbon Monoxide Detection in Filter PAB-F-S1-0 Stairwell Port. Exting. Hose Station None PAB-F-S2-0 Stairwell Port. Exting. Hose Station None
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| : 9. FUEL STORAGE BUILDING FSB-F-lA-A Elev. 7'-0", l0'-0", 21'-6", Port. Exting. Hose Station Smoke 25'-0",64'-0", 84'-0",
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| Port. Exting. Hose Station Temp Elements FAH-F-41,74
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| & Carbon Monoxide Detect. in Filters
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| : 10. WASTE PROCESSING BUILDING W-F-1A-Z Truck Bay & Drum Port. Exting. Hose Station Smoke Storage Area W-F-1B-Z Decontamination Area Port. Exting. Hose Station Smoke W-F-2A-Z Extruder/Evap. Area Deluge System Hose Station Smoke
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| & Thermal W-F-2B-Z Crystallizer Pump Rm. Port. Exting. Hose Station None W-F-2C-Z Asphalt Meter Pump Deluge System Hose Station Smoke Room & Thermal W-F-2D-Z Turntable & Drum Conv. Deluge System Hose Station Smoke Areas & Thermal W-F-2E-Z Waste Solidification Port. Exting. Hose Station Smoke Control Room TF-F-1-0 Tank Farm (RWST) Port. Exting. Standpipe/ Hose None Reel
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| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev. 13 Appendix A Section B STATION Fire Protection System Description Page 12 TABLE 1 FIRE DETECTION AND SUPPRESSION METHODS BY FIRE AREA AND ZONE FIRE SUPPRESSION SYSTEM FIRE AREA AREA NAME DETECTION Primary Secondary
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| : 11. SERVICE WATER PUMP HOUSE SW-F-1A-Z Circulating Pump Area Port. Exting. Yard Hydrant None SW-F-1B-A Electrical Control Room Port. Exting. Yard Hydrant Smoke "A"
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| SW-F-1C-A Electrical Control Room Port. Exting. Yard Hydrant Smoke "B"
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| SW-F-1D-A Fan Room Port. Exting. Yard Hydrant Smoke SW-F-1E-Z Service Water Pump Area Port. Exting. Yard Hydrant Smoke SW-F-2-0 Service Water Intake & Port. Exting. Yard Hydrant None Discharge Structure
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| : 12. SERVICE WATER COOLING TOWER CT-F-1C-A Switchgear Room #3 Unit Port. Exting. Yard Hydrant Smoke
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| #1 Train B CT-F-1D-A Switchgear Room Unit #1 Port. Exting. Yard Hydrant Smoke Train "A" CT-F-2B-A Ventilation & Mech. Port. Exting. Yard Hydrant Smoke Room for Unit #1 CT-F-3-0 Top of Cooling Twr. Port. Exting. Yard Hydrant None
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| : 13. CONTAINMENT ENCLOSURE VENTILATION AREA AND CONTAINMENT ANNULUS CE-F-l-Z Cont. Encl. Ventil. Port. Exting. Hose Station Smoke EAH-F-9, -69 Port. Exting. Hose Station Temp Elements
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| & Carbon Monoxide Detect. in Filter
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| | |
| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev. 13 Appendix A Section B STATION Fire Protection System Description Page 13 TABLE 1 FIRE DETECTION AND SUPPRESSION METHODS BY FIRE AREA AND ZONE FIRE SUPPRESSION SYSTEM FIRE AREA AREA NAME DETECTION Primary Secondary
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| : 14. FIRE PUMP HOUSE FPH-F-1A-A Diesel Pump Rm.-West Auto Sprinkler Port. Exting. Thermal FPH-F-1B-A Electric Pump Room Auto Sprinkler Port. Exting. Smoke FPH-F-1C-A Diesel Pump Rm.-East Auto Sprinkler Port. Exting. Thermal
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| : 15. TURBINE BUILDING TB-F-1A-Z Ground Floor Auto Sprinkler Hose Station None TB-F-1B-A Battery Room Port. Exting Hose Station Smoke TB-F-1C-Z Relay Room Port. Exting Hose Station Smoke TB-F-2-Z Mezzanine Auto Sprinkler Port. Exting. None TB-F-3-Z Start-Up & Turbine Port. Exting Hose Station Smoke Erector's Office Electronic Work Area Port Exiting Hose Station Smoke SAS Computer Room
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| : 16. MECHANICAL PENETRATION AREA PP-F-1A-Z Rad. Piping Area Port. Exting Hose Station Smoke PP-F-2A-Z Rad. Piping Area Port. Exting Hose Station Smoke PP-F-1B-Z Rad. Piping Area Port. Exting Hose Station Smoke PP-F-2B-Z Rad. Piping Area Port. Exting Hose Station Smoke PP-F-3A-Z Rad. Piping Area Port. Exting Hose Station Smoke PP-F-3B-Z Rad. Piping Area Port. Exting Hose Station Smoke PP-F-4B-Z Non-Rad. Piping Area Port. Exting Hose Station Smoke PP-F-5B-Z Rad. Piping Area Port. Exting Hose Station Smoke
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| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev. 13 Appendix A Section B STATION Fire Protection System Description Page 14 TABLE 1 FIRE DETECTION AND SUPPRESSION METHODS BY FIRE AREA AND ZONE FIRE SUPPRESSION SYSTEM FIRE AREA AREA NAME DETECTION Primary Secondary
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| : 17. NON-ESSENTIAL SWITCHGEAR ROOM NES-F-1A-Z Non-Essential Swgr. Port. Exting Yard Hydrant Smoke
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| : 18. CONDENSATE STORAGE TANK CST-F-1-0 Cond. Stor. Tank Port. Exting Yard Hydrant None
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| : 19. MAKE-UP AIR MUA-F-1-0 Make-Up Air East Port. Exting Yard Hydrant None
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| : 20. DUCTBANKS DCT-F-1A-0 Ductbanks N/A N/A N/A DCT-F-1B-0 Ductbanks N/A N/A N/A DCT-F-2A-0 Ductbanks N/A N/A N/A DCT-F-2B-0 Ductbanks N/A N/A N/A DCT-F-3B-0 Ductbanks N/A N/A N/A DCT-F-4A-0 Ductbanks N/A N/A N/A DCT-F-4B-0 Ductbanks N/A N/A N/A DCT-F-5A-0 Ductbanks N/A N/A N/A DCT-F-5B-0 Ductbanks N/A N/A N/A NOTE: This listing does not include the Administration Building, part of Turbine Building, Chlorination Building, RCA Storage Facility, Mechanical Maintenance Storage Facility, Supplemental Emergency Power System and Guard House which do not contain safety-related equipment.
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| | |
| See PID-1-FP-B20274 Fire Protection Yard Piping SEABROOK STATION UPDATED FINAL SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT Figure 9.5-4
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| | |
| See PID-1-FP-B20266 Fire Protection Fire Pumphouse Detail SEABROOK STATION UPDATED FINAL SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT Figure 9.5-5
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| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev 6 Appendix A Section C STATION Safe Shutdown Systems Page 1 For details relating to safe shutdown systems and safe shutdown capability, refer to the Seabrook Station report, Fire Protection of Safe Shutdown Capability (10 CFR 50, Appendix R), latest revision.
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| Section F.2, Tabs 1 through 17, contain tables labeled Equipment and Systems in Fire Area/Zone (Item 12.0.) These tables denote the safety related equipment and systems in each plant Fire Area/Zone.
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| | |
| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev 8 Appendix A Section D STATION Criteria For Evaluation and Comparison Page 1 The criteria listed below served as the basis for the overall evaluation and comparison of the fire protection system against the guidelines of BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Appendix A:
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| : 1. Safe shutdown analyses for the areas listed in this report have been superseded by analyses included in the Fire Protection of Safe Shutdown Capability, 10 CFR 50, Appendix R report.
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| Operation of the Fire Protection system for safe shutdown scenarios, as described in paragraph 3.2.2.3 of the Appendix R report, supersedes the BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Appendix A exclusivity usage requirement.
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| : 2. For the purposes of this fire hazard analysis evaluation, a conservative approach was utilized in determining what could be found in any specific fire area or zone. This especially holds true in the electrical design area where the following conservative criteria were applied:
| |
| : a. Use of cable with low auto-ignition temperature of 750°F.
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| : b. Use of cable trays 40% filled for control, instrumentation and low voltage medium power, or a spaced single layer for high voltage power and low voltage power cables.
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| : c. Use of average size cables for cable tray loading and fire loading.
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| : d. Interlocked armored cable will be used for all 15 kV cables and all 5 kV cables, except the condensate and start-up feed pumps, which are routed in duct and conduit runs and the Supplemental Emergency Power System feeders which are routed in dedicated metal raceways.
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| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev 8 Appendix A Section D STATION Criteria For Evaluation and Comparison Page 2
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| : 3. The fire hazard analysis and evaluation was generally limited to those systems required to place the plant in a cold shutdown condition or to mitigate the consequences of an accident. According to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, safety-related systems and components are systems and components required to shutdown the reactor, mitigate the consequences of postulated accidents or maintain the reactor in a safe shutdown condition.
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| : 4. A single failure of an active component in a fire detection or fire support system will not impair both primary and backup plant fire protection capability.
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| : 5. Fire barriers between redundant cable separation groups and/or automatic sprinkler systems for cable raceway systems were used as a primary protection means from common mode failure by fire. The cabling raceway design meets the spatial separation requirements of Attachment C, Physical Independence of Electric Systems, to the AEC letter dated Dec. 14, 1973, a forerunner of Regulatory Guide 1.75 (hereinafter referred to as Attachment C).
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| Fire stop locations in vertical cable tray runs were selected on the bases of limiting materially 1) the spread of fire via a vertical cable tray run and 2) the resultant damage due to a fire in a vertical cable tray run.
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| The following guidelines were employed:
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| a) Horizontal offsets >1 foot were considered to end vertical cable tray runs.
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| b) Fire stops were not installed where cable tray fire suppression was present regardless of vertical run.
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| | |
| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev 8 Appendix A Section D STATION Criteria For Evaluation and Comparison Page 3 c) In vertical cable tray runs >25 feet, fire stops were placed to limit the spread of fire to not more than 35 feet. In fact more than two thirds of the vertical runs between fire stops are approximately 25 feet or less. The remaining vertical runs between fire stops vary from about 28 feet to about 35 feet. Where practical in vertical cable tray runs greater than 25 feet, fire stop locations were adjusted to floor elevations.
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| : 6. The majority of the cable used meet the fire test requirements of IEEE-383-1974 with the exception noted in Section F-3.
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| : 7. For each area containing significant fire hazard material, fire protection in the form of appropriate fire detection has been provided.
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| : 8. In areas where the fire hazard analysis indicates that a credible fire, should it occur, would adversely affect a safety-related or safe shutdown function, automatic fire suppression capability is provided.
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| : 9. Although the fire hazard analysis has indicated that no fire hazard exists, detectors and automatic suppression have been provided in electrical tunnels, chases and the cable spreading room. Also, in other selected electrical areas as shown by Table 1 (Section B),
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| appropriate fire detection has been provided.
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| : 10. Fire is not considered to occur simultaneously with other accidents, events or phenomena such as a design-basis accident. Capability is provided to safely shut down the plant in the event of any single fire.
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| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev 8 Appendix A Section D STATION Criteria For Evaluation and Comparison Page 4
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| : 11. The fires postulated in this fire hazard analysis and evaluation are presented in Subsection F.2, Results of Fire Hazard Analysis. The heat of combustion values used are as follows:
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| Combustible Heat of Combustion Auto - ignition Temperature Oil (any type) 150,000 BTU/gal 300°F Grease 18,000 BTU/lb. 800°F Class A (paper, wood) 8,000 BTU/lb. 800°F Electrical cables 10,500 BTU/lb. 750°F
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| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev 6 Appendix A Section E STATION Analysis Procedure Page 1
| |
| : 1. Methodology The organization of the Branch Technical Position APCSB 9.5-1, Appendix A, is broken down into overall fire protection requirements, general guidelines for both building design and specific systems, specific requirements for fire protection and suppression and general guidelines for specific plant areas. For the purpose of review, this fire hazards analysis and evaluation is sub-divided into two major areas in accordance with the above requirements, as follows:
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| o General fire protection review (fire hazard analysis and evaluation) o Specific subject review These two areas of review are detailed in the following paragraphs:
| |
| : a. General Fire Protection Review The purpose of this review is to evaluate the fire hazards associated with the plant, the capability to achieve safe reactor plant shutdown and to prevent a single fire from adversely affecting a safety function.
| |
| Figure depicts the flow path used for completing this analysis. As can be seen, this was basically accomplished on an area by area and system by system approach.
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| : b. Specific Subject Review Once the general review was completed, it was further necessary to review the specific requirements for those systems described in the Branch Technical Position, as well as review the guidelines for specific plant areas. Figure also shows the flow path of this review.
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| | |
| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev 6 Appendix A Section E STATION Analysis Procedure Page 2 Note that this review is repeated for each individual plant area requirement. In addition, there is an inter-relationship between these flow paths, such that upon completion of the overall plant review, specific and feasible solutions are derived that may or may not completely comply with the guidelines of APCSB 9.5-1, Appendix A. The results of these reviews are contained in this report. A summary of these results are found in Subsection F.1, Evaluation and Comparison Matrix.
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| The specific subjects under review are enumerated as follows:
| |
| o Plant Area Requirements o Fire Detection o Fire Suppression (including water supply system) o Electrical o Ventilation o Lighting and Communications o Construction (fire walls, etc.)
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| | |
| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev 6 Appendix A Section E STATION Analysis Procedure Page 3 Figure I
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| | |
| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev 6 Appendix A Section E STATION Analysis Procedure Page 4
| |
| : 2. Review Assumptions The assumptions listed below were utilized during this review.
| |
| : a. Fire areas were established based on plant design and floor levels, and designated as that portion of a building separated from other areas by barriers (walls, floors and ceilings) having designated fire ratings of one, one and one-half, or three-hour, as required by the fire hazard analyses. Fire areas, in some cases, were further sub-divided into fire zones for purposes of fire protection evaluation.
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| : b. Credit was taken for spatial separation of combustibles within a given area such that the maximum credible fire was established as the postulated fire in each zone. This postulated fire may consist of multiple fires within a given area only if such fires could credibly spread with no suppression.
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| : c. While fire barrier walls may have fire resistance capability in excess of that required for fire protection (because of shielding or structural requirements), the penetrations are designed for the fire resistance rating designated for the fire barrier.
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| : d. For purposes of this report, outside walls and ceilings of the top floors were not considered as requiring a fire rating.
| |
| : e. It is assumed that a postulated fire cannot exist if only electrical cables are involved.
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| The material selection and construction of the electrical cable insulation meet IEEE 383-1974 (except as noted in Section F-3). In addition, electrical faults will be mitigated by selective tripping of breakers or blowing of fuses.
| |
| : f. The cable construction and insulation material of the safety related and non-safety related cables meet the requirements of IEEE 383-1974. This will certify the cables non-propagational and fire resistance capabilities.
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| | |
| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev 6 Appendix A Section E STATION Analysis Procedure Page 5 However, it is noted that the cable will burn when subjected to external flame or high temperature (greater than 750°F). Therefore, if a design basis fire is determined to be hot enough and burn long enough, cabling in the immediate vicinity is assumed to burn, incapacitating the system the cabling serves and forming another heat source that is analyzed for additional fire possibilities.
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| (1) The additional heat source is considered as part of the original postulated fire.
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| (2) To become an additional heat source, the cable is considered to auto-ignite at an ambient temperature of approximately 750°F when heat of the original postulated fire is applied for five (5) minutes or longer.
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| (3) Once auto-ignition has taken place, the entire stack of cable trays is considered to be involved in the fire.
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| (4) It is assumed that any cabling system enclosed in conduit, which also passes through a postulated fire area, would not provide additional combustibility to the postulated fire. The cabling is assumed to fail as the heat of the fire destroys the insulation, however, the fire and damage is contained within the conduit. The heat contributed is considered insignificant.
| |
| : g. Electric motors are not considered as combustibles due to their metal enclosures, and do not add to the intensity of the original postulated fire. They could, however, be damaged by a postulated fire if situated in the cone of fire influence.
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| | |
| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev 6 Appendix A Section E STATION Analysis Procedure Page 6
| |
| : h. It was assumed that electrical equipment such as switchgear, unit substations, motor control centers, etc., do not contribute to a fire due to their metal enclosure. Electrical equipment, however, could be damaged by a fire. Electrical equipment specifications required that organic insulating materials used in the equipment construction be qualified as being self-extinguishing and non-propagating when exposed to fire and flame. It was also assumed that miscellaneous combustible materials mounted on the electrical equipment, such as operating coils, relays, control switches, etc., are of such small quantities that the heat released is insignificant.
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| : i. In many cases small quantities of grease are contained in valves, motors, fans and pumps. Since these small quantities are contained within a packing gland or a bearing, it is not considered as contributing to a fire.
| |
| : j. Air cleaning units, which contain roughing filters, HEPA filters and charcoal filters, are contained in heavy metal casings and are not considered in the fire hazard analysis for total Fire Loading in the Fire Area and the total combustibles. However, an individual Fire Hazard Analysis was conducted on CAH-F-8, CAP-F-40, EAH-F-9, 69, FAH-F-4l, 74 and PAH-F-l6, to be used for the Appendix R to 10CFR50 Safe Shutdown Study. See Appendix D for analysis. All filter units have early Fire Warning Detection Systems, i.e., Carbon Monoxide detectors and temperature elements within the filter units.
| |
| : k. Pipe and its insulation are not combustible and are not considered in the fire hazard analysis, however, if the pipe is in the cone of fire influence and the temperature of the fire is greater than 2000°F. for a duration greater than ten (10) minutes, the pipe is considered to rupture, incapacitating the system that it is a part of.
| |
| : l. Bare structural steel is not combustible but tends to degrade structurally when an ambient temperature of greater than 1100°F. is maintained for longer than ten (10) minutes. Fireproof-coated steel maintains its integrity for at least three (3) hours.
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| | |
| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev 6 Appendix A Section E STATION Analysis Procedure Page 7
| |
| : m. The fire hazard analysis of each fire area/zone is conducted as follows:
| |
| : 1. The original postulated fire is a fire that starts through the ignition of combustibles and covers a certain floor area. The effects of this fire forms a vertical shaft of fire influence over the fire which extends to the ceiling. For Class A fires, the temperature of the vertical shaft is assumed constant throughout its entire height, and is determined with the use of the NFPA heat potential and time/temperature curves or with the use of other published literature on the subject.
| |
| : 2. Effects of the postulated fire on cabling within 3-O of the shaft are re-evaluated if the temperature or duration of the fire exceeds the auto-ignition assumptions of the cabling. A time/temperature value is determined by forming a cone of influence over the fire covering an area 20 degrees from the vertical edge of the fire, with the fire acting as a flattened vortex of the cone. The new time/temperature value is determined by dividing the BTU value of the original fire by the area of the cone at the intersection of the combustible and the cone.
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| If the temperature and duration of the re-evaluated fire exceeds the auto-ignition assumptions of cabling, then the BTU contents of the cabling are added to the original BTU value, and a secondary fire is postulated.
| |
| The secondary fire has a time duration equal to that of the postulated fire, and its fire loading is determined by dividing the total BTU value by the area of the entire zone.
| |
| If the temperature and duration of this secondary fire exceeds the auto-ignition assumption of cabling, then the remainder of the cabling in the fire area-zone auto-ignites and also burns.
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| | |
| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev 6 Appendix A Section E STATION Analysis Procedure Page 8
| |
| : n. Bulk storage of combustible materials, including spare parts, adjacent to or in safety-related buildings during operation, maintenance or refueling periods is controlled by administrative procedures.
| |
| : 3. Designation of Fire Area and Zones As part of the fire hazard analysis effort, applicable plant general arrangement drawings were modified by superimposing on them the perimeters of fire areas and zones. Heavy solid lines were used to denote 3-hour minimum fire-rated walls, thin slanted lines were used to show 1- 1/2 hour fire-rated walls, heavy dashed lines were used to identify fire zone boundaries, heavy slanted lines were employed to define outside walls of buildings, and arrows were used to indicate the route to a fire exit.
| |
| Designations assigned to the various fire areas and zones denote the name of the building or structure, the floor level and whether the location is an area or zone. As an example, C-F-1-Z = Containment, Fire Analysis, Floor level 1 and Fire Zone. Another example, CB-F-1A-A = Control Building, Fire Analysis, Fire Subdivision A of Floor Level 1 and Fire Area. The Containment was treated as a single fire area comprised of a number of fire zones. Some other designation such as PAB-F-S1-0, Primary Auxiliary Building, Fire Analysis; stairwell has been assigned for convenience. This Suffix 0 designated area may or may not have fire rated boundaries.
| |
| A listing of the various fire areas and zones which were subjected to the fire hazards analysis, together with their applicable drawings, is presented in TABLE 2.
| |
| Abbreviations for the various buildings, structures and locations used in the fire area and zone designations are tabulated below:
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| | |
| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev 6 Appendix A Section E STATION Analysis Procedure Page 9 TABLE 1 - Tab Index Tab. Abbreviation Name of Building/Structure 1 C Containment 2 EFP Emergency Feedwater Pump Building 3 MS Main Steam & Feedwater Pipe Enclosure 4 RHR RHR, S.I., Equipment Vault 5 CB Control Building 6 ET Electrical Tunnels 7 DG Diesel Generator Building 8 PAB Primary Auxiliary Building 9 FSB Fuel Storage Building 10 W Waste Processing Building 10 TF Tank Farm 11 SW Service Water Pump House 12 CT Service Water Cooling Tower 13 CE Containment Enclosure Ventilation Area 14 FPH Fire Pump House 15 TB Turbine Building 16 PP Mechanical Penetration Area 17 NES Non-Essential Switchgear Room 18 CST Condensate Storage Tank 19 MUA Make up Air Intakes - East & West 20 DCT Ductbanks
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| | |
| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev 6 Appendix A Section E STATION Analysis Procedure Page 10 TABLE 2 Identification of Fire Area and Zones on Drawings TAB Structure and Applicable Drawings Fire Area or Zone Designation 1 Containment Dwg. No. 9763-F- Title 805051-FP Containment Structure Plan C-F-1-Z El. (-) 26 Gen. Arrgt.
| |
| 805052-FP Containment Structure Plan C-F-2-Z El. 0 Gen. Arrgt.
| |
| 805053-FP Containment Structure Plan C-F-3-Z El. 25 Gen. Arrgt.
| |
| 2 Emergency Feedwater Pump Building Dwg. No. 9763-F- Title 202065-FP Emergency Feedwater Pump EFP-F-l-A Building Plan & Sections, Gen.
| |
| Arrgt.
| |
| 3 Main Steam and Feedwater Pump Building Dwg. No. 9763-F- Title 202063-FP Main Steam & Feedwater Pipe MS-F-1A-Z, MS-F-1B-Z, Chase - Plan General Arrgt MS-F-2A-Z, MS-F-2B-Z, MS-F-3A-Z, MS-F-3B-Z, MS-F-4A-Z, MS-F-5A-Z, EFF- 1A-A 202064-FP Main Steam & Feedwater Pipe MS-F-1A-Z, MS-F-1B-Z, Enclosure - Sections General MS-F-2A-Z, MS-F-2B-Z, Arrgt MS-F-3A-Z, MS-F-4A-Z
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| | |
| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev 6 Appendix A Section E STATION Analysis Procedure Page 11 TABLE 2 Identification of Fire Area and Zones on Drawings TAB Structure and Applicable Drawings Fire Area or Zone Designation 4 RHR Containment Spray Vault. SI Equipment Vault Dwg. No. 9763-F- Title 805060-FP RHR, Containment Spray, S.I. RHR-F-lA-Z, RHR-F-1B-Z, Equip. Vault - General RHR-F-1C-Z, RHR-F-1D-Z, RHR-F-2A-Z, RHR-F-2B-Z, RHR-F-3A-Z, RHR-F-3B-Z, RHR-F-4A-Z, RHR-F-4B-Z 805078-FP RHR, Containment Spray, S.I. RHR-F-1A-Z, RHR-F-1B-Z, Equip. Vault - General Arrgt - RHR-F-1C-Z, RHR-F-1D-Z, Sections RHR-F-2A-Z, RHR-F-2B-Z, RHR-F-3A-Z, RHR-F-3B-Z, RHR-F-4A-Z 5 Control Building Dwg. No. 9763-F- Title 310431-FP Control Building El. 21-6 CB-F-lA-A, CB-F-1B-A, Electrical General Arrgt CB-F-S1-0, CB-F-S2-0, CB-F-1D-A, CB-F-1E-A, CB-F-1F-A,CB-F-1G-A 310452-FP Control Building El. 50-0 CB-F-2A-A, CB-F-2B-A, Cable Tray Layout - Plan CB-F-2C-A, 3l0455-FP Control Building El. 21-6 CB-F-lA-A, Cable Tray Layout - Sections Sheet 1 310461-FP Control Building El . 50-0 CB-F-2A-A, CB-F-2B-A Cable Tray Layout - Sections Sheet 1 500090-FP Control Building Control Room CB-F-3A-A, CB-F-3B-A, Arrgt Plan at El.75-0 CB-F-3C-A
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| | |
| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev 6 Appendix A Section E STATION Analysis Procedure Page 12 TABLE 2 Identification of Fire Area and Zones on Drawings TAB Structure and Applicable Drawings Fire Area or Zone Designation 6 Electrical Tunnels Dwg. No. 9763-F- Title 310453-FP Electrical Tunnel - A Train ET-F-1A-A, ET-F-1B-A, Cable Tray Layout - Plan ET-F-S1-0 310454- FP Electrical Tunnel - B Train ET-F-1C-A, ET-F-1D-A Cable Tray Layout - Plan 310465-FP Electrical Tunnel - A Train ET-F-1A-A, ET-F-1B-A Cable Tray Layout - Sections Sheet 1 310466-FP Electrical Tunnel - A Train ET-F-1A-A, ET-F-1B-A Cable Tray Layout - Sections Sheet 2 310468-FP Electrical Tunnel - B Train ET-F-1C-A, ET-F-1D-A Cable Tray Layout - Sections Sheet 1 310469-FP Electrical Tunnel - B Train ET-F-1D-A Cable Tray Layout - Sections Sheet 2 7 Diesel Generator Building Dwg. No. 9763-F- Title 202068 -FP Diesel Generator Building -Plan DC-F-1A-A, DG-F-1B-A,
| |
| & Sections - Below Grade DG-F-S1-0, DG-F-S2-0 General Arrangement 202069-FP Diesel Generator Building -Plan DC-F-2A-A, DG-F-2B-A, Above Grade - General DC-F-3A-Z, DC-F-3B-Z, Arrangement DC-F-3C-A, DC-F-3D-A, DC-P-3E-A, DG-F-3F-A
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| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev 6 Appendix A Section E STATION Analysis Procedure Page 13 TABLE 2 Identification of Fire Area and Zones on Drawings TAB Structure and Applicable Drawings Fire Area or Zone Designation 8 Primary Auxiliary Building Dwg. No. 9763-F- Title 805061-FP Primary Auxiliary Building - PAB-P-1A-Z, PAB-F-1B-Z, Plans at El. 7-0 and Below - PAB-F-1C-A, PAB-F-1D-A, General Arrangement PAB-F-1E-A, PAB-F-1F-Z, PAB-P-1G-A, PAB-F-1J-A, PAB-F-1K-Z 805062-FP Primary Auxiliary Building PAB-F-2A-Z, PAB-F-2B-Z, Plans at El. 25-0 -General PAB-F-2C-Z, PAB-F-1G-A, Arrangement PAB-F-1K-Z 805063-FP Primary Auxiliary Building - PAB-F-3A-Z, PAB-F-3B-Z, Plans at El. 53-0 & 8l-0 PAB-F-4A-Z, PAB-F-1K-Z, General Arrangement PAB-F-S1-0, PAB-F-S2-0 805060-FP RHR, Containment Spray, S.I. PAB-F-1G-A Equip. Vault - General 9 Fuel Storage Building Dwg. No. 9763-F- Title 805058-FP Fuel Storage Building - Plan at FSB-F-1-A El. 7- 0 10-0 -General Arrangement 805059-FP Fuel Storage Building - Plan at FSB-F-1-A El. 21-6 & 25-0 -General Arrangement 805084-FP Fuel Storage Building - Plan at. FSB-F-1-A El. 64-0 & 84-0 -General Arrangement
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| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev 6 Appendix A Section E STATION Analysis Procedure Page 14 TABLE 2 Identification of Fire Area and Zones on Drawings TAB Structure and Applicable Drawings Fire Area or Zone Designation 10 Waste Processing Building Dwg. No. 9763-F- Title 805661-FP Waste Processing Building- W-F-1A-Z, W-F-1lB-Z, Plan at El. 25-0 -General TF-F-1-0 Arrangement 805882-FP Waste Processing Building - W-F-2A-Z, W-F-2B-Z, Plan & Sections El. 42-5 & W-F-2C-Z, W-F-2D-Z, 65 General Arrangement W-F-2E-Z 11 Service Water Pump House Dwg. No. 9763-F- Title 202476-FP Service & Circ. Water Pump SW-F-1A-Z, SW-F-1B-A, House - Plan & Section - SW-P-1C-A, SW-F-1D-A, General Arrangement SW-F-1E-Z 202478-FP Service & Circ. Water Pump SW-F-1A-Z, SW-F-1B-A, House - Sections - General SW-F-1D-A Arrangement 300245-FP Underground Duct Plan - Circ. SW-F-2-0
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| & Service Water Area 12 Service Water Cooling Tower Dwg. No. 9763-F- Title 805068- FP Service Water Cooling Tower - CT-F-1C-A, CT-F-1D-A, General Arrangement CT-F-2B-A, CT-F-3-0
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| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev 6 Appendix A Section E STATION Analysis Procedure Page 15 TABLE 2 Identification of Fire Area and Zones on Drawings TAB Structure and Applicable Drawings Fire Area or Zone Designation 13 Containment Enclosure Ventilation Area Dwg. No. 9763-F- Title 805059-FP Fuel Storage Building - Plan at CE-F-l-Z El. 21-6 & 25-0 General Arrangement 805053-FP Containment Structure Plan at CE-F-l-Z Elev. 25-0 General Arrangement 805052-FP Containment Structure Plan at CE-F-l-Z Elev. 0-0 General Arrangement 805051-FP Containment Structure Plan at CE-F-l-Z Elev. (-)26-0 General Arrangement 805056-FP Containment Structure Elev. CE-F-l-Z D-D, E-E, F-F General Arrangement 805055-FP Containment Structure Plan at CE-F-l-Z Elev. (-)44-9 14 Fire Pump House Dwg. No. 9763-F- Title 300831-FP Fire Pump House Tray Plan and FPH-F-1A-A, FPH-F-1B-A, Grounding FPH-F-1C-A
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| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev 6 Appendix A Section E STATION Analysis Procedure Page 16 TABLE 2 Identification of Fire Area and Zones on Drawings TAB Structure and Applicable Drawings Fire Area or Zone Designation 15 Turbine Building Dwg. No. 9763-F- Title 202052-FP Turbine Building Plan Ground TB-F-1A-Z, TB-F-1B-A, Floor, Elevation 2l-0, General TB-F-1C-Z Arrangement 202053-FP Turbine Bldg Plan, Mezzanine TB-F-2-Z Floor, Elevation 46-0 and 50
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| -0, General Arrangement 202054-FP Turbine Building Plan - TB-F-3-Z Operating Floor, Elevation 75 -
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| 0, General Arrangement 16 Mechanical Penetration Area Dwg. No. 9763-F- Title 3l1429-FP Main Steam Tunnel-West PP-F-lA-Z, PP-F-2A-Z, Lighting Plan-Lower Levels PP-F-1B-Z, PP-F-2B-Z, PP-P-3A-Z, PP-F-3B-Z, PP-F-4B-Z, PP-F-5B-Z 17 Non Essential Switchgear Room Dwg. No. 9763-F- Title 310289- FP Non Essential Swgr. Room NES-F-1A-Z Electrical General Arrangement and Grounding 18 Condensate Storage Tank Dwg. No. 9763-F- Title 310828-FP Condensate & Demineralized CST-F-1-0 Water Stor. Tks. Conduit, Ltg.
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| & Ground. Plan 19 Make-Up Air, East and West Dwg. No. 9763-F- Title 310248-FP Underground Duct Plan - Center MUA-F-1-0
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| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev 6 Appendix A Section E STATION Analysis Procedure Page 17 TABLE 2 Identification of Fire Area and Zones on Drawings TAB Structure and Applicable Drawings Fire Area or Zone Designation 20 Duct Banks Dwg. No. 9763-F- Title 32025l-FP Underground Duct Plan - Center DCT-F-5A-0 DCT-F-5B-0 310254-FP Underground Duct & DCT-F-7-0 Grounding, Misc. Area Plans, Details & Elevations 310248-FP Underground Duct Plan - Center DCT-F-4A-0, DCT-F-lB-0, DCT-F-5A-0, DCT-F-4B-0, DCT-F-7-0, DCT-F-1A-0, DCT-F-3B-0 310249-FP Underground Duct Plan - South DCT-F-1A-0, DCT-F-2B-0, DCT-F-lB-0, DCT-F-2A-0 300245- FP Underground Duct Plan - Circ. DCT-F-6-0
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| & Service Water Area 320252-PP Underground Duct Plan - South DCT-F-2A-0 DCT-F-2B-0 310828 -FP Condensate & Demineralized DCT-F-7-0 Water Storage Tanks Conduit, Lighting & Grounding Plan NOTE: Refer to controlled equipment drawings for most up to date equipment locations
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| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev 6 Appendix A Section F STATION Summary of Findings Page 1 This section summarizes the results of the fire analysis performed on Seabrook Station. The information is presented under the following major headings:
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| F.1 Evaluation and Comparison Matrix F.2 Results of Fire Hazard Analysis F.3 Responses to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Appendix A:
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| o Overall requirements of Nuclear plant fire protection program o Administrative procedures, controls and fire brigade o Quality assurance program o General guidelines for plant protection o Fire detection and suppression o Guidelines for specific plant areas o Special protection guidelines
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| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev. 12 Appendix A Section F.1 STATION Evaluation and Comparison Matrix Page 1 F.1 EVALUATION AND COMPARISON MATRIX The Evaluation and Comparison Matrix, Table 3, correlates the requirements of each position of the BTP with each fire area/zone, and summarizes the areas of compliance, basic compliance and non-compliance with APCSB 9.5-1, Appendix A.
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| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev. 12 Appendix A Section F.1 STATION Evaluation and Comparison Matrix Page 2 Table 3 Fire Protection System Evaluation And Comparison Matrix Appendix A Branch Technical Do Not See Following Position Comply Partially Comply Comply Pages For APCSB 9.5-1 With With With Discussion A. Overall Requirements of Nuclear Plant Fire Protection Program
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| : 1. Personnel X F.3-15
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| : 2. Design Bases X F.3-17
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| : 3. Back-up X F.3-17
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| : 4. Single Failure Criterion X F.3-18
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| : 5. Fire Suppression Systems X F.3-20
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| : 6. Fuel Storage Areas X F.3-21
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| : 7. Fuel Loading X F.3-21
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| : 8. Multiple-Reactor Sites X F.3-22
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| : 9. Simultaneous Fires X F.3-22 B. Administrative Procedures Controls and Fire Brigade
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| : 1. Fire Protection System and Personnel Administrative X F.3-23 Procedures
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| : 2. Bulk Storage of Combustible X F.3-24 Materials
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| : 3. Normal/Abnormal Conditions Or X F.3-24 Other Anticipated Operations
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| : 4. Public Fire Department Support X F.3-26
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| : 5. Plant Fire Brigade Guidance X F.3-26
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| : 6. Coordination With Local Fire X F.3-28 Department
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| : 7. NFPA Standards X F.3-29
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| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev. 12 Appendix A Section F.1 STATION Evaluation and Comparison Matrix Page 3 Table 3 Fire Protection System Evaluation And Comparison Matrix Appendix A Branch Technical Do Not See Following Position Comply Partially Comply Comply Pages For APCSB 9.5-1 With With With Discussion C. Quality Assurance Program
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| : 1. Design Control and Procurement X F.3-30 Document Control
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| : 2. Instructions, Procedures and X F.3-31 Drawings
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| : 3. Control of Purchased Material, X F.3-31 Equipment and Services
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| : 4. Inspection X F.3-32
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| : 5. Test and Test Control X F.3-32
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| : 6. Inspection, Test and Operating X F.3-33 Status
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| : 7. Non-Conforming Items X F.3-33
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| : 8. Corrective Action X F.3-34
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| : 9. Records X F.3-34
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| : 10. Audits X F.3-35 D. General Guidelines for Plant Protection
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| : 1. Building Design (a) Plant Layouts X F.3-36 (b) Detailed Fire Hazard Analysis X F.3-37 (c) Cable Spreading Rooms X F.3-37 (d) Non-Combustibility Requirements for Interior X F.3-38 Construction (e) Metal Deck Roof Construction X F.3-39 (f) Suspended Ceilings X F.3-39 (g) High Voltage, High Ampere X F.3-40 Transformers (h) Oil-Filled Transformers X F.3-40 (i) Floor Drains X F.3-41 (j) Floors, Walls and Ceilings X F.3-43
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| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev. 12 Appendix A Section F.1 STATION Evaluation and Comparison Matrix Page 4 Table 3 Fire Protection System Evaluation And Comparison Matrix Appendix A Branch Technical Do Not See Following Position Comply Partially Comply Comply Pages For APCSB 9.5-1 With With With Discussion D. General Guidelines for Plant Protection (Continued)
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| : 2. Control of Combustibles (a) Protection of Safety-Related X F.3-44 Systems (1) Diesel generator fuel oil X F.3-44 day tank (2) Turbine - generator oil and hydraulic control X F.3-44 systems (3) Reactor coolant pump X F.3-45 lube oil System (b) Bulk Gas Storage X F.3-45 (c) Use of Plastic Materials X F.3-48 (d) Storage of Flammable Liquids X F.3-49
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| : 3. Electric Cable Construction, Cable Trays and Cable Penetrations (a) Cable Tray Construction X F.3-50 (b) Cable Spreading Rooms X F.3-50 (c) Cable Trays Outside Cable X F.3-51 Spreading Rooms (d) Cable and Cable Tray X F.3-52 Penetrations of Fire Barriers (e) Fire Breaks X F.3-52 (f) Flame Test of Electric Cables X F.3-53 (g) Corrosive Gases from Cables X F.3-54 (h) Content of Cable Trays, Raceways, Conduit, Trenches X F.3-54 and Culverts (i) Smoke Venting of Cable Tunnels, Culverts and X F.3-55 Spreading Rooms (j) Control Room Cables X F.3-55
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| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev. 12 Appendix A Section F.1 STATION Evaluation and Comparison Matrix Page 5 Table 3 Fire Protection System Evaluation And Comparison Matrix Appendix A Branch Technical Do Not See Following Position Comply Partially Comply Comply Pages For APCSB 9.5-1 With With With Discussion D. General Guidelines for Plant Protection (Continued)
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| : 4. Ventilation (a) Discharge of Products of X F.3-56 Combustion (b) Evaluation of Inadvertent X F.3-57 Operation or Single Failures (c) Power Supply and Controls X F.3-58 (d) Protection of Charcoal Filters X F.3-59 (e) Fresh Air Supply Intakes X F.3-60 (f) Stairwells X F.3-60 (g) Smoke and Heat Vents X F.3-61 (h) Self-Contained Breathing X F.3-62 Apparatus (i) Total Flooding Gas X F.3-63 Extinguishing Systems
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| : 5. Lighting and Communications (a) Fixed Emergency Lighting X F.3-63 (b) Portable Lights X F.3-63 (c) Fixed Emergency X F.3-63 Communication (d) Portable Radio X F.3-63 Communication
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| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev. 12 Appendix A Section F.1 STATION Evaluation and Comparison Matrix Page 6 Table 3 Fire Protection System Evaluation And Comparison Matrix Appendix A Branch Technical Do Not See Following Position Comply Partially Comply Comply Pages For APCSB 9.5-1 With With With Discussion E. Fire Detection & Suppression
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| : 1. Fire Detection (a) Conformance to NFPA 72D X F.3-66 (b) Alarm and Annunciation X F.3-66 (c) Distinctive and Unique Fire X F.3-66 Alarms (d) Connection to Emergency X F.3-66 Power Supply
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| : 2. Fire Protection Water Supply System (a) Yard Fire Main Loop X F.3-67 (b) Multiple Units Fire Protection X F.3-68 Water Supply Systems (c) Fire Pump Installation X F.3-69 (d) Fire Water Supplies X F.3-70 (e) Fire Water Supply Design X F.3-71 Bases (f) Lakes or Ponds as Sources NA F.3-72 (g) Outside Hose Installations X F.3-73
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| : 3. Water Sprinklers and Hose Standpipe Systems (a) Sprinkler and Standpipe X F.3-74 Layout (b) Supervision of Valves X F.3-75 (c) Automatic Sprinkler Systems X F.3-75 (d) Fire Protection Water Supply X F.3-76 System (e) Hose Nozzles X F.3-78 (f) Foam Suppression NA F.3-78
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| : 4. Halon Suppression Systems X F.3-79
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| : 5. Carbon Dioxide Suppression NA F.3-80 Systems
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| : 6. Portable Extinguishers X F.3-81
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| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev. 12 Appendix A Section F.1 STATION Evaluation and Comparison Matrix Page 7 Table 3 Fire Protection System Evaluation And Comparison Matrix Appendix A Branch Technical Do Not See Following Position Comply Partially Comply Comply Pages For APCSB 9.5-1 With With With Discussion F. Guidelines for Specific Plant Areas
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| : 1. Primary and Secondary Containment (a) Normal Operation X F.3-82 (b) Refueling and Maintenance X F.3-84
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| : 2. Control Room X F.3-85
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| : 3. Cable Spreading Room X F.3-87
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| : 4. Plant Computer Room X F.3-89
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| : 5. Switchgear Rooms X F.3-90
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| : 6. Remote Safety-Related Panels X F.3-91
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| : 7. Station Battery Rooms X F.3-92
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| : 8. Turbine Lubrication and Control X F.3-93 Oil Storage and Use Areas
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| : 9. Diesel Generator Areas X F.3-94
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| : 10. Diesel Fuel Oil Storage Areas X F.3-96
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| : 11. Safety-Related Pumps X F.3-97
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| : 12. New Fuel Area X F.3-98
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| : 13. Spent Fuel Pool Area X F.3-99
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| : 14. Radwaste Building X F.3-100
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| : 15. Decontamination Areas X F.3-101
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| : 16. Safety-Related Water Tanks X F.3-101
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| : 17. Cooling Towers X F.3-102
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| : 18. Miscellaneous Areas X F.3-102 G. Special Protection Guidelines
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| : 1. Welding and Cutting, Acetylene -
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| X F.3-103 Oxygen Fuel Gas Systems
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| : 2. Storage Areas for Dry Ion X F.3-104 Exchange Resins
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| : 3. Hazardous Chemicals X F.3-104
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| : 4. Materials Containing Radioactivity X F.3-105
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| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1 Rev 6 Appendix A Sec F.2 Tab 01 STATION Fire Hazard Analysis - C-F-1-Z Page 1 of 3 Fire Hazard Analysis C-F-1-Z 1.0 Building Containment Building 2.0 Fire Area or Zone C-F-1-Z 2.1 Area Name Containment Floor 2.2 Location El. (-) 26'-0" Drawing No 9763-F-805051-FP 3.0 Construction of Area Material Min. Fire Rating 3.1 Walls North Concrete 3 Hr.
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| South Concrete 3 Hr.
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| East Concrete 3 Hr.
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| West Concrete 3 Hr.
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| 3.2 Floor Concrete 3 Hr.
| |
| 3.3 Ceiling Concrete/Grating/Stl Plate -
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| 3.4 Doors None -
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| 3.5 Others - -
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| 4.0 Floor Area 15,400 Sq. Ft. Diameter 140' -0" Height 26' 5.0 Volume 400,000 Cu. Ft.
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| 6.0 Floor Drains Nuclear X Non-Nuclear 7.0 Exhaust Ventilation System Containment Recirculation System 7.1 Percentage of System's Capacity No Exhaust 8.0 8 Hr. Emergency Lighting in Area Yes X No 8.1 Outside Area at Exit Points Yes X No 9.0 Operational Radioactivity 9.1 Equipment/Piping Yes X No 9.2 Airborne Yes X No 10.0 Fire Protection Type 10.1 Primary Fire Extinguisher(s) 10.2 Secondary Standpipe and Hose Reel (isolated in modes 1-4) 10.3 Detection Ionization*
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| 10.4 Other -------------
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| 11.0 Fire Loading in Area 11.1 This zone will be affected by a fire in the zone above (C-F-2-Z) due to the deck grating at the 0' -0" level, therefore see zone C-F-2-Z for effects of the design basis fire.
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| Ref. Deviation No. 2, SBN-904, Dated Dec. 2, 1985.
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| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1 Rev 6 Appendix A Sec F.2 Tab 01 STATION Fire Hazard Analysis - C-F-1-Z Page 2 of 3 12.0 Equipment and Systems in Fire Area/Zone System Train Safety Equipment System A B Related Nuclear Instrumentation NI X X X
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| & Cabling Piping, Valves, RC X X X Equipment & Cabling Piping, Valves & SI X X X Cabling Piping, Valves & CS X X X Cabling Cabling CAP X X Cabling CAH X X Piping, Instrumentation CBS X X X
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| & Cabling Piping, Valves, Motors CC X X X
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| & Cabling Piping, Valves & COP X X Cabling Penetrations, Equipment EDE X X X
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| & Cabling Piping, Valves & NG X X Cabling Piping, Valves & VG X X Cabling Piping Valves & Cabling WLD X X Pressurizer Heaters RC X X Cabling CGC X X Instrumentation & RM X X Cabling Cabling ED X Cabling IA X Cabling SA X
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| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1 Rev 6 Appendix A Sec F.2 Tab 01 STATION Fire Hazard Analysis - C-F-1-Z Page 3 of 3 12.0 Equipment and Systems in Fire Area/Zone System Train Safety Equipment System A B Related Incore Instrumentation & IC X X X Cabling Instrumentation & FW X X X Cabling Instrument Racks MM X X X Piping, Valves & RH X X X Cabling
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| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1 Rev 6 Appendix A Sec F.2 Tab 01 STATION Fire Hazard Analysis - C-F-2-Z Page 1 of 3 Fire Hazard Analysis C-F-2-Z 1.0 Building Containment Building 2.0 Fire Area or Zone C-F-2-Z 2.1 Area Name Containment Floor 2.2 Location El 0'-0" Drawing No 9763-F-805052-FP 3.0 Construction of Area Material Min. Fire Rating 3.1 Walls North Concrete 3 Hr.
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| South Concrete 3 Hr.
| |
| East Concrete 3 Hr.
| |
| West Concrete 3 Hr.
| |
| 3.2 Floor Concrete/Grating/Stl Plate -
| |
| 3.3 Ceiling Concrete/Grating/Stl Plate -
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| 3.4 Doors None -
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| 3.5 Others - -
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| 4.0 Floor Area 15,400 Sq. Ft. Diameter 140' -0" Height 25' 5.0 Volume 385,000 Cu. Ft.
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| 6.0 Floor Drains Nuclear X Non-Nuclear 7.0 Exhaust Ventilation System Containment Recirculation System 7.1 Percentage of System's Capacity No Exhaust 8.0 8 Hr. Emergency Lighting in Area Yes No X 8.1 Outside Area at Exit Points Yes X No 9.0 Operational Radioactivity 9.1 Equipment/Piping Yes X No 9.2 Airborne Yes X No 10.0 Fire Protection Type 10.1 Primary Fire Extinguisher(s) 10.2 Secondary Standpipe and Hose Reel (isolated in modes 1-4) 10.3 Detection Ionization*
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| 10.4 Other -------------
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| 11.0 Fire Loading in Area 11.1 Refer to page 3 (analysis continued Pg. 2 & 3)
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| Ref. Deviation No. 2, SBN-904, Dated Dec. 2, 1985.
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| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1 Rev 6 Appendix A Sec F.2 Tab 01 STATION Fire Hazard Analysis - C-F-2-Z Page 2 of 3 12.0 Equipment and Systems in Fire Area/Zone System Train Safety Equipment System A B Related Rc Pumps RC X Steam Generators RC X Piping, Valves, Fans & CAH X X X Cabling Piping, Valves, FW X X X Instruments & Cabling Piping, Valves, CC X X X Instruments & Cabling Cabling CBS X X X Piping, Valves & CAP X X Cabling Penetrations EDE X X Cabling CS X X Instrument Racks MM X X X Instruments & Cabling RC X X X Radiation Monitors & RM X X X Cabling Piping Valves & Cabling SI X X X Cabling NI X Distr Pnl & Cabling ED X Dryer, Contractor & IA X X Cabling Compressor, Control Pnl SA X X
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| & Cabling Cabling CGC X X Contm. Coolers CAH X Contm. Coolers CAH X Piping, Valves & SB X X Cabling Incore Instruments & IC X X X Cabling
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| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1 Rev 6 Appendix A Sec F.2 Tab 01 STATION Fire Hazard Analysis - C-F-2-Z Page 3 of 3 13.0 Design Basis Fire 13.1 Combustible in Area (In Situ) Fire Loading in Area Oil: 1060 (4 Pumps) Gallons 2580 Btu/Sq. Ft.
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| Grease: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Class A: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Charcoal: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Chemicals: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Plastics: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Resins: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Other:
| |
| 13.2 Total Fire Loading in Area: 2580 Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Total Combustibles: 39,750,000 Btu 14.0 Design Basis Fire Description See Appendix B of this report.
| |
| | |
| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1 Rev 6 Appendix A Sec F.2 Tab 01 STATION Fire Hazard Analysis - C-F-3-Z Page 1 of 2 Fire Hazard Analysis - C-F-3-Z 1.0 Building Containment Building 2.0 Fire Area or Zone C-F-3-Z 2.1 Area Name Containment Floor 2.2 Location El. 25'-0" Drawing No 9763-F-805053-FP 3.0 Construction of Area Material Min. Fire Rating 3.1 Walls North Concrete 3 Hr.
| |
| South Concrete 3 Hr.
| |
| East Concrete 3 Hr.
| |
| West Concrete 3 Hr.
| |
| 3.2 Floor Concrete/Grating/Stl Plate -
| |
| 3.3 Ceiling Concrete 3 Hr 3.4 Doors * -
| |
| 3.5 Others - -
| |
| 4.0 Floor Area 15,400 Sq. Ft. Diameter 140' -0" Height 164' -0"25' 5.0 Volume 2,165,400 Cu. Ft.
| |
| 6.0 Floor Drains Nuclear X Non-Nuclear 7.0 Exhaust Ventilation System Containment Recirculation System 7.1 Percentage of System's Capacity None - Recirculated 8.0 8 Hr. Emergency Lighting in Area Yes No X 8.1 Outside Area at Exit Points Yes X No 9.0 Operational Radioactivity 9.1 Equipment/Piping Yes X No 9.2 Airborne Yes X No 10.0 Fire Protection Type 10.1 Primary Fire Extinguisher(s) 10.2 Secondary Standpipe and Hose Reel 10.3 Detection None 10.4 Other Carbon Monoxide Detection for CAH-F-8**
| |
| 11.0 Fire Loading in Area 11.1 None X (no further analysis required)
| |
| Personnel & Equipment Hatches Charcoal loading for CAH-F-8 is 1300 lb. Charcoal. Charcoal fire loading was not considered in total area.
| |
| See appendix D.
| |
| | |
| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1 Rev 6 Appendix A Sec F.2 Tab 01 STATION Fire Hazard Analysis - C-F-3-Z Page 2 of 2 12.0 Equipment and Systems in Fire Area/Zone System Train Safety Equipment System A B Related Radiation Element. RM X X X Monitors & Cabling Piping, Valves & RC X X X Cabling Dampers, Motors & CAH X X X Cabling Piping, Valves, CGC X X X Recombiners & Cabling Penetrations MM X X
| |
| | |
| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev 7 Appendix A Section F.2 Tab 2 STATION Fire Hazard Analysis - EFP-F-1-A Page 1 of 4 Fire Hazard Analysis - EFP-F-1-A 1.0 Building Emergency Feedwater Pump Building 2.0 Fire Area or Zone EFP-F-1-A 2.1 Area Name Pump Area 2.2 Location El. 27-0 Drawing No 9763-F-202065-FP 3.0 Construction of Area Material Min. Fire Rating 3.1 Walls North Concrete Outside South Concrete 3 Hr.
| |
| East Concrete 3 Hr./Outside West Concrete 3 Hr./Outside 3.2 Floor Concrete 3 Hr 3.3 Ceiling Concrete Outside 3.4 Doors Metal 1 1/2 Hr. (Stairwell) 3.5 Others - -
| |
| 4.0 Floor Area 2,400Sq. Ft. Length 79' Width Varies Height 18' 5.0 Volume 43,000 Cu. Ft.
| |
| 6.0 Floor Drains Nuclear X Non-Nuclear None 7.0 Exhaust Ventilation System Wall Supply Fan 7.1 Percentage of System's Capacity 100%
| |
| 8.0 8 Hr. Emergency Lighting in Area Yes No X 8.1 Outside Area at Exit Points Yes X No 9.0 Operational Radioactivity 9.1 Equipment/Piping Yes No X 9.2 Airborne Yes No X 10.0 Fire Protection Type 10.1 Primary Fire Extinguisher(s) 10.2 Secondary Standpipe and Hose Reel 10.3 Detection Ionization 10.4 Other ------------
| |
| 11.0 Fire Loading in Area 11.1 Refer to page 2. (analysis continued page 2 & 3)
| |
| | |
| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev 7 Appendix A Section F.2 Tab 2 STATION Fire Hazard Analysis - EFP-F-1-A Page 2 of 4 12.0 Equipment and Systems in Fire Area/Zone System Train Safety Equipment System A B Related Emergency Feed Pump FW X X (M)
| |
| Emergency Feed Pump FW X X X (T)
| |
| Flow Transmitters FW X X X Cabling FW X X X Fan FN-47 A & B EPA X X X Damper DP-371, 373 EPA X X Damper DP-372, 374 EPA X X Temperature Switches EPA X X X Instrument Racks MM X X X IR-49, 50 Piping And Valves FW X X X Cabling EPA X X X 13.0 Design Base Fire 13.1 Combustible in Area (In Situ) Fire Loading in Area Note: Oil Fire Oil: 6 Gallons 375 Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Grease: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Class A: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Charcoal: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Chemicals: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Plastics: 32 Pounds 173 Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Resins: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Other:
| |
| 13.2 Total Fire Loading in Area: 548 Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Total Combustibles: 1,316,000 Btu
| |
| | |
| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev 7 Appendix A Section F.2 Tab 2 STATION Fire Hazard Analysis - EFP-F-1-A Page 3 of 4 14.0 Design-Basis Fire Description
| |
| : 1. Turbine ruptures, oil spills spreading over 78 sq. Ft. Of floor. Oil film is 1/8" thick and burn rate is 5" per hour.
| |
| : 2. Oil ignites and is consumed.
| |
| : 3. One ventilation supply fan (14,000 cfm) is assumed to fail 30 seconds after fire starts.
| |
| : 4. A fire which considers oil to be sprayed over a large area will have the same total heat release but the heat will not be concentrated to a small area.
| |
| : 5. A fire which considers oil to spill over a small area will be more concentrated.
| |
| : 6. The DBF over the small area as postulated is considered to be the most serious as it will damage electrical cables in the immediate area.
| |
| 14.1 DBF Fire Loading 11,500 Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| 14.2 Duration of Fire 4 1/2 Minutes 14.3 Peak Temperature 601 °F 15.0 Consequences of Design Basis Fire without Fire Protection 15.1 Turbine is lost.
| |
| 15.2 Safe shutdown can be accomplished by use of startup feed pump. For further discussion, refer to the report on "Fire Protection Of Safe Shutdown Capability (10 CFR 50, Appendix R).
| |
| 16.0 Consequence of Design Basis Fire with Fire Protection 16.1 Loss of the turbine due to loss of oil.
| |
| 17.0 Consequence of Inadvertent or Careless Operation or Rupture of the Fire Protection System 17.1 Not applicable (no water fire suppression in area).
| |
| | |
| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev 7 Appendix A Section F.2 Tab 2 STATION Fire Hazard Analysis - EFP-F-1-A Page 4 of 4 18.0 Containing the Design Basis Fire in the Fire Area/Zone 18.1 A) Short fire duration.
| |
| B) Concrete structure.
| |
| 19.0 How the Redundant Safe Shutdown Equipment in the Same Area is Protected 19.1 Spatial separation between pumps.
| |
| 19.2 Curb around the turbine base to contain an oil spill.
| |
| | |
| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev 6 Appendix A Section F.2 Tab 3 STATION Fire Hazard Analysis - MS-F-1A-Z Page 1 of 2 Fire Hazard Analysis - MS-F-1A-Z 1.0 Building Main Steam & Feedwater Enclosure (East) 2.0 Fire Area or Zone MS-F-1A-Z 2.1 Area Name Lower Level 2.2 Location East El. 3'-0" Drawing No 9763-F-202063-FP, -202064-FP 3.0 Construction of Area Material Min. Fire Rating 3.1 Walls North Concrete Outside South Concrete 3 Hr.
| |
| East Concrete Outside West Concrete 3 Hr./Outside/-
| |
| 3.2 Floor Concrete 3 Hr 3.3 Ceiling Grating -
| |
| 3.4 Doors Metal 3 Hr. /-
| |
| 3.5 Others - -
| |
| 4.0 Floor Area 1220 Sq. Ft. Length 74.75' Width 16.25' Height 25' 5.0 Volume 20.740 Cu. Ft.
| |
| 6.0 Floor Drains Nuclear Non-Nuclear None X 7.0 Exhaust Ventilation System (Supply System Only) 7.1 Percentage of System's Capacity 100%
| |
| 8.0 8 Hr. Emergency Lighting in Area Yes No X 8.1 Outside Area at Exit Points Yes No X 9.0 Operational Radioactivity 9.1 Equipment/Piping Yes No X 9.2 Airborne Yes No X 10.0 Fire Protection Type 10.1 Primary Fire Extinguisher(s) 10.2 Secondary Yard Hydrant 10.3 Detection Ionization 10.4 Other ------
| |
| 11.0 Fire Loading in Area 11.1 None X (no further analysis required)
| |
| | |
| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev 6 Appendix A Section F.2 Tab 3 STATION Fire Hazard Analysis - MS-F-1A-Z Page 2 of 2 12.0 Equipment and Systems in Fire Area/Zone System Train Safety Equipment System A B Related Piping, Valves & MS X X X Cabling Piping, Valves, FW X X X Instrumentation &
| |
| Cabling Cabling EAH X X X Terminal Boxes EDE X X Piping, Valves & MSD X X Cabling
| |
| | |
| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev 6 Appendix A Section F.2 Tab 3 STATION Fire Hazard Analysis - MS-F-1B-Z Page 1 of 3 Fire Hazard Analysis - MS-F-1B-Z 1.0 Building Main Steam & Feedwater Pipe Chase (West) 2.0 Fire Area or Zone MS-F-1B-Z 2.1 Area Name Lower Level 2.2 Location El. 3'-0" Drawing No 9763-F-202064-FP, -202063-FP 3.0 Construction of Area Material Min. Fire Rating 3.1 Walls North Concrete Outside South Concrete 3 Hr. /-
| |
| East Concrete 3 Hr.
| |
| West Concrete 3 Hr.
| |
| 3.2 Floor Concrete 3 Hr 3.3 Ceiling Grating -
| |
| 3.4 Doors Metal 3 Hr 3.5 Others - -
| |
| 4.0 Floor Area 935 Sq. Ft. Length 74' Width 14' Height 25' 5.0 Volume 15,900 Cu. Ft.
| |
| 6.0 Floor Drains Nuclear Non-Nuclear None X 7.0 Exhaust Ventilation System (Supply System Only) 7.1 Percentage of System's Capacity 100%
| |
| 8.0 8 Hr. Emergency Lighting in Area Yes No X 8.1 Outside Area at Exit Points Yes No X 9.0 Operational Radioactivity 9.1 Equipment/Piping Yes No X 9.2 Airborne Yes No X 10.0 Fire Protection Type 10.1 Primary Fire Extinguisher(s) 10.2 Secondary Hose Station 10.3 Detection Ionization 10.4 Other ------
| |
| 11.0 Fire Loading in Area 11.1 Ref. Page 2 of 3
| |
| | |
| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev 6 Appendix A Section F.2 Tab 3 STATION Fire Hazard Analysis - MS-F-1B-Z Page 2 of 3 12.0 Equipment and Systems in Fire Area/Zone System Train Safety Equipment System A B Related Piping and Valves SB X X X Instrument Rack - MM X X X IR-52A, 52B Piping, Valves & MS X X X Cabling Cabling SB X X X Piping, Valves, FW X X X Instrumentation &
| |
| Cabling Terminal Boxes EDE X X Piping Valves & Cabling MSD X X 13.0 Design Base Fire 13.1 Combustible in Area (In Situ) Fire Loading in Area Note: Oil Fire Oil: 1 Gallons 160 Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Grease: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Class A: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Charcoal: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Chemicals: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Plastics: 11 Pounds 153 Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Resins: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Other:
| |
| 13.2 Total Fire Loading in Area: 313 Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Total Combustibles: 293,000 Btu 14.0 Design-Basis Fire Description
| |
| : 1. One of the four (4) steam recirculating pump ruptures, one quart oil spills on floor covering an area of 3 ft. x 4 ft. = 12 sq. Ft.
| |
| : 2. To add conservatism, the oil contents of all four (4) pumps is considered to be spilled on floor (total 1.0 gallon) and burn completely.
| |
| : 3. The ventilating supply fan failed.
| |
| | |
| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev 6 Appendix A Section F.2 Tab 3 STATION Fire Hazard Analysis - MS-F-1B-Z Page 3 of 3 14.1 DBF Fire Loading 125,000 Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| 14.2 Peak Zone Temperature Fire 712 °F 14.3 Duration of Fire 4 1/2 Min.
| |
| 15.0 Consequences of Design Basis Fire without Fire Protection 15.1 Loss of the steam recirculation and layup pumps due to loss of oil.
| |
| 16.0 Consequences of Design Basis Fire with Fire Protection 16.1 Not applicable (no water fire suppression in area).
| |
| 17.0 Consequences of Inadvertent or Careless Operation or Rupture of the Fire Protection System 17.1 Not applicable (no water suppression in area).
| |
| 18.0 Containing Design Basis Fire in the Fire Area/Zone 18.1 Short fire duration, less than five minutes.
| |
| 18.2 Concrete structure.
| |
| 19.0 How the Redundant Safe Shutdown Equipment in the Area is Protected 19.1 The redundant safe shutdown equipment is located in a separate fire area.
| |
| | |
| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev 7 Appendix A Section F.2 Tab 3 STATION Fire Hazard Analysis - MS-F-2A-Z Page 1 of 3 Fire Hazard Analysis - MS-F-2A-Z 1.0 Building Main Steam & Feedwater Enclosure (East) 2.0 Fire Area or Zone MS-F-2A-Z 2.1 Area Name Upper Level 2.2 Location East El. 27-6 Drawing No 9763-F-202063-FP, - 202064-FP 3.0 Construction of Area Material Min. Fire Rating 3.1 Walls North Concrete Outside South Concrete 3 Hr.
| |
| East Concrete Outside West Concrete 3 Hr./Outside 3.2 Floor Grating -
| |
| 3.3 Ceiling Concrete Outside 3.4 Doors Metal 3 Hr/-
| |
| 3.5 Others Exposed Ceiling Beams -
| |
| 4.0 Floor Area 1,220 Sq. Ft. Length 74.75 Width 16.25 Height 40 5.0 Volume 48,800 Cu. Ft.
| |
| 6.0 Floor Drains Nuclear X Non-Nuclear None X 7.0 Exhaust Ventilation System Supply System Only 7.1 Percentage of Systems Capacity 100%
| |
| 8.0 8 Hr. Emergency Lighting in Area Yes No X 8.1 Outside Area at Exit Points Yes No X 9.0 Operational Radioactivity 9.1 Equipment/Piping Yes No X 9.2 Airborne Yes No X 10.0 Fire Protection Type 10.1 Primary Fire Extinguisher(s) 10.2 Secondary Hose Station 10.3 Detection Beam 10.4 Other -------
| |
| 11.0 Fire Loading in Area 11.1 Refer to page 2. (analysis continued pages 2 & 3).
| |
| | |
| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev 7 Appendix A Section F.2 Tab 3 STATION Fire Hazard Analysis - MS-F-2A-Z Page 2 of 3 12.0 Equipment and Systems in Fire Area/Zone System Train Safety Equipment System A B Related Piping and Valves MS X X X Cabling MS X X X Piping, Valves & AS X X X Cabling 13.0 Design Base Fire 13.1 Combustible in Area (In Situ) Fire Loading in Area Oil: Gallons Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Grease: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Class A: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Charcoal: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Chemicals: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Plastics: 30 Pounds 320 Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Resins: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Other:
| |
| 13.2 Total Fire Loading in Area: 320 Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Total Combustibles: 390,000 Btu 14.0 Design-Basis Fire Description
| |
| : 1. For conservatism, the ladders are assumed to be in a vertical position. The bottom of both sets of rails are ignited and burn upward.
| |
| : 2. To add conservatism, it is assumed that the fire is self-sustaining, although the fire is not severe and has a low heat release rate.
| |
| : 3. The fire area will be limited to the length of the ladders and about 2 feet from the wall for an area covering 10 ft. x 2 ft. = 20 ft.2.
| |
| 14.1 DBF Fire Loading 19,500 Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| 14.2 Peak Zone Temperature Fire 152 °F 14.3 Duration of Fire >>5 Minutes 15.0 Consequences of Design Basis Fire without Fire Protection 15.1 Refer to Seabrook Station fire protection of safe shutdown capability
| |
| | |
| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev 7 Appendix A Section F.2 Tab 3 STATION Fire Hazard Analysis - MS-F-2A-Z Page 3 of 3 (10 CFR 50, App. R).
| |
| 16.0 Consequences of Design Basis Fire with Fire Protection 16.1 No consequences . . . Fire will be extinguished with manual hose lines or portable extinguishers.
| |
| 17.0 Consequences of Inadvertent or Careless Operation or Rupture of The Fire Protection System 17.1 Not applicable.
| |
| 18.0 Containing Design Basis Fire in The Fire Area/Zone 18.1 Fire detectors initiate an alarm in the control room. The control room alerts the fire brigade.
| |
| 18.2 The fire would be extinguished using hose lines and/or portable extinguishers.
| |
| 19.0 How The Redundant Safe Shutdown Equipment in The Same Area is Protected 19.1 Refer to safe shutdown requirements Table 3.2.7.58 of the report Seabrook Station Fire Protection Safe Shutdown Capability (10 CFR 50, Appendix R).
| |
| | |
| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev 6 Appendix A Section F.2 Tab 3 STATION Fire Hazard Analysis - MS-F-2B-Z Page 1 of 2 Fire Hazard Analysis - MS-F-2B-Z 1.0 Building Main Steam & Feedwater Pipe Chase (West) 2.0 Fire Area or Zone MS-F-2B-Z 2.1 Area Name Upper Level 2.2 Location El. 27-6 Drawing No 9763-F-202064-FP, - 202063-FP 3.0 Construction of Area Material Min. Fire Rating 3.1 Walls North Concrete Outside South Concrete 3 Hr.
| |
| East Concrete 3 Hr./-
| |
| West Concrete 3 Hr.
| |
| 3.2 Floor Grating -
| |
| 3.3 Ceiling Concrete Outside 3.4 Doors Metal -/3 Hr.
| |
| 3.5 Others Exposed Ceiling Beams -
| |
| 4.0 Floor Area 935 Sq. Ft. Length 66.75 Width 14 Height 40 5.0 Volume 37.400 Cu. Ft.
| |
| 6.0 Floor Drains Nuclear Non-Nuclear None X 7.0 Exhaust Ventilation System (Supply System Only) 7.1 Percentage of Systems Capacity 100%
| |
| 8.0 8 Hr. Emergency Lighting in Area Yes No X 8.1 Outside Area at Exit Points Yes No X 9.0 Operational Radioactivity 9.1 Equipment/Piping Yes No X 9.2 Airborne Yes No X 10.0 Fire Protection Type 10.1 Primary Fire Extinguisher(s) 10.2 Secondary Hose Station 10.3 Detection Beam 10.4 Other ------
| |
| 11.0 Fire Loading in Area 11.1 None X (no further analysis required)
| |
| | |
| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev 6 Appendix A Section F.2 Tab 3 STATION Fire Hazard Analysis - MS-F-2B-Z Page 2 of 2 12.0 Equipment and Systems in Fire Area/Zone Required System Train Safety For Safe Equipment System A B Related Shutdown Piping and Valves MS X X X X Cabling MS X X X X Cabling SB X X X X
| |
| | |
| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev 7 Appendix A Section F.2 Tab 3 STATION Fire Hazard Analysis - MS-F-3A-Z Page 1 of 2 Fire Hazard Analysis - MS-F-3A-Z 1.0 Building Main Steam & Feedwater Pipe Chase (East) 2.0 Fire Area or Zone MS-F-3A-Z 2.1 Area Name Electrical Room 2.2 Location South End of East - MS&FEW - El. 3-0 Drawing No 9763-F-202063-FP, - 202064-FP 3.0 Construction of Area Material Min. Fire Rating 3.1 Walls North Concrete 3 Hr.
| |
| South Concrete Outside East Concrete Outside West Concrete 3 Hr.
| |
| 3.2 Floor Concrete 3 Hr.
| |
| 3.3 Ceiling Concrete -
| |
| 3.4 Doors Metal 1 1/2 Hr.
| |
| 3.5 Others - -
| |
| 4.0 Floor Area 294 Sq. Ft. Length Varies Width 14-0 Height 17-6 5.0 Volume 5145 Cu. Ft.
| |
| 6.0 Floor Drains Nuclear Non-Nuclear None X 7.0 Exhaust Ventilation System EAH 7.1 Percentage of Systems Capacity 100%
| |
| 8.0 8 Hr. Emergency Lighting in Area Yes No X 8.1 Outside Area at Exit Points Yes No X 9.0 Operational Radioactivity 9.1 Equipment/Piping Yes No X 9.2 Airborne Yes No X 10.0 Fire Protection Type 10.1 Primary Fire Extinguisher(s) 10.2 Secondary Yard Hydrant 10.3 Detection Ionization 10.4 Other ------
| |
| 11.0 Fire Loading in Area 11.1 None X (no further analysis required)
| |
| | |
| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev 7 Appendix A Section F.2 Tab 3 STATION Fire Hazard Analysis - MS-F-3A-Z Page 2 of 2 12.0 Equipment and Systems in Fire Area/Zone System Train Safety Equipment System A B Related MSIV-Logic Cab. MS X X CP-182 MSIV-Logic Cab. MS X X CP-184 Cabling MS X X X Press. Transmitters & FW X X X Cabling Instrument Racks MM X X X IR-51A, 51B Control Panels Transf. & HT X X X Cabling
| |
| | |
| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev. 13 Appendix A Section F.2 Tab 3 STATION Fire Hazard Analysis - MS-F-3B-Z Page 1 of 3 Fire Hazard Analysis - MS-F-3B-Z 1.0 Building Main Steam & Feedwater Enclosure (West) 2.0 Fire Area or Zone MS-F-3B-Z 2.1 Area Name Personnel Hatch Area 2.2 Location Northeast of West MS&FEW - N1 12 -0 & 21 -0 Drawing No 9761-F-202063-FP 3.0 Construction of Area Material Min. Fire Rating 3.1 Walls North Concrete 3 Hr./Outside South Concrete 3 Hr.
| |
| East Concrete 3 Hr.
| |
| West Concrete Outside/-
| |
| 3.2 Floor Concrete Outside 3.3 Ceiling Concrete Outside 3.4 Doors Metal 3 Hr./
| |
| * 3.5 Others - -
| |
| 4.0 Floor Area 1,656 Sq. Ft. Length Varies Width Varies Height Varies 5.0 Volume 40,392 Cu. Ft.
| |
| 6.0 Floor Drains Nuclear Non-Nuclear X None 7.0 Exhaust Ventilation System ----
| |
| 7.1 Percentage of Systems Capacity ----
| |
| 8.0 8 Hr. Emergency Lighting in Area Yes No X 8.1 Outside Area at Exit Points Yes No X 9.0 Operational Radioactivity 9.1 Equipment/Piping Yes No X 9.2 Airborne Yes No X 10.0 Fire Protection Type 10.1 Primary Fire Extinguisher(s) 10.2 Secondary Yard Hydrant 10.3 Detection Ionization 10.4 Other ------
| |
| 11.0 Fire Loading in Area 11.1 Refer To Page 2. (Analysis continued pages 2 & 3).
| |
| Personnel Hatch
| |
| | |
| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev. 13 Appendix A Section F.2 Tab 3 STATION Fire Hazard Analysis - MS-F-3B-Z Page 2 of 3 12.0 Equipment and Systems in Fire Area/Zone System Train Safety Equipment System A B Related Cabling MS X X Cabling SB X X Cabling FW X X Cabling AS X X Cabling MSD X X 13.0 Design Base Fire 13.1 Combustible in Area (In Situ) Fire Loading in Area Oil: Gallons Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Grease: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Class A: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Charcoal: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Chemicals: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Plastics: 161 Pounds 1264 Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Resins: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Other:
| |
| 13.2 Total Fire Loading in Area: 1264 Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Total Combustibles: 2,093,000 Btu 14.0 Design-Basis Fire Description
| |
| : 1. For conservatism, the ladders are assumed to be in a vertical position. The bottom of both sets of rails are ignited and burn upward.
| |
| : 2. To add conservatism, it is assumed that the fire is self-sustaining, although the fire is not severe and has a low heat release rate.
| |
| : 3. The fire area will be limited to the length of the ladders and about 2 feet from the wall for an area covering 40 ft. x 2 ft. = 80 ft.2.
| |
| | |
| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev. 13 Appendix A Section F.2 Tab 3 STATION Fire Hazard Analysis - MS-F-3B-Z Page 3 of 3 Note: Fiberglass ladders previously stored in MS-F-3B-Z were removed per EC 156668, but retained in this fire hazard analysis to support future ladder storage in this fire zone. The plastic components typically contained in the permanent storage area located in this fire zone for a Radiation Protection workstation are not considered to contribute to the design basis fire. Refer to Calc MS-MISC-41 for details and additional discussion.
| |
| 14.1 DBF Fire Loading 18,038 Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| 14.2 Peak Zone Temperature Fire 219 °F 14.3 Duration of Fire >5 Minutes 15.0 Consequences of Design Basis Fire without Fire Protection 15.1 Refer to Seabrook Station Fire Protection of Safe Shutdown Capability (10 CFR 50, App. R).
| |
| 16.0 Consequences of Design Basis Fire with Fire Protection 16.1 No consequences. Fire will be extinguished with manual hose lines or portable extinguishers.
| |
| 17.0 Consequences of Inadvertent or Careless Operation or Rupture of Fire Protection System 17.1 Not applicable 18.0 Containing Design Basis Fire in The Fire Area/Zone 18.1 Fire detectors initiate an alarm in the control room. The control room alerts the fire brigade.
| |
| 18.2 The fire would be extinguished using hose lines and/or portable extinguishers.
| |
| 19.0 How The Redundant Safe Shutdown Equipment in The Area is Protected 19.1 Refer to Safe Shutdown Requirements Table 3.2.7.59 of the report Seabrook Station Fire Protection Safe Shutdown Capability (10 CFR 50, Appendix R).
| |
| | |
| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev 6 Appendix A Section F.2 Tab 3 STATION Fire Hazard Analysis - MS-F-4A-Z Page 1 of 2 Fire Hazard Analysis - MS-F-4A-Z 1.0 Building Mainstream & Feedwater Pipe Chase (East) 2.0 Fire Area or Zone MS-F-4A-Z 2.1 Area Name H2 Analyzer Room 2.2 Location South End of East MS & FEW - El. 22-0 Drawing No 9763-F-202063-FP & 202064-FP 3.0 Construction of Area Material Min. Fire Rating 3.1 Walls North Concrete 3 Hr.
| |
| South Concrete Outside East Concrete Outside West Concrete 3 Hr.
| |
| 3.2 Floor Concrete -
| |
| 3.3 Ceiling Concrete Outside 3.4 Doors Metal 1 1/2 Hr.
| |
| 3.5 Others - -
| |
| 4.0 Floor Area 294 Sq. Ft. Length Varies Width 14-0 Height 16-0 5.0 Volume 4,704 Cu. Ft.
| |
| 6.0 Floor Drains Nuclear Non-Nuclear None X 7.0 Exhaust Ventilation System EAH 7.1 Percentage of Systems Capacity 100%
| |
| 8.0 8 Hr. Emergency Lighting in Area Yes No X 8.1 Outside Area at Exit Points Yes No X 9.0 Operational Radioactivity 9.1 Equipment/Piping Yes No X 9.2 Airborne Yes No X 10.0 Fire Protection Type 10.1 Primary Fire Extinguisher(s) 10.2 Secondary Yard Hydrant 10.3 Detection Ionization 10.4 Other ------
| |
| 11.0 Fire Loading in Area 11.1 None X (no further analysis required)
| |
| | |
| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev 6 Appendix A Section F.2 Tab 3 STATION Fire Hazard Analysis - MS-F-4A-Z Page 2 of 2 12.0 Equipment and Systems in Fire Area/Zone System Train Safety Equipment System A B Related Fan FN-174A & B EAH X X X Cabling EAH X X X H2 Analyzer Pnl & CGC X X X Cabling Temperature Sws EAH X X X Control Panels, Transf. HT X X X Heaters & Cabling
| |
| | |
| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev 6 Appendix A Section F.2 Tab 3 STATION Fire Hazard Analysis - MS-F-5A-Z Page 1 of 2 Fire Hazard Analysis - MS-F-5A-Z 1.0 Building Main Steam & Feedwater Pipe Chase (East) 2.0 Fire Area or Zone MS-F-5A-Z 2.1 Area Name Cable Tunnel 2.2 Location Northwest of East MS & FWE - El. 8'-2" Drawing No 9763-F-202063-FP 3.0 Construction of Area Material Min. Fire Rating 3.1 Walls North Concrete Outside South Concrete 3 Hr.
| |
| East Concrete -
| |
| West Concrete 3 Hr.
| |
| 3.2 Floor Concrete Outside 3.3 Ceiling Concrete Outside/Partial 3 Hr.
| |
| 3.4 Doors Metal - /3 Hr.
| |
| 3.5 Others - -
| |
| 4.0 Floor Area 485 Sq. Ft. Length Varies Width Varies Height 12' 5.0 Volume 5,800 Cu. Ft.
| |
| 6.0 Floor Drains Nuclear Non-Nuclear X None 7.0 Exhaust Ventilation System -----
| |
| 7.1 Percentage of System's Capacity -----
| |
| 8.0 8 Hr. Emergency Lighting in Area Yes No X 8.1 Outside Area at Exit Points Yes No X 9.0 Operational Radioactivity 9.1 Equipment/Piping Yes No X 9.2 Airborne Yes No X 10.0 Fire Protection Type 10.1 Primary Fire Extinguisher(s) 10.2 Secondary Standpipe and Hose Reel 10.3 Detection Ionization 10.4 Other None 11.0 Fire Loading in Area 11.1 None X (no further analysis required)
| |
| | |
| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev 6 Appendix A Section F.2 Tab 3 STATION Fire Hazard Analysis - MS-F-5A-Z Page 2 of 2 12.0 Equipment and Systems in Fire Area/Zone Required System Train Safety For Safe Equipment System A B Related Shutdown Cabling MS X X X Cabling SW X X X Cabling SWA X X X
| |
| | |
| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev 7 Appendix A Section F.2 Tab 4 STATION Fire Hazard Analysis - RHR-F-1A-Z Page 1 of 3 Fire Hazard Analysis - RHR-F-1A-Z 1.0 Building RHR, Containment Spray, SI Equip. Vault 2.0 Fire Area or Zone RHR-F-1A-Z 2.1 Area Name Containment Spray Pump - 9b 2.2 Location Southwest El. (-) 61-0 to 25 -6 Drawing No 9763-F-805060-FP, 805078-FP 3.0 Construction of Area Material Min. Fire Rating 3.1 Walls North Concrete 3 Hr.
| |
| South Concrete Outside/3 Hr.
| |
| East Concrete/Open -
| |
| West Concrete Outside 3.2 Floor Concrete Outside 3.3 Ceiling Concrete -
| |
| 3.4 Doors Metal -
| |
| 3.5 Others Exposed Ceiling Beams -
| |
| 4.0 Floor Area 250 Sq. Ft. Length 18 Width 14 Height 84 5.0 Volume 21,200 Cu. Ft.
| |
| 6.0 Floor Drains Nuclear X Non-Nuclear None 7.0 Exhaust Ventilation System PAB Exhaust System 7.1 Percentage of Systems Capacity 100% - Recirculated 8.0 8 Hr. Emergency Lighting in Area Yes No X 8.1 Outside Area at Exit Points Yes X No 9.0 Operational Radioactivity 9.1 Equipment/Piping Yes No X 9.2 Airborne Yes No X 10.0 Fire Protection Type 10.1 Primary Fire Extinguisher(s) 10.2 Secondary Standpipe and Hose Reel 10.3 Detection Ionization 10.4 Other ------
| |
| 11.0 Fire Loading in Area 11.1 Ref. Page 2.
| |
| | |
| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev 7 Appendix A Section F.2 Tab 4 STATION Fire Hazard Analysis - RHR-F-1A-Z Page 2 of 3 12.0 Equipment and Systems in Fire Area/Zone System Train Safety Equipment System A B Related Cont. Spray Pump P-9B CBS X X Instruments & Cabling RH X X Piping, Valves & CBS X X Cabling Piping, Valves and CC X X Cabling 13.0 Design Basis Fire 13.1 Combustible in Area (In Situ) Fire Loading in Area Note: Oil Fire Oil: 5.0 Gallons 3000 Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| 7.25 Gallons (other zones)
| |
| Grease: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Class A: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Charcoal: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Chemicals: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Plastics: 5 Pounds 260 Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Resins: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Other:
| |
| 13.2 Total Fire Loading in Area: 3,260 Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Total Combustibles: 815,000 Btu
| |
| | |
| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev 7 Appendix A Section F.2 Tab 4 STATION Fire Hazard Analysis - RHR-F-1A-Z Page 3 of 3 14.0 Design-Basis Fire Description (a) Fire zones RHR-F-1AZ, RHR-F-1C-Z, RHR-F-2A-Z, and RHR-F-3A-Z constitute on large fire area as they contain open floor hatches and doors, therefore, heat of fire will be disbursed to all 4 zones.
| |
| (b) Containment spray pump ruptures and oil spills on floor covering an area of 5 ft. x 13 ft. = 65 sq. ft..
| |
| (c) The entire 5 gallons of oil in this zone will burn. In addition, because of high temperature, remote location and absence of automatic suppression system, entire oil content of RHR-F-1C-Z and RHR-F-2A-Z will burn (total of 12.5 gallons with 1,875,000 Btu as D. B. combustibles).
| |
| 14.1 DBF Fire Loading 11,719 Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| 14.2 Peak Area/ Zone Temp. During Fire 2,306 °F 14.3 Duration of Fire 41/2 Minutes 15.0 Consequences of Design Basis Fire without Fire Protection 15.1. Loss of pump and loss of cabling in conduit servicing the motor.
| |
| 15.2. Possible loss of any or all system A Train components located in RHR-F-1A-Z, RHR-F-1C-Z, RHR-F-2A-Z, and RHR-F-3A-Z.
| |
| 16.0 Consequences of Design Basis Fire with Fire Protection 16.1. Same as above as fire duration is less than five minutes, fire location is remote from control room, no automatic suppression system exists.
| |
| 17.0 Consequences of Inadvertent or Careless Operation or Rupture of Fire Protection System 17.1. Not applicable (automatic suppression system does not exist).
| |
| 18.0 Containing Design Basis Fire in the Fire Area/Zone 18.1. 3-hr. fire barrier between Train A and Train B equipment and fire duration is less than five minutes, hence fire will be contained within the zones considered.
| |
| 19.0 How the Redundant Safe Shutdown Equipment in the Area is Protected 19.1. Safe shutdown can be accomplished with the redundant train equipment located in an area separated by 3-hr. fire barriers.
| |
| | |
| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev 7 Appendix A Section F.2 Tab 4 STATION Fire Hazard Analysis - RHR-F-1B-Z Page 1 of 3 Fire Hazard Analysis - RHR-F-1B-Z 1.0 Building RHR, Containment Spray, SI Equip. Vault 2.0 Fire Area or Zone RHR-F-1B-Z 2.1 Area Name Containment Spray Pump - 9A 2.2 Location Northwest El. (-) 61-0 to 25 -6 Drawing No 9763-F-805060-FP, 805078-FP 3.0 Construction of Area Material Min. Fire Rating 3.1 Walls North Concrete Outside/3 Hr.
| |
| South Concrete 3 Hr.
| |
| East Concrete/Open -
| |
| West Concrete Outside 3.2 Floor Concrete Outside 3.3 Ceiling Concrete -
| |
| 3.4 Doors Metal -
| |
| 3.5 Others Exposed Ceiling Beams -
| |
| 4.0 Floor Area 250 Sq. Ft. Length 18 Width 14 Height 84 5.0 Volume 21,200 Cu. Ft.
| |
| 6.0 Floor Drains Nuclear X Non-Nuclear None 7.0 Exhaust Ventilation System PAB Exhaust System 7.1 Percentage of Systems Capacity 100 % - Recirculated 8.0 8 Hr. Emergency Lighting in Area Yes No X 8.1 Outside Area at Exit Points Yes X No 9.0 Operational Radioactivity 9.1 Equipment/Piping Yes No X 9.2 Airborne Yes No X 10.0 Fire Protection Type 10.1 Primary Fire Extinguisher(s) 10.2 Secondary Standpipe and Hose Reel 10.3 Detection Ionization 10.4 Other ------
| |
| 11.0 Fire Loading in Area 11.1 Ref. Page 2 of 3.
| |
| | |
| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev 7 Appendix A Section F.2 Tab 4 STATION Fire Hazard Analysis - RHR-F-1B-Z Page 2 of 3 12.0 Equipment and Systems in Fire Area/Zone System Train Safety Equipment System A B Related Cont. Spray Pump P-9A CBS X X Cabling RH X X Piping, Valves & CBS X X Cabling Piping, Valves and CC X X Cabling 13.0 Design Basis Fire 13.1 Combustible in Area (In Situ) Fire Loading in Area Note: Oil Fire Oil: 5.0 Gallons 3,000 Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Grease: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Class A: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Charcoal: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Chemicals: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Plastics: 5 Pounds 260 Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Resins: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Other:
| |
| 13.2 Total Fire Loading in Area: 3,260 Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Total Combustibles: 815,000 Btu
| |
| | |
| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev 7 Appendix A Section F.2 Tab 4 STATION Fire Hazard Analysis - RHR-F-1B-Z Page 3 of 3 14.0 Design-Basis Fire Description (A) Fire zones RHR-F-1B-Z, RHR-F-1D-Z, RHR-F-2B-Z and RHR-F-3B-Z constitute one fire area as they contain open floor hatches and doors. Therefore, heat of the fire will be disbursed to all four zones.
| |
| (B) Containment spray pump ruptures and oil spills on floor covering an area of 5 ft. x 13 ft. = 65 sq. ft.
| |
| (C) The entire 5 gallons of oil will burn. In addition, because of high temperature, remote location and absence of automatic suppression system, entire oil content of RHR-F-1D-Z and RHR-F-2B-Z will burn (total of 12.5 gallons with 1,875,000 Btu as D.B. combustibles).
| |
| 14.1 DBF Fire Loading 11,719 Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| 14.2 Peak Area/Zone Temp. During Fire 2,306 °F 14.3 Duration of Fire 4 1/2 Minutes 15.0 Consequences of Design Basis Fire without Fire Protection 15.1. Loss of pump and loss of cabling in conduit servicing the motor.
| |
| 15.2. Possible loss of any or all system B Train components located in RHR-F-1B-Z, RHR-F-1D-Z, RHR-F-2B-Z, and RHR-F-3B-Z.
| |
| 16.0 Consequences of Design Basis Fire with Fire Protection 16.1. Same as above as fire duration is less than five minutes, fire location is remote from control room, no automatic suppression system exists.
| |
| 17.0 Consequences of Inadvertent or Careless Operation or Rupture of Fire Protection System 17.1. Not applicable (automatic suppression system does not exist).
| |
| 18.0 Containing Design Basis Fire in the Fire Area/Zone 18.1. 3-hr. fire barrier between Train A and Train B equipment and fire duration is less than five minutes, hence fire will be contained within the zones considered.
| |
| 19.0 How the Redundant Safe Shutdown Equipment in the Area is Protected 19.1. Safe shutdown can be accomplished with the redundant train equipment located in an area separated by 3-hr. fire barriers.
| |
| | |
| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev 7 Appendix A Section F.2 Tab 4 STATION Fire Hazard Analysis - RHR-F-1C-Z Page 1 of 3 Fire Hazard Analysis - RHR-F-1C-Z 1.0 Building RHR, Containment Spray, SI Equip. Vault 2.0 Fire Area or Zone RHR-F-1C-Z 2.1 Area Name RHR Pump - 8B 2.2 Location South Side - El. (-) 61-0 Drawing No 9763-F-805060-FP, 805078-FP 3.0 Construction of Area Material Min. Fire Rating 3.1 Walls North Concrete 3 Hr.
| |
| South Concrete Outside East Concrete 3 Hr.
| |
| West Concrete -
| |
| 3.2 Floor Concrete Outside 3.3 Ceiling Concrete/Grating -
| |
| 3.4 Doors Metal 1 1/2 Hr.
| |
| 3.5 Others Exposed Ceiling Beams -
| |
| 4.0 Floor Area 360 Sq. Ft. Length 20 Width 18 Height 8.5 5.0 Volume 3,100 Cu. Ft.
| |
| 6.0 Floor Drains Nuclear X Non-Nuclear None 7.0 Exhaust Ventilation System PAB Exhaust System 7.1 Percentage of Systems Capacity 100%
| |
| 8.0 8 Hr. Emergency Lighting in Area Yes No X 8.1 Outside Area at Exit Points Yes X No 9.0 Operational Radioactivity 9.1 Equipment/Piping Yes X No 9.2 Airborne Yes No X 10.0 Fire Protection Type 10.1 Primary Fire Extinguisher(s) 10.2 Secondary Standpipe & Hose Reel 10.3 Detection Ionization 10.4 Other ------------
| |
| 11.0 Fire Loading in Area 11.1 Refer to page 2 (analysis continued pages 2 & 3)
| |
| | |
| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev 7 Appendix A Section F.2 Tab 4 STATION Fire Hazard Analysis - RHR-F-1C-Z Page 2 of 3 12.0 Equipment and Systems in Fire Area/Zone System Train Safety Equipment System A B Related RHR Pump P-8B RH X X Piping & Valves RH X X Piping & Valves CC X X Piping & Valves CBS X X Cabling RH X X 13.0 Design Base Fire 13.1 Combustible in Area (In Situ) Fire Loading in Area Note: Oil Fire Oil: 1.75 Gallons 729 Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Grease: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Class A: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Charcoal: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Chemicals: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Plastics: 5 Pounds 181 Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Resins: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Other:
| |
| 13.2 Total Fire Loading in Area: 910 Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Total Combustibles: 327,500 Btu
| |
| | |
| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev 7 Appendix A Section F.2 Tab 4 STATION Fire Hazard Analysis - RHR-F-1C-Z Page 3 of 3 14.0 Design-Basis Fire Description (A) Zones RHR-F-1C-Z, 2A-Z, 3A-Z and 1A-Z Constitute One Large Fire Area As They Contain Open Floor Hatches and Doors.
| |
| (B) RH pump ruptures, lube oil spills on floor, covering area of 24 sq. ft.
| |
| (C) 1.75 gallons oil ignites and is consumed. In addition, because of high temp.
| |
| remote location and absence of automatic spray system, entire oil content of RHR-F-2A-Z AND RHR-F-1A-Z will burn (total of 12.5 gallons with 1,875,000 Btu as total D.B. combustibles).
| |
| 14.1 DBF Fire Loading 11,719 Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| 14.2 Peak Temperature 2,306 °F 14.3 Duration of Fire 4 1/2 Minutes 15.0 Consequences of Design Basis Fire without Fire Protection 15.1 Loss of pump and cabling located in conduit servicing the motor.
| |
| 15.2 Possible loss of any or all system A Train components located in RHR-F-1A-Z, RHR-F-1C-Z, RHR-F-2A-Z and RHR-F-3A-Z.
| |
| 16.0 Consequences of Design Basis Fire with Fire Protection 16.1 Same as above as fire duration is less than five minutes, fire location is remote from control room, no automatic suppression system exists.
| |
| 17.0 Consequences of Inadvertent or Careless Operation or Rupture of the Fire Protection System 17.1 Not applicable (automatic suppression system does not exist).
| |
| 18.0 Containing the Design Basis Fire in the Fire Area/Zone 18.1 3-hr. fire barrier between Train A and Train B equipment and fire duration is less than five minutes, hence fire will be contained within the zones considered.
| |
| 19.0 How the Redundant Safe Shutdown Equipment in the Area is Protected 19.1 Safe shutdown can be accomplished with the redundant train equipment located in an area separated by 3-hr. fire barriers.
| |
| | |
| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev 7 Appendix A Section F.2 Tab 4 STATION Fire Hazard Analysis - RHR-F-1D-Z Page 1 of 3 Fire Hazard Analysis - RHR-F-1D-Z 1.0 Building RHR, Containment Spray, SI Equip. Vault 2.0 Fire Area or Zone RHR-F-1D-Z 2.1 Area Name RHR Pump - 8A 2.2 Location North Side - El. (-) 61-0 Drawing No 9763-F-805060-FP, 805078-FP 3.0 Construction of Area Material Min. Fire Rating 3.1 Walls North Concrete Outside South Concrete 3 Hr.
| |
| East Concrete 3 Hr.
| |
| West Concrete -
| |
| 3.2 Floor Concrete Outside 3.3 Ceiling Concrete/Grating -
| |
| 3.4 Doors Metal 11/2 Hr./-
| |
| 3.5 Others Exposed Ceiling Beams -
| |
| 4.0 Floor Area 360 Sq. Ft. Length 20 Width 18 Height 8.5 5.0 Volume 3,100 Cu. Ft.
| |
| 6.0 Floor Drains Nuclear X Non-Nuclear None 7.0 Exhaust Ventilation System PAB Exhaust System 7.1 Percentage of Systems Capacity 100%
| |
| 8.0 8 Hr. Emergency Lighting in Area Yes No X 8.1 Outside Area at Exit Points Yes X No 9.0 Operational Radioactivity 9.1 Equipment/Piping Yes X No 9.2 Airborne Yes No X 10.0 Fire Protection Type 10.1 Primary Fire Extinguisher(s) 10.2 Secondary Standpipe and Hose Reel 10.3 Detection Ionization 10.4 Other ------------
| |
| 11.0 Fire Loading in Area 11.1 Refer to Page 2 (analysis continued pages 2 & 3)
| |
| | |
| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev 7 Appendix A Section F.2 Tab 4 STATION Fire Hazard Analysis - RHR-F-1D-Z Page 2 of 3 12.0 Equipment and Systems in Fire Area/Zone System Train Safety Equipment System A B Related RHR Pump P-8A RH X X Piping & Valves RH X X Piping & Valves CC X X Piping & Valves CBS X X Cabling RH X X 13.0 Design Basis Fire 13.1 Combustible in Area (In Situ) Fire Loading in Area Note: Oil Fire Oil: 1.75 Gallons 729 Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Grease: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Class A: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Charcoal: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Chemicals: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Plastics: 5 Pounds 181 Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Resins: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Other:
| |
| 13.2 Total Fire Loading in Area: 910 Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Total Combustibles: 327,500 Btu
| |
| | |
| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev 7 Appendix A Section F.2 Tab 4 STATION Fire Hazard Analysis - RHR-F-1D-Z Page 3 of 3 14.0 Design-Basis Fire Description (A) Zones RHR-F-1D-Z, 2B-Z, 3B-Z and 1B-Z constitute one large fire area as they contain open floor hatches and doors.
| |
| (B) RH pump ruptures, lube oil spills on floor, covering area of 24 sq. ft.
| |
| (C) 1.75 gallons oil ignites and is consumed. In addition, because of high temp.
| |
| remote location and absence of automatic spray system, entire oil content of RHR-F-2B-Z AND RHR-F-1B-Z will burn (total of 12.5 gallons) with 1,875,000 Btu as D.B. combustibles.
| |
| 14.1 DBF Fire Loading 11,719 Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| 14.2 Peak Temperature 2,306 °F 14.3 Duration of Fire 4 1/2 Minutes 15.0 Consequences of Design Basis Fire without Fire Protection 15.1 Loss of pump and cabling located in conduit servicing the motor.
| |
| 15.2 Possible loss of any or all system a train components located in RHR-F-1B-Z, RHR-F-1D-Z, RHR-F-2B-Z and RHR-F-3B-Z.
| |
| 16.0 Consequences of Design Basis Fire with Fire Protection 16.1 Same as above as fire duration is less than five minutes, fire location is remote from control room, no automatic suppression system exists.
| |
| 17.0 Consequences of Inadvertent or Careless Operation or Rupture of the Fire Protection System 17.1 Not applicable (automatic suppression system does not exist).
| |
| 18.0 Containing the Design Basis Fire in the Fire Area/Zone 18.1 3-hr. fire barrier between Train A and Train B equipment and fire duration is less than five minutes, hence fire will be contained within the zones considered.
| |
| 19.0 How the Redundant Safe Shutdown Equipment in the Area is Protected 19.1 Safe shutdown can be accomplished with the redundant train equipment located in an area separated by 3-hr. fire barriers.
| |
| | |
| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev 8 Appendix A Section F.2 Tab 4 STATION Fire Hazard Analysis - RHR-F-2A-Z Page 1 of 3 Fire Hazard Analysis - RHR-F-2A-Z 1.0 Building RHR, Containment Spray, SI Equip. Vault 2.0 Fire Area or Zone RHR-F-2A-Z 2.1 Area Name Safety Injection Pump - 6B 2.2 Location South Side - El. (-) 50-0 Train B Vault (Vault #2)
| |
| Drawing No 9763-P-805060-FP, 805078-FP 3.0 Construction of Area Material Min. Fire Rating 3.1 Walls North Concrete 3 Hr.
| |
| South Concrete Outside East Concrete/Open 3 Hr.
| |
| West Concrete -
| |
| 3.2 Floor Concrete/Grating -
| |
| 3.3 Ceiling Concrete/Grating -
| |
| 3.4 Doors Metal 11/2 Hr./-
| |
| 3.5 Others Exposed Ceiling Beams -
| |
| 4.0 Floor Area 360 Sq. Ft. Length 201 Width 181 Height 15.66 5.0 Volume 5,600 Cu. Ft.
