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Forwards Response to NRC 840525 Request for Addl Info Re Environ Qualification of safety-related Electrical Equipment at Facility
	ML20101Q086
Person / Time
Site:	Crane
Issue date:	12/11/1984
From:	Wilson R; GENERAL PUBLIC UTILITIES CORP.
To:	Stolz J; Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
	5211-84-2292, NUDOCS 8501070372
	Download: ML20101Q086 (74)
	v • d • e

Nuclear

%,ma;TO'"a Route 441 South Middletown,. Pennsylvania 17057-0191 717 944 76211 TELEX 84 234 ---

Writer's DgedDial Number December 11, 1984 5211-84-2292 Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Attn:

J. F. Stolz, Chief Operating Reactors Branch No. 4 Division of Licensing U. S. Regulatory Commission Washington, D. C.

20555

Dear Sir:

Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit 1 (TMI-1)

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Operating License No. DPR-50 Docket No. 50-289 Environmental Qualification of Electrical Equipment On December 10, 1982 NRC issued the Safety Evaluation Report (SER) regarding the Environmental Qualification of Safety Related Electrical Equipment at TMI-1. The SER contained a Technical Evaluation Report (TER), written by Franklin Research Center (FRC), which noted a number of environmental quali-I fication documentation deficiencies for safety-related electrical equipment at TMI-1.

On October 5,1983 and March 8,1984 meetings were held with members of your staff to discuss GPUN's proposed resolution, for each of those deficiencies. Discussions also took place at the meetings regarding GPUN's general method for achieving compliance with 10CFR 50.49, which be-came effective February 22,.1983. The purpose of this letter is to document our response to your letter of May 25, 1984 concerning environmental qualification of electrical equipment at TMI-1. to this letter, "GPUN Response to the NP.C's May 25, 1984 Letter Enclosed Request For Additional Information", includes the following attachments: Design Basis Accidents - TMI-1 Environmental Concerns At:achment 2 THI-1 TER Qualification Deficiencies Resolution Summary Master List THI-1 Changes to the TER Master List for TM! An Explanation TMI-1 EQ Open Items and Resolution Justification For Interim Operation For TMI-1

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GPU Nuclear Corporation is a subsidiary of the General Public Utilities Corporation

J. F. Stolz 5211-84-2292 The method of identification of electrical equipment within the scope of i

paragraph (b)(2) of 10CFR 50.49 (i.e. non-safety-related electr.is 1 equip-ment whose failure under postulated environmental conditions cobl prevent satisfactory accomplishment of safety functions) is described lei ponse.

to question 2 of the enclosure. No additional non-safety-related lectri-cal equipment at TMI-1 was identified during this review, which had to be t

previously included in the Master List.

J The method used to identify electrical equipment within the scope of para-i graph (b)(3) of 10CFR 50.49 (i.e., certain post accident monitoring equip-i ment) involved a variable-by-variable comparison of the specific requira-3 ments of Regulatory Guide 1.97 to the design of TMI-1. An evaluation of 4

this comparison has been conducted by the 88W Owners Group and GPUN to determine which instrumentation and sampling equipment at TMI-1 requires environmental qualification. The results of this evaluation were sub-i mitted to NRC on October 1,1984. The Master List has been revised as necessary to include identified instrumentation and sampling equipment which requires environmental qualification,

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i In conclusion, an assessment of compliance with the requirements of 10 CFR 50.49 involves the exercise of technical judgments. Based upon our tech-t nical Ddgment and understanding of those requirements, GPUN believes.

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i that the Master List of safety-related electrical equipment (attached) complies with the scope requirements of paragraphs (b)(1) and (2) of t

10 CFR 50.49, and will be brought into compliance with paragraph (b)(3) when the schedules in our October 1,1984 letter concerning R.G.1.97, Rev. 3, and actions described in response to question 1 of the enclosure, are complete.

i Again, based on our technical judgment and understanding of the require-ments, GPUN believes that the environmental qualification documentation maintained in the GPUNC Equipment Qualification Files complies with the

.' requirements of 10 CFR 50.49, and as noted in Attachment 5.