| |
| 6.0 Floor Drains Nuclear X Non-Nuclear None 7.0 Exhaust Ventilation System PAB Exhaust System 7.1 Percentage of Systems Capacity 100%
| |
| 8.0 8 Hr. Emergency Lighting in Area Yes No X 8.1 Outside Area at Exit Points Yes X No 9.0 Operational Radioactivity 9.1 Equipment/Piping Yes X No 9.2 Airborne Yes No X 10.0 Fire Protection Type 10.1 Primary Fire Extinguisher(s) 10.2 Secondary Standpipe and Hose Reel 10.3 Detection Ionization 10.4 Other ------
| |
| 11.0 Fire Loading in Area 11.1 Refer to Page 2 (analysis continued Pages 2 & 3)
| |
| | |
| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev 8 Appendix A Section F.2 Tab 4 STATION Fire Hazard Analysis - RHR-F-2A-Z Page 2 of 3 12.0 Equipment and Systems in Fire Area/Zone Required System Train Safety For Safe Equipment System A B Related Shutdown SI Pump P-6B SI X X Piping RC X X X Piping & Valves CBS X X X Piping & Valves SI X X Piping & Valves CS X X Piping & Valves CC X X X Piping & Valves RH X X X Cabling CBS X X Cabling RH X X X Cabling SI X X X Cabling CC X X 13.0 Design Base Fire (In Situ) 13.1 Combustible in Area (In Situ) Fire Loading in Area Note: Oil Fire Oil: 5.5 Gallons 2,292 Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Grease: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Class A: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Charcoal: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Chemicals: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Plastics: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Resins: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Other:
| |
| 13.2 Total Fire Loading in Area: 2,292 Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Total Combustibles: 825,000 Btu
| |
| | |
| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev 8 Appendix A Section F.2 Tab 4 STATION Fire Hazard Analysis - RHR-F-2A-Z Page 3 of 3 14.0 Design-Basis Fire Description (A) Zones RHR-F-1C-Z, 2A-Z, 3A-Z and 1A-Z constitute one large fire area as they contain open floor hatches and doors.
| |
| (B) Safety injection pump ruptures, lube oil spills on floor, covering area of 72 sq. ft.
| |
| (C) The entire 5.5 gallons of oil in this zone will burn. In addition, because of high temperature, remote location and absence of automatic spray system, entire oil content of RHR-F-1C-Z and RHR-F-1A-Z will burn (total of 12.5 gallons with 1,875 Btu as D.B. combustibles).
| |
| 14.1 DBF Fire Loading 11,719 Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| 14.2 Peak Temperature 2,306 °F 14.3 Duration of Fire 4 1/2 Minutes 15.0 Consequences of Design Basis Fire without Fire Protection 15.1 Loss of pump and cabling located in conduit servicing the motor.
| |
| 15.2 Possible loss of any or all system A Train components located in RHR-F-1A-Z, RHR-F-1C-Z, RHR-F-2A-Z, and RHR-F-3A-Z.
| |
| 16.0 Consequences of Design Basis Fire with Fire Protection 16.1 Same as above as fire duration is less than five minutes, fire location is remote from control room, no automatic suppression system exists.
| |
| 17.0 Consequences of Inadvertent or Careless Operation or Rupture of the Fire Protection System 17.1 Not applicable (automatic suppression system does not exist).
| |
| 18.0 Containing the Design Basis Fire in the Fire Area/Zone 18.1 3-hr. fire barrier between Train A and Train B equipment and fire duration is less than five minutes, hence fire will be contained within the zones considered.
| |
| 19.0 How the Redundant Safe Shutdown Equipment in the Area is Protected 19.1 Safe shutdown can be accomplished with the redundant train equipment located in an area separated by 3-hr. fire barriers.
| |
| | |
| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev 8 Appendix A Section F.2 Tab 4 STATION Fire Hazard Analysis - RHR-F-2B-Z Page 1 of 3 Fire Hazard Analysis - RHR-F-2B-Z 1.0 Building RHR, Containment Spray, SI Equip. Vault 2.0 Fire Area or Zone RHR-F-2B-Z 2.1 Area Name Safety Injection Pump - 6A 2.2 Location North Side - El. (-) 50-0 Train A Vault (Vault #1)
| |
| Drawing No 9763-F-805060-FP, 805078-FP 3.0 Construction of Area Material Min. Fire Rating 3.1 Walls North Concrete Outside South Concrete 3 Hr.
| |
| East Concrete/Open 3 Hr.
| |
| West Concrete -
| |
| 3.2 Floor Concrete/Grating -
| |
| 3.3 Ceiling Concrete/Grating -
| |
| 3.4 Doors Metal 11/2 Hr./-
| |
| 3.5 Others Exposed Ceiling Beams -
| |
| 4.0 Floor Area 360 Sq. Ft. Length 20 Width 18 Height 15.66 5.0 Volume 5.600 Cu. Ft.
| |
| 6.0 Floor Drains Nuclear X Non-Nuclear None 7.0 Exhaust Ventilation System PAB Exhaust System 7.1 Percentage of Systems Capacity 100%
| |
| 8.0 8 Hr. Emergency Lighting in Area Yes No X 8.1 Outside Area at Exit Points Yes X No 9.0 Operational Radioactivity 9.1 Equipment/Piping Yes X No 9.2 Airborne Yes No X 10.0 Fire Protection Type 10.1 Primary Fire Extinguisher(s) 10.2 Secondary Standpipe and Hose Reel 10.3 Detection Ionization 10.4 Other -----------
| |
| 11.0 Fire Loading in Area 11.1 Refer to page 2 (analysis continued pages 2 & 3)
| |
| | |
| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev 8 Appendix A Section F.2 Tab 4 STATION Fire Hazard Analysis - RHR-F-2B-Z Page 2 of 3 12.0 Equipment and Systems in Fire Area/Zone Required System Train Safety For Safe Equipment System A B Related Shutdown SI Pump P-6A SI X X Piping RC X X X Piping & Valves CBS X X X Piping & Valves SI X X Piping & Valves CS X X Piping & Valves CC X X X Piping & Valves RH X X X Cabling CBS X X Cabling RH X X X Cabling CS X X X Cabling CC X X 13.0 Design Basis Fire 13.1 Combustible in Area (In Situ) Fire Loading in Area Note: Oil Fire Oil: 5.5 Gallons 2.292 Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Grease: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Class A: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Charcoal: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Chemicals: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Plastics: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Resins: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Other:
| |
| 13.2 Total Fire Loading in Area: 2,292 Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Total Combustibles: 825,000 Btu
| |
| | |
| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev 8 Appendix A Section F.2 Tab 4 STATION Fire Hazard Analysis - RHR-F-2B-Z Page 3 of 3 14.0 Design-Basis Fire Description (A) Zones RHR-F-1D-Z, 2B-Z, 3B-Z and 1B-Z constitute one large fire area as they contain open floor hatches and doors.
| |
| (B) Safety injection pump ruptures, lube oil spills on floor, covering area of 72 sq. ft..
| |
| (C) The entire 5.5 gallons of oil in this zone will burn. In addition, because of high temperature, remote location and absence of automatic spray system, entire oil content of RHR-F-1C-Z and RHR-F-1A-Z will burn (total of 12.5 gallons oil with 1,875,000 Btu total D.B. combustibles).
| |
| 14.1 DBF Fire Loading 11,719 Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| 14.2 Peak Temperature 2,306 °F 14.3 Duration of Fire 4 1/2 Minutes 15.0 Consequences of Design Basis Fire without Fire Protection 15.1. Loss of pump and cabling located in conduit servicing the motor.
| |
| 15.2. Possible loss of any or all system B Train components located in RHR-F-1B-Z, RHR-F-1D-Z, RHR-F-2B-Z, and RHR-F-3A-Z.
| |
| 16.0 Consequences of Design Basis Fire with Fire Protection 16.1. Same as above as fire duration is less than five minutes, fire location is remote from control room, no automatic suppression system exists.
| |
| 17.0 Consequences of Inadvertent or Careless Operation or Rupture of Fire Protection System 17.1. Not applicable (automatic suppression system does not exist).
| |
| 18.0 Containing Design Basis Fire in the Fire Area/Zone 18.1. 3-hr. fire barrier between Train A and Train B equipment and fire duration is less than five minutes, hence fire will be contained within the zones considered.
| |
| 19.0 How is the Redundant Safe Shutdown Equipment in the Area Protected 19.1. Safe shutdown can be accomplished with the redundant train equipment located in an area separated by 3-hr. fire barriers.
| |
| | |
| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev 8 Appendix A Section F.2 Tab 4 STATION Fire Hazard Analysis - RHR-F-3A-Z Page 1 of 2 Fire Hazard Analysis - RHR-F-3A-Z 1.0 Building RHR, Containment Spray, SI Equip. Vault 2.0 Fire Area or Zone RHR-F-3A-Z 2.1 Area Name RHR Heat Exchanger - 9B 2.2 Location South Side El. (-) 31-10 Train B Vault (Vault #2)
| |
| Drawing No 9763-F-805060, 805078 3.0 Construction of Area Material Min. Fire Rating 3.1 Walls North Concrete Outside South Concrete 3 Hr.
| |
| East Concrete 3 Hr.
| |
| West Concrete/Open -
| |
| 3.2 Floor Concrete/Grating -
| |
| 3.3 Ceiling Concrete/Grating Outside 3.4 Doors Metal 11/2 Hr./-
| |
| 3.5 Others Exposed Ceiling Beams -
| |
| 4.0 Floor Area 360 Sq. Ft. Length 20 Width 18 Height 55 5.0 Volume 19,800 Cu. Ft.
| |
| 6.0 Floor Drains Nuclear X Non-Nuclear None 7.0 Exhaust Ventilation System PAB Exhaust System 7.1 Percentage of Systems Capacity 100%
| |
| 8.0 8 Hr. Emergency Lighting in Area Yes No X 8.1 Outside Area at Exit Points Yes X No 9.0 Operational Radioactivity 9.1 Equipment/Piping Yes X No 9.2 Airborne Yes No X 10.0 Fire Protection Type 10.1 Primary Fire Extinguisher(s) 10.2 Secondary Standpipe and Hose Reel 10.3 Detection Ionization 10.4 Other -----------
| |
| 11.0 Fire Loading in Area 11.1 None X (no further analysis required)
| |
| | |
| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev 8 Appendix A Section F.2 Tab 4 STATION Fire Hazard Analysis - RHR-F-3A-Z Page 2 of 2 12.0 Equipment and Systems in Fire Area/Zone Required System Train Safety For Safe Equipment System A B Related Shutdown Piping and Valves RH X X X Piping and Valves CC X X X RHR Heat Exchanger 9B RH X X X
| |
| | |
| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev 8 Appendix A Section F.2 Tab4 STATION Fire Hazard Analysis - RHR-F-3B-Z Page 1 of 2 Fire Hazard Analysis - RHR-F-3B-Z 1.0 Building RHR, Containment Spray, SI Equip. Vault 2.0 Fire Area or Zone RHR-F-3B-Z 2.1 Area Name RHR Heat Exchanger - 9A 2.2 Location North Side El. (-) 31-10 Train A Vault (Vault #1)
| |
| Drawing No 9763-F-805060, 805078 3.0 Construction of Area Material Min. Fire Rating 3.1 Walls North Concrete 3 Hr.
| |
| South Concrete 1 Hr.
| |
| East Concrete 3 Hr.
| |
| West Concrete/Open -
| |
| 3.2 Floor Concrete/Grating -
| |
| 3.3 Ceiling Concrete Outside 3.4 Doors Metal 11/2 Hr./-
| |
| 3.5 Others Exposed Ceiling Beams -
| |
| 4.0 Floor Area 360 Sq. Ft. Length 20 Width 18 Height 55 5.0 Volume 19,800 Cu. Ft.
| |
| 6.0 Floor Drains Nuclear X Non-Nuclear None 7.0 Exhaust Ventilation System PAB Exhaust System 7.1 Percentage of Systems Capacity 100%
| |
| 8.0 8 Hr. Emergency Lighting in Area Yes No X 8.1 Outside Area at Exit Points Yes X No 9.0 Operational Radioactivity 9.1 Equipment/Piping Yes X No 9.2 Airborne Yes No X 10.0 Fire Protection Type 10.1 Primary Fire Extinguisher(s) 10.2 Secondary Standpipe and Hose Reel 10.3 Detection Ionization 10.4 Other -----------
| |
| 11.0 Fire Loading in Area 11.1 None X (no further analysis required)
| |
| | |
| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev 8 Appendix A Section F.2 Tab4 STATION Fire Hazard Analysis - RHR-F-3B-Z Page 2 of 2 12.0 Equipment and Systems in Fire Area/Zone Required System Train Safety For Safe Equipment System A B Related Shutdown Piping and Valve RH X X X Piping and Valve CC X X X RHR Heat Exchanger 9A RH X X X
| |
| | |
| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev 6 Appendix A Section F.2 Tab 4 STATION Fire Hazard Analysis - RHR-F-4A-Z Page 1 of 3 Fire Hazard Analysis - RHR-F-4A-Z 1.0 Building RHR, Containment Spray, SI Equip. Vault 2.0 Fire Area or Zone RHR-F-4A-Z 2.1 Area Name Stairway & Manlift Area 2.2 Location South, El. (-) 61-0 Up to El. 30 -8 Drawing No 9763-F-805060-FP & 805078-FP 3.0 Construction of Area Material Min. Fire Rating 3.1 Walls North Concrete 3 Hr.
| |
| South Concrete 3 Hr.
| |
| East Concrete 3 Hr.
| |
| West Concrete 3 Hr.
| |
| 3.2 Floor Concrete Outside 3.3 Ceiling Concrete 3 Hr.
| |
| 3.4 Doors Metal 3 Hr. / 11/2 Hr.
| |
| 3.5 Others - -
| |
| 4.0 Floor Area 234 Sq. Ft. Length 18 Width 13 Height 91 5.0 Volume 21,290 Cu. Ft.
| |
| 6.0 Floor Drains Nuclear X Non-Nuclear None 7.0 Exhaust Ventilation System PAB Exhaust System 7.1 Percentage of Systems Capacity 100% - Recirculated 8.0 8 Hr. Emergency Lighting in Area Yes No X 8.1 Outside Area at Exit Points Yes No X 9.0 Operational Radioactivity 9.1 Equipment/Piping Yes No X 9.2 Airborne Yes No X 10.0 Fire Protection Type 10.1 Primary Fire Extinguisher(s) 10.2 Secondary Standpipe and Hose Reel 10.3 Detection Ionization 10.4 Other -----------
| |
| 11.0 Fire Loading in Area 11.1 Refer to pages 3 & 4 (Analysis Continued)
| |
| | |
| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev 6 Appendix A Section F.2 Tab 4 STATION Fire Hazard Analysis - RHR-F-4A-Z Page 2 of 3 12.0 Equipment and Systems in Fire Area/Zone Required System Train Safety For Safe Equipment System A B Related Shutdown Piping & Valves RH X X X Piping & Valves CBS X X X Cabling CS X X Cabling RH X X Cabling CBS X X Local Remote Shutdown RH X X X Panel 13.0 Design Basis Fire 13.1 Combustibles in Area (In Situ) Fire Loading in Area Oil: 0.79 gallons 118,800 Btu Grease: Pounds Wood 142.5 Pounds 1,140,480 Charcoal: Pounds Chemicals: Pounds Plastics: 7.5 Pounds 114,796 Resins: Pounds Other:
| |
| 13.2 Total Fire Loading in Area: 5,872 Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Total Combustibles: 1,374,076 Btu 14.0 Design Basis Fire Description (a) Oil leaks from both RHR manlift gearboxes onto top of lift cage.
| |
| (b) Fire starts and burns wood/oil and subsequently plastic of manlift.
| |
| 14.1 DBF Fire Loading 5,872 Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| 14.2 Peak Area/ Zone Temp. During Fire 340 °F 14.3 Duration of Fire 38.2 Minutes 15.0 Consequences of Design Basis Fire without Fire Protection
| |
| | |
| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev 6 Appendix A Section F.2 Tab 4 STATION Fire Hazard Analysis - RHR-F-4A-Z Page 3 of 3 15.1. Refer to Seabrook Station Fire Protection of Safe Shutdown Capability (10 CFR 50, App. R).
| |
| 16.0 Consequences of Design Basis Fire with Fire Protection 16.1. Same as 15.1, above.
| |
| 17.0 Consequences of Inadvertent or Careless Operation or Rupture of Fire Protection System 17.1. Not applicable (No water suppression in area).
| |
| 18.0 Containing Design Basis Fire in the Fire Area/Zone 18.1. Early detection from smoke detectors with alarm to control room.
| |
| 18.2 Fire Brigade hose stream use will reduce fire duration.
| |
| 18.3 Fire barriers, doors and dampers will limit fire damage to the zone.
| |
| 19.0 How is Redundant Safe Shutdown Equipment in the Area Protected 19.1. Refer to Seabrook Station Fire Protection of Safe Shutdown Capability (10 CFR 50, App. R).
| |
| | |
| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev 6 Appendix A Section F.2 Tab 4 STATION Fire Hazard Analysis - RHR-F-4B-Z Page 1 of 3 Fire Hazard Analysis - RHR-F-4B-Z 1.0 Building RHR, Containment Spray, SI Equip. Vault 2.0 Fire Area or Zone RHR-F-4B-Z 2.1 Area Name Stairway & Hatch Area 2.2 Location North El. (-) 61'-0" Up to El. 30' -8" Drawing No 9763-F-805060-FP 3.0 Construction of Area Material Min. Fire Rating 3.1 Walls North Concrete 3 Hr.
| |
| South Concrete 3 Hr.
| |
| East Concrete 3 Hr.
| |
| West Concrete 3 Hr.
| |
| 3.2 Floor Concrete Outside 3.3 Ceiling Concrete 3 Hr.
| |
| 3.4 Doors Metal 3 Hr. / 11/2 Hr.
| |
| 3.5 Others - -
| |
| 4.0 Floor Area 234 Sq. Ft. Length 18' Width 13' Height 91' 5.0 Volume 21,290 Cu. Ft.
| |
| 6.0 Floor Drains Nuclear X Non-Nuclear None 7.0 Exhaust Ventilation System PAB Exhaust System 7.1 Percentage of System's Capacity 100% - Recirculated 8.0 8 Hr. Emergency Lighting in Area Yes No X 8.1 Outside Area at Exit Points Yes No X 9.0 Operational Radioactivity 9.1 Equipment/Piping Yes X No 9.2 Airborne Yes X No 10.0 Fire Protection Type 10.1 Primary Fire Extinguisher(s) 10.2 Secondary Standpipe and Hose Reel 10.3 Detection Ionization 10.4 Other -----------
| |
| 11.0 Fire Loading in Area 11.1 Refer to page 2 of 3
| |
| | |
| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev 6 Appendix A Section F.2 Tab 4 STATION Fire Hazard Analysis - RHR-F-4B-Z Page 2 of 3 12.0 Equipment and Systems in Fire Area/Zone Required System Train Safety For Safe Equipment System A B Related Shutdown Piping & Valves RH X X X Piping & Valves CBS X X X Cabling CBS X X Cabling CC X X Cabling CS X X X Cabling RH X X Local Remote Shutdown RH X X Panel 13.0 Design Basis Fire 13.1 Combustible in Area (In Situ) Fire Loading in Area Note: Oil Fire Oil: 0.79 Gallons 118,800 Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Grease: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Wood 142.5 Pounds 1,140,480 Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Charcoal: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Chemicals: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Plastics: 7.5 Pounds 114,796 Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Resins: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Other:
| |
| 13.2 Total Fire Loading in Area: 5,872 Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Total Combustibles: 1,374,076 Btu
| |
| | |
| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev 6 Appendix A Section F.2 Tab 4 STATION Fire Hazard Analysis - RHR-F-4B-Z Page 3 of 3 14.0 Design-Basis Fire Description (a) Oil leaks from both RHR manlift gearboxes onto top of liftcage (b) Fire starts and burns wood/oil and subsequently plastic of manlift.
| |
| 14.1 DBF Fire Loading 5,872 Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| 14.2 Peak Area/ Zone Temp. During Fire 340 °F 14.3 Duration of Fire 38.2 Minutes 15.0 Consequences of Design Basis Fire without Fire Protection 15.1. Refer to Seabrook Station Fire Protection of Safe Shutdown Capability (10 CFR 50, App. R).
| |
| 16.0 Consequences of Design Basis Fire with Fire Protection 16.1. Same as 15.1, above.
| |
| 17.0 Consequences of Inadvertent or Careless Operation or Rupture of Fire Protection System 17.1. Not applicable (No water suppression in area).
| |
| 18.0 Containing Design Basis Fire in the Fire Area/Zone 18.1. Early detection from smoke detectors with alarm to control room.
| |
| 18.2 Fire Brigade hose stream use will reduce fire duration.
| |
| 18.3 Fire barriers, doors and dampers will limit fire damage to the zone.
| |
| 19.0 How the Redundant Safe Shutdown Equipment in the Area is Protected 19.1. Refer to Seabrook Station Fire Protection of Safe Shutdown Capability (10 CFR 50, App. R).
| |
| | |
| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev. 16 Appendix A Section F.2 Tab 5 STATION Fire Hazard Analysis - CB-F-1A-A Page 1 of 5 Fire Hazard Analysis - CB-F-1A-A 1.0 Building Control Building 2.0 Fire Area or Zone CB-F-1A-A 2.1 Area Name Switchgear Room "A" 2.2 Location El. 21'-6" Drawing No 9763-F-310431-FP, 310455-FP 3.0 Construction of Area Material Min. Fire Rating 3.1 Walls North Concrete 3 Hr.
| |
| * South MCG/Concrete 3 Hr.
| |
| East Concrete 3 Hr.
| |
| West MCG/Concrete 3 Hr.
| |
| 3.2 Floor Concrete 3 Hr.
| |
| 3.3 Ceiling Concrete 3 Hr.
| |
| 3.4 Doors Metal 3 Hr.
| |
| 3.5 Others Fireproofed Ceiling Beams 3 Hr.
| |
| 4.0 Floor Area 2,450 Sq. Ft. Length 58' Width 42' Height 27.5' 5.0 Volume 67,400 Cu. Ft.
| |
| 6.0 Floor Drains Nuclear Non-Nuclear None X 7.0 Exhaust Ventilation System Switchgear Exhaust 7.1 Percentage of System's Capacity 100%
| |
| 8.0 8 Hr. Emergency Lighting in Area Yes X No 8.1 Outside Area at Exit Points Yes X No 9.0 Operational Radioactivity 9.1 Equipment/Piping Yes No X 9.2 Airborne Yes No X 10.0 Fire Protection Type 10.1 Primary Fire Extinguisher(s) 10.2 Secondary Standpipe and Hose Reel 10.3 Detection Ionization 10.4 Other Yard Hydrant 11.0 Fire Loading in Area 11.1 Refer to page 4 (analysis continued pages 2 - 5)
| |
| Door C-100 is Not 3 Hr. Fire Rated. Ref. Deviation No. 5, Sbn-904 Dated Dec. 2, 1985.
| |
| | |
| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev. 16 Appendix A Section F.2 Tab 5 STATION Fire Hazard Analysis - CB-F-1A-A Page 2 of 5 12.0 Equipment and Systems in Fire Area/Zone Required System Train Safety For Safe Equipment System A B Related Shutdown 4Kv-SWGR-E5 EDE X X 480v-Subst. E51, E52, EDE X X E53 460v-MCC-E512, E515, EDE X X E521, E522, E531, 231 120v-AC Distr Pnls EDE X X 125v-DC SWGR 11A, EDE X X 11C 125v-DC Distr Pnls EDE X X Battery Chargers BC-1A, EDE X X BC - 1C Remote Shutdown Panel MM X X CP-108A Emerg. Pwr. Sequen. DG X X CP-79 UPS I-1A, I-1C, I-1E EDE X X Cabling & Controls CAH X Cabling & Controls CBA X X Cabling & Controls CC X X Cabling & Controls CS X X Cabling DAH X X X Cabling DG X X X
| |
| | |
| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev. 16 Appendix A Section F.2 Tab 5 STATION Fire Hazard Analysis - CB-F-1A-A Page 3 of 5 12.0 Equipment and Systems in Fire Area/Zone Required System Train Safety For Safe Equipment System A B Related Shutdown Cabling EAH X X X Cabling EDE X X X Cabling EPA X X X Cabling FW X X X Cabling MS X X X Cabling NI X X X Cabling PAH X X X Cabling RC X X X Cabling RH X X X Cabling SI X X X Cabling SWA X X X 125v-DC-SWGR 11A EDE X X X Cabling & Controls SWA X X Cabling CAP X X Instruments & Cabling CBS X X Cabling & Controls CGC X X Cabling COP X X Cabling CP X X Cabling FAH X X Cabling MSD X X
| |
| | |
| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev. 16 Appendix A Section F.2 Tab 5 STATION Fire Hazard Analysis - CB-F-1A-A Page 4 of 5 12.0 Equipment and Systems in Fire Area/Zone Required System Train Safety For Safe Equipment System A B Related Shutdown Cabling NG X X Cabling RM X X Cabling RMW X X Cabling SB X X Cabling & Controls SF X X Cabling SS X X Cabling & Controls SW X X Cabling VG X X Cabling WLD X X Cabling SA X 460v-MCC-111, 231 ED X X Cabling CAH X X 13.0 Design Base Fire 13.1 Combustible in Area (In Situ) Fire Loading in Area Note:
| |
| Oil: 1 Gallons 62 Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Grease: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Class A: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Charcoal: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Chemicals: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Plastics: 88 Pounds 467 Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Resins: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Other:
| |
| 13.2 Total Fire Loading in Area: 529 Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Total Combustibles: 1,294,000 Btu
| |
| | |
| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev. 16 Appendix A Section F.2 Tab 5 STATION Fire Hazard Analysis - CB-F-1A-A Page 5 of 5 14.0 Design-Basis Fire Description
| |
| : 1. For CB-1-F-1A-A, the entire quantity of oil will be assumed to spill on the floor, as this result in the most limiting fire. In the absence of any curbs or other restrictions, it will spread to a thickness of 1/8" over an area equal to:
| |
| 1 gal* (ft3/7.4805 gal)*(1/0.125in)*(12in/1ft) = 12.8ft2
| |
| : 2. The ladders are assumed to be not part of the DBF because the plastic will only be assumed to ignite if they meet a temperature of greater than 750°F.
| |
| 14.1 DBF Fire Loading 11,719 Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| 14.2 Peak Zone Temperature Fire 252.8 °F 14.3 Duration of Fire 4.5 Minutes 15.0 Consequences of Design Basis Fire without Fire Protection 15.1 Refer to Seabrook Station Fire Protection Safe Shutdown I Capability (10 CFR 50, Appendix R).
| |
| 16.0 Consequences of Design Basis Fire with Fire Protection 16.1 No consequences. Fire will be extinguished with portable extinguishers.
| |
| 17.0 Consequences of Inadvertent or Careless Operation or Rupture of Fire Protection System 17.1 Not applicable 18.0 Containing Design Basis Fire in the Fire Area/Zone 18.1 Fire detectors initiate an alarm in the control room. The control room alerts the fire brigade.
| |
| 18.2 The fire would be extinguished using hose lines and/or portable extinguishers.
| |
| 19.0 How the Redundant Safe Shutdown Equipment in the Area is Protected 19.1 Refer to Seabrook Station Fire Protection Safe Shutdown Capability (10 CFR 50, Appendix R).
| |
| | |
| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev. 16 Appendix A Section F.2 Tab 5 STATION Fire Hazard Analysis - CB-F-1B-A Page 1 of 5 Fire Hazard Analysis - CB-F-1B-A 1.0 Building Control Building 2.0 Fire Area or Zone CB-F-1B-A 2.1 Area Name Switchgear Room "B" 2.2 Location El. 21'-6" Drawing No 9763-F-310431-FP 3.0 Construction of Area Material Min. Fire Rating 3.1 Walls North MCG/Concrete 3 Hr.
| |
| South Concrete Outside Wall/3 Hr.
| |
| East Concrete 3 Hr.
| |
| West Concrete/MCG 3 Hr.
| |
| 3.2 Floor Concrete 3 Hr.
| |
| 3.3 Ceiling Concrete 3 Hr.
| |
| 3.4 Doors Metal 3 Hr./11/2 Hr.(Stairs) 3.5 Others Fireproofed Ceiling Beams 3 Hr.
| |
| 4.0 Floor Area 2,450 Sq. Ft. Length 58' Width 42' Height 27.5' 5.0 Volume 67,400 Cu. Ft.
| |
| 6.0 Floor Drains Nuclear Non-Nuclear None X 7.0 Exhaust Ventilation System Switchgear Exhaust 7.1 Percentage of System's Capacity 100%
| |
| 8.0 8 Hr. Emergency Lighting in Area Yes X No 8.1 Outside Area at Exit Points Yes X No 9.0 Operational Radioactivity 9.1 Equipment/Piping Yes No X 9.2 Airborne Yes No X 10.0 Fire Protection Type 10.1 Primary Fire Extinguisher(s) 10.2 Secondary Standpipe and Hose Reel 10.3 Detection Ionization 10.4 Other ------
| |
| 11.0 Fire Loading in Area 11.1 Refer to page 4
| |
| | |
| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev. 16 Appendix A Section F.2 Tab 5 STATION Fire Hazard Analysis - CB-F-1B-A Page 2 of 5 12.0 Equipment and Systems in Fire Area/Zone Required System Train Safety For Safe Equipment System A B Related Shutdown 4kv-Swgr-E6 EDE X X 480v-Subst. E61, E62, EDE X X E63 460v-MCC-E612, E615, EDE X X E621, E622, E631 120v-Ac Distr Pnls EDE X X 125v-DC Swgr 11B, 11D EDE X X 125v-DC Distr Pnls EDE X X Battery Chargers BC-1B, EDE X X BC - 1D Remote Shutdown Panel EDE X X CP-108b Emerg. Pwr. Sequen. EDE X X CP-80 UPS I-1B, I-1D, I-1F EDE X X Cabling & Controls CAH X Cabling & Controls CBA X X Cabling & Controls CC X X Cabling & Controls CS X X 125-DC-SWGR 11B EDE X X X 125v-DC-SWG 11D EDE X X X 120v-AC V Distr. 11F EDE X X X 125v-DC Distr. 112B EDE X X X 125v-DC Distr.111D EDE X X X 480-120v Xfmr 31F EDE X X X Aux Relay Panel GN 0 EDE X X X UPS I-1F EDE X X X
| |
| | |
| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev. 16 Appendix A Section F.2 Tab 5 STATION Fire Hazard Analysis - CB-F-1B-A Page 3 of 5 12.0 Equipment and Systems in Fire Area/Zone Required System Train Safety For Safe Equipment System A B Related Shutdown Battery Charger BC-1B EDE X X X Battery Charger BC-1D EDE X X X Fuse Box CP-228 EDE X X X Instrumentation & CBS X X Cabling Cabling & Controls CGC X X Cabling COP X X Cabling CP X X Cabling PAH X X Cabling MSD X X Cabling NG X X Cabling RW X X Cabling RMW X X Cabling SB X X Cabling & Controls SF X X Cabling SS X X Cabling & Controls SW X X Cabling VG X X Cabling WLD X X Cabling SA X Msiv, Logic Cabinets MS X X CP-183, CP-185 Fuse Cabinets EDE X X Cabling CAH X X
| |
| | |
| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev. 16 Appendix A Section F.2 Tab 5 STATION Fire Hazard Analysis - CB-F-1B-A Page 4 of 5 13.0 Design Base Fire 13.1 Combustible in Area (In Situ) Fire Loading in Area Note:
| |
| Oil: 1 Gallons 62 Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Grease: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Class A: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Charcoal: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Chemicals: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Plastics: 88 Pounds 467 Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Resins: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Other: 54 Pounds 231 Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| (non IEEE-383 Cable) 13.2 Total Fire Loading in Area: 760 Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Total Combustibles: 1,861,000 Btu 14.0 Design-Basis Fire Description
| |
| : 1. For CB-F-1B-A, the combustible content of non IEEE-383 qualified cable (cable dolly) is assumed to burn as this is the most limiting fire. Fire loads in CB-F-1B-A are sufficiently separated that they do not need to be considered in the same design basis fire scenario. As shown on drawing EC285783-C-001, the cable is stored in the east of the CB-F-1B-A, whereas the circuit breaker racking tool is installed in the west side of the room (ref. SKM-07160-1000). The cable burns uniformly across its length (burn area = dL = 75.8 ft2). The cable burns over an area of approximately 4 ft2, assuming a 2 ft by 2 ft footprint.
| |
| : 2. The ladders are assumed to be not part of the DBF because the plastic will only be assumed to ignite if they meet a temperature of greater than 750°F.
| |
| 14.1 DBF Fire Loading 141,750 Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| 14.2 Peak Zone Temperature Fire 678 °F 14.3 Duration of Fire 7.3 Minutes 15.0 Consequences of Design Basis Fire without Fire Protection 15.1 Refer to Seabrook Station Fire Protection Safe Shutdown I Capability (10 CFR 50, Appendix R).
| |
| 16.0 Consequences of Design Basis Fire with Fire Protection 16.1 No consequences. Fire will be extinguished with portable extinguishers.
| |
| | |
| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev. 16 Appendix A Section F.2 Tab 5 STATION Fire Hazard Analysis - CB-F-1B-A Page 5 of 5 17.0 Consequences of Inadvertent or Careless Operation or Rupture of Fire Protection System 17.1 Not applicable 18.0 Containing Design Basis Fire in the Fire Area/Zone 18.1 Early warning detectors alarm in the Control Room and alert the Fire Brigade:
| |
| 18.2 Fire would be limited to cable dolly and the fire extinguished using hose lines and portable extinguishers.
| |
| 19.0 How the Redundant Safe Shutdown Equipment in the Area is Protected 19.1 Refer to Seabrook Station Fire Protection Safe Shutdown Capability (10 CFR 50, Appendix R).
| |
| | |
| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev. 6 Appendix A Section F.2 Tab 5 STATION Fire Hazard Analysis - CB-F-1D-A Page 1 of 3 Fire Hazard Analysis - CB-F-1D-A 1.0 Building Control Building 2.0 Fire Area or Zone CB-F-1D-A 2.1 Area Name Battery Room "A" 2.2 Location El. 21'-6" Drawing No 9763-F-310431-FP 3.0 Construction of Area Material Min. Fire Rating 3.1 Walls North Concrete 3 Hr.
| |
| South Concrete 3 Hr.
| |
| East Concrete 3 Hr.
| |
| West Concrete 3 Hr.
| |
| 3.2 Floor Concrete 3 Hr.
| |
| 3.3 Ceiling Concrete 3 Hr.
| |
| 3.4 Doors Metal 3 Hr.
| |
| 3.5 Others - -
| |
| 4.0 Floor Area 330 Sq. Ft. Length 22' Width 151' Height 9.5' 5.0 Volume 3,100 Cu. Ft.
| |
| 6.0 Floor Drains Nuclear Non-Nuclear X None 7.0 Exhaust Ventilation System Battery Room Exhaust 7.1 Percentage of System's Capacity 100%
| |
| 8.0 8 Hr. Emergency Lighting in Area Yes No X 8.1 Outside Area at Exit Points Yes X No 9.0 Operational Radioactivity 9.1 Equipment/Piping Yes No X 9.2 Airborne Yes No X 10.0 Fire Protection Type 10.1 Primary Fire Extinguisher(s) 10.2 Secondary Standpipe and Hose Reel 10.3 Detection Ionization 10.4 Other ------
| |
| 11.0 Fire Loading in Area 11.1 Refer to page 3. (analysis continued pages 2 & 3)
| |
| | |
| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev. 6 Appendix A Section F.2 Tab 5 STATION Fire Hazard Analysis - CB-F-1D-A Page 2 of 3 12.0 Equipment and Systems in Fire Area/Zone System Train Safety Equipment System A B Related Battery A EDE X X Cabling EDE X X 13.0 Design Base Fire 13.1 Combustible in Area (In Situ) Fire Loading in Area Oil: Gallons Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Grease: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Class A: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Charcoal: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Chemicals: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Plastics: 944 Pounds 46,069 Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Resins: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Other:
| |
| 13.2 Total Fire Loading in Area: 46,069 Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Total Combustibles: 15,202,766 Btu 14.0 Design-Basis Fire Description (A) All of the plastic battery jars and covers would be engulfed in a fire.
| |
| (b) The electrolyte was not added to the jars as they were dry and subject to being burned.
| |
| (c) Fire burns without ventilation air as supply and exhaust air duct fire dampers isolate the subject battery room.
| |
| 14.1 DBF Fire Loading 1,464 Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| 14.2 Peak Temperature 690 °F 14.3 Duration of Fire 4 1/2 Minutes 15.0 Consequences of Design Basis Fire without Fire Protection 15.1 Loss of battery use due to jar destruction.
| |
| 15.2 Safe shutdown can be accomplished with use of the redundant battery train.
| |
| | |
| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev. 6 Appendix A Section F.2 Tab 5 STATION Fire Hazard Analysis - CB-F-1D-A Page 3 of 3 16.0 Consequences of Design Basis Fire with Fire Protection 16.1 Loss of battery use due to jar destruction.
| |
| 16.2 Safe shutdown can be accomplished with use of the redundant battery train.
| |
| 17.0 Consequences of Inadvertent or Careless Operation or Rupture of Fire Protection System 17.1 Not applicable 18.0 Containing Design Basis Fire in the Fire Area/Zone 18.1 Duration of the fire is short, therefore the 3 hour partitions will prevent the spread to adjacent areas.
| |
| 18.2 Fire dampers will prevent the spread of fire from the area.
| |
| 19.0 How the Redundant Safe Shutdown Equipment in the Area is Protected 19.1 Not applicable.
| |
| | |
| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev. 6 Appendix A Section F.2 Tab 5 STATION Fire Hazard Analysis - CB-F-1E-A Page 1 of 3 Fire Hazard Analysis - CB-F-1E-A 1.0 Building Control Building 2.0 Fire Area or Zone CB-F-1E-A 2.1 Area Name Battery Room "C" 2.2 Location El. 21'-6" Drawing No 9763-F-310431-FP 3.0 Construction of Area Material Min. Fire Rating 3.1 Walls North Concrete 3 Hr.
| |
| South Concrete 3 Hr.
| |
| East Concrete 3 Hr.
| |
| West Concrete 3 Hr.
| |
| 3.2 Floor Concrete 3 Hr.
| |
| 3.3 Ceiling Concrete 3 Hr.
| |
| 3.4 Doors Metal 3 Hr.
| |
| 3.5 Others - -
| |
| 4.0 Floor Area 330 Sq. Ft. Length 22' Width 15' Height 9.5' 5.0 Volume 3,100 Cu. Ft.
| |
| 6.0 Floor Drains Nuclear Non-Nuclear X None 7.0 Exhaust Ventilation System Battery Room Exhaust 7.1 Percentage of System's Capacity 100%
| |
| 8.0 8 Hr. Emergency Lighting in Area Yes No X 8.1 Outside Area at Exit Points Yes X No 9.0 Operational Radioactivity 9.1 Equipment/Piping Yes No X 9.2 Airborne Yes No X 10.0 Fire Protection Type 10.1 Primary Fire Extinguisher(s) 10.2 Secondary Standpipe and Hose Reel 10.3 Detection Ionization 10.4 Other ------
| |
| 11.0 Fire Loading in Area 11.1 Refer to page 2 (analysis continued pages 2 & 3)
| |
| | |
| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev. 6 Appendix A Section F.2 Tab 5 STATION Fire Hazard Analysis - CB-F-1E-A Page 2 of 3 12.0 Equipment and Systems in Fire Area/Zone System Train Safety Equipment System A B Related Battery C EDE X X Cabling EDE X X 13.0 Design Base Fire 13.1 Combustible in Area (In Situ) Fire Loading in Area Note:
| |
| Oil: Gallons Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Grease: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Class A: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Charcoal: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Chemicals: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Plastics: 944 Pounds 46,069 Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Resins: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Other:
| |
| 13.2 Total Fire Loading in Area: 46,069 Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Total Combustibles: 15,202,766 Btu 14.0 Design-Basis Fire Description (A) All of the plastic battery jars and covers would be engulfed in a fire.
| |
| (B) The electrolyte was not added to the jars as they were dry and subject to being burned.
| |
| © Fire burns without ventilation air as supply and exhaust air duct fire dampers isolate the subject battery room.
| |
| 14.1 DBF Fire Loading 1,464 Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| 14.2 Peak Zone Temperature Fire 690 °F 14.3 Duration of Fire 4 1/2 Minutes 15.0 Consequences of Design Basis Fire without Fire Protection 15.1 Loss of battery use due to jar destruction.
| |
| 15.2 Safe shutdown can be accomplished with use of the redundant battery train.
| |
| | |
| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev. 6 Appendix A Section F.2 Tab 5 STATION Fire Hazard Analysis - CB-F-1E-A Page 3 of 3 16.0 Consequences of Design Basis Fire with Fire Protection 16.1 Loss of battery use due to jar destruction.
| |
| 16.2 Safe shutdown can be accomplished with use of the redundant battery train.
| |
| 17.0 Consequences of Inadvertent or Careless Operation or Rupture of Fire Protection System 17.1 Not applicable 18.0 Containing Design Basis Fire in the Fire Area/Zone 18.1 Duration of the fire is short, therefore the 3 hour partitions will prevent the spread to adjacent areas.
| |
| 18.2 Fire dampers will prevent the spread of fire from the area.
| |
| 19.0 How the Redundant Safe Shutdown Equipment in the Area is Protected 19.1 Not applicable.
| |
| | |
| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev. 6 Appendix A Section F.2 Tab 5 STATION Fire Hazard Analysis - CB-F-1F-A Page 1 of 3 Fire Hazard Analysis - CB-F-1F-A 1.0 Building Control Building 2.0 Fire Area or Zone CB-F-1F-A 2.1 Area Name Battery Room "B" 2.2 Location El. 21'-6" Drawing No 9763-F-310431-FP 3.0 Construction of Area Material Min. Fire Rating 3.1 Walls North Concrete 3 Hr.
| |
| South Concrete 3 Hr.
| |
| East Concrete 3 Hr.
| |
| West Concrete 3 Hr.
| |
| 3.2 Floor Concrete 3 Hr.
| |
| 3.3 Ceiling Concrete 3 Hr.
| |
| 3.4 Doors Metal 3 Hr.
| |
| 3.5 Others - -
| |
| 4.0 Floor Area 300 Sq. Ft. Length 22' Width 15' Height 9.5' 5.0 Volume 3,100 Cu. Ft.
| |
| 6.0 Floor Drains Nuclear Non-Nuclear X None 7.0 Exhaust Ventilation System Battery Room Exhaust 7.1 Percentage of System's Capacity 100%
| |
| 8.0 8 Hr. Emergency Lighting in Area Yes No X 8.1 Outside Area at Exit Points Yes X No 9.0 Operational Radioactivity 9.1 Equipment/Piping Yes No X 9.2 Airborne Yes No X 10.0 Fire Protection Type 10.1 Primary Fire Extinguisher(s) 10.2 Secondary Standpipe and Hose Reel 10.3 Detection Ionization 10.4 Other ------
| |
| 11.0 Fire Loading in Area 11.1 Refer to page 2. (analysis continued pages 2 & 3)
| |
| | |
| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev. 6 Appendix A Section F.2 Tab 5 STATION Fire Hazard Analysis - CB-F-1F-A Page 2 of 3 12.0 Equipment and Systems in Fire Area/Zone System Train Safety Equipment System A B Related Battery B EDE X X Cabling EDE X X 13.0 Design Base Fire 13.1 Combustible in Area (In Situ) Fire Loading in Area Oil: Gallons Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Grease: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Class A: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Charcoal: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Chemicals: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Plastics: 944 Pounds 46,069 Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Resins: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Other:
| |
| 13.2 Total Fire Loading in Area: 46,069 Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Total Combustibles: 15,202,766 Btu 14.0 Design-Basis Fire Description (a) All of the plastic battery jars and covers would be engulfed in a fire.
| |
| (b) The electrolyte was not added to the jars as they were dry and subject to being burned.
| |
| © Fire burns without ventilation air as supply and exhaust air duct fire dampers isolate the subject battery room.
| |
| 14.1 DBF Fire Loading 1,464 Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| 14.2 Peak Zone Temperature Fire 690 °F 14.3 Duration of Fire 4 1/2 Minutes
| |
| | |
| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev. 6 Appendix A Section F.2 Tab 5 STATION Fire Hazard Analysis - CB-F-1F-A Page 3 of 3 15.0 Consequences of Design Basis Fire without Fire Protection 15.1 Loss of battery use due to jar destruction.
| |
| 15.2 Safe shutdown can be accomplished with use of the redundant battery train.
| |
| 16.0 Consequences of Design Basis Fire with Fire Protection 16.1 Loss of battery use due to jar destruction.
| |
| 16.2 Safe shutdown can be accomplished with use of the redundant battery train.
| |
| 17.0 Consequences of Inadvertent or Careless Operation or Rupture of Fire Protection System 17.1 Not applicable 18.0 Containing Design Basis Fire in the Fire Area/Zone 18.1 Duration of the fire is short, therefore the 3 hour partitions will prevent the spread to adjacent areas.
| |
| 18.2 Fire dampers will prevent the spread of fire from the area.
| |
| 19.0 How the Redundant Safe Shutdown Equipment in the Area is Protected 19.1 Not applicable.
| |
| | |
| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev. 6 Appendix A Section F.2 Tab 5 STATION Fire Hazard Analysis - CB-F-1G-A Page 1 of 3 Fire Hazard Analysis - CB-F-1G-A 1.0 Building Control Building 2.0 Fire Area or Zone CB-F-1G-A 2.1 Area Name Battery Room "D" 2.2 Location El. 21'-6" Drawing No 9763-F-310431-FP 3.0 Construction of Area Material Min. Fire Rating 3.1 Walls North Concrete 3 Hr.
| |
| South Concrete 3 Hr.
| |
| East Concrete 3 Hr.
| |
| West Concrete 3 Hr.
| |
| 3.2 Floor Concrete 3 Hr.
| |
| 3.3 Ceiling Concrete 3 Hr.
| |
| 3.4 Doors Metal 3 Hr.
| |
| 3.5 Others - -
| |
| 4.0 Floor Area 330 Sq. Ft. Length 22' Width 151' Height 9.5' 5.0 Volume 3,100 Cu. Ft.
| |
| 6.0 Floor Drains Nuclear Non-Nuclear X None 7.0 Exhaust Ventilation System Battery Room Exhaust 7.1 Percentage of System's Capacity 100%
| |
| 8.0 8 Hr. Emergency Lighting in Area Yes No X 8.1 Outside Area at Exit Points Yes X No 9.0 Operational Radioactivity 9.1 Equipment/Piping Yes No X 9.2 Airborne Yes No X 10.0 Fire Protection Type 10.1 Primary Fire Extinguisher(s) 10.2 Secondary Standpipe and Hose Reel 10.3 Detection Ionization 10.4 Other ------
| |
| 11.0 Fire Loading in Area 11.1 Refer to page 2. (analysis continued pages 2 & 3)
| |
| | |
| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev. 6 Appendix A Section F.2 Tab 5 STATION Fire Hazard Analysis - CB-F-1G-A Page 2 of 3 12.0 Equipment and Systems in Fire Area/Zone System Train Safety Equipment System A B Related Battery D EDE X X Cabling EDE X X 13.0 Design Base Fire 13.1 Combustible in Area (In Situ) Fire Loading in Area Note:
| |
| Oil: Gallons Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Grease: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Class A: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Charcoal: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Chemicals: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Plastics: 944 Pounds 46,069 Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Resins: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Other:
| |
| 13.2 Total Fire Loading in Area: 46,069 Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Total Combustibles: 15,202,766 Btu 14.0 Design-Basis Fire Description (A) All of the plastic battery jars and covers would be engulfed in a fire.
| |
| (B) The electrolyte was not added to the jars as they were dry and subject to being burned.
| |
| © Fire burns without ventilation air as supply and exhaust air duct fire dampers isolate the subject battery room.
| |
| 14.1 DBF Fire Loading 1,464 Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| 14.2 Peak Zone Temperature Fire 690 °F 14.3 Duration of Fire 4 1/2 Minutes 15.0 Consequences of Design Basis Fire without Fire Protection 15.1 Loss of battery use due to jar destruction.
| |
| 15.2 Safe shutdown can be accomplished with use of the redundant battery train.
| |
| | |
| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev. 6 Appendix A Section F.2 Tab 5 STATION Fire Hazard Analysis - CB-F-1G-A Page 3 of 3 16.0 Consequences of Design Basis Fire with Fire Protection 16.1 Loss of battery use due to jar destruction.
| |
| 16.2 Safe shutdown can be accomplished with use of the redundant battery train.
| |
| 17.0 Consequences of Inadvertent or Careless Operation or Rupture of Fire Protection System 17.1 Not applicable 18.0 Containing Design Basis Fire in the Fire Area/Zone 18.1 Duration of the fire is short, therefore the 3 hour partitions will prevent the spread to adjacent areas.
| |
| 18.2 Fire dampers will prevent the spread of fire from the area.
| |
| 19.0 How the Redundant Safe Shutdown Equipment in the Area is Protected 19.1 Not applicable.
| |
| | |
| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev. 8 Appendix A Section F.2 Tab 5 STATION Fire Hazard Analysis - CB-F-2A-A Page 1 of 3 Fire Hazard Analysis - CB-F-2A-A 1.0 Building Control Building 2.0 Fire Area or Zone CB-F-2A-A 2.1 Area Name Cable Spreading Room 2.2 Location El. 50'-0" Drawing No 9763-F-310452-FP, 310461-FP 3.0 Construction of Area Material Min. Fire Rating 3.1 Walls North Concrete 3 Hr./Outside Wall South Concrete 3 Hr./Outside Wall East Concrete Outside Wall West Metal 3 Hr.
| |
| 3.2 Floor Concrete 3 Hr.
| |
| 3.3 Ceiling Concrete 3 Hr.
| |
| 3.4 Doors Metal 1 1/2 Hr. (Stairs)/
| |
| 3 Hrs. Others 3.5 Others Fireproofed Ceiling Beams 3 Hr.
| |
| 4.0 Floor Area 9,200 Sq. Ft. Length 107' Width 86' Height 23' 5.0 Volume 211,600 Cu. Ft.
| |
| 6.0 Floor Drains Nuclear Non-Nuclear X None 7.0 Exhaust Ventilation System Cable Spreading Room Exhaust 7.1 Percentage of System's Capacity 100%
| |
| 8.0 8 Hr. Emergency Lighting in Area Yes No X 8.1 Outside Area at Exit Points Yes X No 9.0 Operational Radioactivity 9.1 Equipment/Piping Yes No X 9.2 Airborne Yes No X 10.0 Fire Protection Type 10.1 Primary Deluge Systems 10.2 Secondary Fire Extinguisher(s) 10.3 Detection Ionization/Thermal 10.4 Other Standpipe and Hose Reel 11.0 Fire Loading in Area 11.1 None X (no further analysis required)
| |
| | |
| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev. 8 Appendix A Section F.2 Tab 5 STATION Fire Hazard Analysis - CB-F-2A-A Page 2 of 3 12.0 Equipment and Systems in Fire Area/Zone Required System Train Safety For Safe Equipment System A B Related Shutdown Cabling CS X X X Cabling SI X X X Cabling EAH X X X Cabling PAH X X X Cabling RC X X X Cabling SB X X X Cabling SW X X X Cabling RH X X X Cabling DG X X X Cabling EDE X X X Cabling NI X X X Cabling EPA X X X Cabling FW X X X Cabling SWA X X X Cabling CAH X X X Cabling MS X X X Cabling RMW X X Cabling SB X X X Cabling SF X X X Cabling SS X X X
| |
| | |
| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev. 8 Appendix A Section F.2 Tab 5 STATION Fire Hazard Analysis - CB-F-2A-A Page 3 of 3 12.0 Equipment and Systems in Fire Area/Zone Required System Train Safety For Safe Equipment System A B Related Shutdown Cabling VG X X X Cabling WLD X X X Cabling IA X X Cabling SA X X Cabling AS X X X Cabling IC X X X
| |
| | |
| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev. 6 Appendix A Section F.2 Tab 5 STATION Fire Hazard Analysis - CB-F-2B-A Page 1 of 2 Fire Hazard Analysis - CB-F-2B-A 1.0 Building Control Building 2.0 Fire Area or Zone CB-F-2B-A 2.1 Area Name Mechanical Room - North 2.2 Location El. 50'-0" Drawing No 9763-F-310452-FP, 310461-FP 3.0 Construction of Area Material Min. Fire Rating 3.1 Walls North Concrete Outside Wall South Metal 3 Hr.
| |
| East Metal 3 Hr.
| |
| West Concrete 3 Hr.
| |
| 3.2 Floor Concrete 3 Hr.
| |
| 3.3 Ceiling Concrete 3 Hr.
| |
| 3.4 Doors Metal 3 Hr.
| |
| 3.5 Others Fireproofed Ceiling Beams 3 Hr.
| |
| 4.0 Floor Area 1,120 Sq. Ft. Length 26' Width 43' Height 23' 5.0 Volume 25,800 Cu. Ft.
| |
| 6.0 Floor Drains Nuclear Non-Nuclear X None 7.0 Exhaust Ventilation System Uses air from diesel generator building 7.1 Percentage of System's Capacity 100%
| |
| 8.0 8 Hr. Emergency Lighting in Area Yes No X 8.1 Outside Area at Exit Points Yes X No 9.0 Operational Radioactivity 9.1 Equipment/Piping Yes No X 9.2 Airborne Yes No X 10.0 Fire Protection Type 10.1 Primary Fire Extinguisher(s) 10.2 Secondary Standpipe and Hose Reel 10.3 Detection Ionization 10.4 Other -----------
| |
| 11.0 Fire Loading in Area 11.1 None X (no further analysis required)
| |
| | |
| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev. 6 Appendix A Section F.2 Tab 5 STATION Fire Hazard Analysis - CB-F-2B-A Page 2 of 2 12.0 Equipment and Systems in Fire Area/Zone System Train Safety Equipment System A B Related Fan-FN-19 CBA X X Fan-FN-21A CBA X X Damper DP-21A CBA X X Pressure Switches CBA X X Cabling CBA X X Fan-FN-20 CBA X X Dampers DP-24A, 24B, CBA X X 24C Cabling EDE X X
| |
| | |
| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to Rev .6 BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Appendix A Table 5 STATION Fire Hazard Analysis - CB-F-2C-A Page 1 of 2 Fire Hazard Analysis - CB-F-2C-A 1.0 Building Control Building 2.0 Fire Area or Zone CB-F-2C-A 2.1 Area Name Mechanical Room - South 2.2 Location El. 50'-0" Drawing No 9763-F-310452-FP 3.0 Construction of Area Material Min. Fire Rating 3.1 Walls North Metal 3 Hr.
| |
| South Concrete Outside Wall East Metal 3 Hr.
| |
| West Concrete 3 Hr.
| |
| 3.2 Floor Concrete 3 Hr.
| |
| 3.3 Ceiling Concrete 3 Hr.
| |
| 3.4 Doors Metal 3 Hr.
| |
| 3.5 Others Fireproofed Ceiling Beams 3 Hr.
| |
| 4.0 Floor Area 1,120 Sq. Ft. Length 26' Width 43' Height 23' 5.0 Volume 25,800 Cu. Ft.
| |
| 6.0 Floor Drains Nuclear Non-Nuclear X None 7.0 Exhaust Ventilation System Uses air from diesel generator building 7.1 Percentage of System's Capacity 100%
| |
| 8.0 8 Hr. Emergency Lighting in Area Yes No X 8.1 Outside Area at Exit Points Yes X No 9.0 Operational Radioactivity 9.1 Equipment/Piping Yes No X 9.2 Airborne Yes No X 10.0 Fire Protection Type 10.1 Primary Fire Extinguisher(s) 10.2 Secondary Standpipe and Hose Reel 10.3 Detection Ionization 10.4 Other -----------
| |
| 11.0 Fire Loading in Area 11.1 None X (no further analysis required)
| |
| | |
| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to Rev .6 BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Appendix A Table 5 STATION Fire Hazard Analysis - CB-F-2C-A Page 2 of 2 12.0 Equipment and Systems in Fire Area/Zone Required System Train Safety For Safe Equipment System A B Related Shutdown Fan-FN-32 CBA X X X Fan-FN-33 CBA X X X Fan-FN-21B CBA X X X Pressure Switches CBA X X X Dampers DP-21B CBA X X X Cabling CBA X X X
| |
| | |
| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev. 19 Appendix A Section F.2 Tab 5 STATION Fire Hazard Analysis - CB-F-3A-A Page 1 of 5 Fire Hazard Analysis - CB-F-3A-A 1.0 Building Control Building 2.0 Fire Area or Zone CB-F-3A-A 2.1 Area Name Control Room **
| |
| 2.2 Location El. 75'-0" Drawing No 9763-P-500090-FP 3.0 Construction of Area Material Min. Fire Rating 3.1 Walls North Concrete/MCG 3 Hr./Outside*
| |
| South Concrete/MCG Outside/3 Hr.
| |
| East Concrete Outside West Concrete/MCG 3 Hr./Outside 3.2 Floor Concrete 3 Hr.
| |
| 3.3 Ceiling Concrete Outside 3.4 Doors Metal 3 Hr. /1 1/2 Hr.
| |
| 3.5 Others Fireproofed Ceiling Beams 1 1/2 Hr.
| |
| 4.0 Floor Area 6,492 Sq. Ft. Length Varies Width Varies Height Varies 5.0 Volume 167,560 Cu. Ft.
| |
| 6.0 Floor Drains Nuclear Non-Nuclear None X 7.0 Exhaust Ventilation System Control Room Recirculating System 7.1 Percentage of System's Capacity 4.5%
| |
| 8.0 8 Hr. Emergency Lighting in Area Yes X No 8.1 Outside Area at Exit Points Yes X No 9.0 Operational Radioactivity 9.1 Equipment/Piping Yes No X 9.2 Airborne Yes No X 10.0 Fire Protection Type 10.1 Primary Fire Extinguisher(s) 10.2 Secondary Standpipe and Hose Reel 10.3 Detection Ionization 10.4 Other -----
| |
| 11.0 Fire Loading in Area 11.1 Refer to page 3. (analysis continued pages 2- 5)
| |
| (Refer to Comp. Eng. Workspace area description for additional area).
| |
| Door C-300 Leading to Turbine Building Operating Floor is Not 3 Hr. Fire Rated. Ref. Deviation No. 6, Sbn-904 Dated Dec. 2, 1985.
| |
| | |
| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev. 19 Appendix A Section F.2 Tab 5 STATION Fire Hazard Analysis - CB-F-3A-A Page 2 of 5 1.0 Building Control Building 2.0 Fire Area or Zone CB-F-3A-A 2.1 Area Name Computer Engineer's Work Space (Part of Control Room) 2.2 Location Col. A-5 Drawing No 500090-FP 3.0 Construction of Area Material Min. Fire Rating 3.1 Walls North Concrete Outside South Concrete 3 Hr.
| |
| East MCG 3 Hr.
| |
| West Concrete Outside 3.2 Floor Concrete 3 Hr.
| |
| 3.3 Ceiling Concrete Outside 3.4 Doors Metal 3 Hr.
| |
| 3.5 Others Fireproofed Ceiling Beams 1 1/2 Hr.
| |
| 4.0 Floor Area 493 Sq. Ft. Length 34' Width 5' Height 21' 5.0 Volume 10,353 Cu. Ft.
| |
| 6.0 Floor Drains Nuclear Non-Nuclear None X 7.0 Exhaust Ventilation System Control Room Complex Exhaust 7.1 Percentage of System's Capacity 100%
| |
| 8.0 8 Hr. Emergency Lighting in Area Yes X No 8.1 Outside Area at Exit Points Yes X No 9.0 Operational Radioactivity 9.1 Equipment/Piping Yes No X 9.2 Airborne Yes No X 10.0 Fire Protection Type 10.1 Primary Fire Extinguisher(s) 10.2 Secondary Standpipe and Hose Reel 10.3 Detection Ionization 10.4 Other -----
| |
| 11.0 Fire Loading in Area 11.1 Refer to CB-F-3A-A (Control Room) for fire loading
| |
| | |
| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev. 19 Appendix A Section F.2 Tab 5 STATION Fire Hazard Analysis - CB-F-3A-A Page 3 of 5 12.0 Equipment and Systems in Fire Area/Zone Required System Train Safety For Safe Equipment System A B Related Shutdown Relay Rack CP-9 NI X X Relay Rack CP-10 NI X X Cabinet CP-152A X X Cabinet CP-152B X X Cabinet CP-12 X X Cabinet CP-13 X X Instruments And SI X X X Controls On Main X X X RH Control Board And Other Cabinets And their CC X X X Associated Cabling X X X DG SW X X X CS X X X RM X X X FW X X X MS X X X EPA X X X CAH X X X SWA X X X EAH X X X SB X X X NI X X X RC X X X ED X X X EDE X X X
| |
| | |
| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev. 19 Appendix A Section F.2 Tab 5 STATION Fire Hazard Analysis - CB-F-3A-A Page 4 of 5 12.0 Equipment and Systems in Fire Area/Zone Required System Train Safety For Safe Equipment System A B Related Shutdown Process Prot CP-L, 2, 3, 4 X X X Test Cabinets CP-14, 15 X X X BOP Process Control X X X Cabinets CP-297A, 297B Isolation Cabinet CP-470 X X X BOP Process Control X Cabinet RVLIS/HELB Cabinet X X X 13.0 Design Base Fire 13.1 Combustible in Area (In Situ) Fire Loading in Area Oil: Gallons Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Grease: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Class A: 12,716 Pounds 14,564 Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Charcoal: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Chemicals: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Plastics: 5,405 Pounds 10,060Note1 Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Resins: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Other:
| |
| 13.2 Total Fire Loading in Area: 24,623 Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Total Combustibles: 171,933,000Note1 Btu 14.0 Design-Basis Fire Description (A) Fire starts in a waste basket in an office (B) Fire spreads to desk and files within office.
| |
| Note 1: Value has been rounded up to the nearest thousands place.
| |
| | |
| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev. 19 Appendix A Section F.2 Tab 5 STATION Fire Hazard Analysis - CB-F-3A-A Page 5 of 5 (C) Fire spreads across glass and metal partitions and consumes one half of the office area.
| |
| (D) Hot exhaust air from the affected area is transferred to the return air plenum which in turn will close the R.A. fire damper. In short period of time, the heat transfer thru the supply air ductwork into the return air plenum will close the supply air fire damper at which time ventilation is lost.
| |
| 14.1 DBF Fire Loading 7,196 Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| 14.2 Peak Temperature 690 °F 14.3 Duration of Fire 8.1 Min.
| |
| 15.0 Consequences of Design Basis Fire without Fire Protection 15.1 The entire control room including the computer area could be rendered uninhabitable due to the smoke.
| |
| 15.2 Safe shutdown can be accomplished from outside the control room.
| |
| 16.0 Consequences of Design Basis Fire with Fire Protection 16.1 The area contains ionization detectors and in addition is occupied 24 hours per day, therefore the fire will be detected early.
| |
| 16.2 The use of portable fire extinguishers and hose reels, if necessary, will extinguish the fire before it spreads.
| |
| 16.3 Damage will be limited to the area where the fire occurs.
| |
| 17.0 Consequences of Inadvertent or Careless Operation or Rupture of Fire Protection System 17.1 Not applicable (no water suppression in area).
| |
| 18.0 Containing Design Basis Fire in the Fire Area/Zone 18.1 Early detection due to ionization detection and occupation of space.
| |
| 18.2 Prompt use of fire extinguishers.
| |
| 18.3 Three hour fire barrier.
| |
| 18.4 Major portion of combustibles are contained within steel metal filing cabinets.
| |
| 19.0 How the Redundant Safe Shutdown Equipment in the Area is Protected 19.1 Not applicable (See 15.2).
| |
| | |
| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev. 7 Appendix A Section F.2 Tab 5 STATION Fire Hazard Analysis - CB-F-3B-A Page 1 of 2 Fire Hazard Analysis - CB-F-3B-A 1.0 Building Control Building 2.0 Fire Area or Zone CB-F-3B-A 2.1 Area Name HVAC Equipment & Duct Area 2.2 Location South West El. 75'-0" Drawing No 9763-F-500090-FP 3.0 Construction of Area Material Min. Fire Rating 3.1 Walls North MCG 3 Hr.
| |
| South Concrete Outside East MCG 3 Hr.
| |
| West Concrete Outside 3.2 Floor Concrete 3 Hr.
| |
| 3.3 Ceiling Concrete Outside 3.4 Doors Metal 3 Hr.
| |
| 3.5 Others Fireproofed Ceiling Beams 1 1/2 Hr.
| |
| 4.0 Floor Area 1,330 Sq. Ft. Length 26' Width 51' Height 21' 5.0 Volume 27,930 Cu. Ft.
| |
| 6.0 Floor Drains Nuclear Non-Nuclear None X 7.0 Exhaust Ventilation System Return air - no exhaust 7.1 Percentage of System's Capacity -
| |
| 8.0 8 Hr. Emergency Lighting in Area Yes X No 8.1 Outside Area at Exit Points Yes X No 9.0 Operational Radioactivity 9.1 Equipment/Piping Yes No X 9.2 Airborne Yes No X 10.0 Fire Protection Type 10.1 Primary Fire Extinguisher(s) 10.2 Secondary Standpipe and Hose Reel 10.3 Detection Ionization 10.4 Other Carbon Monoxide Detector in CBA-F-38, -8038 11.0 Fire Loading in Area 11.1 None X (no further analysis required)
| |
| | |
| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev. 7 Appendix A Section F.2 Tab 5 STATION Fire Hazard Analysis - CB-F-3B-A Page 2 of 2 12.0 Equipment and Systems in Fire Area/Zone Required System Train Safety For Safe Equipment System A B Related Shutdown No Equipment Required For Safe Shutdown in This Area Air Conditioning CBA X X X AC-3A&B Dampers 26A&B CBA X X X Dampers 27A&B CBA X X X Damper 52 CBA X X X Cabling CBA X X X Fans 16A & B CBA X X X Fans F-38 CBA X X Filter F-8038 CBA X X Damper 28 CBA X X Damper 1058 CBA X X
| |
| | |
| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev. 14 Appendix A Section F.2 Tab 5 STATION Fire Hazard Analysis - CB-F-3C-A Page 1 of 3 Fire Hazard Analysis - CB-F-3C-A 1.0 Building Control Building 2.0 Fire Area or Zone CB-F-3C-A 2.1 Area Name Computer Room 2.2 Location El. 75'-0" Drawing No 9763-P-500090-FP 3.0 Construction of Area Material Min. Fire Rating 3.1 Walls North Concrete Outside South MCG 3 Hr.
| |
| East MCG 3 Hr.
| |
| West MCG 3 Hr.
| |
| 3.2 Floor Concrete 3 Hr.
| |
| 3.3 Ceiling Concrete Outside 3.4 Doors Metal 3 Hr.
| |
| 3.5 Others Fireproofed Ceiling Beams 1 1/2 Hr.
| |
| 4.0 Floor Area 1,288 Sq. Ft. Length 46' Width 28' Height 21' 5.0 Volume 27,050 Cu. Ft.
| |
| 6.0 Floor Drains Nuclear Non-Nuclear None X 7.0 Exhaust Ventilation System Control Room Complex Exhaust 7.1 Percentage of System's Capacity 100%
| |
| 8.0 8 Hr. Emergency Lighting in Area Yes No X 8.1 Outside Area at Exit Points Yes X No 9.0 Operational Radioactivity 9.1 Equipment/Piping Yes No X 9.2 Airborne Yes No X 10.0 Fire ProtectionType 10.1 Primary Halon Fixed Gas Extinguishing System 10.2 Secondary Fire Extinguisher(s) 10.3 Detection Ionization (Monitored Temp. Indication) 10.4 Outsid Fire Area Standpipe and Hose Reel 11.0 Fire Loading in Area 11.1 Refer to Page 2. (analysis continued pages. 2 & 3)
| |
| | |
| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev. 14 Appendix A Section F.2 Tab 5 STATION Fire Hazard Analysis - CB-F-3C-A Page 2 of 3 12.0 Equipment and Systems in Fire Area/Zone Required System Train Safety For Safe Equipment System A B Related Shutdown No Equipment Required For Safe Shutdown in This Area Also No Safety Related Equipment in This Area 13.0 Design Base Fire 13.1 Combustible in Area (In Situ) Fire Loading in Area Oil: Gallons Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Grease: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Class A: 420 Pounds 2,609 Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Charcoal: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Chemicals: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Plastics: 2,250 Pounds 22,710 Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Resins: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Other:
| |
| 13.2 Total Fire Loading in Area: 25,319 Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Total Combustibles: 32,610,000 Btu 14.0 Design-Basis Fire Description (A) Fire starts in a waste basket in an office.
| |
| (B) Fire spreads to desk and files within office.
| |
| (C) Fire spreads across glass and metal partitions and consumes one half of the office area.
| |
| (D) Indoor air conditioning unit shuts off on high ambient temperature. The exhaust air path is normally closed and no supply air is provided from the outside, therefore the ventilation is lost.
| |
| 14.1 DBF Fire Loading 6,296 Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| 14.2 Peak Temperature 690 °F 14.3 Duration of Fire 5.3 Min.
| |
| | |
| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev. 14 Appendix A Section F.2 Tab 5 STATION Fire Hazard Analysis - CB-F-3C-A Page 3 of 3 15.0 Consequences of Design Basis Fire without Fire Protection 15.1 The entire computer room could be rendered uninhabitable due to smoke.
| |
| 16.0 Consequences of Design Basis Fire with Fire Protection 16.1 The area is protected by a Halon 1301 Fixed Gas Extinguishing System and early warning ionization detectors, therefore the fire will be detected early.
| |
| 16.2 The use of portable fire extinguishers and hose reels are available for backup.
| |
| 16.3 Damage will be limited to the area where fire occurs.
| |
| 17.0 Consequences of Inadvertent or Careless Operation or Rupture of Fire Protection System 17.1 The area is not required for safe shutdown purpose and can be evacuated with no effect on operation of the control room.
| |
| 17.2 The expended halon and/or products of combustion can be exhausted from the area by manual switch over to the control room complex exhaust system.
| |
| 18.0 Containing Design Basis Fire in the Fire Area/Zone 18.1 Early detection due to ionization detection.
| |
| 18.2 Prompt total flooding of the area by the Halon 1301 Fixed Gas Extinguishing System.
| |
| 18.3 Pressurization of the adjacent control room prevents exfiltration from the area.
| |
| 18.4 Major portion of combustibles are contained within steel metal filing cabinets.
| |
| 19.0 How the Redundant Safe Shutdown Equipment in the Area is Protected 19.1 Not applicable
| |
| | |
| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev. 6 Appendix A Section F.2 Tab 5 STATION Fire Hazard Analysis - CB-F-S1-0 Page 1 of 2 Fire Hazard Analysis - CB-F-S1-0 1.0 Building Control Building 2.0 Fire Area or Zone CB-F-S1-0 2.1 Area Name Stairwell 2.2 Location Col. E-4 Drawing No 9763-F-310431-FP 3.0 Construction of Area Material Min. Fire Rating 3.1 Walls North Concrete 3 Hr.
| |
| South Concrete Outside East Concrete Outside West Concrete Outside 3.2 Floor Concrete Outside 3.3 Ceiling Metal 1 1/2 Hr.
| |
| 3.4 Doors -
| |
| 3.5 Others - -
| |
| 4.0 Floor Area 150 Sq. Ft. Length 18' Width 8'-4" Height 122' 5.0 Volume 18,075 Cu. Ft.
| |
| 6.0 Floor Drains Nuclear Non-Nuclear - None -
| |
| 7.0 Exhaust Ventilation System None 7.1 Percentage of System's Capacity N/A 8.0 8 Hr. Emergency Lighting in Area Yes X No 8.1 Outside Area at Exit Points Yes X No 9.0 Operational Radioactivity 9.1 Equipment/Piping Yes No X 9.2 Airborne Yes No X 10.0 Fire Protection Type 10.1 Primary Portable Extinguisher(s) 10.2 Secondary Hose Station 10.3 Detection None 10.4 Other ------
| |
| 11.0 Fire Loading in Area 11.1 None X (no further analysis required)
| |
| | |
| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev. 6 Appendix A Section F.2 Tab 5 STATION Fire Hazard Analysis - CB-F-S1-0 Page 2 of 2 12.0 Equipment and Systems in Fire Area/Zone Required System Train Safety For Safe Equipment System A B Related Shutdown No Equipment Required For Safe Shutdown in This Area
| |
| | |
| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev. 6 Appendix A Section F.2 Tab 5 STATION Fire Hazard Analysis - CB-F-S2-0 Page 1 of 2 Fire Hazard Analysis - CB-F-S2-0 1.0 Building Control Building 2.0 Fire Area or Zone CB-F-S2-0 2.1 Area Name Stairwell 2.2 Location Col. B-1 Drawing No 9763-F-310431-FP 3.0 Construction of Area Material Min. Fire Rating 3.1 Walls North Concrete 3 Hr.
| |
| South Concrete 3 Hr.
| |
| East Concrete 3 Hr.
| |
| West Concrete 3 Hr.
| |
| 3.2 Floor Concrete 3 Hr.
| |
| 3.3 Ceiling Concrete 3 Hr.
| |
| 3.4 Doors Metal 1 1/2 Hr.
| |
| 3.5 Others - -
| |
| 4.0 Floor Area 226 Sq. Ft. Length 22' Width 10'-4" Height 50' 5.0 Volume 11,330 Cu. Ft.
| |
| 6.0 Floor Drains Nuclear - Non-Nuclear - None 7.0 Exhaust Ventilation System None 7.1 Percentage of System's Capacity N/A 8.0 8 Hr. Emergency Lighting in Area Yes No X 8.1 Outside Area at Exit Points Yes X No 9.0 Operational Radioactivity 9.1 Equipment/Piping Yes No X 9.2 Airborne Yes No X 10.0 Fire Protection Type 10.1 Primary Portable Extinguisher(s) 10.2 Secondary Hose Station 10.3 Detection None 10.4 Other ------
| |
| 11.0 Fire Loading in Area 11.1 None X (no further analysis required)
| |
| | |
| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev. 6 Appendix A Section F.2 Tab 5 STATION Fire Hazard Analysis - CB-F-S2-0 Page 2 of 2 12.0 Equipment and Systems in Fire Area/Zone Required System Train Safety For Safe Equipment System A B Related Shutdown No Equipment Required For Safe Shutdown in This Area
| |
| | |
| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev. 12 Appendix A Section F.2 Tab 6 STATION Fire Hazard Analysis - ET-F-1A-A Page 1 of 3 Fire Hazard Analysis - ET-F-1A-A 1.0 Building Electrical Tunnel 2.0 Fire Area or Zone ET-F-1A-A 2.1 Area Name Upper Electrical Tunnel - Train A
| |
| * 2.2 Location El. 0-0 Drawing No 9763-F-310453-FP, 310465-FP, 310466-FP 3.0 Construction of Area Material Min. Fire Rating 3.1 Walls North Concrete Outside South Concrete 3 Hr.
| |
| East Concrete 3 Hr.
| |
| West Concrete 3 Hr./Outside 3.2 Floor Concrete 3 Hr.
| |
| 3.3 Ceiling Concrete 3 Hr.
| |
| 3.4 Doors Metal 3 Hr./11/2 Hr. (Stairs) 3.5 Others - -
| |
| 4.0 Floor Area 2,137 Sq. Ft. Length 48&Varies Width 38&Varies Height 25 5.0 Volume 53,400 Cu. Ft.
| |
| 6.0 Floor Drains Nuclear Non-Nuclear X None 7.0 Exhaust Ventilation System None 7.1 Percentage of Systems Capacity -
| |
| 8.0 8 Hr. Emergency Lighting in Area Yes No X 8.1 Outside Area at Exit Points Yes X No 9.0 Operational Radioactivity 9.1 Equipment/Piping Yes No X 9.2 Airborne Yes No X 10.0 Fire Protection Type 10.1 Primary Pre-Action System 10.2 Secondary Fire Extinguisher(s) 10.3 Detection Ionization/Photoelectric 10.4 Other --------
| |
| 11.0 Fire Loading in Area 11.1 None X (no further analysis required)
| |
| * Safe Shutdown Cable Requires Fire Protection.
| |
| | |
| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev. 12 Appendix A Section F.2 Tab 6 STATION Fire Hazard Analysis - ET-F-1A-A Page 2 of 3 12.0 Equipment and Systems in Fire Area/Zone Required System Train Safety For Safe Equipment System A B Related Shutdown Cabling CAH X X X Cabling CC X X X Cabling EDE X X X Cabling EPA X X X Cabling FW X X X Cabling MS X X X Cabling NI X X X Cabling RC X X X Cabling SW X X X Cabling SWA X X X Cabling SI X X Elect. Penetration EDE X X X Dist. Panel PP-6A, C, D, E RC X X X Dist Panel PP-8J ED X X Cabling CBS X X Cabling CAP X X Cabling RM X X Cabling SS X X Cabling NG X X Cabling SA X
| |
| | |
| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev. 12 Appendix A Section F.2 Tab 6 STATION Fire Hazard Analysis - ET-F-1A-A Page 3 of 3 12.0 Equipment and Systems in Fire Area/Zone Required System Train Safety For Safe Equipment System A B Related Shutdown Cabling IA X Cabling SB X X Rad Mon RM X X Cabling CS X X Fuse Cabinets EDE X X Cabling IC X X Transformer ED-X-14J ED X
| |
| | |
| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev. 12 Appendix A Section F.2 Tab 6 STATION Fire Hazard Analysis - ET-F-1B-A Page 1 of 2 Fire Hazard Analysis - ET-F-1B-A 1.0 Building Electrical Tunnel 2.0 Fire Area or Zone ET-F-1B-A 2.1 Area Name Electrical Tunnel - Train A
| |
| * 2.2 Location El. 0-0 Drawing No 9763-F-310453-FP, 310466-FP, 310465-FP 3.0 Construction of Area Material Min. Fire Rating 3.1 Walls North Concrete 3 Hr./Outside South Concrete 3 Hr.
| |
| East Concrete 3 Hr.
| |
| West Concrete 3 Hr.
| |
| 3.2 Floor Concrete 3 Hr.
| |
| 3.3 Ceiling Concrete Outside/3 Hr.
| |
| 3.4 Doors Metal 3 Hr./11/2 Hr. (Stairs) 3.5 Others Exposed Ceiling Beams -
| |
| 4.0 Floor Area 1,470 Sq. Ft. Length Varies Width Varies Height Varies 5.0 Volume 33,300 Cu. Ft.
| |
| 6.0 Floor Drains Nuclear Non-Nuclear X None 7.0 Exhaust Ventilation System Electric Cable Tunnel Exhaust 7.1 Percentage of Systems Capacity 100%
| |
| 8.0 8 Hr. Emergency Lighting in Area Yes No X 8.1 Outside Area at Exit Points Yes X No 9.0 Operational Radioactivity 9.1 Equipment/Piping Yes No X 9.2 Airborne Yes No X 10.0 Fire Protection Type 10.1 Primary Pre-Action System 10.2 Secondary Fire Extinguisher(s) 10.3 Detection Ionization/Photoelectric 10.4 Other ------
| |
| 11.0 Fire Loading in Area 11.1 None X (no further analysis required)
| |
| Safe Shutdown Cable Requires Fire Protection
| |
| | |
| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev. 12 Appendix A Section F.2 Tab 6 STATION Fire Hazard Analysis - ET-F-1B-A Page 2 of 2 12.0 Equipment and Systems in Fire Area/Zone Required System Train Safety For Safe Equipment System A B Related Shutdown Cabling CAH X X X Cabling CC X X X Cabling EDE X X X Cabling EPA X X X Cabling FW X X X Cabling MS X X X Cabling NI X X X Cabling RC X X X Cabling SW X X X Cabling SB X X X Cabling SWA X X X Cabling SI X X Cabling CAP X X Cabling RM X X Cabling SS X X Cabling NG X X Cabling SA X Cabling IA X Cabling IC X X
| |
| | |
| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev. 12 Appendix A Section F.2 Tab 6 STATION Fire Hazard Analysis - ET-F-1C-A Page 1 of 4 Fire Hazard Analysis - ET-F-1C-A 1.0 Building Electrical Tunnel 2.0 Fire Area or Zone ET-F-1C-A 2.1 Area Name Lower Electrical Tunnel - Train B 2.2 Location North of Containment El (-) 26 -0 Drawing No 9763-F-310454-FP 3.0 Construction of Area Material Min. Fire Rating 3.1 Walls North Concrete Outside South Concrete 3 Hr.
| |
| East Concrete 3 Hr.
| |
| West Concrete 3 Hr.
| |
| 3.2 Floor Concrete Outside 3.3 Ceiling Concrete 3 Hr.
| |
| 3.4 Doors Metal 3 Hr./11/2 Hr. (Stairs) 3.5 Others Concrete -
| |
| 4.0 Floor Area 2,137 Sq. Ft. Length 48&Varies Width 38&Varies Height 25 5.0 Volume 53,400 Cu. Ft.
| |
| 6.0 Floor Drains Nuclear Non-Nuclear X None 7.0 Exhaust Ventilation System None 7.1 Percentage of Systems Capacity -
| |
| 8.0 8 Hr. Emergency Lighting in Area Yes No X 8.1 Outside Area at Exit Points Yes X No 9.0 Operational Radioactivity 9.1 Equipment/Piping Yes No X 9.2 Airborne Yes No X 10.0 Fire Protection Type 10.1 Primary Pre-Action System 10.2 Secondary Fire Extinguisher(s) 10.3 Detection Ionization/Photoelectric 10.4 Other ------
| |
| 11.0 Fire Loading in Area 11.1 Refer to Page 3.
| |
| Safe Shutdown Cable Requires Fire Protection
| |
| | |
| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev. 12 Appendix A Section F.2 Tab 6 STATION Fire Hazard Analysis - ET-F-1C-A Page 2 of 4 12.0 Equipment and Systems in Fire Area/Zone Required System Train Safety For Safe Equipment System A B Related Shutdown Cabling CAH X X Cabling CC X X Cabling EDE X X Cabling EPA X X Cabling FW X X Cabling MS X X Cabling NI X X Cabling & RC X X Instrumentation Cabling SW X X Cabling SWA X X Cabling SI X X Elect. Penetration EDE X X Dist. Pahel PP-6B RC X X Fuse Cabinets EDE X X Excore Xmtr NI X X Rad Mon RM X X Cabling CS X X Cabling CAP X X Cabling CBS X X
| |
| | |
| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev. 12 Appendix A Section F.2 Tab 6 STATION Fire Hazard Analysis - ET-F-1C-A Page 3 of 4 12.0 Equipment and Systems in Fire Area/Zone Required System Train Safety For Safe Equipment System A B Related Shutdown Cabling COP X X Cabling NG X X Cabling VG X X Cabling WLD X X Cabling CGC X X Cabling RM X X Cabling SA X Cabling IA X Cabling IC X X 13.0 Design Base Fire 13.1 Combustible in Area (In Situ) Fire Loading in Area Oil: Gallons Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Grease: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Class A: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Charcoal: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Chemicals: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Plastics: 12 Pounds 104.3 Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Other:
| |
| 13.2 Total Fire Loading in Area: 104.3 Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Total Combustibles: 222,864 Btu 14.0 Design-Basis Fire Description
| |
| : 1. For conservatism all the plastic components of both pumps are assumed to ignite and burn.
| |
| | |
| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev. 12 Appendix A Section F.2 Tab 6 STATION Fire Hazard Analysis - ET-F-1C-A Page 4 of 4
| |
| : 2. To add conservatism, there are three types of plastic in the components. A series of fire loading calculations using the NRC, NUREG-1805 Fire Dynamics Tools Quantitative Fire Hazard Method for each type of plastic was performed. The bounding maximum burning duration and maximum temperature were determined by taking the maximum duration from all the calculations and the maximum temperature.
| |
| : 3. No credit was given to the CEVA wall that separated the fire location from the remainder of the fire area.
| |
| 14.1 DBF Fire Loading 104.3 Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| 14.2 Peak Zone Temperature Fire 559.7 °F 14.3 Duration of Fire 6.6 Minutes 15.0 Consequences of Design Basis Fire without Fire Protection 15.1 Cable will not become involved in the fire. Also, redundant cabling is not in this fire area.
| |
| 16.0 Consequences of Design Basis Fire with Fire Protection 16.1 No consequences. Fire will be extinguished with portable extinguishers.
| |
| 17.0 Consequences of Inadvertent or Careless Operation or Rupture of Fire Protection System 17.1 Area is designed with a water spray system; drain paths will remove water.
| |
| 18.0 Containing Design Basis Fire in the Fire Area/Zone 18.1 Fire detectors initiate an alarm in the control room and actuate the pre-action sprinkler system valve, allowing water to fill the piping to the closed head sprinklers. The control room alerts the fire brigade.
| |
| 18.2 The fire would be extinguished using hose lines and/or portable extinguishers and/or area sprinkler system.
| |
| 19.0 How the Redundant Safe Shutdown Equipment in the Area is Protected 19.1 Not applicable as no redundant safe shutdown equipment is located in this fire area.
| |
| | |
| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev. 12 Appendix A Section F.2 Tab 6 STATION Fire Hazard Analysis - ET-F-1D-A Page 1 of 3 Fire Hazard Analysis - ET-F-1D-A 1.0 Building Electrical Tunnel 2.0 Fire Area or Zone ET-F-1D-A 2.1 Area Name Electrical Tunnel - Train B
| |
| * 2.2 Location El. (-) 20-0 Drawing No 9763-F-310454-FP, 310431-FP, 310468-FP 3.0 Construction of Area Material Min. Fire Rating 3.1 Walls North Concrete 3 Hr./Outside South Concrete 3 Hr.
| |
| East Concrete 3 Hr.
| |
| West Concrete 3 Hr.
| |
| 3.2 Floor Concrete Outside 3.3 Ceiling Concrete/Firestop 3 Hr./11/2 Hr. (Stairs) 3.4 Doors Metal 11/2 Hr.
| |
| 3.5 Others Exposed Ceiling Beams -
| |
| 4.0 Floor Area 1,890 Sq. Ft. Length Varies Width Varies Height Varies 5.0 Volume 53,600 Cu. Ft.
| |
| 6.0 Floor Drains Nuclear Non-Nuclear X None 7.0 Exhaust Ventilation System Electric Cable Tunnel Exhausts 7.1 Percentage of Systems Capacity 100%
| |
| 8.0 8 Hr. Emergency Lighting in Area Yes No X 8.1 Outside Area at Exit Points Yes X No 9.0 Operational Radioactivity 9.1 Equipment/Piping Yes No X 9.2 Airborne Yes No X 10.0 Fire Protection Type 10.1 Primary Pre-Action System 10.2 Secondary Fire Extinguisher(s) 10.3 Detection Ionization/Photoelectric 10.4 Other ------
| |
| 11.0 Fire Loading in Area 11.1 None X (no further analysis required)
| |
| Safe shutdown cable requires fire protection
| |
| | |
| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev. 12 Appendix A Section F.2 Tab 6 STATION Fire Hazard Analysis - ET-F-1D-A Page 2 of 3 12.0 Equipment and Systems in Fire Area/Zone Required System Train Safety For Safe Equipment System A B Related Shutdown Cabling CAH X X X Cabling CC X X X Cabling EDE X X X Cabling EPA X X X Cabling FW X X X Cabling MS X X X Cabling NI X X X Cabling RC X X X Cabling PAH X X X Cabling SW X X X Cabling SWA X X X Cabling SI X X Cabling CBS X X Cabling COP X X Cabling NG X X Cabling VG X X Cabling WLD X X Cabling CGC X X Cabling & RM X X Instrumentation
| |
| | |
| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev. 12 Appendix A Section F.2 Tab 6 STATION Fire Hazard Analysis - ET-F-1D-A Page 3 of 3 12.0 Equipment and Systems in Fire Area/Zone Required System Train Safety For Safe Equipment System A B Related Shutdown Cabling SB X X Cabling SA X Cabling IA X Cabling IC X
| |
| | |
| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev. 12 Appendix A Section F.2 Tab 6 STATION Fire Hazard Analysis - ET-F-S1-0 Page 1 of 2 Fire Hazard Analysis - ET-F-S1-0 1.0 Building Electrical Tunnel 2.0 Fire Area or Zone ET-F-S1-0 2.1 Area Name Stairwell
| |
| * 2.2 Location El. (-)20 &(-)26 Drawing No 9763-F-310453-FP 3.0 Construction of Area Material Min. Fire Rating 3.1 Walls North Concrete Outside South Concrete 3 Hr.
| |
| East Concrete -
| |
| West Concrete Outside 3.2 Floor Concrete Outside 3.3 Ceiling Concrete Outside 3.4 Doors Metal 11/2 Hr.
| |
| 3.5 Others - -
| |
| 4.0 Floor Area 120 Sq. Ft. Length 14'-6" Width 8'-4" Height 64' 5.0 Volume 7,700 Cu. Ft.
| |
| 6.0 Floor Drains Nuclear Non-Nuclear X (Sump pump in stairwell) 7.0 Exhaust Ventilation System None 7.1 Percentage of System's Capacity N/A 8.0 8 Hr. Emergency Lighting in Area Yes No X 8.1 Outside Area at Exit Points Yes X No 9.0 Operational Radioactivity 9.1 Equipment/Piping Yes No X 9.2 Airborne Yes No X 10.0 Fire Protection Type 10.1 Primary Portable Extinguisher 10.2 Secondary Hose Station 10.3 Detection None 10.4 Other ------
| |
| 11.0 Fire Loading in Area 11.1 None X (no further analysis required)
| |
| Safe Shutdown Cable Requires Fire Protection.
| |
| | |
| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev. 12 Appendix A Section F.2 Tab 6 STATION Fire Hazard Analysis - ET-F-S1-0 Page 2 of 2 12.0 Equipment and Systems in Fire Area/Zone Required System Train Safety For Safe Equipment System A B Related Shutdown No safety related or safe shutdown equipment in this area
| |
| | |
| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev. 15 Appendix A Section F.2 Tab 7 STATION Fire Hazard Analysis - DG-F-1A-A Page 1 of 2 Fire Hazard Analysis - DG-F-1A-A 1.0 Building Diesel Generator Building 2.0 Fire Area or Zone DG-F-1A-A 2.1 Area Name Fuel Oil Storage Tank Area 2.2 Location North - El (-)16-0 Drawing No 9763-F-202068-FP 3.0 Construction of Area Material Min. Fire Rating 3.1 Walls North Concrete Outside South Concrete 3 Hr.
| |
| East Concrete Outside West Concrete Outside 3.2 Floor Concrete Outside 3.3 Ceiling Concrete 3 Hr.
| |
| 3.4 Doors Metal 11/2 Hr.
| |
| 3.5 Others Fireproofed Ceiling Beams 3 Hr.
| |
| 4.0 Floor Area 1,430 Sq. Ft. Length Varies Width Varies Height 33.5 5.0 Volume 47,900 Cu. Ft.
| |
| 6.0 Floor Drains Nuclear Non-Nuclear X None 7.0 Exhaust Ventilation System Gravity Ventilation 7.1 Percentage of Systems Capacity -
| |
| 8.0 8 Hr. Emergency Lighting in Area Yes No X 8.1 Outside Area at Exit Points Yes X No 9.0 Operational Radioactivity 9.1 Equipment/Piping Yes No X 9.2 Airborne Yes No X 10.0 Fire Protection Type 10.1 Primary Redundant Preaction Systems 10.2 Secondary Fire Extinguisher(s) 10.3 Detection Ionization & Thermal 10.4 Other Standpipe and Hose Reel 11.0 Fire Loading in Area 11.1 Refer to page 2. (Analysis continued page 2)
| |
| | |
| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev. 15 Appendix A Section F.2 Tab 7 STATION Fire Hazard Analysis - DG-F-1A-A Page 2 of 2 12.0 Equipment and Systems in Fire Area/Zone Required System Train Safety For Safe Equipment System A B Related Shutdown Fuel Oil Storage Tank DG X X Fuel Oil Transfer Pump DG X X P38A FLEX Electric Fuel FLEX X - -
| |
| Transfer Pump A Level Switches DG X X Cabling DG X X Piping & Valves DG X X 13.0 Design Base Fire 13.1 Combustible in Area (In Situ) Fire Loading in Area Oil: 75,000 Gallons 7,867,000 Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Grease: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Class A: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Charcoal: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Chemicals: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Plastics: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Resins: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Other:
| |
| 13.2 Total Fire Loading in Area: 7,867,000 Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Total Combustibles: 1125 X 107 Btu 14.0 Design-Basis Fire Description See Appendix A of this report.
| |
| Required for safe shutdown only on loss of offsite power.
| |
| | |
| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev. 15 Appendix A Section F.2 Tab 7 STATION Fire Hazard Analysis - DG-F-1B-A Page 1 of 2 Fire Hazard Analysis - DG-F-1B-A 1.0 Building Diesel Generator Building 2.0 Fire Area or Zone DG-F-1B-A 2.1 Area Name Fuel Oil Storage Tank Area 2.2 Location South - El (-)16-0 Drawing No 9763-F-202068-FP 3.0 Construction of Area Material Min. Fire Rating 3.1 Walls North Concrete 3 Hr.
| |
| South Concrete Outside East Concrete Outside West Concrete Outside 3.2 Floor Concrete Outside 3.3 Ceiling Concrete 3 Hr.
| |
| 3.4 Doors Metal 11/2 Hr.
| |
| 3.5 Others Fireproofed Ceiling Beams 3 Hr.
| |
| 4.0 Floor Area 1,430 Sq. Ft. Length Varies Width Varies Height 33.5 5.0 Volume 47,900 Cu. Ft.
| |
| 6.0 Floor Drains Nuclear Non-Nuclear X None 7.0 Exhaust Ventilation System Gravity Ventilation 7.1 Percentage of Systems Capacity -
| |
| 8.0 8 Hr. Emergency Lighting in Area Yes No X 8.1 Outside Area at Exit Points Yes X No 9.0 Operational Radioactivity 9.1 Equipment/Piping Yes No X 9.2 Airborne Yes No X 10.0 Fire Protection Type 10.1 Primary Redundant Preaction Systems 10.2 Secondary Fire Extinguisher(s) 10.3 Detection Ionization & Thermal 10.4 Other Standpipe and Hose Reel 11.0 Fire Loading in Area 11.1 Refer to page 2. (Analysis continued page 2)
| |
| | |
| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev. 15 Appendix A Section F.2 Tab 7 STATION Fire Hazard Analysis - DG-F-1B-A Page 2 of 2 12.0 Equipment and Systems in Fire Area/Zone System Train Safety Equipment System A B Related Fuel Oil Storage Tank DG X X Fuel Oil Transfer Pump DG X X P38B FLEX Electric Fuel FLEX X -
| |
| Transfer Pump B Cabling DG X X Piping & Valves DG X X 13.0 Design Base Fire 13.1 Combustible in Area (In Situ) Fire Loading in Area Note:
| |
| Oil: 75,000 Gallons 7,867,000 Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Grease: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Class A: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Charcoal: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Chemicals: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Plastics: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Resins: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Other:
| |
| 13.2 Total Fire Loading in Area: 7,867,000 Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Total Combustibles: 1125 X 107 Btu 14.0 Design-Basis Fire Description See Appendix A of this report.
| |
| | |
| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev. 16 Appendix A Section F.2 Tab 7 STATION Fire Hazard Analysis - DG-F-2A-A Page 1 of 5 Fire Hazard Analysis - DG-F-2A-A 1.0 Building Diesel Generator Building 2.0 Fire Area or Zone DG-F-2A-A 2.1 Area Name Engine Room 2.2 Location North - El. 21-6 Drawing No 9763-F-202069-FP 3.0 Construction of Area Material Min. Fire Rating 3.1 Walls North Concrete Outside South Concrete 3 Hr.
| |
| East Concrete 3 Hr.
| |
| West Concrete Outside 3.2 Floor Concrete 3 Hr.
| |
| 3.3 Ceiling Concrete 3 Hr.
| |
| 3.4 Doors Metal 3 Hr./11/2 Hr. (Stairs) 3.5 Others Fireproofed Ceiling Beams 3 Hr.
| |
| 4.0 Floor Area 3,700 Sq. Ft. Length 88 Width 42 Height 29 5.0 Volume 107,300 Cu. Ft.
| |
| 6.0 Floor Drains Nuclear Non-Nuclear X None 7.0 Exhaust Ventilation System Dg Bldg. Exhaust System 7.1 Percentage of Systems Capacity 100%
| |
| 8.0 8 Hr. Emergency Lighting in Area Yes X No 8.1 Outside Area at Exit Points Yes X No 9.0 Operational Radioactivity 9.1 Equipment/Piping Yes No X 9.2 Airborne Yes No X 10.0 Fire Protection Type 10.1 Primary Manual Preaction Providing Area Protection and Auto Preaction in Oil Piping Trench 10.2 Secondary Fire Extinguisher(s) 10.3 Detection Ionization & Ultraviolet/Thermal in Trench 10.4 Other Standpipe & Hose Reel 11.0 Fire Loading in Area 11.1 Refer to page 3. (Analysis continued pages 2 - 4)
| |
| | |
| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev. 16 Appendix A Section F.2 Tab 7 STATION Fire Hazard Analysis - DG-F-2A-A Page 2 of 5 12.0 Equipment and Systems in Fire Area/Zone System Train Safety Equipment System A B Related Starting Air Skid 17A DG X X Cabling DG X X Cabling DAH X X Cabling CBA X X Diesel Generator Control DG X X Cabinet CP-75A Diesel Generator Control DG X X Cabinet CP-75B 5Kv Non-Seg. Bus Duct EDE X X Cabling SW X X Damper DP-16A DAH X X Temp Switches DAH X X Diesel Generator Control DG X X Panel CP-36 Terminal Box HF7 DG X Diesel Generator 1-A & DG X X Aux Fan-FN-26A DAH X X Piping & Valves DG X X 460v MCC-E511 EDE X X Cabling & Controls RC X X Disabling Panel MM X X MM-CP-450A Backup Control Air DG X X Compressor
| |
| | |
| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev. 16 Appendix A Section F.2 Tab 7 STATION Fire Hazard Analysis - DG-F-2A-A Page 3 of 5 13.0 Design Base Fire 13.1 Combustible in Area (In Situ) Fire Loading in Area Note: Oil Fire Oil: 1,627.5 Gallons 62,375 Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Grease: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Class A: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Charcoal: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Chemicals: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Plastics: 38 Pounds 134 Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Resins: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Other: 55 LF Cable Trays 9,964 Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Stacked 3 High 13.2 Total Fire Loading in Area: 72,473 Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Total Combustibles: 268,230,000 Btu 14.0 Design-Basis Fire Description
| |
| : 1. The diesel engine is located on the 21-6 level. The engine is not operating.