These files are available for NRC audit and have been sampled by NRR on various occasions from March through September,1984. GPUN also maintains that TMI-1 can operate without undue risk to public health and safety based on the Justifications for Interim Operation supplied in l

As discussed at our meeting of March 8,1984, GPUN requests that a supple-mental SER(s) be issued to indicate the resolution of the deficiencies noted in the December 10, 1982 SER.

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GPUN Response to the NRC's May 25, 1984 Letter Enclosed Request For Additional Information e

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Item 1.

At the time of restart, all electrical equipment import-ant to safety, as defined in 10CFR 50.49, is re uired to be qualified or safe plant operation is requi~re to be demonstrated with equipment not shown to be qua Tied. -

Therefore, for any item of equipment that will not be demonstrated to be qualified prior to restart; E justifi-cation for continued operation (JCO) must be submitted.-

Response

The Electrical Equipment Environmental Qualification (EQ) files have been prepared to support the qualification docu-mentation for components identified on the EQ Master List, which provided as Attachment 3.

Where additional analyses or field verifications are necessary to confirm the qualification documentation for components in an EQ file, commitments have been identified in the EQ file to complete the evaluation, or to make the necessary modifications. Furcher, EQ Master List component circuits are being reviewed to confirm cable type installed. A review of two vendor data bases for a number of specific EQ files is also planned. For components found not to be qualified a JIO is attached (Attachment 6).

Files re-quiring further evaluation are noted in Attachment 5.

We are continuing our efforts to close-out all EQ files requiring additional analyses / verifications in January 1985.

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e Justifications for interim operation are included in for the following components:

'I 84-1 DH-1-DPT 1&2 LPI Flow Indication 84-2 BS-1-DPT-1&2 Reactor Building Spray Flow! m 84-3 MU-23-DPT 1-4 HPI Flow Transmitters MU-42-DPT Seal Injection Flow Transmitters 84-4 MU-14-LT Makeup Tank Level 84-5 DH2-TE1/2 Decay Heat Outlet Temperature 84-6 Incore Thermocouple Extension Cable-84-7 TE-952A/B-955A/B Incore T/C Penetration RTD's 84-8 Transzorb Diodes 84-9 RMG-22, 23 Victoreen Radiation Monitor Item 2.

The licensee should reaffirm that in performing its re-view of the methodology to identify equipment within the scope of 10CFR 50.49(b)(2) that the following steps have been addressed:

(a) A list was generated of safety-related electric equipment as defined in paragraph (b)(1) of 10CFR

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50.49 required to remain functional during or following design-basis Loss of Coolant Accident (LCCA) or High Energy Line Break (HELB) Accidents.

The LOCA/HELB accidents are the only design-basis accidents which result in t'gnificantly adverse environments to electrical t, foment which is re-quired for safe shutdown or accident mitigation.

The list was based on reviews of the Final Safety 4

Analysis Report (FSAR) Technical Specifications, Emergency Operating Procedures Piping and Instrumeniation Diagrams (P& ids), and Electrical Distribution Diagrams;

Response

A list was generated of safety-related electric equipment as defined in paragraph (b)(1) of 10CFR50.49 required to remain functional during or following design basis Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA) or High Energy Line Break (HELB) Accidents.

The LOCA/HELB accidents are the only design basis accidents which result in significantly adverse environments to electri-cal equipment which is required for safe shutdown or accident mitigation.

The methodology included a review of the following TMI-1 docu-ments:

1 - Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR)

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2 - Technical Specifications & Manuals 3 - Normal Operating & Emergency Procedures including Abnormal Transient Procedures

? - System' Flow Diagrams 5 - Piping Drawings 6 - Electrical Distribution & Elementary Wiring Diagrams Item 2b.

The elementary wiring diagrams of the safety-related electrical equipment identified in Step 1 were_ reviewed to identif y any auxiliary devices electrically tonnected directly into the control or power circuitry ofhhe-safety-related equipment (e.g., autc'atic tripst whose failure due to postulated environmental conditions could prevent required operation of the safety-related equip.

ment.

Response

A review of the electrical systems interactions for failure of electrical components which have not been qualified for harsh environments, on electrical components which are required for accident mitigation has been accomplished. This has been accomplished by a review of the TMI-1 electrical wiring dia-grams, with the following results:

All motor operated valves required to be qualified have a-dedicated overcurrent protection devices and contain no interfacing devices that could impact their operation.

b-All solenoid valves are individually fused and have no other electrical devices except limit switches that could impact their operation. These limit switches are identi-fled as part of the valve and are qualified.

(See JIO-T1-84-8)

The pumps identified do not contain any electrical de-c-

g vices other than those identified and qualified which could interface with the operation of these pvans.

d-The identified air handling fan motors do not contain any electrical devices which, if not qualified, could inter-fere with their operation.

s e-The effect of non-qualified instrumentation failure on safety-related instrumentation power supplies has been evaluated. This evaluation concluded that their failure could not result in a failure of the safety-related in-strumentation power supplies or affect the operation of components required for accident mitigation.

Certain instrumentation requiring qualification receive their power from ICS/NNI power. While the ICS/NNI power is non-safety-related, it does have diesel backed power and failure of an ICS/NNI power supply is indicated in the control room.

Each such qualified instrument has its power supply identified on the control room panel, therefo the operator will be aware of an ICS/NNI power supp failure and could then rely on other qualified instrume Etton -

for the required indication. Where such instr ntation provides an automatic control function, the means for qualified manual control and indication are available in the control room.

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0 Item 2c.

The operation of the safety-related systems and equipment were reviewed to identify any directly mechanically l

connected auxiliary systems with electrical co~

nents which are necessary for the required operation

_the safety-related equipment (e.g., cooling watedo.

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u cating systems)..This involved the review of,PEIDs, component technical manuals, and/or system descriptions in the FSAR.

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The support auxiliary systems, the system interfaces, the

-required instrumentation and electrical auxiliary devices were identified by a review of the specific system flow diagrams, component specifications, manuals and. drawings and the ele-mentary wiring diagrams.

The following systems provide for the performance of one or

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more of the required mitigating functions:

1 - Reactor Protection System 2 - Nuclear. Instrumentation (Neutron Monitors) 3 - Engineered Safeguards Actuation System 4 - Containment Isolation System 5 - Reactor Coolant System Instrumentation 6 - High Pressure Injection System 7 - Core Flood System 8 - Low Pressure Injection System 9 - Emergency Feedwater, Main Steam, Condensate and Feedwater Systema 10 - Reactor Building Emergency Cooling System 11 - Vital and ES Electric Power Systems 12 - Reactor Building Spray 13 - Hydrogen.Recombiner The cooling waqer support systems are generally located in non-harsh radiological areas. Components within these cooling L

water systems which are not clearly identifiable to be either

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located in a non-harsh environment and/or to be non-electrical j

in nature were listed. All other such auxiliary support sys-tems including the river water supply. systems are located in non-harsh environments. This includes all of the electrical components in the following systems:

l 1 - Decay Heat Closed Cooling Water System 2 - Nuclear Services Closed Cooling Water System

.(except RB Isolation) 3 - Intermediate Closed Cooling Water System mew 6ept RB Isolation) l~

4 - Auxiliary Building HVAC System

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5 - Control Building HVAC System 6 - Vital and ES Power and Control Systems and' Relays L

These mitigating and mitigating-support-systems encompass all of the-systems required te mitigate LOCA/HELB's.

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Item 2d.

Nonsafety-related electrical circuits indirectly associ-ated with the electrical equipment identified in Step 1 by common power supply or physical proximity 9ege con-sidered by a review of the electrical design inguding the use of applicable industry standards (e.g;,pEEE, NEMA, ANSI, UL, and NEC) and the use of propeilf[coordi-nated protective relays, circuit breakers, and fuses for electrical fault protection.