| |
| : 2. The fuel oil line connecting the day tank on the 51-6 level and the diesel engine ruptures.
| |
| : 3. Fuel oil is siphoned from the day tank at a rate of 24 gpm (30 ft. of head in a 1/2 fuel oil line).
| |
| : 4. Fuel oil is sprayed into the engine room and covers an area of 400 ft.2 with a film of oil 1/16 thick.
| |
| : 5. The oil flows into the trench around the engine.
| |
| : 6. The oil is ignited at the time of the rupture.
| |
| : 7. The oil burns at a rate of 5 per hour and consumes 21 gpm, therefore 3 gpm of unburned oil runs into the trench drain and down to the sump in the fuel oil storage tank vault at the (-) 16 -0 level below.
| |
| : 8. The fuel oil transfer pump at the (-)16-0 level continues to fill the day tank.
| |
| : 9. The fuel oil in the engine room is heated by the fire (4200°F flame temperature).
| |
| The hot oil flowing into the trench will flash upon discharging into the covered sump at the (-)16-0 level below.
| |
| | |
| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev. 16 Appendix A Section F.2 Tab 7 STATION Fire Hazard Analysis - DG-F-2A-A Page 4 of 5
| |
| : 10. The heat from the fire in the covered sump will activate the sump wet pipe sprinklers and the vaults detection and suppression system and alarm in the control room.
| |
| : 11. It is estimated that a time period of 5 minutes lapses between the oil line rupture and ignition of the oil in the sump.
| |
| : 12. The transfer pump will continue to fill the day tank until either the deluge system deactivates the pump or action is taken by plant personnel in response to the alarm.
| |
| : 13. It is estimated that the detectors in the storage tank vault will alarm in 10 Minutes.
| |
| : 14. It requires 62.5 minutes for the tank to empty after the fuel oil transfer pump shuts down, therefore 1500 gallons of oil drains into the engine room. The engine room fire consumes 1312 gallons while 188 gallons of oil drains into the sump below.
| |
| : 15. Estimated minimum fuel oil consumed by the fire and duration of the fire:
| |
| A) Line Rupture to Shut Down of Transfer Pump 15 Min 315 Gal B) Complete Discharge of Day Tank Into the 62.5 Min 1312 Gal Engine Room 77.5 Min 1627 Gal
| |
| : 16. Total combustibles Plastic 494,000 Btu Oil 230,784,000 Btu Cable 36,867,000 Btu Total 268,150,000 Btu
| |
| : 17. A lube oil fire was postulated but found to be less severe than the fuel oil fire, therefore it has not been considered as the design basis fire for the subject area.
| |
| 14.1 DBF Fire Loading 72,473 Btu/Sq.Ft.
| |
| 14.2 Duration of Fire >5 Minutes 14.3 Peak Temperature 1650 °F
| |
| | |
| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev. 16 Appendix A Section F.2 Tab 7 STATION Fire Hazard Analysis - DG-F-2A-A Page 5 of 5 15.0 Consequences of Design Basis Fire without Fire Protection 15.1 The entire area will be engulfed in flame and all equipment and cable will be lost.
| |
| 15.2 Possible spalling of concrete.
| |
| 15.3 Only one diesel generator train will be affected and safe shutdown can be Accomplished By the Redundant Diesel Located in Another Fire Area.
| |
| 16.0 Consequences of Design Basis Fire with Fire Protection 16.1 Possible loss of the equipment and cabling.
| |
| 16.2 No damage to engine due to water deluge system on oil piping.
| |
| 16.3 Safe shutdown can be accomplished, if necessary, by the redundant diesel train located in another area.
| |
| 17.0 Consequences of Inadvertent or Careless Operation or Rupture of Fire Protection System 17.1 Area floor drains and trenches will prevent buildup of water. Deluge is directed on piping and floor area, therefore it will not affect other equipment.
| |
| 18.0 Containing Design Basis Fire in the Fire Area/Zone 18.1 Early warning ionization detectors alarming in the control room.
| |
| 18.2 Thermal detectors setting off the deluge system on the oil piping in the event the fire brigade does not respond in time.
| |
| 18.3 The entire engine room is within a minimum 3 hour fire rated structure.
| |
| 18.4 Fire dampers in the ductwork will prevent the spread of fire to equipment room above.
| |
| 19.0 How the Redundant Safe Shutdown Equipment in the Area is Protected 19.1 Not applicable. (see 15.3)
| |
| | |
| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev. 16 Appendix A Section F.2 Tab 7 STATION Fire Hazard Analysis - DG-F-2B-A Page 1 of 5 Fire Hazard Analysis - DG-F-2B-A 1.0 Building Diesel Generator Building 2.0 Fire Area or Zone DG-F-2B-A 2.1 Area Name Engine Room 2.2 Location South - El. 21-6 Drawing No 9763-F-202069-FP 3.0 Construction of Area Material Min. Fire Rating 3.1 Walls North Concrete 3 Hr.
| |
| South Concrete Outside East Concrete 3 Hr.
| |
| West Concrete Outside 3.2 Floor Concrete 3 Hr.
| |
| 3.3 Ceiling Concrete 3 Hr.
| |
| 3.4 Doors Metal 3 Hr./Outside/
| |
| 11/2 Hr. (Stairs) 3.5 Others Fireproofed Ceiling Beams 3 Hr.
| |
| 4.0 Floor Area 3,700 Sq. Ft. Length 88' Width 42' Height 29' 5.0 Volume 107,300 Cu. Ft.
| |
| 6.0 Floor Drains Nuclear Non-Nuclear X None 7.0 Exhaust Ventilation System Dg Bldg. Exhaust System 7.1 Percentage of System's Capacity 100%
| |
| 8.0 8 Hr. Emergency Lighting in Area Yes X No 8.1 Outside Area at Exit Points Yes X No 9.0 Operational Radioactivity 9.1 Equipment/Piping Yes No X 9.2 Airborne Yes No X 10.0 Fire Protection Type 10.1 Primary Manual preaction providing area protection and auto preaction in oil piping trench 10.2 Secondary Fire Extinguisher(s) 10.3 Detection Ionization & Ultraviolet/Thermal in Trench 10.4 Other Standpipe & Hose Reel 11.0 Fire Loading in Area 11.1 Refer to page 3. (Analysis continued pages 2 - 4)
| |
| | |
| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev. 16 Appendix A Section F.2 Tab 7 STATION Fire Hazard Analysis - DG-F-2B-A Page 2 of 5 12.0 Equipment and Systems in Fire Area/Zone System Train Safety Equipment System A B Related Starting Air Skid 17B DG X X Cabling DG X X Cabling DAH X X Cabling CBA X X Diesel Generator Control DG X X Cabinet CP-76B Diesel Generator Control DG X X Cabinet CP-76A 5Kv Non-Seg. Bus Duct EDE X X Damper DP-16B DAH X X Temp Switches DAH X X Diesel Generator Control DG X X Panel CP-37 Diesel Generator 1-B & DG X X Aux Terminal Box HF8 DG X X Fan-FN-26B DAH X X Cabling SW X X Damper DP-16B DAH X X Cabling EDE X X Piping & Valves DG X X 460v MCC-E611 EDE X X Cabling & Controls RC X X Disabling Panel MM X X MM-CP-450B Backup Control Air DG X X Compressor
| |
| | |
| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev. 16 Appendix A Section F.2 Tab 7 STATION Fire Hazard Analysis - DG-F-2B-A Page 3 of 5 13.0 Design Base Fire 13.1 Combustible in Area (In Situ) Fire Loading in Area Note: Oil Fire Oil: 1,627.5 Gallons 62,375 Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Grease: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Class A: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Charcoal: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Chemicals: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Plastics: 38 Pounds 134 Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Resins: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Cables: 268.5 Pounds Other: 55 LF Cable Trays 10,726 Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Stacked 3 High 13.2 Total Fire Loading in Area: 73,235 Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Total Combustibles: 270,963,800 Btu 14.0 Design-Basis Fire Description
| |
| : 1. The diesel engine is located on the 21-6 level. The engine is not operating.
| |
| : 2. The fuel oil line connecting the day tank on the 51-6 level and the diesel engine ruptures.
| |
| : 3. Fuel oil is siphoned from the day tank at a rate of 24 gpm (30 ft. of head in a 1/2 fuel oil line).
| |
| : 4. Fuel oil is sprayed into the engine room and covers an area of 400 ft.2 with a film of oil 1/16 thick.
| |
| : 5. The oil flaws into the trench around the engine.
| |
| : 6. The oil is ignited at the time of the rupture.
| |
| : 7. The oil burns at a rate of 5 per hour and consumes 21 gpm, therefore 3 gpm of unburned oil runs into the trench drain and down to the sump in the fuel oil storage tank vault at the (-)16-0 level below.
| |
| : 8. The fuel oil transfer pump at the (-)16-0 level continues to fill the day tank.
| |
| | |
| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev. 16 Appendix A Section F.2 Tab 7 STATION Fire Hazard Analysis - DG-F-2B-A Page 4 of 5
| |
| : 9. The fuel oil in the engine room is heated by the fire (4200 °F flame temperature).
| |
| The hot oil flowing into the trench will flash upon discharging into the covered sump at the (-)16-0 level below.
| |
| : 10. The heat from the fire in the covered sump will activate the sump wet pipe sprinklers and the vaults detection and suppression system and alarm in the control room.
| |
| : 11. It is estimated that a time period of 5 minutes lapses between the oil line rupture and ignition of the oil in the sump.
| |
| : 12. The transfer pump will continue to fill the day tank until either the deluge system deactivates the pump or action is taken by plant personnel in response to the alarm.
| |
| : 13. It is estimated that the detectors in the storage tank vault will alarm in 10 minutes.
| |
| : 14. It requires 62.5 minutes for the tank to empty after the fuel oil transfer pump shuts down, therefore 1500 gallons of oil drains into the engine room. The engine room fire consumes 1312 gallons while 188 gallons of oil drains into the sump below.
| |
| : 15. Estimated minimum fuel oil consumed by the fire and duration of the fire:
| |
| A) Line Rupture to Shut Down of Transfer Pump 15 Min 315 Gal B) Complete Discharge of Day Tank Into the 62.5 Min 1312 Gal Engine Room 77.5 Min 1627 Gal
| |
| : 16. Total combustibles Plastic 494,000 Btu Oil 230,784,000 Btu Cable 39,686,200 Btu Total 270,963,800 Btu
| |
| : 17. A lube oil fire was postulated but found to be less severe than the fuel oil fire, therefore it has not been considered as the design basis fire for the subject area.
| |
| 14.1 DBF Fire Loading 73,235 Btu/Sq.Ft.
| |
| 14.2 Duration of Fire >5 Minutes 14.3 Peak Temperature 1650 °F
| |
| | |
| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev. 16 Appendix A Section F.2 Tab 7 STATION Fire Hazard Analysis - DG-F-2B-A Page 5 of 5 15.0 Consequences of Design Basis Fire without Fire Protection 15.1 The area will be engulfed in flame and all equipment and cable will be lost.
| |
| 15.2 Possible spalling of concrete.
| |
| 15.3 Only one diesel generator train will be affected and safe shutdown can be accomplished by the redundant diesel located in another fire area.
| |
| 16.0 Consequences of Design Basis Fire with Fire Protection 16.1 Possible loss of the equipment and cabling.
| |
| 16.2 No damage to engine due to water deluge system on oil piping.
| |
| 16.3 Safe shutdown can be accomplished, if necessary, by the redundant diesel train located in another area.
| |
| 17.0 Consequences of Inadvertent or Careless Operation or Rupture of Fire Protection System 17.1 Area floor drains and trenches will prevent buildup of water. Deluge is directed on piping and floor area, therefore it will not affect other equipment.
| |
| 18.0 Containing Design Basis Fire in the Fire Area/Zone 18.1 Early warning ionization detectors alarming in the control room.
| |
| 18.2 Thermal detectors setting off the deluge system on the oil piping in the event the fire brigade does not respond in time.
| |
| 18.3 The entire engine room is within a minimum 3 hour fire rated structure.
| |
| 18.4 Fire dampers in the ductwork will prevent the spread of fire to equipment room above.
| |
| 19.0 How the Redundant Safe Shutdown Equipment in the Area is Protected 19.1 Not applicable. (See 15.3)
| |
| | |
| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev. 15 Appendix A Section F.2 Tab 7 STATION Fire Hazard Analysis - DG-F-3A-Z Page 1 of 4 Fire Hazard Analysis - DG-F-3A-Z 1.0 Building Diesel Generator Building 2.0 Fire Area or Zone DG-F-3A-Z 2.1 Area Name HVAC Equipment Area 2.2 Location North El. 51-6 Drawing No 9763-F-202069-FP 3.0 Construction of Area Material Min. Fire Rating 3.1 Walls North Concrete Outside South Open -
| |
| East Concrete 3 Hr.
| |
| West MCG 3 Hr.
| |
| 3.2 Floor Concrete 3 Hr.
| |
| 3.3 Ceiling Concrete Outside 3.4 Doors Metal 3 Hr.
| |
| 3.5 Others Exposed Ceiling Beams -
| |
| 4.0 Floor Area 1,555 Sq. Ft. Length 42 Width 37 Height 25 5.0 Volume 38,880 Cu. Ft.
| |
| 6.0 Floor Drains Nuclear Non-Nuclear X None 7.0 Exhaust Ventilation System None 7.1 Percentage of Systems Capacity -
| |
| 8.0 8 Hr. Emergency Lighting in Area Yes No X 8.1 Outside Area at Exit Points Yes No X 9.0 Operational Radioactivity 9.1 Equipment/Piping Yes No X 9.2 Airborne Yes No X 10.0 Fire Protection Type 10.1 Primary Fire Extinguisher(s) 10.2 Secondary Standpipe & Hose Reel 10.3 Detection Ionization & Photoelectric 10.4 Other ------
| |
| 11.0 Fire Loading in Area 11.1 Refer to page 3 of 4
| |
| | |
| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev. 15 Appendix A Section F.2 Tab 7 STATION Fire Hazard Analysis - DG-F-3A-Z Page 2 of 4 12.0 Equipment and Systems in Fire Area/Zone System Train Safety Equipment System A B Related Fan FN-25A DAH X X Cabling DAH X X Damper DP-15A DAH X X Fan FN-27A CBA X X Chiller E-230A CBA X X Fan FN-211A CBA X X Damper DP-53A CBA X X Pressure Switches CBA X X Cabling CBA X X X Fan FN-27B CBA X X Pumps P-434A/P-435A CBA X X Flow Switch DAH X X Damper DP-53B CBA X X 13.0 Design Base Fire 13.1 Combustible in Area (In Situ) Fire Loading in Area Note: Oil Fire Oil: 10 Gallons 482 Btu/Sq. Ft.*
| |
| Grease: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Class A: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Charcoal: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Chemicals: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Plastics: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Resins: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Other:
| |
| 13.2 Total Fire Loading in Area: 482 Btu/Sq. Ft.*
| |
| Total Combustibles: 1,500,000 Btu
| |
| | |
| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev. 15 Appendix A Section F.2 Tab 7 STATION Fire Hazard Analysis - DG-F-3A-Z Page 3 of 4 14.0 Design-Basis Fire Description A) Due to a lack of physical boundary both fire zones, DG-1-3A-Z and DG-F-3B-Z constitute a common fire area.
| |
| B) The oil content of control building HVAC system compressor/condensing unit spills over floor and catches fire and burn, completely.
| |
| 14.1 DBF Fire Loading 11,719 Btu/Sq.Ft.
| |
| 14.2 Duration of Fire 4 1/2 Minutes 14.3 Peak Temperature 1231 °F 15.0 Consequences of Design Basis Fire without Fire Protection 15.1 Loss of both air conditioning trains of control room a/c system because of lack of oil.
| |
| 15.2 Loss of HVAC system to both diesel generator areas as both ventilating fans are located in the affected area and, both fans take suction of hot air from the same plenum.
| |
| *Based on floor area of zones DG-F-3A-Z and DG-F-3B-Z (3100 sq. ft.).
| |
| 15.3 HVAC system cooling capability for both trains of the emergency switch gear battery room and the cable spreading area will not be lost since the fire dampers in supply air stream from diesel generator building will not reach the fuseable link melting temperature to close as a result of the Design Basis Fire (Ref. Calc.
| |
| SBC-173).
| |
| 16.0 Consequences of Design Basis Fire with Fire Protection 16.1 Loss of both trains of control room HVAC system because of lack of oil.
| |
| 16.2 Possible loss of cooling capability of both diesel generator areas as both train ventilating fans are located in the affected area.
| |
| 16.3 HVAC system cooling capability for both trains of the emergency switch gear battery room and the cable spreading area will not be lost since the fire dampers in supply air stream from diesel generator building will not reach the fuseable link melting temperature to close as a result of the Design Basis Fire (Ref. Calc.
| |
| SBC-173).
| |
| | |
| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev. 15 Appendix A Section F.2 Tab 7 STATION Fire Hazard Analysis - DG-F-3A-Z Page 4 of 4 17.0 Consequences of Inadvertent or Careless Operation or Rupture of Fire Protection System 17.1 Not applicable, no automatic water suppression system exists.
| |
| 18.0 Containing Design Basis Fire in the Fire Area/Zone 18.1 The design base fire will be contained in the fire area bounded by fire rated structures. Both affected zones are contained in the same fire area.
| |
| 19.0 How the Redundant Safe Shutdown Equipment in the Area is Protected 19.1 Redundant safe shutdown equipment if any, may be lost. For safe shutdown requirements, refer to Table 3.2.7.41 of the report Fire Protection of Safe Shutdown Capability (10 CFR 50, Appendix R).
| |
| | |
| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev. 9 Appendix A Section F.2 Tab 7 STATION Fire Hazard Analysis - DG-F-3B-Z Page 1 of 4 Fire Hazard Analysis - DG-F-3B-Z 1.0 Building Diesel Generator Building 2.0 Fire Area or Zone DG-F-3B-Z 2.1 Area Name HVAC Equipment Area 2.2 Location South El. 51-6 Drawing No 9763-F-202069-FP 3.0 Construction of Area Material Min. Fire Rating 3.1 Walls North Open -
| |
| South Concrete Outside East Concrete 3 Hr.
| |
| West MCG 3 Hr.
| |
| 3.2 Floor Concrete 3 Hr.
| |
| 3.3 Ceiling Concrete Outside 3.4 Doors Metal 3 Hr.
| |
| 3.5 Others Exposed Ceiling Beams -
| |
| 4.0 Floor Area 1,555 Sq. Ft. Length 42 Width 37 Height 25 5.0 Volume 38,880 Cu. Ft.
| |
| 6.0 Floor Drains Nuclear Non-Nuclear X None 7.0 Exhaust Ventilation System None 7.1 Percentage of Systems Capacity -
| |
| 8.0 8 Hr. Emergency Lighting in Area Yes No X 8.1 Outside Area at Exit Points Yes No X 9.0 Operational Radioactivity 9.1 Equipment/Piping Yes No X 9.2 Airborne Yes No X 10.0 Fire Protection Type 10.1 Primary Fire Extinguisher(s) 10.2 Secondary Standpipe & Hose Reel 10.3 Detection Ionization 10.4 Other ------
| |
| 11.0 Fire Loading in Area 11.1 Refer to page 2 of 4
| |
| | |
| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev. 9 Appendix A Section F.2 Tab 7 STATION Fire Hazard Analysis - DG-F-3B-Z Page 2 of 4 12.0 Equipment and Systems in Fire Area/Zone System Train Safety Equipment System A B Related Fan-FN-25B DAH X X Cabling DAH X X Damper DP-15B DAH X X Fan FN-211B CBA X X Chiller E-230B CBA X X Pressure Switches CBA X X Cabling CBA X X Pumps P-434B-435B CBA X X Flow Switch DAH X X 13.0 Design Base Fire 13.1 Combustible in Area (In Situ) Fire Loading in Area Note: Oil Fire Oil: 10 Gallons 482 Btu/Sq. Ft.*
| |
| Grease: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Class A: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Charcoal: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Chemicals: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Plastics: 27 Pounds 113 Btu/Sq. Ft.*
| |
| Resins: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Other:
| |
| 13.2 Total Fire Loading in Area: 595 Btu/Sq. Ft.*
| |
| Total Combustibles: 1,851,000 Btu
| |
| * Based on floor area of zones DG-1-3A-Z and DG-1-3B-Z (3110 Sq. Ft.)
| |
| | |
| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev. 9 Appendix A Section F.2 Tab 7 STATION Fire Hazard Analysis - DG-F-3B-Z Page 3 of 4 14.0 Design-Basis Fire Description A) Due to a lack of physical boundary both fire zones, DG-F-3A-Z and DG-F-3B-Z constitute a common fire area.
| |
| B) The oil content of control building HVAC system compressor/condensing unit spills over floor and catches fire and burn completely.
| |
| 14.1 DBF Fire Loading 11,719 Btu/Sq.Ft.
| |
| 14.2 Duration of Fire 4 1/2 Minutes 14.3 Peak Temperature 1231 °F 15.0 Consequences of Design Basis Fire without Fire Protection 15.1 Loss of both air conditioning trains of control room A/C System because of lack of oil.
| |
| 15.2 Loss of HVAC system to both diesel generator areas as both ventilating fans are located in the affected area and take suction of hot air from the same plenum.
| |
| 15.3 HVAC system cooling capability for both trains of the emergency switch gear battery room and the cable spreading area will not be lost since the fire dampers in supply air stream from diesel generator building will not reach the fuseable link melting temperature to close as a result of the Design Basis Fire (Ref. Calc.
| |
| SBC-173).
| |
| 16.0 Consequences of Design Basis Fire with Fire Protection 16.1 Loss of both trains of control room HVAC system because of lack of oil.
| |
| 16.2 Possible Loss of Cooling Capability of Both Diesel Generator Areas As Both Train Ventilating Fans Are Located in the Affected Area.
| |
| 16.3 HVAC system cooling capability for both trains of the emergency switch gear battery room and the cable spreading area will not be lost since the fire dampers in supply air stream from diesel generator building will not reach the fuseable link melting temperature to close as a result of the Design Basis Fire (Ref. Calc.
| |
| SBC-173).
| |
| 17.0 Consequences of Inadvertent or Careless Operation or Rupture of Fire Protection System 17.1 Not applicable, no automatic water suppression system exists.
| |
| | |
| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev. 9 Appendix A Section F.2 Tab 7 STATION Fire Hazard Analysis - DG-F-3B-Z Page 4 of 4 18.0 Containing Design Basis Fire in the Fire Area/Zone 18.1 The design base fire will be contained in the fire area bounded by fire rated structures. Both affected zones are contained in the same fire area.
| |
| 19.0 How the Redundant Safe Shutdown Equipment in the Area is Protected 19.1 Redundant safe shutdown equipment if any, may be lost. For safe shutdown requirements refer to Table 3.2.7.41 of the report Fire Protection Safe Shutdown Capability (10 CFR 50, Appendix R).
| |
| | |
| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev. 7 Appendix A Section F.2 Tab 7 STATION Fire Hazard Analysis - DG-F-3C-A Page 1 of 3 Fire Hazard Analysis - DG-F-3C-A 1.0 Building Diesel Generator Building 2.0 Fire Area or Zone DG-F-3C-A 2.1 Area Name Fuel Oil Day Tank Area 2.2 Location North - El. 51-6 Drawing No 9763-F-202069-FP 3.0 Construction of Area Material Min. Fire Rating 3.1 Walls North Concrete 3 Hr.
| |
| South Concrete 3 Hr.
| |
| East Concrete 3 Hr.
| |
| West Concrete 3 Hr.
| |
| 3.2 Floor Concrete 3 Hr.
| |
| 3.3 Ceiling Concrete 3 Hr.
| |
| 3.4 Doors Metal 3 Hr.
| |
| 3.5 Others - -
| |
| 4.0 Floor Area 200 Sq. Ft. Length 23.5 Width 8.5 Height 11.0 5.0 Volume 2,200 Cu. Ft.
| |
| 6.0 Floor Drains Nuclear Non-Nuclear X None 7.0 Exhaust Ventilation System Gravity 7.1 Percentage of Systems Capacity None 8.0 8 Hr. Emergency Lighting in Area Yes No X 8.1 Outside Area at Exit Points Yes No X 9.0 Operational Radioactivity 9.1 Equipment/Piping Yes No X 9.2 Airborne Yes No X 10.0 Fire Protection Type 10.1 Primary Deluge Systems 10.2 Secondary Fire Extinguisher(s) 10.3 Detection Ionization & Thermal 10.4 Other Standpipe and Hose Reel 11.0 Fire Loading in Area 11.1 Refer to page 2 (analysis continued Pages 2 & 3)
| |
| | |
| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev. 7 Appendix A Section F.2 Tab 7 STATION Fire Hazard Analysis - DG-F-3C-A Page 2 of 3 12.0 Equipment and Systems in Fire Area/Zone System Train Safety Equipment System A B Related Fuel Oil Day Tank DG X X Instruments DG X X Cabling DG X X Level Switches DG X X Piping & Valves DG X X 13.0 Design Base Fire 13.1 Combustible in Area (In Situ) Fire Loading in Area Note: Oil Fire Oil: 1,500 Gallons 1,125,000 Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Grease: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Class A: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Charcoal: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Chemicals: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Plastics: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Resins: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Other:
| |
| 13.2 Total Fire Loading in Area: 1,125,000 Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Total Combustibles: 225 X 106 Btu 14.0 Design-Basis Fire Description
| |
| : 1. The diesel oil day tank ruptures and oil spills on the enclosure floor. Floor drain will remove some of the oil. It is conservatively assumed that some of the oil will burn in the enclosure.
| |
| : 2. The maximum rate of burn equals 5 per hour.
| |
| : 3. The oil may burn in excess of 3 hours, at which time the enclosure is assumed to fail. Consequences of failed enclosure is beyond the scope of this appendix A FHA report.
| |
| | |
| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev. 7 Appendix A Section F.2 Tab 7 STATION Fire Hazard Analysis - DG-F-3C-A Page 3 of 3
| |
| : 4. During the 3 hours before the failure of the enclosure, 900 gallons of oil is consumed and the remaining oil will be contained within the bottom or stamp section of the enclosure.
| |
| 14.1 DBF Fire Loading 675,000 Btu/Sq.Ft.
| |
| 14.2 Duration of Fire 3 Hours (Five hours without any means of fire protection) 14.3 Peak Temperature 2,650 °F 15.0 Consequences of Design Basis Fire without Fire Protection 15.1 Loss of the diesel oil day tank and oil.
| |
| 15.2 Loss of the instruments, lighting and cable in the tank vault.
| |
| 15.3 Safe shutdown can be accomplished using the redundant diesel fuel oil day tank which is located outside the 3 hour barrier. (The redundant fuel oil day tank may be lost if fire is not controlled within three hours).
| |
| 16.0 Consequences of Design Basis Fire with Fire Protection 16.1 Possible loss of the day tank, instruments and oil.
| |
| 16.2 Safe shutdown can be accomplished using the redundant diesel train which is located outside the 3 hour barrier.
| |
| 17.0 Consequences of Inadvertent or Careless Operation or Rupture of Fire Protection System 17.1 Vault contains a floor drain which discharges into the sump in the storage tank vault at the (-) 16-0 level, therefore damage due to water is of no consequence.
| |
| 18.0 Containing Design Basis Fire in the Fire Area/Zone 18.1 Fire detectors initiate an alarm in the control room. The control room alerts the fire brigade.
| |
| 18.2 In the event the fire brigade cannot extinguish the fire the rate of rise detectors will set off the water deluge fire protection system.
| |
| 18.3 If deluge system fails then fire will be put out by stand pipe and hose reels.
| |
| 19.0 How the Redundant Safe Shutdown Equipment in the Area is Protected 19.1 There is no redundant safe shutdown equipment in this fire area. (Refer 15.3 above). If in unlikely event both diesel generator day tanks are lost as fire burns beyond three hours, safe shutdown of reactor will be achieved either from control room or RSS panel.
| |
| | |
| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev. 6 Appendix A Section F.2 Tab 7 STATION Fire Hazard Analysis - DG-F-3D-A Page 1 of 3 Fire Hazard Analysis - DG-F-3D-A 1.0 Building Diesel Generator Building 2.0 Fire Area or Zone DG-F-3D-A 2.1 Area Name Fuel Oil Day Tank Area 2.2 Location South El. 51-6 Drawing No 9763-F-202069-FP 3.0 Construction of Area Material Min. Fire Rating 3.1 Walls North Concrete 3 Hr.
| |
| South Concrete 3 Hr.
| |
| East Concrete 3 Hr.
| |
| West Concrete 3 Hr.
| |
| 3.2 Floor Concrete 3 Hr.
| |
| 3.3 Ceiling Concrete 3 Hr.
| |
| 3.4 Doors Metal 3 Hr.
| |
| 3.5 Others - -
| |
| 4.0 Floor Area 200 Sq. Ft. Length 23.5 Width 8.5 Height 11.0 5.0 Volume 2,200 Cu. Ft.
| |
| 6.0 Floor Drains Nuclear Non-Nuclear X None 7.0 Exhaust Ventilation System Gravity 7.1 Percentage of Systems Capacity None 8.0 8 Hr. Emergency Lighting in Area Yes No X 8.1 Outside Area at Exit Points Yes No X 9.0 Operational Radioactivity 9.1 Equipment/Piping Yes No X 9.2 Airborne Yes No X 10.0 Fire Protection Type 10.1 Primary Deluge Systems 10.2 Secondary Fire Extinguisher(s) 10.3 Detectional Ionization & Thermal 10.4 Other Standpipe and Hose Reel 11.0 Fire Loading in Area 11.1 Refer to page 2 (analysis continued pages 2 & 3)
| |
| | |
| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev. 6 Appendix A Section F.2 Tab 7 STATION Fire Hazard Analysis - DG-F-3D-A Page 2 of 3 12.0 Equipment and Systems in Fire Area/Zone System Train Safety Equipment System A B Related Fuel Oil Day Tank DG X X Instruments DG X X Cabling DG X X Level Switches DG X X Piping & Valves DG X X 13.0 Design Base Fire 13.1 Combustible in Area (In Situ) Fire Loading in Area Note: Oil Fire Oil: 1,500 Gallons 1,125,000 Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Grease: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Class A: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Charcoal: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Chemicals: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Plastics: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Resins: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Other:
| |
| 13.2 Total Fire Loading in Area: 1,125,000 Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Total Combustibles: 225 X 106 Btu 14.0 Design-Basis Fire Description
| |
| : 1. The diesel oil day tank ruptures and oil spills on the enclosure floor. Floor drain will remove some of the oil. It is conservatively assumed that some of the oil will burn in the enclosure.
| |
| : 2. The maximum rate of burn equals 5 per hour.
| |
| : 3. The oil may burn in excess of 3 hours, at which time the enclosure is assumed to fail. Consequences of failed enclosure is beyond the scope of this Appendix A FHA report.
| |
| : 4. During the 3 hours before the failure of the enclosure, 900 gallons of oil is consumed. The remaining oil will be contained within the bottom part or sump section of the enclosure.
| |
| | |
| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev. 6 Appendix A Section F.2 Tab 7 STATION Fire Hazard Analysis - DG-F-3D-A Page 3 of 3 14.1 DBF Fire Loading 675,000 Btu/Sq.Ft.
| |
| 14.2 Duration of Fire 3 Hours (Five hours without any means of fire protection) 14.3 Peak Temperature 2,650 °F 15.0 Consequences of Design Basis Fire without Fire Protection 15.1 Loss of the diesel oil day tank and oil.
| |
| 15.2 Loss of the instruments, lighting and cable in the tank vault.
| |
| 15.3 Safe shutdown can be accomplished using the redundant diesel fuel oil day tank which is located outside the 3 hour barrier. (The redundant fuel oil day tank may be lost if fire is not controlled within three hours).
| |
| 16.0 Consequences of Design Basis Fire with Fire Protection 16.1 Possible loss of the day tank, instruments and oil.
| |
| 16.2 Safe shutdown can be accomplished using the redundant diesel train which is located outside the 3 hour barrier.
| |
| 17.0 Consequences of Inadvertent or Careless Operation or Rupture of Fire Protection System 17.1 Vault contains a floor drain which discharges into the sump in the storage tank vault at the (-) 16-0 level, therefore damage due to water is of no consequence.
| |
| 18.0 Containing Design Basis Fire in the Fire Area/Zone 18.1 Fire detectors initiate an alarm in the control room. The control room alerts the fire brigade.
| |
| 18.2 In the event the fire brigade cannot extinguish the fire the rate of rise detectors will set off the water deluge fire protection system.
| |
| 18.3 If deluge system fails then fire will be put out by stand pipe and hose reels.
| |
| 19.0 How the Redundant Safe Shutdown Equipment in the Area is Protected 19.1 There is no redundant safe shutdown equipment in this fire area. (Refer 15.3 above). If in unlikely event both diesel generator day tanks are lost as fire burns beyond three hours, safe shutdown of reactor will be achieved either from control room or RSS panel.
| |
| | |
| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev. 6 Appendix A Section F.2 Tab 7 STATION Fire Hazard Analysis - DG-F-3E-A Page 1 of 2 Fire Hazard Analysis - DG-F-3E-A 1.0 Building Diesel Generator Building 2.0 Fire Area or Zone DG-F-3E-A 2.1 Area Name Train A, D.G. Air Intake & Exhaust Silencer Area 2.2 Location El. 51-6 Drawing No 9763-F-202069-FP 3.0 Construction of Area Material Min. Fire Rating 3.1 Walls North Concrete Outside South Concrete/MCG 3 Hr.
| |
| East Concrete/MCG 3 Hr.
| |
| West Concrete/MCG Outside/3 Hr.
| |
| 3.2 Floor Concrete 3 Hr.
| |
| 3.3 Ceiling Concrete Outside 3.4 Doors Metal 3 Hr. /11/2 Hr. (Stairs) 3.5 Others - -
| |
| 4.0 Floor Area 2,050 Sq. Ft. Length Varies Width Varies Height 25 5.0 Volume 51,250 Cu. Ft.
| |
| 6.0 Floor Drains Nuclear Non-Nuclear X None 7.0 Exhaust Ventilation System None 7.1 Percentage of Systems Capacity -
| |
| 8.0 8 Hr. Emergency Lighting in Area Yes No X 8.1 Outside Area at Exit Points Yes X No 9.0 Operational Radioactivity 9.1 Equipment/Piping Yes No X 9.2 Airborne Yes No X 10.0 Fire Protection Type 10.1 Primary Fire Extinguisher(s) 10.2 Secondary Standpipe and Hose Reel 10.3 Detection None 10.4 Other ------
| |
| 11.0 Fire Loading in Area 11.1 None X (no further analysis required)
| |
| | |
| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev. 6 Appendix A Section F.2 Tab 7 STATION Fire Hazard Analysis - DG-F-3E-A Page 2 of 2 12.0 Equipment and Systems in Fire Area/Zone System Train Safety Equipment System A B Related Air Intake Filter F-36Z DG X X Exhaust Silencer DG X X MM-8A
| |
| | |
| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev. 6 Appendix A Section F.2 Tab 7 STATION Fire Hazard Analysis - DG-F-3F-A Page 1 of 2 Fire Hazard Analysis - DG-F-3F-A 1.0 Building Diesel Generator Building 2.0 Fire Area or Zone DG-F-3F-A 2.1 Area Name Train B, D.G. Air Intake & Exhaust Silencer Area 2.2 Location El. 51-6 Drawing No 9763-F-202069-FP 3.0 Construction of Area Material Min. Fire Rating 3.1 Walls North Concrete/MCG 3 Hr.
| |
| South Concrete Outside East Concrete/MCG 3 Hr.
| |
| West Concrete/MCG Outside/3 Hr.
| |
| 3.2 Floor Concrete 3 Hr.
| |
| 3.3 Ceiling Concrete Outside 3.4 Doors Metal 3 Hr. /11/2 Hr. (Stairs) 3.5 Others - -
| |
| 4.0 Floor Area 2,050 Sq. Ft. Length Varies Width Varies Height 25 5.0 Volume 51,250 Cu. Ft.
| |
| 6.0 Floor Drains Nuclear Non-Nuclear X None 7.0 Exhaust Ventilation System None 7.1 Percentage of Systems Capacity -
| |
| 8.0 8 Hr. Emergency Lighting in Area Yes No X 8.1 Outside Area at Exit Points Yes X No 9.0 Operational Radioactivity 9.1 Equipment/Piping Yes No X 9.2 Airborne Yes No X 10.0 Fire Protection Type 10.1 Primary Fire Extinguisher(s) 10.2 Secondary Standpipe and Hose Reel 10.3 Detection None 10.4 Other ------
| |
| 11.0 Fire Loading in Area 11.1 None X (No Further Analysis Required)
| |
| | |
| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev. 6 Appendix A Section F.2 Tab 7 STATION Fire Hazard Analysis - DG-F-3F-A Page 2 of 2 12.0 Equipment and Systems in Fire Area/Zone System Train Safety Equipment System A B Related Air Intake Filter F-36B DG X X Exhaust Silencer DG X X MM-8B
| |
| | |
| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev. 6 Appendix A Section F.2 Tab 7 STATION Fire Hazard Analysis - DG-F-S1-0 Page 1 of 2 Fire Hazard Analysis - DG-F-S1-0 1.0 Building Diesel Generator Building 2.0 Fire Area or Zone DG-F-S1-0 2.1 Area Name Stairwell 2.2 Location Col. A-9 Drawing No 9763-F-202068-FP 3.0 Construction of Area Material Min. Fire Rating 3.1 Walls North Concrete Outside South Concrete 3 Hr.
| |
| East Concrete 3 Hr.
| |
| West Concrete Outside 3.2 Floor Concrete Outside 3.3 Ceiling Concrete Outside 3.4 Doors Metal 11/2 Hr.
| |
| 3.5 Others - -
| |
| 4.0 Floor Area 137 Sq. Ft. Length 16-4 Width 8-4 Height 43 5.0 Volume 5,890 Cu. Ft.
| |
| 6.0 Floor Drains Nuclear Non-Nuclear X None 7.0 Exhaust Ventilation System None 7.1 Percentage of Systems Capacity N/A 8.0 8 Hr. Emergency Lighting in Area Yes No X 8.1 Outside Area at Exit Points Yes X No 9.0 Operational Radioactivity 9.1 Equipment/Piping Yes No X 9.2 Airborne Yes No X 10.0 Fire Protection Type 10.1 Primary Portable Extinguisher(s) 10.2 Secondary Hose Station 10.3 Detection None 10.4 Other ------
| |
| 11.0 Fire Loading in Area 11.1 None X (no further analysis required)
| |
| | |
| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev. 6 Appendix A Section F.2 Tab 7 STATION Fire Hazard Analysis - DG-F-S1-0 Page 2 of 2 12.0 Equipment and Systems in Fire Area/Zone System Train Safety Equipment System A B Related No Safety Related or Safe Shutdown Equipment in This Area
| |
| | |
| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev. 6 Appendix A Section F.2 Tab 7 STATION Fire Hazard Analysis - DG-F-S2-0 Page 1 of 2 Fire Hazard Analysis - DG-F-S2-0 1.0 Building Diesel Generator Building 2.0 Fire Area or Zone DG-F-S2-0 2.1 Area Name Stairwell 2.2 Location Col. E-9 Drawing No 9763-F-202068-FP 3.0 Construction of Area Material Min. Fire Rating 3.1 Walls North Concrete 3 Hr.
| |
| South Concrete Outside East Concrete 3 Hr.
| |
| West Concrete Outside 3.2 Floor Concrete Outside 3.3 Ceiling Concrete Outside 3.4 Doors Metal 11/2 Hr.
| |
| 3.5 Others - -
| |
| 4.0 Floor Area 137 Sq. Ft. Length 16'-6" Width 8'-4" Height 11'-6" 5.0 Volume 9,795 Cu. Ft.
| |
| 6.0 Floor Drains Nuclear Non-Nuclear X None 7.0 Exhaust Ventilation System None 7.1 Percentage of System's Capacity N/A 8.0 8 Hr. Emergency Lighting in Area Yes X No 8.1 Outside Area at Exit Points Yes X No 9.0 Operational Radioactivity 9.1 Equipment/Piping Yes No X 9.2 Airborne Yes No X 10.0 Fire Protection Type 10.1 Primary Portable Extinguisher(s) 10.2 Secondary Hose Station 10.3 Detection None 10.4 Other ------
| |
| 11.0 Fire Loading in Area 11.1 None X (no further analysis required)
| |
| | |
| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev. 6 Appendix A Section F.2 Tab 7 STATION Fire Hazard Analysis - DG-F-S2-0 Page 2 of 2 12.0 Equipment and Systems in Fire Area/Zone System Train Safety Equipment System A B Related No Safety Related or Safe Shutdown Equipment in This Area
| |
| | |
| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev 6 Appendix A Section F.2 Tab 8 STATION Fire Hazard Analysis - PAB-F-1A-Z Page 1 of 3 PAB-F-1A-Z 1.0 Building Primary Auxiliary Building 2.0 Fire Area or Zone PAB-F-1A-Z 2.1 Area Name Chiller Pump Area 2.2 Location North Side El 7-0 Drawing No 9763-805061-FP 3.0 Construction of Area Material Min. Fire Rating*
| |
| 3.1 Walls North Concrete 3 Hr./Outside South Concrete Outside/3 Hr.
| |
| East Concrete 3 Hr./Outside West Concrete/Open 3 Hr./-
| |
| 3.2 Floor Concrete -
| |
| 3.3 Ceiling Concrete -
| |
| 3.4 Doors Metal 3 Hr./11/2 Hr. (Stairs) 3.5 Others Exposed Ceiling Beams -
| |
| 4.0 Floor Area 5,100 Sq. Ft. Length Varies Width Varies Height 16'-0" 5.0 Volume 81,600 Cu. Ft.
| |
| 6.0 Floor Drains Nuclear X Non-Nuclear None 7.0 Exhaust Ventilation System PAB 7.1 Percentage of System's Capacity 100%
| |
| 8.0 8 Hr. Emergency Lighting in Area Yes X No 8.1 Outside Area at Exit Points Yes X No 9.0 Operational Radioactivity 9.1 Equipment/Piping Yes X No 9.2 Airborne Yes No X 10.0 Fire Protection Type 10.1 Primary Fire Extinguisher(s) 10.2 Secondary Standpipe and Hose Reel 10.3 Detection Ionization 10.4 Other ------
| |
| 11.0 Fire Loading in Area 11.1 Refer to pages 2 and 3.
| |
| The ceiling of piping tunnel and walkway between Fuel Storage Building and PAB 7 elevation which is also a floor of fire zone CE-F-1-Z (Tab 13) is 3 hr. fire rated.
| |
| | |
| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev 6 Appendix A Section F.2 Tab 8 STATION Fire Hazard Analysis - PAB-F-1A-Z Page 2 of 3 12.0 Equipment and Systems in Fire Area/Zone System Train Safety Equipment System A B Related Cabling SW X X X Cabling CC X X X Cabling CS X X X Cabling SWA X X X Cabling EDE X X X Cabling EAH X X Cabling PAH X X Piping, Valves &
| |
| Instrumentation CC X X X Piping, Valves &
| |
| Instrumentation CS X X X Instrument Rack IR-L7 MM X X X Cabling RC X X Cabling SI X X Terminal Boxes EDE X X X 13.0 Design Base Fire 13.1 Combustible in Area (In Situ) Fire Loading in Area Note: Oil Fire Oil: 6.0 Gallons 176.5 Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Grease: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Class A: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Charcoal: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Chemicals: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Plastics: 28 Pounds 71.4 Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Resins: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Other:
| |
| 13.2 Total Fire Loading in Area: 248 Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Total Combustibles: 1,264,000 Btu
| |
| | |
| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev 6 Appendix A Section F.2 Tab 8 STATION Fire Hazard Analysis - PAB-F-1A-Z Page 3 of 3 14.0 Design-Basis Fire Description (A) Conservatively assume both chiller pumps, chiller, both makeup water pumps and chromated water connection tank pump skid rupture simultaneously and spill over an area of 77 sq. ft. and burn.
| |
| (B) To add additional conservatism consider ventilation supply/exhaust air has been isolated.
| |
| 14.1 DBF Fire Loading 11,688 Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| 14.2 Peak Area/Zone Temp. During Fire 585 °F 14.3 Duration of Fire 4 1/2 Min.
| |
| 15.0 Consequences of Design Basis Fire without Fire Protection 15.1 The chiller, chiller pumps, chromated water pump, and the reactor makeup water pumps will be lost upon loss of oil.
| |
| 15.2 Possible loss of some instruments and control devices.
| |
| 16.0 Consequences of Design Basis Fire with Fire Protection 16.1 The chiller pumps, chromated water pump, and the reactor makeup water pumps may be lost.
| |
| 17.0 Consequences of Inadvertent or Careless Operation or Rupture of Fire Protection System 17.1 Not applicable as no automatic water suppression system is provided in the zone.
| |
| 18.0 Containing Design Basis Fire in the Fire Area/Zone 18.1 Total combustibles will burn in less than five minutes. all surrounding zones/area are separated by concrete structures (many walls are fire rated), and hence the oil fire on 77 sq. ft. of the total 5100 sq. ft. area will be contained in the affected zone.
| |
| 19.0 How is Redundant Safe Shutdown Equipment in the Same Area Protected 19.1 Not applicable as no redundant safe shutdown equipment is located in the same fire zone.
| |
| | |
| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev 6 Appendix A Section F.2 Tab 8 STATION Fire Hazard Analysis - PAB-F-1B-Z Page 1 of 2 PAB-F-1B-Z 1.0 Building Primary Auxiliary Building 2.0 Fire Area or Zone PAB-F-1B-Z 2.1 Area Name Demin. Filter and Valve Maint. Area 2.2 Location West Side - El. (-) 60 To 70 Drawing No 9763-F-805061-FP 3.0 Construction of Area Material Min. Fire Rating 3.1 Walls North Concrete -
| |
| South Concrete -
| |
| East Concrete -
| |
| West Concrete 3 Hr./-
| |
| 3.2 Floor Concrete -
| |
| 3.3 Ceiling Concrete -
| |
| 3.4 Doors Metal -
| |
| 3.5 Others Exposed Ceiling -
| |
| 4.0 Floor Area 2,900 Sq. Ft. Length 82' Width 35.5' Height Varies 5.0 Volume 61,000 Cu. Ft.
| |
| 6.0 Floor Drains Nuclear X Non-Nuclear None 7.0 Exhaust Ventilation System PAB 7.1 Percentage of System's Capacity 100%
| |
| 8.0 8 Hr. Emergency Lighting in Area Yes No X 8.1 Outside Area at Exit Points Yes X No 9.0 Operational Radioactivity 9.1 Equipment/Piping Yes X No 9.2 Airborne Yes No X 10.0 Fire Protection Type 10.1 Primary Fire Extinguisher(s) 10.2 Secondary Standpipe and Hose Reel 10.3 Detection None 10.4 Other ------
| |
| 11.0 Fire Loading in Area 11.1 None X (No further analysis required)
| |
| | |
| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev 6 Appendix A Section F.2 Tab 8 STATION Fire Hazard Analysis - PAB-F-1B-Z Page 2 of 2 12.0 Equipment and Systems in Fire Area/Zone System Train Safety Equipment System A B Related No equipment required for safe shutdown in this zone also, no safety related equipment here.
| |
| | |
| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev 8 Appendix A Section F.2 Tab 8 STATION Fire Hazard Analysis - PAB-F-1C-A Page 1 of 3 PAB-F-1C-A 1.0 Building Primary Auxiliary Building 2.0 Fire Area or Zone PAB-F-1C-A 2.1 Area Name Charging Pump - 2A Area 2.2 Location East Side - El. 70 Drawing No 9763-F-80506l-FP 3.0 Construction of Area Material Min. Fire Rating 3.1 Walls North Concrete 1 1/2 Hr.
| |
| South Concrete 3 Hr.
| |
| East Concrete Outside West MCG 1 1/2 Hr.
| |
| 3.2 Floor Concrete Outside 3.3 Ceiling Concrete 1 1/2 Hr.
| |
| 3.4 Doors Metal 1 1/2 Hr.
| |
| 3.5 Others Fireproofed Ceiling Beams 1 1/2 Hr.
| |
| 4.0 Floor Area 318 Sq. Ft. Length 26.5' Width 12' Height 15.25' 5.0 Volume 4,850 Cu. Ft.
| |
| 6.0 Floor Drains Nuclear X Non-Nuclear None 7.0 Exhaust Ventilation System PAB 7.1 Percentage of System's Capacity 100%
| |
| 8.0 8 Hr. Emergency Lighting in Area Yes X No 8.1 Outside Area at Exit Points Yes No X 9.0 Operational Radioactivity 9.1 Equipment/Piping Yes X No 9.2 Airborne Yes No X 10.0 Fire Protection Type 10.1 Primary Fire Extinguisher(s) 10.2 Secondary Standpipe and Hose Reel 10.3 Detection Ionization 10.4 Other ------
| |
| 11.0 Fire Loading in Area 11.1 Refer to page 2 (analysis continued pg. 2, 3 & 4)
| |
| | |
| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev 8 Appendix A Section F.2 Tab 8 STATION Fire Hazard Analysis - PAB-F-1C-A Page 2 of 3 12.0 Equipment and Systems in Fire Area/Zone Required System Train Safety For Safe Equipment System A B Related Shutdown Charging Pump P-2A CS X X X Piping & Valves CBS X X X Piping & Valves CS X X X Piping & Valves CC X X X Cabling CS X X X Pressure Switches CS X X 13.0 Design Base Fire 13.1 Combustible in Area (In Situ) Fire Loading in Area Note: Oil Fire Oil: 61 Gallons 28,774 Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Grease: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Class A: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Charcoal: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Chemicals: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Plastics: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Resins: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Other:
| |
| 13.2 Total Fire Loading in Area: 28,744 Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Total Combustibles: 9,150,000 Btu 14.0 Design-Basis Fire Description
| |
| : 1. Oil reservoir rupture, oil spreads over the entire floor area of the room (318 sq.
| |
| ft.). The thickness of the oil film is 1/4 over the entire floor area.
| |
| : 2. The oil is ignited, burns and is consumed.
| |
| : 3. The space temperature is assumed to be sufficiently high that all the cable in the space will fail. Cable will not contribute to the fire because it is contained within conduit.
| |
| 14.1 DBF Fire Loading 1,524 Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| 14.2 Fire Duration Less than one minute.
| |
| 14.3 Peak Temperature 5959 °F (High temp. spike in short duration).
| |
| | |
| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev 8 Appendix A Section F.2 Tab 8 STATION Fire Hazard Analysis - PAB-F-1C-A Page 3 of 3 15.0 Consequences of Design Basis Fire without Fire Protection 15.1 Loss of the pump due to rupture and loss of oil.
| |
| 15.2 Loss of the cabling due to fire.
| |
| 15.3 The adjacent fire area containing a redundant unit is separated by a 3-hour barrier; therefore safe shutdown can be accomplished.
| |
| 15.4 The structural steel beams and metal partition are covered with a fire protective coating, therefore no damage.
| |
| 15.5 There will be possible spalling of the concrete.
| |
| 15.6 The fire will be contained within the area due to its short duration.
| |
| 16.0 Consequences of Design Basis Fire with Fire Protection 16.1 Loss of the pump due to rupture and loss of oil.
| |
| 16.2 Possible loss of cabling to pump.
| |
| 17.0 Consequences of Inadvertent or Careless Operation or Rupture of Fire Protection System 17.1 Not applicable (no water suppression in area).
| |
| 18.0 Containing Design Basis Fire in the Fire Area/Zone 18.1 Fire detectors initiate an alarm in the control room. The control room alerts the fire brigade.
| |
| 18.2 The fire brigade will extinguish the fire using portable fire extinguishers or fire hoses if necessary.
| |
| 18.3 Concrete walls and fire proofing on metal partition and exposed steel will limit the fire to the subject area.
| |
| 18.4 Fire dampers in the ductwork will prevent the spread of fire to adjacent areas.
| |
| 19.0 How is Redundant Safe Shutdown Equipment in the Same Area Protected 19.1 Not applicable (see 15.3).
| |
| | |
| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev 8 Appendix A Section F.2 Tab 8 STATION Fire Hazard Analysis - PAB-F-1D-A Page 1 of 3 PAB-F-1D-A 1.0 Building Primary Auxiliary Building 2.0 Fire Area or Zone PAB-F-1D-A 2.1 Area Name Charging Pump - 2B Area 2.2 Location East Side - El. 70 Drawing No 9763-F-805061-FP 3.0 Construction of Area Material Min. Fire Rating 3.1 Walls North Concrete 3 Hr.
| |
| South Concrete 3 Hr.
| |
| East Concrete Outside West MCG 3 Hr.
| |
| 3.2 Floor Concrete 3 Hr.
| |
| 3.3 Ceiling Concrete 3 Hr.
| |
| 3.4 Doors Metal 3 Hr.
| |
| 3.5 Others Fireproofed Ceiling Beams 3 Hr.
| |
| 4.0 Floor Area 318 Sq. Ft. Length 26.5' Width 12' Height 15.25' 5.0 Volume 4,850 Cu. Ft.
| |
| 6.0 Floor Drains Nuclear X Non-Nuclear None 7.0 Exhaust Ventilation System PAB 7.1 Percentage of System's Capacity 100%
| |
| 8.0 8 Hr. Emergency Lighting in Area Yes X No 8.1 Outside Area at Exit Points Yes No X 9.0 Operational Radioactivity 9.1 Equipment/Piping Yes X No 9.2 Airborne Yes No X 10.0 Fire Protection Type 10.1 Primary Fire Extinguisher(s) 10.2 Secondary Standpipe and Hose Reel 10.3 Detection Ionization 10.4 Other ------
| |
| 11.0 Fire Loading in Area 11.1 Refer to page 2. (analysis continued pg. 2 - 4)
| |
| | |
| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev 8 Appendix A Section F.2 Tab 8 STATION Fire Hazard Analysis - PAB-F-1D-A Page 2 of 3 12.0 Equipment and Systems in Fire Area/Zone Required System Train Safety For Safe Equipment System A B Related Shutdown Charging Pump P-2b CS X X X Piping & Valves CBS X X X Piping & Valves CS X X X Piping & Valves CC X X X Cabling CS X X X Press Switches CS X X 13.0 Design Base Fire (In Situ) 13.1 Combustible in Area (In Situ) Fire Loading in Area Note: Oil Fire Oil: 61 Gallons 28,774 Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Grease: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Class A: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Charcoal: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Chemicals: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Plastics: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Resins: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Other:
| |
| 13.2 Total Fire Loading in Area: 28,774 Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Total Combustibles: 9,150,000 Btu 14.0 Design-Basis Fire Description
| |
| : 1. Oil reservoir rupture, oil spreads over the entire floor area of the room (318 sq. ft.). The thickness of the oil film is 1/4 over the entire floor area.
| |
| : 2. The oil is ignited, burns and is consumed.
| |
| : 3. The space temperature is assumed to be sufficiently high that all the cable in the space will fail. Cable will not contribute to the fire because it is contained within conduit.
| |
| 14.1 DBF Fire Loading 1,524 Btu/Sq. Ft. (3.23 gallons oil consumed in 318 sq. ft.)
| |
| 14.2 Fire Duration Less than one minute.
| |
| 14.3 Peak Temperature 5959 °F (High temp. spike in short duration).
| |
| | |
| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev 8 Appendix A Section F.2 Tab 8 STATION Fire Hazard Analysis - PAB-F-1D-A Page 3 of 3 15.0 Consequences of Design Basis Fire without Fire Protection 15.1 Loss of the pump due to rupture and loss of oil.
| |
| 15.2 Loss of the cabling due to fire.
| |
| 15.3 The adjacent fire area containing a redundant unit is separated by a 3-hour barrier; therefore, safe shutdown can be accomplished.
| |
| 15.4 The structural steel beams and metal partition are covered with a fire protective coating, therefore no damage.
| |
| 15.5 There will be possible spalling of the concrete.
| |
| 15.6 The fire will be contained within the area due to its short duration.
| |
| 16.0 Consequences of Design Basis Fire with Fire Protection 16.1 Loss of the pump due to rupture and loss of oil.
| |
| 16.2 Possible loss of cabling to pump.
| |
| 17.0 Consequences of Inadvertent or Careless Operation or Rupture of Fire Protection System 17.1 Not applicable (no water suppression in area).
| |
| 18.0 Containing Design Basis Fire in the Fire Area/Zone 18.1 Fire detectors initiate an alarm in the control room. The Control room alerts the fire brigade.
| |
| 18.2 The fire brigade will extinguish the fire using portable fire extinguishers or fire hoses if necessary.
| |
| 18.3 Concrete walls and fire proofing on metal partition and exposed steel will limit the fire to the subject area.
| |
| 18.4 Fire dampers in the ductwork will prevent the spread of fire to adjacent areas.
| |
| 19.0 How is Redundant Safe Shutdown Equipment in the Same Area Protected 19.1 Not applicable (see 15.3).
| |
| | |
| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev 6 Appendix A Section F.2 Tab 8 STATION Fire Hazard Analysis - PAB-F-1E-A Page 1 of 3 PAB-F-1E-A 1.0 Building Primary Auxiliary Building 2.0 Fire Area or Zone PAB-F-1E-A 2.1 Area Name Reciprocating Charging Pump Area 2.2 Location East Side - El. 70 Drawing No 9763-F-805061-FP 3.0 Construction of Area Material Min. Fire Rating 3.1 Walls North Concrete 3 Hr.
| |
| South Concrete 1 1/2 Hr.
| |
| East Concrete Outside West MCG 1 1/2 Hr.
| |
| 3.2 Floor Concrete 1 1/2 Hr.
| |
| 3.3 Ceiling Concrete 1 1/2 Hr.
| |
| 3.4 Doors Metal 1 1/2 Hr.
| |
| 3.5 Others Fireproofed Ceiling 1 1/2 Hr.
| |
| 4.0 Floor Area 272 Sq. Ft. Length 26.5' Width 10.25' Height 15.25' 5.0 Volume 4,100 Cu. Ft.
| |
| 6.0 Floor Drains Nuclear X Non-Nuclear None 7.0 Exhaust Ventilation System PAB 7.1 Percentage of System's Capacity 100%
| |
| 8.0 8 Hr. Emergency Lighting in Area Yes No X 8.1 Outside Area at Exit Points Yes No X 9.0 Operational Radioactivity 9.1 Equipment/Piping Yes X No 9.2 Airborne Yes No X 10.0 Fire Protection Type 10.1 Primary Fire Extinguisher(s) 10.2 Secondary Standpipe and Hose Reel 10.3 Detection Ionization 10.4 Other ------
| |
| 11.0 Fire Loading in Area 11.1 Refer to page 2. (analysis continued pg. 2 - 4)
| |
| | |
| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev 6 Appendix A Section F.2 Tab 8 STATION Fire Hazard Analysis - PAB-F-1E-A Page 2 of 3 12.0 Equipment and Systems in Fire Area/Zone Required System Train Safety For Safe Equipment System A B Related Shutdown No Equipment Required For Safe Shutdown in This Area X
| |
| Piping Valves CBS X Piping Valves CC X X 13.0 Design Base Fire 13.1 Combustible in Area (In Situ) Fire Loading in Area Note: Oil Fire Oil: 14.0 Gallons 7721 Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Grease: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Class A: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Charcoal: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Chemicals: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Plastics: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Resins: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Other:
| |
| 13.2 Total Fire Loading in Area: 7721 Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Total Combustibles: 2,200,000 Btu 14.0 Design-Basis Fire Description
| |
| : 1. Pump ruptures, oil spread over floor covering 605 sq. Ft. Of area (1/8 thick).
| |
| : 2. Oil is ignited and is consumed.
| |
| : 3. The space temperature in the area is assumed to be sufficiently high that all the cable in the space is assumed to fail. Cable will not contribute to the fire because it is contained within conduit.
| |
| 14.1 DBF Fire Loading 2,275 Btu/Sq. Ft. (2.73 gallons oil consumed in 318 sq. ft.)
| |
| 14.2 Fire Duration Less than one minute.
| |
| 14.3 Peak Temperature 5958 °F (High temp. spike in short duration).
| |
| | |
| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev 6 Appendix A Section F.2 Tab 8 STATION Fire Hazard Analysis - PAB-F-1E-A Page 3 of 3 15.0 Consequences of Design Basis Fire without Fire Protection 15.1 Loss of the pump due to rupture and loss of oil.
| |
| 15.2 Loss of cabling due to fire.
| |
| 15.3 The adjacent fire area containing safe shutdown equipment will not be affected.
| |
| 16.0 Consequences of Design Basis Fire with Fire Protection 16.1 Loss of the pump due to rupture and loss of oil.
| |
| 16.2 Possible loss of cabling to pump.
| |
| 17.0 Consequences of Inadvertent or Careless Operation or Rupture of Fire Protection System 17.1 Not applicable (no water suppression in area).
| |
| 18.0 Containing Design Basis Fire in the Fire Area/Zone 18.1 Duration of the fire is short, therefore the fire barrier walls will prevent the spread to adjacent pump areas.
| |
| 18.2 Fire dampers will prevent the spread of fire from the area.
| |
| 19.0 How is Redundant Safe Shutdown Equipment in the Same Area Protected 19.1 Not applicable (see 15.3).
| |
| | |
| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev 7 Appendix A Section F.2 Tab 8 STATION Fire Hazard Analysis - PAB-F-1F-Z Page 1 of 3 PAB-F-1F-Z 1.0 Building Primary Auxiliary Building 2.0 Fire Area or Zone PAB-F-1F-Z 2.1 Area Name Letdown Degasifier Area 2.2 Location East Side El. 70 Drawing No 9763-F-805061-FP 3.0 Construction of Area Material Min. Fire Rating 3.1 Walls North Concrete 1 1/2 Hr.
| |
| South Concrete -
| |
| East Concrete Outside West Concrete -
| |
| 3.2 Floor Concrete -
| |
| 3.3 Ceiling Concrete/Grating -
| |
| 3.4 Doors Metal -
| |
| 3.5 Others Exposed Ceiling Beams -
| |
| 4.0 Floor Area 9,400 Sq. Ft. Length 23.5' Width 13.33' Height 30' 5.0 Volume 9,400 Cu. Ft.
| |
| 6.0 Floor Drains Nuclear X Non-Nuclear None 7.0 Exhaust Ventilation System PAB 7.1 Percentage of System's Capacity 100%
| |
| 8.0 8 Hr. Emergency Lighting in Area Yes No X 8.1 Outside Area at Exit Points Yes No X 9.0 Operational Radioactivity 9.1 Equipment/Piping Yes No X 9.2 Airborne Yes (Minimal) No 10.0 Fire Protection Type 10.1 Primary Fire Extinguisher(s) 10.2 Secondary Standpipe and Hose Reel 10.3 Detection Ionization 10.4 Other ------
| |
| 11.0 Fire Loading in Area 11.1 Refer to page 2. (analysis continued pg. 2 & 3)
| |
| | |
| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev 7 Appendix A Section F.2 Tab 8 STATION Fire Hazard Analysis - PAB-F-1F-Z Page 2 of 3 12.0 Equipment and Systems in Fire Area/Zone System Train Safety Equipment System A B Related No equipment required for safe shutdown in this zone also, no safety related equipment here.
| |
| 13.0 Design Base Fire 13.1 Combustible in Area (In Situ) Fire Loading in Area Note: Oil Fire Oil: 1.0 Gallons 478 Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Grease: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Class A: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Charcoal: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Chemicals: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Plastics: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Resins: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Other:
| |
| 13.2 Total Fire Loading in Area: 478 Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Total Combustibles: 150,000 Btu 14.0 Design-Basis Fire Description (A) The letdown degasifier reciprocating pump will rupture, the entire contents of oil spills on the floor covering approximately a 13 sq. ft. area and burns completely.
| |
| 14.1 DBF fire loading 11,538 Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| 14.2 Peak area/zone temperature during fire 505 °F 14.3 Duration of fire 4 1/2 Minutes 15.0 Consequences of Design Basis Fire without Fire Protection 15.1 Loss of degasifier pump due to loss of oil.
| |
| 15.2 Possible loss of the cabling and instrumentation/controls in the area.
| |
| 16.0 Consequences of Design Basis Fire with Fire Protection 16.1 The consequences are the same as 15.1 and 15.2.
| |
| 17.0 Consequences of Inadvertent or Careless Operation or Rupture of Fire Protection System 17.1 Not applicable as no automatic water suppression system is provided.
| |
| | |
| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev 7 Appendix A Section F.2 Tab 8 STATION Fire Hazard Analysis - PAB-F-1F-Z Page 3 of 3 18.0 Containing Design Basis Fire in the Fire Area/Zone 18.1 Fire detectors initiate an alarm in the control room. The control room alerts the fire brigade.
| |
| 18.2 The fire brigade will extinguish the fire using portable fire extinguishers or fire hoses if necessary.
| |
| 18.3 Because the subject fire zone is bounded by a concrete structure and the duration of the fire is less than 5 minutes, the design base fire will be contained in the area.
| |
| However, with the lack of fire dampers in the supply or exhaust air system, the hot air and smoke will travel through PAB normal exhaust filter unit to the outside. (The air has not been transferred from this zone to any other zones in PAB).
| |
| 19.0 How is Redundant Safe Shutdown Equipment in the Same Area Protected 19.1 Not applicable. No safe shutdown equipment in the area.
| |
| | |
| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev 6 Appendix A Section F.2 Tab 8 STATION Fire Hazard Analysis - PAB-F-1G-A Page 1 of 2 PAB-F-1G-A 1.0 Building Primary Auxiliary Building 2.0 Fire Area or Zone PAB-F- 1G-A 2.1 Area Name Electrical Chase & Elec. Tunnel Between Control Bldg & PAB*
| |
| 2.2 Location El. (-) 26-0 To El. 35-3 & 3008 Drawing No 9763-F-805061-FP. 805062-FP & 805060-FP 3.0 Construction of Area Material Min. Fire Rating 3.1 Walls North Concrete 3 Hr.
| |
| South Concrete/MCG 3 Hr.
| |
| East Concrete 3 Hr./Outside West Concrete/MCG 3 Hr./Outside 3.2 Floor Concrete 3 Hr.
| |
| 3.3 Ceiling Concrete 3 Hr.
| |
| 3.4 Doors Metal 3 Hr.
| |
| 3.5 Others - -
| |
| 4.0 Floor Area 1,120 Sq. Ft. Length 80'-0" Width 14'-0" Height 20'-0" 5.0 Volume 22,400; 31,400; 9000 Cu. Ft.
| |
| 6.0 Floor Drains Nuclear Non-Nuclear X None 7.0 Exhaust Ventilation System None 7.1 Percentage of System's Capacity N/A 8.0 8 Hr. Emergency Lighting in Area Yes No X 8.1 Outside Area at Exit Points Yes No X 9.0 Operational Radioactivity 9.1 Equipment/Piping Yes No X 9.2 Airborne Yes No X 10.0 Fire Protection Type 10.1 Primary Pre-Action Systems 10.2 Secondary Fire Extinguisher(s) 10.3 Detection Ionization & Photoelectric 10.4 Other ------
| |
| 11.0 Fire Loading in Area 11.1 None X (no further analysis required)
| |
| Safety Related Cable Requires Fire Protection.
| |
| | |
| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev 6 Appendix A Section F.2 Tab 8 STATION Fire Hazard Analysis - PAB-F-1G-A Page 2 of 2 12.0 Equipment and Systems in Fire Area/Zone Required System Train Safety For Safe Equipment System A B Related Shutdown CC Cabling X X X X CS Cabling X X X X EAH Cabling X X X X SI Cabling X X X PAH Cabling X X X X SW Cabling X X X X SWA Cabling X X X Cabling RH X X X Cabling RC X X X CBS Cabling X X X FAH Cabling X X X WLD Cabling X X SF Cabling X X X VG Cabling X X SS Cabling X X NG Cabling X X RMW Cabling X X Cabling CAH X X X
| |
| | |
| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev 7 Appendix A Section F.2 Tab 8 STATION Fire Hazard Analysis - PAB-F-1J-Z Page 1 of 3 PAB-F-1J-Z 1.0 Building Primary Auxiliary Building 2.0 Fire Area or Zone PAB-F-1J-Z 2.1 Area Name Aux. Steam Condensate Tank Area 2.2 Location North End PAB El. (-) 6-0: & (-) 26-0 Drawing No 9763-F-805061-FP 3.0 Construction of Area Material Min. Fire Rating 3.1 Walls North Concrete 3 Hr./Outside South Concrete - /Outside East Concrete - /3 Hr.
| |
| West Concrete 3 Hr./Outside 3.2 Floor Concrete/Grating -
| |
| 3.3 Ceiling Concrete -
| |
| 3.4 Doors Metal 3 Hr./-
| |
| 3.5 Others - -
| |
| 4.0 Floor Area 1,980 Sq. Ft. Length Varies Width Varies Height 11' & 18' 5.0 Volume 23,782 Cu. Ft.
| |
| 6.0 Floor Drains Nuclear X Non-Nuclear None 7.0 Exhaust Ventilation System PAH 7.1 Percentage of System's Capacity 100%
| |
| 8.0 8 Hr. Emergency Lighting in Area Yes X No 8.1 Outside Area at Exit Points Yes No X 9.0 Operational Radioactivity 9.1 Equipment/Piping Yes X No 9.2 Airborne Yes X No 10.0 Fire Protection Type 10.1 Primary Fire Extinguisher(s) 10.2 Secondary Standpipe and Hose Reel 10.3 Detection Ionization 10.4 Other -----------
| |
| 11.0 Fire Loading in Area 11.1 Refer to page 2 of 4
| |
| | |
| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev 7 Appendix A Section F.2 Tab 8 STATION Fire Hazard Analysis - PAB-F-1J-Z Page 2 of 3 12.0 Equipment and Systems in Fire Area/Zone System Train Safety Equipment System A B Related Piping & Valves CS X X X Cabling CS X X X Piping & Valves SI X X X Cabling SI X X X Cabling RC X X X Cabling CC X X X Cabling CAH X X X Cabling VG X X Cabling CBS X X Cabling NG X X Cabling RMW X X Cabling WLD X X Temperature Elements & MM X X X Cabling 13.0 Design Base Fire 13.1 Combustible in Area (In Situ) Fire Loading in Area Note: Oil Fire Oil: 1.0 Gallons 76.0 Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Grease: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Class A: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Charcoal: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Chemicals: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Plastics: 5 Pounds 33 Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Resins: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Other:
| |
| 13.2 Total Fire Loading in Area: 109 Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Total Combustibles: 215,000 Btu
| |
| | |
| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev 7 Appendix A Section F.2 Tab 8 STATION Fire Hazard Analysis - PAB-F-1J-Z Page 3 of 3 14.0 Design-Basis Fire Description (A) The condensate pump oil reservoir will rupture and oil spills on an area of 13 sq.
| |
| Ft., ignites and burns completely.
| |
| 14.1 DBF Fire Loading 11,538 Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| 14.2 Peak Area/Zone Temp. During Fire 309 °F 14.3 Duration of Fire 4 1/2 Minutes 15.0 Consequences of Design Basis Fire without Fire Protection 15.1 Loss of condensate pump as a result of the loss of oil content.
| |
| 15.2 Because of the non-ducted exhaust air from the area and the lack of fire dampers, smoke and fire will spread into the upper zones of PAB, via PAB-F-1A-Z, PAB-F-2C-Z, PAB-3B-Z.
| |
| 16.0 Consequences of Design Basis Fire with Fire Protection 16.1 Loss of the condensate pump as a result of the loss of oil content.
| |
| 16.2 Area detection system will alarm in control room and early response of the fire brigade will minimize the spread of smoke and fire to the upper zones.
| |
| 17.0 Consequences of Inadvertent or Careless Operation or Rupture of Fire Protection System 17.1 Not applicable as no automatic water suppression system exists.
| |
| 18.0 Containing Design Basis Fire in the Fire Area/Zone 18.1 The subject pumps are located in a pit at elevation of 26-0. The localized zone is bounded by a concrete structure and most of the fire will be contained.
| |
| However, because of the lack of isolation of ventilation air and non-ducted exhaust air, fire and particularly smoke will spread to the other parts of the building, including the component cooling heat exchanger and pump area.
| |
| 19.0 How is Redundant Safe Shutdown Equipment in the Same Area Protected
| |
| : 1. Not applicable. The separation of the safe shutdown equipment is discussed in the report Fire Protection of Safe Shutdown Capability (10 CFR 50 Appendix R).
| |
| | |
| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev 6 Appendix A Section F.2 Tab 8 STATION Fire Hazard Analysis - PAB-F-1K-Z Page 1 of 2 PAB-F-1K-Z 1.0 Building Primary Auxiliary Building 2.0 Fire Area or Zone PAB-F-1K-Z 2.1 Area Name Non-Radioactive Pipe Tunnels & Pine Chase 2.2 Location Northwest Corner - El. (-)6-O Up Thru 53-O Drawing No 9763-F-805061-FP, 809062-FP & 805063-FP 3.0 Construction of Area Material Min. Fire Rating 3.1 Walls North Concrete Outside South Concrete Outside/3 Hr.
| |
| East Concrete 3 Hr./ -
| |
| West Concrete 3 Hr.
| |
| * 3.2 Floor Concrete -
| |
| 3.3 Ceiling Concrete Outside 3.4 Doors Metal 3 Hr./ -
| |
| 3.5 Others - -
| |
| 4.0 Floor Area 4,620 Sq. Ft. Length 68'-0" Width 9'-0" & 15' Height Varies 5.0 Volume 75,350 Cu. Ft.
| |
| (El (-)6,5 6.0 Floor Drains Nuclear X & 53) Non-Nuclear 7.0 Exhaust Ventilation System PAH-FN-L47 7.1 Percentage of System's Capacity 100%
| |
| 8.0 8 Hr. Emergency Lighting in Area Yes No X 8.1 Outside Area at Exit Points Yes No X 9.0 Operational Radioactivity 9.1 Equipment/Piping Yes No X 9.2 Airborne Yes No X 10.0 Fire Protection Type 10.1 Primary Fire Extinguisher(s) 10.2 Secondary Standpipe and Hose Reel 10.3 Detection None - SBN-439, Dated 1/21/85 10.4 Other -----------
| |
| Door No. W-400 Leading Into Waste Process Building is Not 3 Hr. Fire Rated Door. Ref. Deviation No. 7, SBN-9o4, Dated Dec. 2, 1985.
| |
| | |
| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev 6 Appendix A Section F.2 Tab 8 STATION Fire Hazard Analysis - PAB-F-1K-Z Page 2 of 2 11.0 Fire Loading in Area 11.1 None X (no further analysis required) 12.0 Equipment and Systems in Fire Area/Zone System Train Safety Equipment System A B Related Piping & Valves SW X X X
| |
| | |
| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev 16 Appendix A Section F.2 Tab 8 STATION Fire Hazard Analysis - PAB-F-2A-Z Page 1 of 3 PAB-F-2A-Z 1.0 Building Primary Auxiliary Building 2.0 Fire Area or Zone PAB-F-2A-Z 2.1 Area Name Resin Fill Tank Area 2.2 Location South-East El. 25-0 Drawing No 9763-F-805062-FP 3.0 Construction of Area Material Min. Fire Rating 3.1 Walls North Open -
| |
| South Concrete 3 Hr./Outside East Concrete 3 Hr.
| |
| West Concrete/Metal -
| |
| 3.2 Floor Plt/Concrete/Grating -
| |
| 3.3 Ceiling Concrete/Plt -
| |
| 3.4 Doors Metal - /3 Hr. (Stairs) 3.5 Others Exposed Ceiling Beams -
| |
| 4.0 Floor Area 1,550 Sq. Ft. Length 43.5' Width 38.5' Height 26' 5.0 Volume 40,400 Cu. Ft.
| |
| 6.0 Floor Drains Nuclear X Non-Nuclear None 7.0 Exhaust Ventilation System PAB 7.1 Percentage of System's Capacity 100%
| |
| 8.0 8 Hr. Emergency Lighting in Area Yes X No 8.1 Outside Area at Exit Points Yes X No 9.0 Operational Radioactivity 9.1 Equipment/Piping Yes X No 9.2 Airborne Yes No X 10.0 Fire Protection Type 10.1 Primary Fire Extinguisher(s) 10.2 Secondary Standpipe and Hose Reel 10.3 Detection Ionization 10.4 Other -----
| |
| 11.0 Fire Loading in Area 11.1 Refer to page 2. (analysis continued page 2 & 3).
| |
| | |
| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev 16 Appendix A Section F.2 Tab 8 STATION Fire Hazard Analysis - PAB-F-2A-Z Page 2 of 3 12.0 Equipment and Systems in Fire Area/Zone System Train Safety Equipment System A B Related Cabling SW X X X Cabling SWA X X X Cabling EDE X X X Cabling EAH X X Cabling PAH X X X Damper DP-35A PAH X X Cabling CS X X X Cabling FAH X X Cabling CC X X Cabling SF X X Sample Panel CP-482 SS X X 13.0 Design Base Fire 13.1 Combustible in Area (In Situ) Fire Loading in Area Note:
| |
| Oil: Gallons Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Grease: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Class A: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Charcoal: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Chemicals: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Plastics: 106 Pounds 889 Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Resins: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Other:
| |
| 13.2 Total Fire Loading in Area: 889 Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Total Combustibles: 1,378,000 Btu
| |
| | |
| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev 16 Appendix A Section F.2 Tab 8 STATION Fire Hazard Analysis - PAB-F-2A-Z Page 3 of 3 14.0 Design-Basis Fire Description
| |
| : 1. For conservatism the ladders are assumed to be in a vertical position. The bottom of both sets of rails are ignited and burn upward.
| |
| : 2. To add conservatism, it is assumed that the fire is self sustaining although the fire is not severe and has a low heat release rate.
| |
| : 3. The fire area will be limited to the length of the ladder and about 2 feet from the wall for an area covering 30 ft. x 2 ft. = 60 sq. ft.
| |
| 14.1 DBF fire loading 22,967 Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| 14.2 Peak area/zone temperature during fire 147 °F 14.3 Duration of fire > 5 Minutes 15.0 Consequences of Design Basis Fire without Fire Protection 15.1 Refer to Seabrook Station Fire Protection of Safe Shutdown Capability (10 CFR 50, App. R).
| |
| 16.0 Consequences of Design Basis Fire with Fire Protection 16.1 No consequences. Fire will be extinguished with portable extinguishers.
| |
| 17.0 Consequences of Inadvertent or Careless Operation or Rupture of Fire Protection System 17.1 Not applicable.
| |
| 18.0 Containing Design Basis Fire in the Fire Area/Zone 18.1 Fire detectors initiate an alarm in the control room. The control room alerts the fire brigade.
| |
| 18.2 The fire would be extinguished using portable extinguishers and/or hose lines.
| |
| 19.0 How is Redundant Safe Shutdown Equipment in the Same Area Protected 19.1 Refer To Seabrook Station Fire Protection of Safe Shutdown Capability (10 CFR 50, App. R).
| |
| | |
| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev 6 Appendix A Section F.2 Tab 8 STATION Fire Hazard Analysis - PAB-F-2B-Z Page 1 of 2 PAB-F-2B-Z 1.0 Building Primary Auxiliary Building 2.0 Fire Area or Zone PAB-F-2B-Z 2.1 Area Name Boric Acid Tank Area 2.2 Location South-West El. 25-O Drawing No 9763-F-805062-FP 3.0 Construction of Area Material Min. Fire Rating 3.1 Walls North Concrete/Metal -
| |
| South Concrete Outside East Concrete/Metal -
| |
| West Concrete 3 Hr.
| |
| 3.2 Floor Concrete -
| |
| 3.3 Ceiling Concrete -
| |
| 3.4 Doors Metal 3 Hr./ -
| |
| 3.5 Others Exposed Ceiling Beams -
| |
| 4.0 Floor Area 1,300 Sq. Ft. Length Varies Width Varies Height 26' 5.0 Volume 33,800 Cu. Ft.
| |
| 6.0 Floor Drains Nuclear X Non-Nuclear None 7.0 Exhaust Ventilation System PAB 7.1 Percentage of System's Capacity 100%
| |
| 8.0 8 Hr. Emergency Lighting in Area Yes X No 8.1 Outside Area at Exit Points Yes X No 9.0 Operational Radioactivity 9.1 Equipment/Piping Yes X No 9.2 Airborne Yes No X 10.0 Fire Protection Type 10.1 Primary Fire Extinguisher(s) 10.2 Secondary Standpipe and Hose Reel 10.3 Detection Ionization 10.4 Other -----
| |
| 11.0 Fire Loading in Area 11.1 None X (no further analysis required)
| |
| | |
| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev 6 Appendix A Section F.2 Tab 8 STATION Fire Hazard Analysis - PAB-F-2B-Z Page 2 of 2 12.0 Equipment and Systems in Fire Area/Zone Required System Train Safety For Safe Equipment System A B Related Shutdown Piping & Valves CS X X X X Cabling CS X X X Boric Acid Tanks CS X X X
| |
| | |
| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev. 19 Appendix A Section F.2 Tab 8 STATION Fire Hazard Analysis - PAB-F-2C-Z Page 1 of 4 PAB-F-2C-Z 1.0 Building Primary Auxiliary Building 2.0 Fire Area or Zone PAB-F-2C-Z 2.1 Area Name Primary Component Cooling Pump Area 2.2 Location North - El 25-0 Drawing No 9763-F-805062-FP 3.0 Construction of Area Material Min. Fire Rating 3.1 Walls North Concrete Outside/3 Hr.
| |
| South Concrete/Metal/Open -
| |
| East Concrete 3 Hr.
| |
| West Concrete 3 Hr./ -
| |
| 3.2 Floor Concrete -
| |
| 3.3 Ceiling Concrete -
| |
| 3.4 Doors Metal 3 Hr./ -
| |
| 3.5 Others Exposed Ceiling Beams -
| |
| 4.0 Floor Area 7,200 Sq. Ft. Length Varies Width Varies Height 26' 5.0 Volume 187,000 Cu. Ft.
| |
| 6.0 Floor Drains Nuclear X Non-Nuclear None 7.0 Exhaust Ventilation System PAB 7.1 Percentage of System's Capacity 100%
| |
| 8.0 8 Hr. Emergency Lighting in Area Yes X No 8.1 Outside Area at Exit Points Yes X No 9.0 Operational Radioactivity 9.1 Equipment/Piping Yes X No 9.2 Airborne Yes No X 10.0 Fire Protection Type 10.1 Primary Pre-Action System 10.2 Secondary Fire Extinguisher(s) 10.3 Detection Ionization & Photoelectric 10.4 Other -----
| |
| 11.0 Fire Loading in Area 11.1 Refer to page 3 (analysis continued pg. 2 - 4)
| |
| | |
| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev. 19 Appendix A Section F.2 Tab 8 STATION Fire Hazard Analysis - PAB-F-2C-Z Page 2 of 4 12.0 Equipment and Systems in Fire Area/Zone System Train Safety Equipment System A B Related Pump P-11A, P-11C CC X X Cabling CC X X X Pump P-11B, P-11D CC X X Piping & Valves CC X X X Piping & Valves SW X X X Instrument Rack IR-93 MM X X X Cabling CS X X X Cabling SW X X X Cabling SWA X X X Cabling EAH X X X Cabling SI X X X Cabling PAH X X X Cabling RM X X X Terminal Boxes & EDE X X X Cabling Piping & Valves CS X X X Fan-FN-42A PAH X X Fan-FN-42B PAH X X Dampers PAH X X X Instruments PAH X X X Instruments PAH X X X
| |
| | |
| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev. 19 Appendix A Section F.2 Tab 8 STATION Fire Hazard Analysis - PAB-F-2C-Z Page 3 of 4 12.0 Equipment and Systems in Fire Area/Zone System Train Safety Equipment System A B Related Radiation Monitors RM X X X Cabling CBS X X X Cabling CAP X X X PCCW HX-CC-E-17A CC X X X
| |
| &B Boron Injection SI X X X TK-SI-TK-6 Piping & Valves SI X X X Cabling COP X X X Control Panel CC X X X CP-443A, B Temperature Elements & MM X X X Cabling 13.0 Design Base Fire 13.1 Combustible in Area (In Situ) Fire Loading in Area Note: Oil Fire Oil: 1.75 Gallons 36.5 Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Grease: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Class A: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Charcoal: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Chemicals: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Plastics: 51.5 Pounds 93.0 Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Resins: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Other:
| |
| 13.2 Total Fire Loading in Area: 129.5 Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Total Combustibles: 932,400 Btu
| |
| | |
| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev. 19 Appendix A Section F.2 Tab 8 STATION Fire Hazard Analysis - PAB-F-2C-Z Page 4 of 4 14.0 Design-Basis Fire Description
| |
| : 1. Oil reservoir ruptures, oil spreads over 16.0 sq. ft. of floor (1/8 thick).
| |
| : 2. Oil ignites, burns and is consumed.
| |
| 14.1 DBF Fire Loading 11,688 Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| 14.2 Peak Temperature 146 °F 14.3 Duration of Fire 4 1/2 Minutes 15.0 Consequences of Design Basis Fire without Fire Protection 15.1 Loss of pump due to rupture.
| |
| 15.2 Possible loss of pump cable.
| |
| 16.0 Consequences of Design Basis Fire with Fire Protection 16.1 Loss of pump due to rupture.
| |
| 17.0 Consequences of Inadvertent or Careless Operation or Rupture of Fire Protection System 17.1 A double failure would be required to inadvertently spray water in area.
| |
| 18.0 Containing Design Basis Fire in the Fire Area/Zone 18.1 Duration of the fire is short.
| |
| 18.2 Total fire loading in zone is light (129.5 Btu/Sq. Ft).
| |
| 19.0 How is Redundant Safe Shutdown Equipment in the Same Area Protected 19.1 Spatial separation and metal shield wall.
| |
| 19.2 The design base fire has neither the duration or intensity to ignite cable or damage equipment.
| |
| 19.3 Water shields are installed over PCCW pump motors.
| |
| | |
| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev. 10 Appendix A Section F.2 Tab 8 STATION Fire Hazard Analysis - PAB-F-3A-Z Page 1 of 3 PAB-F-3A-Z 1.0 Building Primary Auxiliary Building 2.0 Fire Area or Zone PAB-F-3A-Z 2.1 Area Name Water Cooler Heat Exchanger Area 2.2 Location North El. 53-0 Drawing No 9763-F-805063-FP 3.0 Construction of Area Material Min. Fire Rating 3.1 Walls North Concrete Outside/3 Hr.
| |
| South Metal/Open -
| |
| East Concrete Outside West Concrete -
| |
| 3.2 Floor Concrete -
| |
| 3.3 Ceiling Concrete - /Outside 3.4 Doors Metal 3 Hr.
| |
| 3.5 Others Exposed Ceiling Beams -
| |
| 4.0 Floor Area 4,000 Sq. Ft. Length 53' Width 75' Height 26' 5.0 Volume 103,400 Cu. Ft.
| |
| 6.0 Floor Drains Nuclear X Non-Nuclear None 7.0 Exhaust Ventilation System PAB 7.1 Percentage of System's Capacity 100%
| |
| 8.0 8 Hr. Emergency Lighting in Area Yes No X 8.1 Outside Area at Exit Points Yes X No 9.0 Operational Radioactivity 9.1 Equipment/Piping Yes X No 9.2 Airborne Yes No X 10.0 Fire Protection Type 10.1 Primary Fire Extinguisher(s) 10.2 Secondary Standpipe and Hose Reel 10.3 Detection Ionization 10.4 Other Carbon Monoxide Detector in CAP-F-40 11.0 Fire Loading in Area 11.1 Refer to page 3 of 4
| |
| | |
| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev. 10 Appendix A Section F.2 Tab 8 STATION Fire Hazard Analysis - PAB-F-3A-Z Page 2 of 3 12.0 Equipment and Systems in Fire Area/Zone System Train Safety Equipment System A B Related Piping & Valves SW X X X Cabling SW X X X PCCW Head Tanks Tk- CC X X X 19A & 19B Piping & Instruments CC X X X Cabling CC X X X Dg Heat Exchangers DG X X X E-42A & 42B Cabling CAP X X X Cabling COP X X X Cabling CS X X X Terminal Boxes EDE X X X Temperature Elements & MM X X X Cabling Pressure Switch & PAH X X Cabling 13.0 Design Base Fire 13.1 Combustible in Area (In Situ) Fire Loading in Area Note: Oil Fire Oil: 2.25 Gallons 84 Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Grease: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Class A: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Charcoal: 6,600 Pounds
| |
| * Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Chemicals: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Plastics: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Resins: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Other:
| |
| 13.2 Total Fire Loading in Area: 84 Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Total Combustibles: 37,500 Btu Charcoal Fire Loading Was Not Considered in Total Area. See Appendix D.
| |
| | |
| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev. 10 Appendix A Section F.2 Tab 8 STATION Fire Hazard Analysis - PAB-F-3A-Z Page 3 of 3 14.0 Design-Basis Fire Description (A) The flash tank distillate pump oil reservoir fails and the entire 2.25 gallon of oil spreads over 29 sq. ft. and will ignite and is assumed to burn completely.
| |
| 14.1 DBF Fire Loading 11,638 Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| 14.2 Peak Area/Zone Temp. During Fire 240 °F 14.3 Duration of Fire 4 1/2 Minutes 15.0 Consequences of Design Basis Fire without Fire Protection 15.1 Loss of the flash tank distillate pumps as a result of the loss of oil.
| |
| 15.2 Failure of instruments, controls and cabling within the area of immediate vicinity of the fire.
| |
| 16.0 Consequences of Design Basis Fire with Fire Protection 16.1 Loss of the flash tank distillate pumps as a result of the loss of oil.
| |
| 16.2 The possible loss of instruments, controls and cabling within the area of immediate vicinity of the fire.
| |
| 17.0 Consequences of Inadvertent or Careless Operation or Rupture of Fire Protection System 17.1 Not applicable as no automatic water suppression system exists.
| |
| 18.0 Containing Design Basis Fire in the Fire Area/Zone 18.1 The fire duration is less than five minutes. The fire location is in the north east corner of the zone and is surrounded by outside fire rated concrete structures.
| |
| Hence, the bulk of the fire will be contained within the zone. However, due to the lack of ventilation exhaust system isolation, the smoke will spread to fire zone PAB-F-3B-Z.
| |
| 19.0 How is Redundant Safe Shutdown Equipment in the Same Area Protected 19.1 Not applicable. For the separation requirements refer to report Fire Protection Of Safe Shutdown Capability (10 CFR 50, Appendix R).
| |
| | |
| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev. 16 Appendix A Section F.2 Tab 8 STATION Fire Hazard Analysis - PAB-F-3B-Z Page 1 of 3 PAB-F-3B-Z 1.0 Building Primary Auxiliary Building 2.0 Fire Area or Zone PAB-F-3B-Z 2.1 Area Name PAB Supply and Exhaust Fan Area 2.2 Location South Side El. 53-0 Drawing No 9763-F-805063-FP 3.0 Construction of Area Material Min. Fire Rating 3.1 Walls North Metal/Open -
| |
| South Concrete Outside/3 Hr.
| |
| East Concrete Outside/3 Hr.*
| |
| West Concrete Outside/ -
| |
| 3.2 Floor Concrete -
| |
| 3.3 Ceiling Concrete - /Outside 3.4 Doors Metal 3 Hr./ -
| |
| 3.5 Others Exposed Ceiling Beams -
| |
| 4.0 Floor Area 6,600 Sq. Ft. Length 88' Width 75' Height 26' 5.0 Volume 171,600 Cu. Ft.
| |
| 6.0 Floor Drains Nuclear X Non-Nuclear None 7.0 Exhaust Ventilation System PAB 7.1 Percentage of System's Capacity 100%
| |
| 8.0 8 Hr. Emergency Lighting in Area Yes No X 8.1 Outside Area at Exit Points Yes X No 9.0 Operational Radioactivity 9.1 Equipment/Piping Yes X No 9.2 Airborne Yes No X 10.0 Fire Protection Type 10.1 Primary Fire Extinguisher(s) 10.2 Secondary Standpipe and Hose Reel 10.3 Detection Ionization & Photoelectric 10.4 Other -----
| |
| 11.0 Fire Loading in Area 11.1 Refer to page 2 (analysis continued pg. 2 & 3) 3 Hr. Fire Damper Has Not Been Provided in Exhaust Duct at the Point of Connection To Unit Plant Vent.
| |
| Ref: Deviation No. 1 SBN-904 Dated 12/2/85
| |
| | |
| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev. 16 Appendix A Section F.2 Tab 8 STATION Fire Hazard Analysis - PAB-F-3B-Z Page 2 of 3 12.0 Equipment and Systems in Fire Area/Zone System Train Safety Equipment System A B Related Piping & Valves CS X X X Cabling CS X X X Instruments & Cabling CAP X X Instruments & Cabling COP X X X Instruments & Cabling PAH X X Temperature Elements & MM X X X Cabling Instruments & Cabling CC X X X 13.0 Design Base Fire 13.1 Combustible in Area (In Situ) Fire Loading in Area Note: Oil and Class A Fire Oil: 0.5 Gallons 231 Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Grease: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Class A: 50 Pounds 1,231 Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Charcoal: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Chemicals: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Plastics: 85 Pounds 172 Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Resins: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Other:
| |
| 13.2 Total Fire Loading in Area: 1,633 Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Total Combustibles: 1,611,422 Btu
| |
| | |
| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev. 16 Appendix A Section F.2 Tab 8 STATION Fire Hazard Analysis - PAB-F-3B-Z Page 3 of 3 14.0 Design-Basis Fire Description
| |
| : 1. Oil reservoir in the monorail crane hoist ruptures and 1/2 gallon of oil spills covering 6.4 sq. Ft. of the boric acid storage area floor. The oil runs under two stacked wood pallets, which has a burning area of 24 sq. Ft
| |
| : 2. The oil is ignited and burns along with the pallets.
| |
| : 3. Design basis fire is separated from the fan area by metal partitions.
| |
| 14.1 DBF Fire Loading 28,386 Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| 14.2 Peak Temperature 1,560 °F 14.3 Duration of Fire 4.8 Minutes.
| |
| 15.0 Consequences of Design Basis Fire without Fire Protection 15.1 Loss of monorail crane.
| |
| 15.2 Loss of the boric acid storage area.
| |
| 16.0 Consequences of Design Basis Fire with Fire Protection 16.1 Loss of monorail crane due to loss of oil.
| |
| 16.2 Possible loss of boric acid storage area.
| |
| 17.0 Consequences of Inadvertent or Careless Operation or Rupture of Fire Protection System 17.1 Not applicable.
| |
| 18.0 Containing Design Basis Fire in the Fire Area/Zone 18.1 Fire detectors initiate an alarm in the control room. The control room alerts the fire brigade.
| |
| 18.2 The fire brigade will extinguish the fire using portable fire extinguishers or fire hoses if necessary.
| |
| 18.3 The fire rating of the structure exceeds the duration of the fire.
| |
| 19.0 How is Redundant Safe Shutdown Equipment in the Same Area Protected 19.1 Not applicable (equipment is not required for safe shutdown).
| |
| | |
| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev 6 Appendix A Section F.2 Tab 8 STATION Fire Hazard Analysis - PAB-F-4-Z Page 1 of 2 PAB-F-4-Z 1.0 Building Primary Auxiliary Building 2.0 Fire Area or Zone PAB-F-4-Z 2.1 Area Name Filter Area 2.2 Location El. 81-0 Drawing No 9763-P-805063-FP 3.0 Construction of Area Material Min. Fire Rating 3.1 Walls North Concrete Outside South Concrete Outside East Concrete Outside West Concrete Outside 3.2 Floor Concrete -
| |
| 3.3 Ceiling Concrete Outside 3.4 Doors Metal -
| |
| 3.5 Others Exposed Ceiling Beams -
| |
| 4.0 Floor Area 2,650 Sq. Ft. Length 54' Width 49' Height 25' 5.0 Volume 66,000 Cu. Ft.
| |
| 6.0 Floor Drains Nuclear X Non-Nuclear None 7.0 Exhaust Ventilation System Mechanical Room 7.1 Percentage of System's Capacity 100%
| |
| 8.0 8 Hr. Emergency Lighting in Area Yes No X 8.1 Outside Area at Exit Points Yes X No 9.0 Operational Radioactivity 9.1 Equipment/Piping Yes No X 9.2 Airborne Yes No X 10.0 Fire Protection Type 10.1 Primary Fire Extinguisher(s) 10.2 Secondary Standpipe & Hose Reel 10.3 Detection Ionization 10.4 Other Temperature Elements in Filters/ Carbon Monoxide Detection in PAH-F-16
| |
| * 11.0 Fire Loading in Area 11.1 None X (no further analysis required)
| |
| Charcoal Loading For PAH-F-L6 is 25750 Lbs. of Charcoal. CharcoalFire Loading Was Not Considered in Total Area. See Appendix D.
| |
| | |
| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev 6 Appendix A Section F.2 Tab 8 STATION Fire Hazard Analysis - PAB-F-4-Z Page 2 of 2 12.0 Equipment and Systems in Fire Area/Zone
| |
| * System Train Safety Equipment System A B Related No safety related or safe shutdown equipment in this zone 3 Hr. Fire Damper Has Not Been Provided in Exhaust Duct, 81-0 Elev. at the Point of Connection To Unit Plant Vent.
| |
| * Ref: Deviation No. 1 SBN- 904 Dated 12/02/85
| |
| | |
| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev 6 Appendix A Section F.2 Tab 8 STATION Fire Hazard Analysis - PAB-F-S1-0 Page 1 of 2 PAB-F-S1-0 1.0 Building Primary Auxiliary Building 2.0 Fire Area or Zone PAB-F-S1-0 2.1 Area Name Stairwell 2.2 Location Col. C-1 Drawing No 9763-F-805063-FP 3.0 Construction of Area Material Min. Fire Rating 3.1 Walls North Concrete Outside South Concrete 3 Hrs.
| |
| East Concrete 3 Hrs.
| |
| West Concrete 3 Hrs.
| |
| 3.2 Floor Concrete Outside 3.3 Ceiling Concrete 3 Hrs.
| |
| 3.4 Doors Metal 1 1/2 Hr.
| |
| 3.5 Others - -
| |
| 4.0 Floor Area 127 Sq. Ft. Length 15'-4" Width 8'-4" Height 37' 5.0 Volume 4,700 Cu. Ft.