Response

In response to IE Notice 79-22 dated 7/21/82 GPUN reviewed principal components and their associated trnins of control and power subcomponents to determine the effects of an adverse environment on their performance. The results showed that the necessary systems will perform their function during HELB/LOCA accidents by virtue of location and/or environmental qualifi-cation and will not result in an adverse effect on the safety analysis. This review identified no additional electrical equipment at TMI-1 which was not previously included in the haster List. Further, GPUN performed an additional study:

(1) to identify power sources of instruments, (2) to determine if the power is safety related and if the failure of the in-strument can cause any degradation of a safety related power supply and (3) to identify equipment interlocks associated with these instruments. The result is summarized in response to item 2b.

Those non-safety circuits which are related by " common power j

supply" were addressed by a review of the plant electrical design to verify that all such circuits are protected by properly coordinated protective devices which will ensure that failure of a non-safety related circuit will not cause loss of a power supply to qualified electrical equipment.

Those non-safety circuits which are related by " physical proximity" of their wiring are addressed by the fact that the j

plant design standard is that all circuits are protected by fuses or circuit breakers which are properly sized to protect the circuit wiring. This insures that damage due to faults will be limited and will not result in either fire or excess-ive heat in raceways or enclosures which might disable quali-fled electrical equipment. As an extension of the electrical design review noted above, a review is being performed to i

verify that properly sized fuses have been specified and in-stalled.

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. Non-safety-related circuits related by " physical proximity" of equipment are much less likely to be sources of damfge to qualified equipment. There is no mechanism by whicg'env, iron-mental conditions would cause a spontaneous explosi@ in an '"

electrical device. Heat ganeration due to circuit faults will remain localized and restricted to a short duratio~n Jecause of the energy limiting effects of the protective devices' referred to above.

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Reaffirm that all design basis events which could poten-tially result in a harsh environment, including 4 flooding outside containment were addressed in identifyi safety-related electrical equipment with the se e"of 10CFR 50.49(b)(1).

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Response

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All design basis events which could potentially result in a harsh environment, including flooding outside contain-ment were addressed in identifying safety related elec-trical equipment within the scope of 10CFR50.49(b)(1).

The environmental effects resulting from all postulated design basis accidents documented in Chapter 14 of the TMI-1 FSAR including Loss of Coolant Accident and the Main Steam Line Break Accident (in Containment and the Intermediate Building) (for EQ purposes these were the only bounding events] were considered in the identifica-tion of safety related electrical equipment which was to be environmentally qualified (Attachment 1).

The flood-ing resulting from LOCA's and High Energy Line Breaks

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(HELB) inside containment is documented in GPUN letters dated June 11, 1982, September 1, 1982 and April 14, 1983. The. maximum flood level of 5.66 ft. above the Reactor Building mat based on a large break LOCA is below instruments of interest (S/G Level & Pressurizer Level which are located at or above 5.89 ft.) Sufficient flood volume in the Intermediate Building exists (as is addressed in TDR 250 dated January 22, 1984 and GPUN i

. letter dated April 1 and 26 and August 1,1984) such that no operator action is required for 25 minutes. There-fore, all design basis events including accidents at TMI-1 were considered in the identification of electrical equipment within the scope of paragraph (b)(1) of 10CFR 50.49.

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Item 4.

The level of detail for the proposed resolutions of the j

equipment environmenta' qualification deficiencies, identified in the FRC TER dated November 5,1981, should besimilartotheexamplesthatareontheenciged-sample. For each TER equipment item, the deficyncies should be listed and a proposed resolution idenbified for each deficiency.

Response discusses the resolution of each open TER item both specific and generic in nature as indicated in Table 4-1 categories (I.B., II.A., II.B., II.C. and IV) of the FRC/TER. This enclosure revises our submittal of February 10, 1984, February 22, 1984 and March 29, 1984.

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1 Item 5.

Verify completeness of the list of equipment required to 4

be environmentally qualified.

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Response

, contains a revised Master List of [afety related electrical equipment for TMI-1 within the. scope, of 10CFR 50.49.

This Summary Master List reflects the changes provided to the original Master List dated August 28, 1981 in letters dated May 3, 1982 and May 16, 1983 and additional items added to the list, in GPUN letters dated 8/23/84, 5/10/84, 11/9/84, 8/6/84, 5/31/84 and 10/2/84 Since GPUN has a continuous program of review-ing and cross verification of equipment qualification this master list may be modified to accomodate changes in plant configuration, regulatory regul ements and refine-ments in the EQ Program.

~"~~ identifies.the components in the revised EQ Master List which were added or deleted from the Technical Evaluation Report dated November 8, 1982. A statement as to why each of these components was changed from the Technical Evaluation Report is included in.

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e DESIGN BASIS ACCIDENTS - TMI-1 ENVIRONMENTAL CONCERNS S

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Design Basis Accidents - TMI-1 Environmental Concerns

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FSAR 1.

Uncompensated Operating Reactivity Changes (14.1.2.1)

No harsh environment created since there is no breach in the primary or secondary boundary or fuel failure.

2.

Startup Accident (14.1.2.2)

No harsh environment created since there is no breach in primary or secondary boundary or fuel failure.

3.

Rod Withdrawal Accident at Rated Power (14.1.2.3)

No harsh environment created since there is no breach in primary or secondary boundary or fuel failure.

i 74.

Moderator Dilution Accident (Power / Shutdown)

(14.1.2.4)

No harsh environment created at power since there is no breach in primary or secondary boundary or fuel failure.

During shutdown in a drained down condition with the head removed dilu-tion events occur very slowly and do not result in above normal en-vironmental conditions or fuel failure.

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Cold Water Accident (14.1.2.5)

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No harsh environment created since there is no breach id trimary or secondary boundary or fuel failure.

6.

Loss of Coolant Flow (1451[26)

No harsh environment created since there is no breach in primary.or secondary boundary or fuel failure 7.

Stuck Out, Stuck In or Dropped Control Rod (14.1.2.7)

No Harsh Environment Created since there is no breach in primary or secondary boundary or fuel failure 8.

Loss of Electrical Power (14.1.2.8) a) Loss of Load No harsh environment created since there is no breach in primary or secondary boundary or fuel failure b) Loss of all AC No harsh environment created since there is no breach in primary or secondary boundary or fuel failure. Some temperature rise would occur in the Intermediate Building by the operation of the turbine 4

driven EFW pump without ventilation available. However, some cooling would be accomplished by building natural circulation.

9.

Steam Line Break (14.1.2.9) a) Inside Containment The TMI-1 design incorporates the RB Emergency Cooling System and RB Spray system which, in conjunction provide a single failure protected post accident mechanism to limit peak RB pressure and temperature (Enveloped by LOCA in accordance with IEB-79-01-B Section 4.2.1.

A 60 second peak of approximately 320*F occurs at the outset of a MSLB based on a conservative plant analysis. A thermal la3 analysis for components of interest in containment shoes that the equipment qualification would be enveloped by the LOCA profile.)

s b) Outside Containment ?(Intermediate Bldg.)

A steam environment is created in the Intermediate Building from a MSLB which returns to ambient conditions in about 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />. The i

profile also includes a turbine driven EFW pump steam line break.

10.

Steam Generator Tube Rupture-

_ (14.1.2.10)

No harsh environment'is created unless Feed and Bleed is required.

The environment created by Feed and Bleed is enveloped by LOCA conditions.

11.

Fuel Handling Accident (14.2.2.1) a.

Inside Containment 7

The radiation exposure presented by a fuel handling accident is enveloped by a LOCA in containment.

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Outside Containment Using source term data of RG 1.25 and assuming conserva,ttiely that allradioisotopesremainintheFHBthe30daymaximuminggrated radiation dose is less than 5000 rads. Therefore, no har@

environment is created.

12.

Rod Ejection Accident (14.252.2)

A breach occurs in the primary boundary (SB LOCA) which creates a harsh environment but which is enveloped by LOCA.