| |
| 6.0 Floor Drains Nuclear - Non-Nuclear -
| |
| 7.0 Exhaust Ventilation System None 7.1 Percentage of System's Capacity N/A 8.0 8 Hr. Emergency Lighting in Area Yes X No 8.1 Outside Area at Exit Points Yes X No 9.0 Operational Radioactivity 9.1 Equipment/Piping Yes X No 9.2 Airborne Yes X No 10.0 Fire Protection Type 10.1 Primary Portable Extinguisher 10.2 Secondary Hose Station 10.3 Detection None 10.4 Other ------
| |
| 11.0 Fire Loading in Area 11.1 None X (no further analysis required)
| |
| | |
| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev 6 Appendix A Section F.2 Tab 8 STATION Fire Hazard Analysis - PAB-F-S1-0 Page 2 of 2 12.0 Equipment and Systems in Fire Area/Zone System Train Safety Equipment System A B Related No safety related or safe shutdown equipment in this zone
| |
| | |
| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev 6 Appendix A Section F.2 Tab 8 STATION Fire Hazard Analysis - PAB-F-S2-0 Page 1 of 2 PAB-F-S2-0 1.0 Building Primary Auxiliary Building 2.0 Fire Area or Zone PAB-F-S2-0 2.1 Area Name Stairwell 2.2 Location Col. D-6 Drawing No 9763-F-805063-FP 3.0 Construction of Area Material Min. Fire Rating 3.1 Walls North Concrete 3 Hrs.
| |
| South Concrete Outside East Concrete 3 Hrs.
| |
| West Concrete 3 Hrs.
| |
| 3.2 Floor Concrete Outside 3.3 Ceiling Concrete Outside 3.4 Doors Metal 1 1/2 Hr.
| |
| 3.5 Others - -
| |
| 4.0 Floor Area 130 Sq. Ft. Length 15'-8" Width 8'-4" Height 66' 5.0 Volume 8,600 Cu. Ft.
| |
| 6.0 Floor Drains Nuclear - Non-Nuclear -
| |
| 7.0 Exhaust Ventilation System None 7.1 Percentage of System's Capacity N/A 8.0 8 Hr. Emergency Lighting in Area Yes X No 8.1 Outside Area at Exit Points Yes X No 9.0 Operational Radioactivity 9.1 Equipment/Piping Yes No X 9.2 Airborne Yes No X 10.0 Fire Protection Type 10.1 Primary Portable Extinguisher 10.2 Secondary Hose Station 10.3 Detection None 10.4 Other -----
| |
| 11.0 Fire Loading in Area 11.1 None X (no further analysis required)
| |
| | |
| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev 6 Appendix A Section F.2 Tab 8 STATION Fire Hazard Analysis - PAB-F-S2-0 Page 2 of 2 12.0 Equipment and Systems in Fire Area/Zone System Train Safety Equipment System A B Related No safety related or safe shutdown equipment in this zone
| |
| | |
| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev. 18 Appendix A Section F.2 Tab 9 STATION Fire Hazard Analysis - FSB-F-1-A Page 1 of 4 Fire Hazard Analysis - FSB-F-1-A 1.0 Building Fuel Storage Building 2.0 Fire Area or Zone FSB-F-1-A 2.1 Area Name -----
| |
| 2.2 Location El 7-0, 10-0, 21-6, 25-0, 64-0 & 84-0 Drawing No 9763-F-805058-FP, 805059-FP & 805084-FP 3.0 Construction of Area Material Min. Fire Rating 3.1 Walls North Concrete 3 Hr./Outside South Concrete Outside East Concrete Outside West MCG/Concrete 3 Hr./Outside**
| |
| 3.2 Floor Concrete Outside 3.3 Ceiling Concrete Outside 3.4 Doors Metal 3 Hr./ -
| |
| 3.5 Others - -
| |
| 4.0 Floor Area 5,350 Sq. Ft. Length 93' Width Varies Height Varies 5.0 Volume 579,100 Cu. Ft.
| |
| 6.0 Floor Drains Nuclear X Non-Nuclear None 7.0 Exhaust Ventilation System FSB Normal Exhaust 7.1 Percentage of System's Capacity 100%
| |
| 8.0 8 Hr. Emergency Lighting in Area Yes No X 8.1 Outside Area at Exit Points Yes X No 9.0 Operational Radioactivity 9.1 Equipment/Piping Yes X No 9.2 Airborne Yes X No 10.0 Fire Protection Type 10.1 Primary Fire Extinguisher(s) 10.2 Secondary Standpipe & Hose Reel 10.3 Detection Ionization 10.4 Other Carbon Monoxide Detector in FAH-F-41, 74 11.0 Fire Loading in Area 11.1 Refer to page 3 (analysis continued on pages 2, 3, 4).
| |
| * Walkway and piping tunnel between column A of FSB and column D of PAB has 3 hr. fire rated ceiling.
| |
| ** 3 hr. fire rated fire damper has not been provided in exhaust duct to the point of connection at plant vent. Ref. To Deviation No. 1 SBN-904 Dated 12/2/85
| |
| | |
| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev. 18 Appendix A Section F.2 Tab 9 STATION Fire Hazard Analysis - FSB-F-1-A Page 2 of 4 12.0 Equipment and Systems in Fire Area/Zone System Train Safety Equipment System A B Related Spent Fuel Pool P-10A SF X X Spent Fuel Pool P-10B SF X X Piping & Valves CC X X X Controls & Instruments FAH X X X FAH - FN - 11A & 124 FAH X X FAH - FN - 11B FAH X X Heaters FAH X X X Filters 41, 71 FAH X X X Dampers FAH X X X Cabling FAH X X X Cabling CC X X X Spent Fuel Pool P-10C SF X Note 1 X Note 1 X Note 1: Capable of being powered from either Train A or Train B
| |
| | |
| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev. 18 Appendix A Section F.2 Tab 9 STATION Fire Hazard Analysis - FSB-F-1-A Page 3 of 4 13.0 Total Fire Loading in Area 13.1 Combustible in Area (In Situ) Fire Loading in Area Oil: 323.7 Gallons 9,076 Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Grease: 79.5 Pounds 268 Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Class A: 10,078 Pounds 15,070 Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Charcoal: 21,750 Pounds
| |
| * Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Chemicals: 0 Pounds 0 Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Plastics: 138 Pounds 335 Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Resins: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Cables: 22,803 Pounds 44,754 Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| ML-2 Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Hydraulic Fluid 17.5 Gallons 491 Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| 13.2 Total Fire Loading in Area: 69,502 Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Total Combustibles: 369,835,500 Btu 14.0 Design-Basis Fire Description
| |
| : 1. One of the four (4) Spent Fuel Pool pumps ruptures, lubrication oil spills on floor.
| |
| For conservatism, the lubrication oil from the other three (3) adjacent pumps are also considered as combustible; therefore, all four (4) gallons of lubrication oil are assumed spilled on floor covering an area of 40 sq. ft. The entire four (4) gallons of lubrication oil ignite and are consumed. The normal exhaust system fails. Oil thickness is 1/6 inch.
| |
| : 2. Maximum peak temperature throughout the entire fire area will reach 160.6°F based on (T 60.6ºF + 100ºF ambient temperature).
| |
| Note 1: Fiberglass ladders not included since ladders will not ignite at the DBF peak temperature.
| |
| Note 2: Reactor Coolant Pump (RCP) motor lubrication oil not included since the lubrication oil is contained in a metal reservoir and the RCP motor is not in-service or available for service.
| |
| Note 3: Cask crane lubrication oil and hydraulic fluid not included since crane not normally energized and location of lubrication oil reservoir and hydraulic fluid.
| |
| * Charcoal fire loading was not considered in total area. See App. D.
| |
| | |
| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev. 18 Appendix A Section F.2 Tab 9 STATION Fire Hazard Analysis - FSB-F-1-A Page 4 of 4 14.1 DBF Fire Loading 15,000 Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| 14.2 Peak Temperature 161 °F 14.3 Duration of Fire 5.775 Minutes 15.0 Consequences of Design Basis Fire without Fire Protection 15.1 Loss of spent fuel pool pump due to loss of oil.
| |
| 16.0 Consequences of Design Basis Fire with Fire Protection 16.1 Fire duration will be short with peak temperature of 160ºF; hence, spent fuel pool pump might be lost.
| |
| 17.0 Consequences of Inadvertent or Careless Operation or Rupture of Fire Protection System 17.1 Not applicable as no automatic suppression system exists in the area.
| |
| 18.0 Containing Design Basis Fire in the Fire Area/Zone 18.1 Fire duration is short and will be contained in the subject fire area of concrete structure.
| |
| 19.0 How Is Redundant Safe Shutdown Equipment in the Same Area Protected 19.1 Not applicable as pump is not required for safe shutdown.
| |
| | |
| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev. 16 Appendix A Section F.2 Tab 10 STATION Fire Hazard Analysis - W-F-1A-Z Page 1 of 3 W-F-1A-Z 1.0 Building Waste Processing Building 2.0 Fire Area or Zone W-F-1A-Z 2.1 Area Name Truck Bay and Drum Storage Area 2.2 Location South Side El. 25-0 Drawing No 9763-F-805661-FP 3.0 Construction of Area Material Min. Fire Rating 3.1 Walls North Concrete -
| |
| South Concrete Outside East Concrete -
| |
| West Concrete Outside 3.2 Floor Concrete -
| |
| 3.3 Ceiling Concrete -
| |
| 3.4 Doors Metal -
| |
| 3.5 Others - -
| |
| 4.0 Floor Area 2,050 Sq. Ft. Length 81.5' Width 25' Height Varies 5.0 Volume 87,400 Cu. Ft.
| |
| 6.0 Floor Drains Nuclear X Non-Nuclear None 7.0 Exhaust Ventilation System WPB Exhaust System 7.1 Percentage of System's Capacity 100%
| |
| 8.0 8 Hr. Emergency Lighting in Area Yes No X 8.1 Outside Area at Exit Points Yes No X 9.0 Operational Radioactivity 9.1 Equipment/Piping Yes X No 9.2 Airborne Yes X No 10.0 Fire Protection Type 10.1 Primary Fire Extinguisher(s) 10.2 Secondary Standpipe and Hose Reel 10.3 Detection Ionization 10.4 Other -----
| |
| 11.0 Fire Loading in Area 11.1 Refer to page 2 (analysis continued pg. 2 & 3)
| |
| | |
| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev. 16 Appendix A Section F.2 Tab 10 STATION Fire Hazard Analysis - W-F-1A-Z Page 2 of 3 12.0 Equipment and Systems in Fire Area/Zone System Train Safety Equipment System A B Related No Safety Related or Safe Shutdown Equipment in ThisArea 13.0 Design Base Fire 13.1 Combustible in Area (In Situ) Fire Loading in Area Note: Class A Fire Oil: Gallons Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Grease: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Class A: 1,400 Pounds 5,464 Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Charcoal: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Chemicals: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Plastics: 630 Pounds 4,592 Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Resins: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Other:
| |
| 13.2 Total Fire Loading in Area: 10,056 Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Total Combustibles: 20,614,076 Btu 14.0 Design-Basis Fire Description (A) This fire zone is not separated from adjacent fire zones (W-F-1A-Z, W-F-2A-Z, W-F-2B-Z, W-F-2C-Z and W-F-2D-Z) by fire rated walls and hence it is assumed that all combustibles in all these zones will ignite and burn simultaneously. Total combustibles are 28,744,076 Btu spread over 1598 sq.ft. (fire loading 17,988 Btu/ft.2).
| |
| (B) These zones are non-safety related and hence additional combustibles due to cable loading will have no significance.
| |
| 14.1 DBF Fire Loading 17,988 Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| 14.2 Peak Fire Temperature 2,104 °F 14.3 Duration of Fire 28 Minutes 15.0 Consequences of Design Basis Fire without Fire Protection 15.1 No safe shutdown or safety related equipment in the area.
| |
| 16.0 Consequences of Design Basis Fire with Fire Protection 16.1 None
| |
| | |
| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev. 16 Appendix A Section F.2 Tab 10 STATION Fire Hazard Analysis - W-F-1A-Z Page 3 of 3 17.0 Consequences of Inadvertent or Careless Operation or Rupture of Fire Protection System 17.1 Not applicable. There is no water fire suppression in the subject area.
| |
| 18.0 Containing Design Basis Fire in the Fire Area/Zone 18.1 Spatial separation and the PABs 3 hour barrier prevents loss of any safe shutdown, or safety-related function.
| |
| 18.2 Fire detectors initiate an alarm in the control room. The control room alerts the fire brigade.
| |
| 18.3 The fire brigade will extinguish the fire using portable fire extinguishers or hose reel, as necessary.
| |
| 19.0 How the Redundant Safe Shutdown Equipment in the Area Is Protected 19.1 Not applicable (see 15.2).
| |
| | |
| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev. 6 Appendix A Section F.2 Tab 10 STATION Fire Hazard Analysis - W-F-1B-Z Page 1 of 2 W-F-1B-Z 1.0 Building Waste Processing Building 2.0 Fire Area or Zone W-F-1B-Z 2.1 Area Name Decontamination Area 2.2 Location South Side El. 25-0 Drawing No 9763-F-805661-FP 3.0 Construction of Area Material Min. Fire Rating 3.1 Walls North Concrete -
| |
| South Concrete Outside East Concrete Outside West Concrete -
| |
| 3.2 Floor Concrete -
| |
| 3.3 Ceiling Concrete -
| |
| 3.4 Doors Metal -
| |
| 3.5 Others - -
| |
| 4.0 Floor Area 500 Sq. Ft. Length 25'-6" Width 19'-6" Height 26'-0" 5.0 Volume 13,000 Cu. Ft.
| |
| 6.0 Floor Drains Nuclear X Non-Nuclear None 7.0 Exhaust Ventilation System WPB Exhaust System 7.1 Percentage of System's Capacity .01%
| |
| 8.0 8 Hr. Emergency Lighting in Area Yes No X 8.1 Outside Area at Exit Points Yes No X 9.0 Operational Radioactivity 9.1 Equipment/Piping Yes X No 9.2 Airborne Yes X No 10.0 Fire Protection Type 10.1 Primary Fire Extinguisher(s) 10.2 Secondary Standpipe and Hose Reel 10.3 Detection Ionization 10.4 Other -----
| |
| 11.0 Fire Loading in Area 11.1 None X (no further analysis required)
| |
| | |
| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev. 6 Appendix A Section F.2 Tab 10 STATION Fire Hazard Analysis - W-F-1B-Z Page 2 of 2 12.0 Equipment and Systems in Fire Area/Zone System Train Safety Equipment System A B Related No Safety Related or Safe Shutdown Equipment in ThisArea
| |
| | |
| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev. 7 Appendix A Section F.2 Tab 10 STATION Fire Hazard Analysis - W-F-2A-Z Page 1 of 3 W-F-2A-Z 1.0 Building Waste Processing Building 2.0 Fire Area or Zone W-F-2A-Z 2.1 Area Name Extruder/Evaporator Area 2.2 Location 42-5 Elev. Cols. A To B - 2 To 3 +
| |
| Drawing No 9763-F-805882-FP 3.0 Construction of Area Material Min. Fire Rating 3.1 Walls North 3'-0" Concrete 3 Hrs.
| |
| South 1'-6" & 2'-6" Concrete None East 2'-6" Concrete None West 1'-6" Concrete None 3.2 Floor 2'-6" Concrete & Open None 3.3 Ceiling 2'-6" Concrete None 3.4 Doors Open Access None 3.5 Others Ladder None 4.0 Floor Area 491 Sq. Ft. Length 27'/14' Width 18'/10' Height 10'-6" 5.0 Volume 5,156 Cu. Ft.
| |
| 6.0 Floor Drains Nuclear X Non-Nuclear None 7.0 Exhaust Ventilation System Waste Solidification Exhaust System 7.1 Percentage of System's Capacity 3%
| |
| 8.0 8 Hr. Emergency Lighting in Area Yes No X 8.1 Outside Area at Exit Points Yes No X 9.0 Operational Radioactivity 9.1 Equipment/Piping Yes X No 9.2 Airborne Yes No X 10.0 Fire Protection Type 10.1 Primary Water Deluge System 10.2 Secondary Standpipe and Hose Reel Station 10.3 Detection Ionization and Thermal 10.4 Other -----
| |
| 11.0 Fire Loading in Area 11.1 Refer to page 2 (analysis continued pg. 2, 3 & 4)
| |
| | |
| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev. 7 Appendix A Section F.2 Tab 10 STATION Fire Hazard Analysis - W-F-2A-Z Page 2 of 3 12.0 Equipment and Systems in Fire Area/Zone System Train Safety Equipment System A B Related No Safety Related or Safe Shutdown Equipment in ThisArea 13.0 Design Base Fire 13.1 Combustible in Area (In Situ) Fire Loading in Area Note: Class A Fire Oil: 2.2 Gallons 672 Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Grease: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Class A: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Charcoal: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Chemicals: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Plastics: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Resins: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Other:
| |
| 13.2 Total Fire Loading in Area: 672 Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Total Combustibles: 330,000 Btu 14.0 Design-Basis Fire Description (A) This fire zone is not separated from adjacent fire zones (W-F-1A-Z, W-F-1B-Z, W-F-2A-Z, W-F-2B-Z, W-F-2C-Z & W-F-2D-Z) by fire rated walls and hence it is assumed that all combustibles in all these zones will ignite and burn simultaneously. Total combustibles are 32,155,000 Btu spread over 1598 sq.ft.
| |
| (fire loading 20,122 Btu/ft.2).
| |
| (B) These zones are non-safety related and hence additional combustibles due to cable loading will have no significance.
| |
| 14.1 DBF Fire Loading 20,122 Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| 14.2 Peak Fire Temperature 3,112 °F 14.3 Fire Duration 10 Minutes 15.0 Consequences of Design Basis Fire without Fire Protection 15.1 Loss of extruder/evaporator function.
| |
| 15.2 No safe shutdown or safety related equipment in the area.
| |
| 16.0 Consequences of Design Basis Fire with Fire Protection 16.1 No consequences. Fire will be extinguished.
| |
| | |
| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev. 7 Appendix A Section F.2 Tab 10 STATION Fire Hazard Analysis - W-F-2A-Z Page 3 of 3 17.0 Consequences of Inadvertent or Careless Operation or Rupture of Fire Protection System 17.1 No consequences.
| |
| 18.0 Containing Design Basis Fire in the Fire Area/Zone 18.1 Fire detectors initiate an alarm in the control room. The control room alerts the fire brigade.
| |
| 18.2 The fire brigade will put out the fire with hose reels and/or portable extinguishers.
| |
| 19.0 How Is Redundant Safe Shutdown Equipment in the Same Area Protected 19.1 Not applicable (see 15.2).
| |
| | |
| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev. 7 Appendix A Section F.2 Tab 10 STATION Fire Hazard Analysis - W-F-2B-Z Page 1 of 3 W-F-2B-Z 1.0 Building Waste Processing Building 2.0 Fire Area or Zone W-F-2B-Z 2.1 Area Name Crystallizer Pump Room 2.2 Location 4.2-5 Elev. Cols. A-3 Drawing No 9763-F-805882-FP 3.0 Construction of Area Material Min. Fire Rating 3.1 Walls North 1'-6" Concrete 3 Hrs.
| |
| South 2'-6" Concrete None East 1'-6" Concrete None West 2'-6" Concrete None 3.2 Floor 2'-3" Concrete None 3.3 Ceiling 2'-0" Concrete None 3.4 Doors - -
| |
| 3.5 Others - -
| |
| 4.0 Floor Area 187 Sq. Ft. Length 17' Width 11' Height 10'-6" 5.0 Volume 1,964 Cu. Ft.
| |
| 6.0 Floor Drains Nuclear X Non-Nuclear None 7.0 Exhaust Ventilation System Waste Solidification Exhaust 7.1 Percentage of System's Capacity 3.3%
| |
| 8.0 8 Hr. Emergency Lighting in Area Yes No X 8.1 Outside Area at Exit Points Yes X No 9.0 Operational Radioactivity 9.1 Equipment/Piping Yes X No 9.2 Airborne Yes No X 10.0 Fire Protection Type 10.1 Primary Portable Extinguishers 10.2 Secondary Stand Pipe System Hose Station 10.3 Detection None 10.4 Other -----
| |
| 11.0 Fire Loading in Area 11.1 Refer to page 2.
| |
| | |
| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev. 7 Appendix A Section F.2 Tab 10 STATION Fire Hazard Analysis - W-F-2B-Z Page 2 of 3 12.0 Equipment and Systems in Fire Area/Zone System Train Safety Equipment System A B Related No Safety Related or Safe Shutdown Equipment in ThisArea 13.0 Design Base Fire Note: Oil Fire 13.1 Combustible in Area (In Situ) Fire Loading in Area Note: Oil Fire Oil: 1.5 Gallons 1,203 Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Grease: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Class A: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Charcoal: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Chemicals: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Plastics: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Resins: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Other:
| |
| 13.2 Total Fire Loading in Area: 1203 Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Total Combustibles: 225,000 Btu 14.0 Design-Basis Fire Description (A) This fire zone is not separated from adjacent fire zones (W-F-1A-Z, W-F-1B-Z, W-F-2A-Z, W-F-2B-Z, W-F-2C-Z and W-F-2D-Z) by fire rated walls and hence it is assumed that all combustibles in all these zones will ignite and burn simultaneously. Total combustibles are 32,155,000 Btu spread over 1598 sq.ft.
| |
| (fire loading 20,122 Btu/ft.2).
| |
| (B) These zones are non-safety related and hence additional combustibles due to cable loading will have no significance.
| |
| 14.1 DBF Fire Loading 20,122 Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| 14.2 Peak Fire Temperature 3,112 °F 14.3 Duration of Fire 10 Minutes 15.0 Consequences of Design Basis Fire without Fire Protection 15.1 Loss of crystal recirculation pumps.
| |
| 15.2 No safe shutdown or safety related equipment in the area.
| |
| 16.0 Consequences of Design Basis Fire with Fire Protection 16.1 Possible loss of cryst. Pumps.
| |
| | |
| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev. 7 Appendix A Section F.2 Tab 10 STATION Fire Hazard Analysis - W-F-2B-Z Page 3 of 3 17.0 Consequences of Inadvertent or Careless Operation or Rupture of Fire Protection System 17.1 Not applicable. There is no water fire suppression in the subject area.
| |
| 18.0 Containing Design Basis Fire in the Fire Area/Zone 18.1 Fire detectors initiate an alarm in the control room. The control room alerts the fire brigade.
| |
| 18.2 The fire brigade will put out the fire with hose reels and/or portable extinguishers.
| |
| 19.0 How Is Redundant Safe Shutdown Equipment in the Same Area Protected 19.1 Not applicable (see 15.2).
| |
| | |
| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev. 7 Appendix A Section F.2 Tab 10 STATION Fire Hazard Analysis - W-F-2C-Z Page 1 of 3 W-F-2C-Z 1.0 Building Waste Processing Building 2.0 Fire Area or Zone W-F-2C-Z 2.1 Area Name Asphalt Meter Pump Area 2.2 Location 42-5 Elev. Cols. A-3 Drawing No 9763-F-805882-FP 3.0 Construction of Area Material Min. Fire Rating 3.1 Walls North 3'-0" Concrete 3 Hrs.
| |
| South 1'-6" Concrete None East 1'-6" Concrete None West 2'-6" Concrete Outside Wall 3.2 Floor 2'-6" Concrete None 3.3 Ceiling 2'-6" Concrete None 3.4 Doors One (1) 3 Hrs.
| |
| 3.5 Others One (1) Locked Mesh Door None 4.0 Floor Area 150 Sq. Ft. Length 10'-0" Width 15'-0" Height 10'-6" 5.0 Volume 1,575 Cu. Ft.
| |
| 6.0 Floor Drains Nuclear Non-Nuclear None X 7.0 Exhaust Ventilation System Waste Solidification Exhaust System 7.1 Percentage of System's Capacity 8.5%
| |
| 8.0 8 Hr. Emergency Lighting in Area Yes No X 8.1 Outside Area at Exit Points Yes X No 9.0 Operational Radioactivity 9.1 Equipment/Piping Yes X No 9.2 Airborne Yes No X 10.0 Fire Protection Type 10.1 Primary Water Deluge System 10.2 Secondary Standpipe and Hose Reel Station 10.3 Detection Ionization and Thermal 10.4 Other -----
| |
| 11.0 Fire Loading in Area 11.1 Refer to page 2.
| |
| | |
| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev. 7 Appendix A Section F.2 Tab 10 STATION Fire Hazard Analysis - W-F-2C-Z Page 2 of 3 12.0 Equipment and Systems in Fire Area/Zone System Train Safety Equipment System A B Related No Safety Related or Safe Shutdown Equipment in ThisArea 13.0 Design Base Fire 13.1 Combustible in Area (In Situ) Fire Loading in Area Note: Oil Fire Oil: 4.25 Gallons 4250 Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Grease: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Class A: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Charcoal: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Chemicals: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Plastics: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Resins: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Other: Asphalt -5 Gallons 5,000 Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| 13.2 Total Fire Loading in Area: 9,250 Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Total Combustibles: 1,387,500 Btu 14.0 Design-Basis Fire Description (A) This fire zone is not separated from adjacent fire zones (W-F-1A-Z, W-F-1B-Z, W-F-2A-Z, W-F-2B-Z, W-F-2C-Z & W-F-2D-Z) by fire rated walls and hence it is assumed that all combustibles in all these zones will ignite and burn simultaneously. Total combustibles are 32,155,000 Btu spread over 1598 sq.ft.
| |
| (fire loading 20,122 Btu/ft.2).
| |
| (B) These zones are non-safety related and hence additional combustibles due to cable loading will have no significance.
| |
| 14.1 DBF Fire Loading 20,122 Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| 14.2 Peak Fire Temperature 3,112 °F 14.3 Duration of Fire 10 Minutes 15.0 Consequences of Design Basis Fire without Fire Protection 15.1 Loss of metering function.
| |
| 15.2 No safe shutdown or safety related equipment in the area.
| |
| 16.0 Consequences of Design Basis Fire with Fire Protection 16.1 No consequences. Fire will be extinguished.
| |
| | |
| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev. 7 Appendix A Section F.2 Tab 10 STATION Fire Hazard Analysis - W-F-2C-Z Page 3 of 3 17.0 Consequences of Inadvertent or Careless Operation or Rupture of Fire Protection System 17.1 No consequences.
| |
| 18.0 Containing Design Basis Fire in the Fire Area/Zone 18.1 Fire detectors initiate an alarm in the control room. The control room alerts the fire brigade.
| |
| 18.2 The fire brigade will put out the fire with hose reels and/or portable extinguishers.
| |
| 19.0 How Is Redundant Safe Shutdown Equipment in the Same Area Protected 19.1 Not applicable (see 15.2).
| |
| | |
| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev. 7 Appendix A Section F.2 Tab 10 STATION Fire Hazard Analysis - W-F-2D-Z Page 1 of 3 W-F-2D-Z 1.0 Building Waste Processing Building 2.0 Fire Area or Zone W-F-2D-Z 2.1 Area Name Turntable and Drum Conveyor Area 2.2 Location 25-0 Elev, Cols. A - B & 2 - 4 Drawing No F-80566l-FP 3.0 Construction of Area Material Min. Fire Rating 3.1 Walls North 3'-0" Concrete 3 Hrs.
| |
| South 3'-0" Concrete None East 2'-6" Concrete None West 2'-6" Concrete None 3.2 Floor 2'-0" Concrete None 3.3 Ceiling 2'-0" Concrete & Open None 3.4 Doors 5" Lead None 3.5 Others Ladder None 4.0 Floor Area 507 Sq. Ft. Length 39'-0" Width 13'-0" Height 17'-0" 5.0 Volume 8,619 Cu. Ft.
| |
| 6.0 Floor Drains Nuclear X Non-Nuclear None 7.0 Exhaust Ventilation System Waste Solidification Exhaust System 7.1 Percentage of System's Capacity 70%
| |
| 8.0 8 Hr. Emergency Lighting in Area Yes No X 8.1 Outside Area at Exit Points Yes X No 9.0 Operational Radioactivity 9.1 Equipment/Piping Yes X No 9.2 Airborne Yes No X 10.0 Fire Protection Type 10.1 Primary Water Deluge System 10.2 Secondary Standpipe and Hose Reel Station 10.3 Detection Ionization and Thermal 10.4 Other -----
| |
| 11.0 Fire Loading in Area 11.1 Refer to page 2.
| |
| | |
| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev. 7 Appendix A Section F.2 Tab 10 STATION Fire Hazard Analysis - W-F-2D-Z Page 2 of 3 12.0 Equipment and Systems in Fire Area/Zone System Train Safety Equipment System A B Related No Safety Related or Safe Shutdown Equipment in ThisArea 13.0 Design Base Fire 13.1 Combustible in Area (In Situ) Fire Loading in Area Note: Oil Fire Oil: 41.25 Gallons 12,204 Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Grease: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Class A: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Charcoal: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Chemicals: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Plastics: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Resins: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Other:
| |
| 13.2 Total Fire Loading in Area: 12,204 Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Total Combustibles: 6,187,500 Btu 14.0 Design-Basis Fire Description (A) This fire zone is not separated from adjacent fire zones (W-F-1A-Z, W-F-LB-Z, W-F-2A-Z, W-F-2B-Z, W-F-2C-Z & W-F-2D-Z) by fire rated walls and hence it is assumed that all combustibles in all these zones will ignite and burn simultaneously. Total combustibles are 32,155,000 Btu spread over 1598 sq.ft.
| |
| (fire loading 20,122 Btu/ft.2).
| |
| (B) These zones are non-safety related and hence additional combustibles due to cable loading will have no significance.
| |
| 14.1 DBF Fire Loading 20,122 Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| 14.2 Peak Fire Temperature 3,112 °F 14.3 Duration of Fire 10 Minutes 15.0 Consequences of Design Basis Fire without Fire Protection 15.1 Loss of drum conveyor.
| |
| 15.2 No safe shutdown or safety-related equipment in the area.
| |
| 16.0 Consequences of Design Basis Fire with Fire Protection 16.1 No consequences -- fire will be extinguished.
| |
| | |
| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev. 7 Appendix A Section F.2 Tab 10 STATION Fire Hazard Analysis - W-F-2D-Z Page 3 of 3 17.0 Consequences of Inadvertent or Careless Operation or Rupture of Fire Protection System 17.1 No consequences.
| |
| 18.0 Containing Design Basis Fire in the Fire Area/Zone 18.1 Fire detectors initiate an alarm in the control room. The control room alerts the fire brigade.
| |
| 18.2 The fire brigade will put out the fire with hose reels and/or portable extinguishers.
| |
| 19.0 How Is Redundant Safe Shutdown Equipment in the Same Space Protected
| |
| : 1. Not applicable (see 15.2).
| |
| | |
| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev. 6 Appendix A Section F.2 Tab 10 STATION Fire Hazard Analysis - W-F-2E-Z Page 1 of 2 W-F-2E-Z 1.0 Building Waste Processing Building 2.0 Fire Area or Zone W-F-2E-Z 2.1 Area Name Waste Solidification Control Room 2.2 Location 25-0 Elev. Cols. A-B & 3-4 Drawing No 9763-F-805661-FP 3.0 Construction of Area Material Min. Fire Rating 3.1 Walls North 3'-0" Concrete 3 Hrs.
| |
| South 3'-0" Concrete None East 2'-0" Concrete None West 2'-6" Concrete Outside 3.2 Floor 2'-0" Concrete None 3.3 Ceiling 2'-0" Concrete None 3.4 Doors One (1) 3 Hrs.
| |
| 3.5 Others None -
| |
| 4.0 Floor Area 477 Sq. Ft. Length 26'-6" Width 18'-0" Height 14'-6" 5.0 Volume 6,917 Cu. Ft.
| |
| 6.0 Floor Drains Nuclear X Non-Nuclear None 7.0 Exhaust Ventilation System WAH-AC-76 Air Conditioning Unit 7.1 Percentage of System's Capacity 100%
| |
| 8.0 8 Hr. Emergency Lighting in Area Yes No X 8.1 Outside Area at Exit Points Yes X No 9.0 Operational Radioactivity 9.1 Equipment/Piping Yes No X 9.2 Airborne Yes No X 10.0 Fire Protection Type 10.1 Primary Portable Extinguisher 10.2 Secondary Standpipe and Hose Reel Station 10.3 Detection Ionization 10.4 Other -----
| |
| 11.0 Fire Loading in Area 11.1 None X (No Further Analysis Required)
| |
| | |
| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev. 6 Appendix A Section F.2 Tab 10 STATION Fire Hazard Analysis - W-F-2E-Z Page 2 of 2 12.0 Equipment and Systems in Fire Area/Zone System Train Safety Equipment System A B Related No Safety Related or Safe Shutdown Equipment in ThisArea
| |
| | |
| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev. 6 Appendix A Section F.2 Tab 10 STATION Fire Hazard Analysis - TF-F-1-0 Page 1 of 2 TF-F-1-0 1.0 Building Tank Farm (RWST) 2.0 Fire Area or Zone TF-F-1-0 2.1 Area Name Refueling Water Storage Tank (RWST) Area 2.2 Location Between PAB & Waste Processing Building Drawing No 805661-FP 3.0 Construction of Area Material Min. Fire Rating 3.1 Walls North 22'-0" H x 2'-0" Conc.
| |
| W/Siding to Roof 3 Hr.
| |
| South 22'-0" H x 2'-0" Conc. Dike -
| |
| East 2'-0" Concrete 3 Hr. (PAB)
| |
| West 2'-0" Concrete -
| |
| 3.2 Floor Concrete -
| |
| 3.3 Ceiling Buildup Roof -
| |
| 3.4 Doors None -
| |
| 3.5 Others - -
| |
| 4.0 Floor Area 3,120 Sq. Ft. Length 65'-0" Width 48'-0" Height 60'-0" 5.0 Volume 187,200 Cu. Ft.
| |
| 6.0 Floor Drains Nuclear Non-Nuclear None X 7.0 Exhaust Ventilation System WAH-FN-59A&B 7.1 Percentage of System's Capacity 100%
| |
| 8.0 8 Hr. Emergency Lighting in Area Yes No X 8.1 Outside Area at Exit Points Yes No X 9.0 Operational Radioactivity 9.1 Equipment/Piping Yes No X 9.2 Airborne Yes No X 10.0 Fire Protection Type Ref. Deviation No. 2 SBN-904 Dated 12/2/85 10.1 Primary Fire Extinguisher(s) 10.2 Secondary Standpipe and Hose Reel 10.3 Detection None 10.4 Other -----
| |
| 11.0 Fire Loading in Area 11.1 None X (no further analysis required)
| |
| | |
| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev. 6 Appendix A Section F.2 Tab 10 STATION Fire Hazard Analysis - TF-F-1-0 Page 2 of 2 12.0 Equipment and Systems in Fire Area/Zone System Train Safety Equipment System A B Related Piping, Valves & CBS X X X Instruments Cabling CBS X X X Piping & Valves CS X X X Cabling CS X X X
| |
| | |
| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev. 19 Appendix A Section F.2 Tab 11 STATION Fire Hazard Analysis - SW-F-1A-Z Page 1 of 3 SW-F-1A-Z 1.0 Building Service Water Pump House 2.0 Fire Area or Zone SW-F-1A-Z 2.1 Area Name Circulating Water Pump 2.2 Location North Side El 21 - 0 Drawing No 9763-F-202476 - FP, 20247 3.0 Construction of Area Material Min. Fire Rating 3.1 Walls North Metal Outside South Concrete 1 1/2 Hr.*
| |
| East Metal Outside West Metal Outside 3.2 Floor Grating/Concrete -
| |
| 3.3 Ceiling Concrete/Fiberboard Outside 3.4 Doors Metal -
| |
| 3.5 Others Exposed Steel Beams -
| |
| 4.0 Floor Area 14,800 Sq. Ft. Length 125' Width 118.67' Height 29.83' 5.0 Volume 442,500 Cu. Ft.
| |
| 6.0 Floor Drains Nuclear Non-Nuclear X (Grating) 7.0 Exhaust Ventilation System Wall Exhaust 7.1 Percentage of System's Capacity 100%
| |
| 8.0 8 Hr. Emergency Lighting in Area Yes No X 8.1 Outside Area at Exit Points Yes X No 9.0 Operational Radioactivity 9.1 Equipment/Piping Yes No X 9.2 Airborne Yes No X 10.0 Fire Protection Type 10.1 Primary Fire Extinguisher(s) 10.2 Secondary Yard Hydrant 10.3 Detection None 10.4 Other ----
| |
| 11.0 Fire Loading in Area 11.1 Refer to page 2.
| |
| 2 -0X1 -8 Trash Through Penetration Is Not Fire Rated.
| |
| Ref. Deviation No. 3 SBN-904 Dated 12/2/85
| |
| | |
| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev. 19 Appendix A Section F.2 Tab 11 STATION Fire Hazard Analysis - SW-F-1A-Z Page 2 of 3 12.0 Equipment and Systems in Fire Area/Zone System Train Safety Equipment System A B Related No Safety Related or Safe Shutdown Equipment in This Area 13.0 Design Base Fire 13.1 Combustible in Area (In Situ) Fire Loading in Area Note: Oil Fire Oil: 145.5 Gallons 1,475 Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Grease: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Class A: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Charcoal: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Chemicals: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Plastics: 3,577.1 Pounds 3,141.9 Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Resins: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Other:
| |
| 13.2 Total Fire Loading in Area: 4,616.9 Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Total Combustibles: 68,336,500 Btu 14.0 Design-Basis Fire Description (A) One of the three (3) circulating water pumps ruptures and the entire contents (32.5 gallon/unit x 1 = 32.5 gallons) of oil will spill down and be contained in the cubicle at pit floor at elevation 4' -0". This will cover an area of approximately 16' -0" x 26' -0" = 416 sq. Ft. The entire contents will ignite and burn.
| |
| (B) The oil from one of the three circulating water pump traveling screens spills on the floor and the total of 70.5 gallons of oil will ignite and burn covering an area of 15' -0" x 60' -0" = 900 sq. ft.
| |
| 14.1 DBF Fire Loading 11, 719 Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| 14.2 Peak Area/Zone Temp. During Fire 476 °F 14.3 Duration of Fire 4 1/2 Minutes 15.0 Consequences of Design Basis Fire without Fire Protection 15.1 Loss of affected service water pump due to loss of oil. Fire duration is less than 5 minutes and affected pit is separated from adjoining pit by a concrete structure.
| |
| 16.0 Consequences of Design Basis Fire with Fire Protection 16.1 Not applicable (neither automatic suppression system nor fire detection system is present). Effect will be the loss of affected pump.
| |
| | |
| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev. 19 Appendix A Section F.2 Tab 11 STATION Fire Hazard Analysis - SW-F-1A-Z Page 3 of 3 17.0 Consequences of Inadvertent or Careless Operation or Rupture of Fire Protection System 17.1 Not applicable (automatic suppression system does not exist).
| |
| 18.0 Containing the Design Basis Fire in the Fire Area/Zone 18.1 The pit of each pump is surrounded by a concrete structure. The fire duration is less than 5 minutes and the pit is 16.0 feet deep.
| |
| A fire involving a traveling screen will not spread to other fire zones. The subject fire zone is separated from other zones by a concrete structure. The exception is an opening in the trench loading to SW-F-1E-Z. Exhaust air moment, however, is away from SW-F-1E-Z and therefore the fire will not spread to this fire zone.
| |
| 19.0 How Is Redundant Safe Shutdown Equipment in Same Area Protected 19.1 There is no safe shutdown equipment in the affected area.
| |
| | |
| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev. 16 Appendix A Section F.2 Tab 11 STATION Fire Hazard Analysis - SW-F-1B-A Page 1 of 2 SW-F-1B-A 1.0 Building Service Water Pump House 2.0 Fire Area or Zone SW-F-1B-A 2.1 Area Name Electrical Control Room A 2.2 Location Southwest El 22'-0" Drawing No 9763-F-202476-FP 3.0 Construction of Area Material Min. Fire Rating 3.1 Walls North Concrete Outside South Concrete 3 Hr.
| |
| East Concrete 11/2 Hr.
| |
| West Concrete 11/2 Hr./Outside 3.2 Floor Concrete Outside 3.3 Ceiling Concrete 3 Hr.
| |
| 3.4 Doors Metal 3 Hr./ -
| |
| 3.5 Others Exposed Steel Beams -
| |
| 4.0 Floor Area 725 Sq. Ft. Length 31' Width 23.3' Height 17.5' 5.0 Volume 12,700 Cu. Ft.
| |
| 6.0 Floor Drains Nuclear Non-Nuclear None X 7.0 Exhaust Ventilation System Pressurized Supply 7.1 Percentage of System's Capacity 100%
| |
| 8.0 8 Hr. Emergency Lighting in Area Yes No X 8.1 Outside Area at Exit Points Yes X No 9.0 Operational Radioactivity 9.1 Equipment/Piping Yes No X 9.2 Airborne Yes No X 10.0 Fire Protection Type 10.1 Primary Fire Extinguisher(s) 10.2 Secondary Yard Hydrant 10.3 Detection Ionization 10.4 Other -----
| |
| | |
| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev. 16 Appendix A Section F.2 Tab 11 STATION Fire Hazard Analysis - SW-F-1B-A Page 2 of 2 11.0 Fire Loading in Area 11.1 Total Combustibles: 182,000 Btu 11.2 Design Basis Fire: No Design Basis Fire postulated 12.0 Equipment and Systems in Fire Area/Zone System Train Safety Equipment System A B Related 460 Motor EDE X X Control Centers E514 Cabling EDE X X Cabling SW X X Cabling SWA X X X Temp. Switches SWA X X X Cabling CW X
| |
| | |
| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev. 6 Appendix A Section F.2 Tab 11 STATION Fire Hazard Analysis - SW-F-1C-A Page 1 of 2 SW-F-1C-A 1.0 Building Service Water Pump House 2.0 Fire Area or Zone SW-F-1C-A 2.1 Area Name Electrical Control Room B 2.2 Location Southwest El 22'-0" Drawing No 9763-F-202476-FP 3.0 Construction of Area Material Min. Fire Rating 3.1 Walls North Concrete 3 Hr.
| |
| South Concrete Outside East Concrete 11/2 Hr.
| |
| West Concrete Outside/11/2 Hr.
| |
| 3.2 Floor Concrete Outside 3.3 Ceiling Concrete Outside 3.4 Doors Metal 3 Hr./11/2 Hr.
| |
| 3.5 Others Exposed Steel Beams -
| |
| 4.0 Floor Area 375 Sq. Ft. Length 23.3' Width 16' Height 17.5' 5.0 Volume 6,530 Cu. Ft.
| |
| 6.0 Floor Drains Nuclear Non-Nuclear None X 7.0 Exhaust Ventilation System Pressurized Supply 7.1 Percentage of System's Capacity 100%
| |
| 8.0 8 Hr. Emergency Lighting in Area Yes No X 8.1 Outside Area at Exit Points Yes X No 9.0 Operational Radioactivity 9.1 Equipment/Piping Yes No X 9.2 Airborne Yes No X 10.0 Fire Protection Type 10.1 Primary Fire Extinguisher (s) 10.2 Secondary Yard Hydrant 10.3 Detection Ionization 10.4 Other -----
| |
| 11.0 Fire Loading in Area 11.1 None X (no further analysis required)
| |
| | |
| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev. 6 Appendix A Section F.2 Tab 11 STATION Fire Hazard Analysis - SW-F-1C-A Page 2 of 2 12.0 Equipment and Systems in Fire Area/Zone Required System Train Safety For Safe Equipment System A B Related Shutdown Temp. Switches SWA X X X Cabling SWA X X X X 460v-Motor Control EDE X X X Centers E614 Cabling SW X X X Cabling SWA X X X
| |
| | |
| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev. 6 Appendix A Section F.2 Tab 11 STATION Fire Hazard Analysis - SW-F-1D-A Page 1 of 2 SW-F-1D-A 1.0 Building Service Water Pump House 2.0 Fire Area or Zone SW-F-1D-A 2.1 Area Name Fan Room 2.2 Location Southwest El 22'-0" Drawing No 9763-F-202476-FP 3.0 Construction of Area Material Min. Fire Rating 3.1 Walls North Concrete Outside South Concrete Outside East Concrete 11/2 Hr.
| |
| West Concrete Outside 3.2 Floor Concrete Outside 3.3 Ceiling Concrete Outside 3.4 Doors Metal -
| |
| 3.5 Others - -
| |
| 4.0 Floor Area 110 Sq. Ft. Length 16.5' Width 6.6' Height 17.5' 5.0 Volume 1,925 Cu. Ft.
| |
| 6.0 Floor Drains Nuclear Non-Nuclear None X 7.0 Exhaust Ventilation System Electrical Room Vent System 7.1 Percentage of System's Capacity 100%
| |
| 8.0 8 Hr. Emergency Lighting in Area Yes No X 8.1 Outside Area at Exit Points Yes No X 9.0 Operational Radioactivity 9.1 Equipment/Piping Yes No X 9.2 Airborne Yes No X 10.0 Fire Protection Type 10.1 Primary Fire Extinguisher (s) 10.2 Secondary Yard Hydrant 10.3 Detection Ionization 10.4 Other -----
| |
| 11.0 Fire Loading in Area 11.1 None X (no further analysis required)
| |
| | |
| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev. 6 Appendix A Section F.2 Tab 11 STATION Fire Hazard Analysis - SW-F-1D-A Page 2 of 2 12.0 Equipment and Systems in Fire Area/Zone System Train Safety Equipment System A B Related Fan-FN-40A SWA X X Cabling SWA X X X Fan FN-40B SWA X X
| |
| | |
| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev. 19 Appendix A Section F.2 Tab 11 STATION Fire Hazard Analysis - SW-F-1E-Z Page 1 of 3 SW-F-1E-Z 1.0 Building Service Water Pump House 2.0 Fire Area or Zone SW-F-1E-Z 2.1 Area Name Service Water Pump Area 2.2 Location South Side El 21'-0" Drawing No 9763-F-202476-FP & 202478 - FP 3.0 Construction of Area Material Min. Fire Rating 3.1 Walls North Concrete 1 1/2 Hr.
| |
| * South Concrete Outside East Concrete Outside West Concrete 11/2 Hr.
| |
| 3.2 Floor Grating/Concrete -
| |
| 3.3 Ceiling Concrete Outside 3.4 Doors Metal 11/2 Hr.
| |
| 3.5 Others Exposed Ceiling Beams -
| |
| 4.0 Floor Area 8,500 Sq. Ft. Length 114.6' Width 74' Height 27.25' 5.0 Volume 231,250 Cu. Ft.
| |
| 6.0 Floor Drains Nuclear Non-Nuclear X (Grating) 7.0 Exhaust Ventilation System Wall Exhaust 7.1 Percentage of System's Capacity 100%
| |
| 8.0 8 Hr. Emergency Lighting in Area Yes No X 8.1 Outside Area at Exit Points Yes X No 9.0 Operational Radioactivity 9.1 Equipment/Piping Yes No X 9.2 Airborne Yes No X 10.0 Fire Protection Type 10.1 Primary Fire Extinguisher (s) 10.2 Secondary Yard Hydrant 10.3 Detection Ionization 10.4 Other -----
| |
| 2' -0" X 1' -8" Trash Through Penetration Is Not Fire Rated.
| |
| Ref: Deviation No. 3 SBN-904 Dated 12/2/85
| |
| | |
| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev. 19 Appendix A Section F.2 Tab 11 STATION Fire Hazard Analysis - SW-F-1E-Z Page 2 of 3 11.0 Fire Loading in Area 11.1 Refer to page 2 of 3.
| |
| 12.0 Equipment and Systems in Fire Area/Zone System Train Safety Equipment System A B Related Pump P-41A SW X X Cabling SW X X X Pump P-41C SW X X Piping, Valves & SW X X X Instruments Pump P-41B SW X X Pump P-41D SW X X Instrument Rack IR - 73 MM X X X Fans FN - 38A & 38B SWA X X X Dampers DP - 39A & SWA X X X 39B Temp. Switches SWA X X X Cabling SWA X X X FLEX Equipment FLEX 13.0 Design Base Fire 13.1 Combustible in Area (In Situ) Fire Loading in Area Note: Oil Fire Oil: 357.9 Gallons 6,316.1 Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Grease: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Class A: 5,889.8 Pounds 5,543.3 Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Charcoal: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Chemicals: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Plastics: 15,562.1 Pounds 23,800.7 Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Resins: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Cables: 919.6 Pounds 1,136 Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Other:
| |
| 13.2 Total Fire Loading in Area: 36,796.1 Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Total Combustibles: 312,768,000 Btu
| |
| | |
| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev. 19 Appendix A Section F.2 Tab 11 STATION Fire Hazard Analysis - SW-F-1E-Z Page 3 of 3 14.0 Design-Basis Fire Description (A) Two out of a total of four service water pumps rupture. Total oil content of 26.5 gallons spills to the pit floor at elevation 4 -0 and burns completely, covering an area of 342 square feet.
| |
| 14.1 DBF Fire Loading 11,623 Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| 14.2 Peak Area/Zone Temp. During Fire 804 °F 14.3 Duration of Fire 4.5 Minutes 15.0 Consequences of Design Basis Fire without Fire Protection 15.1 The affected circulating water pumps are lost due to loss of oil.
| |
| 16.0 Consequences of Design Basis Fire with Fire Protection 16.1 Because of the remote location from the control room, the short duration of fire (less than five minutes and manual fire protection systems consisting of fire hydrant and fire extinguishers, only the affected circulating water pumps may be lost.
| |
| 17.0 Consequences of in Advertent or Careless Operation or Rupture of Fire Protection System 17.1 Not applicable (automatic suppression system does not exist).
| |
| 18.0 Containing Design Basis Fire in the Fire Area/Zone 18.1 The subject zone is surrounded by a concrete structure which separates adjoining fire zones with the exception of the opening however, is away from SW-F-1A-Z, and therefore, the fire will not spread to other fire zone.
| |
| 19.0 How Is Redundant Safe Shutdown Equipment in the Same Area Protected 19.1 There is no safe shutdown equipment in the subject fire zone.
| |
| | |
| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev. 6 Appendix A Section F.2 Tab 11 STATION Fire Hazard Analysis - SW-F-2-0 Page 1 of 2 SW-F-2-0 1.0 Building Service Water Intake & Discharge Structure 2.0 Fire Area or Zone SW-F-2-0 2.1 Area Name Service Water Intake & Discharge Structure 2.2 Location E - 6500, N-10,000 & N-9,990 Drawing No 9763 - F - 300245 - FP 3.0 Construction of Area Material Min. Fire Rating 3.1 Walls North Concrete Outside South Concrete Outside East Concrete Outside West Concrete Outside 3.2 Floor Grating Outside 3.3 Ceiling Concrete Outside 3.4 Doors Tornado/Missile -
| |
| 3.5 Others - -
| |
| 4.0 Floor Area 2,086/1,876 Sq. Ft. Length 75'/67' Width 74'/67' Height 101'/101' 5.0 Volume 210,686/189,476 Cu. Ft.
| |
| 6.0 Floor Drains Nuclear Non-Nuclear None X 7.0 Exhaust Ventilation System None 7.1 Percentage of System's Capacity N/A 8.0 8 Hr. Emergency Lighting in Area Yes No X 8.1 Outside Area at Exit Points Yes No 9.0 Operational Radioactivity 9.1 Equipment/Piping Yes No X 9.2 Airborne Yes No X 10.0 Fire Protection Type 10.1 Primary Portable Extinguishers 10.2 Secondary Yard Hydrant 10.3 Detection None*
| |
| 10.4 Other -----
| |
| 11.0 Fire Loading in Area 11.1 None X (no further analysis required)
| |
| Ref.: Deviation No. 2, SBN-904, Dated Dec. 2, 1985
| |
| | |
| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev. 6 Appendix A Section F.2 Tab 11 STATION Fire Hazard Analysis - SW-F-2-0 Page 2 of 2 12.0 Equipment and Systems in Fire Area/Zone System Train Safety Equipment System A B Related SW-V-44 SW X X X SW-V-63 SW X X X Piping & Valves SW X X Cabling SW X
| |
| | |
| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev. 16 Appendix A Section F.2 Tab 12 STATION Fire Hazard Analysis - CT-F-1C-A Page 1 of 3 CT-F-1C-A 1.0 Building Cooling Tower 2.0 Fire Area or Zone CT-F-1C-A 2.1 Area Name Switchgear Room Unit #1 Train B 2.2 Location East Side El 22 -0 Drawing No 9763-F -805068-FP 3.0 Construction of Area Material Min. Fire Rating 3.1 Walls North Concrete Outside South Concrete 3 Hr.
| |
| East Concrete Outside West Concrete 11/2 Hr.
| |
| 3.2 Floor Concrete Outside 3.3 Ceiling Concrete 11/2 Hr.
| |
| 3.4 Doors Metal 3 Hr./11/2 Hr.
| |
| 3.5 Others Exposed Ceiling Beams -
| |
| 4.0 Floor Area 615 Sq. Ft. Length 25' Width 24.5' Height 22' 5.0 Volume 13,500 Cu. Ft.
| |
| 6.0 Floor Drains Nuclear Non-Nuclear None X 7.0 Exhaust Ventilation System Pressurized Supply 7.1 Percentage of System's Capacity 100%
| |
| 8.0 8 Hr. Emergency Lighting in Area Yes No X 8.1 Outside Area at Exit Points Yes X No 9.0 Operational Radioactivity 9.1 Equipment/Piping Yes No X 9.2 Airborne Yes No X 10.0 Fire Protection Type 10.1 Primary Fire Extinguisher(s) 10.2 Secondary Yard Hydrant 10.3 Detection Ionization 10.4 Other ------
| |
| 11.0 Fire Loading in Area 11.1 Refer to page 2 (analysis continued page 2)
| |
| | |
| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev. 16 Appendix A Section F.2 Tab 12 STATION Fire Hazard Analysis - CT-F-1C-A Page 2 of 3 12.0 Equipment and Systems in Fire Area/Zone Required System Train Safety For Safe Equipment System A B Related Shutdown Temp. Switches SWA X X 480v Subst. E64 EDE X X Cabling EDE X X 460v - Motor Control EDE X X X Centers MCC-E-641 Cabling SW X X X Cabling SWA X X 13.0 Design Base Fire 13.1 Combustible in Area (In Situ) Fire Loading in Area Note:
| |
| Oil: Gallons Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Grease: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Class A: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Charcoal: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Chemicals: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Plastics: 30 Pounds 634 Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Resins: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Other:
| |
| 13.2 Total Fire Loading in Area: 634 Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Total Combustibles: 390,000 Btu 14.0 Design-Basis Fire Description
| |
| : 1. The combustible portions of the racking tool ignite and burn over an area covering 2 ft. x 2.2 ft = 4.4 ft2. This is the approximate size of breaker racking tool.
| |
| : 2. The entire combustible content of the tool burns.
| |
| | |
| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev. 16 Appendix A Section F.2 Tab 12 STATION Fire Hazard Analysis - CT-F-1C-A Page 3 of 3 14.1 DBF Fire Loading 88,636 Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| 14.2 Peak Area/Zone Temp. Fire 165 °F 14.3 Duration of Fire 93 Minutes 15.0 Consequences of Design Basis Fire without Fire Protection 15.1 Train B service water may not be available due to smoke damage. Thermal damage is expected to be minimal.
| |
| 16.0 Consequences of Design Basis Fire with Fire Protection 16.1 No consequences. Fire will be extinguished with manual hose lines.
| |
| 17.0 Consequences of Inadvertent or Careless Operation or Rupture of Fire Protection System 17.1 Not applicable. There is no fire suppression in the subject area.
| |
| 18.0 Containing Design Basis Fire in the Fire Area/Zone 18.1 Fire detectors initiate an alarm in the control room. The control room alerts the fire brigade.
| |
| 18.2 The fire would be extinguished using portable extinguishers and/or hose lines.
| |
| 19.0 How Is Redundant Safe Shutdown Equipment in the Same Area Protected 19.1 The redundant Train A equipment and cables are located in a separate fire area.
| |
| | |
| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev. 8 Appendix A Section F.2 Tab 12 STATION Fire Hazard Analysis - CT-F-1D-A Page 1 of 3 CT-F-1D-A 1.0 Building Cooling Tower 2.0 Fire Area or Zone CT-F-1D-A 2.1 Area Name Switchgear Room Unit #1 Train A 2.2 Location East Side El 22 -0 Drawing No 9763-F -805068 3.0 Construction of Area Material Min. Fire Rating 3.1 Walls North Concrete 3 Hr.
| |
| South Concrete 3 Hr East Concrete Outside West Concrete 11/2 Hr.
| |
| 3.2 Floor Concrete 11/2 Hr./Outside 3.3 Ceiling Concrete 11/2 Hr.
| |
| 3.4 Doors Metal 3 Hr./11/2 Hr.
| |
| 3.5 Others Exposed Ceiling Beams -
| |
| 4.0 Floor Area 615 Sq. Ft. Length 25' Width 24.5' Height 22' 5.0 Volume 13,500 Cu. Ft.
| |
| 6.0 Floor Drains Nuclear Non-Nuclear None X 7.0 Exhaust Ventilation System Pressurized Supply 7.1 Percentage of System's Capacity 100%
| |
| 8.0 8 Hr. Emergency Lighting in Area Yes No X 8.1 Outside Area at Exit Points Yes X No 9.0 Operational Radioactivity 9.1 Equipment/Piping Yes No X 9.2 Airborne Yes No X 10.0 Fire Protection Type 10.1 Primary Fire Extinguisher(s) 10.2 Secondary Yard Hydrant 10.3 Detection Ionization 10.4 Other ------
| |
| 11.0 Fire Loading in Area 11.1 Refer to page 2 (analysis continued page 2)
| |
| | |
| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev. 8 Appendix A Section F.2 Tab 12 STATION Fire Hazard Analysis - CT-F-1D-A Page 2 of 3 12.0 Equipment and Systems in Fire Area/Zone Required System Train Safety For Safe Equipment System A B Related Shutdown 460v Motor Control EDE X X Centers E-513 Cabling EDE X X Cabling SW X X X Cabling SWA X X Temp. Switches SWA X X 13.0 Design Base Fire 13.1 Combustible in Area (In Situ) Fire Loading in Area Note:
| |
| Oil: Gallons Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Grease: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Class A: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Charcoal: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Chemicals: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Plastics: 27 Pounds 571 Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Resins: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Other:
| |
| 13.2 Total Fire Loading in Area: 571 Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Total Combustibles: 351,000 Btu 14.0 Design-Basis Fire Description
| |
| : 3. For conservatism the ladders are assumed to be in a vertical position. The bottom of both sets of rails are ignited and burn upward.
| |
| : 4. To add conservatism, it is assumed that the fire is self sustaining although the fire is not severe and has a low heat release rate.
| |
| : 5. The fire area will be limited to the length of the ladder and about 2 feet from the wall for an area covering 20 ft. X 2 ft. = 40 sq. ft.
| |
| 14.1 DBF Fire Loading 8775 Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| 14.2 Peak Area/Zone Temp. Fire 165 °F 14.3 Duration of Fire >> 5 Minutes
| |
| | |
| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev. 8 Appendix A Section F.2 Tab 12 STATION Fire Hazard Analysis - CT-F-1D-A Page 3 of 3 15.0 Consequences of Design Basis Fire without Fire Protection 15.1 Train a service water may not be available due to smoke damage. Thermal damage is expected to be minimal.
| |
| 16.0 Consequences of Design Basis Fire with Fire Protection 16.1 No consequences. Fire will be extinguished with manual hose lines.
| |
| 17.0 Consequences of Inadvertent or Careless Operation or Rupture of Fire Protection System 17.1 Not applicable.
| |
| 18.0 Containing Design Basis Fire in the Fire Area/Zone 18.3 Fire detectors initiate an alarm in the control room. The control room alerts the fire brigade.
| |
| 18.4 The fire would be extinguished using portable extinguishers and/or hose lines.
| |
| 19.0 How Is Redundant Safe Shutdown Equipment in the Same Area Protected 19.1 The redundant Train B equipment and cables are located in a separate fire area.
| |
| | |
| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev. 8 Appendix A Section F.2 Tab 12 STATION Fire Hazard Analysis - CT-F-2B-A Page 1 of 3 CT-F-2B-A 1.0 Building Cooling Tower 2.0 Fire Area or Zone CT-F-2B-A 2.1 Area Name Ventilation & Mech. Rooms For Unit #1 2.2 Location East Side El 46 -0 Drawing No 9763-F -805068-FP 3.0 Construction of Area Material Min. Fire Rating 3.1 Walls North Concrete Outside South Concrete 3 Hr East Concrete Outside West Concrete Outside 3.2 Floor Concrete 11/2 Hr./
| |
| 3.3 Ceiling Concrete Outside 3.4 Doors Metal 3 Hr./11/2 Hr.
| |
| 3.5 Others Exposed Ceiling Beams -
| |
| 4.0 Floor Area 3,575 Sq. Ft. Length 71.5' Width 50' Height 29.5' 5.0 Volume 105,460 Cu. Ft.
| |
| 6.0 Floor Drains Nuclear Non-Nuclear X None 7.0 Exhaust Ventilation System Roof Ventilators 7.1 Percentage of System's Capacity 100%
| |
| 8.0 8 Hr. Emergency Lighting in Area Yes No X 8.1 Outside Area at Exit Points Yes X No 9.0 Operational Radioactivity 9.1 Equipment/Piping Yes No X 9.2 Airborne Yes No X 10.0 Fire Protection Type 10.1 Primary Fire Extinguisher(s) 10.2 Secondary Yard Hydrant 10.3 Detection Ionization 10.4 Other ------
| |
| 11.0 Fire Loading in Area 11.1 Refer to page 2 (analysis continued page 2 & 3).
| |
| | |
| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev. 8 Appendix A Section F.2 Tab 12 STATION Fire Hazard Analysis - CT-F-2B-A Page 2 of 3 12.0 Equipment and Systems in Fire Area/Zone Required System Train Safety For Safe Equipment System A B Related Shutdown Pump - P - 110A SW X X Cabling SW X X X Pump - P -110B SW X X Piping & Valves SW X X X X Fan FN - 64 SWA X X Cabling SWA X X Fan FN - 63 SWA X X Damper Dp - 65, 66 SWA X X 13.0 Design Base Fire 13.1 Combustible in Area (In Situ) Fire Loading in Area Note:
| |
| Oil: 26.5 Gallons 1,112 Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Grease: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Class A: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Charcoal: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Chemicals: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Plastics: 43 Pounds 156 Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Resins: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Other:
| |
| 13.2 Total Fire Loading in Area: 1,268 Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Total Combustibles: 3,975,000 Btu
| |
| | |
| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev. 8 Appendix A Section F.2 Tab 12 STATION Fire Hazard Analysis - CT-F-2B-A Page 3 of 3 14.0 Design-Basis Fire Description
| |
| : 1. One of the two (2) Service Water Pumps rupture, oil spills on the floor. For conservatism, the oil from the other pump is added to the spill, therefore a total of 26.5 gallons of oil is assumed spilled.
| |
| : 2. This oil is assumed to cover an area of approximately 350 square feet. It ignites and burns completely.
| |
| 14.1 DBF Fire Loading 1,112 Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| 14.2 Peak Area/Zone Temp. During Fire 1658 °F 14.3 Duration of Fire <5 Minutes 15.0 Consequences of Design Basis Fire without Fire Protection 15.1 Refer to Seabrook Station Fire Protection of Safe Shutdown Capability (10 CFR 50, App. R).
| |
| 16.0 Consequences of Design Basis Fire with Fire Protection 16.1 No consequences. Fire will be extinguished with portable extinguishers.
| |
| 17.0 Consequences of Inadvertent or Careless Operation or Rupture of Fire Protection System 17.1 Not applicable.
| |
| 18.0 Containing Design Basis Fire in the Fire Area/Zone 18.1 Fire detectors initiate an alarm in the control room. The control room alerts the fire brigade.
| |
| 18.2 The fire would be extinguished using portable extinguishers and/or fire hoses.
| |
| 19.0 How Is Redundant Safe Shutdown Equipment in the Same Area Protected 19.1 Refer to Seabrook Station Fire Protection of Safe Shutdown Capability (10 CFR 50, App. R).
| |
| | |
| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev. 6 Appendix A Section F.2 Tab 12 STATION Fire Hazard Analysis - CT-F-3-0 Page 1 of 2 CT-F-3-0 1.0 Building Cooling Tower 2.0 Fire Area or Zone CT-F-3-0 2.1 Area Name Top of Cooling Tower 2.2 Location Outside - Top of Cooling Tower El. 77 -0 Drawing No 9763-F-805068-FP 3.0 Construction of Area Material Min. Fire Rating 3.1 Walls North N/A N/A South N/A N/A East N/A N/A West N/A N/A 3.2 Floor N/A N/A 3.3 Ceiling N/A N/A 3.4 Doors - -
| |
| 3.5 Others - -
| |
| 4.0 Floor Area N/A Sq. Ft. Length N/A Width N/A Height N/A 5.0 Volume N/A Cu. Ft.
| |
| 6.0 Floor Drains Nuclear Non-Nuclear None X 7.0 Exhaust Ventilation System N/A 7.1 Percentage of System's Capacity N/A 8.0 8 Hr. Emergency Lighting in Area Yes No X 8.1 Outside Area at Exit Points Yes X No 9.0 Operational Radioactivity 9.1 Equipment/Piping Yes No X 9.2 Airborne Yes No X 10.0 Fire Protection Type 10.1 Primary Fire Extinguisher(s) 10.2 Secondary Yard Hydrant 10.3 Detection None 10.4 Other ------
| |
| 11.0 Fire Loading in Area 11.1 Approximately 70 gallons of oil in each Train A fan gear reducer and approximately 30 gallons of oil in each Train B fan gear reducer. Outside location no further analysis required.
| |
| 12.0 Equipment and Systems in Fire Area/Zone
| |
| | |
| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev. 6 Appendix A Section F.2 Tab 12 STATION Fire Hazard Analysis - CT-F-3-0 Page 2 of 2 Required System Train Safety For Safe Equipment System A B Related Shutdown No Equipment Required For Safe Shutdown in This Area Fan-FN-1-51A SW X X Fan-1-FN-51B SW X X Fan-2-FN-51B SW X X Fan-2-FN-51A SW X X Cabling SW X X X
| |
| | |
| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev. 15 Appendix A Section F.2 Tab 13 STATION Fire Hazard Analysis - CE-F-1-Z Page 1 of 4 CE-F-1-Z 1.0 Building Containment Enclosure Ventilation Area 2.0 Fire Area or Zone CE-F-1-Z 2.1 Area Name Cont. Encl. Ventilation Area & Cont. Annulus **
| |
| 2.2 Location El. 21-6 Drawing No 9763-P-805051-FP, 805052-FP, 805053-FP, 805055-FP, 805056-FP, and 805059-FP 3.0 Construction of Area Material Min. Fire Rating 3.1 Walls North Concrete 3 Hr.
| |
| South Concrete 3 Hr./Outside East Concrete 3 Hr.
| |
| West Concrete 3 Hr.
| |
| 3.2 Floor Concrete Outside 3.3 Ceiling Concrete Outside 3.4 Doors Metal 3 Hr./11/2 Hr. (Stairs) 3.5 Others Fireproofed Cols -
| |
| 4.0 Floor Area 1,633 Sq. Ft. ( x 130' x 4') x 125' = 40,825 Cu. Ft.
| |
| 3,060 Sq. Ft. Length 112' Width Varies Height 29.5' Total 4,693 Sq. Ft. = 90,270 Cu. Ft.
| |
| 5.0 Volume 131,095 Cu. Ft.
| |
| 6.0 Floor Drains Nuclear X Non-Nuclear None 7.0 Exhaust Ventilation System PAB Normal Exhaust System 7.1 Percentage of System's Capacity 30%
| |
| 8.0 8 Hr. Emergency Lighting in Area Yes No X 8.1 Outside Area at Exit Points Yes X No 9.0 Operational Radioactivity 9.1 Equipment/Piping Yes No X 9.2 Airborne Yes No X 10.0 Fire Protection Type 10.1 Primary Fire Extinguisher(s) 10.2 Secondary Standpipe & Hose Reel 10.3 Detection Photoelectric/Ionization/None* /Carbon Monoxide Detection in EAH - F- 9. 69.
| |
| 10.4 Other Yard Hydrant 11.0 Fire Loading in Area 11.1 Refer to page 3 *** (analysis continued pages 2 - 4)
| |
| Cont. Encl. Vent Eq. Area and Cont. Annulus Are in Communication with Each Other Thru Structural Openings.
| |
| Cont. Annulus Portion Has No Detection.
| |
| Ref. Deviation No. 2, SBN-904, Dated 12/02/85 Charcoal Loading For Both EAH-F-9, 69 Total Is 2100 Lbs. Charcoal. Charcoal Fire Loading Was Not Considered in Total Area. See Appendix D.
| |
| 12.0 Equipment and Systems in Fire Area/Zone
| |
| | |
| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev. 15 Appendix A Section F.2 Tab 13 STATION Fire Hazard Analysis - CE-F-1-Z Page 2 of 4 System Train Safety Equipment System A B Related Cooling Unit AC-2A EAH X X Cabling EAH X X X Cooling Unit AC - 2B EAH X X Damper DP - 3A EAH X X Damper DP - 3B EAH X X Fan FN - 31A EAH X X Fan FN - 31B EAH X X Damper DP - 25A EAH X Damper DP - 25B EAH X Cabling PAH X X Damper DP - 35B, 36b PAH X X Filters F - 9, 69 EAH X X X Fan FN-4A, B EAH X X X Dampers DP - 30A, B EAH X X X Dampers DP - 29A, B EAH X X X Cabling SF X X X Cabling FAH X X X Cabling CC X X X FN FN - 5A, B EAH X X X Damper DP-37A, B EAH X X X Instruments EAH X X X Piping, Valves, CAP X X X Instruments & Cabling Damper DP - 13A, B FAH X X X 13.0 No 3 hr. Rated fire damper provided in exhaust duct at the point of connection to the unit plant vent.
| |
| No Automatic Detection in Containment Annulus Area.
| |
| Ref: Deviation No. 1 SBN - 904 Dated 12/2/85 Ref: Deviation No. 2 SBN - 904 Dated 12/2/85 13.0 Design Base Fire 13.1 Combustible in Area (In Situ) Fire Loading in Area Note:
| |
| | |
| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev. 15 Appendix A Section F.2 Tab 13 STATION Fire Hazard Analysis - CE-F-1-Z Page 3 of 4 Oil: Gallons Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Grease: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Class A: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Charcoal: 2,100 Pounds
| |
| * Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Chemicals: 35 Pounds 97 Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Plastics: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Resins: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Other:
| |
| 13.2 Total Fire Loading in Area: 97 Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Total Combustibles: 455.000 Btu 14.0 Design-Basis Fire Description
| |
| : 1. For conservatism the ladders are assumed to be in a vertical position. The bottom of both sets of rails are ignited and burn upward.
| |
| : 2. To add conservatism, it is assumed that the fire is self sustaining although the fire is not severe and has a low heat release rate.
| |
| : 3. The fire area will be limited to the length of the ladders and about 2 feet from the wall for an area covering 24 ft. X 2 ft. = 48 ft.2.
| |
| 14.1 DBF Fire Loading 7313 Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| 14.2 Peak Area/Zone Temp.During Fire 290 °F 14.3 Duration of Fire >5 Minutes 15.0 Consequences of Design Basis Fire without Fire Protection 15.1 Refer to Seabrook Station Fire Protection of Safe Shutdown Capability (10 CFR 50, App. R).
| |
| 16.0 Consequences of Design Basis Fire with Fire Protection 16.1 No consequences. Fire will be extinguished with portable extinguishers.
| |
| 17.0 Consequences of Inadvertent or Careless Operation or Rupture of Fire Protection System 17.1 Not applicable 18.0 Containing Design Basis Fire in the Fire Area/Zone 18.1 Fire detectors initiate an alarm in the control room. The control room alerts the fire brigade.
| |
| Charcoal Fire Loading was not considered in total area. See Appendix D.
| |
| | |
| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev. 15 Appendix A Section F.2 Tab 13 STATION Fire Hazard Analysis - CE-F-1-Z Page 4 of 4 18.2 The fire would be extinguished using hose lines and/or portable extinguishers.
| |
| 19.0 How the Redundant Safe Shutdown Equipment in the Area Is Protected 19.1 Refer to Seabrook Station Fire Protection of Safe Shutdown Capability (10 CFR 50, App. R).
| |
| | |
| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev 19 Appendix A Section F.2 Tab 14 STATION Fire Hazard Analysis - FPH-F-1A-A Page 1 of 3 FPH-F-1A-A 1.0 Building Fire Pump House 2.0 Fire Area or Zone FPH-F-1A-A 2.1 Area Name Diesel Pump Room - West 2.2 Location EL 21-0 Drawing No 9763-F-300831-FP 3.0 Construction of Area Material Min. Fire Rating 3.1 Walls North Metal Outside South Metal Outside East Concrete 3 Hr.
| |
| West Metal Outside 3.2 Floor Concrete Outside 3.3 Ceiling Concrete -
| |
| 3.4 Doors Metal 3 Hr./ -
| |
| 3.5 Others Exposed Steel Beams -
| |
| 4.0 Floor Area 825 Sq. Ft. Length 30' Width 27.5' Height 17' 5.0 Volume 14,025 Cu. Ft.
| |
| 6.0 Floor Drains Nuclear Non-Nuclear X None 7.0 Exhaust Ventilation System Pump Room Exhaust System 7.1 Percentage of System's Capacity 100%
| |
| 8.0 8 Hr. Emergency Lighting in Area Yes No X 8.1 Outside Area at Exit Points Yes X No 9.0 Operational Radioactivity 9.1 Equipment/Piping Yes No X 9.2 Airborne Yes No X 10.0 Fire Protection Type 10.1 Primary Wet Pipe Sprinkler System 10.2 Secondary Fire Extinguisher(s) 10.3 Detection Thermal 10.4 Other --------
| |
| 11.0 Fire Loading in Area 11.1 Refer to page 2 (analysis continued pg. 2 & 3)
| |
| | |
| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev 19 Appendix A Section F.2 Tab 14 STATION Fire Hazard Analysis - FPH-F-1A-A Page 2 of 3 12.0 Equipment and Systems in Fire Area/Zone Required System Train Safety For Safe Equipment System A B Related Shutdown No Safety Related Equipment -
| |
| No Equipment Required For Safe Shutdown in This Area 13.0 Design Basis Fire 13.1 Combustible in Area (In Situ) Fire Loading in Area Note: Oil Fire Oil: 6 Gallons 1,091 Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Grease: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Class A: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Charcoal: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Chemicals: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Plastics: 732 Pounds 11,535 Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Resins: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Other:
| |
| 13.2 Total Fire Loading in Area: 12,626 Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Total Combustibles: 10,416,000 Btu 14.0 Design-Basis Fire Description
| |
| : 1. The engine lube oil system ruptures and the entire contents (6 gallons of oil) are sprayed over the pump room covering an area of 91 square feet. Oil film thickness is 1/8.
| |
| : 2. Oil is ignited, burned and consumed.
| |
| 14.1 DBF Fire Loading 9,890 Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| 14.2 Fire Area Peak Temperature 1,967 ºF 14.3 Fire Duration 4 Minutes 15.0 Consequences of Design Basis Fire without Fire Protection 15.1 Loss of diesel fire pump engine.
| |
| 15.2 Loss of controls to pump engine.
| |
| 15.3 Redundant pump, located in separate fire area.
| |
| | |
| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev 19 Appendix A Section F.2 Tab 14 STATION Fire Hazard Analysis - FPH-F-1A-A Page 3 of 3 16.0 Consequences of Design Basis Fire with Fire Protection 16.1 Loss of diesel fire pump engine due to lose of oil.
| |
| 16.2 Possible loss of engine controls.
| |
| 17.0 Consequences of Inadvertent or Careless Operation or Rupture of Fire Protection System 17.1 Possible loss of engine controls.
| |
| 18.0 Containing Design Basis Fire in the Fire Area/Zone 18.1 The fire duration is short, therefore, the structure will contain the fire. The consequences of fire are mitigated further by operation of the sprinkler system.
| |
| 19.0 How Is Redundant Safe Shutdown Equipment in the Same Area Protected 19.1 Not applicable. (see 15.1) fire pumps are not required for safe shutdown nor are they safety related.
| |
| | |
| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev 6 Appendix A Section F.2 Tab 14 STATION Fire Hazard Analysis - FPH-F-1B-A Page 1 of 2 FPH-F-1B-A 1.0 Building Fire Pump House 2.0 Fire Area or Zone FPH-F-1B-A 2.1 Area Name Electric Pump Room 2.2 Location El 21 -0 Drawing No 9763-F-300831-FP 3.0 Construction of Area Material Min. Fire Rating 3.1 Walls North Metal Outside South Metal Outside East Concrete 3 Hr.
| |
| West Concrete 3 Hr.
| |
| 3.2 Floor Concrete Outside 3.3 Ceiling Concrete -
| |
| 3.4 Doors Metal 3 Hr./ -
| |
| 3.5 Others Exposed Steel Beams -
| |
| 4.0 Floor Area 480 Sq. Ft. Length 16 Width 30 Height 17 5.0 Volume 8,160 Cu. Ft.
| |
| 6.0 Floor Drains Nuclear Non-Nuclear X None 7.0 Exhaust Ventilation System Pump Room Exhaust System 7.1 Percentage of Systems Capacity 100%
| |
| 8.0 8 Hr. Emergency Lighting in Area Yes No X 8.1 Outside Area at Exit Points Yes X No 9.0 Operational Radioactivity 9.1 Equipment/Piping Yes No X 9.2 Airborne Yes No X 10.0 Fire Protection Type 10.1 Primary Wet Pipe Sprinkler System 10.2 Secondary Fire Extinguisher(s) 10.3 Detection Ionization 10.4 Other ------
| |
| 11.0 Fire Loading in Area 11.1 None X (no further analysis required)
| |
| | |
| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev 6 Appendix A Section F.2 Tab 14 STATION Fire Hazard Analysis - FPH-F-1B-A Page 2 of 2 12.0 Equipment and Systems in Fire Area/Zone Required System Train Safety For Safe Equipment System A B Related Shutdown No Safety Related Equipment -
| |
| No Equipment Required For Safe Shutdown in This Area
| |
| | |
| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev 19 Appendix A Section F.2. Tab 14 STATION Fire Hazard Analysis - FPH-F-1C-A Page 1 of 3 FPH-F-1C-A 1.0 Building Fire Pump House 2.0 Fire Area or Zone FPH-F-1C-A 2.1 Area Name Diesel Pump Room East 2.2 Location El 21-0 Drawing No 9763-F-300831-FP 3.0 Construction of Area Material Min. Fire Rating 3.1 Walls North Metal Outside South Metal Outside East Metal Outside West Concrete 3 Hr.
| |
| 3.2 Floor Concrete Outside 3.3 Ceiling Concrete -
| |
| 3.4 Doors Metal 3 Hr./ -
| |
| 3.5 Others Exposed Steel Beams -
| |
| 4.0 Floor Area 825 Sq. Ft. Length 30' Width 27.5' Height 17' 5.0 Volume 14,025 Cu. Ft.
| |
| 6.0 Floor Drains Nuclear Non-Nuclear X None 7.0 Exhaust Ventilation System Pump Room Exhaust System 7.1 Percentage of System's Capacity 100%
| |
| 8.0 8 Hr. Emergency Lighting in Area Yes No X 8.1 Outside Area at Exit Points Yes X No 9.0 Operational Radioactivity 9.1 Equipment/Piping Yes No X 9.2 Airborne Yes No X 10.0 Fire Protection Type 10.1 Primary Wet Pipe Sprinkler System 10.2 Secondary Fire Extinguisher(s) 10.3 Detection Thermal 10.4 Other ------
| |
| 11.0 Fire Loading in Area 11.1 Refer to page 2 (analysis continued pg. 2 & 3)
| |
| | |
| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev 19 Appendix A Section F.2. Tab 14 STATION Fire Hazard Analysis - FPH-F-1C-A Page 2 of 3 12.0 Equipment and Systems in Fire Area/Zone Required System Train Safety For Safe Equipment System A B Related Shutdown No Safety Related Equipment -
| |
| No Equipment Required For Safe Shutdown in This Area 13.0 Design Base Fire 13.1 Combustible in Area (In Situ) Fire Loading in Area Note: Oil Fire Oil: 6 Gallons 1,091 Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Grease: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Class A: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Charcoal: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Chemicals: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Plastics: 33 Pounds 520 Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Resins: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Other:
| |
| 13.2 Total Fire Loading in Area: 1,611 Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Total Combustibles: 1,329,000 Btu 14.0 Design-Basis Fire Description
| |
| : 1. the Engine Lube Oil System Ruptures and the Entire Contents (6 Gallons of Oil)
| |
| Are Sprayed Over the Pump Room Covering An Area of 91 Square Feet. Oil Film Thickness Is 1/8.
| |
| : 2. Oil Is Ignited, Burned and Consumed.
| |
| : 3. Duration of Fire Is 1 1/2 Minutes.
| |
| 14.1 DBF Fire Loading 9,890 Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| 14.2 Fire Area Peak Temperature 1,916 ºF 14.3 Fire Duration 4 Minutes 15.0 Consequences of Design Basis Fire without Fire Protection 15.1 Loss of diesel fire pump engine.
| |
| 15.2 Loss of controls to pump engine.
| |
| 15.3 Redundant pump, located elsewhere, is unaffected.
| |
| | |
| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev 19 Appendix A Section F.2. Tab 14 STATION Fire Hazard Analysis - FPH-F-1C-A Page 3 of 3 16.0 Consequences of Design Basis Fire with Fire Protection 16.1 Loss of diesel fire pump engine due to loss of oil.
| |
| 16.2 Possible loss of engine controls.
| |
| 17.0 Consequences of Inadvertent or Careless Operation or Rupture of Fire Protection System 17.1 Not applicable (no water suppression in area).
| |
| 18.0 Containing Design Basis Fire in the Fire Area/Zone 18.1 The fire duration is short therefore the structure will contain the fire.
| |
| 19.0 How Is Redundant Safe Shutdown Equipment in the Same Area Protected 19.1 Not applicable (see 15.3). Fire pumps are not required for safe shutdown nor are they safety related.
| |
| | |
| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev. 18 Appendix A Section F.2 Tab 15 STATION Fire Hazard Analysis - TB-F-1A-Z Page 1 of 3 TB-F-1A-Z 1.0 Building Turbine Building 2.0 Fire Area or Zone TB-F-1A-Z 2.1 Area Name Ground Floor 2.2 Location El 21 -0 Southwest Drawing No 9763-F -202052-FP 3.0 Construction of Area Material Min. Fire Rating 3.1 Walls North Concrete/Block -
| |
| South Concrete/Metal 3 Hr./Outside East - -
| |
| West Concrete/Block 3 Hr.
| |
| 3.2 Floor Concrete Outside 3.3 Ceiling Grating -
| |
| 3.4 Doors Metal 3 Hr.
| |
| 3.5 Others - -
| |
| 21,185 Sq. Ft.
| |
| 4.0 Floor Area 7,852 Sq. Ft. Length Varies Width Varies Height 25' 21,675 5.0 Volume 196,312 Cu. Ft.
| |
| 6.0 Floor Drains Nuclear Non-Nuclear X None 7.0 Exhaust Ventilation System Power Roof Ventilators 7.1 Percentage of System's Capacity 100%
| |
| 8.0 8 Hr. Emergency Lighting in Area Yes X No 8.1 Outside Area at Exit Points Yes X No 9.0 Operational Radioactivity 9.1 Equipment/Piping Yes No X 9.2 Airborne Yes No X 10.0 Fire Protection Type 10.1 Primary Wet Pipe Sprinkler System 10.2 Secondary Standpipe & Hose Reel 10.3 Detection None 10.4 Other Fire Extinguisher(s) 11.0 Fire Loading in Area 11.1 Refer to page 3.
| |
| | |
| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev. 18 Appendix A Section F.2 Tab 15 STATION Fire Hazard Analysis - TB-F-1A-Z Page 2 of 3 12.0 Equipment and Systems in Fire Area/Zone System Train Safety Equipment System A B Related Cabling EDE X X Non Seg Bus Feeder For EDE X 4160v Swgr E5 Non Seg Bus Feeder For EDE X 4160v Swgr E6 Air Compressor SA X X SA-SKD-137A, SA-SKD-137B, SA-SKD-137C Instruments SA X X Piping & Valves SA X X Dryer SKD-18A, 18B IA X X Cabling SA X X Cabling IA X X Cabling FW X X X Cabling MS X X X 125 V Dc Switch Gear EDE X 12A, 12B Pump P-113 FW X Cabling CO X PAA Skid SKD-900 CAS Security Enclosure, SFD 1-SFD-MM-2009
| |
| | |
| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev. 18 Appendix A Section F.2 Tab 15 STATION Fire Hazard Analysis - TB-F-1A-Z Page 3 of 3 13.0 Design Base Fire 13.1 Combustible in Area (In Situ) Fire Loading in Area Note: Oil Fire Oil: 961 Gallons 3,372 Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Grease: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Class A: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Charcoal: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Chemicals: 1,677.3 (PAA) Pounds 420.2 Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Plastics: 109 Pounds 33.1 Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Resins: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Other: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Hydrogen 2,860 Cubic Feet 22 Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| 13.2 Total Fire Loading in Area: 3,847.3 Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Total Combustibles: 164,472,075 Btu 14.0 Design-Basis Fire Description (a) The single largest quantity of oil, 680 gallons, which is associated with hydrogen seal unit, is spilled over a curbed area of 320 square feet and burned completely.
| |
| (b) Ventilation supply air thru open louvers and exhaust air thru roof ventilators is passing over the fire area providing oxygen for burning.
| |
| (c) Oil fire causes spill and ignition of PAA, contributing to DBF.
| |
| 14.1 DBF Fire Loading 639,536 Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| 14.2 Peak Area/Zone Temp. During Fire 222 °F 14.3 Duration of Fire 130 Minutes 15.0 Consequences of Design Basis Fire without Fire Protection 15.1 Hydrogen seal unit is lost because of loss of oil leading to eventual trip.
| |
| 16.0 Consequences of Design Basis Fire with Fire Protection 16.1 Hydrogen seal unit may be lost because of loss of oil possibly leading to reactor trip.
| |
| 17.0 Consequences of Inadvertent or Careless Operation or Rupture of Fire Protection System 17.1 Inadvertent actuation of deluge sprinkler system will cause minor flooding.
| |
| Hydrogen seal unit is unaffected. Floor is sloped for drainage.
| |
| 18.0 Containing the Design Basis Fire in the Fire Area/Zone 18.1 The entire spill of oil is isolated by a curbed area from surroundings. The fire will be contained locally.
| |
| 19.0 How Is Redundant Safe Shutdown Equipment in the Same Area Protected 19.1 Not applicable as no redundant safe shutdown equipment in the vicinity of the affected zone.
| |
| | |
| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev 6 Appendix A Section F.2 Tab 15 STATION Fire Hazard Analysis - TB-F-1B-A Page 1 of 3 TB-F-1B-A 1.0 Building Turbine Building 2.0 Fire Area or Zone TB-F-1B-A 2.1 Area Name Battery Room 2.2 Location El 21 -0 SW Corner Drawing No 9763-F-202052 3.0 Construction of Area Material Min. Fire Rating 3.1 Walls North Concrete/Block 3 Hr.
| |
| South Concrete/Block 3 Hr.
| |
| East Concrete/Block 3 Hr.
| |
| West Concrete/Block 3 Hr.
| |
| 3.2 Floor Concrete 3 Hr.
| |
| 3.3 Ceiling Concrete Outside 3.4 Doors Metal 3 Hr.
| |
| 3.5 Others Fireproof Ceiling Beams 3 Hr.
| |
| * 4.0 Floor Area 450 Sq. Ft. Length 28'-0" Width 16'-0" Height 14'-4" 5.0 Volume 6,422 Cu. Ft.
| |
| 6.0 Floor Drains Nuclear Non-Nuclear None X 7.0 Exhaust Ventilation System Wall Exhaust Fan 7.1 Percentage of System's Capacity 100%
| |
| 8.0 8 Hr. Emergency Lighting in Area Yes No X 8.1 Outside Area at Exit Points Yes No X 9.0 Operational Radioactivity 9.1 Equipment/Piping Yes No X 9.2 Airborne Yes No X 10.0 Fire Protection Type 10.1 Primary Fire Extinguisher(s) 10.2 Secondary Standpipe & Hose Reel 10.3 Detection Ionization 10.4 Other Yard Hydrant 11.0 Fire Loading in Area 11.1 Refer to page 2 of 3 Fire Proofing Not Required By Steel Analysis.
| |
| | |
| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev 6 Appendix A Section F.2 Tab 15 STATION Fire Hazard Analysis - TB-F-1B-A Page 2 of 3 12.0 Equipment and Systems in Fire Area/Zone System Train Safety Equipment System A B Related Battery B-2A, B ED X 13.0 Design Base Fire 13.1 Combustible in Area (In Situ) Fire Loading in Area Note: Class A Material Fire Oil: Gallons Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Grease: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Class A: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Charcoal: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Chemicals: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Plastics: 1,888 Pounds 67,568 Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Resins: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Other:
| |
| 13.2 Total Fire Loading in Area: 67, 568 Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Total Combustibles: 30,405,532 Btu 14.0 Design-Basis Fire Description (A) Fire Starts Involving the Battery Cells.
| |
| (B) the Fire Spreads To Involve All Battery Cells.
| |
| (C) This Area Is Cut-Off From the Main Turbine Ground Floor By Fire Rated Construction. A Fire Is Not Expected To Propagate Beyond This Area.
| |
| 14.1 DBF Fire Loading 67.568 Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| 14.2 Peak Area/Zone Temp. During Fire >750 °F 14.3 Duration of Fire >5 Minutes 15.0 Consequences of Design Basis Fire without Fire Protection 15.1 Loss of batteries.
| |
| 15.2 Refer to Seabrook Station Safe Shutdown Capability Appendix R analysis.
| |
| 16.0 Consequences of Design Basis Fire with Fire Protection 16.1 Loss of one of two batteries.
| |
| 17.0 Consequences of Inadvertent or Careless Operation or Rupture of Fire Protection System 17.1 Not applicable. No water suppression in area.
| |
| | |
| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev 6 Appendix A Section F.2 Tab 15 STATION Fire Hazard Analysis - TB-F-1B-A Page 3 of 3 18.0 Containing Design Basis Fire in the Fire Area/Zone 18.1 Area is separated from the main turbine building ground floor by fire rated barriers.
| |
| 19.0 How Is Redundant Safe Shutdown Equipment in the Same Area Protected 19.1 See 15.0 above.
| |
| | |
| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to Rev 6 BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Appendix A Section F.2 Tab 15 STATION Fire Hazard Analysis - TB-F-1C-Z Page 1 of 3 TB-F-1C-Z 1.0 Building Turbine Building 2.0 Fire Area or Zone TB-F-1C-Z 2.1 Area Name Relay Room 2.2 Location Northwest El. 21 -0 Drawing No 9763-F -202052 3.0 Construction of Area Material Min. Fire Rating 3.1 Walls North Concrete/Block -
| |
| South Concrete/Block -
| |
| East Concrete/Block -
| |
| West Concrete/Block 3 Hr.
| |
| 3.2 Floor Concrete Outside 3.3 Ceiling Concrete Plank -
| |
| 3.4 Doors Metal 3 Hr.
| |
| 3.5 Others - -
| |
| 4.0 Floor Area 2,600 Sq. Ft. Length 80'-0" Width 32'-6" Height 14'-0" 5.0 Volume 36,400 Cu. Ft.
| |
| 6.0 Floor Drains Nuclear Non-Nuclear X None 7.0 Exhaust Ventilation System TAH-FN-127 & TAH-FN-67 7.1 Percentage of System's Capacity 7.6%
| |
| 8.0 8 Hr. Emergency Lighting in Area Yes No X 8.1 Outside Area at Exit Points Yes No X 9.0 Operational Radioactivity 9.1 Equipment/Piping Yes No X 9.2 Airborne Yes No X 10.0 Fire Protection Type 10.1 Primary Fire Extinguisher(s) 10.2 Secondary Standpipe & Hose Reel 10.3 Detection Ionization 10.4 Other ------
| |
| 11.0 Fire Loading in Area 11.1 Refer to page 2 of 3.
| |
| | |
| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to Rev 6 BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Appendix A Section F.2 Tab 15 STATION Fire Hazard Analysis - TB-F-1C-Z Page 2 of 3 12.0 Equipment and Systems in Fire Area/Zone Required System Train Safety For Safe Equipment System A B Related Shutdown Control Panel CP-84 SY X X X Cabling EDE X X X Control Panel CP-85 SY X X X Control Panel CP-86 SY X X X Control Panel CP-87 SY X X X 13.0 Design Base Fire 13.1 Combustible in Area (In Situ) Fire Loading in Area Note: Class A Material Fire Oil: Gallons Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Grease: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Class A: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Charcoal: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Chemicals: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Plastics: 544 Pounds 32,650 Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Resins: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Other:
| |
| 13.2 Total Fire Loading in Area: 32,650 Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Total Combustibles: 8,800,000 Btu 14.0 Design-Basis Fire Description A. Fire starts in one of the two battery rooms.
| |
| B. The fire spreads to involve all the battery cells within the room.
| |
| 14.1 DBF Fire Loading 36,300 Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| 14.2 Peak Area/Zone Temp. During Fire 1,040 °F 14.3 Duration of Fire 41 Minutes
| |
| | |
| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to Rev 6 BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Appendix A Section F.2 Tab 15 STATION Fire Hazard Analysis - TB-F-1C-Z Page 3 of 3 15.0 Consequences of Design Basis Fire without Fire Protection 15.1 Loss of battery function.
| |
| 15.2 Refer to Seabrook Station Safe Shutdown Capability Appendix R analysis.
| |
| 16.0 Consequences of Design Basis Fire with Fire Protection 16.1 Loss of one of two batteries.
| |
| 17.0 Consequences of Inadvertent or Careless Operation or Rupture of Fire Protection System 17.1 Not applicable. No water suppression in zone.
| |
| 18.0 Containing Design Basis Fire in the Fire Area/Zone 18.1 Batteries are not separated from relay room by fire-rated construction. Effects from battery fire may propagate to relay room. See 15.0 above.
| |
| 19.0 How Is Redundant Safe Shutdown Equipment in the Same Area Protected 19.1 See 15.0 above.
| |
| | |
| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev 6 Appendix A Section F.2 Tab 15 STATION Fire Hazard Analysis - TB-F-2-Z Page 1 of 2 TB-F-2-Z 1.0 Building Turbine Building 2.0 Fire Area or Zone TB-F-2-Z 2.1 Area Name Mezzanine (Hallway*)
| |
| 2.2 Location El 50' -0" SW Corner (El 75' -0" SW Corner)
| |
| Drawing No 9763-F -202053-FP (9763-F -202054-FP) 3.0 Construction of Area Material Min. Fire Rating 3.1 Walls North - / (Concrete) -(-)
| |
| South Concrete/Metal (Concrete/Metal) 3 Hr./Outside (3 Hr./Outside)
| |
| East -(-) -(-)
| |
| West Concrete (Concrete) 3 Hr./Outside (Outside) 3.2 Floor Grating (Concrete) -(-)
| |
| 3.3 Ceiling Concrete ( - ) -(-)
| |
| 3.4 Doors Metal (Metal) 3 Hr./ - (3 Hr.)
| |
| 3.5 Others - -(-)
| |
| (650) (10') (65') (25')
| |
| 4.0 Floor Area 3,250 Sq. Ft. Length 50' Width 65' Height 25' 5.0 Volume 81,250 (16,250) Cu. Ft.
| |
| 6.0 Floor Drains Nuclear Non-Nuclear None X 7.0 Exhaust Ventilation System Power Roof Ventilator 7.1 Percentage of System's Capacity 100%
| |
| 8.0 8 Hr. Emergency Lighting in Area Yes X No 8.1 Outside Area at Exit Points Yes X No (X) 9.0 Operational Radioactivity (Hallway & Mezzanine) 9.1 Equipment/Piping Yes No X 9.2 Airborne Yes No X 10.0 Fire Protection Type 10.1 Primary Wet Pipe Sprinkler System 10.2 Secondary Fire Extinguisher(s) 10.3 Detection None 10.4 Other Standpipe & Hose Reel 11.0 Fire Loading in Area 11.1 None X (no further analysis required)
| |
| Entries for Hallway in parenthesis and italicized for differentiation
| |
| | |
| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev 6 Appendix A Section F.2 Tab 15 STATION Fire Hazard Analysis - TB-F-2-Z Page 2 of 2 12.0 Equipment and Systems in Fire Area/Zone System Train Safety Equipment System A B Related Control Panel CP-414 FP X Control Panel CP-558 Cabling CBA X Cabling EDE X Cabling SA X Cabling MS X X X
| |
| | |
| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev 6 Appendix A Section F.2 Tab 15 STATION Fire Hazard Analysis - TB-F-3-Z Page 1 of 3 TB-F-3-Z 1.0 Building Turbine Building 2.0 Fire Area or Zone TB-F-3-Z SAS & Computer Rooms, Start-Up & Turbine 2.1 Area Name Erectors Office - Electronic Work Area 2.2 Location El 75 -0 SW Corner Drawing No 9763-F -202054-FP 3.0 Construction of Area Material Min. Fire Rating 3.1 Walls North Concrete -
| |
| South Concrete -
| |
| East Concrete -
| |
| West Metal Outside/3 Hr.
| |
| 3.2 Floor Concrete -
| |
| Class I Interior Floor Finish 3.3 Ceiling Concrete -
| |
| 3.4 Doors Metal -
| |
| 3.5 Others - -
| |
| 4.0 Floor Area 4,030 Sq. Ft. Length 62' Width 65' Height 25' 5.0 Volume 100,750 Cu. Ft.
| |
| 6.0 Floor Drains Nuclear Non-Nuclear None X 7.0 Exhaust Ventilation System Office Air Conditioning System 7.1 Percentage of System's Capacity 10%
| |
| 8.0 8 Hr. Emergency Lighting in Area Yes No X 8.1 Outside Area at Exit Points Yes No X 9.0 Operational Radioactivity 9.1 Equipment/Piping Yes No X 9.2 Airborne Yes No X 10.0 Fire Protection Type (Sprinkler system above rooms) 10.1 Primary Fire Extinguisher(s) 10.2 Secondary Standpipe & Hose Reel 10.3 Detection Ionization & Photoelectric 10.4 Other ------
| |
| 11.0 Fire Loading in Area 11.1 Refer to page 2 (analysis continued pg. 2 & 3)
| |
| | |
| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev 6 Appendix A Section F.2 Tab 15 STATION Fire Hazard Analysis - TB-F-3-Z Page 2 of 3 12.0 Equipment and Systems in Fire Area/Zone Required System Train Safety For Safe Equipment System A B Related Shutdown No Safety Related Equipment Required For Safe Shutdown in This Zone 13.0 Design Base Fire 13.1 Combustible in Area (In Situ) Fire Loading in Area Note: Class A Material Fire Oil: Gallons Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Grease: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Class A: 4,500 Pounds 12,630 Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Charcoal: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Chemicals: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Plastics: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Resins: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Other:
| |
| 13.2 Total Fire Loading in Area: 12,630 Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Total Combustibles: 36,000,000 Btu 14.0 Design-Basis Fire Description A. Fire starts in an office waste paper basket.
| |
| B. Fire spreads throughout the entire fire zone consuming all combustibles (class a material).
| |
| C. The affected zone is isolated from ventilation air by the fire damper, allowing only partial combustibles to burn.
| |
| 14.1 DBF Fire Loading 12,630 Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| 14.2 Peak Area/Zone Temp. During Fire 690 °F 14.3 Duration of Fire Eight (8) Minutes 15.0 Consequences of Design Basis Fire without Fire Protection 15.1 Loss of occupancy of the offices and electronic work room.
| |
| 15.2 There is no safe shutdown nor safety related equipment in the zone. Therefore, the consequences of a design basis fire will not be serious.
| |
| 16.0 Consequences of Design Basis Fire with Fire Protection 16.1 Possible loss of occupancy of the subject area.
| |
| | |
| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev 6 Appendix A Section F.2 Tab 15 STATION Fire Hazard Analysis - TB-F-3-Z Page 3 of 3 17.0 Consequences of Inadvertent or Careless Operation or Rupture of Fire Protection System 17.1 Not applicable. No water suppression in area.
| |
| 18.0 Containing Design Basis Fire in the Fire Area/Zone 18.1 Separation from the control room by a three-hour-rated fire barrier prevents loss of any safety-related function..
| |
| 19.0 How Is Redundant Safe Shutdown Equipment in the Same Area Protected 19.1 Not applicable (see 15.2)
| |
| | |
| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev 6 Appendix A Section F.2 Tab 16 STATION Fire Hazard Analysis - PP-F-1A-Z Page 1 of 2 PP-F-1A-Z 1.0 Building Mechanical Penetration Area 2.0 Fire Area or Zone PP-F-1A-Z 2.1 Area Name Radioactive Piping Area 2.2 Location Northeast Corner - El. (-) 34 -6, (-) 20 -0 Drawing No 9763-F -311429-FP 3.0 Construction of Area Material Min. Fire Rating 3.1 Walls North Concrete 3 Hr.
| |
| South Concrete -
| |
| East Concrete 3 Hr.
| |
| West Concrete/Open -
| |
| 3.2 Floor Concrete Outside 3.3 Ceiling Concrete -
| |
| 3.4 Doors - -
| |
| 3.5 Others - -
| |
| 4.0 Floor Area 450 Sq. Ft. Length 36' Width Varies Height 22' 5.0 Volume 9,900 Cu. Ft.
| |
| 6.0 Floor Drains Nuclear Non-Nuclear None X 7.0 Exhaust Ventilation System EAH (Non-Ducted) 7.1 Percentage of System's Capacity 33%
| |
| 8.0 8 Hr. Emergency Lighting in Area Yes No X 8.1 Outside Area at Exit Points Yes No X 9.0 Operational Radioactivity 9.1 Equipment/Piping Yes X No 9.2 Airborne Yes X No 10.0 Fire Protection Type 10.1 Primary Fire Extinguisher(s) 10.2 Secondary Standpipe and Hose Reel 10.3 Detection Ionization 10.4 Other ----
| |
| 11.0 Fire Loading in Area 11.1 None X (no further analysis required)
| |
| | |
| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev 6 Appendix A Section F.2 Tab 16 STATION Fire Hazard Analysis - PP-F-1A-Z Page 2 of 2 12.0 Equipment and Systems in Fire Area/Zone Required System Train Safety For Safe Equipment System A B Related Shutdown Piping & Valves CS X X X X Piping & Valves RC X X X Piping & Valves RH X X X Piping & Valves CBS X X Cabling RH X X X Cabling CBS X X Cabling CS X X X X Cabling RC X X X Instrumentation SI X X
| |
| | |
| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev 6 Appendix A Section F.2 Tab 16 STATION Fire Hazard Analysis - PP-F-1B-Z Page 1 of 2 PP-F-1B-Z 1.0 Building Mechanical Penetration Area 2.0 Fire Area or Zone PP-F-1B-Z 2.1 Area Name Radioactive Piping Area 2.2 Location El. (-) 26 -0 & (-) 34 -6 Drawing No 9763-F -311429-FP 3.0 Construction of Area Material Min. Fire Rating 3.1 Walls North Concrete/Open -
| |
| South Concrete/Open -
| |
| East Concrete 3 Hr.
| |
| West Concrete/Open -
| |
| 3.2 Floor Concrete Outside 3.3 Ceiling Concrete -
| |
| 3.4 Doors - -
| |
| 3.5 Others - -
| |
| 4.0 Floor Area 441 Sq. Ft. Length Varies Width Varies Height 16' & 22' 5.0 Volume 7,704 Cu. Ft.
| |
| 6.0 Floor Drains Nuclear X Non-Nuclear None 7.0 Exhaust Ventilation System EAH (Non-Ducted) 7.1 Percentage of System's Capacity 33%
| |
| 8.0 8 Hr. Emergency Lighting in Area Yes No X 8.1 Outside Area at Exit Points Yes No X 9.0 Operational Radioactivity 9.1 Equipment/Piping Yes X No 9.2 Airborne Yes X No 10.0 Fire Protection Type 10.1 Primary Fire Extinguisher(s) 10.2 Secondary Standpipe and Hose Reel 10.3 Detection Ionization 10.4 Other ----
| |
| 11.0 Fire Loading in Area 11.1 None X (no further analysis required)
| |
| | |
| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev 6 Appendix A Section F.2 Tab 16 STATION Fire Hazard Analysis - PP-F-1B-Z Page 2 of 2 12.0 Equipment and Systems in Fire Area/Zone Required System Train Safety For Safe Equipment System A B Related Shutdown Piping & Valves RH X X X Cabling SI X X X Cabling CS X X X Piping & Valves CBS X X X Piping & Valves RC X X Piping & Valves SI X X X Cabling RH X X Cabling RC X X Instruments SI X X Piping & Valves VG X X Cabling VG X X Piping & Valves WLD X X Instrument Rack IR-13A MM X X Temperature Elements & MM X X X Cabling
| |
| | |
| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev 6 Appendix A Section F.2 Tab 16 STATION Fire Hazard Analysis - PP-F-2A-Z Page 1 of 2 PP-F-2A-Z 1.0 Building Mechanical Penetration Area 2.0 Fire Area or Zone PP-F-2A-Z 2.1 Area Name Radioactive Piping Area 2.2 Location Northwest Corner - El. (-) 34 -6 Drawing No 9763-F-311429-FP 3.0 Construction of Area Material Min. Fire Rating 3.1 Walls North Concrete 3 Hr.
| |
| South Concrete/Open -
| |
| East Concrete/Open -
| |
| West Concrete 3 Hr.
| |
| 3.2 Floor Concrete Outside 3.3 Ceiling Concrete -
| |
| 3.4 Doors None -
| |
| 3.5 Others - -
| |
| 4.0 Floor Area 252 Sq. Ft. Length 18' Width 14' Height 35'-6" 5.0 Volume 8,946 Cu. Ft.
| |
| 6.0 Floor Drains Nuclear Non-Nuclear None 7.0 Exhaust Ventilation System EAH (Non-Ducted) 7.1 Percentage of System's Capacity 33%
| |
| 8.0 8 Hr. Emergency Lighting in Area Yes No X 8.1 Outside Area at Exit Points Yes No X 9.0 Operational Radioactivity 9.1 Equipment/Piping Yes X No 9.2 Airborne Yes X No 10.0 Fire Protection Type 10.1 Primary Fire Extinguisher(s) 10.2 Secondary Standpipe & Hose Reel 10.3 Detection Ionization 10.4 Other ----
| |
| 11.0 Fire Loading in Area 11.1 None X (no further analysis required)
| |
| | |
| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev 6 Appendix A Section F.2 Tab 16 STATION Fire Hazard Analysis - PP-F-2A-Z Page 2 of 2 12.0 Equipment and Systems in Fire Area/Zone Required System Train Safety For Safe Equipment System A B Related Shutdown Cabling SI X X Cabling CS X X X Cabling CBS X X Cabling RH X X Cabling RC X X
| |
| | |
| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev 6 Appendix A Section F.2 Tab 16 STATION Fire Hazard Analysis - PP-F-2B-Z Page 1 of 2 PP-F-2B-Z 1.0 Building Mechanical Penetration Area 2.0 Fire Area or Zone PP-F-2B-Z 2.1 Area Name Radioactive Piping Area 2.2 Location Southwest - El. (-) 26 -0 Drawing No 9763-F-311429-FP 3.0 Construction of Area Material Min. Fire Rating 3.1 Walls North Concrete/Open -
| |
| South Concrete -
| |
| East Concrete/Open -
| |
| West MCG 3 Hr.
| |
| 3.2 Floor Concrete Outside 3.3 Ceiling Concrete -
| |
| 3.4 Doors Metal 3 Hr.
| |
| 3.5 Others - -
| |
| 4.0 Floor Area 157 Sq. Ft. Length 16'-6" Width 9'-6" Height 16' 5.0 Volume 2,512 Cu. Ft.
| |
| 6.0 Floor Drains Nuclear X Non-Nuclear None 7.0 Exhaust Ventilation System EAH (Non-Ducted) 7.1 Percentage of System's Capacity 33%
| |
| 8.0 8 Hr. Emergency Lighting in Area Yes No X 8.1 Outside Area at Exit Points Yes No X 9.0 Operational Radioactivity 9.1 Equipment/Piping Yes X No 9.2 Airborne Yes X No 10.0 Fire Protection Type 10.1 Primary Fire Extinguisher(s) 10.2 Secondary Standpipe & Hose Reel 10.3 Detection Ionization 10.4 Other ----
| |
| 11.0 Fire Loading in Area 11.1 None X (no further analysis required)
| |
| | |
| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev 6 Appendix A Section F.2 Tab 16 STATION Fire Hazard Analysis - PP-F-2B-Z Page 2 of 2 12.0 Equipment and Systems in Fire Area/Zone Required System Train Safety For Safe Equipment System A B Related Shutdown Cabling CC X X X Cabling CS X X X Cabling RH X X Cabling CBS X X X Cabling RC X X Cabling SI X X X
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| | |
| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev 6 Appendix A Section F.2 Tab 16 STATION Fire Hazard Analysis - PP-F-3A-Z Page 1 of 2 PP-F-3A-Z 1.0 Building Mechanical Penetration Area 2.0 Fire Area or Zone PP-F-3A-Z 2.1 Area Name Radioactive Piping Area 2.2 Location Northeast Corner, El. (-) 11 -2 1/2 Drawing No 9763-F-311429-FP 3.0 Construction of Area Material Min. Fire Rating 3.1 Walls North Concrete/Open 3 Hr./ -
| |
| South Concrete -
| |
| East Concrete 3 Hr.
| |
| West Concrete -
| |
| 3.2 Floor Concrete -
| |
| 3.3 Ceiling Concrete/Open -
| |
| 3.4 Doors - -
| |
| 3.5 Others - -
| |
| 4.0 Floor Area 450 Sq. Ft. Length 36' Width Varies Height 12' 5.0 Volume 5,400 Cu. Ft.
| |
| 6.0 Floor Drains Nuclear Non-Nuclear None X 7.0 Exhaust Ventilation System EAH (Non-Ducted) 7.1 Percentage of System's Capacity 33%
| |
| 8.0 8 Hr. Emergency Lighting in Area Yes No X 8.1 Outside Area at Exit Points Yes No X 9.0 Operational Radioactivity 9.1 Equipment/Piping Yes X No 9.2 Airborne Yes X No 10.0 Fire Protection Type 10.1 Primary Fire Extinguisher(s) 10.2 Secondary Standpipe and Hose Reel 10.3 Detection Ionization 10.4 Other ----
| |
| 11.0 Fire Loading in Area 11.1 None X (no further analysis required)
| |
| | |
| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev 6 Appendix A Section F.2 Tab 16 STATION Fire Hazard Analysis - PP-F-3A-Z Page 2 of 2 12.0 Equipment and Systems in Fire Area/Zone Required System Train Safety For Safe Equipment System A B Related Shutdown Cabling CS X X X X Instrumentation SI X X Piping & Valves SI X X X Piping & Valves CBS X X Cabling SI X X X Cabling CBS X X
| |
| | |
| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev 6 Appendix A Section F.2 Tab 16 STATION Fire Hazard Analysis - PP-F-3B-Z Page 1 of 2 PP-F-3B-Z 1.0 Building Mechanical Penetration Area 2.0 Fire Area or Zone PP-F-3B-Z 2.1 Area Name Radioactive Piping Area 2.2 Location West Central - El. (-) 34 -6 To (-) 11 -2 1/2 , (-) 26 -0 Drawing No 9763-F -311429- FP 3.0 Construction of Area Material Min. Fire Rating 3.1 Walls North Concrete -
| |
| South Concrete/Open -
| |
| East Concrete -
| |
| West Concrete 3 Hr.
| |
| 3.2 Floor Concrete Outside 3.3 Ceiling Concrete -
| |
| 3.4 Doors - -
| |
| 3.5 Others - -
| |
| 4.0 Floor Area 199 Sq. Ft. Length 26'-6" Width 7'-6" Height 35'-6" 5.0 Volume 7,065 Cu. Ft.
| |
| 6.0 Floor Drains Nuclear Non-Nuclear None X 7.0 Exhaust Ventilation System EAH (Non-Ducted) 7.1 Percentage of System's Capacity 33%
| |
| 8.0 8 Hr. Emergency Lighting in Area Yes No X 8.1 Outside Area at Exit Points Yes No X 9.0 Operational Radioactivity 9.1 Equipment/Piping Yes X No 9.2 Airborne Yes X No 10.0 Fire Protection Type 10.1 Primary Fire Extinguisher(s) 10.2 Secondary Standpipe and Hose Reel 10.3 Detection Ionization 10.4 Other ------
| |
| 11.0 Fire Loading in Area 11.1 None X (no further analysis required)
| |
| | |
| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev 6 Appendix A Section F.2 Tab 16 STATION Fire Hazard Analysis - PP-F-3B-Z Page 2 of 2 12.0 Equipment and Systems in Fire Area/Zone Required System Train Safety For Safe Equipment System A B Related Shutdown Cabling CS X X X Cabling RH X X Cabling CBS X X
| |
| | |
| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev 6 Appendix A Section F.2 Tab 16 STATION Fire Hazard Analysis - PP-F-4B-Z Page 1 of 2 PP-F-4B-Z 1.0 Building Mechanical Penetration Area 2.0 Fire Area or Zone PP-F-4B-Z 2.1 Area Name Non-Radioactive Piping Area 2.2 Location El. (-) 8 -0 & (-) 11 -2 1/2 Drawing No 9763-F -311429- FP 3.0 Construction of Area Material Min. Fire Rating 3.1 Walls North Concrete/Open -
| |
| South Concrete/Open - /Outside East Concrete 3 Hr./ -
| |
| West Concrete/MCG - /3 Hr.
| |
| 3.2 Floor Concrete Outside 3.3 Ceiling Concrete/Open -
| |
| 3.4 Doors Metal 3 Hr.
| |
| 3.5 Others - -
| |
| 4.0 Floor Area 555 Sq. Ft. Length Varies Width Varies Height Varies 5.0 Volume 5,307 Cu. Ft.
| |
| 6.0 Floor Drains Nuclear Non-Nuclear None X 7.0 Exhaust Ventilation System EAH (Non-Ducted) 7.1 Percentage of System's Capacity 33%
| |
| 8.0 8 Hr. Emergency Lighting in Area Yes X No 8.1 Outside Area at Exit Points Yes No X 9.0 Operational Radioactivity 9.1 Equipment/Piping Yes No X 9.2 Airborne Yes X No 10.0 Fire Protection Type 10.1 Primary Fire Extinguisher(s) 10.2 Secondary Standpipe and Hose Reel 10.3 Detection Ionization 10.4 Other ------
| |
| 11.0 Fire Loading in Area 11.1 None X (no further analysis required)
| |
| | |
| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev 6 Appendix A Section F.2 Tab 16 STATION Fire Hazard Analysis - PP-F-4B-Z Page 2 of 2 12.0 Equipment and Systems in Fire Area/Zone Required System Train Safety For Safe Equipment System A B Related Shutdown Piping & Valves CC X X X X Cabling CC X X X X Piping & Valves CBS X X Cabling CBS X X Cabling CS X X X
| |
| | |
| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev 6 STATION Appendix A Section F.2 Tab 16 Fire Hazard Analysis - PP-F-5B-Z Page 1 of 2 PP-F-5B-Z 1.0 Building Mechanical Penetration Area 2.0 Fire Area or Zone PP-F-5B-Z 2.1 Area Name Radioactive Piping Area 2.2 Location South End - El. (-) 34 -6 , (-) 26 -0 & 8 -0 Drawing No 9763-F -311429- FP 3.0 Construction of Area Material Min. Fire Rating 3.1 Walls North Concrete/Open -
| |
| South Concrete Outside East Concrete 3 Hr.
| |
| West Concrete 3 Hr.
| |
| 3.2 Floor Concrete Outside 3.3 Ceiling Concrete -
| |
| 3.4 Doors - -
| |
| 3.5 Others - -
| |
| 4.0 Floor Area 294 Sq. Ft. Length Varies Width Varies Height Varies 5.0 Volume 4,629 Cu. Ft.
| |
| 6.0 Floor Drains Nuclear Non-Nuclear None X 7.0 Exhaust Ventilation System EAH (Non-Ducted) 7.1 Percentage of System's Capacity 33%
| |
| 8.0 8 Hr. Emergency Lighting in Area Yes No X 8.1 Outside Area at Exit Points Yes No X 9.0 Operational Radioactivity 9.1 Equipment/Piping Yes X No 9.2 Airborne Yes X No 10.0 Fire Protection Type 10.1 Primary Fire Extinguisher(s) 10.2 Secondary Standpipe and Hose Reel 10.3 Detection Ionization 10.4 Other ------
| |
| 11.0 Fire Loading in Area 11.1 None X (no further analysis required)
| |
| | |
| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev 6 STATION Appendix A Section F.2 Tab 16 Fire Hazard Analysis - PP-F-5B-Z Page 2 of 2 12.0 Equipment and Systems in Fire Area/Zone Required System Train Safety For Safe Equipment System A B Related Shutdown No Equipment Required For Safe Shutdown in This Zone Piping & Valves CS X X Instrumentation SI X X Cabling CS X X Cabling SI X X
| |
| | |
| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev. 19 Appendix A Section F.2 Tab 17 STATION Fire Hazard Analysis - NES-F-1A-Z Page 1 of 3 NES-F-1A-Z 1.0 Building Non-Essential Switchgear Room 2.0 Fire Area or Zone NES-F-1A-Z 2.1 Area Name Non-Essential Switchgear Area 2.2 Location North of Control Building, El. 21 -6 & 37 -6 Drawing No 9763-F -310289-FP 3.0 Construction of Area Material Min. Fire Rating 3.1 Walls North Concrete/Block 3 Hr.
| |
| South Concrete 3 Hr.
| |
| * East Concrete/Block 3 Hr.
| |
| West Concrete/Block Outside 3.2 Floor Concrete Outside 3.3 Ceiling Concrete/Plank Outside 3.4 Doors Metal 3 Hr./Outside 3.5 Others - -
| |
| 4.0 Floor Area 3,552 Sq. Ft. Length 96' Width 37' Height 27' 5.0 Volume 95,904 Cu. Ft.
| |
| 6.0 Floor Drains Nuclear Non-Nuclear X (El. 37 -6 Only) 7.0 Exhaust Ventilation System SGA 7.1 Percentage of System's Capacity 100%
| |
| 8.0 8 Hr. Emergency Lighting in Area Yes X No 8.1 Outside Area at Exit Points Yes X No 9.0 Operational Radioactivity 9.1 Equipment/Piping Yes No X 9.2 Airborne Yes No X 10.0 Fire Protection Type 10.1 Primary Fire Extinguisher(s) 10.2 Secondary Yard Hydrant 10.3 Detection Ionization 10.4 Other ----
| |
| 11.0 Fire Loading in Area 11.1 Refer to page 2 (analysis continued page 2)
| |
| Door C-100 Is Not 3 Hr. Fire Rated. (no further analysis required)
| |
| Ref. Deviation No. 5, SBN-904, Dated Dec. 2, 1985.
| |
| | |
| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev. 19 Appendix A Section F.2 Tab 17 STATION Fire Hazard Analysis - NES-F-1A-Z Page 2 of 3 12.0 Equipment and Systems in Fire Area/Zone Required System Train Safety For Safe Equipment System A B Related Shutdown Cabling EDE X X Cabling ED X X Cabling RC X X 13.0 Design Base Fire 13.1 Combustible in Area (In Situ) Fire Loading in Area Note:
| |
| Oil: Gallons Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Grease: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Class A: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Charcoal: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Chemicals: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Plastics: 30 Pounds 110 Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Resins: Pounds Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Other:
| |
| 13.2 Total Fire Loading in Area: 110 Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| Total Combustibles: 390,000 Btu 14.0 Design-Basis Fire Description
| |
| : 1. The combustible portions of the racking tool ignite and burn over an area covering 2 ft. x 2.2 ft = 4.4 ft2. This is the approximate size of breaker racking tool.
| |
| : 2. The entire combustible content of the tool burns.
| |
| 14.1 DBF Fire Loading 88,636 Btu/Sq. Ft.
| |
| 14.2 Peak Area/Zone Temp. Fire 144 °F 14.3 Duration of Fire 93 Minutes
| |
| | |
| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev. 19 Appendix A Section F.2 Tab 17 STATION Fire Hazard Analysis - NES-F-1A-Z Page 3 of 3 15.0 Consequences of Design Basis Fire without Fire Protection 15.1 A fire could result in loss of CST level instrumentation due to loss of ED-I-4, ED-PP-5, ED-CP-932, MM-CP-153; loss of RC pump switchgear control power (ED-SWG-1 and ED-SWG-2); loss of Pressurizer heaters C, D and control group power (ED-US-11 and ED-US-23) and loss of offsite power from EDE-SWG-5.
| |
| 16.0 Consequences of Design Basis Fire with Fire Protection 16.1 No consequences. Fire will be extinguished with manual hose lines.
| |
| 17.0 Consequences of Inadvertent or Careless Operation or Rupture of Fire Protection System 17.1 Not applicable. There is no fire suppression in the subject area.
| |
| 18.0 Containing Design Basis Fire in the Fire Area/Zone 18.1 Fire detectors initiate an alarm in the control room. The control room alerts the fire brigade.
| |
| 18.2 The fire would be extinguished using portable extinguishers and/or hose lines.
| |
| 19.0 How Is Redundant Safe Shutdown Equipment in the Same Area Protected 19.1 Not applicable - Only Train A cables are located in NES-F-1-A-Z.
| |
| | |
| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev 6 Appendix A Section F.2 Tab 18 STATION Fire Hazard Analysis - CST-F-1-0 Page 1 of 2 CST-F-1-0 1.0 Building Condensate Storage Tank 2.0 Fire Area Or Zone CST-F-1-0 2.1 Area Name Condensate Storage Tank 2.2 Location E-6, 100 N-10, 200 Drawing No 9763-F -310248-FP 3.0 Construction of Area Material Min. Fire Rating 3.1 Walls North Concrete Outside South Concrete Outside East Concrete Outside West Concrete Outside 3.2 Floor Concrete Outside 3.3 Ceiling Concrete Outside 3.4 Doors Metal -
| |
| 3.5 Others - -
| |
| 4.0 Floor Area 468/150 Sq. Ft. Length 48'/30' Width 8'/3' Height 13'/7' 5.0 Volume 6,084/1,050 Cu. Ft.
| |
| 6.0 Floor Drains Nuclear Non-Nuclear None X 7.0 Exhaust Ventilation System None 7.1 Percentage of System's Capacity N/A%
| |
| 8.0 8 Hr. Emergency Lighting in Area Yes X No 8.1 Outside Area at Exit Points Yes XA No 9.0 Operational Radioactivity 9.1 Equipment/Piping Yes X No 9.2 Airborne Yes X No 10.0 Fire Protection Type 10.1 Primary Fire Extinguisher(s) 10.2 Secondary Yard Hydrant 10.3 Detection None*
| |
| 10.4 Other 11.0 Fire Loading In Area 11.1 None X (no further analysis required)
| |
| Ref. Deviation No. 2, SBN-904, Dated Dec. 2, 1985
| |
| | |
| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev 6 Appendix A Section F.2 Tab 18 STATION Fire Hazard Analysis - CST-F-1-0 Page 2 of 2 12.0 Equipment and Systems in Fire Area/Zone System Train Safety Equipment System A B Related CO-LT-4096 A CO X X X CO-LISL-4052 A & B CO X X X Instrumentaion & CO X Cabling Condensate Storage CO X X X Tank TK-25 Piping & Valves CO X X X
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| | |
| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev 6 Appendix A Section F.2 Tab 19 STATION Fire Hazard Analysis - MUA-F-1-0 Page 1 of 2 MUA-F-1-0 1.0 Building Make Up Air - East 2.0 Fire Area Or Zone MUA-F-1-0 2.1 Area Name Make Up Air East 2.2 Location E-6, 300 N-10, 200 Drawing No 9763-F -310248-FP 3.0 Construction of Area Material Min. Fire Rating 3.1 Walls North Concrete Outside South Concrete Outside East Concrete Outside West Concrete Outside 3.2 Floor Concrete Outside 3.3 Ceiling Concrete Outside 3.4 Doors Manhole Cover Outside 3.5 Others - -
| |
| 4.0 Floor Area 205 Sq. Ft. Length 14'-4" Width 14'-4" Height 8'-9" 5.0 Volume 1,790 Cu. Ft.
| |
| 6.0 Floor Drains Nuclear Non-Nuclear None X 7.0 Exhaust Ventilation System Control Building Make Up Air 7.1 Percentage of System's Capacity 100%
| |
| 8.0 8 Hr. Emergency Lighting in Area Yes No X 8.1 Outside Area at Exit Points Yes No X 9.0 Operational Radioactivity 9.1 Equipment/Piping Yes No X 9.2 Airborne Yes No X 10.0 Fire Protection Type 10.1 Primary Portable Extinguishers 10.2 Secondary Yard Hydrant 10.3 Detection None
| |
| * 10.4 Other 11.0 Fire Loading In Area 11.1 None X (no further analysis required)
| |
| Ref. Deviation No. 2, SBN-904, Dated Dec. 2, 1985.
| |
| | |
| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev 6 Appendix A Section F.2 Tab 19 STATION Fire Hazard Analysis - MUA-F-1-0 Page 2 of 2 12.0 Equipment and Systems in Fire Area/Zone System Train Safety Equipment System A B Related RM-RM-6506A CBA X X X RM-RM-6506B CBA X X X Radiation Monitor RM X X X Cabling RM X X X Cabling CBA X X X
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| | |
| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev 6 Appendix A Section F.2 Tab 20 STATION Fire Hazard Analysis - DCT-F-* Page 1 of 2 DCT-F-*
| |
| 1.0 Building Ductbanks 2.0 Fire Area or Zone DCT-F-1A-0, 1B-0, 2A-0, 2B-0, 3B-0, 4A-0, 4B-0, 5A-0 5B-0, 6-0, 7-0 2.1 Area Name Ductbanks 2.2 Location Site Drawing No 9763-F-310828-FP; 320251-FP; 300245-FP; 310254-FP; 310248-FP; 310249-FP; 320252-FP 3.0 Construction of Area Material Min. Fire Rating 3.1 Walls North N/A N/A South N/A N/A East N/A N/A West N/A N/A 3.2 Floor N/A N/A 3.3 Ceiling N/A N/A 3.4 Doors N/A N/A 3.5 Others N/A N/A 4.0 Floor Area N/A Sq. Ft. Length Width Height 5.0 Volume Cu. Ft.
| |
| 6.0 Floor Drains N/A 7.0 Exhaust Ventilation System N/A 7.1 Percentage of System's Capacity N/A 8.0 8 Hr. Emergency Lighting in Area Yes No X 8.1 Outside Area at Exit Points Yes No 9.0 Operational Radioactivity 9.1 Equipment/Piping Yes No 9.2 Airborne Yes No 10.0 Fire Protection Type Ref: Deviation No. 2 SBN-904 Dated 12/2/85 10.1 Primary N/A 10.2 Secondary N/A 10.3 Detection N/A 10.4 Other ___
| |
| | |
| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev 6 Appendix A Section F.2 Tab 20 STATION Fire Hazard Analysis - DCT-F-* Page 2 of 2 11.0 Fire Loading In Area 11.1 None X (no further analysis required) 12.0 Equipment and Systems in Fire Area/Zone System Train Safety Equipment System A B Related Cabling EDE X X X Cabling SW X X X Cabling SWA X X X Cabling CC X X Cabling SI X X Cabling RC X X Cabling CS X X Cabling PAH X X Cabling EAH X X Cabling CBA X X X Cabling RM X X X
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| | |
| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev 6 Appendix A Section F.2 STATION Results of Fire Hazard Analysis Page 8 F.2 RESULTS OF FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS This section presents the detailed results of an analysis of the consequences of a fire in each designated fire area and zone. These details are presented on standardized Fire Hazard Analysis forms which consolidate all desired information for each designated area and zone.
| |
| Information provided includes, as applicable to a particular fire area or zone, the type of construction, combustibles, fire protection/detection, safety-related systems* and description of equipment within the area, radioactivity within the area, consequences of a fire with and without suppression, consequences of inadvertent operation or rupture of fire protection equipment, means for containing and inhibiting fires, and protection of redundant equipment within the fire area. The fire load within the total fire area or zone can be found on line 13.2 of the form; the worst fire load within the floor area covered by the combustibles is found on line 14.1.
| |
| For-areas which do not include any safety-related system components, analyses were still made to determine if the effects of a fire within such areas could jeopardize adjacent areas containing safety-related systems.
| |
| Table 4 identifies by tab the various fire areas and zones located in each building.
| |
| Abbreviations of equipment and system used in the fire hazard analysis are as follows:
| |
| Abbreviation System ASH Auxiliary Steam Heating CAH Containment Air Handling CAP Containment Air Purge CBA Control Building Air Handling CBS Containment Building Spray CC Component Cooling Water - Primary CL Chlorination COP Containment on-line Purge CP Rod Control and Position CS Chemical and Volume Control DAH Diesel Generator Air Handling DF Drains - Floor DG Diesel Generator System See page C-1 for the criterion used for safe shutdown.
| |
| | |
| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev 6 Appendix A Section F.2 STATION Results of Fire Hazard Analysis Page 9 Abbreviation System DM Demineralized Water EAH Containment Enclosure Air Handling ED Electrical Distribution EDE Electrical Distribution - Emergency FO Fuel Oil FP Fire Protection FPA Fire Pumphouse Air Handling FW Feed Water or Emergency Feedwater HWS Heating Water System IA Instrument Air MS Main Steam NG Nitrogen Gas NI Nuclear Instrumentation PAH PAB Air Handling PW Potable Water RC Reactor Coolant RH Residual Heat Removal RM. Radiation Monitor RPI Rod Position Indicator SB Steam Generator Blowdown SI Safety Injection SS Sampling System SW Service Water WLD Nuclear Equipment/Floor Drains
| |
| | |
| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev 6 Appendix A Section F.2 STATION Results of Fire Hazard Analysis Page 10 The details on the specific areas and zones analyzed are found behind the tabs listed below:
| |
| Table 4 Buildings Fire Area Fire Zones Tab
| |
| : 1. Containment Bldg. C-F-1-Z 1.
| |
| C-F-2-Z C-F-3-Z
| |
| : 2. Emergency Feedwater Pump Building EFP-F-1-A 2.
| |
| : 3. Main Steam & Feedwater Pipe MS-F-1A-Z 3.
| |
| Enclosure MS-F-1B-Z MS-F-2A-Z MS-F-2B-Z MS-F-3A-Z MS-F-3B-Z MS-F-4A-Z MS-F-5A-Z
| |
| : 4. RHR Containment Spray, SI Equipment RHR-F-1A-Z 4.
| |
| Vault RHR-F-1B-Z RHR-F-1C-Z RHR-F-1D-Z RHR-F-2A-Z RHR-F-2B-Z RHR-F-3A-Z RHR-F-3B-Z RHR-F-4A-Z RHR-F-4B-Z
| |
| : 5. Control Building CB-F-1A-A 5.
| |
| CB-F-1B-A CB-F-1D-A CB-F-1E-A CB-F-1F-A CB-F-1G-A CB-F-2A-A CB-F-2B-A CB-F-2C-A CB-F-3A-A CB-F-3B-A CB-F-3C-A
| |
| | |
| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev 6 Appendix A Section F.2 STATION Results of Fire Hazard Analysis Page 11 Table 4 Buildings Fire Area Fire Zones Tab
| |
| : 6. Electrical Tunnels CB-F-S1-0 6.
| |
| CB-F-S2-0 ET-F-1A-A ET-F-1B-A ET-F-1C-A ET-F-1D-A ET-F-S1-0
| |
| : 7. Diesel Generator Building DG-F-1A-A DG-F-3A-Z 7.
| |
| DG-F-1B-A DG-F-3B-Z DG-F-2A-A DG-F-2B-A DG-F-3C-A DG-F-3D-A DG-F-3E-A DG-F-3F-A DG-F-S1-0 DG-F-S2-0
| |
| : 8. Primary Auxiliary Building PAB-F-1C-A PAB-F-1A-Z 8.
| |
| PAB-F-1D-A PAB-F-1B-Z PAB-F-1E-A PAB-F-1F-Z PAB-F-1G-A PAB-F-2A-Z PAB-F-S1-0 PAB-F-2B-Z PAB-F-S2-0 PAB-F-2C-Z PAB-F-3A-Z PAB-F-3B-Z PAB-F-4-Z PAB-F-1J-Z PAB-F-1K-Z
| |
| : 9. Fuel Storage Building FSB-F-1-A 9.
| |
| | |
| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev 6 Appendix A Section F.2 STATION Results of Fire Hazard Analysis Page 12 Table 4 Buildings Fire Area Fire Zones Tab
| |
| : 10. Waste Processing Building W-F-1A-Z 10.
| |
| W-F-1B-Z TF-F-1-0 W-F-2A-Z W-F-2B-Z W-F-2C-Z W-F-2D-Z W-F-2E-Z
| |
| : 11. Service Water Pump House SW-F-1B-A SW-F-1A-Z 11.
| |
| SW-F-1C-A SW-F-1E-Z SW-F-1D-A SW-F-2-0
| |
| : 12. Service Water Cooling Tower CT-F-1C-A 12.
| |
| CT-F-1D-A CT-F-2B-A CT-F-3-0
| |
| : 13. Containment Enclosure Ventilation CE-F-1-Z 13.
| |
| Area
| |
| : 14. Fire Pump House FPH-F-1A-A 14.
| |
| FPH-F-1B-A FPH-F-1C-A
| |
| : 15. Turbine Building TB-F-1B-A TB-F-1A-Z 15.
| |
| TB-F-1C-Z TB-F-2-Z TB-F-E-Z
| |
| : 16. Mechanical Penetration Area PP-F-1A-Z 16.
| |
| PP-F-2A-Z PP-F-1B-Z PP-F-2B-Z PP-F-3A-Z PP-F-3B-Z PP-F-4B-Z PP-F-5B-Z
| |
| : 17. Non-Essential Switch-Gear Room NES-F-1A-Z 17.
| |
| : 18. Condensate Storage Tank CST-F-1-0 18.
| |
| : 19. Make-Up Air, East MUA-F-1-0 19.
| |
| | |
| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev 6 Appendix A Section F.2 STATION Results of Fire Hazard Analysis Page 13 Table 4 Buildings Fire Area Fire Zones Tab
| |
| : 20. Ductbanks DCT-F-1A-0 20.
| |
| DCT-F-1B-0 DCT-F-2A-0 DCT-F-2B-0 DCT-F-3B-0 DCT-F-4A-0 DCT-F-4B-0 DCT-F-5A-0 DCT-F-5B-0 DCT-F-6-0 DCT-F-7-0
| |
| | |
| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev 6 Appendix A Appendix A STATION Diesel Fuel Storage Room Fire Analysis Page 1 Design Basis Fire
| |
| : 1. Diesel oil spills onto the floor of the storage room and is ignited.
| |
| : 2. The flame spreads in all directions (unless obstructed) from the point of ignition at a rate of 3 in./sec. (1).
| |
| : 3. The burning rate is 8.3 inches of depth per hour (2).
| |
| : 4. The fire burns at the rate until 50% of the initial oxygen supply is gone (3).
| |
| : 5. The burning rate decreases linearly from the 50% moment to zero when 100% of the initial oxygen supply in exhausted.
| |
| Assumptions
| |
| : 1. The heat value of the oil is taken a 19,000 Btu/lb. (4).
| |
| : 2. The specific heat of all gases is taken as that of air at standard conditions.
| |
| : 3. The products of combustion are taken to be carbon monoxide and water. This is a very conservative assumption in that it uses oxygen at a slower rate than would an assumption of carbon dioxide product. The heat value in such a case would be much lower in this case than 19,000 Btu/lb., which assumes complete combustion.
| |
| : 4. Heat transfer to passive heat sinks has been considered. Heat transfer coefficients were calculated on the basis of blackbody radiation for the bare concrete walls and ceiling and steel fuel oil tank directly exposed to the flame, turbulent convection for the remainder of the tank, 1 Btu/hr Ft.2 - °F outside the room.
| |
| Dimensional Parameters
| |
| : 1. Room size is 40.5 ft. x 40 ft. and 33.5 ft height.
| |
| : 2. Diameter of the tank is 20 ft. and the length of the straight part is 28 ft.
| |
| : 3. Area of the vent is 4 sq. ft.
| |
| : 4. Heat transfer surfaces exposed to direct radiation are 1,429 sq. ft. concrete ceiling (4 ft.
| |
| thick), 1,393 sq. ft, concrete walls (3.5 ft. thick) and 909 sq. ft. steel ( 1/2 inch thick),
| |
| convective heat transfer being considered for the rest of the tank surface.
| |
| | |
| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev 6 Appendix A Appendix A STATION Diesel Fuel Storage Room Fire Analysis Page 2 Method Of Analysis
| |
| : 1. Flow to and from the room is calculated based on room pressure by the computer code CONTEMPT, which also calculates the room temperature and pressure transients, as well as the temperature profiles in the concrete.
| |
| : 2. Credit is taken for the depletion of oxygen due to venting during the early, maximum burn, stage of fire in the following manner:
| |
| (a) Based on assumptions listed above, the rate of heat addition to the room is 39.17t2 Btu/sec. (t in seconds), and at 19,000 Btu/lb, the mass addition rate is 2.06 x 10-3 t2 lb/sec.
| |
| (b) Conservatively using standard conditions, there are 3,058 lbs. air initially of which 710 lb. is oxygen.
| |
| (c) The mass and energy addition rates in (a), above are inputted to CONTEMPT which is run 100 or so seconds of fire at maximum burn. From the output of this run R(t) the venting rate from the room, and M(t) the total lbs. of air in the room are ascertained as tabular functions of time.
| |
| (d) Based on the oil consumption rate, 2.06 x 10-3 t2 lb/sec., a typical diesel fuel oil composition (5) and combustion products consisting Of CO and H2O, the oxygen consumption rate due to combustion is found to be 3.96 x 10-3 t2 lb/sec.
| |
| (e) The equation:
| |
| d 0 (t ) R(t )
| |
| = 3.96 X 103 t 2 0(t )
| |
| dt M (t )
| |
| which determines 0(t), the time-dependent mass of oxygen in the room, is numerically integrated to find the time at which 50% of the initial amount of oxygen is exhausted.
| |
| (f) The period of maximum burn rate is thus obtained as the time of 50% oxygen remaining in the room.
| |
| | |
| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev 6 Appendix A Appendix A STATION Diesel Fuel Storage Room Fire Analysis Page 3
| |
| : 3. After the maximum burning time, although the venting rate is considerable at that time, no credit is taken for further loss of oxygen through this means. The fire burns at a linearly decreasing rate until the remaining oxygen is consumed. It is recognized that during the late stages of the fire, as the room cools, air will actually be drawn into the room through the vent sustaining some combustion. It should be noted, however, that the mechanism is self-defeating and that air can enter only when the temperature of the room is dropping, thus the peak temperatures will never be approached again. A slow, smoldering condition will result.
| |
| RESULTS Case I: Without Spray Actuation In the case when the spray fails to actuate, the room pressure reaches a maximum of 4.2 psig at 29 seconds when 50% of the oxygen is exhausted, and the room temperature peaks at l,582°F at 41 seconds. Figure 1 shows the transient pressure/temperature responses. The ceiling concrete temperature reaches a maximum of 774°F at 135 seconds.
| |
| The fire continues to burn till 237 seconds. Figure 2 shows the temperature profiles through ceiling concrete.
| |
| Case II: With Spray Actuation In the case when the spray with a flow rate of 625 gpm at 90°F temperature actuates automatically when the room temperature reaches 200 °F, the situation greatly improves.
| |
| The spray starts at approximately 18 seconds when the rate of rise of pressure/temperature is significantly reduced resulting in much less severe transients. No credits have been considered for removal of heat due to vaporization of spray water which is expected to reduce the consequences further.
| |
| The room pressure reaches a maximum of 0.9 psig at 37 seconds when 50% of the oxygen is exhausted, and the room temperature peaks at 611°F at 41 seconds. Figure 3 shows the transient pressure/temperature responses. The fire continues for 157 seconds.
| |
| The ceiling concrete temperature reaches a maximum of 316°F at 70 seconds and the temperature profiles are presented in Figure 4.
| |
| | |
| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev 6 Appendix A Appendix A STATION Diesel Fuel Storage Room Fire Analysis Page 4 References
| |
| : 1. Mackinven, R., Hansel, J.G., and Glassman, I., "Influence of Laboratory Parameters on Flame Spread Across Liquid Fuels". Combustion Science & Technology, Volume 1 - pp.
| |
| 293-306, 1970
| |
| : 2. Blinor, V.1., and Khidiakor, G.N., "Certain Laws Governing Diffusive Burning of Liquids", Fire Research Abstract and Review, Volume - 1 pp. 41-44, 1958
| |
| : 3. Zabetokis, G.M., "Flammability Characteristics of Combustible Gases and Vapors",
| |
| Bulletin 627, Bureaus of Mines, U.S. Dept. of Interior, 1965
| |
| : 4. Perry, J.H., et al.; Chemical Engineering Handbook, 4th Edition, pp.142-143, McGraw-Hill 1963
| |
| : 5. Marks' Handbook of Mechanical Engineering, p. 7-22, California Fuel Oil (other oils with higher carbon and hydrogen fractions consume oxygen more rapidly). (The corresponding heat rate for this oil was not used.)
| |
| | |
| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev 6 Appendix A Appendix B STATION Reactor Coolant Pump Fire Analysis Page 1 Design Basis Fire
| |
| : 1. RCP lube oil leaks from the pump, is heated close to its flash point while traveling over piping, falls to the floor of the containment and is ignited.
| |
| : 2. The oil spill is limited to an area of 150 ft2.
| |
| : 3. The entire 265 gallons of lubricating oil in the pump burns.
| |
| Assumptions
| |
| : 1. The heat value of the oil is 150,000 Btu/gal.
| |
| : 2. The burning rate is equivalent to 5.0 inches of depth per hour.
| |
| : 3. Heat transfer to passive heat sinks has been considered. A heat transfer coefficient of 2 Btu/ft2-hr-0F, characteristic of laminar convection, was conservatively used for transfer to the steel and concrete within the containment and to the containment walls. No radiative heat transfer has been accounted for.
| |
| : 4. Heat removal by active heat sinks (Fan coolers) was also considered. The five fan coolers just balance the containment sensible heat generation rate (5.85 x 106 Btu/hr) at 120°F containment atmosphere temperature. At a temperature of 300°F, the total capacity of the fan coolers is 25 x 106 Btu/hr (or 19.15 x 106 Btu/hr in excess of containment sensible heat generation rate). In actuality, the capacity is somewhat higher, thus that used is conservative.
| |
| : 5. The burning of the oil would add approximately 1900 lbs. to the containment atmosphere mass. This is neglected. Doing so yields a slightly higher peak temperature and an insignificantly lower peak pressure. The temperature transient is more severe and therefore the omission is conservative.
| |
| : 6. The initial temperature and pressure of the containment atmosphere are 1200F and 15.2 psia, respectively.
| |
| : 7. Each Seabrook Station reactor coolant pump contains approximately 240 gallons of oil.
| |
| Each collection tank has a capacity of 320 gallons. The tanks were sized to hold the entire inventory of one pump plus 25%. However, if the lube oil systems for two pumps were to fail simultaneously, there would be an excess of 160 gallons of oil per tank. In order to contain this excess oil, a seismically designed dike will be built around the tank.
| |
| The tanks and their dikes are located such that the excess oil does not present a fire hazard to any safety-related equipment. Additionally, there is no ignition source near the diked area. (Ref.: SBN-762, dated February 8, 1985.)
| |
| | |
| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev 6 Appendix A Appendix B STATION Reactor Coolant Pump Fire Analysis Page 2 Method of Analysis
| |
| : 1. Based on the assumptions above, the duration of the fire is calculated to be 34 minutes with a constant heat addition rate of 1.169 x 106 Btu/hr.
| |
| : 2. The computer code CONTRAST-S was used to calculate the temperature and pressure transients due to the fire.
| |
| Results The maximum temperature obtaining in the containment is 253°F and the maximum pressure is 4 psig. Both peaks occur at 34 minutes, at which time the fire burns itself out.
| |
| The temperature transient is shown in Figure 1 and the pressure transient is shown in Figure 2. Both temperature and pressure decay rapidly as soon as burning stops.
| |
| | |
| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev 6 Appendix A Appendix C STATION Resumes Page 1 RESUME ALFRED S. BOCCHINO United Engineers & Constructors Inc.
| |
| EDUCATION B.S.M.E., 1939, University of Alabama PROFESSIONAL Delaware New Jersey ENGINEERING Missouri Pennsylvania REGISTRATION New Hampshire MEMBERSHIPS American Society of Mechanical Engineers New Jersey Society of Professional Engineers National Society of Professional Engineers Society of Fire Protection Engineers
| |
| | |
| ==SUMMARY==
| |
| Over thirty-three years of experience in the engineering and design of power plants, manufacturing facilities, chemical plants and oil refineries. Developed the scope of various projects, specified equipment and supervised the engineering and design of fire protection systems and mechanical facilities, both process and service. Especially competent in plant fire protection including water supply, fire pumps, yard mains, automatic sprinkler system, etc. and the plant service area consisting of plumbing and drainage, waste treatment facilities, dust collection, central vacuum cleaning systems, heating, ventilating, air conditioning and special nuclear related air cleaning systems. Responsible for the coordination of the engineering and design for complete service and fire protection facilities of several power plants, both fossil and nuclear, and manufacturing plants. Responsibility in the nuclear field included preparation of preliminary safety analysis reports, final safety analysis reports, environmental reports, fire protection system design, and other licensing activities for pressurized water reactors (PWR) and High Temperature Gas-Cooled Reactors (HTGR) power plants.
| |
| EXPERIENCE United Engineers & Constructors Inc.
| |
| Philadelphia. Pennsylvania 19101
| |
| | |
| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev 6 Appendix A Appendix C STATION Resumes Page 2 October 1975 to Consultant - Mechanical Services Engineer present Responsible for the review, comment and approval of Mechanical Services related work, including plant fire protection, on fossil and nuclear power plants designed by UE&C. The Branch Technical Position APCSB 9.5-1 and Regulatory Guide 1.120 are used as guides in the review of fire protection for safety-related systems and equipment.
| |
| May 1972 to Supervising Discipline Engineer October 1975 Project - Delmarva Power & Light Company, Summit Power Station, Summit Bridge, Delaware, two 770 Mw HTGR Units No. 1 and Unit No. 2.
| |
| Responsible for engineering the heating, ventilating and air conditioning systems; plant fire protection system, including yard hydrant system complete with water storage and pumping facilities, building standpipe systems, sprinkler systems, pre-action sprinkler systems, deluge systems, specified use of CO2 and Halon extinguishers. This project was not completed.
| |
| January 1971 to Supervising Discipline Engineer November 1974 Project - Philadelphia Electric Company, Eddystone Generating Station, two 400 Mw crude oil-fired peaking generating units Nos. 3 and 4.
| |
| Responsibilities same as for period May 1972 to October 1975. In addition, engineered automatic foam fire protection system for crude oil spill areas resulting from possible oil pipe rupture.
| |
| July 1970 to Supervising Discipline Engineer January 1974 Project - Atlantic City Electric Company, B. L. England Station.
| |
| Conversion of Low existing coal-burning units to burn crude oil.
| |
| Design of new 150 Mw crude oil-fired plant. Units Nos. 1, 2 and 3.
| |
| Responsibilities same as for period May 1972 to October 1975. In addition engineered (1) foam fire protection system for crude oil storage tanks; (2) a combustible gas detection system for continuously detecting and indicating the presence of combustible gas fumes in selected plant areas; (3) special ventilating systems for removal of gas fumes from burner areas.
| |
| | |
| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev 6 Appendix A Appendix C STATION Resumes Page 3 December 1970 to Supervising Discipline Engineer July 1973 Project - Public Service Electric & Gas Company, Sewaren Generating Station; two 400 Mw oil-fired peaking units, Unit Nos. 7 and 8.
| |
| Responsibilities same as for period May 1972 to October 1975. This project was not completed.
| |
| March 1971 to Supervising Discipline Engineer February 1973 Project - Puerto Rico Water Resources Authority, Aguirre Nuclear Plant, Unit No. 1, P.W.R. units.
| |
| Provide consulting engineering services on plant service facilities. This project was not completed.
| |
| April 1969 to Supervising Discipline Engineer June 1972 Project - Delmarva Power & Light Company, Vienna Power Station; 150 Mw oil-fired generating unit, Unit No. 8.
| |
| Responsibilities same as for period May 1972 to October 1975, except no Halon extinguishing equipment.
| |
| August 1967 to Supervising Discipline Engineer September 1969 Project - Delmarva Power & Light Company, Indian River Power Station; 150 Mw coal-fired Unit No. 3.
| |
| Responsibilities same as for period May 1972 to October 1975, except no pre-action systems, Halon extinguishing equipment water supply or pumping equipment.
| |
| September 1966 to Mechanical Supervising Engineer February 1971 Project - Alleghony Power System, Hatfield Power Station, three 500 Mw coal-fired units, Units Nos. 1, 2 and 3.
| |
| Responsibilities same as for period May 1972 to October 1975, except no Halon extinguishing equipment.
| |
| November 1965 to Mechanical Supervising Engineer December 1973 Project - Consolidated Edison Company of New York, Indian Point Generating Station, Units Nos. 2 and 3, P.W.R. units.
| |
| Responsibilities same as for period May 1972 to October 1975, except no Halon extinguishing equipment. Fixed foam systems used on turbine oil storage tanks and associated equipment.
| |
| | |
| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev 6 Appendix A Appendix C STATION Resumes Page 4 April 1965 to Mechanical Supervising Engineer July 1966 Project - Pickands Mather & Company, Taconite Harbor Power Station, Unit No. 3, coal-fired.
| |
| Extended yard fire protection and building standpipe system. Specified deluge spray system for transformers.
| |
| April 1964 to Mechanical Supervising Engineer March 1968 Project - Union Electric Company, Sioux Power Plant, Units Nos. 1 and 2, 500,000 kw capacity coal-fired units.
| |
| Responsibilities same as for period May 1972 to October 1975, except no Halon extinguishing equipment.
| |
| June 1964 Mechanical Supervising Engineer to Project - United States Steel Corporation, Clairton Works. Addition to February 1965 Boiler House No. 3.
| |
| Extended yard fire protection system, added transformer deluge water spray systems.
| |
| March 1961 to Mechanical Supervising Engineer November 1962 Project - Connecticut Light & Power Company, Norwalk Harbor Station; 165,000 kw capacity, Unit No. 2, coal-fired.
| |
| Responsibilities same as for period JuLy 1972 to October 1975, except no pre-action sprinkler systems, Halon extinguishing equipment or water supply and pumping equipment.
| |
| May 1961 Mechanical Supervising Engineer to Project - Texas Electric Company, Handley Station; 35,000 kw capacity, March 1962 gas-fired outdoor plant.
| |
| Responsibilities same as for period May 1972 to October 1975, except no pre-action sprinkler systems, standpipe systems or Halon extinguishing equipment.
| |
| September 1960 to Mechanical Supervising Engineer May 1961 Project - National Aniline Division, Allied Chemical Corporation, Polyamide Fiber Plant, Hopewell, Virginia.
| |
| Responsibilities same as for period May 1972 to October 1975, except no pre-action sprinkler systems or Halon extinguishing equipment.
| |
| | |
| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev 6 Appendix A Appendix C STATION Resumes Page 5 February 1960 to Mechanical Supervising Engineer September 1960 Project - Western Electric, Kansas City, Missouri, Electronic Facilities covering l 1/2 million square feet of building area.
| |
| Responsibilities same as for period May 1972 to October 1975, except no pre-action sprinkler systems or Halon extinguishing equipment.
| |
| October 1957 to Mechanical Supervising Engineer February 1960 Project - Connecticut Light & Power Company, Norfolk Harbor Station, 150,000 kw capacity, Unit No. 1, coal-fired.
| |
| Responsibilities same as for period May 1972 to October 1975, except no pre-action sprinkler systems or Halon extinguishing equipment.
| |
| June 1957 to Mechanical Supervising Engineer October 1957 Project - Connecticut Light & Power Company, Devon Generating Station; 112,000 Kw capacity, Unit No. 8, coal-fired.
| |
| Responsibilities same as for period May 1972 to October 1975, except no pre-action sprinkler systems or Halon extinguishing equipment.
| |
| May 1955 Mechanical Supervising Engineer to Project - Delaware Power & Light Company, Indian River Power June 1957 Station; two 85,000 Kw units, Units Nos. 1 and 2, coal-fired.
| |
| Responsibilities same as for period May 1972 to October 1975, except no pre-action sprinkler systems or Halon extinguishing equipment.
| |
| August 1939 to This time period is no longer relevant to the matter at hand and is not May 1955 included in this resume.
| |
| | |
| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev 6 Appendix A Appendix C STATION Resumes Page 6 RESUME EDWARD A. SAWYER Fire Protection Coordinator Yankee Atomic Electric Co.
| |
| EDUCATION 1977 - Series of short intensive courses on Fire Protection for Nuclear Power Plants, Fire Protection for Nuclear Power Plant Operating Personnel, and Fire Hazard Analysis for Nuclear Power Plant. All given by NATLSCo and Professional Loss Control, Inc.
| |
| September 1976 - December 1976 - Worcester Polytechnical Institute.
| |
| Engineering Methodology for Building Fire Safety Evaluation.
| |
| August 1976 - University of Wisconsin-Extension. Fire Safety Design for Buildings.
| |
| 1965 - Northeastern University - BS in Electrical Engineering.
| |
| MEMBERSHIPS Society of Fire Protection Engineers National Fire Protection Association EXPERIENCE Yankee Atomic Electric Company July 1976 to Fire Protection Coordinator directly responsible for the overall Present preparation and implementation of the fire prevention and protection programs for three operating nuclear power plants - Yankee Rowe, Vermont Yankee, and Maine Yankee. Specifically responsible for the performance of the fire hazard analysis at the plants, and the development and implementation of recommendations concerning the updating and backfitting of the plants to the applicable requirements contained in Appendix A to the Branch Technical Position on Fire Protection, APCSB
| |
| : 9. 5-1, Regulatory Guide 1. 120, and any further NRC requirements in the area of fire protection. Responsible for insuring, the development of fire prevention and protection procedures, including programs for the training of the plant staff and plant fire brigade. Responsible for ultimate review and approval of the design of Seabrook Station and NEP 1 and 2 with respect to coordination of design with fire protection requirements.
| |
| | |
| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev 6 Appendix A Appendix C STATION Resumes Page 7 Responsible for the ultimate review and approval of the fire hazard analysis and the Fire Protection Reevaluation Report. Responsible for dealing with the insurers for the operating plants in matters relating to fire protection.
| |
| August 1974 to Project Manager on the Central Maine Power Company Nuclear Project July 1976 directly responsible for coordinating the development of project design and engineering schedules with the principal contractors, administration of the Project Engineers under my direction, developing, monitoring and controlling project costs: including dealing with insurers of the project; generally responsible for the licensing of the project and for engineering, design, and quality assurance activities related to the work of the principal contractor organizations associated with the project.
| |
| January 1972 to Electrical Project Engineer on the Seabrook Nuclear Power Station.
| |
| August 1974 Duties consisted of supervision of the Electrical Engineering effort of the A/E and Yankee in PSAR submittal and in plant design, and responsibility to the Project Manager for licensing activities, engineering coordination, notification of any cost or schedular problems, including dealing with NELPIA in areas of fire protection design.
| |
| Project Engineer on the engineering, construction and testing of an Advanced Off-Gas Control System for the Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Plant. Duties consisted of supervising the engineering, scheduling and cost control efforts of the A/E and Yankee personnel; and following of the construction effort and test effort for the system.
| |
| November 1971 Assistant to the Project Engineer for Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power to Plant. Duties consisted of aiding in plant licensing, plant licensing, January 1972 writing of plant Environmental Report.
| |
| September 1970 Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Plant to November 1971 Technical Assistant to the Plant Maintenance Supervisor. Duties consisted of aiding Maintenance Department personnel in preparing the p-l-ant for commission, ranging from work on Microwave Communications, Metering, and Relaying to work on large motors, switchgear, and power transformers.
| |
| | |
| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev 6 Appendix A Appendix C STATION Resumes Page 8 January 1968 to Yankee Atomic Electric Company September 1970 Engineer in the Project group for the Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Plant. The Project group coordinated the work done on the plant by the Architect Engineer, Nuclear Steam Supplier, and the various other vendors and suppliers. Work was mainly in the Electrical and Instrumentation coordination and design, with some excursions into Nuclear and Mechanical areas, including working with NELPIA in developing fire protection systems.
| |
| April 1963 to New England Electric System June 1965 Brayton Point Generating Station, Somerset, Massachusetts. Co-op employment as Assistant to the Electrical Department Foreign of a 500 M Thermal Generating Plant - Maintenance planning, job planning, parts ordering, responsibility for maintenance of fire protection systems.
| |
| | |
| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison ri~?n'totoBT BTPPAAPCSB 9.5-1, Evaluation and~G,on:ip~ Rev.
| |
| . 99 SEA BROOK PCSB 9.5- 1 Rev Appendix A , Appendix STATION STA 'llO N .',/ ") *.
| |
| Charcoal Ap p~ nd i~ A Filter Units Hazard Analysis Ap pendixDD
| |
| . ,Cl1~~,9;()~1'Fjlt~r,:tJ:nits Hazard Aln tilys is Page'i'i "
| |
| Page d
| |
| h m
| |
| d 0
| |
| kl Cr U U R D S ANALYSES Or SEABROOK HAZARDS ANALYSES OF SEAB ROOK STAT STATION ION CHARCOAL FILTER UNITS CHARCOAL FILT ER UNIT S Seabrook Seab rook Stat Station ion PubltcServ Service pany ofofNew Company ice Com NewHam pshi re Bampshire Pub lic New Hampshire Division isio n New Ham pshi re Yan kee Yankee Div Revision 1 Rev isio n 1 November 1991 Nov emb er 199 1
| |
| * 3-8 '=.&
| |
| \ 043-8
| |
| )0-Prepared b Prep ared b ~ ,,'~~, rC \ e ~ Date Date by ~.Le~
| |
| 10.8-W-Revi ewed t- !r_
| |
| : 10. Date Date Alexander~. Kle in ,
| |
| App rove d by4f/fJ./?L.%~
| |
| t~l~ac Clo utie r z-r
| |
| .-_-_* -. -- ..-C I
| |
| REV ISIO N 1 -
| |
| BY\DATB APPROVED DY\DA'rE '
| |
| PREPARED BY\DATE R~EWED
| |
| - u*tt -'"
| |
| Yankee Yank Atomic ee Atom Electric ic Ele ctri c Com pany Coupany ,
| |
| HucleerServ Services ices Div isio n Division Nuc leer
| |
| --... . . . 1671 Worcester Soad 1671 Wor cest er Road Eramingha~, klassachusetts 0170 Fram ingh am, Mas sach uset ts 1
| |
| 01701 - -.
| |
| I
| |
| | |
| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparisont o'BTPMC8B Evalu~t1on;'ahd1~~mp~~tsofi to BTP APCSB9.5-1, 9.5- 1, Rev. 9
| |
| ............." ..... ixA Appendix A Appendix D STATION Charcoal Filter Units HazardAnalysis Analysis ChardoaJ.~ilfJaZard Page ii
| |
| ~ISCLAIMER OF RESPQNSIBUITY This ThisdocumentdocumentW&S wasprepared preparedby byYankee YankeeAtomic AtomicElectric Electric Company Company
| |
| ("Yankee").
| |
| (*'Yankeee') The Theusewe ofo f iflformation inforrationcontained contained ininthis t h i sdocument docmmtby by anyone 8nyQneother other than tban Yankee, or the Organization f o r which the document was prepared, isisnot Yankee. or the Organiz&tion for which the document was prepared. not authorized authorizedand ardwith respect to any uoAUthori;ed usc. neither Yankee nor its neither Yankee nor i t.
| |
| officers. ,
| |
| officers directors, directors, agents, agents,or oremployee. assme any' employeesass~e any'obligation.
| |
| obligation, responsibility.
| |
| n s p m r s i b i l i t y . or or liability l i a b i l i t yor makes any ormakes anywarranty warranty or orrepresentation representationof of the the material contained in material contained in thethedocument.
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| document.
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| ./
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| -ii-WP1'l9/181
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| SEABROOK SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison Evaluation to BTP APCSB 9.5-1~
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| C()mpa~isont()BTPAPCSB 9.5-1, Rev.
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| R.ev~9 9 Appendix
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| ,. ..... i\ppeQdixA A Appendix D i\ppep.d.ix *0 STATION STATION Charcoal Filter Units Hazard Analysis Ch~~~~~l~~lt~rllnitsHaz~rd Page iii TAELE OF CONIENIS SUBJEct PBEL In traduction **************************************************** 11 Backgro1JI1d. It " ** " ; * * * ,,- * " ** " * "
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| 1 DisCU5Sion ****************************************************** 1-6 Conclusion****************************************************** 6 Evaluation of Charcoal Charcoal Filer Unit Unit Fires Appendix II Evaluation at at Seabrook Station - PLC Iodine Adsorber Fire Test - - II Appendix 11 Nuclear Consulting Services.
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| Nuclear Services, Inc.Jnc.
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| -iii-WFP19/181
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| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP
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| *lEvaluatiori:~it~I;~*~iij~~Js'~nt6 BTP APCSBMeSH JJ:5"" 9.5-1, J', Rev. 9 * . J t~~M::"~:
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| STATION . " ":' . '~p~¢;tlaix Appendix A A . Section F.3 D
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| ::~~9~j~V;F::j; D' Page .!.;:,:
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| '\eag~ 1 "
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| A y.
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| I INTRODUCTION describes a Bazardo This report describes Hazards Analysis Analysis conducted conducted on on Seabrook Ststion96Station's filter filter units. which contain units, charcoal bedsfcells.
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| contain charcoal Deds/cells. Table 1 iidentifies Seabrook's nine ((9) d e n t i f i e s Seabrook's 9) filter units filter units snd and their their location.
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| location.
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| BACKGROUND Seabrook's approach to a charcoal Seabrook's charcoal fire fire w within the filter i t h i n the filter unitsunits is is ffire prevention i r e preventian 4 and detection and detection as as outlined outlined within within the the guidelines of of Item III.B(3) of 1OCm0, I . B ( 3 ) of 10CFRSO, Appendix R, which Appendix "hieh states, states, "specify measurerDleasures for ffire prevention, ffire i r e prevention, ire d detection, etection, ffire suppression, &
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| i r e suppression, and ad firefire containment, contafament, and alternative shutdown .hutdown capability capability a6 as required for each fire fire area area containing structures, structure~, systuns, systems, and componentscomponents important to important to safety safety in in accordance ac!=ordance wwith i t h NRC guidelines and and regulations."
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| regulations."
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| I I
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| internal charcoal fires, To address internal fires, an analysis was conducted conducted on all Seabrook .
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| filter units, which contain charcoal beds/cells, to filter to determine the mexhum maxtmum temperatures of the charcoal adsorber sections, temperatures sections, due to decay decay heat beat from from iodine and iits daughter product decay wdthout t s daughter without air flew. flow. Thia This analysis showed that tbe the overall
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| .aximurn temperature would maximum would be limited to 1 170°F.
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| 7 0 ~ ~ .Additional analyses analyses indicate indicate that temperature for the the maximum temperature the HEPA filters filters (due ttoo decay beat heat from the particulate iodine5iodines accumulated accumulated in these these ffilters)i l t e r s ) will be limited to 187 c F. These 1870~.
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| temperatures are temperatures are well below the maximum llimit i m i t of 300'~300°F recommended recommended in ANSI-N509-1980. Thus, there iiss no p ANSI-N509-1980. possibility o s s i b i l i t y ofof an internal internal charcoal charcoal fire fire due due to decay heat.
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| decay heat.
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| ~" charcoal adsorber Seabrook's charcoal adsorber fil filters tcrs are also protected from external external fires fires ~ ince since
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| :,:.\.:.: they are they are contained in in a a combination combination of of heavy metal casing, casing. wire d debris screens, and e b r i s screens, fire retardant BEPA filters recommended iin filters as recOmaended n Regulatory Guide 1.52, Design.
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| 1.52, Deslgn, fire Testing, and Maintenance Criteria for for Post-Accident Engineered - Safety Feature '1 Cleanup System Air Filtration Atmosphere Cleanup Filtration and Adsorption Units of Light-Wattr-CoolCd Light-Water-Cool~d 1 Nuciear
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| ~ u c i e a rPower Plants, Revifiion Power Plants, Revision 2,2, March 1978. I Any welding or open 1
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| Further. transient combustibles are limited Further, l i m i t e d administratively.
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| administratively. Any flame sources flame sources vlll will be controlled and limited. A A fire fire watch will be maintained per plant administrative plant administrative procedure6 procedurel during these these activities.
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| activities. Theae precautions will These precautions prevent external prevent beds/cells.
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| b eds/cells external sources from causing taming internal internal combustioncombustion to to thethe charcoal I
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| However, aa fire f i r e hazard analysisanalysie is developed developed in in this this report to to address address the the effects effects of aa postulated postulated charcoal charcoal fire fire in in the the filter u n i t s and f i l t e r units mad its i t s impact on on equipment I needed for safe shutdown. A realistic, realistic. but conse;vativec o n s e ~ a t i v eapproach was was used to to model the the charcoal charcoal firesfires since charcoal i s aa slow charcoal is slow burning medium.
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| - I2uuwma DISCUSSION The The following following assumptions assmptiona were used w e d in this this hazardhazard analysis.
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| analysi6.
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| 1.
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| 2.
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| Fire Fire w will i l l be From detection.
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| be.detected d e t e c t i o n , which reliable and detected by reliable i s ala~ed which is alarmed in and early early warning i n Control Room, warning ,ystem. system.
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| Boom, Operations per per Operating Operating I
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| I 0:
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| Procedures Procedures will minutes minutes time w i l l shutdown time from shutdown air from alarm air flow alarm conditions flaw to conditions to to thethe filter to shutdown filter units. Assume five shutdown of of sitair flow.
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| flow. Charcoal five Charcoal is is assumed assumed ttoo be ignited in in tbis this time frame.
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| WPP19/18l
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| | |
| SEABROOK SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB ahaGb1tl~~~~9:Ittb 9.5- 1, APCSB9.5.:I, .iltev:<9.:
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| Rev. 9 STATION STATION . '~p~~ij~i~ A Appendix A Section F.3 iD
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| *Se~tioHiF;3 D Page 2 R~g~'4?***
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| : 3. The Fire Brigade will respond to the charcoal filter within 20 minutes from notification by the Control Room for all protected plant areas except I
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| Containment. This notification is per Operating Procedures. For a fire within Containment, the Fire Brigade will respond within 90 minutes. (See Engineering 1 Evaluation EE-05-033, Revision 00.)
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| 4.
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| : 4. Ignition ofof the charcoal starts at the top of of the charcoal bedlcell.
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| bed/cell. This is assumed conservative since a fire located lower in the bedlcell bed/cell wouId would burn bum the retaining mesh and drop the charcoal from the air flow path precluding rapid fire propagation.
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| 55.. Since a fire cannot be started due to internal decay heat, the fire must be started from an external source. Assume an outside source is carried into the filter unit.
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| All the units have HEPA filters on the inlet before the charcoal bed. Each HEPA filter section assembly is made up of of a grouping of HEPA filter elements 24" x ofHEPA 24" 11-1/2". Each element is a throwaway, extended medium, dry-type filter, 24" x 11-112".
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| which are open face, face, rectangular, fire-resistance type design for radioactive service. Assume the source carried internal by air flow totally ignites one HEPA filter element, 2' x 2'. This 2' x 2' filter element is assumed to ignite a 4 ftS2 ft. 2 area of of the charcoal bedlcell.
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| bed/cell.
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| : 6. Air flow through the charcoal bedlcell bed/cell is assumed to be from the start of ignition.
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| 2 4 ft?
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| ft. area of of charcoal will bum burn under air flow condition for a period of of 5 minutes time. At this point forced air flow has stopped and the resulting fire will be analyzed under natural draft air flow.
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| : 7. Air flow velocity through the charcoal during forced forced ventilation is 40 feet per minute which is Seabrook's Seabrook's charcoal bedlcell bed/cell design velocity.
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| : 8. Further assumptions assumptions are used in Appendix I, "Evaluation "Evaluation of Charcoal Filter Unit Station," 9-29-86 by Professional Loss Control, Inc. and are Fires at Seabrook Station,"
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| noted in that Appendix.
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| Appendix.
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| The Hazard Analysis consist of 3 parts, (l) (1) Determination of charcoal bed burning rates, (2) a heat transfer model of the charcoal bedslcells beds/cells and (3) effects of the heat transfer on safe shutdown equipment.
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| shutdown equipment.
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| (l)
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| (1) Determination of Charcoal Determination Charcoal Bed Burning Rates conducted by NUCON in their ASTM D3466 Test Rig.
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| fire test was conducted A charcoal fire Rig. Data from from this test was used by Professional Professional Loss Control, Inc. (PLC) in their unsteady state state heat transfer model Seabrook's filter of each of Seabrook's filter units, which contain charcoal beds/cells, bedslcells, excluding CBA-F-38 and CBA-F-8038. Each Seabrook CBA-F-8038. Seabrook filter filter was reviewed separately. NUCON's ASTM D3466 Test conducted for conducted for Seabrook used the same same type of charcoal used in Seabrook's Seabrook's charcoal bedslcells.
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| beds/cells.
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| normally is performed at 100 The test normally 100 feet feet per minute air velocity, however, 40 FPM velocity Seabrook's filter was used which is Seabrook's filter design velocity. The bed depth depth is normally normally 1.0 inch deep.deep.
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| WPP191l81 SEABROOK SEABROOK - . :':' ::": .:::. '.::':'.
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| and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, valtlation'aha:66l11}j)ariSbll,t(1':~~Rji\;~CSB EEvaluation 9.5-1, Rev. 99 Rev:
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| STAT~ON STATION . Appendix A
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| , ~ppetldix A . " SectionF.3 Section F.3 DD Page 3 P~ge3 For For Seabrook's Seabrook's test test aa 2.0 2.0 inchesinches deep deep bed bed was was used u s e d Which which is is the limit. of the limit- of 'the
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| 'the ASTM ASm
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| ~ 3 4 6 apparatus.
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| D3466 6apparatus. Seabrook's Seabrook's bed bed depth depth is is 4.0 b.O inches.
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| inches. Use of of thethe test data by t e s t data by PLePLC air flow' I
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| is is conservative conservative since s i n c e thethe test test waswas conducted conducted under mder forcedforced air f l o w ' over over aa one me hourhow period.
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| period. Seabrook's Seabrook's filter filter unit unit beat transfermodel heat transfer nodel assumes assumes five five minutes minuter time time fromfrom charcoal charcoal ignition 3gnition to t o shutdown shutdown of of air a i r flow; flow; where-aswhere-as air a i r flow flow willw i l l be be shutdown shutdown five five minutes minute6 after after detection detection of of aa potential potential fire, fire, which.most which.most likely likely occurs OccWs before before sufficient temperature is s u f f i c i e n t temperature i s available available to t o ignite ignite the the eharcoal-c+rcoal.
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| A f i r e wind A fire tunnel (FWT) wind tunnel (EWT) test test was conducted by was conducted by NUCON NUCON on an aa 24 20 inchinch xx 24 24 inch inch face face area area carbon carbon adsorber adsorber specimen. specimen. The The depth depth of of the the bed tested was bed tested was 4.0 4.0 inehes.
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| inches- Again. Again, the the charcoal charcoal used used was was the t h e samesame type type used used at st SeabrOOk, Seabrook, 21 2% KlKZ and and 2% 2%TEDATEDA impregated impregated carbon.
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| carbon.
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| The The charcoal charcoal was ignited by was ignited by preheating preheating inlet inlet air air to to thet h e charcoal charcoal spec~. specimen. The The speci.en specimen started started burningburning approximately approximately 66 minutes minutes afterafttr CO production levels CO production levels of of 50 ppm SO ppm Were measured. Air were measured. Air flow flow was was then then continuedcontinued for for an an additional additional 55 minutes, minutco, then then stopped.
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| stopped. Inlet Inlet and and outlet outlet temperatures temperatures vere were then moaitored for then monitored for one one bour.
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| hour.
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| Seabrook's Seabrook's anticipated a n t i c i p a t e d alarm setpoint for alarm setpoint for CO CO isis 5050 ppmppm and and the t h e normal normal background background level l e v e l is i s 22 ppm.
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| ppm. .
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| The purpose The purpose of of thethe FWT FWT testt e s t was was to to looklook at at thethe actual a c t u a l test test size s i z e modeled modeled by by PLCPU:
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| under under fire f i r e conditions.
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| conditions.
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| Air A i r flow flow conditions conditions under under forced forced ventilation ventilation were were the the samesame for for the t h e FWT FWT testtest versus versus Seabrook's Seabrook's filter filter unit u n i t design design velocity.
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| v e l o c i t y . Once Once the the ventilation ventilation was was stopped stopped and and natural natural drafting drafting began, began, the the FWT FWT test t e s t waswas nO longer similar no longer s i m i l a r toto Seabrook Seabrook because because of of duct configuration differences.
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| duct configuration differences. Seabrook's Seabrook's filter f fl ter units bavt outlet u n i t s have outlet dampers,dampers, long long RVAC duct BVAC duct runs. rtms, and and in i n some some casescases inlet inlet dampers dampers which which are are isolated isolated once once the t h e filter filter fans fansare are shutdown.
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| shutdown. Thus, Thus, natural natural drafting d r a f t i n g through through Seabrook's Seabrook's filters filters would would be be small.
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| small. The The FWT FWT test test with with natural natural drafting drafting indicates indicates tbe the charcoal charcoal fire fire willwill contain contain
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| * itself itself to t o aa limited limited fire fire vithw i t h decreasing decreasing temperature temperatureafter after stopping atopping forced forced ventilation.
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| vehtilation.
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| C Results Result6 of the FWr of the EWT testt e s t show, show, under under conditions conditions used used in i n the the PLC model, carbon PIX model. carbon losl lose "
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| for for aa test t e s t duration duration of of one one hour hour vas was 4.53 4.53 lbs which is lbs which approximately lot is approximately l a of of the the testtest dry d r y c:a.rbon carbon weight.weight. Also Also that t h a t CO levels inerea.e CO levels increase well well above above normal mvironmcnt normal environment levels long levels before aa fire long before fire starts.
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| starts.
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| (2) Heat Transfer Model The The PLC unsteady heat PLC unsteady conducUon analysis heat conducti~n analysis looked looked at at each each charcDal charcoel filter f i l t e r unit.
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| unit, except CBA-F-38 except C5A-F-38 and and CBA-F-8038.
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| CBA-F-8038, to to determine determine the ,net heat tkie.net heat transfer t r e n r f e r to t o tbe the filter filter housing housing surface surface based based on on chareoal charcoal temperaturetemperature data da'tasupplied supplied by NUCQN. ltadiation by NUCON. Radiation and and convection convection beat heat transfer transfervas was a180 a l s o considered considered in i n PLC's PLC'a analyGis.
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| analysis.
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| Radiation Radiation Beat Heat Transfer T r s n ~ f e fromrfrom the the fire fire vas was considered.
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| considered, taking taking into into account eccount the the geometry geometry of of each each of of thethe filter filter units.units. The The REPA f i l t e r s have KEPA filters have aa nominal nominal 2.4" 24" Xx 24" 24" outside outside dimensions dimensions with with aa 22" 22" xx 22" 22" steel steel mounting mounting frame frame opening, opening, which which limits l i m i t s the the :
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| burning material burning m a t e r i a l to one HEPA t o O11e REPA filter f i l t e r size.oize. The burning charcoal The burning charcoal surface s u r f a c e area area "'a. was cODservatively conservativelyassumed assumed to to be be aa 24-incb 24-inch square. square. The The larger l a r g e r burning burning surface surface area area accounts accounts for for anyany fire fire propagation propagation under under the t h e five five minute minute forced forced ventilation v e n t i l a t i o n period.
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| period.
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| The The temperatures t a p e r a t u r e s usedused in in tbethe analysis analysiswere were measuredmeasured within within the the charcoal charcoal beel bed on on tbethe outlet o u t l e t side.side. The The highest highest of of any any of of the the temperatures temperaturesmeasured measured was was also also used.
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| used.
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| Radiation Radiation Beat Beat LossLoas from from the the ateel a t e e l housing housing to to its its surroundings surroundingsvas was also also considered.
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| considered.
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| WFP19/181
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| | |
| SEABROOK S~A~cD,0()i{ Evaluation Evaluat.io and ComP.*.**a.ris.*.o.
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| **.n. (;tn.d.: Comparison BTP to.*. .*.B Il*.;.t.o " .....,: APCSB p.. A.*.P
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| .. S.B 9.5-1,
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| ..*.:95.:1*
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| ...... Rev. 9 Rev.
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| Section F.3 m
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| :::.T.:*:.,. .*.*
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| . D STATION ST1\mION Appendix A Appebdix~ SectionF.3 Page 4 Page '
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| convectiv,e heat For, convective For transfer, forced convection within the filter housing wes -
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| heat transfer, .;...
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| neglected. If neglected. If accounted accounted for. for, the forced air stream would be beated and enhance the o,;:i?
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| heat beat removal removal from from the the housing.
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| housing. Therefore, this as.umption is cODservative. Free ~i' convection convection heat heat transfer transfer was considered on was considered on the the outside outside of of thethe filter housin.ng.
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| filter housing.
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| Attachment Attachment II gives the 11 gives the detailed detailed .ethodology methodology and and results results of of the the analysis.
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| analysis, The The following in the in the filter c o n c l ~ i m sare following conclusions f i l t e r units.
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| units, are drawn drawn fromfrm aa fire f i r e involving involving the the charcoal bed6lcells charcoal beds/cells 1 1.
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| : 1. The The vorst worst case case maximum localized steel maximum localized steel plate plate housing temperature was housing temperature was calculated to calculated to be be 704°F.
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| 704OF. This This temperature temperature is i s substantially substantially below below thet that required required for for structural structural failure failure of of the the steel s t e e l housing.
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| housing.
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| 2.
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| : 2. Structural Structural failurefailure of of any any steel steel beam beam or or column column in in thethe vicinity v i c i n i t y ofof these these filter units cannot f i l t e r units cannot be be caused c a w e d byby heatbeat transfer transfer from from thethe filter filter housing.
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| hous5ng.
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| 0 3.
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| : 3. The 7 3 . maximum n m h m m radiant radiant heat heat emissive emissive !lux $lafrom from the the housing housing at at 704704 F
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| "~t ,
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| calculated calculated to to bebe lessless than than 10 KW/m *, i.
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| 10 KW/m is leas.than 1ess.than half half thethe critical critical radiant radiant flux flux necessary necessary to to ignite i g n i t e the the worst worot case case cable cable jacket jacket materials materfals as as determined determined by by EPRIEPRI sponsored eponsored tests tests at at FactoryFactory Mutual Mutual Research Research Corporation Corporatia (EPRI (EPRI NP-1200.
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| NP-1200, Part Part 1). 1).
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| (3)
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| (3) Safe S a f eShutdown t d o w n EQuipment m t Review Rwiew would be be no
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| +:@.w;:.\
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| From the From the conclusions conclusions of of the the beat heat transfer transfer model model there there would s t r u c t u r a l stee~
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| no structural stee failures fatlures in in the the vicinity vicinity of of Seabrook's Seabrooklr's charcoal charcoal filters. filters. Thus mu6 no no .afe
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| .sf e sbutdovn shutdo=
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| equipment equipment would would be be effected effected due due toto steel steel failures.
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| failures. EquipUlent Equipment further further th8II than three three "'
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| .I i'
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| 0.:;::::.:
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| f e e t from feet flux from flux from the from the the filter how ing the housing. .
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| units also filter unit. a l s o would would not not be be effected effected based based on on the the maximum maximum heat heat t
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| evaluation of An evaluation An of safe safe shutdown shutdown equipmentequipment vaS was conducted conducted looking looking at at thet h e equipment equipment 1 w i t h i n and within and including including threethree feet feet fromfrom eacheach of of the the filter filter units. units.
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| I 2..
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| CBA-F-3B 8038 -
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| o.ia - No No charcoal charcoal fire fire modeling modeling vas w m done done on un these t h e s e filters.
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| filters. It It isis assumed'that aa charcoal
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| &ss~edthat charcoal fire fire viII cauee 10**
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| will cause loss of of all all equipment equipment vithin w i t h i n its it6 firefire area area (i.e (i-e.,** CB-F-3B-A).
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| C3-F-3B-A). Seabrook's Seabrook's present present Appendix A p p a d i x RR Safe Saf a Shutdown Shutdown StUdy Study .hows shows thist h i s to to be b e acceptable.
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| acceptable- Aleo Also there there is i s nono concern concern of of damage damage to to structural structural steel steel since since all ell this this steel steel in in this this fire fire areaare8 is fire proofed.
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| is fire proofed-CAP-F-40 CAP-F-4Q - there a.rea.
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| - There is PAB-F-3A-2, within area, PAB-F-3A-Z, no safe is DO withfn and shutdown equipllleJ1t safe ShUtdOWD and including equipomt used including three three fee~/of wed during feet/.of CAP-F-40.
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| during aa fire CAP-F-40.
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| fire in i n thil; t h i s fire fire m-F-40 -- There CAB-F-40 There is is no no safesafe shutdOwn equipment ued shutdown equipment w e d duringduring aa fire fire in t h i s fire i n this fire area. C-F-3-Z, within area, C-F-3-Z. within and and including including three three feet feet of of CAH-F-40.
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| CAH-F-40.
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| EAH-F-9 69 - There is 6 9 - There is no no safesafe shutdown equipment used shutdown equipment wed during during aa fire fire in fire this fire in this area, CE-F-l-Z, area, CE-F-1-2, vithin within and and inclUding including three three feet feet of of EAB-F-9.69.
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| 15AB-F-9.69.
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| FAH-F-4l. 74 area, FSB-Fl-A.
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| area. FSB-F1-A.
| |
| 74 - There There is i s noao .afesafe shutdown shutdown equiJDeDt equipment used used during during aa fire fire in in this this fire fire WPP19/181
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| | |
| SEABROOK SEAIJROO~ Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, .Rev>9 Rev. 9 STATION Appendix A Section F.3 D SectionF.3*1D STATIO~
| |
| Page55 Page 1'65-F-16 ~ ~ere
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| %-~~~Z,w PAB-F-4-Z, CONCLUSION Thereis within isnO I t b f n and safe s~utdown n o safe a n dincluding
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| .hutdown equipment ineluding equipmt used t h r e feet three e f e e tof o f l'AB-F-16.
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| PM-F-16.
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| during aa fire used during fire in in this "fire area fhis"fire area The hazards posed Tbe ha~ards posed by by the the heating beating ofof the the ateel steel housing housing from from aa charcoal charcoalbed/cell bed/cell filter filter fire, f i r e . under under thethe operatiDnal operational guidelines guidelines to to sh~tdown forced ventilation shutdown forced ventilation of of the the filter filter inin question, question, will will not not jeopardize jeopardize the the safe safe shutdown shutdown of of Seabrook Seabrook Station Station.*
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| ./
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| W1'1'19/181
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| .--A_- -1,
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| -_..-..... .. . . - . I.. - . _--_- .-- -a--- . --. .. . - . . -. .- . . .. . . - ..
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| I ~~
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| ~. >
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| ~.
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| ~ 0
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| ° IADLL1
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| - =:
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| Z 0 . . ~.
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| ~
| |
| Filter W DIID Safety/Non Saf e_tv/Non-etg Meeta RG BG e1.52 1 : -. :**Area Detectign
| |
| - Fire Area EAH-F-9 EAR-F-9 Safety Yes Yes Yes CE-F-1-2 CE-F-I-Z Containment Enclosure Containment Enclosure EL ZI' 21' 6" EM-F-6 EAH-F-699 Safety Ye6 Yes Yes CE-F-l-Z Containment Enclosure CE-F-1-2 Containment Enclosure ....*.*.sa'.
| |
| EL 21 EL 21't 6" '~.
| |
| e
| |
| ~.
| |
| FAH-F-41 FAH-F-41 Safety Yes Ye8 Yea Yes FSB-Fl-A FSB-F1-A Fuel Building EL Fuel Building EL 84' 0" 84' ON o*
| |
| ;:s 01 FAH-F-74 FAH-F-74 Safety Safetp Yes Yes Yea Yes FSB-Fl-A FSB-F1-A Fuel Building EL Fuel Building EL 84' 84' 00" ~
| |
| ='
| |
| q..
| |
| CAM-F-8 CAH-F-8 Non Non No No Yes Yes C-F-3-Z Containment C-F-3-2 Containment (j o
| |
| PAH-F-16 PM-F-16 Non I No No Yell Yes PAB-F-4-Z Primary Auxiliary PAB-P-4-2 Primary Auxiliary ;>3 Building EL 81' 81' 0"0''
| |
| ,,'"0
| |
| .-g"~;
| |
| :::S'(/)
| |
| CAP-F-40 CAP-F-40 Non Non No Yes PA8-F-3A-Z Primary PAB-F-3A-Z Auxiliary Primary Auxiliary 0 Building Building EL 53' 5 3 ' 0" ....
| |
| 0.. ::s X ....,..
| |
| ;><0'"
| |
| CBA-F-38 CBA-F-38 Safety Safety Yes Yes CB-F-3B-A CB-F-3B-A Control Room HVAC AVAC ,.~
| |
| Equipment Equipment BoomRoom £LEL 75' 75'
| |
| , ,.?,;~,.
| |
| Safety "- Yes Yes CB-F-3B-A CBA-F-8038 CBA-F-80 38 Safety Yes Yes CB-F-3B-A Control Control RoomRoom HVAC HVAC Equipment Equipment RoomRoom EL 75' 75 ' ';~
| |
| en
| |
| .~
| |
| ~
| |
| YJ
| |
| ~
| |
| u** .
| |
| '~. CZi::*:~.' .
| |
| ~ ~.:I'!'"
| |
| (JQ 0 .*~
| |
| . (I).. =t* . !......
| |
| O'\g *.'i¢ loT:j W'
| |
| WPP1~!. d
| |
| ~.
| |
| <, },
| |
| | |
| SEABROOK SEABROOK Evaluationand
| |
| ;Evaluation and,Comparison Comparisonto BTP APCSB 9.5-1; toBTPAFCSB. 9.5- 1, , <Revi.'~i:
| |
| Rev. 9 AppendixAA Appendix Section F.3DD
| |
| ; S~ctioRF.3 STATION STATION Page 7 I'ag~7
| |
| . Attachment Attachment II to to Hazards .Aarlyses of Ha~ards'An&lyses of I u m ~. .a.l.m
| |
| ..JllO. l D N ALO*
| |
| .ONAL L WIm* cCNTROL."
| |
| C D m b L .1Ne.lRJc* Seabrook Station Scrbrook Station
| |
| .. 9 F i l t e r Units Charcoal 111~er Charc~.l U n i t sI 9 1571 YAEC lS71
| |
| 'YAEC Evaluation Evaluation of of Charcoal Charcoal Filter F i l t e r Unit Unit fires F i r e s atst Seabrook Seabrook station Station September September 29, 29, 1986 1986 Prepa red by: '/ a~L-*
| |
| -=-....:.:....;~~~~~-:--_-::---=-
| |
| ~mes A. Milke, P.E.
| |
| lteviewed by: M;gJC':~
| |
| Michael E. Mowrer, P.E.
| |
| * P. o. no~ 446
| |
| * 001: Ridge. Tcnncucc 3iR31 * (615) 482*3541
| |
| | |
| SEABROOK SEABROOK Evaluation andComparison Eval\latioii~lld Comparison'totoBTP BTPAPCSB APCSB9.5-1, 9.5-1, Rev. 9 Rev~9.
| |
| '. . Appendix AppendixAA Section F.3 D SectionEd:])i STATION STATION Page 8 Page~
| |
| Table of lib" o f Contents Contents Subject Subject Page Pagg '
| |
| I n t r ~ u c t i o n . . . . . . . . ~ o ~ . . ~ o . o . . . . . . b . o ~ . . . . . . . . . e . . . . o . **..******
| |
| Jnt~oductfon........................................... 11 lac.t;round. .***.
| |
| e~....*.-~..oe.****
| |
| B~~k~~~~nd..-*....e-.mt..m*~e..~ ****.*
| |
| ..**e**...*...*
| |
| .... **.. ******** *... *.***.**** *.****. **** *** 11 Discussion.......................................................
| |
| D i s c u s s i o n o , b , ~ . , . . . ~ m D . b b ~ . . ~ b . . . . e . . b b . . m . b b m . o55. . . o . m . . .
| |
| tonc1us1ons ..........................m...........................
| |
| Conclusions**** , ************************************************* 11 11 Analysis Anrlysls Methodology Combustion Canbustfm of o f WoodMood Ch.rco.l ...............................
| |
| **************************************Append1x AA kth~d~l~gy.~..........~~~~~.~.~.~.~~.......~.Appd~
| |
| Charcoal*******************************Appendix Ap pendix BB
| |
| | |
| r SEABROOK SEABROOK Evaluation and:(t:o Evaluation and Comparison ll1 parison to to BTPBTP APCSB APCSB 9.5-1, 9.5- 1, Rev. 9, Rev. 9 STATION
| |
| 'STATION Appendix
| |
| , }~ppendix A A Section Section ,F.3 D F.3 D
| |
| " ' ,":."" .. ,.: ,r* ..
| |
| Page 99 '
| |
| Page IKTRODUCTI ON IttTROOUCTION Thls rep~rt ThIs desctlbes In report describes tngfneerfng analysis an engineering analysis conductedconducted to characterlre the, to characterize. the, hazard ofa
| |
| 'hazard i f a fire inrolrlng the fire involving the chircoal chrrcorl filter f i l t e r Wlits m f t r tt rt the Seabrook sta-the ~abrook st.-
| |
| tlon.
| |
| t1on. unsteady-state heat An unsteady-stlte Art heat conduct conduction rnrlysfs has ion analysis has been perfom* to been performed to p n d i c t the predict the locillocal temperature temperature rise rlrt in I n the plate steel t h t plate stet1 hous1ng uposed to b u s i n g exposed to. Is chuco.'
| |
| charcoal filter f f n for f i l t e r fire for elch tach of of stven seven 11r a i r handling hrndlfng units. unlts.
| |
| * OACK6ROUND I~CKGROUHD Charcoal filter Charcoal filter beds beds Ire installed in art insUlled tn the!the sevensevtn (7) (7) airrlr handl1ng handltng ""its mlts i d t n t lfied 1dent1 l l e d in Tabfe 1.
| |
| 4n Tab'e Inside the
| |
| : 1. Inside the ho~s1ng houstng .@re nunemus charcoal
| |
| " "ualr'OUS charcoal filter bed f i l t e r bed cells, The cells. number of The nUllber cells within of cells within Ir musing tnclosurt ranges b u s l n g enclosure ranges fram f r a 44 to to
| |
| : 28. The
| |
| : 28. charcoal ignition The charcoal source is I g n i t f o n source ISuSUlied assumtd to t o be external to be external tk unit.,
| |
| t o the unit..
| |
| configuration of The configuration The r l r cleaning of air cleaning systems systetns is I s such such that that the charcoal absorb-the chareoal absorb-ers I~
| |
| ers preceded ~Y a r e preceded HEPA filters.
| |
| by HEPA filters. The HEPA The HEPA filter f l l t e r llOunting m u n t l n g frameframe is i s ~a steel structure stee1 structure tt1th w i t h 2222 inl;t!
| |
| i n c h xx 22 22 inchI n c h openings.
| |
| openings. Therefore. Therefore, no no larger larger burning ,nterhl burning rnaterlrl than than ene one HEPA HEPA filter f i l t e r size could enter s i z e could enter the carbon bed.
| |
| the carbon bed.
| |
| Anything larger Anything larger ~ul m u ldd be be stopped stopped by by the tk HEPA nounttng HEPA Ilount frame structure 1ng frlllle wen r t r u c t u t t even if ifit would penetrate i t would penetrate the the preceding ptsccdlng components. cunponents. This Thls was was the the reason reason for for selectfon of t h e selection the of Ia 24 Inch xx 24 24 inch 24 inch exposure to inch ellj)csure t o *a single single carbon carbon cell cell fer for both the both the FST FST testt e s t Ind subsequent engineering and subseque"t engineering analysis analysls.*
| |
| An unsteady-stat!
| |
| An unsteady-state heat heat conduction conductibn analysis analysls was performed on was perfon1led on tre the steel s t e t 1 hous-hous-iing.
| |
| n g . SinceSince the the heat eonductlon withfn heat conduction wlthln the t h e steel steel pllte occurs very p l a t e occurs rapfdly, very rapidly.
| |
| Ir 1lumped urnped heat heat capacity capacity approach approach could could be a p p l i e d to be applied s i m p l i f y the t o simplify mathma-the matheJIl-t i c s Involved. The steel housdnp tics involved. The steel housing was considered to rioctive radiant ~at was considered to & e i v e radiant bat f r a n the from the burning burning charcollcharcoal b~d. bed. RadiativeRadiative lnd convcctfuc heat and c:onvectin heat losses losses from from the steel the b u s l n g to s t e e l tDus1ng t o the surroundings M!~
| |
| the surroundings Included. AAdetalled were included. detailed descrip- descrip-t i o n Ind tion and the the equations tquations for f o r thethe Ina1ys1s analysis Ire am included Included in I n Appendix Appendix A* A.
| |
| ./
| |
| * 1
| |
| | |
| SEABROOK
| |
| ,SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB andC~mp~~i~()rlJo A~eSB9.5 1, 9.5--1, Rev. 9
| |
| 'App.~p(l*;A . ..... .., Section F.3 D STATION STATION Appendix A I," ....
| |
| Page 10 10 TABLE 1 DIMENSIONS OF CHARCOAL SECTION OF UNITS Unl t - - -
| |
| A 0 C PAH-F-16 5'1' - 12'2" 26'7' EAH-F-9 5'1" 5'6' 3'6" EAH-F-69 FAH-F-41 5'1" 10'3" 1 4 '8" FAH-F-74 B
| |
| A
| |
| ./
| |
| 2
| |
| | |
| SEABROOK SEAIJ:R<JOK, : ;bvai~atibn and Comparison to BtP.:~(2,$~[9.5'::1, Evaluationand~~QmpatrSOI1to
| |
| :;. ~pp~p~ix<:A,,'
| |
| BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev.
| |
| Rev. 99 SectionF.3
| |
| .Section D F.3 D STATION STATI<JN Appendix A I1 Page 11 Page i
| |
| TABLE 2 (Tlble (Table 11 fran fron September September 15,15, 1986.
| |
| 1986, *'Iodine Iodine Adsorber Msorbcr Fire Flrt Test-Test' by by Nuclear Huclear Consulting Consulting Strvices.
| |
| Services, Inc.)
| |
| lnc.)
| |
| rut Date test Dmtr 33 Sept 1986 Sapt 1986 Carbon a r b o n 1&n1t1on I ~ l i t i o nfollovec2 f o l l w m d b1 r~sidurlbeat1J11:
| |
| by residual butiw (1.e. f l w conUDUed r i r nOli (1.0. &1.. continued but but beat beat orr).
| |
| err 1.
| |
| ktbod:
| |
| Hetbod: AS1ll EiW D3U6 D3456 uc:ept:
| |
| OXcapt: .0 40 rPM, inch bec2 FPII, 22 lDch bad deptb depth and r u t lI_t and rut up b u t up
| |
| . kteri.2:
| |
| Hater1al: Dry air Dr,. WSORB IITEO mud IftJSORB a i r a.acS UTE II XI toot Lot .5/10 45/10 Starting eondltimn: 25.C I g i t L o n oecu~~d lenition a c c u r n d at a t an m upper upper bed (outlet 1 ttemperrtrrre bed (ou~l.t) ** ~.r.ture or a p p r ~ x i ~ a t
| |
| * l.OO*C, of approz1matelr 7 400'C, lover l o v e r bed ( i n l e t ) te.peratvre bed (inlet) temperature of of 28S*C, L85*C, air m i r inlet temp. 2eS*C.
| |
| inlet ~.mp. 285.C.
| |
| f empenturts T~peratures arte.. iml tion:
| |
| after ~cnit1on:
| |
| Within Carbon led Ylthln Carbon Bed Time {tUn.) Outlet Sid.
| |
| Outlet Side (*C)
| |
| (*C) X n h t Side Inlet (*CI Sldm (*e) 0: 15 790 255 255 1:00 700 920 920 2:00 650 850 850 3:00 6_0 *.800
| |
| ,800
| |
| .~oo 730 800 800 5:00 '160. . 8OS_
| |
| 805 ,
| |
| 6:00 no 190 790 1:00 135 780 T80 e~oo 160 190 790 9:00 920 190 790 10:00 950 . TID 780 11~OO ,aD T30 7 3 12:00* 1050 - purplr a80ke 800 pul"Jlle 800 .sake 15:00 20:00 TlO -so 450 375 250 250
| |
| '0:00 210 150 19 60:00 100 1:35 135
| |
| * 3
| |
| | |
| SEABROOK andComparisontOl$rfPAPCSB Evaluationand Evaluatiotl Comparison to BTP APCSB9.5-1, 9.5- 1, Rev.99 Rev.
| |
| AppendixAA Appendix Section F.3DD SectionF.3 STATION Page12 Page 12 FIGURE 11 FIGURE 1200 1000 from NSC, Inc.
| |
| from NSC, Inc. test test of Sept.
| |
| of Sept. 3, 1986 3,1986 u
| |
| o o 10 20 ~ 40 60 Tl ME (MINJ /'
| |
| Tl ME (MlN.]?,,
| |
| Ternperof u n His1or1 Temperature in Charcoal History in Charcoal BedBed 4
| |
| | |
| SEABROOK
| |
| :SEAB_t:>OK Evaluationand Evaluation andCdmparisoll ComparisontotoBT~;APCSB BTP APCSB9.5-1, 9.5- 1, . Rev.
| |
| Rev.9 9 STATION Appendix A 1~pendi~A '.\ . . Section SectionF3D F.3 D STATiON Page Page1313 osscussro'n DlSC\lSSIO'N The r i s e of the steel housing on th seven charcoal f l l i e r TI% temperature tunparaturn rise of the steel housing on the seven charcoll filter u n f t s ofO f concern units Concern isIs presented presented friYriTables through 7.7. Ask "oted t a b l e s 3 3 through noted ini n the the tables, the tables, the1Il&lC1m~
| |
| rnaximunlocalized localized housing housingtemperltu" t m p t r a t u e for f o rUntts Lhfts PAJi-F-16 PAH-F-16 (see (see Table Table3). 3). CAP-F-40 CAP-F-40 (see (seeT.ble Table5), 5 ) . FAH-F-41 FAH-F-42 and FCH-F-74 (see and FAH-F-7~ (seeTable Table6),"are 6).-are w i t h i n50-F within 50°F ofof one one.nother rnothcr(between (betmen411 4'11and and 461 F) *. .The 461.F).
| |
| e surfrce tenpeTa-T k surflu tunptra-t u n spresent tures present &8.iniml' slnfmal bazard hazardtot ofixed equipmentoror~.blfng fixed equipment cabllngunless mltsseount.d mounted d f n c t l y onem the directly houslng. ASas wen the housing, well asas toto perscmne',personnel, unless unless they they ~amecame into Into contact w i t h the contact .nth the enclosure ftself, enclosure I t s e l f .
| |
| The .u1mUll The local lzed temperature maximumlocalized predicted for t e m p r a t u r t predicted for Unfts Units EAH-F-9 EAH-F-9 and and EAH-f-69 EAH-F-69 I s 704.F (see Table 4 ) . The increased is 704-F (see Table -4). The increased temperature is due to the reduced temperature i s dw to tk reduced sfze ofof the size the housing, houslng, which which includes includes less less steelsteel through through which which the the ~at k a t can can diffused. S t i l l , t h l s temperature be d1 ffused. St ill. tht 5 temperature woul d nGt appear to be It I 1eyel or be would not appear b b e at a l w e l or e x f s t for r s u l f i c i e n t l y long duration exist for I 5uff\ciently long duration to pose
| |
| * serious exposure condi- t o post r x r f o u s exposure condi-tion. unless the t i o n , unless materials of the materials concern are of concern are in In didlrect red conUct contact with with t~ tk hous- bus-ing. .
| |
| ing *.
| |
| finally, because Finally. because of of the d i f f t rent air the ~ifftrent a l r flow f l o w arrangement, arrangement, the plaximm temper-tk ~xi~um temper-I t u l t to ature tk top t o th! top of of the th. enclosure C ~ C ~ O S U for CAH-F-8 is Rf o r CAH-F-8 4s 638 638.Fe F (see Table Table 7). 7 ) . lhisf h j ~
| |
| temperature is temperature I s due due to t o the the relatively* ~small size r e l a t i v t l y 51l1al1 s i z e of*tlle enclosure unit o f ' t h h enclosure as u n j t 15 well as well as the location of the lotation of the exposed side the exposed side being being tt. tk top top of of tt'e enclosure.
| |
| th? enclosure.
| |
| Being located Being located on on the the top. top, the eonvectfve heat the convective k a t losseslosses are substantially an substantially reduced frcn reduced f r a thatthat of o f aa side.sqde.
| |
| As noted .in the k noted1n tables, the tk tables. tk Inalys1s analysis was was tenninated tennfnated at at 60 60 minutes.
| |
| minutes. Extend* Extend-lng the 1n; the duration duration beyond beyond 60 60 minutes minutes is 4s not necessary sinc.
| |
| not necessary s4nce the steel temper-the steel temper-a t u r e is ature I s dec11ning decllnlng 15 IS to t o 20 20 minutes mlnutes 1nto Into t~ the incident qncident with ulth ~ no actie-t othcr a c t i m other than thuttlng down the related thin shutting down the related fan within S Ilinutesof fan withfn 5 minutes.of the f l t e I n t t fire' initiation.l a t lon.
| |
| * s
| |
| | |
| ..' ABCSB\9.5 SEABROOK 11,;:/> Rev. 9 Evaluation and and .Comparison to BTP ' ' '.'9.5-APCSB 1, Evaluation &ev~9 SEABROOK .' Comparison Appendixto ABt~
| |
| Section F.lD
| |
| .Section F.3 D STATION
| |
| **STATION Appendix A Page 14 Page 14 UNIT UNIT PAH-F-16 PAH-F-16 LOCAL LOCAL HOUSING MAXIMUM MXIHUM LOCAL LOCAL TIME T I M IN
| |
| ~-
| |
| TABLE 3 HOUSING TEMPERATURE EMPERATWE VS.
| |
| I N UNIT UNIT PAH-F-16 PAH-F-16 UNIT UNIT VS.
| |
| PAH-F-16.
| |
| . PAH*f*16 TIKE MAXIMUM HAXICIV#
| |
| t()US LOCAL LOCAL ING TEMP.
| |
| TIME T 1% HOUS ING TEMP.
| |
| HOUSING TEnP. TIME HOUSING TEMP.
| |
| (MINI (MIN) (DEG F)
| |
| (DEG F) (MIN)
| |
| [WIN) (DEG f)
| |
| (DEG F) 11 94 94 31 31 351 351 2 104 104 32 32 342 3 115 115 33 33 33.
| |
| 4 128 128 34 34 326 5 142 14 2 3S 35 318 6 159 36 36 309 7 178 178 37 37 301 B8 199 199 38 293 9 223 39 39 285 10 10 24 9 249 40 277 II 11 278 2 78 41 U 270 12 310 42 26Z 13 337 433 4 2SS 14 359 44 248 15 15 376 45 241 16 ' 390 46 234 17 17 399 - 47 227 18 406 48 221 19
| |
| -- 2 020 21 21 409 411 411-4100 41
| |
| - 49
| |
| $9 50 51 51 214 208 rot 22 408 S2 52 197 23 404 53 191 24 400 54 186 25 394 S5 55 . 181 26 388 56 56 176 27 27 381 381 57 171 2288 374 374 58/
| |
| 38 167 29 29 366 366 59 163 30 30 359 359 60 60 158 Ii
| |
| * SEABROOK SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev.99 R.~V.
| |
| Appendix A Section F.3 "SeQtjon,F .3DD STATION
| |
| $'!tATION Page 15
| |
| '~~~~J5'
| |
| * UNITS UNITS fAH-F-9, EAH-F-69 EAH-F-9. EhH-F-69 T 1?4E TIME LOCAL TIME LOCAL HOUSING TIME IN MAXIMUM WXIWUH LOCAL LOCAL tlJUSING WUSING TEMP. TEMP.
| |
| lASt!
| |
| TABLE 44 HOUSING TEMPERATURE IN UNITS TEUPERATURE YS.
| |
| UNITS EAH.F*9 EAH-F-9 and EAH-F*9.
| |
| rS.
| |
| and EAH-F-69 EAH-F-69 UNITS UNITS EAH-F-9, EAH-F-69
| |
| - TIME EAH-F-69 TIME .
| |
| wxmun K'UMUM LOCAL LOCAL HOUSING TEMP.
| |
| t<<)USING TEMP.
| |
| {?!IN)
| |
| (HIN) (OEG (DEG F) f) . (WIN)
| |
| (MIN) (OEG (DEG F) F) 11 121 121 31 31 544 544 2 152 32 32 532 53 2 3 186 33 33 520 5 20 4 222 34 34 508 508 5 261 35 35 497 4 97 6 303 36 36 486 486 7 349 37 37 US 475 8 398 38 38 464 464 9 449 39 39 .54 454 10 503 40 40 444 444 11 5S9 41 41 434 434 12 617 42 42 424 324 13 657 43 43 415 415 14 684 44 44 406 406 15 6!J8 45 45 398 398
| |
| -16 704 46 46 390 390 17 704 47 47 382 382.
| |
| 18 699 48 48 374 374 19 691 49 49 367 367 20 682 50 SO 360 360 21 670 51 51 - 353 353 22 659 52 52 347 347 23 646 53 53 341 34 1 24 633 54 54 335 3 35 25 620 SS 55 329 329 26 608 56 56 324 324 27 595 57 57 319 319 28 582 58
| |
| $8 315 315 29 569 59 59 ' ' 310 310 30 5S6 60 60 306 306
| |
| * 7
| |
| | |
| SEABROOK SEAiBR.OOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5- 1, Rev. 9 Ritw.9 STATION Appendix A 'Section F.3D SectionF3 D STATION Page Page1616 UNIT UNIT FAH-F-41.
| |
| FAH-F dl, FAH-F-74 TIME TIME FAH-F-7 4 TIME LOCAL LOCAL HOUS!NG TIHE IN IN UNITS MAXIMUM MXIHUFI LOCAL LOCAL tCUSIHG tlOUSING TEMP.
| |
| TEMP.
| |
| .ill.b..U.
| |
| TABLE 5 TEMPERATURE VS.
| |
| HOUS 16TEMPE~ATURE UNITS FAH-F-41 FAH-F-41 and FAH-F-41.
| |
| YS.
| |
| and FAH-F-74 FAU-F-74 UNIT UNIT FAH-f -4 1, FAH-F-74 TIME FAH-F-74 TfWE .
| |
| MAXIMUM
| |
| ~XIMUM LOCAL LOCAL Jl)USJlCG HOUSlNG TEMP.TEMP-(PI1N)
| |
| (MHO (DEG F)
| |
| (DEG F) (MIN)
| |
| (WIN) (DEG (DEG F)F) 11 96 96 31 31 .. 369 2 106 32 359 3 118 33 350 4 132 34 340 5 148 3S 331 6 167 36 321 7 188 37 312 e 212 38 303 9 239 39 294 10 269 40 2BS 11 302 41 276 12 339 42 267 13 369 43 259 14 394 44 251 15 412 45 243 16 426 46 235 17 436 47 227 18 '42 48 220 19 .45 49 213 20 US SO 206 21 443 51 199 22 UO 52 192 23 435 53 186
| |
| - 24 428 .... 54 180 2S 421 55 174 26 41" 56 169 27 405 57 163 28 397 58 158 29 388 59 153 30 378 60 148 8
| |
| | |
| SEABROOK SEAUROOK Evaluationand
| |
| ~valu~t~on Comparisonto andCoril~~ison to BTP BTPAP)SB APCSB 9.5-1, 9.5-1, Rev. 9 Rev~j;9 Appendix AA .
| |
| Appendix Sediptl D F.3 D SectionF.3 STATION STATION Page J7 Page 17
| |
| * UIlIT UNIT CAP-F-40 CAP-F-40 LOCAL LOCAL HOUSING WXIEIUH MAXIMUM LOCAL LOCAL TIME 71% 1M TABLE 66
| |
| .:'ABLE HOUS I NG TEMPERATURE I N UNIT TEMPERATURE YS.
| |
| UNIT CAP-F-.O CAP-F-40 U"IT UNIT YS.
| |
| ,CAP-F -40
| |
| ,CAP-F-40 TIME .
| |
| WXPUM p(A~IMUM LOCAL LOCAL tIlUSING TEMP.
| |
| WUSING TEMP.
| |
| :E, WIJSIHG TEMP.
| |
| )()USIHG TEMP, TIME
| |
| - TIME (MIN) (DEG F)
| |
| (DEG F) (MIN)
| |
| (WIN) 31 31 (DEE F)
| |
| (DEG 382 382 F) 11 97 97 109 32 372 22 109 122 33 363 33 lU 137 34 353 44 137 155 35 343 55 155 35 334 66 175 175 37 325 77 197 197 38 316 8B 222 222 39 306 99 251 251 40 298 10 10 282 282 316 41 289 11 11 316 354 42 280 12 12 354 3 85 .3 272 13 13 385 44 264 14 14 UO 410 256 15 429
| |
| .29 4S 15 248 16 16 - 443 443 46 47 241 1737 452 452 234 18 458 458 48 18 227
| |
| '19 461 461- 49
| |
| -19 220 20 460 460 50 20 213 21 458 458 51 21 22 22 454 454 - 52 207 201 23 449 449 53 23 195 24 44 3 443 S4 24 189 25 435 435 55 25 184 26 427 427 56 26 178 27 419 U9 57 27 173 28 410 410 58 ,-
| |
| 28 59' 169 29 401 401 29 164 391 391 60 30 30
| |
| * 9
| |
| | |
| SEABROOK SEABROOK and Comparison to BTPAPCSB Evaluationat,1dtt01nlJarls~llt~BTP Eva~uati()n APCSB9.5-1, 9.5- 1, Rev.
| |
| Rev.9"9 Appendix A '
| |
| ~gp~q'.~;8,! Section F.3
| |
| ~~ctip.~jJi .3' DD STATION STA1010N Pagei:8,'
| |
| Page 18 UNIT UNIT CAH-F-8 CAH-F-B LOCAL LOCALMOUSI MAXIMUM HAXIMUM LUCAL LOtAl
| |
| .TABLE 7 NG TEMPERATURE HOUSING TEHPERATUREYS.
| |
| CAH-F-B UNIT TIME 1"INCAH-F-B TIME UNIT UNIT UNIT YS.
| |
| CAH-F-B
| |
| . CAH-f-8 .
| |
| MAXIMUM WXIMUN LOCAL LOCAL
| |
| * TIHE TIME HOUSING HOUSINGTEMP.
| |
| TEMP. TIME TIHE teUSI"G WUSING TEMP.
| |
| TErlP-
| |
| _(M1N) (DEG (DEG F)F) . (MIN)
| |
| (HIN) (DEG (DEG F)F )
| |
| (MIM) 3131 486 486 11 106 106 124 32 472 2
| |
| 144 33 459 3
| |
| 168 34 445 197 35 432 5
| |
| 229 36 419 6
| |
| 7 266 37 406 8 307 38 393 354 39 380 9
| |
| 40 368 10 40S 460 41 356 11 42 344 12 ~19 565 43 332 13 14 597 .4 321 619 45 310 15 16 632 46 299 637 .7 ,BB 17 18 637- 48 278 19 633 .9 26B 20 626 50 2SB 617 51 248 21 22 606 52 239 594 53 230 23 24 582 S4 221 2S 569 55 213 26 555 56 204 21 542 57 196 28 428 58 ' 189 514 59 181 29 30 500 60 174 10
| |
| * SEABROOK SEAB ROOK Evaluation Evalua tion and and COlnP~Comparison ,isbnto~:i'P to BTP,;,APG APCSB 9.5- 1, SB 9.5-1, Rev. 99 Rev.
| |
| STATION STATI ON Appendix Appendi xA.:~,H A ' Section F.3 Section D F.3 D
| |
| , " *. ,.* ,.i' ".'
| |
| Page 19 Page 19
| |
| * CONCLUS CONCLUSIONS 1ONS Based
| |
| &I& up"on u p h tonser conrmatlve, ut1n. wor~t n r r r cue r a r e ~1'tull
| |
| ~ a l ~ u ltion5.
| |
| r t l o n rthethe
| |
| . fDllowin following conclusions g conclus ions Ire a n dramdrawn from frClfl Ir fire f l r e tnuolvlng in\'D1v1n g" "the
| |
| -the chartOI charcoal' cells cells in i n the the air air blndl1ng hndlfng units:
| |
| unl t s :
| |
| 1.
| |
| : 1. The The rotst use worst caw llax1mlJll 1ocrl 1zed m l x i m u n loc:aHz -steel phte ed'stee' plate housinghouslng teapera t s a ~ c r ture ature was ud to
| |
| "'0-was ciltula calculated to be be 704*F.
| |
| 704.F. ThIs tempera This tcmpe;aturc ture is substmtirl\r t s substan tially below that required that requlred for for structu ral !Inure of the steel structural f a f l u r e of the steel Ntusing hausing..
| |
| 2.
| |
| : 2. Structu Structural ral flil r n of f a i l uure of any steel beam any steel beam or or colc o ltII'I l m in tn the of v i c i n i t y of the vicinity these t h e s t fUter f i l t e r ",its mits cannot cannot be caused by k caused transfer
| |
| ) r a t transfe by Nat fran the the r frc:rn f l l t e r housing filter houslng..
| |
| 3.
| |
| : 3. T~
| |
| The lIu1mum maxlmum radiant r n d l a n t heatheat emissh n i s s l vee flux frcm the f l u x frcrn housing at tk housing r t 704-,.
| |
| 704.F.
| |
| cllcuht calculated ed to t o be be lessless thanthan 10 k ~ / m22* , is 10 tW/m I s 'ess less tNt\thn half h a l f the crttl-tk criti-cal crl racSilnt radlrnt flUI f l u x necessa necessary ry to t o ignite I g n i t e the worst case the worst case c.able cable jacket Jacket IlIiter'll n r t e r l alsl s as 8s detemin detennfntd ed by by EPRI EPRI sponsor sponsored a t factory t e s t s .t ed tests Factory """tual h t ~ a l Research Research CDrpora C o r p e r tion f (EPRI
| |
| ~ ton (EPRI NP-1200 HP-1200 plrt 1).
| |
| p a r t 1).
| |
| * Therefo Therefore, re. the hazards posed the hazards posed by by the the heating h'eatlng of of the steel the steel houslng frem trm a housing I eharcoa charcoall bed bed filter f i l t e r cencell fire dl 1 not f i r e will not jeopard jeopatdlze fze t~ safe tht safe shvtdorn of thethe st.Jtdown of plant.
| |
| plant.
| |
| b Ref: SE-02-0 F i I e Ref: SE-02-02-103 File Z-103 11
| |
| | |
| SEABROOK SEABROOK* Evaluation and Comparison EvaIuation 9;;5.:1 ~ :'
| |
| to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, crQrj1p~ri~c>n;toBTPAPC$B Rev. 9
| |
| :R;¢v.9*
| |
| AP.Fi.entlixA.
| |
| Appendix A . .., Section F.3 D SectionF3 STATION S;trATU>N . ~'. . "
| |
| Page 20 Section F-3 Appendix D Hazards Analyses of Seabrook Station Charcoal Filter Units APPENDIX AA APPENDIX
| |
| | |
| SEABRQOK
| |
| $EA~RO()Ki** Evaluationatid EyaluaUon andCdltlpatlson ComparisontoBTPAP@SB:9 to BTP APCSB .$~1 9.5-,) 1, Rev. 9.... :
| |
| ~ev;~\
| |
| STATION Appendix Appendix A A . $¢ction'F.3D Section F.3 D STATI0N JRage2.1 Page 2 1
| |
| -APPENDIX
| |
| ~PPEHOrx AA ANALYSIS ANALYSISM[THOOOlOGY METHODOLOGY 1 Theunsteady The unsteadyheat heatconduction tonductlon analysis m a l y s f s used used for f o r this study isi sdescribed t h l s study dcscrlbedini n i d r t r I l in1nthis deUn eppendlx. AA lumped t h l s appendix. lumped heat capacfty approach heat cipac1ty approachwas was utilized.
| |
| rrtllfzcd, I
| |
| -lid as long as the fieat nHd IS long IS the ~It conduction is sufficiently fut. IS alIlPlred toto conduction I s r u f f ! c l e n t l y f a s t . as canpared i thc rite the r a t eofo f heatheattransfer t r a n s f e r tot o the tkobject o b j e c t (the rpproprtatenessofof tte
| |
| ( t h eapproprilt~ness thlumped lumped i heatcapacity helt capacityapproach approachis' i s rev1twed
| |
| ' n v i e m dlater l a t e rinI nthis t h l sappendiX).
| |
| appendix).
| |
| F i g u r e 1.-1 Figure kldepicts d e p i c t s the tk hut heat transfer-t r a n s f e r tot o the the sUel s t e e l housing.
| |
| heustng. The Thenet net heat heat t r a n s f e r tot o the transfer tk steels t e e l lets acts tot o 1nc:rease Increase the the inhmal internal energy energy ofo f the tb steel s t e e l*,
| |
| r e s u l t i n ginI n I atemperature
| |
| . resulting temperature du. rf se. This This c:an canbebedescribed describedinIn equation equation[lJ [l]IS: as:
| |
| where :
| |
| where:
| |
| QOuw *'RadiativeRadiatlve heat heat trlnsfer fran f1f i re t r a n s f e r frCJ1l r e (W) (U)
| |
| ,Q *r Radhti,ve Qft4, Radiat!ve !'eat heat lossl o s s fromf r u n stee' s t e e l to t o surroundings surroundings (W) (W)
| |
| Qc:
| |
| Q, *1ConvectiveConvectlve heat heat lossl o s s fran f r o n steel s t e e l to t o surroundings surroundings (W) (W)
| |
| TTs s * * ' s Steelt e e l temperature temperature (.C)
| |
| (*e) tt Time (sec.)
| |
| *8 Time (sec.)
| |
| ee *= Steel Steel densitydensity (7700 (7700 kg/m k g h33))
| |
| C, C,
| |
| * Steel S t e e l specific h a t (5Z0 s p e c l f l c heat (520 J/kg J/kg 'C) ec)
| |
| VY *= SSteel t e e l vol v o lUlle m e (m 3)
| |
| (m3)
| |
| It should It should be be noted noted that t h a t conductive conductive losses thrbugh the l o s s e s through tk steel s t e e l toto the the remain-rmafn-d t r of der of the howlng have the hous'ng have been k e n neglected.
| |
| neglected. This T h i s .ssumption assumption is Is eonserv.ttve by c o n s e r v r t t v e by jgnoring 19 n o r1n 9 heat heat which which d i f f diffuses u s e s throughout t theh e assembly.
| |
| assembly.
| |
| A - 1
| |
| | |
| SEABROOK SEABROOK EvaluationaridCompatlson
| |
| 'Ev~t~ation BTP APCSB 9.5- 1, "
| |
| and ComparisontotoBTPAPCSB9j,:,1; LRev.,.9"*'
| |
| Rev. 9
| |
| " Appendix AppendixA A Section F.3DD S~ctionP.3*
| |
| STATION STATION Page 22 t *'~~g~,s~~.,.",
| |
| Heat Figure Figure AA
| |
| * 11 -
| |
| Heat Transfer T r a n s f e r Process Process st eel Steel ChlrCDal HDusing HouSl ng Oc
| |
| ,0...
| |
| ,Q -
| |
| 0, *= convection convect !on heat
| |
| * ndiation QQw
| |
| * f.dht loss heat loss r a d i r t l o n hut loss Feat loss l o n fran r a d l a tion flm frm fire .
| |
| u A- 2
| |
| | |
| SEAB ROOK Evaluati?n and doipparison to BTP APCSB 9.5- 1, *Rev~9 STATI ON NPpendixA Secti~nF~JP Page 23 The The three three tems tenns involvin f n v o l v f ngg rldlltfo r a d i a t i onn or c o n v u ton o r conncti i ~ n...
| |
| h at t t.ransfer will now t r a n s f e r will now btbe dlScr1be d
| |
| * Radiatio R ~ d l r t ino HeAt nHeat Transfe Transferr fra- fra Fire Fln In I n general.
| |
| general, radiatio radiation n heatheat transfer t r a n s f e r between between two two finite.
| |
| f i n i t e . non-blac non-black bodfes is is k bodies glvrn b.Y:
| |
| 51.1van by:
| |
| [23 where:
| |
| where:
| |
| 6
| |
| * Stefan-B IS T, =
| |
| Stefan-Boltmann Charcoal oltzmann Constant Tc
| |
| * Charcoal tempera ture (*K) temperature Constant (5.67 (5.67 xx 10- 10-8 u/~**K) 8 w/mZ.X,)
| |
| ('K)
| |
| T7,s Steel temperat
| |
| *= Steel t m p e r a tureu r e (*K) ('K) t, tc
| |
| * Charcoal Charcoal m i emissivs s i v l ityt y (assume .75)
| |
| (assume -75)
| |
| * Area Area of of burning burning chlrco,' charcosl (m 2)
| |
| (m2) cs *= View FFcs View factor f a c t o r (lSsume (assume 1.0) 1.0) es *= Steel
| |
| *s Steel emissivi m i s s i v lty t y ConStN conservatively lt ;vely approlCfapproximated .aUd IS as 0.8 0.8 (1) (1)
| |
| . AS
| |
| * Area As Area of o f steel (m2) s t e e l (~2)
| |
| The surface The surface area area of steel directly of steel d i r e c t l y exposed exposed to t o thethe radiant cadfant helt b a t fromfrom the the charcoal charcoal filter f i l t e r bed bed cellc e l l fire v a r i e d for f i r e varied f o r thetht fivef i v e distinct d f s t i n c t Unit Unlt types.typcs. For for tach each unit. the area u n i t , the area can can be be calculat calculated ed as as thethe product product of o f di~ensio dimensions "A" and md ns MAlO "8"
| |
| "8" from from TableTable 1. 1, except except for f o r UnitUnit CAH-F-8CAH-F-8 where where tte tk area area is the product I s the product of of dimensions dimensio ns "A" 'Aw and md *Cn, "eM.
| |
| The The viewview ficto"f a c t o r cancan be be detennin detennined uslng graphs ed using graphs and and view vfew factor algebra.
| |
| f a c t o r algebra.
| |
| Because Because of o f thet t r steel steel area area being belng apprecia r p p r c c l sbly b l y greater greater than than the th exposing exposfng char- char-coal bed coal bed area.
| |
| area, the the view factor was view factDr was approxim approximated ated IS 1.0.
| |
| 8s 1.0. should be It should It k noted noted that t h a t since since the tk steel~ t e e fandand charcDal charcoal Ire 8- finitef f n i t e in slze, the i n siu. the view factor is v i e w fa~tDr is
| |
| .ctuilly actually slightlys l i g h t l y less less than than 1.0. 1.0. Estimation Estilllati of the view on of the v1~ factor of 1.0 is f a c t o r of 1.0 is conserv conservative.ative. i.t 1.e.. ** this t h i s win wlll '.ad lead to t o ar greater greater steel s t e t 1 tempera temperature. ture.
| |
| A- 3
| |
| | |
| SEABROOK SEABROOK EV~lu~ti9rii~q&;Cprril'arl~~11 Evaluation and Comparisonto:J3T~APCSB to BTP APCSB95-1, 9.5- 1, Rev. 9 STATION STA:TleN *App~hpif{A Appendix A Section F.3 D Page 24 The charco'l The charcoh~ 8IItssiv1ty assumedtot o ~be0.75, a i s s i v i t y is1sassume<! 0.75, ISr ssU9gested suggestedbybyEvans Evansand and EJmrcns Emnons (2): (2). The The burning burning charco.' charcoal surface surface are. area (A(Ac] c ) was was conservatively conservatively assumed assumedtot o bebe0.465 0.465 mm2 2 (26 (26 inches fnches:square)
| |
| 'square) which whfc his1s'arger largerthin thanthetheIllaxt/lllllTl mxlmurn possible posslblefire f l mexposure exposum (22 (22inches fnches square) square) tot otbe tbe charcoal charcoal bed. bed. The Thechar-char-coal temperature is1sa afunction coal t~perature functlonofo fti~e. time, ISasprovide<!
| |
| p r w l d t dini nthe thetest reportsum-test report sum-
| |
| .ariled marlzedinI nlable TableZ2ofof this r e p o r t (3).
| |
| t h l s report (3). The T k tenperatur.es ttmperatums used usedinI nthist h l s an.l-rnal-ysls were
| |
| )'115 were_asuredmeasuredwithin wlthlnthe thcchircoal charcoal bed bedenonthe the outlet side. This o u t l e t side. Thfs set set ofof telllperatures temperatures WIS was thetk highest h l g h t s t ofo f Iny any ofo f the tk temperatures temperrtuns .enured, measured. thereby thereby y i e l d i n g aa conservathe yielding conscrvatlveprediction p r e d l c t l o n ofo f the steel temperature.
| |
| t h e steel temperature. This This 15Isalso also conseNlthe conservrtfve since sfnct the tk tllllperature temperatun used used is1s Inm interior I n t e r l o r temperature tmperature ISas opposed opposed to t o I a surface surface temperature temperature (which (whtch the the radilt r a d i aion t i o n 15i s dependent dependent on) on) whichwould which would bebe eoohr.cooler.
| |
| Radiative. l k a t Loss Since Since the t h e temperature temperatun of o f thetk surroundings surroundfngs of of the the steel steel housing, housing. otherother than than the burning the burnfng charcoal charcoal filter f l l t e r bed c e l l . 1$
| |
| bed cell. I s assumed assumed to t o be be unaffected unaffected by by the the Ii reo the fin, the surround surroundings ings fitll rill remainremain cool cool in fn comparison comparison to the steel to the steel plplate..
| |
| ate,.
| |
| As I r result.
| |
| As result, radiation k a t transfer r a d i a t i o n heat w l l l occur t r a n s f e r will f r m the occur frtJII the steel steel tot o the sur-the sur-roundings.
| |
| roundings, nsulting n s u l t I n g in i n aa net net heat heat ~oss !ass from fran the tht steel.
| |
| steel. Since Slncc thet h e sur-sur-roundings roundfngs are are infinite i n f t n f t e in i n size size as as compared compared to the h:lusing.
| |
| t o tl'le b u s i n g . the radiative the rad1athe heat loss heat loss is I s given given by: by:
| |
| where:
| |
| where:
| |
| T T~ *= Room temperature (-K)
| |
| Roan temperature ('K)
| |
| Ts,es and TStes were defined a n dIfs were previously for defined previously f o r equation equatfon (2). 123. AA room room temperature tesperrtute o f Z7-C of 27.C (81-F)(81°F] was was arbitrarily a r b l t r a r l l y selected select& for f o r vse use in fn }he calculations.
| |
| )he calculations.
| |
| The T k radiative r a d l a t l v t heat heat loss l o s s is Is assUllled assuned to t o occur occur on on bothboth sides sides of of thethe steel steel hous housing. 1ng .
| |
| A - 4 A'
| |
| | |
| SEABROOK SEABROOK Evaluationand Evaluation and<bo~parisontoBTR Comparison to BTPAPCSB APCSB9.5-1, 95 1 , . Rev.
| |
| Rev.9 9 STATION AppendixAA
| |
| ;\ppendix Secti(m .3rQD SectionFF.3 STATION Page*25 Page 25 convectiveHeat HeatLon Loss 3r eonvectiwe AsAslong longASasthe thcsurrounding surroundingair tr;riptraturtisi sless a i rtem~r&ture lessthan thanthe tksteel steeltempera- tmpera-ture, ture.free f r e econvtetion convection heat k a ttransfer t r a n s f e rwill d l 1occur. occur. Due Duttot othe theforced forced 11r a i rflow flow of ~O ft/~in. through the charcoll filter bed Ind M1th1n the housing during mf 40 ft/mln. thmugh t h charcoal f i l t e r bed and w l t h l n tk burlng d u ilng the f i r s tfive t h efirst f i v e.1nutes minuttsafter a f t e r19nit1on, i g n f t i o n . forc~d f o r c t dconvection convectionhalt h a ttrlnsfer transfer .150 a1 so can bebe expected.
| |
| can expecttd. The r d d f t l o n ofo f forced The addft10n forcedconvection* convectlon~ w i l l had
| |
| ,,111 leadtotoanm en- en-hancedconvective hanced c o n v ~ t l v helt ek a tloss frunthe l o s sfrCJll the shel, steel. for Forthe thepurpose purposeofof this t h i sanlly-analy-s i s , the sis. the forced forcedconvection convection was was neglected, neglected, since since the tk forcedforced air a l r strum stream cln can expected tot o bebe heated.
| |
| bebeexpected b a t e d , ISas doc""ented documented1 n i nthethe testt e s t "port.
| |
| report. ItItshoul should d bebe notedthat noted thatthe the heated heated lir a i r temperlture temperature isi s expected expectedtotobebe less less than than the th?? Steel stul temperature. Thus.
| |
| temperature. Thus, neglecting neglecting the theforced forced convection c o n v u t i o n heat h a t trlnsfer t r a n s f e r isf s con-con-servative.
| |
| servative.
| |
| The free The f r e e convection convection heat heat transfer t,ransftr will wlll occur occur due due tot o the th heating heatfng of of the th aia ri r adjacent t o the plate, r e s u adjacent to the steel phte. resulting in air IIlOvement due to a buoyancy steel l t i n g I n a i r rnovemcht due t o r buoyancy change. Equation thlnge. Equation [4] 141describes descrlbes the thc free f r e e convection convection heat loss.
| |
| h e a t loss.
| |
| Qc .h"s(~T) (4]
| |
| where:
| |
| ~
| |
| hh - Convection heat
| |
| * Convection ATT *= Temperature k a t transfer Tmperatum difference t r a n s f e r coefficient d l f f e r c n c e between c o e f f i c i e n t (W/m between steel steel and
| |
| (~/m Z 2-~)
| |
| and ambient
| |
| 'K) ambient air a i r (-le).
| |
| ('K).
| |
| The convection coefficient can convection coefficient can be be approxillated approximated IS as 4.5 4.5 W/1l y/m2 2 'K (1). This The -" (1). This value can be ctlecked use empirically derhed values for the coeffic;1e nt.
| |
| value can be checked n e a p f r i c a l l y derlved values f o r the coefficient.
| |
| where the where convectfng fluid thc convecting f l u i d is i s Ifr rlr (u. (1).
| |
| 0.95 Cl~
| |
| O.9S ( AT)1/3 T ) ~ Ifor f~o r vertic.'
| |
| v e r t i c a l pl.te plate
| |
| ~ tS1 (5) h
| |
| * 1.43 (~T) 1.U ( ~ ~1/3 ) 1 forf/ o3r hod h o r lzontll z o n t r l pllteplate The condition of Ia horizonta' The h o r l z m t a l plate p l a t e is i s present for f o r unit u n i t CAH-F-8.
| |
| CAH-F-8. The value The value o f the of the convection ccoefficient oefficient w Milli l l be revfewedrev1ewed aafter f t e r the steel temperature i s estimated, is estf~ated. so so tthlt h a t tthe.temperature h t ,temperature d i f f e r e n c e can difference tan be be evaluated.
| |
| evaluated.
| |
| A - 5
| |
| | |
| SEABROOK SEABROOK Evaluationand Evaluation Comparisonto and Comparison BTP APCiSB to BTl>, APCSB 9.5-1, 9.5- 1, Rev. 99 Rev.
| |
| STATION STATION Appendix A Appendix A Section F.3 Section D F.3 D
| |
| , Page 26 Page 26 I n the In the use CaSf of of the MI~S t h e &m1ts ~ h e r the where t h t exposed exposed housing housing surfacesurface 1$ vertlca\
| |
| I S "rtica' (PAH-F-16.*.£AM-F-9.
| |
| (PAH-F-16 &AH-F-9, EAH-r-69.EAH-F-69, rAH-F-4I, FAH-F-41, rAH-F-74 FAH-F-74 and C~p-F-40), ttl!
| |
| and CAP-F-40). tk freefree convection t'elt convection h a t transfer transfer 15 assumed to i s assumed t o occur occur lltl m bothboth sidessides of of the the musing.
| |
| huslng.
| |
| Unit PH-F-8. with Unit CAH-F-S. tk exposed w l t h tl'e exposed horizontal h o t i r o n t a l surface.
| |
| rutfrcc. the tk free fm convection convection 1$ ts rssumed to ISSum~ occur only t o occur only frCllllf r a the the top t o p surface.
| |
| surface. convectlon .,.,11 Free convection Free dl1 alsoalso exist frm tt'e e x l s t fron tk lowerlower surhee,surface, but but at a t Ia .ueh much reduced reducgd rate rate due due to the con-to the con-v.feting air lIlOving v e c t l n g 11r m d n g in I n ~position opposltlon to smoke' produced to smoke* produced*by -by the burnlng cnar-tht burning rhar-coal. In co.l. In .11all c:ases.
| |
| casts, the tk IIIlbfent ambient a1r air temperatun temperature hI s arbitrarily assumed to r r b l t r a r l l y assumed to be not(81-F).
| |
| be 27-C (8lof).
| |
| So1 u t f o n for Solution f o r Steel Steel Temp!rature Temperature The steel The steel temperature temperature can can bt be dettnnined
| |
| &tennined by substitutfng equations by SUbstituting equations [2). 123. [3)133 and [4) and [4'J into I n t o equation equatlon [1). [I]. The derivative, efTs.
| |
| Tk derivative. dTs tin dt' can be replaced by be replaced a.
| |
| by .!...!1.
| |
| at
| |
| ~ ~t M I t e r a t i v e solution Ln iterative solutlon tecMique technlqvc un can be a p p l i e d to be applied t o detem1ne determine 1$ after aa time Ts after time duration of duration of interest.
| |
| interest. For t h i s study.
| |
| For this study, aa totll time of t o t a l time o f 6060 minutes minutes was was con-con-sidered. InI n general.
| |
| sider~. general. the equatlon for the equation f o r 1, Ts is I s given given IS: as:
| |
| Since estimates Since e s t ~ m a t t sfor f o r thethe sbelstetl temperature temperature are an now now available.
| |
| r v a i l a b l e , the validity tk validity of two of two k~y assumptions cln key assumptions can be checked. One be check~d. assumpion co~sidered One .ssum~t1on considered the the rate rate of on duct ion heat o f conduction heat transfer t r a n s f e r within w i t h i n the tk steels t e e l tot o be be lIIuch.*
| |
| nuch.'greater greater than than thethe r r d f r t i o n and radhtion and con'iectfon convectlon telt b a t transfer t r a n s f e r on on thetk steels t e t l bound.ry.
| |
| boundary. The second The second.
| |
| assumptton stlted assumption stated that t h a t the the cDnvection convection heat heat transfer t r a n s f e r coefficient.
| |
| c o c f f i c f e n t .was was 4.54.5
| |
| ~/m W/m 2 2.1(.
| |
| *Y. The second assumpt The second assumption ion -nll dl1 be be addressed addressed fif i rst. r s t , since since the the euminl*
| |
| exrmlns-t i o n of ticn of thethe first assumption requi~s f i r s t USUIlptfon nqulres the the convection convect~on.coefficient. c o e f f ~ c l t n tto to bebe known.
| |
| known.
| |
| ./
| |
| ./
| |
| The convection helt The convection heat transfer coefficient cln t r a n s f e r coeffident can be dettnnlned frCJll be determined frm equation equation 151. Considering (5). Considering the t h e temperature temperature di difference rference to t o be 2MI.C (an be 200*C (an approxiaate approximate A
| |
| * 6
| |
| | |
| SEABROOK SEA.bROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5- 1, Re;\r~9 Rev. 9 Appendix A .Section'F.3 Section F.3~ D'D
| |
| 'STATION STATION Page Page27 27 I
| |
| * averagetemperature average w/mZ for f o r the yielding temperaturedifference t l o ncoeffi~ient tion W/m coefficient isi sactually 2 .K*Kfor f o rthe the convection d f f h n n c eduring actually5.5 b r l z o n t a l plate~'
| |
| thet'Ori:z:ontal convutlon coeffie:ient y l e l d l n ggreater isIsshe"",
| |
| greatersteel durlngthe 5.5 W/1112
| |
| ~ / m -K ptate..' Thus, coefftcfent underesti.ated temperatures. Since steel telllperatures.
| |
| consenative, without shonteltabebec:onser'VIt1Ye, wltfioutgrossly the6o-minute Thus, use useofof the Sincethe exposure), the 6O-mlnuteexposure},
| |
| 2 *K forth!
| |
| f o r -thevertical v e r t i c a l plate value ofef4.S the value convective heat tk convective u n d t r e s t l n r t a t the theIssUllption grossly underestimating
| |
| ~ s s u n p t l oof undenstlmatlngthe theconvec-plate and no f 4.5 4.5 W/.
| |
| thtconvective eonvec-and8.43 4.5 '11m 2
| |
| 8.43
| |
| ~ / m 2-I(*K
| |
| !ass.
| |
| haat ~OS5.
| |
| ~ l2m -"
| |
| tonvactlvt
| |
| **K heatloss, h~at loss. the tht Issumption is assumption 1sconsidered u m s l d c n d valid.
| |
| valid.
| |
| The' v a l l d l t y ofo f the The' validity the first f i r s t andand ~remore 1~portlnt Important assumption rssmptton can a n now now bek ISsessed.
| |
| assessed. The T k cCllllparhon cmparlson ofof r.tes eonductlon toto convection rates ofof conduction convection and and radia-radia-tion t i o n heatb a t transfer transfer cln can bebe performed prformed by evaluating the by evllulting thc parlllete parameter, #/k ISas
| |
| .. , tl./k noted 1nI nequation noted equatton[7J: C7 3:
| |
| rf<L < 0.1 [7) where:
| |
| where:
| |
| HH * =Combined Combined radiation radiatfon and and convection convectlon heat h a t trlnsfer transfer coefficientcoefficient
| |
| ~ / m ax,)
| |
| 2*K )
| |
| (W/m2 L
| |
| kl * =Characteristic Characteristfc dimension dimcnslon of o f suel steel (m) (m)
| |
| Ie themal conductivity Steel thermal
| |
| * Steel condurtfvtty (W/m (N/m *K) *K) cunblnd radiation The combined radiation and convection heat and convection heat transfer transfer coefficient c o e f f l c l e n t isi s given given
| |
| @ IS:
| |
| HH *= titk ++ hh~ u ++ hh~ w raJ
| |
| [B]
| |
| where :
| |
| he: * .c.s W/m 2 ale hlU.
| |
| * 0 t.~
| |
| ~
| |
| ".,
| |
| * Q..
| |
| I, - TS h,
| |
| h~ can be can be re-ellpressed re-expressed as: as:
| |
| * Q.~
| |
| * esAs ,. (1 5 --T,*)
| |
| h.... ~ is -'T, Slml1arly, hhuw h:
| |
| Similarly, Is:
| |
| * r(T c 4 - T$4) h", (I-ec
| |
| * 1 + l-e S )(1c_ Ts )
| |
| At
| |
| ~ Is"s A- 7
| |
| | |
| .Rev.
| |
| SEABROOK SEABR(i)OK. and Comparison to BTP Evaluation andComparisonto Evaluation BTP APC$:B9.5;.1, APCSB 9.5 1, Rev. 9*
| |
| 9 STATION Appendix A App¢n~i?,A Sectioni'F;3
| |
| . SectiOh D F.3 I)
| |
| STArrlt!jN ...Page28 I Page 28 Assuming Assuming an m averlge average steel steel tl'llperature temperature of of 500 500 .K, -K. lverlge average charcoalcharcoal tempera-tempera-ture t u r n of 1000 1000 *K. *K, and and roanroan temperature t e M p t f a t u n of o f 300 300 *.: .K hh,,... and and h..,hy can can be walu-k evalu-atcd, usiftg ated. the values for sff fig the all other f o r al1 other parameters parameters which which were previously pre-e n prev1ousl~
| |
| sent ed.
| |
| sented.
| |
| hh IL.
| |
| * 56.8 56.8 W/1llY / ~2ZKK tt.,
| |
| * hRF 36.~ 36.4 W/IIIU / Z~K K Thus, the ThuS, tk sum sun Df of thethc heatheat transfer coefficient5c o e f f l c l e n t r is 97.7 W/m I s 97.7 ~ / m2 2eK.
| |
| OK.
| |
| T k characteristic The c h a r a c t e r l s t ~ cdilllension dlmenslon of the thc steel (L) is s t e e l (l) I s the the ratio r a t l o of thethc yolUllle v o l w to to the surflCe surface area. area. In this In t h i s case u s e the characteristic c h a r r c t e r t s t i c dimensiDn dimenslon is I s the th plate plate thlckness, i.e thickness. I.@., 0.601 III
| |
| ** 0.001 m {1/4 Inch).
| |
| (1/4 inch}.
| |
| Assuming A s s d n g the tk steel s t e e l conductivity I s estimated as c o n d u c t i v i t y is as 25 W/mK. Y/mK, Hl
| |
| * 97.7 x .001
| |
| * 0.004 < 0.1 r 25 Tnus.
| |
| Thus, tk the assumption assumption of o f the rate r a t e of o f heat conduction conduction being being subst,nthl11 subst8ntfally greater g r e a t e r th.n than tthath a t of of thethe convection and r a d i a t i o n heat and radiation r a n s f e r Iiss appro-k a t ttransfer appro-prf priate.
| |
| 8te.
| |
| The convectfve convective and and rradia d l ative a t i v r losses can aall ssoo bt canpared tto be compared o assess tk the sen-sen-sitivity s l t l v i t y ofof the m In,lysis a l y s l s ttoo the selected roOlll temperature. For fillustra-roan temperature. llustra-tlon tion purposes Iiff tk the assumed ISsum~ room room temperature tr 1ncreas~ from 81 is increased 81 F'-F ttoo 120 'F er (27 *C *C ttoo 49 'C), -C). the maxIrnurn o c a l i z e d bhOusing IIIaximum llocalized u s i n g temperature increases by only approximately 20 *F.
| |
| Increases OF.
| |
| ./
| |
| A - 8
| |
| | |
| . .~. .: ~: ~
| |
| SEABROUK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1,
| |
| ,;';F;val:u:aticlilami~Gon1parisontoB1PAPCSI3*9;5~I,;~ Rev.99 Rev.
| |
| STATION AppendixAA Appendix Section F.30D
| |
| ~e~tjpnF.3 Page 29
| |
| :m~geg9.
| |
| * 1.1.
| |
| 2.2.
| |
| Holman.
| |
| Holman, J.P Evans, D.O.
| |
| Evans, 1, (1971).
| |
| 1, J.?.,** Heat 0.0. and~ n Emmons.
| |
| (1977). p.p. 57-66.
| |
| Selected Transfer,6th HeatTransfer.
| |
| Reftrtnces SelectedReferences 6thEdition.
| |
| dEmons. *Combustion Edltlon, N!w
| |
| 'Cambustfon ofof Wood (sac Append1lt 57-66. (see AppendixB)8 ) . .
| |
| Ykw York.
| |
| York, McGraw k t r mHill.
| |
| Charcoal ,'Fire MoodCharcoal,-
| |
| H i l l . 1986.
| |
| P l nResearch.
| |
| Resea~h, 1986.
| |
| 3.*
| |
| 3.. Nuclear h c l e a r Consulting Consulting services.
| |
| Services. Inc ** -Iodine Inc., o l o d l n e Adsorber Msorbcr Fire F l r eTest:
| |
| Test,' Sep- Sep-tember15.
| |
| tember 15, 1986 1986 (unpublished).
| |
| (unpubl lshed).
| |
| ./
| |
| F11e Ref: 5E-02-02-103 A - 9
| |
| | |
| T SEABROOK SEAlBR00:H Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5- 1, Rev. 9 Appendix A Section F.3 D STATION STATION Page 30 Section F-3 Appendix D Section Hazards Analyses of Seabrook Station Charcoal Filter Units APPENDIX BB APPEMDIX
| |
| | |
| SEABROOK SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparisontto E.V~fqa~i~t1.(\t1d;(Jon1parison o BTPBTP APCSB9;?*-l, APCSB 9.5-1, Rev.
| |
| Rev. 99 Appendix A
| |
| ~ppeIlpiKA SectionE'.3Ll Section F.3 D STATION STATION Page 31 Pag~Jl "rc R
| |
| * u
| |
| * I ~ .(11'") 51*- II
| |
| --PriII"'d
| |
| *e n r ~
| |
| s1f....~1&.1 (1977) 67 66 eOE2wticr b i e r '-qlloil M u o L ,SA. ....... La.........
| |
| L-nr M i a d ia t b m NclJllriuda ht1a1t NeLbriLaL Combustionof Combwt.iOD of Wood Wood QwocoaJ Chrrorl'.
| |
| D. IlI'VAHS* . .II H. W. DtMONS H ~ Uniw,.II)'. D''''o" of ~."","'" .ypl;'t1 #'It)'. . . C.... brilWe.II... (V.s.....)
| |
| (Jl,ecitlftcl Ju.. 21.117')
| |
| eombwiianor.ood c:ombwtion of wood chalcoal chucoJ hu hu been done ban done in t h e put.
| |
| ia the put. MOlt Mort basic r l d i H of W c .tudies of carbon
| |
| =boa com* corn-The dynamics The dynamicsof of buminC burning of of wood c h d wood charcoal buttion utilize bUJtjon utilize IBPhit.e graphilc whichwhich iI iseasily ob easily ob-inan in an lit e r m i n e d both c t n m isit esamined air stream both experimen-uprimen- Wed molt tained more chemlca1Jy chemicdy pure pure and md physically physicrtly W y and tally md theoretically.
| |
| Lheoreiiully. To To simplify simplify the the tlIeory.
| |
| tbeory. uniform. Notable wWorm. Notable &monEunongthe the Itlolditf studies 01 mph-of pph*
| |
| an uperimentd artancementapproximatina an experimental urrngement approximating 11.e combustion lsis \he itc combustion the utensive extensive....ork work pet-per-aa one one dimensional dimensional phenomenon phenomenon WILl rdopted.
| |
| was adopted. formed by formed by Nar1e Nagle and Stricklmd-Corntable m d Strickland-<:Onatable Tbe theory The theory includfl includes conduction conduction in in the the .cUd, aolid, 111 in (1] in whieh which an expression for an expreuion for thethe chemic:al chemical t h e m i d reaction.
| |
| chemical ructions and and heat releue at heat release the at the mtc of zate of reaction rerction of of pyro graphitewith pyro er&pbite oxygen with OXYIen arrlxe. anef lUlface, m d heat heat andm d massmru transfer tnnsfer in the ,as in the gu wu dweloped. One wu dneloped. rnight consider One mirht consider initilJly initially bounduy layer above bouncl&ry above the She lW1ace.
| |
| surface. The mohr The molar buminp gnphitc to avoid buminr &nphite to avoid the ash and cnckinrthe uh and a cking COIC02 CO/C0 2 n t ratio i o L iI rncuund.
| |
| meuured. The The theory theory p r pre- e problem. However problems. However the the 1o"",
| |
| low porosity (relative[relative dic1.Iludac:e trcmpemture, solid t.emperatwe dicta surface toemperatule,lolid tcmpenture to chucorl)and to charcoal) md the the consequent conrcquent luIe luge clwllel chvnges distribution and cliftribution burning rate and bu.minc r a l within uperi-within uperi* af properties or properties maJces makes such tcrts 01 such tests of IiUle due little value mental error.
| |
| mental error. An An effective rrsction rate effective reaction nt*for*for. for the for the present present problem. In In fact, k t ,gmphite II'Iphite mula ia mwa developd.
| |
| k developed. will not will not burn burn in the present in the present apparatul.
| |
| apparatus.
| |
| primary loal The primary The tad or of this investiption itir to t h i s investipUon to predict the buming chanet.erisUc:s tht buminc chamctcristirr of of wood wood INTRODUCflON tharcoal from charcoal from basic physical principles.
| |
| hasic physical principks. Hope-Hope f d l y thilume Mly this w e model model will will prove prove adequate adequate kl Sa This ltudy This ~ t u d yis is ar step undenfrnding towud u.ndentandinc step toward describe InOrt describe complex eues more complex cases and and in in particular puticvlu details of the details ttl. of the the extinl:\1ishment extinguishment of ....ood wood will be will helpful in be helpfw in the Ule ltucly study or extinguishment.
| |
| of extineuishmenL.
| |
| fires by fires water. To by waler. To avoid avoid th. complitrtions in the complications in Thus itit iIk advantaieow Thus dvantrgeous to to let wt up up anm experi-upcri-chemistry durinC chemistry during the the pyrolysis pyrolysis that wood t h a t wood mcnt \hat ment that isis eally e=Uy modeled.
| |
| modeled. One One fmcUfmdr th..t thrt undereocs au itit bums, underCDes burns, the the initiIJ initial ltudy reported study npotlcd Uif an isolated piece an ilolat.ed piece or of wood c h u c d is ia-wood cb~oa1la ig-here is here for the is lor the buminc buming ot of wood wood charcoal.
| |
| c h u e d . TheThe nited, itit will nited. continue to will not continue w bum bum unJeaunless oneone buming DC buminr of woodwood charcoal charcoal offen offen aa simplified simplified blows an blows m oxidi:ttr, oxidizer. h. Lc. air, air, on on toto iLit AA puUC1I-putitu-chemistry while chemistry maintaining ar physical while maintainin, r a w . -'
| |
| physical struc:. luly ustlu) 1arIy useful way way to blow air b blow on itIt and rir on md at the a t the tun closely ture related to closely relaled to the orilinrl ....
| |
| the oricinal wood, ood. andwid same time same time to neuly one produce ar nearly ta produce one dimension-dimedon-is an is imporbnt procea an important processin. wood f1ft!
| |
| in a wood t i IS u well.
| |
| wtll. phenomenon. 11 d phenomenon, al toate the to locate is \0 burningSUf*
| |
| the bumine sur.
| |
| The wood charcoal The wood chucod used used in in this experiment this experiment face in tace rbpnatioh point now in ar sUl:f\atiori now field.m field. in thethe cornmenidly available was commercially was 8Milrblc and produced m d produced laminar case.
| |
| laminar the .ta~ation crsc. the rbgnation point paint now now field field from basswood from basswood (Tilia (Tiilia americana).
| |
| americana). When When wood wod developsaa uniloMn develops uniform boundary boundary layer layer thicknesl thicknen charcoal is charcoal is burned, burned, the burning surface be-the burnincsurface k- over lhe impingement plrnc over the impinJ:ement plane and thus unilorm and thus uniform t o m a complicated by com6 by aa system system or of craw en* tnnsport phenomenon can transport cm be cxpectrd.
| |
| h expedecl. .
| |
| generated in eenented in thethe combustion process, md by p r o n u , and by Unfortunately.
| |
| Unfortunately,in in order to to maintain miinWn combul- comb-fiberour azray a liberous m a y 01 of residual residual ash (cnFl*.
| |
| ash (let! 1).
| |
| Fig. 1). tion, air tlon, air must must be b l o w .t be blown the charcoal at the chucod bum- bum Cansidering theH Considerinc comp~icrtions,it l&& not these complications, m-not 1\11. ~ r f a c at inp Nflace Ins: at e hirh mainsham velocities; high mainstnam veloeiticc; ve-vr-prisinp that litO.
| |
| prisins:
| |
| * h r ~ r n l l yIt:
| |
| *h.'Ully quantillive work OD little quantitative Ccnier fo, nt: ~flt.' for rFn"w,
| |
| ... Jl....
| |
| Rcunrch.
| |
| the oo the Nntionrl
| |
| ,~h. N.li-.l locitics that locities turbulent.
| |
| thrt are hieh The high enourh degree enough to wrbulent. The de~H to which the bounduy thickness lor layer thickness Lo for a8 turbulent which make the now t4 make Lhc turbulent 1tas:natioD b u tlrpnaiion n d now uy a"relll of Sland.,da, W.dliIlClon. I).Co 20234 paint now point flaw field unifonn. IS field remains uniCOMn, 5in the in the
| |
| | |
| SEABROOK SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5- 1, Rev.
| |
| Evaluation BTP 'APCSB 9.5-1, Rev. 9 9
| |
| STATION STATION Appendix A AppeI)dix A Section F.3 D Section*F.3 D Page 32 Page 32 it rIC- 1** "mill' &II'r....
| |
| : 1. Burnihg wrfae*or. of acharcoal rberingcrKU cyiindtrIbowlll' rbmrtodQliJult, mad_ramw m e L*** raur.na.
| |
| ubc_. 6 d . r ..--c&loo 01 fa.cim&lar or theaurCec**
| |
| &10. .urIac. appun p p u n.l1ip~ic:.1 buuu110.
| |
| elliptidbaca_ r h m_ held.L
| |
| , a _ru!leld t.mcra
| |
| * aft,l.
| |
| mL*BD rntlr\0 the....
| |
| ko&1M at u h dUtethe.,.liN" ryliadu &0 Lokeep krrpI'itDiaL outofof tbm fidd.
| |
| \be ait now I'iUe!.
| |
| ab Row cue art01 ofthe luninunow thelaminar nowwas wasnot notinyestiClted.
| |
| invesligrltd, m d u e edmp& with tht hert trrnzler butthe but uperimenbl reswts theuperimentaJ resultswerewerefoundfound\0 k tobe N~Q.
| |
| wellapprO¥.ima\ed well approximatedby by*aone dimeruiorulthe-onedimeNionaJ (he The ndiation is cornwtrd bv usurnin? r ory.
| |
| ory- C U I ~ ~ S The model01 Themodel ofthe thebuminc burningproeasproctuwed w dhue here value I*IIs wjlhin the w g e oiltenturc values rrtumesthat ISsumes thatan ovenltreaction anoverall &;ween reactionbetween for "rough cubon" u for example mt. 2.
| |
| urbonand carbon mdoxnen oxygentakestakesplacep l s eon onthe thepr~pre T h e heat conduction into the chvcod it surfactarea jeetedsunace jected u e a(i.~. not~unt1nc (i.r.not countingthe thead-ad- the heat required to heat the e h u c d from ditional ueu within c a ditional areas within c~ks or pores; theb or porn; tbe the rmbient brnperrturc to the surface tern-cracks crackscover aboutO.5~
| |
| coverabout 0.5% 01 ofthe projectedan.
| |
| theprojected ma peratlam.
| |
| whilethe while theporn pornan complexand rmdlcomplu very.mall ucvery and Finally the ratio of cubon monoxide to conru'tubabout conltiluu a b u t80~80%01 ofthe volume)\0bpfl>
| |
| thevolume) pm rubon dioxide produced during chueorl carbondioxide ducecarbon duee dioxideand andcarbon carbonmonoxide.
| |
| monoxide, combustion w u measured by r mus specWe TheenereY The energyand andmass balancesat~tthe massbalances thelW'lace cutlace metct analysis of grab umplcr. The radU f knowledge01
| |
| =quire aaknowledce require ofthe convectiveheat theconvecUve hert uc compared with litemturt v d u u m d m w transfer nkr, the and mass transr., raLes, the radiative heatradiative hut exchulpe,and excbance. andthe conductioninto theconduction inbthe rolid.
| |
| thelOUd.
| |
| Herttrander Heat cocMcienlrwere transfercoefficients meuundby w e emeasured by cooling01ofI copper thecoolinl the copperIlul slugininthe placeof theplace of RAm BURNINGJIlATE AND BURNINC SURFACETE!!lPERATURL:
| |
| ANDSUJl.FACETEM'EJlATUJIlE:
| |
| the sample.The charcoilsample.
| |
| thecharcoal resultsa,re Theresults ur.pmcnUd
| |
| 'presenWd f XrWllblENTAL APPARATUSAND EX'EJllJ.1ENTALAP'ARATUS ANDRESULTS dimensionlesslorm.
| |
| InIndimensionless form. . - '
| |
| M utransfer Mass transfercoetrieients cocSficicn&were weremeasured mtmurd Thewood The c h u c dobtained woodcharcoal obl.inrd rrom frombus-b bybythett!eevaporaLion evapontionof ofwaur w 8 l urrombornI 8wet parmu.
| |
| wetporous woodused wood experimentisi Sthat hisexperiment usedininthis coat-thatcom-slug In the place of the charcoal slul in the place or the ch:ucoal lample. The sample. The mertially toldby rncrciallysold byWilliam WiHiarnDixon
| |
| &on Co. Co.01of multrare h!Sults presmlcdinindimensionless areprnenLed dimemionleuform forin Carlrtadt,New Carliladt, Jemy.inin.olid NewJUKy. blockswith solidblocks with
| |
| | |
| SEABROOK
| |
| *:SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison COn'lt'ari$oti ~to; to BTP APCSB AP(;~B9 9.5-1,
| |
| .S-}, Rev. 9
| |
| **Appendix:A::
| |
| Appendix A Section F.3 D SectionF.3.
| |
| STATION
| |
| *$t~l1:10N 33 Page 33
| |
| .t aa,..... -..-..............,-.............
| |
| r A**
| |
| bFh !i Fi.2 Schematic d i g r u n ofappuatru.
| |
| F'ie.
| |
| k d
| |
| *0 Fi,. 5.I. -411 k1Cily; n'. for ntr m 10 CIMft_1 burnlng 11:. aprrimraul i t y ; k, lor ruiovr o10 ' ; oso.' , ;. .o .0 w '_ ; ¥lLDCln m v g L # i T ~ r&u bumillf n aperim.D&&I d
| |
| ""Dill b e Lic p kiJlu;c na.
| |
| LI a r u ; --
| |
| ctl1.a; uw~.tn
| |
| , .p
| |
| ' b b 10 u malnalrrsm IlL aa1Mlftam dr pnllicLacl yalllM.
| |
| T ~UU air .
| |
| d i c u d bumins r
| |
| bllra.i1\'
| |
| approximate dimensions 17 17 XX 10 XX 3.5 em. em. imp-impinces utlini .Uin, up Up th. stqn.tion point flow
| |
| ~ st&*rion Bulk densities nnged ranced from 0.26 to 0.34 0.34 field. M.instrrm Mainstream Jr air velocities measured ~t at
| |
| ~II/ems l t m 'm and con&ent from 0.5 d uashh content C.!> to 1 .3% by 1.5~ the exite.z.lt of noule up to 45 misee of the nozzle m/t.ec: were weight.
| |
| weilM. No comlrtioncorrelation of ash concenhtion of rsh concentration nvulable.
| |
| available. The innulationinl\uation plate ..u held a plaIA! vlr with the ccban:oal ~ o densityd wu w uo ~ K N C ~The observed. . fixed diztmce 6;xtd distance of two nozzle noule dimeten diameters from densities of the test &elt chucod d l in the uurne charcoal ffal) me the exit of the nozzle by ralar,er or (he l u g u rluminum aluminum m
| |
| Janee geu as the densities which m u l t from a fire, ftSult plate with ra circular owning pktc cent.ered on the opeDin& cantered although althollih the latter lat&er are llSually riddled with lie usually uis of the axis th. now.
| |
| flow.
| |
| cracks-luge crac:ks-Iulle and rmd--while small_hile the uptrimen-e.z.perimen- internal tempemtun The internal distribution in temperature diitn'bution tal u tpi m p l o were free of samples of cracks kbelore f o r t the test the burning bumine chsrcorl chazeoal m p l e was musund aamp1e measured by and druing durinC the test only onl)' undl d c e sack UDalllUlface cnelu thennocouples irnplmted implanted near the bottom appeared.
| |
| ~PP&. end o tnd f the cylinder. A, of A$ Lhe the buming buminc ssurfaceuhe measurementl of buming To make the measurements buminc rate, rate. ~E'used, the rrpessed, th, thermocouples thermocouples would wowd come surface lurlace tempcr;rture, t.emperatllre. and iinternal n k r n d temperature t.emperature closer doser to the buming surface burnincllU'face rventudly eventually pua.
| |
| pru-distribution of ra wood charcod distriburion chucoal cylinder burn. bum* ine through ing throu,h it. iL From From meuurernentr measurementl of of the ing ine in a stagnation stalnation point flow, now, Lhcthe apparatus apparatus wrfact IUrface positions, poaitions, internal kmpenturetemperature infor* infor-rac:hemalic:aJl)'
| |
| h e m a t i d l y represented represcn&.ed in Fig. Fil. 2 w wasu w assem*
| |
| m - mation from the thumocouplu.could thumocouples.could be approximately 2.7 bled. A charcoal cylinder .pproximat.ely 2.7 related nlated to their distance from the th, burning buminc diarnewr and initially 11.4 em i em in diameler cm n beight in heicbt Nrlace. To measure curfnn. meuwe the rurfrce IUrfac, position with wUh Js rhown is burning surrounded by insulating
| |
| .hown buminelurrounded maul.tine respect to the platfoxan, platrorm. the pin Oil on the end mattrid.
| |
| malA!rial. T his insulation is This is astatid essenti&lll if lhe
| |
| &be o r r wale was lowered p e r i o d i d y to 01
| |
| * ac:al, wu lo,..red periodically to the nu-AU*
| |
| phenomenon phenomenon II L to be one dimensional. The face. Contact or 4f the pinpin was determind wu det.ermined ccharcoal h u c o d cylinder cyiinder iiss cuteut from trom 8 larger block of a l&rler of visually by obsening virudy observine the pin throu& throu&b the ehucoal charcoal suchcuch Lhal that the Lhe enin direction is prin direction i s ptr-per* magnifying opticr rystem of the pyrometer.
| |
| InIl:nifyine optiCll)'ltem pyrometcr.
| |
| taendieulu pendicylar to to the axis u i s of cylinder. At.
| |
| oC the cvlinder. Al the U'hen Y.'hen the th, pin was not in rut. use. iitt w WIS swung out u awunC burning lurface buminl surfoec regresses bw;ds the bottom relresses towards of or the flow now field lincesince III wake in its wak, in the tlow now of the cylinder.
| |
| cvlinder. the motor driven ~IrUorm driven platform located more when locat.ed more than ar few pin diamet.en diametln wrnbl; with k assembly m u d operated manually ~~ ~ c n ipeed l c dcon-con-
| |
| ~ i ~ d above the bumln!: nulrce 11'11 burning surface w l r an unampt
| |
| .n un.c:cep~
| |
| trol pushes the core up rune rate uu the u p at the same ably llllfluge disturbance. Allde k i d e from from ~inl Wing used Budace is rel:feuinl.
| |
| IUdlce r e p z i n g . The bumin£ burning surface II b .. u ttlescopt, a disrppcving as aa telescope. disappearinc filam,ntfilament type thus maintained at the same level thw level as u the top pyromeler pyrometer was one of the pytornchn used to Iht pyrometlrs b surface of the insulltion aurCace insulation on which the flow l h e air now measure the meuure Lht tcmpcnturc temperature 01 burning mar-of the buminllUr-
| |
| | |
| SEABROOIt SEABROOK Evaluation..and Comparison Evaluation Compati~6!tthJ~:rP to BTP APCSB .AF@'SB;:9;)~*sil; 9.5- 1, Rev. . 9
| |
| )~¥:v; STATION STATION Appendix Appendix A A . . " . ., Section Sebtjon*rF.3 3D Page 34
| |
| .0 a &fee1t extinction vdocity ftlocity oi of 5.5 mit<< will 5.5 m/t+c be w uaed.d.
| |
| The corrspoading m.asurements of c:orraponc1inc rneuurrmenlr ot the the buminc surf-buming lurface kmpcnture temperature rnsvurtd mlUured wfth with .
| |
| thermocoupl. m the themocouplu and two pyrometczr d two pyrome&eJl r, _ a hrnction func:tion of 01 the rnlinstm!am mainstrum rL air velocity u are e
| |
| Ibown
| |
| &own in Fir. -t.
| |
| Fig.4. Pyromttrr mcuurcmenL are
| |
| ~me1.er measurementl based b e d on aalWiaced m cmiruMty emiuMty of 0.75, which of 0.75, reprwnCItive 01 is repreHntauve ill carbon auf-of crrbon aufaca iItt iemper- tamper*
| |
| atwoes 8 t u m around m u a d 900 *C. 'C. The maximum Dlaximum temper- temper*
| |
| m t u d by an implanted thermocou-
| |
| .tunmlUlUlld atw't ple 'WUmr lenenl1y genenlly M o w the meuurementl below mt.rurmrtntr mad.
| |
| nude by the pyromet.en. pyrometen. This This is unar.
| |
| Jlot unex*
| |
| ir not pectrd u ntu pected u neU' the JUdace surface w it wasn common for the leads l u & of the 0.025 em Ult 0.025 cm diameter chromeI-' chromel-'
| |
| - J u m e l wire
| |
| . alumel threaded ndially w h t.bruded through the rrdirlly tbroulh the cylinder 10 to be upOled exposed by hgukr-nul.cc inel\llar*
| |
| by IWfac:e jues ititia to to the coolinC efltttr of them cooling effec:tl the rir Bow.now.
| |
| The dkappeuing filament type optical The dilappearin&
| |
| pyzomtter man\l1'ac:twed pyrometer manufactured by Pyrometer Fymmetcr In* In-o 10 10 JO 40 rtrurnent Company ItrUment Comp8ny wu w u wed u8ed to mertum the b measure
| |
| .,. wofUICrn .,_ (crnpcrrture of specific temperature apecac arWlutua d r r e u of the the Fie*
| |
| ?it 4.
| |
| tty; hy;0, wmpwmtun IlL Surf- "'J*III""
| |
| : 4. hrlKe fidamcnk pynItnalltr; 0,ralamftll Lhrrlb#ouplc;-.
| |
| cMl"IIMIeDUple; pymmrlw; 0,
| |
| - . JW-dic&ecl rMiIU-Um air u _ilYtrnJD Int,aM ,~.lft; 0,Lnfrsrrd wmpsratuu lor p d i c w d &eInJW,aluflI dr ftI~
| |
| d*
| |
| pyran*lrr; *. *.
| |
| ruirur for YariOUI buminf surfue where buminlsurface mum. The The area where uh cborcn 10 uu c:holen to be cover w_
| |
| ub coyer be measured w ua munucd and mini-a mini*
| |
| and Maricing of the balanc:inc the inltNment inrtmmmt wule!t wrs left \0 f p the kine& JaU'8_lft ltiMlic purm.t*r .a1....
| |
| rdur judgcrnenl of the jud,ement opentor.
| |
| the operator.
| |
| The i n f m d pyrome1.er The infrared pyromebr wu B m u En-was.a Barna En- .
| |
| flce independent of h c e independent of thethe readinp rudinip obtained obtained pnHrinl Co., Infmscopt Mark gineering CO.,lnfrucope Muk 1.I. This Thi8 inlU\l*
| |
| hrcN.
| |
| b pe from the from the thermocouples.
| |
| thermocouples.
| |
| Figure 33shOWI FilUn shornthe experimmtrl resulu the experimental r-ult tor for rnent was ment ot of the in the was let the averqe cenhr set upup to rvemge \amperatun of temperature in.
| |
| the burning continud readine fie ar continual in r "U em' rudacc.
| |
| cm' &rea+
| |
| reding IU reCord racord the steady state buming nte of the chvcod the steady st.at.e bumin, rate of the chucoal in the cen~r of the huminlsurl'ace. Ita as. function ot rr B function the mainltream of the mlinstrtun air &velocity.
| |
| velocity. provided an provided indiestion ot ur indication m et!ec:1ive of an effectiveaurtacerurimcc The The buminC burning rate rate of of thethe charcoal chucorl 11 i 8calculated ulcul~ted iemperature indudin~
| |
| Semper.ture including the influence 01 the ln1]uence of the the
| |
| ..rthe productof the product of the the nterateDC of reerasion regmrion of the of the .th llyer.
| |
| ub Becaue of laver. BecauN of l1wnDtions fluxmtionz caused c a d by bumhgsurface buminC rurfaee andmd bulk density ot bulk density the char*
| |
| of the chu- pieen 01 of ash ash coyer wing Iwept ewer beinC wept aWIY awry in in the th; coal cylinder meuund cod cylinder measured in morn air.
| |
| inroom The car-ah.The cu- air flow air flow and and chanpnc changinglurtace rurI.ce crack pt&mr, crack patt.efn$,
| |
| bon cont.ent bon conttnt ot of the chutort wu the charcoal determined w u detumined some judgement wu some judcement exercisedin w u exercised in usilJ'inl urigning 10 i o be approximately 93!l beapproximately 93% by weigh^ The by wei,hL T h ere-m one value ot one value tempentun characteri&inc of t.empel'llt.ure chmclerizing the the munderincluded mainder ineluded residual hydrogenand residualhydrosen and o&y' oxy- outnu+ Generally output. Cenerrllv the uncerkinitv...ociat.ed the uncertainity woci8ted chucod structure,moisture, rnouturc, ad. wi& these *ese mealUJ'erMnts m e w e m e n i s is 'c.
| |
| 15 *C.
| |
| ~np n in IOrbed in the the charcoalstnltt.ure.
| |
| aorbtdrues,guer, and uh. Thul and uh. Thusthe ehucod bum-thecharcoal ad.
| |
| bum - with urrninaCion or*
| |
| Closeexamination Clole in tt16 pyrometcrdata the J'1'rometer of.the data
| |
| &om
| |
| * car- m e & that that the meiruremenb made the meUUfemenLl madewith inyraLe in!, mcrrured dilters nLcmeuured differssUChUy slightlyfrom cul. reveall with ~ the bon bumin, bon burningrate. mtr. infrared pyrometer, intrared pyromrlt. inthaencedinflumeed by by thethe lib uh Thelownt Th~ mdnstrelmair xrcordedmainstream lowest~orded airvelocity velocity t y e r , are 18)'er, rpproximrkly 25*Clower u e approximately 25 'C lower &h&D t b ~
| |
| a twhich at which the chucorl wovld thecharcoal would aell-iUltain 8elf-rurWn itl Itr t b o made thOle made
| |
| ~ with the with pyrometu, mea-filuaent pyrometer, the rJIameDt mea-own eornburtion wu awntombustion waa 7.7 7.7 rza/sec. Repeatedtries mlrec. Repeated trim miringt.empent.ura NrinC tempenhret in ue.r ot inareu minimum uh of minimum .rh too tobum cylindersat b u m cylinden mdnstmun ,elocily r i a8mainstnam vdocity of of concentration, tor cont'mtntioD, for low lowair velocitia. With
| |
| .irnloeiUes. With
| |
| ",t 4.4 ./see Afteri,mUon fulled. Alter m!rc tailed. ignitionOJ! uthof eneach of trcreving air lncnasin, velocity,the sir nJoc:fly, the twotwoNU utr 01 drtr of data these trials,extinruishment Utset.ri&Is, cxLinpirhrnent bepn bepnat &
| |
| th. c:ir-at.the blend iolltber.
| |
| blend together. TbiJ trend Indicates This&lend jndicatm the the d..
| |
| dt cumfeteneeof Nml~len~ of the Lhehumin, burningsurlace near curlace n c uthe the creasing innuence ereasinc influence of olthe the ashrthlayer layer at higher at hilhel' insulrtionand inJulation mdprocressed progressedinward inward towards b w u dthe the
| |
| ~ I1r velocitin. uasitit isisswept JI velocities. swept trom t o m the tJw l\Uface rurfrcr the .. more easilyeasilythanthanat velocilier. At lower velocities. At the n n k r . This cenl.er. sequence DI This~uence of evenu rvenb nveals revtalr the more at lower Lh*
| |
| influenceof iDnuence oflome somebeal heat Joss CojhtiPuikI1QI losstOJ,hL~ highest aitvelocity.
| |
| hi~hest air velocity, 43 rnlsec, the 4 9 millc, the measure-me-ForIhe ring. For line. purpose01 thepurpOle urdysiror ofanalysis of lh"e thatdata.data, m e n u with menu with the the infrared pyromter all infrucd pyromet.er uereo re
| |
| | |
| SEABROOK Evaluationand Eva.luation and Comi'arison ComparisontoBtP to BTP AP(D~J19 APCSB 9.5-1, 54, Rev. 9 STATION Appert<.JixA Appendix A Section F.3 D Page 35 a1 corded..
| |
| CCl~ed higher ihan u hieher thocc with thrn thClH with the1UUDent the Iilrment and the and the ruction ruction rate -ed rate is uaumed in the in form' the form pyroxz~elu.
| |
| pyrometer. This Thiscowd indicnte that r o d d indicate h a t theYn cho-c h p.. . of a8 fint or Arzheniur ruction.
| |
| older Arrhenius fixstorder ruetion.
| |
| *m emirrivity for n emissivity for thethe bumine buming aunteenuface i&is &.00 too low.
| |
| iI h ~ ~ m i that bw.Aaawninl negligible at L ne~Jible that n g the r t this tbe influenee influence of high air this biih air 'HlocUy, of the velocity. the the ah .rh value the vaJue
| |
| -me:
| |
| * ApO)** ap(-EIRT) - .lPOa..
| |
| *ZrAPq,,rrp(-E/RTImdlpq,, . (5)
| |
| (5) 0(d thethe Iydaee surface emiuinty ernissivity that that brinp bring^ bothbotb M c f i o n of Prediction of the burningrate tbe bumiD& ntcand .nd lurface adace
| |
| . p)'rometer "3m/Me 43 m / m and thrt U,e that meuurtmtntr into pyromettr mHSUrements md 10551055*C the diUereneelln
| |
| ' 0.85. It C iIir 0.85.
| |
| dillerenccs In kmPeraWrt ag?eemmt at into acreement It ist also d m likely morded G - b n t u r e recorded at likely temperatureof temperature combustion1IL done combustiOll ly two ly of the the charcoal done by indtpmdenlequat.lona two ",dependent.
| |
| chrrarl in inltady r t u d y nate robing dmdtmtow by IONinrlimultaneous-equation, relatiD.
| |
| tt.k d a t i n g the the
| |
| .ut ahply the
| |
| . limply the .mult
| |
| .Illt of of W1eert&inti..
| |
| uncerLrintiecin in the the burning rate bwnin& nteandm d lUrlaee
| |
| &ace wmpezatwe.
| |
| k m p t n t u e . The The wmurcrnents as measuremenu as they rpproacb the they approach Limitr of the limits or fint k t equaUon equation involves bvolvtr Ul meneqy energy balance balance at. rt
| |
| -=cuney u e w u y lor for the tbe measwementa.
| |
| meuurcmmb. the bumine the ~ r f a cequatinl burnihg IUrface cgluting e the the entfIY energy ,en-gen-mM era ted in the above in the c h e d u l reaction rbwe chemical &on t.o tothat tbrt lort throulh lost throub beat W e t . The heat tDn1Ier. buming llte The buminC ntc lVRNlNC RATE BURNINC RATEAND ANDSURFACE ?aa?ERATURR SURFACETDlPERATUR!:: of the of c b u c d based the charcoal bucd on on the energy the I\Uface enellY TnEORmCALMODEl.
| |
| THEORETlCAL MODU t-lance h l m c e isis pen
| |
| @en by: by:
| |
| AI menlionrd i1l At znen1ioned in the introduction, lone the introduction, r one -me - [h(T. - Ta) + eG(T': - T:>> I dimensional model dimenuonal model isi s adequate rdeqrutc for for these these u* ex- [-SU~,H~o - "bH eoa +
| |
| perimental reswu. It II desirable to know p r i m e n u m u Il a . It is desirable to h o w thethe
| |
| , Jlo M eo Atriled chemical detailed chemical kinetic kinetic mechmiam mechrnbm involvine involving Cc +Z_2 COJ - C 1 - Ceo rractions at reactions the carbon at the turfact, in cubon sudace, in cracks cracks and md Me Mc pores, and pores. and in the cas in the phm. Unfortunately gas phase. Unfortunately IIlf* mf-ficienUy detailed ticienUy detailed chemical chemical data d a b wu wu not not found.
| |
| found. M co1
| |
| -b~ce03 ) X graphitereaction The sraphite The reaction kinetic kinetic fonnula formula af of Nae1e Nagle and but as SMcklmd-Conruble (1) and Stric:ltland*Const.able expected was as expected w whoUy
| |
| [I]WII inadequate (low wholly inadequate tried w u tried (low X (T. -T*)-:-cc(T.. -1'10)] (6) by *a factor by factor01 about 50).
| |
| ofabout 50). A rneuunment of A measurement of In eqn.
| |
| In cqn. (6). tbe value (6). the value of of Iah illiven shown t given as Ihown I d density I e local the density near the the charcoal durtd lurface surfue later by:
| |
| later by:
| |
| Wllests stome burnin(
| |
| m g ~ e s t lome burning in in the porn and the pora and cracu erackr NU*= hd/lr.
| |
| Nu h d h - 3.5 9.5 (ltePt,)ul
| |
| (~e4)0" (7 I (7)
| |
| (up to 10',;).
| |
| (up,,> 10%).With With charcoal there thereiIic no rignif-no aicniJ*
| |
| icant burning out iunt buminc out in in tne bounduy layer or the boundary or The The second secondequaUonequation reJat.i.nc dating the burning the buminr else the else Lhe fire could be fire could "blown out" be "blown out" as u isil the the rrk and rate ttmpenture 11 surface tempellwre and surface b eqn.
| |
| eqn. (5}( 5 )which which.
| |
| case with case burning polymethy)methacrylate.
| |
| with buminr polymethylmethrtylatt. howwer requires howeover rtquircl the the oX)"Ien partid preuwe oxygen partial pnsrrve m e absence The absence of such major of such major boundary bounduy layer at the at buming rurfnce. The the buminlsurface. The oxnen putid oxy Ben partial burning does buminc doer notnot preclude minor reactiOl'll mrctionr in in presswe at presswe at the nrrface Pa".
| |
| the surface pea, is dttennimd b determined B e boundary the boundary layer layer nor major reactions nor inajor reactions in in the the from
| |
| &om the conservrtion of .pecies the conservation quationr s p c c i ~equatiON
| |
| ,as phase very gu phase very close dose to the charcoal Lo the charcoal surface.
| |
| &act. rt the at burning rurfact. For the bummllurface. oxygen this For oXoYEe" takes this takes the absence In the In absence of applicable chemical of applicable chemical data. data, the form:
| |
| t h e form:
| |
| we usume an will assume we will o v e d reactioD m overall n u t i o n and reaction and reaction 1': ) ... ~ ... MOl kinetics formula kinetics formula applicable applicable \0 the charcoal tothe &mod JI.(YO,.a - oa.* +mc 0,... --mc Me :r projeckd lurface projected turface uea. u e r . Thus Thus we ruume an we us\Une an effective 'urface effeet.ive curfrce reacUon:
| |
| reaction: (8)
| |
| C + :rO. ~ aCO + bCO. (1) Similu balanm SimUa: balm& for dl the for all otherspecies the other specie ue needed to needed determine the to determine the compDlIUon comporitien o! Lhe of the where mixture o! of IlSes
| |
| ~ u eat nt r the burning surface in the buminllurface in
| |
| .+b-l (2) order to fmd Ule to rmd the oxnen prcwurr. For pulid pt!S5ure.
| |
| oxygen partial For cdculation the this calnJlation this the transport.
| |
| trrnrporLrate rrk per unit. wit z=-l+&
| |
| _!... b I (3)
| |
| (3) concentration di!ferenee concentntion difference of each rpceies is e x h 'pecies b 2
| |
| 2 considered equal equal \0 to that for ox)'ren.
| |
| Chat for oxygen. As d*
| |
| A, de--
| |
| As discussed AI discussedJater Ihe CO 1 r L r the CD to COI molar b CO. mblu raUo ntio h k r , the scribed lal.er.
| |
| scribed the mass m w transfer trrnsfer coefficient given by is liven is Is given by is liven
| |
| .Ib * .c.3 exp(-3390/T) (.c) Sh
| |
| * 1l.dlp,..D - 2.1 (ReSe)-** (9)
| |
| | |
| SEABROOK STATION Eva~uationand Comparison Eva~uationand Comparison to.
| |
| Appendix A BTP APCSB 9'.5-1;"
| |
| to BTP.A.~tSB 9.5-1,
| |
| / Rev.
| |
| R~v;.9 9 Section F.3 D
| |
| 'Section
| |
| ;l>,~ge' 36 '
| |
| D I 'nt, m e oSYJen Ph,- m oxygen partial thusfound thus found to i
| |
| to be
| |
| [l+mna prc-p A . 1 pftU\U'e k
| |
| M!!,u, d
| |
| l at the lUlface d the m . c c iI 3
| |
| Nc Mc
| |
| + h.Yo*.
| |
| is I
| |
| -1 (10)
| |
| . Suhtitution of thk u p d o n into q n . (5) yid& the mond equation relating tbc burn-ing nk md the w i r e bmptntruc d k r rome manipulrtlon as:
| |
| * A MoZ(=-1) [ ( f i ~ ~ ~ + ~ . ~MN* ~ , . . * ~ h . ~ ~ , . . )
| |
| (11)
| |
| Solutionstor SolutiON for the the.1.eady burningrate steady buminl nte.andand m d AA
| |
| * 25.42 and (alema 25.42 (Ilcm s lee rcc a1m) rrrulU in 8tm)nsult.s in tne the temperatureuwtyinl surfacewmperature lW'fa~1 utisfying eqru.eqnr. (6) and (6)and agrtement considerin&
| |
| best IJI'Hmmt best considcrkrg both both stt.s of g-w t o,t at-(11)W,rt (11) were found found as u arfunction function of of the the ma.in*
| |
| mrin- @mental data.
| |
| perimenw daL.
| |
| r t r r air atream ~ velocity rt velocity and m d nh.lft valuesfor forall dlthethe para-pus- %cause the Becaus. extinctionvelocity fht utinc:tion vt1DEity is imp-t L important m t t c nin meters h the reaction raw the ruction nteuJ)rewon expressioneqn. eqn. jn Lhr determination in the determination of a?the comtanLr A and the constanta.A ~d (5). In d l the predictions, r (S). In.I1 the pr~icUoN. a pressun of 1 a1m prcuurt of 1 ~ t m E/R, some malytis wrr p t d
| |
| £/R*
| |
| * OIM anal)'lis was performed \0 d.ter-o m t d b deter-and an and ur ambient kmpenture ot unbitnt i.emperature 20.4 'e of20.4 .C rRpr--
| |
| rep* mine the mine dlcct af fhc aftect. of the the uncel1ainty uncertainty in in thil thic wntingth, aentinc vdue dunnr:
| |
| m n p evalue the avera!:. durjng a1J the tests rLI the tests value on value onthe results. Vuying the the resu.lts.Varyinc extinction thcestinction yitldingthe yie.ldinC thedata recorded in dabrecorded in Fip.
| |
| Figs.39and and 44 velocity above velocity rbove and b l o w 5.S and below mlclc by 5.5 m/ac: 1.5 by 1.5 uwd.
| |
| wm1&IeI1.
| |
| was m/scc tor
| |
| 'fIl/sec for.a.value
| |
| ,a vdue 01 of EIR equd \0 E/R .qual to 9000.
| |
| 9000.
| |
| mostpowereul Themost The powerful piece pie= at ofinformation infonnrtion changed the chlneed of A to vdue of.A the value 24.19 and to 24.19 m d 27.31 2731 obtrinedtrom obtained fromthe thedatad a binin Lenns Wnns ot ofpredic~
| |
| predicting respecrively.In respectively. tc& ot In UnM of an w e d l first an overall order futtord.r v J u aof
| |
| ",haes of the nteparameters thefaLe punmetenAA and mdEIR &/Rwas WJS ftaction ocnvring on readionote:urrinC on the the lUlface, curfree, the form the lorm Lht determination of relf-extinction the determination ot the telt-utinc:tion y...
| |
| Lhc vt. of the upnvion for the effective ot the exprfllion tor the effective chemical cherniul locity. From Joc:ity. experimentc,the From experiments, minimumair theminimum air kinetic rate kinetic ntcof mactionapplicable ofreaction applicable\0 wood
| |
| %owood velodty at nJodty whichthe atwhich thecharcoal c h u c a d will rutlain its will.ustain itc chvcorl oxidized charcoal oxidized in inair.
| |
| rir.is:
| |
| ir:
| |
| owncombustion tombwtioncan canonlyonly bebeDidmid \0 be-bebe--
| |
| own tween4.4 tWHn 4.4 and md1.17.7 m/see.
| |
| mlrrc. For tobe Fot cM\.Irmininr de~rmkring -m~ * (25.4}po,**** ~ODOIT) (I em- a .- J) (12) approptisk values appropriau vduts ot of the panmeten A and thepanm.ten.A md d u e01 Thevalu.
| |
| The dE / R of EIR 9000lound o t9000 found applicable rpplicablt E/R,assum.d E/If, assumedto labe beconstant.
| |
| constant,the theYaJu.
| |
| d u eof of th.
| |
| he wood charcoal b wood
| |
| \0 c o m p u n favorably chucodcompares fwonbly with witb *8 vtloeity_t airvelocity air cctasa%the &elf-extinctionnloc.ity the**It-extinction velocity vdue oC value 8160found of 8160 found uldullor useful forAwtricAustrian was 5.5 Choosing a was 5.5 nl/~. Choosinc a value lor £IB,
| |
| * ni/sec. value for &/R, a brown c o d chu in a work brown coal char in a work by Hamor, Smith by Hamor, Smith correspondingvalue comspondinc valuefor forAA can canbe foundIw:b belound nrch mdTyler and Tyler (3 [31. Botb01 J* 80th thesevalues ofthese vaJundo d onot not thatno that no.olulion solution to t oeqru.
| |
| e q m(6)(6)and and(11)(11)repre-rcpm acree w.n w e wellwith withthe 15,200value Ute15.100 vdue of of E.111 E/Rfound found -
| |
| sentinesteldy aentine existsat burningexist.s steadybumine stair vtlociCi~
| |
| rirYeJociUes applicableto applicable oxidiution ot the oxidization tothe of pyro pyroIt&philC graphite below5.5 below 5.5m/nc.mlcec. FoUo"'inr Followingthis LhicprocedUJ"e.
| |
| procedure, In thework inthe work of of Naa:1e and Strickland-eonltab1e N q l e and Strickland-Cunst.blt lineson thelines the onFip.Fip.33and and..4show showthe thecalculated cdculatcd 111.
| |
| (1] possibleupllnaUon
| |
| * AA pOSlibl. uplanation lor for\hethe ditr.rtnet difference muitstor JOnulti forbuminc burningni.e surfacetemper-andsurface r a kand temp between I h t mults for between the relult.s tor crap)Ute and graphite UI~K and &hON atute for three valuer of E/R-8000,9000 ature lor three values of £111-8000. 9000 md md for coal c b u m d charcod tor coal chu and charroal could be the could be theirlI1u-lO,OO+assuming memissivity 10,OOO-USuminlan tmirsivityfor forthethe bum-burn- cncr01 enc. of**ubstantial r rubrtmt3damount mountofbuminrof burning De- 0 ~ -
| |
| surfaceof ingwrCace Inl; of0.15.
| |
| 0.75.The TheC:OfTfSpondinr comspondincvalue vdue curringininpores eurrinl portlopeninr openineon\o ontothethe.uriace.
| |
| surface.
| |
| giveninin.Ich ofAAisisriven eachrISe. Compuingth. the Under eeNinc c d ncondiLioN, conditions. combustion combustion Inh potu case.Comparinl poru DC Under calculrtjontobthe calculation Uitexperimental txperirntnLJdata, dab,one onecan opposed to
| |
| *.copposed thaton tothat onan expared .udace anIItpolld rurfrcc thatininall r ethat aee cases\he dlcues agreementisk generalaCteement therenen! can lowerthe canlower observedactivation theobservt'd activation ene1D' energyby by good. The combination or lood. The combination or E.IR
| |
| * 9000 ("lC)&/R 9000 (OK) artac&or f a c b rof o rtwo twofrom fmm the actudvalue theactual usochtcd valueassociated
| |
| | |
| SEABROOK, BV~I;u~~ionand'CoInpari$9rt to' BTP APCSB9;;;~;71,,~." ,Rey.:~f STATION , Appendix A ' Se,ctI011'F3 D
| |
| .P#g~;37
| |
| * .nth with the surface.
| |
| mrfaec. A IILriven by ruction oceurrin&
| |
| tbe ruction ocamingat d e t d t d d.iscuuion A detai1ed given by Wheeler (41.
| |
| Wheeler dircuvionof 14 J.
| |
| at the bumin?
| |
| the bumin(
| |
| of UUa thkeffect dfut .. :f'... .... _
| |
| -~ ~....,
| |
| ~.
| |
| .~
| |
| '!'HE THETDI'ERA1URE i M I E R A T U R E DlSTRBtmON DISTR1IVZI;ONWITHIN rXt umuJUfED
| |
| ~
| |
| THE UNBURNEDSOUD SOLID To Tomodelmodelthe the temperature dbtritnation 1ft tcmpenturtdistributioD kr 0<1*-..
| |
| Ibe cblrrd below tbe charcoal M o w the buming Nrf&ce.
| |
| the blUTlinl nrrirn,*r d y.taw 11; w.
| |
| *a ady solutionto 8 t r t e.oll.ltion tothe tbe onHlimensional on~enaional '. . . .1t. .._
| |
| .~ . . in l O w _n _ ~ IOm .. IO ~ . .- '" i ~ n ~ * ~ k heat conduction equation beat conduction equationin wmi-Wite in*a lemi*lnfmite I Cnvctrroru.Ly.cul-~
| |
| mlid wlr IOUPlt.
| |
| IOlid sought.The burning A1~
| |
| The buminC ru* was WAS FIt.
| |
| n g . 6.8.!&ptrillM"ul IpcrinunuJda lor Ib. aleady
| |
| &u IOIIJII LaL.rnol u t e illLer1la1 a m d y &&all "uJ!Nd r r r u w d to tobave eonstant temperatun b v econstant tempenbuc T.. T, andmd ".pera'lIn bmpenlum dmLributionill t1i&\ribution k *adl.~ c~crfi(ldm
| |
| & a r c 4 cyliadn with
| |
| .nUl to totravel travel at d *8constant velocity V.
| |
| c o n s a tveloeity V. (with (with respect rrtpcct .1II11y O.JZ9,fCrll k m i t y0.32' glcma. '
| |
| * aIId and ial'ial LrmpmrPn ITo) iaitid &nIs--lJIn (To) of of 1'.7*C 19.7 'C blll'Md burad ill. auinotrroa, air in r aainatrttUl air ... Iocil)' 0121 wloci~y d 21 to aa coordinate to coordinateSYltem system med rued to the bue to the base of02 the the ..fMc. mu m / m Pa... &O.alrom ahown from &Il.. La. &11.., . . . -... (.)
| |
| tbemaeoupk (+)and aatl tharcou chucoal cylinder) cylinder) into intothe unburnedlOUd.
| |
| !he unburned -lid, (0) idiidly ".2
| |
| ( 0 )ialtiall)' IP.2 mm 1IIc1104.3 mnd 101.3 ....mm 11'01II from thl Lbc buminl burning lniually initially at uniform tempentwe at uniform ternpentweTo. To. ...,Ian y . LiM:
| |
| m p c c l i n lI)'.
| |
| n r f a c e ,...pec~ Linr: au-ip, lim lit rtmig!tl Ii.. .r fit of cia...
| |
| &la No lteady No rterdy S1ate solutionuuu Mtelolution rxistain frameot in ar frame of .... burniw IlIrfU".
| |
| wu bllmine murfatc.
| |
| rrferenceinin which I'dereMe whichthe the lUrlace mwcs;but curfaceJDOV.; but respect &0 with rupeet with syrlcmin b *a'Yltem which the in which burning the b\lD\inC dftorption desorptionof adsorbed IUeI ot adsorbed gesofromfrom the the char*
| |
| cbu-lUdace aufaceremains remainsfixed fired ininspace, spice, the the.teady study coal ttsucturr.
| |
| cod It.Netwe.
| |
| From ar !mowletiCIe of the atate ~ u t i oiI:
| |
| rtAbsolutiOD n it: From knowledge of thea.mace velocity, rurfrcevelocity, V. (for tllis V,(for this test 0.138em/min) test 0.138 cm/min) and and ahellope the dope
| |
| ( T - TT.)*
| |
| (T- o ) D(T. ( T-, -T.)
| |
| T ~exp(-VX/e)
| |
| ) ~ p ( - Y X / ~ ) (13) (13) of the data of the data near new the the bwninc burningaurface.
| |
| & d a c e a,a value due To T oobtain obtaineqn. eqn.(13) (13)aU dlth. theproperties properties of of the the of the thtmrl diffwivity of wood chrrcod oC the thermal difCusivity ot wood cha.rcoal drucorlfonnine cha.rcoal fomingthe thethermal cliifuivitye, thermaldilluaivtty a, appropriateto appropriate to that that temperature ttmpembm ranee metcan u n be k (e Wpc),were (Q
| |
| * Jc/Ile), assumedconstant, wereauumrd constant,and heat andheat found indicated by found ursindicated the results by the resultr ot of the the simple iunple nux fluxonly only inin the u i ddirection theaxial dimtion was allowed.
| |
| wasallowed. conduction conductionmodel. model. The The ItraiKht*line straight-ine fit fit of the of the Theexponential The exponential form formof ofthe anticipated theanticipated data shown diU shownin in fie.Fig. 5, 5, yieldl value for yieldr ar value for the the temperatureprome temperature profileSUrfelu nrggcrtr that that Iruseful w f u l way way thermal diffusivity, thermal diffusivity,ct, ct, of 0.0026 emilio of 0.0026 cm'ls. Use UW ioplot to Ibe plot the thelorm theexperimental form ot Jtitwould wouldbe of In(T- -
| |
| experimental results ln(T To) expectedthat beexpected To) resultswould or.X.
| |
| PI.
| |
| that**
| |
| X. From would be From eqn.
| |
| be inin eqn.(13) tnipt*lin. with a straight-line (13) wi*
| |
| of tM ot to thedope bpredict mult of result dopeot predict the of the ofthethedata thethermal the5implt dataat rimple conduction at Jower diffusivity usinc t h e m J diftu$1vily conduction model, temptntunr lower temperatures h a g the modd.eqn.
| |
| the eqn.
| |
| slope-VlQ dope -V/a would wouldresult.
| |
| result (13)would (13) wouldbe be inappropriat.t inappropriatebecause becrure ot of the the FilUre Figure55IhOWI tho- the aperimcntd rel~lv theexperimental mul* tor for influence01 innuence of thethe desorpUon duorpLionrerian. region, the termi-Lhetermi-charcoalcylinder aacharcoal cylinder with density0.329 with density 0.329a/em'glcm8 nation ot nation theinsulation, ofthe insulation, and urd consequent consequent ndia1 ndiil initialtemperature m dinitial and of 19.7 *C burnedinin tempcnture of19.'*Cbumed heat lOlL hut lou mainstreamair mainstream velocityof airvelocity of21 mfwc.The 21m/sec. Thetem*
| |
| tem- modestattempt AAmodest rtttmpt wu wasmademade to dcul.tc toc:a1culat.t peraturnoutputs perature outputsfrom fromtwo thtrmocoupla Iwothermocouples thennd dir!~ivily the thennal the dilfwivity.lrom .frommeasurementl rneuurement, of of locatedon located onthe urirot theaxil of the cylinderand thecylinder initially mdinUil1Jy the basic the propertiu or basic properties then& cDnductivity.
| |
| of thermal conductivity, 99.2mm 99.2 mmand m d104.3 104.3mm mm from t o mIbe theend endof ofthe tbt dentityand density specificheat.
| |
| and specific: beat. TheTbethermal Lhermdcon- ton-cylinder to be burned, (1and 2 mpcctivsly cylinder to be bumed. (1 and 2 nspect1vely ductivity ot ductivity of wD9d wqgd charcoalc h u c d wu meuured and wasmeuured and Fig.2),
| |
| ininFie. 2),are functions01 h o w nasufunctions urshown oflb.
| |
| thediIo db IISsgivmby liven b y " .
| |
| tance h n c cfrom fromthe thebuminf burningNrC.ce.d a c e . The Theplot yieldc plotyieldl It* 0.0016,11 - 0.0001'1 (c:aJ em-I .-1 .c-1 )
| |
| aarDuCh roughl1raicht*line straight-linewith withmark markdt\liationa deviationsat at (14) lara' lugedistances dirturcclfrom hornthe thebumlnc burningINrfaa surfaceand md rangeof Sheranee ininthe krnpentundilference oftemperature differenceequal qud applicableat applicable atroom ttmpenturt, and roomtemperature, .nd &.hetheape-rpt to to100 100*C.
| |
| wrfrce,the 5urface, of ofthe
| |
| 'C.At Iupdistances Atlarr;e thedeviation distancesfrom deviationismcaused insularionaround theInsulation uoundthe fromthe tsusedby Ulecylinde, cylindera&
| |
| burning thebwninl termination bytermination at&656 . .
| |
| citic mdwu and heat wu cificheat wasfoundfound to Theresultant The measuredat.
| |
| w u measured tobe resultantthermal k0.24 droom 0.24 (cal (4
| |
| Shennrldiflusivity
| |
| ,-1 roomtemperature ternpemtrrrc g-1-C.,l).
| |
| diffusivitywu
| |
| %'.I).
| |
| wu em.cm.TheThedpiltion dwirtionininthe npionof lhtreeion tempem-ofaatempera- 0.0045 cmS/tect.o 0.0045cms/set: tobe compucdwith kcompared 0.0026 with 0.0026 tunturedirrerence differenceof of100 100'C bcliwcddue
| |
| 'Ciskbelieved dueia b ccm'lrcc found cml/HC foundIrom fromthe burningexperiment.
| |
| theburninc upcrirnmt.
| |
| | |
| SEABROOK *~vfll~a~ib'f!and';Co~pa.ris6n SEABROOK'. Evaluation and Comparison'totoBTPAPCSB9 BTP APCSB 9.5-1, .5~ 1, Rev. 9
| |
| . ., . '.. **AitlRe9clix Appendix A A Section F.3 D STATION STATION Page 38
| |
| .. ...........-_....,.-..--...--r""'........,
| |
| meuact
| |
| '!be autreuon reasonfor forthe discrepancyW.
| |
| thediscrepancy w oDot not urught IOlollh but ia probably awociated with the t but is proMbly aNOCiated with the '
| |
| fact tbat tact that the bw1Un1 ~t vaJue isln a biJhere r the bunrtng k t vJue ir In a h i b tempmtumranre Wl'llpentuR m p ewhere wherethe theadsorbed adsorbedIUU b ebeen baYe upclledtrom ksnexpelled fromthe thecharcoal.
| |
| chutprl.
| |
| HE:'T AND WASS TaAHSfU COEPT1CJENTi Tomeasure To measurethe convectiveheat theconvective heattnnIfer tsuvfw nluuarfunction ntoe functionof oftile tbemlinatrnm mainstreamair rirveloc-vdoc-a copper cylinder the Ity** copper cylinder the &ame diameta uas I ty. r u n e diameter the chatcod eylindcn k the charcoal cylindm beinC uaed wu Nt mIDi n g w d nu net iato inrulrrion10 theinsulation the BOthat occupiedthe thatIt.itoccupied thelUDeume position the position chrrcwlwould thecharcoal wouldnormally.
| |
| n o d y .The The nuofofenero' nte energy10it laituoititcooledcooled!rom from350 350ID to 250*C 2!iO 'Cwas detcrmintd.This wasdetermined. Thismeuwement memu*ment wu corrut@d for heal lost
| |
| ... corrected for heat lost to the inlulation to the insulation to find the tofind the COnvectivf c o m ~ t i vheat cheat lou1ouratoe nkfrom !ram the the torlrce. The exposedsurface.
| |
| apoud Themass murtzanslu ch-r-trw1e.rchara.der*
| |
| ttim 01 utica the Dow of the fieldwere flow field determinedfrom weredetermined from detoermine deermine the the ratio ntio 01 of carbon u r b o n monoxide monoxide to to mevurements of meuuremenu of the mk ot Lberate of evaporation evrpontion ot of carbon carbon dioxide dioxide formedformed in reaction. Sam-tba reaction.
| |
| in the sun-waterfrom wawr r rintercd disk from .sinterd dirk of the sam.
| |
| of the m e dia- dir- ples of cas extracted (rom ples of p s utractrd from r teaon j ~above a repon just above t
| |
| meter and meter locmtedin and located in the runepoaUon the same podtion in the in the the the level kvel of of the the surface
| |
| &ace and and at at the the circumfer*
| |
| cirnrmfer.
| |
| air flow uu aa charcoal airflow charcoal cylinder-.
| |
| cylinder. ence ence 01 of the the burnin, burning Nrface.
| |
| mrfm, were were analyzed dyxed The non-dimensionaJiud The non-dirnencionrlited hS~US results of af thethe for the CO/CO, for the CO/COI ratio wirh ar mass ntio with rnut .pectro*
| |
| spcetto-exptrimtnL are experiment shown in are shown Figure 6.
| |
| in FiIUft 6. The The resu)ud t s meta. figure 'I7 shows metar. FilUre shows the the results results ploued~,
| |
| plotbd 8s for Che heat mad mass t m for the heat and mass tranJler rata are fit f e r rates uc fit aI funcUon function of the I\Idac' surface temperature.
| |
| tempcnmre. OrillnaJ*
| |
| the ..
| |
| original.
| |
| eqni. (7) by eqns.
| |
| by (7) and and (9) mptctively. AU (91respectively. All of of the Jy ly the the data dat. were w m c:oUKted collcc,ted IS u ar function function of of the tbe propertics used properties used inin the the non-dimensionaJintioh non-dimeruion.lirrtion rnlinstrtm air mainsueam air velocity velocity of the now of the now indicated indicated rrc eva!\Iated are evaluated at at the the rUJn tamperatuxe, the film t.mperature. the the iop at the 'top of FiC. Fig. 1.
| |
| : 7. Characteristic Chua~lcrbticnuface aurlace aVUlee between the avurge between the .urrace surface and and ambient ambient tem* Sem- temperatures krnpenturei u as rI function function 02 of the air vdocity velocity pctrlures. The peratures. The binuy dinusion c:oertic:ient binuy diftusion coefficient for for &bown in shown Fia, 44 from in Fig. (rom the the infrared infrared pyrornetcr pyrometer water into water into air, rir, DHIhh DHto-.an was d c u l a t e d from wu calculated from w
| |
| ~re en uused d loto conver(
| |
| convert the the data from (rom an an rir air m expression developed from an expression developed trom kinetic theory kinetic theory velocity dependence b to curface IUdace tempenture temperature by Chrpmrn and by Chapman Enskol (51.
| |
| and Enskog Good agreement (5). Good acreement dependence.
| |
| dependence. "
| |
| mong amonl the the two two reLHts of lIleUllrementa in of mersuremtntr in tumr t.ermI Also indicated in Also Fil. 7, b in Fig. the m it Uat tuult of u l l of of analol:)' between the andow of the between convectivt convective heat heat tmm- tnnI- Mhur Arthur 181 (81 for for tthe COfeO, nratio h e CO/COs produced t i o produced fer fer and and m ass transfer mISS transfer n tcr is raLes iI mded.
| |
| mruJed. in the combustion in the combustion of pphite m of graphite and coal chrt d cod char Also rhown Abo shown in FiC. 6 in Fig. &we U'I. m Ife the u l u lor res~l\S for heat heat plfal'Iules in ra quartz n u l e s in quaru rc~clinp. nssel. The relctinc: vessel. Th. rela-rtla-tmnsftr transfer in in ra turbulent turbulent sLgnaLion stacnltion point point flow now tion XcofXco, tionXcolXtor = lo'-'
| |
| * IOU ap(-12.4001T>
| |
| up(-12,4001T) he he taken horn trken Garden md from Garden and Cobonpue Cobonpue [6] (6) md and determined from determined anaJysia of trom rnrlytir of the the producU producu of of Jakob 171.
| |
| fakob 11}. h aelfl:Une mults In selecting !Hults from from ttheN hee the urban the reaction with carbon reaction with ra now flow of oxyc en of oxygen courccr m made
| |
| &curee. an effort was made to preserve the effort was to pmewe the nitrocen, rdtro.:en, and amaD mount and 8* mrf) amount of ofphosphoryl phosphoryl ratios of ratios of the distance of the distance of thethe st.gn&tion staenation pplane l u ~ chloride (POCl;)
| |
| chlatide (POCl~)vapor. "apor.Tht The POClr po~, ws wasrddcd added from the from the nozzle nozzle exit uit b the nozzle to the nozzle diunebr diameter b inhibitthe
| |
| \D inhibit the gIU phase matlion u phuc relc:Uonof ofarbon carbon and diameter (lId) and (I/$) diameter of 01 the the nozzle nozzleto to thethed im-diam- monoxide ta t u b o n dioxide. In a preview monoxide to <<:arbon dioxid*. In a previous eeter k r of the circulu of the circularheat heatttransfer r u u f t r surface surface (dl# (d/.).). ItUdy 191, study 19).tJ~e theeffect effectof thisInhibitor ofthis inhibitoron onthethe raUoof mtio monoxidetto carbonmonoxide ofcubon cubon dioxide e cubon dioxide form&
| |
| formedduring dIAnnethe theoxidation oxidationof ofgraphite CTlphite*ru ~
| |
| CARBON CARlONMONOXIDE.,ONOXJD£PomAnoN FORMATIONcuxma DUlliNG examined.ItIt.was examined. wasfoundfoundthatthat. concentration 8 concentrafion BURNING aURNlNC - o01 POOJ ofofless f POCl* thanI%
| |
| lessUlah 1'J.ininthe thesir lirnow nowmiiir+d raised ToToddetermine t l t r m i ~the enerl)'telcued theenergy releasedIn illthe.
| |
| the . the CO/CO.ratio theCO/COz ratioIninthe theproducts producuof ofcc:ombul-ornb~
| |
| eornbu!tion combu~Lionof thecharcoal, oflhe chareoal.iti~isiInecctryt necessaryto to tion tionto 8.4from ID8.4 fromaavaluevalueoof f 0.05 O.O!i(shown (showninIn
| |
| | |
| SEABROOK SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev.
| |
| R~V.99 . ,
| |
| STATION STATION Appendix A Section F.3 D SectionF3D Page 39 Page 39 IS model in model in 8* wmi-Wmite aemi-wlnit.e solid, lOUd, K it ra vdut yaJue for for the the thermal thermal diffurivity dilllA1ivity rpproprirt*
| |
| appropriat.. b to wood wood d:larc:oa1 at elevated temperature. can be ob-tained II\d adeq~te insulation willed around the bu,tninl umplc.
| |
| the bryning IImple. .
| |
| bBaulta u l t r ofof t ustudy thia imply m.
| |
| ltudy imply t bath.
| |
| tbat both
| |
| * IUb '
| |
| phase reaction and pbue reaction and rub6~ntirl aublt.ult.i.IJ combustion CODlbuslion i inn may k pores may porn be involved Ul\'Olved h in the She midation OXidaUOD of of wood drutorl in'&. Thcv d e a d m h -
| |
| wood cbucoa1 in -air. These detailed mecha-nifrns nill need nismllt1ll Deed elucldrtioa, elucidation.
| |
| ACXNOWLEDOEMENTJ This wotk work ir JeSwt of is aa result of the thesis thesis study Wldy af of BY-EVani md and wrrwu support4 supported i in part by the n put the Na-Na-tional Science Foundation under Gmt Grant NSF NSF (U34734, and by the G134734, Divilion of the Division of Enpinetring Enlineerina and Applied Physics, H w u d Univenity.
| |
| md Applied Pbysics, Huvud University.
| |
| ~'........~
| |
| t
| |
| ....*1:'1........"""":1:,....1.......... ' ....
| |
| 1O~.. U P Molu nlio i.7'7.. Molar F~. noli<> of 01 CO/COz CO/C~ u .... inwma .. rfaee iJI..._ rrfm UST LIST OFor SYMBOLS snlIOl"S
| |
| - warpentun.
| |
| "lIIpeRl\l....
| |
| * Moles of CO pproduced d u d per mole C bumd burned Fia. 7 with no inhibitor prewnt).
| |
| Fig. preMnt). Also rIbown hom A ppre-exponential n u p o n e n t i d factor. clcrnaI/em' see sec: run aun Fi,. 7 in Fig. 1 is one vdue value for the COICOI CO(CO a mtio ratio b moles of molcr of COa COl produced produced p pera mole Dlole C m e u u r t d in the combustion measured combwtion of of chucod charcoal by burned Parker and Hotul Hottel [lo]. Comparin& the rmulti
| |
| [10] . Comparing mul~ c lpecific but,
| |
| * cpecific hul, d wlc*Ck *C of of the measurements rneasuremenu reported here hen b to those thOle d diameter of the air n ode nowe of Arthur Althur would rugpert JURest that Eome lome grr,as phrv phase D binuy binary diffusion coefficient,. rspecl, diffusion cwfficicnt. p ~ i ie naction reaction iiss involved in our combustion of or wood air. assumed all into lir, dl tqurl equal to to oxygen oX)'Ien charcod.
| |
| charcoal. Because of hilh drvelocitiu of the hieh air velocities in dculation, cakullUon, cms/rcc em'/tee wed in used in this thi5 experiment, if a gas IU p h w reaction phase reaclion £ =tivation activation enero. d/g-mole e n e m . calla-mole does exist it rnust docs must be confied conflned to w *a region recion very veIY II heat W e r coefficient, transler cdfcm' sec:
| |
| coetfU:ienl, c:aJ(cm' d w to ciON to tbe the burningbuminr surface. JUrlace. K 4H, Maalive of the heat negative heat of combustion c:ombustion of charcoal to product i.
| |
| chucoll d l g carbon i, callI wbon CONC1.USIONS CONCLUSIONS h. mus transfer mass coefficient, a/em' trmsfer c:oef'ficient. sec:
| |
| c/crns rcc
| |
| , conductivity, d / c m aec:
| |
| thermal conductivity, cal/cm see *C*C The simple surfrce
| |
| 'nIe l\u!lce combustion model pre- pre- 1C A (-.&/Rl')
| |
| A exp (-*E/BT) distance lrom'from'nozrle impinge.
| |
| _nt.ed wnted in thil this work can be u~d to be used Lo predict the , distance nozzle nilexit to impince.
| |
| bumin, burning rat.e nte and .nd surface t.em~ratureLmptnture of wood menl plane, em ment plan.,
| |
| - c f i u t o d bumed charcoal burned in *r stal:nalion stagnation point flow of d 1ft" rate increase of mass ah of incnale rnw per unit. unit time air.
| |
| rk. vnit area, per unit gtcm' He uc.,clem! aec expression for An exp~ssion lor the effective chemical e!1ecliye chemical M rnoleculu weight molecular weip.t rate 01 rat.e naction of wood of reaction wood charcoal oxidized oxidized in kr Hu Nusrell nwnbex.
| |
| Nus~1l number, hdli lid/)
| |
| air hashas been k e n develo~d.
| |
| developed. Since Since Shu m u l t it lbir result is II prCINm, atm preuurt,_tm empirical and not empirical no; basedbased upon del.alleddelailcd ehem-ehem- III prtvure ollpecw putid prea\lrt partial ntm of specie i,i,a1DI leal mechanismr. further kJ mechanisms, further work 11 ttcuired &0 is re!iuir'ed b R Meal p ideal p si constant. cdfg-mole *X conrtmt, c:&J/l-mole *K determine the extent det.ermine t&nt or itr applicabiJity.
| |
| of ita rpplicibkty. JlePr product ollleynolds product. of Reynolds and PrmndU m d PrandU Predictions of the the internal temperawft temperature . . n u m h n , Pd/.
| |
| numben, u$/a distribution in in the mmpl; can burning sample the humin!: can be made be made ReSe product of ReynoldsReynolds and urd Schmidt Schmidt based on Ir simple simple one-dimensional onedimensional conduction num numben, bers, IJdID ud/D
| |
| | |
| SEABROOK Evaluation and Evaluation :andComparison Coinparrs~IltoBTPAPCSB to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, 9:.5-1, Rev.
| |
| Rev. 99
| |
| .Appep~i~.~
| |
| Appendix A SectionF.3 Section D F3D STATION Page Page4040 I'
| |
| 66
| |
| . B* ddiameter h e k of ofhhut tJux wn~or, u t flux Ieft.or,em em ~BV'EJU:HCES
| |
| ~ZRENCE!~
| |
| Sh Sh Sherwood number, Shewood Dumber,h,d/p.,,D h.dlp.-J) uIt maillltrum dl velocity, alrvdo~ity, em/Me ' .'
| |
| "'11.~d 11 J.J.Wad. IUI4RR.FF**. ttr*kkad6N&blc,
| |
| &ricldalllf,C_labk.Oxidation O1ida~ion xX X
| |
| I'V z
| |
| Nrfacevelocity,
| |
| &ace
| |
| ~dilt.ance veJDCity, c:m/HC (crf2) ++ bb [m
| |
| ~ ~ Ofrom (lee eqn5.
| |
| eqm. ((1),
| |
| . ~thee b (2),
| |
| ). (2).
| |
| 1u (3)]
| |
| k(3))
| |
| m aur1'ace l ~ into
| |
| ., earN. klwms deuben Cubon c.rboll
| |
| . c c i naJ GtGoC Co a
| |
| .C.. 0."'-".
| |
| l IIe'W"1II000 Coal.,
| |
| .. 11 (1961 1000and (1111) J 1$4 154 -
| |
| a"d2000 2000'C, 164.
| |
| -1~.
| |
| hoc.Fifrh
| |
| *C.hoc.
| |
| Fjflh
| |
| """"""11""7. "D.
| |
| bumJnC ~ b f f , +J. EE.hl a - m- m . aadd ~Jl.l ~H.&TorbCU'c.
| |
| g.
| |
| &be solid,
| |
| .olid, cmem Tkraul
| |
| ~ RRadiaUCNI a d t l a n h m S u q , Rontyrcll HOIWyWtiI the ~C . ~ MY Coin. T M__. p dJNll..
| |
| h b , Mi-.MilIA..blad ddm.
| |
| XIXI fraction of mole hction mole ofrpcdm speciali (1160).
| |
| (ISWL 2'..
| |
| Yr mmaa s h c t o!
| |
| a s!raction n o f ~i i i ospecies aI 1L LJ. JHutor.
| |
| . w LLWW.. &'-11.1I ilbm PcIIL d I a .J.~ yT,Iu, JU..&.iu k r ~timclicr c o . r bllla-det.... w ~ Lor ~'h p v l r r r i u d bawa
| |
| .fpulftn-d bro.....rorl cb&rb.... e GI'Hlt Greek *--630 tunr no rad uel 2200 2100 1k, e-Aua&loa.ad
| |
| (,CcmbwUoa ud hFlam** r .
| |
| eml/Me 2121 (U71)
| |
| (ll731153 15J
| |
| * 112.
| |
| 162 8
| |
| * thennd th.rmal diffuivity, &/PC, cma/rsc diflumvity,lIlpc, ct lUreac.
| |
| w emiuivit)'
| |
| f a c r tmirtivily 4* A. WMeI." ha..cu..
| |
| A. Wbccler, a d e n ntm I l l ..n a.d&MillC&lyj" W i r y LIII a a~ porn, crlJyat JIOftI, M Ad,.r . CItd.)y.i.
| |
| CaW,...sd ud Retared Jlalaled Sub illb-
| |
| ,r demit)', Clem' density, g/cma he&.
| |
| jecl&, VVol d 5. S. h~ d s m i e ~rms,"'-.k N.w w York.
| |
| York.1151. UU.
| |
| * Stcfm-Boltrmmn Stefan*Bollzmann oonrtmt, constant, & caI/cm
| |
| /cmal ,,. 27 pp. 211*112.
| |
| 5 182.
| |
| aec: K 8ec X
| |
| 't 8* k Iird, w.
| |
| L Bird,
| |
| ?k-menm.
| |
| ~ .Wiley, W. bud J&-anI and W"~.N.r.
| |
| ..If Er..
| |
| N_ Yark.
| |
| Lichll_l,Tm~pon
| |
| . Lightfmot, York. lB60, IHO.JlP.
| |
| TraMJlOrt pp. 110110 * -
| |
| "1_."
| |
| Su Sl,jb~riptJ bdytt 112-812.
| |
| 8* ambient ambient I* ItJL Oldon Gartloa and aad J.3.
| |
| . Coboopw.
| |
| Coboap,... Heat Lraaar.r ktwrn Heal tmuler air air l ftlt plrk a fit aJMI je pl... and b of jew or vrair Impinging I.,pinelnc on 11, Inurn.
| |
| .... 1% .....m.
| |
| air 8ir Heat n r l r r bar..
| |
| H**t hTNllIfer CoDr., Unirmily Un;Yel'lily oor f Cdomdo.
| |
| CoIorado.lNt. 1961.
| |
| CC carbon urban f7 L6M. hkob.
| |
| Jakob. 6 Jo..
| |
| em iUt,,"liC'I.iOlll n m t i ~ r l i o nIn rIn ~tl... tr..ld of h fidd of hem;h.. ,
| |
| CO CO carbon monnxide arbon monoxide d e r , ?roc hlnMf.r. hoc. Myr Ph)'L k London. 59 Soc.l.oallon. 51 (1 (1147) 017)
| |
| CO.
| |
| Cot &on carbon dioxide 726 U6*765. 765.
| |
| property of of the mhtun mature 8* J.l. R Il R w , R.ulioni 1Ie,...ftn cuboa Il...ct.ioni krrrccn eatboll and m
| |
| N.
| |
| N2 property niuo_en nitrogen sen.
| |
| .en. h.nr ArtJuu.
| |
| Farada, Sac.,
| |
| Tnll&. randry Ioc., 47 47 (ID5 (1ISJ) 1 ) 164 -
| |
| and ory-154 -1.71.X78.
| |
| liZ),'
| |
| BI J. L O. H .
| |
| ~. Jl ArtlIvr. D. H. IuChans Md J. R. Jknrrinc.
| |
| Arrhur, %ragham urd J. R bollrring.
| |
| O.
| |
| Ot oxycen ayeen ~ i m t i~
| |
| KllMlic tpccu
| |
| .pec&a or 01 thr cOIIlb... t.ioll or
| |
| &h. tornbwrioa nolid turk.
| |
| o'lOlld r...l&.
| |
| w W bumin" rutface burning surface 'nllrcl Symp.
| |
| ?hied S,mp. on COtftbul.lll'll. hmmt, OIl Combrubion, F1.me. md and L tple E.aplo-o 0 initial VUUC injtid value aiOtI tPINDDIM....
| |
| don b r a ~ l c n a .Willurru 1rillia_ sad aDd Wikiar WillLi... Co.,Co**
| |
| Jlallialon. Ylylsnd.
| |
| Wtimorr. N.rylaftd, 1949. 1'4', pp. . "
| |
| * 474.
| |
| pp. 466 4".
| |
| supencpt SIJ~"Cript 10 A 10 A. 6. 'uker md S. Parkor ud H. C. Hotr.1 CaftlbvaUOIl n HoU.I, Combvrtion ta rate
| |
| * rr the kfercnct at temperature for the
| |
| ~ferenc:e tempemturn .t carborn of carbolla1vdy uhpling. li study of lnd. En6 a' g......hrlinl.wellin Chrm..
| |
| Nl'llp "l.lnd. Me. Cbftll.* 21 (136)
| |
| ~ im 1
| |
| i c t u r e by mino-1 (1936) 1334 -
| |
| lIIil:l'O-
| |
| .. fonnrticrrl8 *C heats of form.tion-18 *C Jail.
| |
| 1341.
| |
| /
| |
| | |
| SEABROOK SEABRboK Compatj§b~to Evaluation and Comparison APCSB~~:521~
| |
| BTl> APCSB to BTP 9.5-1, Rev. 9 Appendix A SeetiQIl F.3 D Section STATION STATION APf>~jldix Page l?;Cjlge 41
| |
| ~H :.
| |
| Nuclear Consulting Attachment I1 Attachment II to Rz Services, Inc.
| |
| SBW~CBS, Inc.
| |
| Hazards Analyses Hazards ADalyses of Seabrook SStation Seabrook t 8 tion Charcoal Filter Charcoal of Units ,
| |
| FilterUnlts, ro '0& HIS' COLUW'U$. OHIO UU' YAIC 1571 YAEC lS71 Iodine Adaorber Fir. tut.
| |
| pertormed for performed tor Janke. Atomic Electrio Co.
| |
| lev RampBh1re laDk**
| |
| under PO No. 46114 15 Sept 1986 DISTJlIBUnON tAte:
| |
| fAEC: D.H. Pepe D.H. (3) +
| |
| Pep. (3) (1) b
| |
| + (1) y.Telefu b1.%e1etas PLC:
| |
| PLC: Hawter (1) br H.E. Mowrer H.B. b1 Fad.
| |
| Fed. Exp.
| |
| Izp.
| |
| NUCOI:
| |
| NUCOr:: P.G. frfyatir P.G. Lat1atu /1
| |
| .N. Hagnus H.H.
| |
| H Halnua J.n 3 srtphe~ -
| |
| . Stephena
| |
| .H.
| |
| Y.P. frtemn V.P. Free.n J.L.
| |
| J .L. lo.,.cb foraeh 08f'S91&2 w O8PS902 HF'
| |
| | |
| SEABROOK ." :Evaluation SEABROOK Evaluationand Comparisonto andConiparison to BTPBTPAPeS1l9 APCSB 9.5-1, .5-1, Rev. 99 Rev" AppendixAA Appendix Section D F.3 D SectionF.3 STATION STATION Page 42 Page 42
| |
| * 08P59112101 lDt,roducUOD
| |
| .;. 1 -
| |
| impremated carbon The 1.preenated The crrbon und umad ln I n thl t b e nriou.
| |
| varlour alr Oleaning I,,_tea
| |
| .LPelaarUnl r y r t m hl m t,,,p1callr typic8llj
| |
| . protected rrom prot.ctad from tire f i r e bl water delule by watlr deluge 11lteas.
| |
| rystams. The l a i t i a t f o n or me initiation of the t h e water water delule deluge normally takes DO~117 takes place p l a t e by tcaperature rl..
| |
| b r t.perature rirr 11p1al.
| |
| a 1 5 l l . nil This t,,.petype ot o r tlre f i r e coatrol control bas bas mevmral lnherent
| |
| ****r.l Inherent problem~: problams : ..
| |
| : 8) tempenture rSra vill i n d i c a t e only r j o r , full^ daraloped f i r e b) b) wter dlstrlbution vater d l r t r i b u t i o n ln I n pleated p l u t e d carbon carbon beda beds 1a l~ aon un1to~
| |
| DOD unlfor~
| |
| e) C ) ** ve large UIOUftts ryy larle amunts or p o t e n t l r l l y cont&a1nated of potenUally c o n k d m t e d water u a t e r ......n....ted.
| |
| are ~ r n e n t e d .
| |
| To To a.oid avoid these these proble=s problems aa .,stem mystem teat uaa pertormed t e s t was performed to t o eYaluate evaluate tbe t h e det.ction detection or of u r b o n oXidation carbon axidmtion by by CO monitoring and C 0 ~nitorlnl and to t o throttle t h r o t t l e carbon carbon tlr** f i r e s br mtopping by atopplnc forced airflow torc.d a i r f l o u throulh t h r o u ~ hthe t h e carbon carbon bed. bed. Test. T u t s vereuerm perfroaed perframed In i n both both the t h e 15TH AS'f?!
| |
| i g n i t i o n t.st lenltion t e s t r11 r i g and and 1n I n thethe F1re Firs Wind Wind Tunnel Tunnel (FWT) (FYT) to t o .,aluate mvaluate CO pcnetI=tlOn CO penatration andand temperature temperature lenerat10n. generation.
| |
| Description or DescriptIon of the the Equlpment Equipment ,L Procedures Procedures
| |
| : 1) 1) Tbe The lSTH ASTH n3~6603466 Test Test RII Rig vhlch which conslst~
| |
| c o n s i s t s or of halted heated al,. a I r rlow f l w tbroulh through a8 carbon carbon bed with bed With inlet f n l e t alr, a i r , inlet i n l e t carbon c a r b n bed bed andand outlet o u t l e t carbon u r b o n bed bed temperature temperature measurement. The measurement. The test t e s t Is n o r m l l y pertormed Is normalll perroracd at a t 100100 FPM r e l o c i t y , howe.e,..
| |
| PPH ,eloclt)', however, tor for t h e s e testa these t e s t s the t h e aIrflow airflow was reduced to urs ..educld t o .040 FPM whicb 1_
| |
| fPH which i s thet h e deslan design Yelocltyvelocity or of thet h e Seabrook Seabrook all' a i r cleaninc cleaning Iy~tems. rystemr. The The bed bed depth depth Dormallynormally II 18 1.0 1.0 InchInch deep deep torfor theJe tests.
| |
| then tests. TlIo Two lnch inch deep deep beds beds or of 50 50 IlI1 -5g) dl f"-2Sc) of carbon or carbon ~s swed.
| |
| w ~ used.
| |
| : 2) 2) the t h e NUCONWCON tire f i r e wind wind tunneltunnel CFVT) c o n s i s t s ot (FUT) consists of an a n adjustable a d j u r t i b l e tlow f l o v blower blower followed by rollowed by an an Ind1rect IndZrect tired l l r e d natural n a t u r a l 'IS gas turnace furnace to t o heat heat the t h e air.
| |
| a i r , and and an 8n a d j u s t a b l e plenum t o hold m inch adjustable plen~ to hold
| |
| * 2- IDch X 2~ inch race area ICSsorber apecl.an, and 29 X 24 inch f a c t area rdsorber Ipeclmen, and the commensurate reduction t h e co.-enaurate reductton lor l o r outlet o u t l e t ductlnc.
| |
| ductiry.
| |
| ForFor tbesethese te:sts t a t s aa 1&.0 4.0 inchinch deep deep carbon carbon bed bed vas uas uud used tilled f i l l e d with with 2J 2%n and 2J fI and a laptegnated carbon.
| |
| TEDA 1.prelnated TEDl carbon. The The 1nletinlet teaperature temperature to t o thet h e carbon carbon bed bed vaS monitored was monitored at a t a8 11nlle a i n g l e point point ln i n thet h e center center ara. a r e 8 tour four inches inches Ire. from inlet f a c e or I n l e t race of tbe the adsorber. lbe adsorber. The outlet o u t l e t taci f a c e or of thet h e adsorber rdrorber was war Instru.ented instrumented at a t _.0 inches avay 4.0 Inch.1 WRY ftrom r o m thet h e Idsorber adsorber with with tlye f i v e thermocouples.
| |
| thermocouples. The The CO s o n l t o r Can CO .enitor (an Infrared Infrared .Insorsensor t y p e ) vas t7pe) taking .a~ples was taklng armplcr 22 teet f e e t down down _tr...
| |
| stream trc. from tbe the tilter f i l t e r outlet o u t l e t taci face ln i n the the 10 10 Inchinch reduced reduced duct duct .ectlon.
| |
| section.
| |
| me aeborber lbe mdsorber tull f u l l we1lht w e i m t bltorl before tire f i r e vu v8n 65.8 65.8 lbr lbl empty weicht weight 18.4 Ibd
| |
| -1.'
| |
| ellpt)' ') 18.1& lbe a s is as i s ca,.bon carbon ve1&ht waifit 47.1 lba lb.
| |
| carbon vel&ht d r y carbon weight (less (less R FI2O] 13.6 ltn dr.y 20) "3.6 Ills When the When t h e test t e s t vas performed, tbe was perror.ed, the las gas beater h e a t e r waswas turned turned on mxinua heat on ~xll1um heat to to accomplish aa
| |
| .cco~pllsh ms fast f a s t heat-up heat-up as a s possible.
| |
| possible. Air Air flowflow was mas aaintalned maintained ror f o r tl.1 five m h u t e s arter
| |
| ~nute~ a f t e r tire f i r e vaswas detected, detected, then then alrrlow a i r f l o w waswas Itopped
| |
| ~ t o p p e dand and the t h e carbon carbon b.d bed i n l e t and inlet and outlet o u t l e t temperatures temperatures monltored monitored tor hour. The f o r 11 hour. ?he carbon carbon bed bed was was ..emoved removed from thl trom Lhe FWTPUT and and veilhed.
| |
| weighed,
| |
| | |
| SEABROOK Evaluationand Evaluation andComparis~n Comparisonf9>J3T~~~SB to BTP APCSB9.5-1, 9.5- 1, Rev. 9
| |
| ;R~y~;9
| |
| , AppendixAA. . ,
| |
| Appendix .Section SectionF:3 F.3D; D,
| |
| STATION Pa.ge Page4343 081.59112101 rpt. Juulloa n.
| |
| t b mtelt.
| |
| tent (result( r e s u l toro f \.be a r b o nburtUns tbeoarboD burningtest) test)1aIntbe theASTH A mril warOODduct~
| |
| rigva. waduotbdant.l1
| |
| ~ t l l all .ofttl.
| |
| all.of thecarboncarbonvu w m con,uHd wnuuwd.t @t11040rPM FPH..re1ocity.
| |
| locH)'. n. tenperaturu oro f\.be thet.uperatu1'e8 the i n l e tand inlet mndoutlet o u t l e t carbon clrbonbed bed are shownon are.bown onTable Table1.1.
| |
| TH m u l t sorofttle Tbt....ults thet1ref i r e vlad (m) tunnel (FVT) windtUDnel tut.
| |
| tutare rhowaaDonTable ape.hown and012On Tmble22and Figure110.
| |
| F1IUre No. 1.1.
| |
| Tbe pertinent .alues Thepertinent mluesare 8mal followa:
| |
| ma tollow8:
| |
| coCOoro f 5050 PpIII ppmat minutes a t "1 1mnutes COCOorr Fire o f f lcale F i r e in Ai~riow.topped Airflow meale (200+
| |
| i n carbon carbon bed stopped at (ZOO+ ppm) bed .t ppm) at at 19:15 at 19 24 unutes at 211 minutes
| |
| - minutes 19ainutes 19 :45 a1nutes 19 :15 - 19:-5 aimte~
| |
| HaxillUll Tempermture 11.0 H . x f m u m Te.per.ture 4.0 inebes from inches trell outlet !ace outlet face 375.~
| |
| Temperature.t te.perature at 1.0 bour .1' I .D bour after tel' ignition wlth lenition with no no .1r flow air flow 20Q.C 4.0
| |
| ** 0 inches I'rom outlet race inches from outlet face arbon loss. total test l o s s , total duration Carbon test duration (excluding lIIo1sture (excludlns moiaturt and and 2J21 TEDA TEDA which would whlch would evaporate evaporate in i n test) test) h.53 l~
| |
| 11.53 lba Carbon ~onoxlde Carbon nonoxlde .1snal s i g n a l .h.rply sharply inereaslns increasing at at lnlet inlet temperat.ure temperature or of 175-C Filter Crame (3011 SS) brllbt red at
| |
| /'
| |
| | |
| SEABROOK SEABROOK Evaluation tvaluationand and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5- I, toBTPAd?QSl!~.5fl, Rev. 9 Appendix A;ppendixA A Section F.3 D STATION STA'jlO~
| |
| Page 44 44 08PS911210 1 . InluaUon E m l u m t i o n of of tthe he T Tuta a t IluyUa wulta fbe tbe conflcuraUon c o n f i ~ r r t i o nof of 8ir air cclean1nC a,.atem 18 l e a n i n g systems 1a nu&auch tfobatb r t tthe b e 10eUne i o b l n e radsorbera d s o r k n aare re
| |
| - preceded by HEPA fl1tera.
| |
| uwith i t 6 22 linch ncb X I 22 iinch f i l t e r 8 . The SEPA n c h open1DI',
| |
| BEPA ff'Uter openlags, ttberef'or.,
| |
| ~Unt1nc frame i l t e r moimtlng h e r e f o r e , aDOo llarcer tra.e i.
| |
| a r e a r bburainE fs a sateel u r n l n g ..terlal t e e l aatructure r t e r i a l than tructurt tban one BEPA frUter BEPA i l t e r rize
| |
| .lze could eenter troll ttbe n t e r from w b o n kbed, b e carbon al:lyth1nl llarler d , maything a r g e r would be atoppt4 r t o p p t d by ~1 tthe BElA .auntlnK h e REPA mounting fr- rr... *8 tructuret r u o t u ~evenIyen it if iItt wouldvould ppenetratem e t m t e ttbe be
| |
| ,reo.dinE,componenta.
| |
| p n c e d i n g ~ c o m p o n e n t 8 . Thl. Thla w wasa s ttbeh e rr".ODu s o n ttor o r ttheh e **lectlon r e l e c t l o n of a 24 2ll iincb nch X % 24 2~
| |
| lllch aoarbon inch r b o n 8aection e c t i o n Tor tor the M FVT tt.** a a tt..
| |
| the The S Seabrook u b r o o k pprocedure r o c e d u r e 18 la b a e d on abut based r h u t down ai or tthe a1rt1ov 5 h e airflw dilutes atter 5 minuter after a a CO aala1'll.
| |
| l a r m . IHoveYer, w a v e r , to to .uint81n
| |
| . 8 a i a t a f n coonservatlell o n s e r v a t i r m 111 la thetne ttest,e r t , tthe h e aairflow irflow w vasas rahut dC!"n h u t dqvn JOT 5 lainutas HOT i n u t e 3 aArterf t e r CO alarm,e l a m , bbut u t 5 minute8 II1nute. aafter f t e r aactual c t u a l burning bU~DI of or tthe carbon h e Carbon IInn ttheh e testteat mection.
| |
| aeetlon. Even under ttb.ae b c s e conditions ttbe maximum temperature aatt 4.0 h e "XlI1UII 4.0 lInche, a c h e s fromtr-Oll ttheh e ooutletu t l e t face f a c e ofor the aadsorber d s o r b e r uar va, oon17 n l y 375-C, 375*C, and ttbe b e ttnperature emperature
| |
| .tarted s t a r t e d ttoo drop as aoon aass tthe a s Boon blower- was h e blower vas rahut h u t ort.
| |
| o f f . It i8 l a llIIportant m p c r t m t ttoo nnote ote tthat h a t no iisolation s o l a t i o n dampers were vere cclo.ed l o s e d iInn ttbe b e iinlet n l e t and ooutlet u t l e t otof tthe FWT, ttbus b e TWT, bus nnatural a t u n l aair i r cconvection onvection m va,s amalntained r i n t a i n e d ddurinl u r i n g tthe teat even w h e test w1tb tbe bblower i t h the l o u e r rah~t hut oorr, whlch 1, f f , which i s another m o t h e r ccoDserTatlam c n s e r v r t i s m because .a.t most alr a i r ccleanlnl r y s t t m a aare l e a n i n g 8yStems re equlpped equipped w wlth i t h ooutlet u t l e t dampers and and ****ral aarerrl w m o l a t a b l a on both iinlet aree ii.01atable n l e t anda n d ooutlet utlet
| |
| .ide.
| |
| ride.
| |
| The ASTU ASTH tert test rril i g data d a t a iindicates n d l o r t c s (trOll (from T Table a b l e 1) tthat h a t evenw1tb even w i t h airflow atmow maintained, approximately one hhour mnintained, our h is needed ta to burn 2.0 2.0 iinch n c h depth of carbon
| |
| * o f carbon.
| |
| Whlle tthe While h e rresults e s u l t s fromtrom tthe h e TWTFWT ttest e s t indicate i n d i c a t e tthath a t If i r f l o w 11 if aairflov t o p p e d friye ir ratopped ire mnute, m i n u t e r aArter f t e r carbon burning burdn" oonl,. n l y aappronllllltelr p p r o d r m t r l y 10% 10J of of tthe h e carbon 1a bUMled 1n
| |
| : 1. buraed in one hour. hour. V While h l l e iIff tthe h e carbon amonoxide J n o x i d e a1anal a i g n a l 18I8 used tor system 1s01ation, f o r ayrtem i s o l a t i o n , tthe he ftirei r e itselr l t s t l f Wwill pr-obably be prevented.
| |
| i l l probably pre.ented.
| |
| The sharp s h a r p iincr.ase n c r e a s e iInn W CO concentration c o n c e n t r a t i o a at a t 17SeC 17S*C 1nleti n l e t air a i r ttemperat~re e m p e r a t u r e uar va. aalao lso deterDdned iinn tthe determined h e ASTMA5tH ttest e l t rril i g aatt 40 _0 FM FPH and it i t iindlcated n d i c a t e d aharp s h a r p rriae i a c at a t 175-C 175.C iinletn l e t aair i r temperature w While h i l e aautoicnit1on u t o i g n i t i o n did d i d nnot o t ttake a k e pplace l a c e uuntil n t i l iInn exces.e x c e s s ooff 2S0*C 1nlet 25OWC i n l e t air temperature.
| |
| m i r temperature.
| |
| Concluslons and RecommendatloDi Carbon .onox1de C8rbon monexidc monitoringmonitorinl ii.m a vary very ~ lOod o detection dde t e c t i o n method ooff carbon oxidatlon oxidation PRIOR TO to ACTUAL aaelfsustainede l ~ s u s k i n e dbburninl u r n i n c of of' tthe carbon. IIaolatioD h e carbon. a o l r t i o n oorf tthe h e ayat**
| |
| myatem l n d i m t i n g ftire Sndieat1ns ire w i t h i n fri.e within i r e alnutes mlnutes ooff #) CO aailnal i g n a l uV111l l l probably probabl1 pprevent revent develop**nt of saeltausta1nlnc development c a r b o n fire. Iaolat10n e l f s u s t a i n i n g carbon ~f tthe I s o l a t i o n -of h e system can, after tthe h e frire i r e develops ddurinl LLr flow, rresult u r i n g air e s u l t iinn #harpaharp ttellp.r-ature e m p e r a t u r e drop upon upon 1s01at1on isolation or of tthe h e aair flow. n i r flow. thee maximum ttemperature a m p e r a t u r c *4 linch** downstream of tthe n c h e s dounstream he carbon bed vvii ttbb a u r n i n g earban bburninl i r flow air now a att "040 FPH rPK vas 375.C. 375-C.
| |
| hBased s e d on these rresults e s u l t s 1t It 1s i s recommended tthat h a t CO m n s t a l l e d iIDn n l t 0 r 8 be iInstalled monitor. the fob.
| |
| housing hous1ns at a t outlet o u t l e t of or tthe h e housing housins aand n d another r e f e r a b l y iIn a n o t h e r pprer.rab11 n tthe n l e t .re8 h e iinlet area (Just (just upstrea. from upstream troll carbon beds matt tthe h e ttop op o orf housing, houslnl, mince .1nce co CO 18 1s l11&hter l g h t e r tthan han .It) air) e_
| |
| The syatem system should s h o u l d be iisolatedsolated w i t h i n ftiye vlthin i v e minutes or o r *a co s.1enal a ignal ootf SO 50 pprppa mxl.u**
| |
| | |
| 1, " Rev. 9
| |
| <'< v SEABROOK Evaluation Evaluation and and Comparison ComparisoIvto to BTP BTP APCSB 9.5- 9 }5 i l,j>
| |
| Appendix A Section F.3 D
| |
| ,*Sectiop;,;R.3 STATION Page Pag¢4;;;
| |
| 45 table Table 1 tTest
| |
| ** t Date Date 3 Sept 1986 1986 Carbon Carbon 11niUonlgnltion tolloved Tollowed b7 beating U.e.
| |
| r t s l d u a l beat1nc by reddual ti.@. air flow continue" mir tlow continued but but beat beat 0rr 1.
| |
| ott).
| |
| Method:
| |
| Hethod: ASTH ASTH D3-66 P3466 except:
| |
| except: .0
| |
| $0 FPM,FPU, Z2 inch i n c h bed bed depth depth and and last fast b.atbeat up up Haterial:
| |
| H8teri.l: Dry I.1r Dry a i r and NUSORB JCUte and NUSOIUI KXTEG IXII Lot tot .lJ5/10 45/10 Startina condition: 2S*C S t a r t l n g condition: 25.C lenition Ignition occurred occurred at an upper at an upper bedbed (outlet)
| |
| (outlet) temperature temperature or of approxi..telr 8pproxLmntely .OO*C,h00*C, lower lover bed ( i n l e t ) temperatura bed (inlet) temperature of o f 285-C, 285.C. air a i r inlet i n l e t temp.
| |
| temp. 28S-C.
| |
| 285'C.
| |
| Temperatures Temperatures .rter a f t e r icn1t1on:
| |
| ignition:
| |
| Witbin Carbon Bed Within carbon Bed Time Time (Kin.)fun. Outlet Side OUtlet Side (-e)
| |
| ('C) Inlet Side Inlet Side (*e)
| |
| ('C) 0:15 790 255 1:00 700 920 2:00 650 850 3:00 6"'0 '800
| |
| .lJ:oo 730 '800 5:00 760 80s 6:00 no 790 7:00 835 .180 8:00 860 790 9:00 920 790 10:00 950 780
| |
| " :00 980 730
| |
| '2:00 1050 800 purple allOlce 15:00 T80 ./
| |
| .50 20:00 375 ZSD 30:00 210 150 60:00 100 135
| |
| .-7'
| |
| | |
| SEABROOK SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB andC:g~pa:rison APCSI39 9.5-1,
| |
| ;5~":i ~ Rev. 9
| |
| ,Re;Vi9
| |
| ',Appen dix A Appendix A Section F.3 D
| |
| ,:§~C:ti,~~}~i;jD STATION STATION Page 46
| |
| ':Pag~TZl{t
| |
| * 01!PS911210 1 table 2 Table m rut nata Kaxim&D or the (5) t1lle CH1n. ) co Lenl(PP"") Inlet Tap C*C} Outl.t t ** ps. (*e) 0 2 28 28
| |
| .II 5 15 35 T 10 125 35
| |
| *0 '0 30 '0 12 28 38 150
| |
| '040 13 44
| |
| ~!1 14 60 160 15 7786 16 102 17 1.116 146 170 18 172 50 19 O Scale ff S Ott afe 50 comine out or test Smoke coming ,.1& exbauat tut rig ezhauat 20 175 175 200 23 250 315 2!1 Shut dovn down fan n d furnace ran aan~ turnace Filter trame top (glowing Fl1ter frame &1owln& rreded 26 375 320 28 350 30 260 33 320 250 35 300 36 300 38 280
| |
| .0 215 225
| |
| .II, 260 225
| |
| '7 250 220 75 205 195 Both iinletn l e t and outlet temperature; at
| |
| ~tlet temperatures a t ** inches trom 4.00 inches from f11ter face 1n filter race in the flovflow direction
| |
| * direction.
| |
| | |
| SEABROOK EvaltJati()n;~and Evaluation ~d~(COt Comparison APCSB BTP APCS 11pati~o~totoJ3TP 9.5- 1,, 'Rev.
| |
| Rev. 9,9 "
| |
| SEAB ROOK H95-1 Appendix
| |
| :.,;;~pp~ijg A"
| |
| .ix A' Sectio F.3 ID, SectionRF3 D STATION STATI ON Page Page 47 47
| |
| .- ~
| |
| '.i .
| |
| | |
| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev. 19 STATION Appendix A Section F.3 Responses To BTP APCSB 9.5-1 Page 14 F.3 RESPONSES TO BTP APCSB 9.5-1, APPENDIX A This section presents a detailed comparison of the Branch Technical Position APCSB 9.5-1, Appendix A, on a position by position basis, with the approach taken in the design of Seabrook Station. Positions found in the left-hand column of each page of Appendix A are restated followed by a discussion as to how closely the plant design complies with the particular Appendix position. Each position and its corresponding response have been presented on a separate page(s).
| |
| It should be noted that Appendix A to Branch Technical Position APCSB 9.5-1 requires that plants for which applications for construction were docketed prior to July 1, 1976, but have not received a construction permit, address the positions presented in the left hand side of each page of Appendix A, whereas those plants for which construction permits were issued discuss the positions on the right hand side of the pages. Since the Licensing Boards Initial Decision awarding the Seabrook construction permits is dated June 29, 1976, whereas the permits themselves are dated July 7, 1976, it was debated whether the responses should be to the positions in the right-hand side of the pages. The decision reached was to address the left-hand side and, thereby, provide, in many cases, a more conservative response.
| |
| | |
| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev. 19 STATION Appendix A Section F.3 Responses To BTP APCSB 9.5-1 Page 15 A. Overall Requirements of Nuclear Plant Fire Protection Program APCSB 9.5-1, App. A Page Paragraph 1 A.1 Personnel Responsibility for the overall fire protection program should be assigned to a designated person in the upper level of management. This person should retain ultimate responsibility even though formulation and assurance of program implementation is delegated. Such delegation of authority should be to staff personnel prepared by training and experience in fire protection and nuclear plant safety to provide a balanced approach in directing the fire protection programs for nuclear power plants. The qualification requirements for the fire protection engineer or consultant who will assist in the design and selection of equipment, inspect and test the completed physical aspects of the system, develop the fire protection program, and assist in the fire-fighting training for the operating plant should be stated. Subsequently, the FSAR should discuss the training and the updating provisions such as fire drills provided for maintaining the competence of the station fire-fighting and operating crew, including personnel responsible for maintaining and inspecting the fire protection equipment.
| |
| The fire protection staff should be responsible for:
| |
| (a) Coordination of building layout and systems design with fire area requirements, including consideration of potential hazards associated with postulated design basis fire, (b) Design and maintenance of fire detection, suppression and extinguishing systems, (c) Fire prevention activities, (d) Training and manual fire fighting activities of plant personnel and the fire brigade.
| |
| (NOTE: NFPA 6 - Recommendations for Organization of Industrial Fire Loss Prevention, contains useful guidance for organization and operation of the entire fire loss prevention program).
| |
| The ultimate responsibility for the overall fire protection program for Seabrook Station rests with the Site Vice President.
| |
| The responsibility for various parts of the program has been delegated to other staff personnel and organizations prepared by training and experience in fire protection and in nuclear plant safety in order to provide a balanced approach in direction of the program.
| |
| | |
| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev. 19 STATION Appendix A Section F.3 Responses To BTP APCSB 9.5-1 Page 16 The initial design, construction and basic engineering responsibility for building layout and systems design of Seabrook Station relative to fire area requirements, including consideration of potential hazards associated with postulated fires, fire detection, suppression and extinguishing systems, was assigned to the architect-engineer, United Engineers & Constructors Inc. This included responsibility for design of fire detection, suppression, and extinguishing systems.
| |
| Coordination of this effort at UE&C was handled by a representative of UE&Cs fire protection group which was responsible for ensuring that all applicable fire protection and prevention codes and NRC regulatory requirements were complied with. The representative directed the conduct of the fire hazards analysis to verify that the effects of postulated fires were correctly evaluated and protected against. Final review and approval at UE&C of the fire hazard analysis and the Fire Protection Reevaluation Report was performed by a staff-level fire protection engineer, an individual with an extensive background in fire protection design and evaluation. A copy of his resume has been included in this report.
| |
| During the initial design, construction and basic engineering, final review and approval of the layout and design came under the cognizance of Yankee Atomic Electric Company, Nuclear Services Division, who represented the owner. The responsibility for final review and approval of this effort with respect to fire area requirements was assigned to the Fire Protection Coordinator, who was also assigned the responsibility for the ultimate review and approval of the Seabrook fire hazard analysis and the Fire Protection Re-evaluation Report. A copy of the Yankee Atomic Electric Company Fire Protection Coordinators resume has been included in this report. The responsibility for the fire prevention program during construction of Seabrook Station was assigned to the Resident Construction Manager. He and his staff were assisted in these activities by the YAEC Fire Protection Coordinator. Subsequent to construction completion and core load the corporate fire protection program responsibility has been assigned to the Director of Engineering. The Director of Engineering has assigned this responsibility to the Manager of Design Engineering to coordinate all fire protection activities and to perform technical reviews and evaluations of modifications and program implementation. Lead responsibility for fire protection engineering is assigned to corporate Design Engineering.
| |
| The responsibility for the maintenance of fire detection, suppression, and extinguishing systems has been assigned to the Seabrook Station Director. In addition, he has been assigned the responsibility for fire prevention activities at the plant, including training and manual fire fighting activities of plant personnel, including the fire brigade. He is assisted in these activities by his plant staff. The development of the in-plant program, plan and procedures is more fully addressed in responses to Paragraph B.1 through B.7.
| |
| | |
| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev. 19 STATION Appendix A Section F.3 Responses To BTP APCSB 9.5-1 Page 17 APCSB 9.5-1, App. A Page Paragraph 2 A.2 Design Bases The overall fire protection program should be based upon evaluation of potential fire hazards throughout the plant and the effect of postulated design basis fires relative to maintaining ability to perform safety shutdown functions and minimize radioactive releases to the environment.
| |
| | |
| ===Response===
| |
| The overall fire protection systems for the Seabrook plant are based upon evaluation of potential fire hazards throughout the plant and the effect of postulated fires relative to maintaining ability to perform safe shutdown functions and minimize radioactive releases to the environment.
| |
| APCSB 9.5-1, App. A Page Paragraph 2 A.3 Back-up Total reliance should not be placed on a single automatic fire suppression system. Appropriate back-up fire suppression capability should be provided.
| |
| | |
| ===Response===
| |
| Total reliance has not been placed on a single automatic fire suppression system. In all instances, there is at least one back-up system available to suppress a fire. Additional back-up capability is provided by the fire brigade as well as response by an outside fire department.
| |
| Portable fire extinguishers are provided throughout the plant for use on small fires.
| |
| | |
| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev. 19 STATION Appendix A Section F.3 Responses To BTP APCSB 9.5-1 Page 18 APCSB 9.5-1, App. A Page Paragraph 2 A.4 Single Failure Criterion A single failure in the fire suppression system should not impair both the primary and backup fire suppression capability. For example, redundant fire water pumps with independent power supplies and controls should be provided.
| |
| Postulated fires or fire protection system failures need not be considered concurrent with other plant accidents or the most severe natural phenomena. However, in the event of the most severe earthquake, i.e. the safe shutdown earthquake (SSE), the fire suppression systems should be capable of delivering water to manual hose stations located within hose reach of areas containing equipment required for safe plant shutdown. The fire protection system should, however, retain their original design capability for:
| |
| (1) natural phenomena of less severity and greater frequency (approximately once in 10 years) such as tornadoes, hurricanes, floods, ice storms or small intensity earthquakes which are characteristic of the site geographic region and (2) for potential man-created site related events such as oil barge collisions, aircraft crashes which have a reasonable probability of occurring at a specific plant site. The effects of lightning strikes should be included in the overall plant fire protection program.
| |
| | |
| ===Response===
| |
| The fire suppression system includes three redundant fire water pumps; each pump designed to handle 50% of capacity. One of the fire pumps is electrically driven while the other two are individually diesel engine driven. The electric power for the motor-driven pump is provided with two independent power supplies. Each diesel engine-driven pump has its own controller.
| |
| Each controller has two independent batteries. Upon loss of power from one battery, the other battery is available to supply the required power for starting the diesel engine-driven pump.
| |
| Each controller is furnished with a battery charger for charging both batteries simultaneously.
| |
| The yard fire water main piping is supplied from the three independent discharge lines from the fire pumps. These lines feed the fire main piping in two directions.
| |
| The fire tanks are grounded; the fire pumps are housed within a grounded building; the fire lines are run underground and are free from the effects of lightning. Adequate grounding in plant buildings provides assurance that the effects of lightning strikes will not degrade the performance of fire detection systems.
| |
| | |
| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev. 19 STATION Appendix A Section F.3 Responses To BTP APCSB 9.5-1 Page 19 Those portions of the fire suppression system which are underground or contained in seismic Category I buildings are protected against tornadoes and tornado driven missiles. The potential for damage of other portions of the fire suppression system by tornadoes is low because of the low incidence of tornadoes in the Seabrook area.
| |
| The entire fire suppression system including the fire pump house structure and fire protection storage tanks is designed to withstand the effects of the 100 year hurricane-110 mph. (See FSAR, Section 3.3). This wind could possibly cause the removal of some of the steel siding of the fire pump house, but would not otherwise cause the building structure to fail.
| |
| Since the elevation of the fire pump house floor slab is 21-0, the 100 year flood which results in a still water elevation of 20.6 would cause no damage to the fire suppression system components here. Seabrook FSAR Section 3.4.1 describes the flood protection provided for Category I structures and their contents.
| |
| All buildings containing fire suppression systems are designed to withstand the 100 year snow and/or ice storm, which is equivalent to a roof loading of 75 psf (see FSAR Section 2.3).
| |
| In general, the fire suppression system is not designed as a seismic Category I system. However, those portions of this system within seismic Category I structures necessary to deliver water to manual hose stations located within hose reach of areas containing equipment required for safe plant shutdown are designed to withstand the effects of the SSE. Three exceptions are certain hose stations serving the Control Building, A Train Electrical Tunnel, and B Train Electrical Tunnel. These hose stations were added so that the served areas could be reached with an effective water stream using a maximum hose length of 100 feet. For physical reasons, they are connected to the non-seismic part of the fire protection system. During a fire, however, the fire brigade can add additional hose to other seismic hose stations serving these areas to provide satisfactory coverage if the non-seismic stations are unavailable. The fire pump house, as with all non-seismic Category I buildings, is designed to the requirements of the Uniform Building Code. Thus, the pump house structure will not fail as a result of an earthquake with a ground acceleration up to approximately 0.12g. In the Seabrook area, the 10 year earthquake is estimated to have a ground acceleration of approximately 0.05 g.
| |
| In the event of the most severe earthquake, the SSE, the fire suppression system is capable of delivering water to manual hose stations located within hose reach of areas containing equipment required for safe plant shutdown in the following manner:
| |
| All such areas (except as noted above) are provided with standpipes (Category I design) which are connected through an administratively controlled valve to plant service water system, also seismic Category I designed.
| |
| The potential for man-created, site related events such as oil barge collisions, aircraft crashes and explosions which could adversely affect the fire suppression system is of a very low probability.
| |
| The details pertaining to these events are given in the FSAR Section 2.2 and in the NRC staff Safety Evaluation Report for the Seabrook station.
| |
| | |
| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev. 19 STATION Appendix A Section F.3 Responses To BTP APCSB 9.5-1 Page 20 APCSB 9.5-1, App. A Page Paragraph 3 A.5 Fire Suppression System Failure or inadvertent operation of the fire suppression system should not incapacitate safety related systems or components. Fire suppression systems that are pressurized during normal plant operation should meet the guideline specified in APCSB Branch Technical Position 3-1, Protection Against Postulated Piping Failures in Fluid Systems Outside Containment.
| |
| | |
| ===Response===
| |
| The failure or inadvertent operation of the fire suppression systems will not incapacitate safety related systems or components.
| |
| The fixed fire suppression system for safety-related areas consists of standpipes and hose reels and automatic water spray systems. All standpipes are pressurized except those in the containment building which are dry. The automatic pre-action sprinkler systems are pressurized with air but are not wet until actuated by the Fire Detection System. The automatic water spray deluge systems are not pressurized. The standpipes in the containment building are not pressurized until the water supply valves are opened.
| |
| Standpipes and automatic water spray deluge piping systems in safety-related areas are designed and supported as required for a Category I system to prevent pipe failure and subsequent pipe whip.
| |
| | |
| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev. 19 STATION Appendix A Section F.3 Responses To BTP APCSB 9.5-1 Page 21 APCSB 9.5-1, App. A Page Paragraph 3 A.6 Fuel Storage Areas The fire protection program (plans, personnel and equipment) for buildings storing new reactor fuel and for adjacent fire zones which could affect the fuel storage zone should be fully operational before fuel is received at the site. Schedule for implementation of modifications, if any, will be established on a case-by-case basis.
| |
| | |
| ===Response===
| |
| The fire protection system for the fuel area and the adjacent fire areas was operational prior to receiving fuel on site. The portion of the fire protection program required to protect the new fuel storage building, including implementing procedures and personnel training, was in effect prior to receiving fuel on site.
| |
| APCSB 9.5-1, App. A Page Paragraph 4 A.7 Fuel Loading The fire protection program for an entire reactor unit should be fully operational prior to initial fuel loading in that reactor unit. Schedule for implementation of modifications, if any, will be established on a case-by-case basis.
| |
| | |
| ===Response===
| |
| The fire protection program was operational prior to initial fuel loading.
| |
| | |
| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev. 19 STATION Appendix A Section F.3 Responses To BTP APCSB 9.5-1 Page 22 APCSB 9.5-1, App. A Page Paragraph 4 A.8 Multiple-Reactor Sites On multiple-reactor sites where there are operating reactors and construction of remaining units is being completed, the fire protection program should provide continuing evaluation and include additional fire barriers, fire protection capability, and administrative controls necessary to protect the operating units from construction fire hazards. The superintendent of the operating plant should have the lead responsibility for site fire protection.
| |
| | |
| ===Response===
| |
| Seabrook 2 construction activities have been stopped. The fire protection program developed for Seabrook 1 provides for a continuing evaluation and the administrative controls necessary to protect the operating unit from fire hazards. The provision of additional fire protection capability is based upon the results of this continuing evaluation. The response to Paragraph A.1 provides the responsibilities applicable to the post-construction operational phase.
| |
| APCSB 9.5-1, App. A Page Paragraph 4 A.9 Simultaneous Fires Simultaneous fires in more than one reactor need not be postulated where separation requirements are met. A fire involving more than one reactor unit need not be postulated except for facilities shared between units.
| |
| | |
| ===Response===
| |
| A fire involving more than one reactor has not been postulated. Construction on Seabrook 2 has been stopped.
| |
| | |
| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev. 19 STATION Appendix A Section F.3 Responses To BTP APCSB 9.5-1 Page 23 B. Administrative Procedures, Controls and Fire Brigade APCSB 9.5-1, App. A Page Paragraph 4 B.1 Fire Protection System and Personnel Administrative Procedures Administrative procedures consistent with the need for maintaining the performance of the fire protection system and personnel in nuclear power plants should be provided.
| |
| Guidance is contained in the following publications:
| |
| NFPA 4 - Organization for Fire Services NFPA 4A - Organization for Fire Department NFPA 6 - Industrial Fire Loss Prevention NFPA 7 - Management of Fire Emergencies NFPA 8 - Management Responsibility for Effects of Fire on Operations NFPA 27 - Private Fire Brigades
| |
| | |
| ===Response===
| |
| Administrative procedures consistent with the need for maintaining the performance of the fire protection system and personnel in nuclear power plants is provided using the guidance contained in the appropriate NFPA publications. These procedures are described in the Station Fire Protection Manual.
| |
| | |
| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev. 19 STATION Appendix A Section F.3 Responses To BTP APCSB 9.5-1 Page 24 APCSB 9.5-1, App. A Page Paragraph 5 B.2 Bulk Storage of Combustible Materials Effective administrative measures should be implemented to prohibit bulk storage of combustible materials inside or adjacent to safety related buildings or systems during operation or maintenance periods. Regulatory Guide 1.39, Housekeeping Requirements for Water-Cooled Nuclear Power Plants, provides guidance on housekeeping, including the disposal of combustible materials.
| |
| | |
| ===Response===
| |
| Effective administrative measures are implemented to govern the storage of materials and the housekeeping of the plant. The plant Station Maintenance Manual shall be the governing administrative document for housekeeping. The Station Fire Protection Manual is the administrative manual to control combustible materials.
| |
| APCSB 9.5-1, App. A Page Paragraph 5 B.3 Normal/Abnormal Conditions Or Other Anticipated Operations Normal and abnormal conditions or other anticipated operations such as modifications (e.g.,
| |
| breaking fire stops, impairment of fire detection and suppression systems) and refueling activities should be reviewed by appropriate levels of management and appropriate special actions and procedures such as fire watches or temporary fire barriers implemented to assure adequate fire protection and reactor safety. In particular:
| |
| (a) Work involving ignition sources such as welding and flame cutting should be done under closely controlled conditions. Procedures governing such work should be reviewed and approved by persons trained and experienced in fire protection. Persons performing and directly assisting in such work should be trained and equipped to prevent and combat fires. If this is not possible, a person qualified in fire protection should directly monitor the work and function as a fire watch.
| |
| | |
| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev. 19 STATION Appendix A Section F.3 Responses To BTP APCSB 9.5-1 Page 25 (b) Leak testing, and similar procedures such as air flow determination, should use one of the commercially available aerosol techniques. Open flames or combustion generated smoke should not be permitted.
| |
| (c) Use of combustible material, e.g., HEPA and charcoal filters, dry ion exchange resins or other combustible supplies, in safety related areas should be controlled. Use of wood inside buildings containing safety related systems or equipment should be permitted only when suitable non-combustible substitutes are not available. If wood must be used, only fire-retardant treated wood (scaffolding, lay down blocks) should be permitted. Such materials should be allowed into safety related areas only when they are to be used immediately. Their possible and probable use should be considered in the fire hazard analysis to determine the adequacy of the installed fire protection systems.
| |
| | |
| ===Response===
| |
| Any plant modifications, engineering design change requests, and plant design change requests are reviewed for fire protection concerns. Plant procedures are reviewed by plant management.
| |
| Maintenance procedures, except for routine jobs in non-controlled areas, are reviewed by plant management.
| |
| (a) Work involving welding, cutting and brazing is controlled and covered in the Station Fire Protection Manual.
| |
| (b) Open flames or combustion generated smoke will not be used for leak testing or air flow determinations.
| |
| (c) Storage of combustible supplies are controlled in plant areas. Use of wood is controlled by the Station Fire Protection Manual. In-situ combustibles are considered in the fire hazards analysis. Transient combustibles used during maintenance or refueling are controlled by the Station Fire Protection Manual.
| |
| | |
| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev. 19 STATION Appendix A Section F.3 Responses To BTP APCSB 9.5-1 Page 26 APCSB 9.5-1, App. A Page Paragraph 6 B.4 Public Fire Department Support Nuclear power plants are frequently located in remote areas, at some distance from public fire departments. Also, first response fire departments are often volunteer. Public fire department response should be considered in the overall fire protection program. However, the plant should be designed to be self-sufficient with respect to fire fighting activities and rely on the public response only for supplemental or backup capability.
| |
| | |
| ===Response===
| |
| The plant fire protection systems plus the fire brigade allow the plant to be self-sufficient with respect to fire fighting. Reliance on the local fire department is for backup capability.
| |
| APCSB 9.5-1, App. A Page Paragraph 7 B.5 Plant Fire Brigade Guidance The need for good organization, training and equipping of fire brigades at nuclear power plant sites requires effective measures be implemented to assure proper discharge of these functions.
| |
| The guidance in Regulatory Guide 1.101, Emergency Planning for Nuclear Power Plants, should be followed as applicable.
| |
| (a) Successful fire fighting requires testing and maintenance of the fire protection equipment, emergency lighting and communication, as well as practice as brigades for the people who must utilize the equipment. A test plan that lists the individuals and their responsibilities in connection with routine tests and inspections of the fire detection and protection systems should be developed. The test plan should contain the types, frequency and detailed procedures for testing. Procedures should also contain instructions on maintaining fire protection during those periods when the fire protection system is impaired or during periods of plant maintenance, e.g., fire watches or temporary hose connections to water systems.
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| | |
| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev. 19 STATION Appendix A Section F.3 Responses To BTP APCSB 9.5-1 Page 27 (b) Basic training is a necessary element in effective fire fighting operation. In order for a fire brigade to operate effectively, it must operate as a team. All members must know what their individual duties are. They must be familiar with the layout of the plant and equipment location and operation in order to permit effective fire fighting operations during times when a particular area is filled with smoke or is insufficiently lighted. Such training can only be accomplished by conducting drills several times a year (at least quarterly) so that all members of the fire brigade have had the opportunity to train as a team, testing itself in the major areas of the plant. The drills should include the simulated use of equipment in each area and should be pre planned and post-critiques to establish the training objective of the drills and determine how well these objectives have been met. These drills should periodically (at least annually) include local fire department participation where possible. Such drills also permit supervising personnel to evaluate the effectiveness of communications within the fire brigade and with the on scene fire team leader, the reactor operator in the control room, and the offsite command post.
| |
| | |
| ===Response===
| |
| (a) Effective measures for training and equipping fire brigades, testing and maintaining fire protection equipment, emergency lighting and communication have been implemented to cover the above subjects.
| |
| Testing and inspections of fire detection and protection systems have been covered by established procedures.
| |
| (b) Fire brigade training is accomplished in a manner to include all of the above concerns.
| |
| | |
| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev. 19 STATION Appendix A Section F.3 Responses To BTP APCSB 9.5-1 Page 28 APCSB 9.5-1, App. A Page Paragraph 8 B.6 Coordination With Local Fire Department To have proper coverage during all phases of operation, members of each shift crew should be trained in fire protection. Training of the plant fire brigade should be coordinated with the local fire department so that responsibilities and duties are delineated in advance. This coordination should be part of the training course and implemented into the training of the local fire department staff. Local fire departments should be educated in the operational precautions when fighting fires on nuclear power plant sites. Local fire departments should be made aware of the need for radioactive protection of personnel and the special hazards associated with a nuclear power plant site.
| |
| | |
| ===Response===
| |
| Selected shift crew personnel are trained in fire protection. Shift crew fire protection training is by job classification which is directed towards those individuals who are at liberty to leave the control room during various phases of plant operation.
| |
| The plant fire protection training program is offered annually to local fire departments where practicable. Local fire department training curriculum includes the pertinent aspects of:
| |
| : a. Station layout
| |
| : b. Operational precautions
| |
| : c. Radiological and other hazards
| |
| : d. Types and locations of probable fires
| |
| : e. Responsibilities and limitations of authority
| |
| : f. Other topics, as necessary
| |
| | |
| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev. 19 STATION Appendix A Section F.3 Responses To BTP APCSB 9.5-1 Page 29 APCSB 9.5-1, App. A Page Paragraph 9 B.7 NFPA Standards NFPA 27, Private Fire Brigade should be followed in organization, training, and fire drills.
| |
| This standard also is applicable for the inspection and maintenance of fire fighting equipment.
| |
| Among the standards referenced in this document, the following should be utilized: NFPA 194, Standard for Screw Threads and Gaskets for Fire Hose Couplings, NFPA 196, Standard for Fire Hose, NFPA 197, Training Standard on Initial Fire Attacks, NFPA 601, Recommended Manual of Instructions and Duties for the Plant Watchman on Guard. NFPA booklets and pamphlets listed on page 27-11 of Volume 8, 1971-72 are also applicable for good training references. In addition, courses in fire prevention and fire suppression which are recognized and/or sponsored by the fire protection industry should be utilized.
| |
| | |
| ===Response===
| |
| Fire brigade training is formulated around the recommendations in NFPA 27. Other NFPA manuals are used as they apply to the plant fire protection program.
| |
| | |
| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev. 19 STATION Appendix A Section F.3 Responses To BTP APCSB 9.5-1 Page 30 C. Quality Assurance Program Quality Assurance (QA) programs of applicants and contractors should be developed and implemented to assure that the requirements for design, procurement, installation, and testing and administrative controls for the fire protection program for safety-related areas as defined in this Branch Position are satisfied. The program should be under the management control of the Oversight organization. The QA program criteria that apply to the fire protection program should include the following:
| |
| APCSB 9.5-1, App. A Page Paragraph 10 C.1 Design Control and Procurement Document Control Measures should be established to assure that all design related guidelines of the Branch Technical Position are included in design and procurement documents and that deviations therefrom are controlled.
| |
| | |
| ===Response===
| |
| During initial design and construction UE&C engineering organization prepared fire protection design engineering and procurement documents which met the guidelines of the Branch Technical Positions. The Yankee Atomic Electric Company (YAEC) reviewed design and procurement documents to ensure compliance. The above functions are currently the responsibility of Engineering.
| |
| | |
| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev. 19 STATION Appendix A Section F.3 Responses To BTP APCSB 9.5-1 Page 31 APCSB 9.5-1, App. A Page Paragraph 10 C.2 Instructions, Procedures and Drawings Inspections, tests, administrative controls, fire drills and training that govern the fire protection program should be prescribed by documented instructions, procedures or drawings and should be accomplished in accordance with these documents.
| |
| | |
| ===Response===
| |
| Detailed, written operational test, inspection, fire drill, training and administrative control procedures for the fire protection program have been prepared by the plant staff. These activities are audited by the Oversight Organization.
| |
| APCSB 9.5-1, App. A Page Paragraph 10 C.3 Control of Purchased Material, Equipment and Services Measures should be established to assure that purchased material, equipment and services conform to the procurement documents.
| |
| | |
| ===Response===
| |
| The Operational Quality Assurance Program (OQAP) defines and establishes the application of the OQAP to Fire Protection Program.
| |
| | |
| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev. 19 STATION Appendix A Section F.3 Responses To BTP APCSB 9.5-1 Page 32 APCSB 9.5-1, App. A Page Paragraph 11 C.4 Inspection A program for independent inspection of activities affecting fire protection should be established and executed by, or for, the organization performing the activity to verify conformance with documented installation drawings and test procedures for accomplishing the activities.
| |
| | |
| ===Response===
| |
| The Oversight organization performs audits to verify implementation of the fire protection program.
| |
| APCSB 9.5-1, App. A Page Paragraph 11 C.5 Test and Test Control A test program should be established and implemented to assure that testing is performed and verified by inspection and audit to demonstrate conformance with design and system readiness requirements. The tests should be performed in accordance with written test procedures; test results should be properly evaluated and acted on.
| |
| | |
| ===Response===
| |
| A fire protection test program has been established and implemented to assure that the fire protection systems are in conformance with the design requirements. Current station procedures provide for tests and inspections to assure readiness of the systems and its components. The fire protection surveillance program is audited by the Oversight organization.
| |
| | |
| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev. 19 STATION Appendix A Section F.3 Responses To BTP APCSB 9.5-1 Page 33 APCSB 9.5-1, App. A Page Paragraph 11 C.6 Inspection, Test and Operating Status Measures should be established to provide for the identification of items that have satisfactorily passed required tests and inspections.
| |
| | |
| ===Response===
| |
| Procedure documentation is provided for the identification of items that have satisfactorily passed required tests and inspections. The Oversight organization performs audits to verify documentation.
| |
| APCSB 9.5-1, App. A Page Paragraph 11 C.7 Non- Conforming Items Measures should be established to control items that do not conform to specified requirements to prevent inadvertent use or installation.
| |
| | |
| ===Response===
| |
| The OQAP provides measures to control the use of items and to prevent inadvertent use or installation of non-conforming items.
| |
| | |
| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev. 19 STATION Appendix A Section F.3 Responses To BTP APCSB 9.5-1 Page 34 APCSB 9.5-1, App. A Page Paragraph 11 C.8 Corrective Action Measures should be established to assure that conditions adverse to fire protection, such as failures, malfunctions, deficiencies, deviations, defective components, uncontrolled combustible material and non-conformances are promptly identified, reported and corrected.
| |
| | |
| ===Response===
| |
| Measures have been established and implemented via the Fire Protection Program per the responsibilities discussed in the response to Paragraph A.1.
| |
| APCSB 9.5-1, App. A Page Paragraph 12 C.9 Records Records should be prepared and maintained to furnish evidence that the criteria enumerated above are being met for activities affecting the fire protection program.
| |
| | |
| ===Response===
| |
| Records for fire protection activities are prepared and maintained per Administrative Procedures.
| |
| | |
| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev. 19 STATION Appendix A Section F.3 Responses To BTP APCSB 9.5-1 Page 35 APCSB 9.5-1, App. A Page Paragraph 12 C.10 Audits Audits should be conducted and documented to verify compliance with the fire protection program including design and procurement documents; instructions; procedures and drawings; and inspection and test activities.
| |
| | |
| ===Response===
| |
| The Oversight organization provides audits to verify the above activities.
| |
| | |
| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev. 19 STATION Appendix A Section F.3 Responses To BTP APCSB 9.5-1 Page 36 D. General Guidelines for Plant Protection APCSB 9.5-1, App. A Page Paragraph 12 D.1 (a)
| |
| Building Design - Plant Layouts Plant layouts should be arranged to:
| |
| (1) Isolate safety-related systems from unacceptable hazards, and (2) Separate redundant safety-related systems from each other so that both are not subject to damage from a single fire hazard.
| |
| | |
| ===Response===
| |
| The above stated design requirements of isolation and separation have been adhered to in the layout of the plant, to the maximum extent practical. Where safety-related systems cannot be isolated from potential fire hazards, additional detection, barriers and/or automatic fire suppression methods with appropriate backup are provided.
| |
| Those safety-related systems which are required to safely shut down the plant consist of separate and independent flow trains. No portions of these systems are located near or in any area which could potentially become a significant fire hazard. In those cases where redundant safety-related equipment (e.g. the primary component cooling water heat exchangers) are not separated from each other by a physical barrier, no combustible materials of any significant quantity are present within the immediate vicinity of the equipment, precluding the possibility of damage to redundant equipment due to a potential fire. Where necessary, an adequate barrier is provided to prevent the propagation of a postulated fire caused by combustible material contained in one safety-related component (e.g. component cooling pump) from jeopardizing the operation of a redundant component.
| |
| Electrical and instrument layouts are arranged to isolate safety-related systems from unacceptable fire hazards by eliminating the use of combustible materials to the greatest extent possible. Redundant safety-related electrical equipment are separated from each other by physical barriers or distance to prevent both systems from damage due to a single fire hazard.
| |
| Each diesel generator has been structurally segregated from its redundant adjacent unit. The wall which separates the units on the main level and below is constructed of two-foot thick reinforced concrete with a fire rating in excess of three hours. Upper floor walls, which are one-foot thick reinforced concrete, have a three hour fire rating.
| |
| The circulating and service water areas are separated by a two-foot thick reinforced concrete wall whose fire rating is in excess of one and one-half hours. (Reference Deviation #3, SBN-904).
| |
| | |
| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev. 19 STATION Appendix A Section F.3 Responses To BTP APCSB 9.5-1 Page 37 APCSB 9.5-1, App. A Page Paragraph 3 D.1 (b)
| |
| Building Design - Detailed Fire Hazard Analysis In order to accomplish l.(a) above, safety related systems and fire hazards should be identified throughout the plant. Therefore, a detailed fire hazard analysis should be made. The fire hazards analysis should be reviewed and updated as necessary.
| |
| | |
| ===Response===
| |
| A detailed fire hazards analysis of all areas which include safe shutdown systems has been provided in this report. The need for additional hazard analyses will be determined based on the type and extent of proposed plant modifications.
| |
| APCSB 9.5-1, App. A Page Paragraph 13 D.1 (c)
| |
| Building Design - Cable Spreading Room For multiple reactor sites, cable spreading rooms should not be shared between reactors. Each cable spreading room should be separated from other areas of the plant by barriers (walls and floors) having a minimum fire resistance of three hours. Cabling for redundant safety divisions should be separated by walls having three hour fire barriers.
| |
| | |
| ===Response===
| |
| The cable spreading room is designated a fire area and is separated from other areas of the plant by fire barriers having a fire resistance of three hours. Three hour fire barrier walls are not provided between redundant safety-related cable trays in the cable spreading room because the space allocation of the station design makes it physically impossible. However, the redundant safety-related cables are located in the cable trays which are separated by distance, and this distance meets or exceeds that required by Attachment C, Physical Independence of Electric Systems of AEC letter dated 12/14/73, which is generally in agreement with Regulatory Guide 1.75.
| |
| | |
| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev. 19 STATION Appendix A Section F.3 Responses To BTP APCSB 9.5-1 Page 38 In addition, the cable spreading room does not contain high energy equipment such as switchgear, transformers or potential sources of missile or pipe whip, and is not used for storage of flammable materials. Circuits in trays are limited to control and instrument functions. Those power supply circuits serving the control room are routed in embedded conduits. All cables are self-extinguishing and non-propagating and, as a minimum, pass the IEEE-383 1974 flame test.
| |
| See response to D.3(c) for justification of design.
| |
| APCSB 9.5-1, App. A Page Paragraph 13 D.1 (d)
| |
| Building Design - Non-Combustibility Requirements for Interior Construction Interior wall and structural components, thermal insulation materials and radiation shielding materials and sound-proofing should be non-combustible. Interior finishes should be non-combustible or listed by a nationally recognized testing laboratory, such as Factory Mutual or Underwriters Laboratory, Inc. for flame spread, smoke and fuel contribution of 25 or less in its configuration (ASTM E-84 Test, Surface Burning Characteristics of Building Materials).
| |
| | |
| ===Response===
| |
| Thermal insulating materials meet the non-combustible definition in Branch Technical Position CMEB 9.5-1, Guidelines for Fire Protection for Nuclear Power Plants. They have flame spread/smoke developed/fuel contributed rating of 25/50/50, as tested by Underwriters Laboratories Inc. in its use configuration, ASTM E-84 test Surface Burning Characteristics of Building Materials.
| |
| Interior walls and structural components, radiation shielding materials and sound-proofing and interior finishes are non-combustible or listed by a nationally recognized testing laboratory, such as Factory Mutual or Underwriters Laboratory, Inc. for flame spread, smoke and fuel contribution of 25 or less in its use configuration, ASTM E-84 Test, Surface Burning Characteristics Building Materials Prior to 1978 the ASTM E-84 Test reported flame spread, smoke developed and fuel contribution. However, fuel contribution is no longer reported. Therefore, materials tested prior to 1978 must report flame spread, smoke developed and fuel contribution. Materials tested in 1978 and after must only report flame spread and smoke developed.
| |
| | |
| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev. 19 STATION Appendix A Section F.3 Responses To BTP APCSB 9.5-1 Page 39 APCSB 9.5-1, App. A Page Paragraph 13 D.1 (e)
| |
| Building Design - Metal Deck Roof Construction Metal deck roof construction should be non-combustible (see the building materials directory of the Underwriters Laboratory, Inc.) or listed as Class I by Factory Mutual System Guide.
| |
| | |
| ===Response===
| |
| Metal deck roof construction is non-combustible or listed as Class I by Factory Mutual System Approval Guide.
| |
| APCSB 9.5-1, App. A Page Paragraph 14 D.1 (f)
| |
| Building Design - Suspended Ceilings Suspended ceilings and their supports should be of non-combustible construction. Concealed spaces should be devoid of combustibles.
| |
| | |
| ===Response===
| |
| Suspended ceilings and their supports are non-combustible construction.
| |
| Concealed spaces in safety-related areas are devoid of combustibles. Such spaces, however, may contain metal-sheathed lighting cable type ALS, which is not considered combustible.
| |
| | |
| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev. 19 STATION Appendix A Section F.3 Responses To BTP APCSB 9.5-1 Page 40 APCSB 9.5-1, App. A Page Paragraph 14 D.1 (g)
| |
| Building Design - High Voltage. High Ampere Transformers High voltage - high ampere transformers installed inside buildings containing safety related systems should be of the dry type or insulated and cooled with non-combustible liquid.
| |
| | |
| ===Response===
| |
| The only high voltage - high ampere transformers installed inside buildings containing safety related systems are 480 volt unit substations which utilize dry type transformers.
| |
| APCSB 9.5-1, App. A Page Paragraph 14 D.1 (h)
| |
| Building Design - Oil Filled Transformers Buildings containing safety related systems should be protected from exposure or spill fires involving oil filled transformers by:
| |
| locating such transformers at least 50 feet distant; or ensuring that such building walls within 50 feet of oil filled transformers are without openings and have a fire resistance rating of at least three hours.
| |
| | |
| ===Response===
| |
| The generator step-up transformers, unit auxiliary transformers and reserve auxiliary transformers are the only oil-filled transformers, and are located outside along the north wall of the turbine building. The north wall has a three hour fire resistance rating. Refer to Tab 15. All oil-filled transformers are protected by automatic water spray systems, and are located at least 50 feet from any safety related systems.
| |
| | |
| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev. 19 STATION Appendix A Section F.3 Responses To BTP APCSB 9.5-1 Page 41 APCSB 9.5-1, App. A Page Paragraph 15 D.1 (i)
| |
| Building Design - Floor Drains Floor drains, sized to remove expected fire fighting water flow should be provided in those areas where fixed water fire suppression systems are installed. Drains should also be provided in other areas where hand hose lines may be used if such fire fighting water could cause unacceptable damage to equipment in the area. Equipment should be installed on pedestals, or curbs should be provided as required to contain water and direct it to floor drains (see NFPA 92M Waterproofing and Drainage of Floors). Drains in areas containing combustible liquids should have provisions for preventing the spread of the fire throughout the drain system. Water drainage from areas which may contain radioactivity should be sampled and analyzed before discharge to the environment.
| |
| | |
| ===Response===
| |
| Floor drains are located in those areas where automatic sprinkler and spray systems are installed.
| |
| These drains are sized to pass the expected flows resulting from automatic system actuation, as well as that produced by manual hose application if employed.
| |
| In areas where hand hose lines are the only water sources utilized to combat a fire, drains are provided if accumulation of fire fighting water could result in unacceptable damage to safety-related equipment in the area. In such areas, the operator can use the hose to control the quantity of drain water to avoid unacceptable damage to equipment.
| |
| Water drainage from buildings with potential for radioactive contamination will be routed to the waste processing building, where it is sampled and analyzed for radioactivity.
| |
| Drainage within the diesel generator building is designed to prevent the spread of fire from one area to another. Other areas with combustible liquids have normally closed shut-off valves in the drain lines or drain directly to the oil/water separation vault.
| |
| A fire in the primary auxiliary building, should it occur, may require large amounts of fire fighting water, which could result in the PAB floor drain sump overflowing and spilling over into the pipe tunnel between the vault area and the containment building. The combined pipe tunnel area and the PAB sump can hold up to 14,000 gallons of fire fighting water. Water in excess of this would overflow into the vault No. 2 floor drain sump. This contained water would not jeopardize the operability of safety-related equipment and equipment required for a safe plant shutdown. Contaminated drainage is processed through the liquid waste system. Sump pumps located in the affected areas pump water at a nominal rate of 25 gpm per pump to the floor drain tanks in the waste processing building. Provisions for sample analysis are available at the waste test tank prior to discharge to the environment.
| |
| | |
| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev. 19 STATION Appendix A Section F.3 Responses To BTP APCSB 9.5-1 Page 42 In the event of a fire in either the waste processing building or the fuel storage building, the fire fighting water could drain to the lowest elevation of the building, where it would be contained.
| |
| Any resulting flooding in either building would thus not jeopardize the operability of safety-related equipment or equipment required for the safe shutdown of the plant. Sump pumps located in the affected areas pump water at a nominal rate of 25 gpm per pump to the floor drain tanks in the waste processing building.
| |
| If a fire requiring large amounts of water should occur in the containment building, there exists a possibility of flooding the reactor instrument cavity. However, the cavity can hold more than 47,000 gallons of water without jeopardizing the operability of safety-related equipment or equipment required for safe shutdown of the plant. Sump pumps located in the affected areas pump water at a nominal rate of 25 gpm per pump to the floor drain tanks in the waste processing building.
| |
| All safety-related equipment, except draw-out switchgear and local control panels are mounted on pedestals to avoid water damage, or provided with curbs or other barriers, as required, to contain the water and direct it to floor drains. The draw-out switchgear and local control panels are capable of withstanding a minimal degree of floor flooding without damage.
| |
| The electrical tunnels contain no sources of flood water other than the fire protection system piping. The fire protection system piping are zoned pre-action dry pipe systems with the zone valves located external to the tunnel areas. The individual fire protection system zones will be actuated by ionization fire detectors. Fire detectors are provided in the areas zoned to provide for local indication and for an audible and visual alarm in the control room and the guardhouse.
| |
| Water from the fire protection system will be drained from the tunnel zones to a sump external to the electrical tunnel areas.
| |
| Redundant pumps have been installed in the sump to pump the water collected from the tunnel fire water drains to the storm drain system.
| |
| The electrical tunnel areas are zoned for fire protection. It is highly improbable that a fire will occur in more than one zone at any time; therefore the capacity of each pump is based on the flow of the largest tunnel zone. Each pump is connected to a redundant emergency bus. The installed pump capacity is capable of handling the flow requirements from two zones at all times except in the event of loss of power on one emergency bus.
| |
| | |
| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev. 19 STATION Appendix A Section F.3 Responses To BTP APCSB 9.5-1 Page 43 APCSB 9.5-1, App. A Page Paragraph 15 D.1 (j)
| |
| Building Design - Floors, Walls and Ceilings Floors, walls and ceilings enclosing separate fire areas should have minimum fire rating of three hours. Penetrations in these fire barriers, including conduits and piping, should be sealed or closed to provide a fire resistance rating at least equal to that of the fire barrier itself. Door openings should be protected with equivalent rated doors, frames and hardware that have been tested and approved by a nationally recognized laboratory. Such doors should be normally closed and locked or alarmed with alarm and annunciation in the control room. Penetrations for ventilation system should be protected by a standard fire door damper where required. (Refer to NFPA 80, Fire Doors and Windows.)
| |
| | |
| ===Response===
| |
| Except for exterior walls and ceilings, floors, walls and ceilings enclosing separate fire areas have a minimum 11/2 hour or three hour fire rating. Stairwells have three hour rated walls and 11/2 hour rated doors.
| |
| Penetrations in fire barriers having a fire resistance of three hours, including conduits, piping and sleeves, are sealed or closed with materials providing a fire resistance rating at least equal to that designated for the fire barrier itself, with the exception of bus duct penetrations in the east wall of the non essential switchgear room and bus duct penetration in the north wall of turbine building. Refer to Deviation 14, SBN 970, dated March 18, 1986.
| |
| Door openings, except where noted above, are protected with equivalent rated doors, frames and hardware that have been tested and approved by a nationally recognized laboratory. Only doors providing access to the buildings from outside or doors providing access to vital areas are locked and alarmed.
| |
| Penetrations for ventilation ducts are protected by a standard fire door damper, where required, with a fire rating equal to fire barrier itself.
| |
| For compliance of 3-hour rated double leaf pressure doors in fire zones GB-FI 2B-A, CB-F-2B-A, CB-F-2C-A and PAB-F-2B-Z, refer to Deviation No. 11, SBN 932, dated March 18, 1986. Refer to the following letters for additional deviations: Deviation 5, SBN-904; Deviation 6, SBN-904; Deviation 7, SBN-904; Deviation 8, SBN-904.
| |
| The sub units of multi-section type rated fire dampers, CBA-DP-l3l (CB-F-4A-A); DAH-DP-163
| |
| & 164 (DG-F-3A-Z & 3B-Z) have been independently tested and UL certified. Refer to Deviation No. 12, SBN 932, dated January 24, 1986; and Deviation 8, SBN-970.
| |
| | |
| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev. 19 STATION Appendix A Section F.3 Responses To BTP APCSB 9.5-1 Page 44 APCSB 9.5-1, App. A Page Paragraph 16 D.2 (a)
| |
| Control of Combustibles Protection of Safety-Related Systems Safety related systems should be isolated or separated from combustible materials. When this is not possible because of the nature of the safety system or the combustible material, special protection should be provided to prevent a fire from defeating the safety system function. Such protection may involve a combination of automatic fire suppression and construction capable of withstanding and containing a fire that consumes all combustibles present. Examples of such combustible materials that may not be separable from the remainder of its system are:
| |
| (1) emergency diesel generator fuel oil day tanks (2) turbine generator oil and hydraulic control fluid systems (3) reactor coolant pump lube oil system
| |
| | |
| ===Response===
| |
| All safety related systems are isolated or separated from combustible material wherever feasible.
| |
| Where isolation is not feasible, as noted below, the fire protection system supplies suppression, based on the fire hazard analysis, to insure that a fire does not defeat the safety system function.
| |
| (1) The redundant emergency diesel generator fuel oil day tank and associated piping are separated from each other by three hour fire rated barriers. No combustible materials other than the fuel oil in the day tank and piping is stored in the area. Each system is protected by an automatic deluge water spray system which is actuated by a detection system.
| |
| (2) The turbine-generator lube oil tank and reservoir, even though a non safety-related system, is separated and protected as described above.
| |
| | |
| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev. 19 STATION Appendix A Section F.3 Responses To BTP APCSB 9.5-1 Page 45 (3) The reactor coolant pump oil systems are provided with an oil collection system and are isolated by virtue of spatial separation and would, should a fire occur, only involve one reactor coolant pump area. The fire hazard analysis presented in Appendix B of this report demonstrates that during a design basis fire, except for the vertical shaft of fire influence, the operation of the containment fan coolers and the heat sink of the steel and concrete would limit the temperature of the general containment area to 253°F. The associated pressure at this time in the containment would be 4.0 psig. This temperature and pressure throughout the containment would not prevent the safe shutdown of the reactor. The vertical shaft of fire influence, while being much hotter than the general area (flame temperature of 4000°F), does not impinge on, nor would it damage, any system or components required for safe shutdown of the reactor.
| |
| Based on the results of the fire hazard analysis, no fire suppression system is provided in these areas.
| |
| APCSB 9.5-1, App. A Page Paragraph 16 D.2 (b)
| |
| Bulk Gas Storage Bulk gas storage (either compressed or cryogenic), should not be permitted inside structures housing safety-related equipment. Storage of flammable gas such as hydrogen, should be located outdoors or in separate detached buildings so that a fire or explosion will not adversely affect any safety-related systems or equipment. (Refer to NFPA 50A, Gaseous Hydrogen Systems.)
| |
| Care should be taken to locate high pressure gas storage containers with the long axis parallel to building walls. This will minimize the possibility of wall penetration in the event of a container failure. Use of compressed gases (especially flammable and fuel gases) inside buildings should be controlled. (Refer to NFPA 6, Industrial Fire Loss Prevention.)
| |
| | |
| ===Response===
| |
| There are no large bulk containers (non-DOT cylinders) of flammable gas inside structures near safety-related equipment. Bulk Hydrogen storage is located outdoors and remote from any safety related equipment. The bulk gas storage located within the Turbine Building is the non-flammable, low pressure 2-3/4 ton, carbon dioxide storage tank for the generator purge system. Also stored in the Administration Building are DOT approved cyrogenic containers of Argon and Nitrogen. The containers are equipped with DOT required and approved pressure relief valves. The containers are installed per Station requirements. The gases are non-flammable and are used by Chemistry and Health Physics.
| |
| | |
| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev. 19 STATION Appendix A Section F.3 Responses To BTP APCSB 9.5-1 Page 46 Many of the different gases being utilized within the administration and service building are stored outdoors located within a roofed over storage area south of the administration and service building (See Table 1 for the gases being used).
| |
| Seabrook Station requires the installation of several DOT approved compressed gas cylinders inside structure housing safety-related equipment. These DOT cylinders are seismically mounted and/or restrained in seismic buildings and restrained in bottle racks in non-seismic buildings. The DOT cylinders are fitted with an approved safety device to allow gas to escape, preventing an explosion, of the normally charged cylinders if they are exposed to a fire.
| |
| The following is a description of the general location and purpose of the DOT cylinder installations:
| |
| (A) West Feedwater Pipe Chase - nitrogen cylinder(s) are installed at elevation 3'-0", to provide a backup safety-grade supply of control air for the atmospheric steam dump valves (MS-PV-3001 and MS-PV-3004).
| |
| (B) Personnel Hatch Area - nitrogen cylinder(s) are installed at elevation 21'-0", to provide a refill supply of control air for the West Chase Feedwater and Main Steam Isolation valves.
| |
| (C) East Feedwater Pipe Chase - nitrogen cylinder(s) are installed at elevation 3'-0", to provide a backup safety-grade supply of control air for the atmospheric steam dump valves (MS-PV-3002 and MS-PV-3003).
| |
| (D) Primary Auxiliary Building - nitrogen cylinder(s) are installed at elevation 25'-0", to provide a safety-grade backup air supply for each Train of primary component cooling water temperature control valves (CC-TV-2171-1,2 and CC-TV-2271-1).
| |
| (E) Diesel Generator Building - nitrogen cylinder(s) are installed in each stairwell, elevation 21'-6", to provide an air supply for the preaction sprinkler system, installed over the diesel generators.
| |
| (F) Primary Auxiliary Building Sample Room - Argon cylinder(s) are installed in the Sample Room for an inert gas supply for the Flush Tank (SS-TK-197). Nitrogen Cylinders are installed for purging the hydrogen sensor.
| |
| (G) Hydrogen Analyzer Room - Oxygen cylinder(s) are installed in the room to provide reagent gas for the analyzers.
| |
| (H) Turbine Building - Carbon dioxide and hydrogen cylinders are installed at the generator pedestal, elevation 21'-6", to provide a backup supply of gases for the generator hydrogen and purge systems.
| |
| | |
| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev. 19 STATION Appendix A Section F.3 Responses To BTP APCSB 9.5-1 Page 47 (I) Turbine Building - Air cylinder(s) are installed in the vicinity of the generator pedestal, elevation 21'-6", to provide a backup supply of air, during maintenance to the generator breaker air receivers.
| |
| (J) Turbine Building - Nitrogen cylinder(s) are located on the northwest side of the Generator Stator (GSC) Coolant Tank, elevation 21'-0" to provide a supply of purge gas for calibration of the coolant tank vent hydrogen monitor.
| |
| (K) Turbine Building - Oxygen cylinder(s) are located on the northeast side of the Generator Stator (GSC) Coolant Tank, elevation 21'-0" to provide a supply of oxygen for maintaining an oxygen saturated environment within the GSC cooling water.
| |
| (L) Fuel Storage Building - Nitrogen cylinder(s) are located on the south side of the spent fuel pool near the spent fuel pool heat exchangers, to provide a supply of Nitrogen for tools and accessories used on the Spent Fuel Bridge Crane.
| |
| (M) 345kV Switchyard Equipment Enclosure and Overhead Crane Structure - SF6 Gas Cylinders are located in the southwest corner of the enclosure at elevation 55' - 1 1/4" to provide a supply of gas for the Gas Insulated Substation equipment located in the 345kV Switchyard.
| |
| Table 1 Cylinder Storage Number of Gas Volume (Ft3)* Condition (psi) Cylinders Acetylene 300 250 2 Argon 331 2400 9 Argon/Methane 240 2200 10 Helium 291 2400 6 Nitrogen 301 2400 12 Propane 172** 516 3 At 70 ºF, 14.7 psi 20-pound cylinders
| |
| | |
| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev. 19 STATION Appendix A Section F.3 Responses To BTP APCSB 9.5-1 Page 48 APCSB 9.5-1, App. A Page Paragraph 17 D.2 (c)
| |
| Use of Plastic Materials The use of plastic materials should be minimized. In particular, halogenated plastics such as polyvinyl chloride (PVC) and neoprene should be used only when substitute non-combustible materials are not available. All plastic materials, including flame and fire retardant materials, will burn with an intensity and BTU production in a range similar to that of ordinary hydrocarbons. When burning, they produce heavy smoke that obscures visibility and can plug air filters, especially charcoal and HEPA. The halogenated plastics also release free chlorine and hydrogen chloride when burning which are toxic to humans and corrosive to equipment.
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| | |
| ===Response===
| |
| Usage of plastic materials (except that employed as insulating materials on electric cabling, see Section D.3.(g)) is as follows:
| |
| The use of plastic materials, especially PVC and neoprene, has been minimized. In electrical specifications, all materials are required to be self-extinguishing and non-propagating when exposed to fire and flames, to the extent practical.
| |
| Fiberglass-reinforced plastic (FRP) floating covers are used in the boric acid, recovery test and reactor makeup water tanks. The FRP skin on the polyurethane foam core has a flame spread rating of 100 which is equivalent to that of redwood. In normal operation the tanks will be at least partially filled with water and the covers will be in full contact with water. The probability of initiating combustion in the cover under this condition and having the combustion spread is extremely low.
| |
| Fiberglass-reinforced plastic is used for the chemical drain, chemical drain treatment, and seal water supply tanks. Each tank is located in a separate cubicle. In the highly unlikely event of combustion igniting the tank, the flame would be extinguished at the tank water level.
| |
| Plastic spent fuel pool and reactor cavity skimmers are partially immersed in water and, therefore, not a fire hazard.
| |
| Batteries in the four battery rooms of the Control Building, one battery room in the Turbine Building and two battery rooms in the Relay Room are fabricated with plastic. The containers will contain the electrolyte solution.
| |
| Fibercast Factory Manual (FM) approved pipe and fittings are being used in the fire protection underground piping system. This use of Fiberglass-reinforced pipe does not create an unacceptable fire hazard.
| |
| | |
| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev. 19 STATION Appendix A Section F.3 Responses To BTP APCSB 9.5-1 Page 49 PVC piping and polyethylene containers are used in the Fire Pump House as part of the chlorine addition system for the Fire Protection Water Storage Tanks. These materials are used because the Sodium Hypochlorite is not compatible with carbon steel equipment. This material is being installed in a sprinkler area. Therefore, it does not create an unacceptable fire hazard.
| |
| Fiberglass-reinforced plastic (FRP) piping is used in the Air Removal System from the Waterbox Priming Drop Out Tank to the Priming pumps to eliminate the corrosion experienced with carbon steel equipment. This piping is only installed in sprinkler areas of the Turbine Building.
| |
| Therefore, it does not create a unacceptable fire hazard.
| |
| Polyethylene (plastic) high integrity containers (HIC) in steel overpacks are used to hold spent resins in the drum storage area of the Waster Processing building. Because the HICs are contained in the steel overpacks, the HICs are not a fire hazard and will not add to the combustible loading of the building.
| |
| Vendor-supplied Leased Makeup Water Treatment System piping and conduit is plastic. The room has sprinklers and is cut off from the Administration Building by CMU block walls. The installation is therefore acceptable.
| |
| The Waste Processing Building air filters 1-WAH-F-11 and 1-WAH-F-170 contain filter cores that are three-inch, schedule 40, PVC. The PVC cores may be installed on the filter supply and take-up reels if metal filter cores are not available. A filter fire would not adversely affect the ability to achieve and maintain shutdown in the event of a fire. It is preferable to install non-PVC roll filter cores in these filters.
| |
| APCSB 9.5-1, App. A Page Paragraph 17 D.2 (d)
| |
| Storage of Flammable Liquids Storage of flammable liquids should as a minimum, comply with the requirements of NFPA 30, Flammable and Combustible Liquids Code.
| |
| | |
| ===Response===
| |
| Storage of flammable liquids complies with the requirements of NFPA 30, Flammable and Combustible Liquids Code in the design and venting of tanks.
| |
| | |
| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev. 19 STATION Appendix A Section F.3 Responses To BTP APCSB 9.5-1 Page 50 APCSB 9.5-1, App. A Page Paragraph 18 D.3 (a)
| |
| Electric Cable Construction, Cable Trays and Cable Penetrations Cable Tray Construction Only non-combustible materials should be used for cable tray construction.
| |
| | |
| ===Response===
| |
| All cable trays are of unpainted galvanized steel construction except for cable trays used in the 345 kV switchyard enclosure area which are of unpainted aluminum construction.
| |
| APCSB 9.5-1, App. A Page Paragraph 18 D.3(b)
| |
| Cable Spreading Rooms See Section F.3 for fire protection guidelines for cable spreading rooms.
| |
| | |
| ===Response===
| |
| See response to APCSB 9.5-1, Appendix A, Section F.3 on cable spreading room.
| |
| | |
| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev. 19 STATION Appendix A Section F.3 Responses To BTP APCSB 9.5-1 Page 51 APCSB 9.5-1; App. A Page Paragraph 18 D.3 (c)
| |
| Cable Trays Outside Cable Spreading Rooms Automatic water sprinkler systems should be provided for cable trays outside the cable spreading room. Cables should be designed to allow wetting down with deluge water without electrical faulting. Manual hose stations and portable hand extinguishers should be provided as backup.
| |
| Safety related equipment in the vicinity of such cable trays, that does not itself require water fire protection, but is subject to unacceptable damage from sprinkler water discharge, should be protected from sprinkler system operation or malfunction.
| |
| | |
| ===Response===
| |
| Water based fire protection systems are provided for cable trays except for trays containing only instrumentation cables, in the cable spreading room, cable chases, electrical tunnels, penetration areas outside of containment and elevation 25-0 of the primary auxiliary building. Manual hose stations and portable extinguishers are provided as backup in these areas and all other areas.
| |
| However, automatic water sprinkler systems are not provided in other areas for the reasons stated below.
| |
| The cables to be used will be self extinguishing, non-propagating and, as a minimum, will pass the IEEE-383-1974 flame test. Control and instrumentation cables cannot ignite from overloading or grounds since the maximum fault is insufficient to heat the insulation to the flash point. Power cables can carry sufficient fault current to reach the flash point of the cable insulation; however, protective relaying on the switchgear circuits will respond to fault currents and open the circuit before enough heating has occurred to damage the cable insulation and start a fire. For additional protection, interlocked armored cable will be used for all 15 kV cables and those 5 kV cables which are routed in trays except cables for the Supplemental Emergency Power System (SEPS). Cables for the SEPS are triplex cables routed in solid bottom trays with solid covers. The redundant safety divisions are separated in accordance with Attachment C of AEC letter dated 12/14/73 Physical Independence of Electric Systems and the fire hazard analysis has assured that both divisions can not be incapacitated by a single fire.
| |
| Cables are designed for wet and dry locations without electrical faulting.
| |
| | |
| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev. 19 STATION Appendix A Section F.3 Responses To BTP APCSB 9.5-1 Page 52 APCSB 9.5-1, App. A Page Paragraph 18 D.3 (d)
| |
| Cable and Cable Tray Penetration of Fire Barriers Cable and cable tray penetration of fire barriers (vertical and horizontal) should be sealed to give protection at least equivalent to that fire barrier. The design of fire barriers for horizontal and vertical cable trays should, minimum meet the requirements of ASTM E-119, Fire Test of Building Construction and Materials, including the hose stream test.
| |
| | |
| ===Response===
| |
| Penetrations of fire barriers by cable and cable trays are sealed with materials providing a fire resistance rating at least equal to that designated for the fire barrier. The fire seals, as a minimum, meet the requirements of ASTM E-119, Fire Test of Building Construction and Materials.
| |
| APCSB 9.5-1, App. A Page Paragraph 18 D.3 (e)
| |
| Fire Breaks Fire breaks should be provided as deemed necessary by the fire hazards analysis. Flame or flame retardant coatings may be used as a fire break for grouped electrical cables to limit spread of fire in cable ventings. (Possible cable derating owing to use of such coating materials must be considered during design.)
| |
| | |
| ===Response===
| |
| Fire breaks are not provided in horizontal tray runs between the fire barriers, based on fire hazard analysis.
| |
| Fire stop locations in vertical cable tray runs were selected on the bases of limiting materially
| |
| : 1) the spread of fire via a vertical cable tray and 2) the resultant damage due to a fire in a vertical cable tray run.
| |
| | |
| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev. 19 STATION Appendix A Section F.3 Responses To BTP APCSB 9.5-1 Page 53 The following guidelines were employed:
| |
| a) Horizontal offsets >1 foot were considered to end vertical cable tray runs.
| |
| b) Fire stops were not installed where cable tray fire suppression was present regardless of length of vertical run.
| |
| c) In vertical cable tray runs >25 feet, fire stops were placed to limit the spread of fire to not more than 35 feet. In fact more than two thirds of the vertical runs between fire stops are approximately 25 feet or less. The remaining vertical runs between fire stops vary from about 28 feet to about 35 feet. Where practical in vertical cable tray runs greater than 25 feet, fire stop locations were adjusted to floor elevations.
| |
| APCSB 9.5-1, App. A Page Paragraph 19 D.3 (f)
| |
| Flame Test of Electric Cables Electric cable constructions should as a minimum pass the current IEEE No. 383 flame test.
| |
| (This does not imply that cables passing this test will not require additional fire protection.)
| |
| | |
| ===Response===
| |
| The majority of the control cable construction used is at a minimum qualified to the IEEE-383 (1974) flame test. Non-IEEE 383 control cable and wiring is used in some locations and is considered to be insignificant. Examples of non-IEEE 383 cable and wiring uses include vendor supplied wiring under the computer room floor; detector cable for Lubricating Oil and Turbine Bearing running above elevation 75 of the Turbine Building; Excore Neutron Monitoring Cable Assemblies; various telephone wiring; and wiring within some pre-wired cabinets, such as the Main Plant Computer System Cabinets in the Computer Room.
| |
| Power cable is qualified to the IEEE-383 (1974) flame test.
| |
| | |
| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev. 19 STATION Appendix A Section F.3 Responses To BTP APCSB 9.5-1 Page 54 APCSB 9.5-1, App. A Page Paragraph 19 D.3 (g)
| |
| Corrosive Gases from Cables To the extent practical, cable construction that does not give off corrosive gases while burning should be used.
| |
| | |
| ===Response===
| |
| There is no objective standard corrosion test available. From the presently available tests, results are subject to individual judgement and are not repeatable. Available copper mirror test date was reviewed prior to award of the cable order.
| |
| APCSB 9.5-1, App. A Page Paragraph 19 D.3 (h)
| |
| Content of Cable Trays, Raceways, Conduit, Trenches and Culverts Cable trays, raceways, conduit, trenches, or culverts should be used only for cables.
| |
| Miscellaneous storage should not be permitted, nor should piping for flammable or combustible liquids or gases be installed in these areas.
| |
| | |
| ===Response===
| |
| Electrical cable trays, raceways, conduit, or trenches are normally used exclusively for cables.
| |
| No piping for flammable or combustible liquids or gases are installed in these areas. The introduction of combustible materials into these areas are reviewed by Engineering and administratively controlled to ensure that safety related systems will not be impacted. The use of combustible materials has been minimized to the extent practical. The use of combustible materials in these areas is as follows:
| |
| Nylon 11 tubing (Imperial Eastman Nylo-Seal) has been installed in conduits and junction boxes with cables which service non-safety related plant equipment. This tubing supports the Chemical Analysis System Hydrogen detection sensors which monitor the Excess Letdown Hx and Letdown Hx compartments, and the Valve Room in containment for Hydrogen concentrations below 50% of the lowest explosive limit. Since the tubing is routed in conduit which does not service equipment required for accident mitigation or post accident monitoring, the probability of initiating combustion and having the combustion impact a safety system is extremely low.
| |
| | |
| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev. 19 STATION Appendix A Section F.3 Responses To BTP APCSB 9.5-1 Page 55 APCSB 9.5-1, App. A Page Paragraph 19 D.3 (i)
| |
| Smoke Venting of Cable Tunnels, Culverts and Spreading Rooms The design of cable tunnels, culverts and spreading rooms should provide for automatic or manual smoke venting as required to facilitate manual fire fighting capability.
| |
| | |
| ===Response===
| |
| Manual smoke venting is provided in the cable spreading rooms and cable tunnels, but not for the containment electrical penetration area. The present ventilation system in this penetration area consists of recirculation air cooling units which have no exhaust capability. Portable fans will be used by the fire brigade for smoke removal if necessary.
| |
| The design of cable tunnels and spreading room provides for manual smoke venting, as required to facilitate manual fire fighting capability.
| |
| APCSB 9.5-1, App. A Page Paragraph 19 D.3 (j)
| |
| Control Room Cables Cables in the control room should be kept to the minimum necessary for operation of the control room. All cables entering the control room should terminate there. Cable should not be installed in floor trenches or culverts in the control room.
| |
| | |
| ===Response===
| |
| The control room is not used as a raceway for cables between other rooms or buildings. Cables entering the control room are terminated there. Cables routed to the control room are the minimum necessary for operation of the units.
| |
| A floor trench, less than one square foot in cross section, connects the computer room to the control room and leads to a trench under the main control board. It accommodates low voltage signal cables.
| |
| A second floor trench, less than one square foot in cross section, connects the computer room to the control room and leads to auxiliary control consoles in the control room. It accommodates low voltage signal cables. Both of the above trenches between the computer room and the control room total less than one square foot in cross sectional area.
| |
| | |
| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev. 19 STATION Appendix A Section F.3 Responses To BTP APCSB 9.5-1 Page 56 APCSB 9.5-1, App. A Page Paragraph 20 D.4 (a)
| |
| Ventilation Discharge of Products of Combustion The products of combustion that need to be removed from a specific fire area should be evaluated to determine how they will be controlled. Smoke and corrosive gases should generally be automatically discharged directly outside to a safe location. Smoke and gases containing radioactive materials should be monitored in the fire area to determine if release to the environment is within the permissible limits of the plant technical specifications.
| |
| | |
| ===Response===
| |
| The products of combustion that need to be removed from a specific fire area have been evaluated as part of our fire hazard analysis.
| |
| All fire areas are exhausted through the normal plant ventilation system, if available and practical, in the event of a fire. Portable exhausters are available to remove smoke and corrosive gases from fire areas in case of closure of ventilation fire dampers. The exhausts from the radioactive areas are monitored by permanently installed radiation instrumentation. High radiation is alarmed in the control room. Additionally, portable radiation instrumentation can be used if necessary. Should the products of combustion contain radioactivity above the permissible limits of the plant technical specifications, the exhaust of the products of combustion will be terminated until adequate cleanup can be conducted.
| |
| | |
| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev. 19 STATION Appendix A Section F.3 Responses To BTP APCSB 9.5-1 Page 57 APCSB 9.5-1, App. A Page Paragraph 20 D.4 (b)
| |
| Evaluation of Inadvertent Operation or Single Failures Any ventilation system designed to exhaust smoke or corrosive gases should be evaluated to ensure that inadvertent operation or single failures will not violate the controlled areas of the plant design. This requirement includes containment functions for protection of the public and maintaining habitability of operations personnel.
| |
| | |
| ===Response===
| |
| There is no ventilation system designed specifically to exhaust smoke or corrosive gases; normal ventilation is designed so there is no possibility for an inadvertent operation or single failure to violate the plant controlled areas.
| |
| The plant ventilation system is designed to ensure containment capability during a single failure or inadvertent operation without violating the controlled areas or endangering the public or operating personnel.
| |
| | |
| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev. 19 STATION Appendix A Section F.3 Responses To BTP APCSB 9.5-1 Page 58 APCSB 9.5-1, App. A Page Paragraph 20 D.4 (c)
| |
| Power Supply and Controls The power supply and controls for mechanical ventilation systems should be run outside the fire area served by the system.
| |
| | |
| ===Response===
| |
| All mechanical ventilation equipment is located in mechanical equipment rooms. The power supply and controls for the mechanical ventilation systems are generally run outside the fire area served by the system, with the following exceptions:
| |
| The power supply and controls of the ventilation system for the A Train switchgear room is supplied from a motor control center in that room. A similar system fed from a B Train motor control center ventilates the B Train switchgear room. The control cables are routed in separated paths through the cable spreading room.
| |
| Ventilation of the cable spreading room is controlled by cables passing through the cable spreading room, but its power feed is routed outside the spreading room. The control cables for the cable spreading room ventilation fans are run through the cable spreading room since it is not feasible to bring the control cables into the main control room except via the cable spreading room.
| |
| It is necessary to locate the power supply to each 4 kV switchgear room ventilation fan in its switchgear area because it is not feasible to do otherwise. In addition, fire detection and manual fire protection are provided in the areas.
| |
| | |
| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev. 19 STATION Appendix A Section F.3 Responses To BTP APCSB 9.5-1 Page 59 APCSB 9.5-1, App. A Page Paragraph 20 D.4 (d)
| |
| Protection of Charcoal Filters Fire suppression systems should be installed to protect charcoal filters in accordance with Regulatory Guide 1.52, Design Testing and Maintenance Criteria for Atmospheric Clean-Up Air Filtration.
| |
| | |
| ===Response===
| |
| Charcoal filters provided for this project are not equipped with fire suppression systems.
| |
| Ref.: SBN-1208, dated October 9, 1986 and SBN-97O, dated March 18, 1986.
| |
| Revision Regulatory Guide 1.52, dated July 1976, states that a single failure-proof low flow air bleed system or other cooling mechanisms is acceptable to prevent excessive temperature rise in the charcoal filter bed.
| |
| A low flow air bleed system, which meets the requirements of R.G. 1.52, is provided for the following safety-related charcoal filters:
| |
| Filter No. System Low Flow Air Source EAH-F-9 & Containment Enclosure Emergency By-Pass Air from Redundant EAH-E-69 Exhaust (Redundant Filter and Fans) Fan FAH-F-41 & Fuel Storage Building Exhaust Unit By-Pass Air from Redundant FAH-F-74 (Redundant Filter and Fans) Fan CBA-F-38 & Control Room Emergency Clean Up Unit By-Pass Air from Redundant CBA-F-8038 (Redundant Filter and Fans) Fan The following non-safety-related charcoal filters do not meet the guidelines of R.G. 1.52.
| |
| However, per Reference SBN-970, Deviation No. 13 and SBN-l208, no fire would result from loss of air flow across these charcoal filters.
| |
| Filter No. System CAH-F-8 Containment Recirculation Unit PAH-F-16 PAB Nominal Exhaust Unit CAP-F-40 Containment On-Line Purge Unit All the charcoal filters, both safety and non-safety, are provided with temperature alarms and carbon monoxide alarms in the Control Room.
| |
| | |
| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev. 19 STATION Appendix A Section F.3 Responses To BTP APCSB 9.5-1 Page 60 APCSB 9.5-1, App. A Page Paragraph 20 D.4 (e)
| |
| Fresh Air Supply Intakes The fresh air supply intakes to areas containing safety related equipment or systems should be located remote from the exhaust air outlets and smoke vents of other fire areas to minimize the possibility of contaminating the intake air with the products of combustion.
| |
| | |
| ===Response===
| |
| All buildings satisfy the above requirements. In addition, the fresh air intakes for the control room which provide air for ventilation and pressurization are obtained from two locations remote from exhaust air outlets and smoke vents of other fire areas. These are the only sources of supply air to the control room.
| |
| APCSB 9.5-1, App. A Page Paragraph 21 D.4 (f)
| |
| Stairwells Stairwells should be designed to minimize smoke infiltration during a fire. Staircases should serve as escape routes and access routes for fire fighting. Fire exit routes should be clearly marked. Stairwells, elevators and chutes should be enclosed in masonry towers with minimum fire rating of three hours and automatic fire doors at least equal to the enclosure construction, at each opening into the building. Elevators should not be used during fire emergencies.
| |
| | |
| ===Response===
| |
| Stairwells are designed to minimize smoke infiltration during a fire, and to serve as escape and access routes in the event of a fire. Fire exits are clearly marked and established by pre-fire plan.
| |
| Stairways, designated as fire access or egress routes, except in the primary containment structure, are enclosed with fire barriers having a designated fire resistance rating of at least three hours (2 hours for the Administration Building), and have approved automatic fire door assemblies rated at a minimum of one and one-half hours.
| |
| | |
| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev. 19 STATION Appendix A Section F.3 Responses To BTP APCSB 9.5-1 Page 61 APCSB 9.5-1, App. A Page Paragraph 21 D.4(g)
| |
| Smoke and Heat Vents Smoke and heat vents may be useful in specific areas such as cable spreading rooms and diesel fuel oil storage areas and switchgear rooms. When natural-convection ventilation is used, a minimum ratio of 1 square foot of venting area per 200 square feet of floor area should be provided. If forced-convection ventilation is used, 300 CFM should be provided for every 200 square feet of floor area. See NFPA No. 204 for additional guidance on smoke control.
| |
| | |
| ===Response===
| |
| Smoke and heat vents have generally not been used since the normal ventilation system for potentially affected area can be manually controlled and can be used for smoke and heat venting, unless the fire damper in the fire wall closes due to excessive heat. Portable exhausters are available to remove smoke and heat upon closure of the ventilation fire dampers.
| |
| The normal ventilation exhaust system for the cable spreading room and switchgear rooms can be utilized for smoke and heat relief. The cable spreading room and each switchgear room is supplied air from its own supply fan, and air is exhausted from each area by its own exhaust fan.
| |
| Ventilation air can be drawn into the cable spreading room or switchgear rooms by opening doors. Air would be exhausted through the affected room exhaust system.
| |
| The supply air system will be manually shut down if smoke or radiation is detected in the supply plenum of the PAB.
| |
| | |
| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev. 19 STATION Appendix A Section F.3 Responses To BTP APCSB 9.5-1 Page 62 APCSB 9.5-1, App. A Page Paragraph 21 D.4 (h)
| |
| Self-Contained Breathing Apparatus Self-contained breathing apparatus, using full face positive pressure masks, approved by NIOSH (National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health -approval formerly given by the U.S.
| |
| Bureau of Mines) should be provided for fire brigade, damage control and control room personnel. Control room personnel may be furnished breathing air by a manifold system piped from a storage reservoir if practical. Service or operating life should be a minimum of one half hour for the self-contained units.
| |
| At least two extra air bottles should be located on-site for each self-contained breathing unit. In addition, an on-site six hour supply of reserve air should be provided and arranged to permit quick and complete replenishment of exhausted supply air bottles as they are returned. If compressors are used as a source of breathing air, only units approved for breathing air should be used. Special care must be taken to locate the compressor in areas free of dust and containments.
| |
| | |
| ===Response===
| |
| Self-contained breathing apparatus using full face positive pressure masks and approved by NIOSH have been provided for fire fighting, damage control and control room personnel. These units have a minimum operating life of one-half hour and have been distributed in the control room and the fire brigade lockers. At least two extra air bottles for these units, each with a minimum operating life of one-half hour, are located on-site. The plant also has a respiratory air compressor for recharging the air bottles on-site. The air compressor is located in an area free of dust and contaminants.
| |
| | |
| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev. 19 STATION Appendix A Section F.3 Responses To BTP APCSB 9.5-1 Page 63 APCSB 9.5-1, App. A Page Paragraph 22 D.4(i)
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| Total Flooding Gas Extinguishing Systems Where total flooding gas extinguishing systems are used, area intake and exhaust ventilation dampers should close upon initiation of gas flow to maintain necessary gas concentration. (See NFPA 12, Carbon Dioxide System and 12A, Halon 1301 Systems).
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| | |
| ===Response===
| |
| Areas having Halon 1301 gas extinguishing systems are provided with automatic damper closures in the supply and exhaust ducts, initiated from the Halon control panel upon actuation of the system in conformance to NFPA-12A.
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| APCSB 9.5-1, App. A Page Paragraph 22 D.5 Lighting and Communication Lighting and two way voice communication are vital to safe shutdown and emergency response in the event of fire. Suitable fixed and portable emergency lighting and communication devices should be provided to satisfy the following requirements:
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| (a) Fixed emergency lighting should consist of sealed beam units with individual 8-hour minimum battery power supplies.
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| (b) Suitable sealed beam battery powered portable hand lights should be provided for emergency use.
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| (c) Fixed emergency communication should use voice powered head sets at pre-selected stations.
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| (d) Fixed repeaters installed to permit use of portable radio communication units should be protected from exposure fire damage.
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| | |
| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev. 19 STATION Appendix A Section F.3 Responses To BTP APCSB 9.5-1 Page 64
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| | |
| ===Response===
| |
| (a) The following tabulation identifies lighting systems available at each area required to be manned for safe shutdown of the reactor.
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| Normal Essential Area Lighting Lighting Emergency Lighting
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| : 1. Control Room Yes Train A & B Diesel Generator powered fluorescent fixtures (Train A & B) per deviation request transmittal by letter SBN-932 Battery Packs (8 hour)
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| : 2. Train A Switchgear Room Yes Train A & B Diesel Generator powered fluorescent fixtures (Train B) per deviation request transmitted by letter SBN-932 Battery Packs (8 hour)
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| : 3. Train B Switchgear Room Yes Train A & B Diesel Generator powered fluorescent fixtures (Train B) per deviation request transmitted by letter SBN-932 Battery Packs (8 hour)
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| : 4. Diesel Generator Room A Yes Train A & B Battery Packs (8 hours)
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| : 5. Diesel Generator Room B Yes Train A & B Battery Packs (8 hours)
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| : 6. PAB Boric Acid Tank Yes Train B Battery Packs (8 hours)
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| Room
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| : 7. PAB Charging Pump Rm. Yes Train B Battery Packs (8 hours)
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| CS-P-2A
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| : 8. PAB Charging Pump Rm. Yes Train B Battery Packs (8 hours)
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| CS-P-2B
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| : 9. PAB DG Heat Exchanger Yes Train B Battery Packs (8 hours)
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| Area - Valve SW-V-l7
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| : 10. Mechanical Yes Train B Battery Packs (8 hours)
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| : 11. Turbine Bldg. Main Fl. Yes Train A Battery Packs (8 hours)
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| Valves SCC-V138 and SCC-Vl39
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| : 12. Condensate Storage Tank Yes None Battery Packs (8 hours)
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| NW Valve Room
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| : 13. Non-Essential Yes Train A Battery Packs (8 hours)
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| : 14. Control Rm. HVAC Yes None Battery Packs (8 hours)
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| Equip. Rm.
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| | |
| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev. 19 STATION Appendix A Section F.3 Responses To BTP APCSB 9.5-1 Page 65 In compliance with 10CFR Part 50, Appendix R, Section III-J, all the above areas are also provided with eight-hour-rated self-contained battery packs with sealed beam units for access and egress lighting. All other plant areas are provided with 11/2 hour rated self-contained battery packs with sealed beam units for egress lighting.
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| The extent of the compliance to above requirements refer to Deviation No. 10, SBN-932, dated March 18, 1986.
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| (b) Fire brigade and operation personnel required to achieve safe plant shutdown have been provided with suitable battery-powered, portable hand lights.
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| (c) For those events which require Control Room evacuation, we have identified the following areas as requiring manning to achieve and maintain cold shutdown.
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| Switchgear Rooms A and B Diesel Generator Control Panels A and B In addition, there are other areas (e.g., Boric Acid Tank Room) where one time actions (e.g., valve operation) may be necessary.
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| The remote shutdown locations identified above share a dedicated sound powered telephone channel (headphones are provided as necessary to assure effective communications). Each location also has access to a dedicated paging station. There is also an extension from the station telephone system near each location.
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| (d) The station trunked radio system is designed to provide communications between all areas of the station via hand-held portable radios. The radio system would provide communication to those areas noted in (c) as requiring one time actions.
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| The trunked radio system equipment (trunking controller, repeaters, and RF mixing rack) is powered from Unit 1 non-safety power system. Back-up power is provided by the Train A emergency diesel generator and a dedicated battery rated for 2-hour use.
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| Portable units are powered by rechargeable batteries.
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| The trunked radio system equipment (trunking controller, repeaters, and RF mixing rack) is protected from exposure to possible fire damage.
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| | |
| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev. 19 STATION Appendix A Section F.3 Responses To BTP APCSB 9.5-1 Page 66 E. Fire Detection and Suppression APCSB 9.5-1, App. A Page Paragraph 23 E.1 Fire Detection (a) Fire detection systems should as a minimum comply with NFPA 72D, Standard for the Installation, Maintenance and Use of Proprietary Protective Signaling Systems.
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| (b) Fire detection systems should give audible and visual alarm and annunciation in the control room. Local audible alarms should also sound at the location of the fire.
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| (c) Fire alarms should be distinctive and unique. They should not be capable of being confused with any other plant system alarms.
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| (d) Fire detection and actuation systems should be connected to the plant emergency power supply.
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| | |
| ===Response===
| |
| (a) The fire detection system will comply with NFPA 72D as follows:
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| The fire detection system provides in the main control room distinctive displays of either fire or trouble for each fire control panel. Each change in status is recorded on hard copy for record purposes. The record identifies time, date, and occurrence.
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| Inspection and tests of automatic fire detectors is conducted in accordance with Chapter 8 of NFPA 72E (1987). Due to the lack of combustibles, detectors have not been provided above the suspended ceiling in the control room. Reference Deviation 16, SBN-970, dated March 18, 1986.
| |
| The electronic fire detection and alarm system employs a multiplexed reporting system using a multi-conductor data bus to interconnect different fire zones. Circuits have been arranged such that a single break or a single ground fault in the wiring will not result in a false alarm signal.
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| An open circuit will not prevent transmission on either side of the fault. The system is checked against open circuit by means of periodic maintenance tests.
| |
| A ground or a short circuit will be alarmed automatically as a system trouble alarm.
| |
| Fire detecting equipment is installed in accordance with Paragraph 2-6 of NFPA 72E, Automatic Fire Detectors.
| |
| | |
| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev. 19 STATION Appendix A Section F.3 Responses To BTP APCSB 9.5-1 Page 67 The circuit arrangement, system equipment and trunk capacities of the multiplexed fire detection system complies with the requirements of Table A of Article 430.
| |
| (b) The fire detection system gives an alarm locally at its control panel and an audible and a visual alarm in the main control room. Furthermore, the plant PA system will be utilized to warn personnel for a fire in an area. The trouble signals are similarly annunciated at the same locations.
| |
| (c) Fire alarms are distinctive and unique. They are not capable of being confused with any other plant system alarms.
| |
| (d) The fire detection alarm panels on Main Control Board are fed by the 120V A-C uninterruptible power bus. Alarm data loop is powered by the emergency diesel. Power to local detectors and local panels is provided by the 120V A-C emergency diesel bus where available. Each local panel has built-in battery backup.
| |
| APCSB 9.5-1, App. A Page Paragraph 23 E.2 (a)
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| Fire Protection Water Supply Systems Yard Fire Main Loop An underground yard fire main loop should be installed to furnish anticipated fire water requirements. NFPA 24, Standard for Outside Protection, gives necessary guidance for such installation. It references other design codes and standards developed by such organizations as the American National Standards Institute (ANSI) and the American Water Works Association (AWA). Lined steel or cast iron pipe should be used to reduce internal tuberculation. Such tuberculation deposits in an unlined pipe over a period of years can significantly reduce water flow through the combination of increased friction and reduced pipe diameter. Means for treating and flushing the systems should be provided. Approved visually indicating sectional control valves, such as post indicator valves, should be provided to isolate portions of the main for maintenance or repair without shutting off the entire system.
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| The fire main system piping should be separate from service or sanitary water system piping.
| |
| | |
| ===Response===
| |
| The underground fire main loop was designed to furnish the anticipated fire water requirements using published codes and standards for guidance as enumerated above.
| |
| | |
| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev. 19 STATION Appendix A Section F.3 Responses To BTP APCSB 9.5-1 Page 68 The pipe material is cement-lined welded steel pipe, (except the feed to the General Office Building outside the Protected Area which is plastic pipe and the underground feed to the Mechanical Maintenance Storage Facility, and the RCA Storage Facility which is Fibercast, Factory Mutual (FM) approved, Class 1614, pipe.) to reduce internal tuberculation, coated and wrapped on the outside with bituminous coal tar paint and paper wrapping.
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| Water from the town of Seabrook water system is used to fill the fire water tanks. A metering pump automatically injects sodium hypochlorite into the fire water tank fill line as required.
| |
| Flushing of the entire system will be accomplished by discharging water through selected hydrants.
| |
| Sections of the main can be isolated, during periods of maintenance and repair, by closing, approved visually-indicating, sectional post indicator valves. The fire main system piping serves the fire protection system exclusively.
| |
| APCSB 9.5-1, App. A Page Paragraph 24 E.2 (b)
| |
| Multiple Units Fire Protection Water Supply Systems A common yard fire main loop may serve multi-unit nuclear power plant sites, if cross-connected between units. Sectional control valves should permit maintaining independence of the individual loop around each unit. For such installations, common water supplies may also be utilized. The water supply should be sized for the largest single expected flow. For multiple reactor sites with widely separated plants (approaching 1 mile or so), separate yard fire main loops should be used.
| |
| | |
| ===Response===
| |
| The yard fire main system consists of a single loop with cross-connection between units. Unit 2 construction has been stopped, however some Unit 2 buildings have active water suppression systems installed for property loss conservation. Post indicating valves are provided to allow maintenance of a portion of the loop, if required. The water supply is sized for the largest single expected flow including 500 gpm for manual hose streams. The fire water piping main is supplied from three independent discharge lines, one from each fire pump. These lines feed in two directions to supply water to each half of the looped plant fire main piping.
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| | |
| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev. 19 STATION Appendix A Section F.3 Responses To BTP APCSB 9.5-1 Page 69 APCSB 9.5-1, App. A Page Paragraph 25 E.2 (c)
| |
| Fire Pump Installation If pumps are required to meet system pressure or flow requirements, a sufficient number of pumps should be provided so that 100% capacity will be available with one pump inactive (e.g. three 50% pumps or two 100% pumps). The connection to the yard fire main loop from each fire pump should be widely separated, preferably located on opposite sides of the plant.
| |
| Each pump should have its own driver with independent power supplies and control. At least one pump (if not powered from the emergency diesels) should be driven by non-electrical means, preferably diesel engine. Pump and drivers should be located in rooms separated from the remaining pumps and equipment by a minimum three-hour fire wall. Alarms indicating pump running, driver availability, or failure to start should be provided in the control room.
| |
| Details of the fire pump installation should as a minimum conform to NFPA 20 Standard for the Installation of Centrifugal Fire Pumps.
| |
| | |
| ===Response===
| |
| The fire protection system has three 50% pumps. During a fire, water is supplied by operation of one (1) motor driven pump and one (1) diesel engine-driven pump with the second diesel engine-driven pump functioning as a spare. At all times 100% capacity is available with one 50% pump inactive.
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| Fire pump discharge connections to the yard fire main loop are not located on opposite sides of the plant. Each fire pump discharges to an outside manifold with independent sectional valves.
| |
| The yard fire main loop is supplied in two directions from the outside manifold arranged to discharge to either half of the loop.
| |
| Each pump has its own driver with independent power supplies and control. There are 3 hour rated fire barrier walls between each of the three fire pumps. Each of the fire pumps with its controller is in a separate fire area.
| |
| Remote indication and alarm is provided in the control room for engine failure to start, low lube oil pressure, high engine jacket water temperature, engine overspeed, A-C power failure and battery failure.
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| | |
| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev. 19 STATION Appendix A Section F.3 Responses To BTP APCSB 9.5-1 Page 70 APCSB 9.5-1, App. A Page Paragraph 25 E.2 (d)
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| Fire Water Supplies Two separate reliable water supplies should be provided. If tanks are used, two 100% (minimum of 300,000 gallons each) system capacity tanks should be installed. They should be so interconnected that pumps can take suction from either or both. However, a leak in one tank or its piping should not cause both tanks to drain. The main plant fire water supply capacity should be capable of refilling either tank in a minimum of eight hours.
| |
| Common tanks are permitted for fire and sanitary or service water storage. When this is done, however, minimum fire water storage requirements should be dedicated by means of a vertical standpipe for other water sources.
| |
| | |
| ===Response===
| |
| The water supply for the fire protection system is stored in two 500,000 gallon tanks.
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| 300,000 gallons in each tank is reserved exclusively for fire protection by means of vertical standpipes for other water sources. This standpipe extends up to the 300,000 gallon level in each tank and provides a source of water for non-fire protection service. The Technical Requirement minimum volume of water in each tank is 215,000 gallons.
| |
| The suction piping to the three fire pumps is arranged to permit suction from either or both of the two fire water storage tanks.
| |
| The manual valves in the suction piping to the fire pumps and in the relief valve header permit isolation of either storage tank.
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| The plants fire water supply system is capable of refilling either tank in eight hours to the 300,000 gallon level.
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| | |
| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev. 19 STATION Appendix A Section F.3 Responses To BTP APCSB 9.5-1 Page 71 APCSB 9.5-1, App. A Page Paragraph 26 E.2 (e)
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| Fire Water Supply Design Bases The fire water supply (total capacity and flow rate) should be calculated on the basis of the largest expected flow rate for a period of two hours, but not less than 300,000 gallons. This flow rate should be based (conservatively) on 1,000 GPM for manual hose streams plus the greater of:
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| (1) all sprinkler heads opened and flowing in the largest designed fire area; or (2) the largest open head deluge system(s) operating.
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| | |
| ===Response===
| |
| The two (2) 500,000 gallon tanks, with 300,000 gallons per tank dedicated for fire protection supply capacity meet the above requirements for hose streams plus the largest demand on a safety related area. Reference Deviation No. 9, SBN 932, dated January 24, 1986. Deviation No. 9 of SBN-932 indicated that the largest demand safety related area was the Diesel Generator Room. Per EC274103, it has since been determined that the largest demand safety related area is the PAB. This does not alter the conclusion of this paragraph or the commitment of this response.
| |
| The flow from two fire pumps, each sized to deliver 1,500 GPM at a discharge head of 130 PSI, exceeds the above requirements.
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| | |
| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev. 19 STATION Appendix A Section F.3 Responses To BTP APCSB 9.5-1 Page 72 APCSB 9.5-1, App. A Page Paragraph 26 E.2 (f)
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| Lakes or Ponds as Sources Lakes or fresh water ponds of sufficient size may qualify as sole source of water for fire protection, but require at least two intakes to the pump supply. When a common water supply is permitted for fire protection and the ultimate heat sink, the following conditions should also be satisfied.
| |
| (1) the additional fire protection water requirements are designed into the total storage capacity; and (2) failure of the fire protection system should not degrade the function of the ultimate heat sink.
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| | |
| ===Response===
| |
| Lakes or fresh water ponds are not utilized as a source of fire protection.
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| | |
| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev. 19 STATION Appendix A Section F.3 Responses To BTP APCSB 9.5-1 Page 73 APCSB 9.5-1, App. A Page Paragraph 27 E.2(g)
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| Outside Hose Installations Outside manual hose installation should be sufficient to reach any location with an effective hose stream. To accomplish this hydrants should be installed approximately every 250 feet on the yard main system. The lateral to each hydrant from the yard main should be controlled by a visually indicating or key operated (curb) valve. A hose house, equipped with hose and combination nozzle, and other auxiliary equipment recommended in NFPA 24, Outside Protection, should be provided as needed but at least every 1000 feet.
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| Threads compatible with those used by local fire departments should be provided on all hydrants, hose couplings and standpipe risers.
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| | |
| ===Response===
| |
| Factory mutual approved, or UL listed fire hydrants equipped with 6 inlet and two (2) 21/2 hose connections are located throughout the plant site. These hydrants are supplied from the main fire loop through a 6 branch line with shut-off valve and valve box to grade. The hydrants are so located that no structure is jeopardized by hydrant spacing, due to plant layout, in excess of 250 feet, since they are within 50 feet of any structure. Hose houses are provided at designated hydrant locations.
| |
| Each hose house is equipped with 250 feet of 21/2 woven jacket lined fire hose and other auxiliary equipment recommended in NFPA No. 24, Outside Protection.
| |
| All 21/2 and larger threads used on standpipe risers, hose couplings and hydrants are American Standard (National) threads and all 11/2 threads are Iron Pipe Thread (IPT). The threads are compatible with equipment used by the local fire department.
| |
| There is a wall hydrant with two 21/2 hose connections located on the west side of the Mechanical Maintenance Storage Facility.
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| | |
| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev. 19 STATION Appendix A Section F.3 Responses To BTP APCSB 9.5-1 Page 74 APCSB 9.5-1, App. A Page Paragraph 27 E.3 (a)
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| Water Sprinklers and Hose Standpipe Systems Sprinkler and Standpipe Layout Each automatic sprinkler system and manual hose station standpipe should have independent connection to the plant underground water main. Headers fed from each end are permitted inside buildings to supply multiple sprinkler and standpipe systems. When provided, such headers are considered an extension of the yard main system. The header arrangement should be such that no single failure can impair both the primary and backup fire protection systems.
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| Each sprinkler and standpipe system should be equipped with OS&Y (outside screw and yoke) gate valve, or other approved shutoff valve, and water flow alarm. Safety related equipment that does not itself require sprinkler water fire protection, but is subject to unacceptable damage if wetted by sprinkler water discharge should be protected by water shields or baffles.
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| | |
| ===Response===
| |
| All automatic sprinkler systems and manual hose station standpipes located throughout the plant are connected to the plant underground water main. Sufficient isolation valves are provided in the distribution piping to insure flow to both the primary and backup systems. Each of the above systems is equipped with an OS&Y gate valve.
| |
| The sprinkler and hose reels in the Mechanical Maintenance Storage Facility are controlled by a common OS&Y gate valve. The wall hydrant could provide a supply for backup protection.
| |
| The Administration building has a combined sprinkler manual hose station system.
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| Automatic sprinkler systems and automatic water spray deluge systems alarm and annunciate in the main control room where location of a fire is readily identified. Water flow alarms are not provided in standpipe systems since hose stations must be manned by fire fighting personnel before water flow could signal an alarm. Since fire fighting personnel are already at the site of the fire, an alarm serves no useful purpose.
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| | |
| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev. 19 STATION Appendix A Section F.3 Responses To BTP APCSB 9.5-1 Page 75 APCSB 9.5-1, App. A Page Paragraph 28 E.3 (b)
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| Supervision of Valves All valves in the fire water systems should be electrically supervised. The electrical supervision signal should indicate in the control room and other appropriate command locations in the plant (See NFPA 26, Supervision of Valves).
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| | |
| ===Response===
| |
| Valves for automatic sprinkler systems and hose standpipe systems are either electrically or administratively supervised.
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| Post indicator valves in the yard loop show open or shut and are supervised by the administrative control.
| |
| With valves supervised as described above, and with the administrative control supervised by the plant operators, adequate control is provided for fire protection.
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| APCSB 9.5-1, App. A Page Paragraph 28 E.3 (c)
| |
| Automatic Sprinkler Systems Automatic sprinkler systems should as a minimum conform to requirements of appropriate standards such as NFPA 13, Standard for the Installation of Sprinkler Systems and NFPA 15, Standard for Water Spray Fixed Systems.
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| | |
| ===Response===
| |
| The automatic sprinkler systems conform to the requirements of NFPA 13, Standard for the Installation of Sprinkler System and NFPA 15, Standard for Water Spray Fixed System.
| |
| An exception is face bushings that were installed in the piping. A limited number of face bushings were permitted on condition that they were installed without screwed automatic sprinkler heads. See also Deviations 1 and 6, SBN- 970.
| |
| An additional exception is the Administration Building which has a combined sprinkler/manual hose station system.
| |
| | |
| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev. 19 STATION Appendix A Section F.3 Responses To BTP APCSB 9.5-1 Page 76 APCSB 9.5-1, App. A Page Paragraph 28 E.3 (d)
| |
| Fire Protection Water Supply System Interior manual hose installation should be able to reach any location with at least one effective hose stream. To accomplish this, standpipes with hose connections, equipped with a maximum 100 feet of 11/2 inch woven jacket lined fire hose and suitable nozzles should be provided in all buildings, including containment, on all floors and should be spaced at not more than 100 foot intervals. Individual standpipes should be of at least 4 inch diameter for multiple hose connections and 21/4 inch diameter for single hose connections. These systems should follow the requirements of NFPA 14, Standpipe and Hose Systems for sizing, spacing and pipe support requirements.
| |
| Hose stations should be located outside entrances to normally unoccupied areas and inside normally occupied areas. Standpipes serving hose stations in areas housing safety related equipment should have shut off valves and pressure reducing devices (if applicable) outside the area.
| |
| Provisions should be made to supply water at least to standpipes and hose connections for manual fire fighting in areas within hose reach of equipment required for safe plant shutdown in the event of a safe shutdown earthquake (SSE). The standpipe system serving such hose stations should be analyzed for SSE loading and should be provided with supports to assure system pressure integrity. The piping and valves for the portion of hose standpipe system affected by this functional requirements should at least satisfy ANSI Standard B31.l, Power Piping. The water supply for this condition may be obtained by manual operator actuation of valve(s) in a connection to the hose standpipe header from a normal Seismic Category I water system such as essential service water system. The cross connection should be:
| |
| (a) capable of providing flow to at least two hose stations (approximately 75 GPM/hose station) and, (b) designed to the same standards as the Seismic Category I water system. It should not degrade the performance of the Seismic Category I water system.
| |
| | |
| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev. 19 STATION Appendix A Section F.3 Responses To BTP APCSB 9.5-1 Page 77
| |
| | |
| ===Response===
| |
| Interior manual hose stations are spaced at approximately 100 foot intervals, and will reach any location with an effective hose stream.
| |
| Each hose station consists of a 21/2 hose connection with 21/2 valve, 21/2 x 11/2 reducer, 100 feet of 11/2 (minimum) woven jacket lined fire hose and nozzle. In some cases 13/4 fire hose with 11/2 couplings may be used in lieu of 11/2 hose.
| |
| The hose stations are supplied by standpipes with a minimum diameter of 4 (except for those hose stations, in non-safety related buildings, connected to sprinkler systems). Also, a 2.5" bypass line with a restricting orifice is included in the 6" Fire Protection header supplying the Control Building and Diesel Generator Building hose stations to limit flooding in the event of a pipe rupture. The bypass line pipes flow around a normally closed 6" butterfly valve. The restricting orifice and bypass line have an inner diameter of less than 4", but have been sized to allow the required flow and pressure to the downstream hose stations. If additional flow or pressure is desired, the 6" valve may be opened.
| |
| With the ability to open the 6" valve and provide a large diameter flow path, the system complies with NFPA 14, "Standpipe and Hose Systems."
| |
| Hose stations for normally unoccupied areas are located at the outside entrances and for normally occupied areas at the inside of the entrance, except containment and control room. Hose stations in the containment are located to provide complete coverage of the areas.
| |
| The basic fire protection system is designated as an NNS system, and is designed so that failure of the system will not induce failure of any safety-related system or equipment.
| |
| Standpipes located in buildings containing safety-related equipment though not safety related are supported in the same manner as a Seismic Category I system, except as noted in the response to paragraph A.4 of Appendix A to BTP 9.5-1. These standpipes are connected through an administratively controlled valve to a safety-related service water system having the capacity to supply 150 gpm flow, which will be available for use following an SSE. The required amount of water flow and pressure in the Seismic Category I standpipe system is assured by a seismically qualified booster pump which is powered from a diesel backed seismically qualified motor control center. If this backup fire protection water supply is placed in service, the 6" butterfly valve described above is opened to ensure full flow capability to the downstream hose stations.
| |
| The safety-related equipment, structure and/or components in the Cooling Tower East Main Steam and Feedwater Pipe Chases, Service Water Pumphouse, Intake and Discharge Structures are protected by hose houses provided at yard fire hydrants located near these structures.
| |
| Reference Deviation No. 15, SBN 970, dated March 18, 1986.
| |
| | |
| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev. 19 STATION Appendix A Section F.3 Responses To BTP APCSB 9.5-1 Page 78 Hose reels in the Mechanical Maintenance Storage Facility are supplied by the buildings sprinkler system. Each hose station consists of a 1 1/2 hose connection and a one hundred foot length of 1 1/2 hose.
| |
| APCSB 9.5-1, App. A Page Paragraph 30 E.3 (e)
| |
| Hose Nozzles The proper type of hose nozzles to be supplied to each area should be based on the fire hazard analysis. The usual combination spray/straight-stream nozzle may cause unacceptable mechanical damage (for example, the delicate electronic equipment in the control room) and be unsuitable. Electrically safe nozzles should be provided at locations where electrical equipment or cabling is located.
| |
| | |
| ===Response===
| |
| Standpipe hose racks or reels are equipped with adjustable spray (fog) nozzles that are Factory Mutual approved and/or Underwriters Laboratory, Inc. listed. Only spray type nozzles have been provided for use on energized electrical equipment and on energized cabling. Solid stream nozzles are not provided for use on energized electrical equipment or cabling.
| |
| APCSB 9.5-1, App. A Page Paragraph 30 E.3 (f)
| |
| Foam Suppression Certain fires such as those involving flammable liquids respond well to foam suppression.
| |
| Consideration should be given to use of any of the available foams for such specialized protection application. These include the more common chemical and mechanical low expansion foams, high expansion foam and the relatively new aqueous film forming foam (AFFF).
| |
| | |
| ===Response===
| |
| The design of the fire protection system does not include the use of foam suppression. Tanks and transformers containing flammable liquids that are within or near buildings are protected by automatic deluge systems actuated by thermal detection. Detectors alarm in the main control room.
| |
| | |
| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev. 19 STATION Appendix A Section F.3 Responses To BTP APCSB 9.5-1 Page 79 APCSB 9.5-1, App. A Page Paragraph 31 E.4 Halon Suppression Systems The use of Halon fire extinguishing agents should as a minimum comply with the requirements of NFPA l2A and l2B, Halogenated Fire Extinguishing Agent Systems, Halon 1301 and Halon 1211. Only UL or FM approved agents should be used.
| |
| In addition to the guidelines of NFPA l2A and l2B, preventative maintenance and testing of the systems, including check weighing of the Halon cylinders should be done at least quarterly.
| |
| Particular consideration should also be given to:
| |
| (a) minimum required Halon concentration and soak time (b) toxicity of Halon (c) toxicity and corrosive characteristics of thermal decomposition products of Halon.
| |
| | |
| ===Response===
| |
| Halon 1301 fixed gas extinguishing systems used in the plant facilities meet the requirements of NFPA l2A and are UL listed or FM approved.
| |
| | |
| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev. 19 STATION Appendix A Section F.3 Responses To BTP APCSB 9.5-1 Page 80 APCSB 9.5-1, App. A Page Paragraph 31 E.5 Carbon Dioxide Suppression Systems The use of carbon dioxide extinguishing systems should as a minimum comply with the requirements of NFPA 12, Carbon Dioxide Extinguishing Systems.
| |
| Particular consideration should also be given to:
| |
| (1) minimum required CO2 concentration and soak time; (2) toxicity of CO2 (3) possibility of secondary thermal shock (cooling) damage; (4) offsetting requirements for venting during CO2 injection to prevent over pressurization versus sealing to prevent loss of agent; (5) design requirements from over pressurization; and (6) possibility and probability of CO2 systems being out-of-service because of personnel safety consideration. CO2 systems are disarmed whenever people are present in an area so protected. Areas entered frequently (even though duration time for any visit is short) have often been found with CO2 systems shut off.
| |
| | |
| ===Response===
| |
| No carbon dioxide suppression systems, except for portable extinguishers, are used in the plant fire protection system.
| |
| | |
| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev. 19 STATION Appendix A Section F.3 Responses To BTP APCSB 9.5-1 Page 81 APCSB 9.5-1, App. A Page Paragraph 32 E.6 Portable Extinguishers Fire extinguishers should be provided in accordance with guidelines of NFPA 10 and 10A, Portable Fire Extinguishers, Maintenance and Use. Dry chemical extinguishers should be installed with due consideration given to clean-up problems after use and possible adverse effects on equipment installed in the area.
| |
| | |
| ===Response===
| |
| Portable fire extinguishers are provided in accordance with guidelines of NFPA 10 and 10A, Portable Fire Extinguishers, Maintenance and Use.
| |
| Extinguishers (Halon, CO2, dry chemical or pressurized water) are selected and installed with consideration given to 1) combustibles in the area, such as paper and wood, liquid fuel and electrical equipment and 2) the avoidance of detrimental effects on equipment installed in the area of possible usage.
| |
| | |
| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev. 19 STATION Appendix A Section F.3 Responses To BTP APCSB 9.5-1 Page 82 F. Guidelines for Specific Plant Areas APCSB 9.5-1, App. A Page Paragraph 32 F.1 (a)
| |
| Primary and Secondary Containment - Normal Operation Fire protection requirements for the primary and secondary containment areas should be provided on the basis of specific identified hazards. For example:
| |
| * Lubricating oil or hydraulic fluid system for the primary coolant pumps.
| |
| * Cable tray arrangements and cable penetrations.
| |
| * Charcoal filters.
| |
| Because of the general inaccessibility of these areas during normal plant operations, protection should be provided by automatic fixed systems. Automatic sprinklers should be installed for those hazards identified as requiring fixed suppression.
| |
| Operation of the fire protection systems should not compromise integrity of the containment or the other safety-related systems. Fire protection activities in the containment areas should function in conjunction with total containment requirements such as control of contaminated liquid and gaseous release and ventilation.
| |
| Fire detection systems should alarm and annunciate in the control room. The type of detection used and the location of the detectors should be most suitable to the particular type of fire that could be expected from the identified hazard. A primary containment general area fire detection capability should be provided as backup for the above described hazard detection. To accomplish this, suitable smoke detection (e.g., visual obscuration, light scattering and particle counting) should be installed in the air recirculation system ahead of any filters.
| |
| Automatic fire suppression capability need not be provided in the primary containment atmospheres that are inserted during normal operation. However, special fire protection requirements during refueling and maintenance operations should be satisfied as provided below.
| |
| | |
| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev. 19 STATION Appendix A Section F.3 Responses To BTP APCSB 9.5-1 Page 83
| |
| | |
| ===Response===
| |
| An automatic water spray deluge system is not provided for the reactor coolant pumps lube oil systems located in the primary containment, since the fire hazard analysis presented in Appendix B of this report demonstrates that a suppression system is not necessary to prevent damage to safety-related systems or components. An automatic pre-action system is provided for the electrical penetration areas of the secondary containment.
| |
| The cable tray arrangement inside the primary containment is not provided with fixed suppression or detection systems, since there are no combustibles stored in this area. The cable used is a fire retardant, non-propagating type, meeting the fire test requirements of IEEE-383.
| |
| Cabling for redundant safety divisions is separated by distance or barrier, as described in response D.1. (c). Fire hose stations and portable fire extinguishers are readily available for use in the unlikely event of a fire.
| |
| Each of the reactor coolant pump areas in the containment is provided with high voltage ionization fire detectors.
| |
| The primary containment is accessible for manual fire fighting during normal operation.
| |
| Control of contaminated liquid and gaseous release is ensured by the primary containment ventilation purge system.
| |
| | |
| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev. 19 STATION Appendix A Section F.3 Responses To BTP APCSB 9.5-1 Page 84 APCSB 9.5-1, App. A Page Paragraph 34 F.1 (b)
| |
| Primary and Secondary Containment - Refueling and Maintenance Refueling and maintenance operations in containment may introduce additional hazards such as contamination control materials, decontamination supplies, wood planking, temporary wiring, welding and flame cutting (with portable compressed fuel gas supply). Possible fires would not necessarily be in the vicinity of fixed detection and suppression systems.
| |
| Management procedures and controls necessary to assure adequate fire protection are discussed in Section 3a.
| |
| In addition, manual fire fighting capability should be permanently installed in containment.
| |
| Standpipes with hose stations, and portable fire extinguishers, should be installed at strategic locations throughout containment for any required manual fire fighting operations.
| |
| Adequate self-contained breathing apparatus should be provided near the containment entrances for fire fighting and damage control personnel. These units should be independent of any breathing apparatus or air supply systems provided for general plant activities.
| |
| | |
| ===Response===
| |
| The permanent fire detection and suppression systems in the containment are discussed in the response to Section F.1 (a).
| |
| It is realized that refueling and maintenance operations in the containment could introduce additional transient loads, such as decontamination control materials, decontamination supplies and temporary wood staging, as well as introducing additional hazards such as welding and cutting and temporary wiring. Procedures and controls necessary to assure adequate fire protection during this time period have been developed. These are more fully discussed in the response to Section B.3.
| |
| Standpipes with hose stations have been permanently installed in the containment for use as required in any fire fighting operations during a refueling or maintenance outage. In addition, portable fire extinguishers are available at strategic locations in the containment.
| |
| | |
| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev. 19 STATION Appendix A Section F.3 Responses To BTP APCSB 9.5-1 Page 85 APCSB 9.5-b. App. A Page Paragraph 35 F.2 Control Room The control room is essential to safe reactor operation. It must be protected against disabling fire damage and should be separated from other areas of the plant by floors, walls and roofs having minimum fire resistance ratings of three hours.
| |
| Control room cabinets and consoles are subject to damage from two distinct fire hazards:
| |
| (a) Fire originating within a cabinet or console; and (b) Exposure fire involving combustibles in the general room area.
| |
| Manual fire fighting capability should be provided for both hazards. Hose stations and portable water and Halon extinguishers should be located in the control room to eliminate the need for operators to leave the control room. An additional hose piping shutoff valve and pressure reducing device should be installed outside the control room. Hose stations adjacent to the control room with portable extinguishers in the control room are acceptable.
| |
| Nozzles that are compatible with the hazards and equipment in the control room should be provided for the manual hose station. The nozzles chosen should satisfy actual fire fighting needs, satisfy electrical safety and minimize physical damage to electrical equipment from hose stream impingement.
| |
| Fire detection in the control room cabinets and consoles should be provided by smoke and heat detectors in each fire area. Alarm and annunciation should be provided in the control room. Fire alarms in other parts of the plant should also be alarmed and annunciated in the control room.
| |
| Breathing apparatus for control room operators should be readily available. Control room floors, ceiling, supporting structures, and walls, including penetrations and doors, should be designed to a minimum fire rating of three hours. All penetration seals should be air tight.
| |
| The control room ventilation intake should be provided with smoke detection capability to automatically alarm locally and isolate the control room ventilation system to protect operation by preventing smoke from entering the control room. Manually operated venting of the control room should be available so that operators have the option of venting for visibility. Cables should not be located in concealed floor and ceiling spaces. All cables that enter the control room should terminate in the control room. That is, no cabling should be simply routed through the control room from one area to another.
| |
| | |
| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev. 19 STATION Appendix A Section F.3 Responses To BTP APCSB 9.5-1 Page 86 Safety related equipment should be mounted on pedestals or the control room should have curbs and drains to direct water away from such equipment. Such drains should be provided with means for closing to maintain integrity of the control room in the event of other accidents requiring control room isolation.
| |
| | |
| ===Response===
| |
| The control room complex is separated from other areas of the plant by floors and walls having a minimum fire resistance rating of three hours. All penetration seals have a minimum fire resistance rating equal to that designated for the wall and floor they penetrate.
| |
| Manual hose stations are located outside the control room. Nozzles were chosen for the hose stations to satisfy actual fire fighting needs, satisfy electrical safety and minimize physical damage to the electrical equipment from hose stream impingement. Portable fire extinguishers are located in the control room. Breathing apparatus is provided for the control room operators.
| |
| Fire detection in the control room complex is provided by ionization detectors. Alarm and annunciation is provided in the main control room. Fire detection from other parts of the plant is also alarmed and annunciated at the same location.
| |
| The control room ventilation intake is provided with smoke detection capability to automatically alarm and permit isolation of the control room ventilation so as to protect operators by preventing smoke from entering the control room. A recirculation system with charcoal filters has been provided. This system can be started manually by the control room operator from the Main Control Board to remove smoke. Additional venting of the control room could be accomplished by opening the doors.
| |
| All cables that enter the control room terminate in the control room. There is no cabling routed through the control room from one area to another.
| |
| Metal jacketed lighting cable (Type ALS) is used in the control room ceiling spaces. This cable has an aluminum sheath which is not a combustible material. No other cables are located in ceiling spaces.
| |
| Control room electrical equipment is not provided with pedestals, and floor drains are not provided. These features are not required, as hose stations and standpipes are located outside the room and up to 4 inches of flooding can be tolerated without damage to any safety-related equipment. Drainage can be maintained through the open door to the turbine building or the stairwell to the outdoors.
| |
| | |
| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev. 19 STATION Appendix A Section F.3 Responses To BTP APCSB 9.5-1 Page 87 APCSB 9.5-1, App. A Page Paragraph 37 F.3 Cable Spreading Room The primary fire suppression in the cable spreading room should be an automatic water system such as closed head sprinklers, open head deluge, or open directional spray nozzles. Deluge and open spray systems should have provisions for manual operation at a remote station; however, there should be provisions to preclude inadvertent operation. Location of sprinkler heads or spray nozzles should consider cable tray sizing and arrangements to assure adequate water coverage. Cables should be designed to allow wetting down with deluge water without electrical faulting.
| |
| Open head deluge and open directional spray systems should be zoned so that a single failure will not deprive the entire area of automatic fire suppression capability.
| |
| The use of foam is acceptable, provided it is of a type capable of being delivered by a sprinkler or deluge system, such as an Aqueous Film Forming Foam (AFFF).
| |
| An automatic water suppression system with manual hoses and portable extinguisher backup is acceptable, provided:
| |
| (a) At least two remote and separate entrances are provided to the room for access by fire brigade personnel; and (b) Aisle separation provided between tray stacks should be at least three feet wide and eight feet high.
| |
| Alternately, gas systems (Halon or C02) may be used for primary fire suppression if they are backed up by an installed water spray system and hose stations and portable extinguishers immediately outside the room and if the access requirements stated above are met.
| |
| Electric cable construction should, as a minimum, pass the flame test in IEEE Std 383, IEEE Standard for Type Test of Class 1E Electric Cables, Field Splices and Connections for Nuclear Power Generating Stations.
| |
| Drains to remove fire fighting water should be provided with adequate seals when gas extinguishing systems are also installed.
| |
| Redundant safety related cable division should be separated by walls with a three-hour fire rating.
| |
| | |
| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev. 19 STATION Appendix A Section F.3 Responses To BTP APCSB 9.5-1 Page 88 For multiple-reactor unit sites, cable spreading rooms should not be shared between reactors.
| |
| Each cable spreading room of each unit should have divisional cable separation as stated above and be separated from the other and the rest of the plant by a wall with a minimum fire rating of three hours. (See NFPA 251, Fire Tests, Building Construction and Materials, or ASTM E-119, Fire Test of Building Construction and Materials, for fire test resistance rating.)
| |
| The ventilation system to the cable spreading room should be designed to isolate the area upon actuation of any gas extinguishing system in the area. In addition, smoke venting of the cable spreading room may be desirable. Such smoke venting systems should be controlled automatically by the fire detection or suppression system as appropriate. Capability for remote manual control should also be provided.
| |
| | |
| ===Response===
| |
| The primary fire suppression in the cable spreading room consists of several automatic fixed spray dry pipe deluge systems. Automatic water sprinkler systems are provided for cable trays except for trays containing only instrumentation cables. Instrumentation cables would not ignite from over loading since the maximum fault current is insufficient to heat the insulation to the flash point. Provisions are made to preclude inadvertent operation by having two or more fire detection heads actuate the automatic spray systems. Location of spray nozzles considers cable tray sizing and arrangement to assure adequate water coverage. Cables are specified to allow wetting down with deluge water without electrical faulting.
| |
| Spray systems are zoned so that a single failure will not deprive the entire area of automatic fire suppression capability. Manual hoses and portable extinguishers are provided in adjacent areas for back-up use in the cable spreading room. Access to the cable spreading room is provided through two remote and separated entrances. Aisle separation between stacked cable trays meets the three feet wide by eight feet high, except in limited cross-over locations which do not limit personnel access. Electric cable construction, as a minimum, pass the flame test in IEEE Standard 383.
| |
| Cabling for redundant safety divisions is separated by distance or barrier as described in Attachment C Physical Independence of Electric Systems of AEC letter dated 12/14/73, which is generally in agreement with Regulatory Guide 1.75.
| |
| Cable spreading rooms are not shared between reactors. Construction on Unit 2 has been stopped. Unit 1 cable spreading room is designated a fire area and is separated from other areas of the plant by a fire barrier having a fire resistance of three hours.
| |
| The cable spreading room does not contain high energy equipment such as switchgear, transformer or potential sources of missiles or pipe whip, and is not used for storing flammable materials. Circuits in trays are limited to control and instrument functions. Those power supply circuits serving the control room are routed in embedded conduits. There are no combustible materials other than cable in the cable spreading room and all cables are self-extinguishing and non-propagating; therefore, the fire hazard evaluation shows that a postulated fire will not occur in the cable spreading room.
| |
| | |
| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev. 19 STATION Appendix A Section F.3 Responses To BTP APCSB 9.5-1 Page 89 Smoke venting of the cable spreading room is available by use of the normal Ventilation system.
| |
| This system is not controlled automatically by the fire detection or suppression system but by remote manual control. Portable fans can be used for smoke removal upon closure of ventilation fire dampers. Automatic fire detectors provide an alarm at its local control panel and a visual and an audible alarm in the main control room.
| |
| Drains are provided to remove fire water from actuation of the deluge system.
| |
| See D.3(c) for justification of adequacy of separation without the use of three hour fire rated walls.
| |
| APCSB 9.5-1, App. A Page Paragraph 39 F.4 Plant Computer Room Safety related computers should be separated from other areas of the plant by barriers having a minimum three-hour fire resistant rating. Automatic fire detection should be provided to alarm and annunciate in the control room and alarm locally. Manual hose stations and portable water and Halon fire extinguishers should be provided.
| |
| | |
| ===Response===
| |
| The plant computer does not perform any safety function, and the total failure of the computer will not prevent the safe and orderly shutdown of the plant. The plant computer room is a portion of the control room complex but is separated from the main control room by three hour fire rated walls. Automatic fire detectors with fixed Halon 1301 system are provided in the computer room to provide an alarm at its local control panel and a visual and an audible alarm in the main control room. Manual hose stations are located outside the control room. Halon hand-held extinguishers are located in the computer room. Portable water extinguishers are not provided.
| |
| | |
| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev. 19 STATION Appendix A Section F.3 Responses To BTP APCSB 9.5-1 Page 90 APCSB 9.5-1, App. A Page Paragraph 40 F.5 Switchgear Rooms Switchgear rooms should be separated from the remainder of the plant by minimum three-hour rated fire barriers, if practicable. Automatic fire detection should alarm and annunciate in the control room and alarm locally. Fire hose stations and portable extinguishers should be readily available.
| |
| Acceptable protection for cables that pass through the switchgear room is automatic water or gas agent suppression. Such automatic suppression must consider preventing unacceptable damage to electrical equipment and possible necessary containment of agent following discharge.
| |
| | |
| ===Response===
| |
| Switchgear rooms are separated from the remainder of the plant by minimum three-hour rated fire barriers. Automatic fire detection is alarmed and annunciated in the main control room.
| |
| Even though switchgear rooms are unoccupied, alarms are provided. Alarm and indication in the main control room readily identify the fire control panel in alarm. Portable extinguishers are provided in the area with hose stations located outside in an adjacent area and yard fire hydrants readily available for use if and when required.
| |
| | |
| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev. 19 STATION Appendix A Section F.3 Responses To BTP APCSB 9.5-1 Page 91 APCSB 9.5-1, App. A Page Paragraph 40 F.6 Remote Safety-Related Panels The general area housing remote safety related panels should be provided with automatic fire detectors that alarm locally and alarm and annunciate in the control room. Combustible materials should be controlled and limited to those required for operation. Portable extinguishers and manual hose stations should be provided.
| |
| | |
| ===Response===
| |
| The remote safety-related shutdown panels are housed in the control building at floor elevation 21-6 and in the diesel generator building at floor elevation 2l-6. (See drawings F-3l0431 and F-202069.)
| |
| Automatic fire detectors are provided in the control building at floor elevation 21-6 and in the diesel generator building at floor elevation 21-6. These automatic fire detectors provide local indication plus alarm and indication in the main control room. In addition, the diesel generator building at elevation 21-6 is protected by a manual preaction sprinkler system.
| |
| Combustible materials are minimized in all of the above areas. Portable extinguishers are provided inside these areas, and manual hose stations are provided outside these areas.
| |
| | |
| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev. 19 STATION Appendix A Section F.3 Responses To BTP APCSB 9.5-1 Page 92 APCSB 9.5-1, App. A Page Paragraph 41 F.7 Station Battery Rooms Battery rooms should be protected against fire explosions. Battery rooms should be separated from each other and other areas of the plant by barriers having a minimum fire rating of three-hours inclusive of all penetrations and openings. (See NFPA 69, Standard on Explosion Prevention Systems.) Ventilation systems in the battery rooms should be capable of maintaining the hydrogen concentration well below 2 vol. % hydrogen concentration. Standpipe and hose and portable extinguishers should be provided.
| |
| Alternatives:
| |
| (a) Provide a total fire rated barrier enclosure of the battery room complex that exceeds the fire load contained in the room.
| |
| (b) Reduce the fire load to be within the fire barrier capability of 11/2 hours.
| |
| (c) Provide a remote manual actuated sprinkler system in each room and provide the 11/2 hour fire barrier separation.
| |
| | |
| ===Response===
| |
| Battery rooms are separated from each other and other areas of the plant by barriers having a fire rating of 3 hours. The exhaust ventilation system for the battery rooms is capable of maintaining a hydrogen concentration well below 2% by volume. The exhaust system is redundant, and powered from independent safety related electrical trains. Each exhaust fan is provided with a flow switch which indicates loss of flow in the control room.
| |
| Portable fire extinguishers are located nearby, and a hose station is available within hose reach of the battery rooms.
| |
| | |
| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev. 19 STATION Appendix A Section F.3 Responses To BTP APCSB 9.5-1 Page 93 APCSB 9.5-1, App. A Page Paragraph 41 F.8 Turbine Lubrication and Control Oil Storage and Use Areas A blank fire wall having a minimum resistance rating of three hours should separate all areas containing safety related systems and equipment from the turbine oil system.
| |
| | |
| ===Response===
| |
| The turbine lube oil tank is located adjacent to the exterior wall of the turbine building inside a one (1) foot thick concrete wall enclosure whose fire rating is in excess of three (3) hours. This enclosure is capable of containing the contents of the tank. Although there are no safety related systems located in the vicinity, the fire protection system in this area consists of an automatic deluge suppression system and back-up protection with local hose stations.
| |
| | |
| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev. 19 STATION Appendix A Section F.3 Responses To BTP APCSB 9.5-1 Page 94 APCSB 9.5-1, App. A Page Paragraph 42 F.9 Diesel Generator Areas Diesel generators should be separated from each other and other areas of the plant by fire barriers having a minimum fire resistance rating of three hours.
| |
| Automatic fire suppression such as AFFF foam, or sprinklers should be installed to combat any diesel generator or lubricating oil fires. Automatic fire detection should be provided to alarm and annunciate in the control room and alarm locally. Drainage for fire fighting water and means for local manual venting of smoke should be provided. Day tanks with total capacity up to 1,100 gallons are permitted in the diesel generator area under the following conditions:
| |
| : a. The day tank is located in a separate enclosure, with a minimum fire resistance rating of three hours, including doors or penetrations. These enclosures should be capable of containing the entire contents of the day tanks. The enclosure should be ventilated to avoid accumulation of oil fumes.
| |
| : b. The enclosure should-be protected by automatic fire suppression systems such as AFFF or sprinklers.
| |
| | |
| ===Response===
| |
| Each diesel generator, along with its associated auxiliary equipment, is separated from the adjacent redundant unit by a wall having a fire rating in excess of the designated rating of three hours. Doors in these walls are Class A with a three hour fire rating.
| |
| Each fuel oil day tank (1500 gallons) is installed in a separate enclosure which is located on the floor above the diesel generator served. This enclosure is designed with walls, floor and ceiling having a fire rating in excess of the designated rating of three hours, and sized to contain the contents of the tank. Doors servicing these enclosures are Class A.
| |
| Redundant automatic preaction water systems are provided in each of the two Fuel Oil Storage Tanks areas. Automatic deluge water systems are provided in each of the two fuel oil day tank areas. Automatic preaction water system in fuel oil piping trenches is provided in each of the two engine rooms. Manual preaction water system for area wide coverage is provided in each of the two engine rooms. Drainage is provided to remove fire protection water.
| |
| | |
| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev. 19 STATION Appendix A Section F.3 Responses To BTP APCSB 9.5-1 Page 95 Automatic fire detection has been provided in the fuel oil storage areas and trenches and in the diesel generator area, with an alarm at its local control panel and a visual and an audible alarm in the main control room. Sufficient detection devices are available to detect that a fire exists in the area and alarm. Local fire hydrants are available to extinguish a fire outside the range of the fixed water spray system.
| |
| The normal ventilation systems have the capacity to exhaust the area during and after a fire, unless heat from the fire closes the fire damper in the system. A gravity vent system is provided for the diesel fuel oil vapor, but will not provide sufficient air for sustaining combustion should a fire start. This restriction of combustion air is more important than smoke and heat removal from this area.
| |
| | |
| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev. 19 STATION Appendix A Section F.3 Responses To BTP APCSB 9.5-1 Page 96 APCSB 9.5-1, App. A Page Paragraph 42 F.10 Diesel Fuel Oil Storage Areas Diesel fuel oil tanks with a capacity greater than 1,100 gallons should not be located inside the buildings containing safety related equipment. They should be located at least 50 feet from any building containing safety related equipment, or if located within 50 feet, they should be housed in a separate building with construction having a minimum fire resistance rating of three hours.
| |
| Buried tanks are considered as meeting the three-hours fire resistance requirements. See NFPA 30, Flammable and Combustible Liquids Code, for additional guidance.
| |
| When located in a separate building the tank should be protected by an automatic fire suppression system such as AFFF or sprinklers.
| |
| Tanks, unless buried, should not be located directly above or below safety related systems or equipment regardless of the fire rating of separating floors or ceilings.
| |
| | |
| ===Response===
| |
| Although the design of the fuel oil storage areas differs from the design Specified above, the results of the fire hazard analysis presented in Appendix A of this report demonstrates the adequacy of the provided construction, even under the most extreme condition of failure of the water spray system. The design provides fire protection comparable to that recommended in the above guidelines.
| |
| Each of the SEPS diesel fuel tanks is in excess of 6,000 gallons. The SEPS diesel generators with their fuel tanks are located less than 50 feet from the Cooling Tower that contains safety related equipment. The generator enclosures are not fire rated. However, the south wall of the Cooling Tower, adjacent to the SEPS installation is three-hour fire rated. The construction of this wall would prevent a fire in the non-safety related SEPS diesel generators from adversely affecting the operation of the safety related equipment in the Cooling Tower. This design meets the intent of these guidelines.
| |
| | |
| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev. 19 STATION Appendix A Section F.3 Responses To BTP APCSB 9.5-1 Page 97 APCSB 9.5-1, App. A Page Paragraph 44 F.11 Safety-Related Pumps Pump houses and rooms housing safety-related pumps should be protected by automatic sprinkler protection unless a fire hazards analysis can demonstrate that a fire will not endanger other safety-related equipment required for safe plant shutdown. Early warning fire detection should be installed with alarm and annunciation locally and in the control room. Local hose stations and portable extinguishers should also be provided.
| |
| Equipment pedestals or curbs and drains should be provided to remove and direct water away from safety-related equipment.
| |
| Provisions should be made for manual control of the ventilation system to facilitate smoke removal if required for manual fire fighting operation.
| |
| | |
| ===Response===
| |
| The equipment vault areas and the charging pump areas which house safety related pumps and heat exchangers are each divided into fire areas separated by fire barriers having at least 11/2 or 3 hour ratings. Each fire area contains only one of two redundant components in a safety related system. The fire hazard analysis demonstrates that any postulated fire in one fire area will not affect safety related equipment in an adjacent fire area. These areas are equipped with portable fire extinguishers and have standpipe hose stations available.
| |
| Both of the redundant primary component cooling water pumps are located in one fire area. A metal barrier partition has been placed between the two pumps and a preaction sprinkler system has been provided above the pumps.
| |
| Both the motor driven and turbine driven emergency feedwater pumps are located in one fire area. Our fire hazard analysis indicates there are minimal combustibles, other than pump lubricating oil and fiberglass ladders, located in this area. The pumps are separated by 15 feet.
| |
| Ionization detectors have been provided for early warning of a fire and portable extinguishers and hose station for manual firefighting.
| |
| The service water pump and the circulating water pump areas are separated by a 11/2 hour fire wall. Our fire hazard analysis indicates that combustibles located in these areas consist of pump lubricating oil and fiberglass ladders. Ionization detectors have been provided in the service water pump area and portable extinguishers supplemental by yard hydrants for manual firefighting.
| |
| | |
| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev. 19 STATION Appendix A Section F.3 Responses To BTP APCSB 9.5-1 Page 98 Normal ventilation equipment can be used to facilitate smoke removal, as it can be manually controlled from the main control room until the fire dampers close.
| |
| All safety-related pumps and equipment are supported on curbs or pedestals. Floor drains in these areas will direct all water to either the radioactive liquid waste or non-radioactive liquid waste system, as required.
| |
| APCSB 9.5-1, App. A Page Paragraph 44 F.12 New Fuel Area Hand portable extinguishers should be located within this area. Also, local hose stations should be located outside but within hose reach of this area. Automatic fire detection should alarm and annunciate in the control room and alarm locally. Combustibles should be limited to a minimum in the new fuel area. The storage area should be provided with a drainage system to preclude accumulation of water.
| |
| The storage configuration of new fuel should always be so maintained as to preclude criticality for any water density that might occur during fire water application.
| |
| | |
| ===Response===
| |
| Portable extinguishers are located in the fuel storage building. A local hose station is located outside the area but within hose reach.
| |
| There are minimal combustibles in the fuel storage building. A fire detection system has been provided.
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| Sumps and sump pumps are provided to prevent accumulation of water. New fuel is stored to preclude criticality should unborated water accumulate in this area.
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| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev. 19 STATION Appendix A Section F.3 Responses To BTP APCSB 9.5-1 Page 99 APCSB 9.5-1, App. A Page Paragraph 45 F.13 Spent Fuel Pool Area Protection for the spent fuel pool area should be provided by local hose stations and portable extinguishers. Automatic fire detection should be provided to alarm and annunciate in the control room and to alarm locally.
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| ===Response===
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| Portable fire extinguishers are provided, and a local hose station is within hose reach of the spent fuel storage area.
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| There are minimal combustibles in the spent fuel area. A fire detection system has been provided.
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| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev. 19 STATION Appendix A Section F.3 Responses To BTP APCSB 9.5-1 Page 100 APCSB 9.5-1, App. A Page Paragraph 45 F.14 Radwaste Building The Radwaste Building should be separated from other areas of the plant by fire barriers having at least three-hour ratings. Automatic sprinklers should be used in all areas where combustible materials are located. Automatic fire detection should be provided to annunciate and alarm in the control room and alarm locally. During a fire, the ventilation systems in these areas should be capable of being isolated. Water should drain to liquid radwaste building sumps.
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| Acceptable alternate fire protection is automatic fire detection to alarm and annunciate in the control room, in addition to manual hose stations and portable extinguishers consisting of hand held and large wheeled units.
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| ===Response===
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| The radwaste building is separated from other areas of the plant by fire barrier having 3 hour rating. Automatic deluge systems are provided in the extruder/evaporator area, asphalt meter pump room and turn table/drum conveyor area. Ionization type fire detectors are provided in the waste compactor area, decontamination area, extruder/evaporator area (thermal detection also),
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| asphalt meter pump room (thermal detection also), turntable/drum conveyor area (thermal detection also) and waste solidification control room to indicate locally at the control panel and to initiate visual and audible alarm in the main control room. Manual hose stations and portable fire extinguishers are available for use. The ventilation system is capable of being isolated during a fire. All water from the fire suppression systems will drain to the waste processing building sumps.
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| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev. 19 STATION Appendix A Section F.3 Responses To BTP APCSB 9.5-1 Page 101 APCSB 9.5-1, App. A Page Paragraph 46 F.15 Decontamination Areas The decontamination areas should be protected by automatic sprinklers if flammable liquids are stored. Automatic fire detection should be provided to annunciate and alarm in the control room and alarm locally. The ventilation system should be capable of being isolated. Local hose stations and hand portable extinguishers should be provided as back-up to the sprinkler system.
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| ===Response===
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| No flammable liquids are stored in the decontamination area nor are other combustibles stored in the decontamination area, therefore no automatic sprinklers are provided. However, smoke detectors have been installed and portable fire extinguishers and hose stations are available.
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| With the aid of early detection, the operator has the capability for shutting down the ventilation system and manually fight an unlikely fire.
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| APCSB 9.5-1, App. A Page Paragraph 46 F.l6 Safety-Related Water Tanks Storage tanks that supply water for safe shutdown should be protected from the effects of fire.
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| Local hose stations and portable extinguishers should be provided. Portable extinguishers should be located in nearby hose houses. Combustible materials should not be stored next to outdoor tanks. A minimum of 50 feet of separation should be provided between outdoor tank and combustible materials where feasible.
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| ===Response===
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| Combustible materials should not be stored near safe shutdown water storage tanks in such a manner that the operability of the tanks could be compromised by the effects of a fire. Hose reels and/or hydrants and portable extinguishers are provided as fire protection.
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| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev. 19 STATION Appendix A Section F.3 Responses To BTP APCSB 9.5-1 Page 102 APCSB 9.5-1, App. A Page Paragraph 46 F.17 Cooling Towers Cooling towers should be of non-combustible construction or so located that a fire wall not adversely affect any safety-related systems or equipment. Cooling towers should be of non-combustible construction when the basins are used for the ultimate heat sink or for the fire protection water supply.
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| ===Response===
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| The service water cooling tower is constructed of non-combustible material. Concrete is used for the superstructure. The fill material is a hard burned clay which is chemically inert, and the mist eliminators are fiberglass.
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| APCSB 9.5-1, App. A Page Paragraph 47 F.18 Miscellaneous Areas Miscellaneous areas such as records storage areas, shops, warehouses, and auxiliary boiler rooms should be so located that a fire or effects of a fire, including smoke, will not adversely affect any safety related systems or equipment. Fuel oil tanks for auxiliary boilers should be buried or provided with dikes to contain the entire tank contents.
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| ===Response===
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| The record storage, shops, storage room, and auxiliary boiler room within the Administration and Service Building are separated from other buildings by barriers having a three (3) hour fire rating. Due to their remote location relative to safety related systems and equipment, a fire in these areas could not adversely affect any safety related systems or equipment. The fuel oil tank for the auxiliary boilers is provided with a dike to contain its entire contents.
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| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev. 19 STATION Appendix A Section F.3 Responses To BTP APCSB 9.5-1 Page 103 G. Special Protection Guidelines APCSB 9.5-1, App. A Page Paragraph 47 G.1 Welding and Cutting Acetylene - Oxygen Fuel Gas Systems This equipment is used in various areas throughout the plant. Storage areas should be chosen to permit fire protection by automatic sprinkler systems. Local hose stations and portable equipment should be provided as backup. The requirements of NFPA 51 and 51B are applicable to these hazards. A permit system should be required to utilize this equipment (also refer to 2f herein).
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| ===Response===
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| Flammable welding gas equipment is generally stored in the Administrative Building - Machine Shops, Chlorination - Machine Shop, Circulating Water Pumphouse. Portable extinguishers, hose stations, and/or hydrants with hose houses are provided in these areas. Administrative procedures have been generated for the use of this equipment; hot work permits are required for utilization of this equipment.
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| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev. 19 STATION Appendix A Section F.3 Responses To BTP APCSB 9.5-1 Page 104 APCSB 9.5-1, App. A Page Paragraph 47 G.2 Storage Areas for Dry Ion Exchange Resins Dry ion exchange resins should not be stored near essential safety related systems. Dry unused resins should be protected by automatic wet pipe sprinkler installations. Detection by smoke and heat detectors should alarm and annunciate in the control room and alarm locally. Local hose stations and portable extinguishers should provide backup for these areas. Storage areas of dry resin should have curbs and drains. (Refer to NFPA 92M, Waterproofing and Draining of Floors.)
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| ===Response===
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| Dry ion exchange resin is not stored near essential safety related systems. Long term storage of dry ion exchange resin will be in the service building and/or warehouses. The storeroom in the service building and warehouses are protected by sprinkler systems. Local hose stations and hydrants are provided as backup fire protection. Fire protection flow alarms would indicate fire conditions in the warehouses. Curbs are not provided for these storage areas. Drains are provided.
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| APCSB 9.5-1, App. A Page Paragraph 48 G.3 Hazardous Chemicals Hazardous chemicals should be stored and protected in accordance with the recommendations of NFPA 49 Hazardous Chemicals Data. Chemical storage areas should be well ventilated and protected against flooding conditions since some chemicals may react with water to produce ignition.
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| ===Response===
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| Chemicals are stored in the chemical storage room and storeroom of the service building and in the warehouses. These areas are well ventilated and protected against flooding conditions.
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| Small quantities of chemicals are also stored for use in the chemical laboratories which are well ventilated and protected against flooding.
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| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev. 19 STATION Appendix A Section F.3 Responses To BTP APCSB 9.5-1 Page 105 APCSB 9.5-1, App. A Page Paragraph 48 G.4 Materials Containing Radioactivity Materials that collect and contain radioactivity such as spent ion exchange resins, charcoal filters, and HEPA filters should be stored in closed metal tanks or containers that are located in areas free from ignition sources or combustibles. These materials should be protected from exposure to fires in adjacent areas as well. Consideration should be given to requirements for removal of isotopic decay heat from entrained radioactive material.
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| ===Response===
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| Materials that have collected and contain radioactivity are stored in metal tanks or containers which are located in the waste processing building. The storage area is free from ignition sources and combustibles and is separated from fires in adjacent buildings by a three hour rated fire wall. Decay heat emanating from the containers is removed by the building ventilation system.
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| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev. 19 STATION Appendix A Section F.3 Responses To BTP APCSB 9.5-1 Page 106 H. Deviations from National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) Code/Underwriters Laboratory (UL) Listing Ref.: -SBN- 970, dated 3/18/86 Section 9.5.1.1 from Seabrooks FSAR states:
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| The Fire Protection Systems have been designed using the general guidelines of the following codes and standards:
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| (a) American Nuclear Insurers (ANI) - Specifications for Fire Protection of New Plants.
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| (b) National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) and ABS Codes as Listed in Table 9S-I.
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| (c) Uniform Building Code (UBC).
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| The following are deviations from NFPA:
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| : 1. Low Point Drain Valves in Sprinkler Systems:
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| Most of the low point drain valves, used throughout the sprinkler systems, do not meet NFPA 13, Section 3-14 since they are not UL listed. These drain valves, United Brass Series 125 S Globe Valves, have all the same characteristics as United Brass UL listed valves, except for the flow characteristics. Since these valves are only used as low point drains, the flow characteristics are not of a concern. The use of non-UL listed valves in this application is acceptable.
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| : 2. The test flow meter for Fire Pumps 1-FP-P-20A, 20B, and 20C does not meet NFPA 20:
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| NFPA 20 states that the test flow meter must be capable of up to 175% of rated pump capacity. The pumps have a rated capacity of 1,500 gpm. One hundred seventy-five percent (175%) of this is 2,625 gpm, but the flow meter is only capable up to 2,600 gpm.
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| These pumps will only be tested to a maximum 150% of their rated capacity which is well within the range of the flow meter. The capacity of the flow meter is also only 1%
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| lower than what is required by code.
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| Because of the above stated reasons, the test flow meter is acceptable.
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| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev. 19 STATION Appendix A Section F.3 Responses To BTP APCSB 9.5-1 Page 107
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| : 3. Audible evacuation alarms do not meet NFPA 72A:
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| NFPA 72A, Section 2-5.4, Distribution of Evacuation Signals, states that fire alarm systems provided for evacuation of occupants shall have one or more audible alarms on each floor divided by a fire wall. Areas of the plant which are protected by preaction sprinkler systems do not have audible alarms throughout the area for the evacuation of occupants. However, if there is a fire problem, the Control Room will receive an alarm from the area detection and/or the water flow alarm valves on the sprinkler systems.
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| Plant operating personnel and the fire brigade will be immediately dispatched to the area in question.
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| Because of this reason, lack of the audible alarms within the fire area is acceptable.
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| The areas which do not have audible alarms throughout the area include the Fuel Oil Day Tank Rooms, the Mechanical Room on El. 5l-6, the Diesel Generator Rooms, and the Fuel Oil Storage Rooms in the Diesel Generator Building, the Turbine Building. El. 25 in the PAB, the electrical tunnels Trains A and B, the cable spreading area in the Control Building, and the extruder/evaporator area, the metering pump area, and the turntable/conveyor belt area in the Waste Process Building.
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| : 4. Fire tanks were not built to AWWA Standards as required by NFPA 22, but instead, to API 650:
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| The requirements for a tank built to American Petroleum Institute Standard 650, for storage of petroleum, are more stringent than the requirements in AWWA Standards for water tanks. The tanks are, therefore, acceptable.
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| : 5. HVAC fans do not shut down upon detection of smoke as required by NFPA 90A:
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| For safety-related ventilation systems, there is a conflict between the nuclear safety-related HVAC System and NFPA 90A. It is necessary to keep the ventilation system operational (depending on area heat loads). This is especially true for a ventilation system serving multiple areas. If a damper in a branch duct for one fire area closes due to fire in its respective fire area, it is necessary to continue operating fans to provide cooling air to other areas served. This design philosophy is also applied to nonsafety-related HVAC Systems at Seabrook.
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| Seabrook Station relies on area detection for early warning of fire problems. These detectors alarm in the Control Room. Plant operating personnel will take immediate action to determine the magnitude of the fire problem and will, at that time, decide if it is necessary to shut down fans.
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| For these reasons, not shutting down the fans is an acceptable deviation.
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| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev. 19 STATION Appendix A Section F.3 Responses To BTP APCSB 9.5-1 Page 108
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| : 6. Sprinklers for area coverage over the PCCW pumps in the PAB El. 25, do not strictly meet NFPA 13:
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| Due to severe congestion at the ceiling and the thickness of the beams at the ceiling, several sprinklers over the PCCW pumps could not be located in strict accordance with NFPA 13, Section 4.3.
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| The ceiling beams, extending down to 42 inches from the ceiling, do not physically allow sprinkler location to meet Table 4-2.4.b in NFPA 13. The sprinklers are, however, placed in the beam pockets to compensate for the obstruction of the spray patterns due to the beams. There are also areas in the PAB in which the ceiling is heavily congested with supplementary steel, supports, and conduits not allowing the sprinklers to meet the maximum distance from the ceiling criteria in NFPA 13. In these cases, the sprinklers were placed in the best location possible to allow for complete coverage of the floor. For the above reasons, the locations of the sprinklers are an acceptable deviation.
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| : 7. Fire protection booster pump does not meet NFPA 20:
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| Per Branch Technical Position APCSB 9.5-1, Appendix A, Position C3(d) - A backup to the normal Fire Protection System was provided for the standpipes servicing safety equipment in the event of a Safe Shutdown Earthquake (SSE). A permanent connection between one train of service water and the Fire Protection System (safety-related area standpipe) is provided with a booster pump to supply the required pressure.
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| The fire protection booster pump is an Aurora Series 350, stainless steel pump that is not UL listed, nor FM approved. The pump controller is a non-automatic (manual) controller which includes a local on-off push button with status lights. There is a gate valve and a pressure gauge in both the suction and discharge lines to the pump. A relief valve is located at the pump discharge. An orifice plate is located in a test line connecting the suction and discharge of the pump so that pump flow may be tested. A permanent flow meter is not being provided, but there are connections for a portable flow meter.
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| One requirement in NFPA 20 is that fire pumps shall be listed for fire protection. Even though the FP booster pump is not UL/FM, it has similar characteristics to a UL/FM pump. UL/FM pumps, however, are made from cast iron which cannot be seismically qualified. The FP booster pump is made from stainless steel and, therefore, can be seismically qualified.
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| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev. 19 STATION Appendix A Section F.3 Responses To BTP APCSB 9.5-1 Page 109 NFPA 20 also requires that fire pumps shall have an automatic controller which would start the pump upon a low pressure reading. The pump is also required by NFPA 20 to have remote reading. The pump is also required by NFPA 20 to have remote alarm and signal devices at a point of constant, attendance to indicate such items as that the controller has operated into a motor running condition and loss of line power on the line side of the motor starter. NFPA 20 also requires to galvanize or paint the suction pipe to prevent tuberculation.
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| The FP booster pump is not, however, the main fire pump. It is a small (150 gpm) backup fire pump which only supplies the standpipe (hose reel) systems in certain areas of the plant in the unlikely event that SSE damages the normal fire protection supply.
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| The plant operating personnel will be immediately dispatched to the FP booster pump to open the isolation valve between the Service Water System and the Fire Protection System, and to start the pump. Due to these circumstances, an automatic controller is not necessary. The alarms required by NFPA 20 are also not needed since plant operating personnel will be at the pump if there is a problem with it. Since tuberculation is also not seen as being a problem due to the limited use of the pump, lining of the suction piping is not required.
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| For these reasons, the deviations stated above are acceptable.
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| Equipment in the Fire Protection Systems, except as noted in the FSAR, conforms to the standards of the NFPA, and is Underwriters Laboratory (UL) listed and/or Factory Mutual (FM) approved. The following is a deviation from UL listed:
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| : 1. Teflon used to enhance closure of UL listed fire damper:
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| A Teflon coating has been applied to the blade guide flange of the fire dampers to improve their closure characteristics under flow. Although the dampers are not tested with the Teflon coating, this coating will not prevent the dampers from meeting the test requirements of UL 555. In the damper closure part of the test, the dampers were tested under no flow conditions. The untested, per UL, Teflon modification allows the damper to close under a flow condition.
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| UL 555 under Corrosion Protection, allows after a damper is tested the use of epoxy or alkyd-resin type or other outdoor paint in the surface of the damper. Since the Teflon coating is, in essence, the same as a paint coating, it will not affect the rating of the damper. The use of Teflon on fire dampers is acceptable.
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| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Rev. 19 STATION Appendix A Section F.3 Responses To BTP APCSB 9.5-1 Page 110 The following is a deviation from the FM approval requirements:
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| : 1. Fibercast fittings used in the underground sprinkler supply line to the Alternate RP Checkpoint:
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| During installation of the underground sprinkler supply line to the Alternate RP Checkpoint, it was discovered that FM approved Fibercast pipe and fittings were no longer available from the manufacturer. There was sufficient inventory of FM approved Fibercast pipe in stock to complete the installation. However, fittings (tee, flanges and elbows) were not in stock. Fibercast fittings made from the same material, with the same dimensions and the same engagement as the FM approved Fibercast fittings were available without the FM stamp. Engineering reviewed the form, fit and function of the substitute Fibercast fittings and allowed their installation in this application only.
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| I. Fire Proofing for Structural Steel (Ref.: Letter to NRC SBN-lOl7, dated April 24, 1986)
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| Professional Loss Control, Inc. (PLC) conducted a Seabrook Structural Steel Survivability Analysis for those areas noted in Table 1. Wherever PLC indicated structural steel needed to be fire proofed, a structural integrity review was conducted on the fire areas as indicated by PLC temperatures. In most cases, the structure can withstand the potential loss of structural steel. No fireproofing will be done on these beams and/or columns. A few limited cases, some steel was fireproofed in a fire area but only steel indicated by PLC and needed to maintain the fire areas structure.
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| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5, Rev. 19 STATION Appendix A Section F.3 Responses To BTP APCSB 9.5-1 Page 111 TABLE 1 STRUCTURAL STEEL FIRE PROOFING ANALYSIS CHART PLC Analysis of Area Shows PLC Analysis of Only Limited Fireproofing of PLC Analysis of Area Shows Only Structural Steel is Needed Area Shows no Limited Fireproofing UE&C Has Determined Fire Structural Steel of Structural Steel is Structure Can Accept Steel Area/Zone Fireproof Required Needed Losses Miscellaneous Notes EFP-F-l-A X MS-F-1A-Z X MS-F-1B-Z X MS-F-2A-Z Does not contain exposed combustibles. Low MS-F-2B-Z Loading.
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| MS-F-3A-Z X MS-F-3B-Z Does not contain exposed combustibles. Low Loading.
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| MS-F-4A-Z X MS-F-5A-Z Exposed steel used for cable tray supports.
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| Concrete slab is self-supporting.
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| RHR-F-1A-Z X RHR-F-1B-Z X RHR-F-1C-Z X RHR-F-1D-Z X RHR-F-2A-Z X RHR-F-2B-Z X
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| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5, Rev. 19 STATION Appendix A Section F.3 Responses To BTP APCSB 9.5-1 Page 112 TABLE 1 STRUCTURAL STEEL FIRE PROOFING ANALYSIS CHART PLC Analysis of Area Shows PLC Analysis of Only Limited Fireproofing of PLC Analysis of Area Shows Only Structural Steel is Needed Area Shows no Limited Fireproofing UE&C Has Determined Fire Structural Steel of Structural Steel is Structure Can Accept Steel Area/Zone Fireproof Required Needed Losses Miscellaneous Notes RHR-F-3A-Z X RHR-F-3B-Z X CB-F-3B-A X CB-F-S1-0 Does not contain exposed combustibles. Low CB-F-S2-0 Loading.
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| ET-F-1A-A Slab is self-supporting. Do not need structure ET-F-1B-A steel.
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| ET-F-1C-A ET-F-1D-A ET-F-S1-0 DG-F-3A-Z X DG-F-3B-Z X DG-F-3E-A X DG-F-3F-A X PAB-F-1A-Z X PAB-F-1B-Z X PAB-F-1F-Z X PAB-F-1G-A X
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| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5, Rev. 19 STATION Appendix A Section F.3 Responses To BTP APCSB 9.5-1 Page 113 TABLE 1 STRUCTURAL STEEL FIRE PROOFING ANALYSIS CHART PLC Analysis of Area Shows PLC Analysis of Only Limited Fireproofing of PLC Analysis of Area Shows Only Structural Steel is Needed Area Shows no Limited Fireproofing UE&C Has Determined Fire Structural Steel of Structural Steel is Structure Can Accept Steel Area/Zone Fireproof Required Needed Losses Miscellaneous Notes PAB-F-S1-0 Does not contain exposed PAB combustibles.
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| PAB-F-S2-0 Low loading.
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| PAB-F-2A-Z X PAB-F-2B-Z X PAB-F-2C-Z X PAB-F-3A-Z X PAB-F-3B-Z X PAB-F-4-Z X PAB-F-1J-Z X PAB-F-1K-Z Does not contain exposed combustibles. Low loading.
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| FSB-F-1A X SW-F-1A-Z Structure is separated from fire area used for safe shutdown by seismic gap. Can accept loss of structure.
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| SEABROOK Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5, Rev. 19 STATION Appendix A Section F.3 Responses To BTP APCSB 9.5-1 Page 114 TABLE 1 STRUCTURAL STEEL FIRE PROOFING ANALYSIS CHART PLC Analysis of Area Shows PLC Analysis of Only Limited Fireproofing of PLC Analysis of Area Shows Only Structural Steel is Needed Area Shows no Limited Fireproofing UE&C Has Determined Fire Structural Steel of Structural Steel is Structure Can Accept Steel Area/Zone Fireproof Required Needed Losses Miscellaneous Notes SW-F-1B-A Loss of this structure does not affect safe SW-F-1C-A shutdown. Structure is isolated from remaining SW-F-1D-A fire areas.
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| SW-F-1E-Z SW-F-2-0 CT-F-1C-A Loss of this structure does not affect safe CT-F-1D-A shutdown. Structure is isolated from remaining CT-F-2B-A fire areas.
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| CT-F-3-0 CE-F-1-A X FPH-F-1A-A Loss of this structure does not affect safe FPH-F-1B-A shutdown. Structure is isolated from remaining FPH-F-1C-A fire areas TB-F-1B-A Loss of this structure does not affect safe TB-F-1A-Z shutdown. Structure is isolated from fire areas TB-F-1C-Z used during safe shutdown by seismic gap.
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| TB-F-2-Z TB-F-3-Z NES-F-1A-A Loss of this structure does not affect safe shutdown. Structure is isolated from fire areas used during safe shutdown by seismic gap.}}
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