13.

Large Break LOCA (14.2.2.3)

A breach occurs in the primary boundary which produces a harsh environment with RB Spray and RB emergency cooling which limit RB peak pressure and temperature profiles (FSAR Figures 6.B-14 & 13) 14.

Small Break LOCA (14.2.2.4)

The harsh environment created by SBLOCA is enveloped by Large Break

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LOCA.

15. Maximum Hypothetical Accident (14.2.2.5)

This accident discusses offsite release of gross fission products

- ;o resulting from a LB/LOCA (See item 13 above).

16.

Waste Gas Tank Rupture (14.2.2.6)

No equipment assumed to operate to mitigate consequences of this accident.

17.

Loss of Feedwater Accident (14.2.2.7)

No Harsh Environment Created Outside or Inside Containment.

1 18.

Fuel Cask Drop (14.2.2.8)

No equipment assumed to operate to mitigate consequences of this accident.

19.

Feedwater Line Break (Restart Report Chapter 8)

Enveloped by MSLB inside and outside containment except for flooding in Intermediate Bldg. for which 25 minutes is available j

for operator action.

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_- NA'JURAL EVENTS - TMI 1 FSAR It (5.4.3.2.2.&l5-2:1.2.6) 1.

TORNADOS - Special structures at TMI-1 have been designed t'o nithstand short term loadings including tornado generated missiles where such structures house systems and components whose failure could result in an inability to safely shutdown and isolate the reactor. Therefore, no harsh environment for plant systems results.

1 (2.6.4 & 5) 2.

FLOODS - TMI is protected against flooding from external sources by dikes, channels, pressure conduits and other physical barriers. Other protective equipment are discussed in Section 2.6.5 of the FSAR. No harsh environment for plant systems results from external flooding.

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EARTHQUAKES - TMI-1 is protected against earthquakes by design of building and structures, and systems and components required for protection of the reactor coolant pressure boundary, safe shutdown and containment of radioactive materials. Such systems were re-evaluated

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as part of the IEB-79-02/14 program as described in GPUN letters dated 9/1/81 and 7/17/81. Additionally, GPUN has analyzed the Auxiliary Steam System in the Intermediate Building as described in GPUN letter dated September 7, 1984 to show it has adequate seismic resistance.

Further GPUN by letter dated August 6, 1984 agreed to qualify COV 14A/B and 111A/B as a result of seismic and EQ considerations. Therefore, no harsh environment is predicted for which required components are not i

qualified..

(5.2.4.2) 3 MISSILES - TMI-1 is protected against missiles inside the Reactor Building as discussed in Section 5.2.4.2 of the FSAR.-

Outside the Reactor Building enginee. red safety features are adequately protected against internally generated missiles. Therefore, no harsh environment for plant systems results.

1 (9.9) 5.

FIRE - TMI-1 is protected against fires as described in the TMI-1 Fire l

Hazards Analysis and FSA" Svetion 9.9.

Further analyses are being i

accomplished under 10CFxP Appendix R for safe shutdown at TMI-1.

(1.2.7, 2.4 & 5.1.3) 6.

AldCRAFT IMPACT - THI-1 is protected against aircraf t impact by I

aircraft hardened structures as shown in Section 5.1.3 of the FSAR.

The structures house systems vital for the protection of th'e rpactor coolant pressure boundary, safe shutdown equipment and containment of radioactive materials. Therefore, no harsh environment fof plant systems results.

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r TMI-l FRC/TER Qualification Deficiencies Resolution Summary

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QUALIFICATION DEFICIENCIES

SUMMARY

- NRC CATEGORIES IB, IIA, IIB

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Requirement Deficiencies

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1 Documentation 20 2 Similarity 30 3 Aging evaluation 24 4 Qualified life 21 5

Aging program 0

6 Aging simulation 5

7A Peak temperature 5

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78 Peak pressure 2

7C Duration 2

7D Profile envelope 3

7E steam exposure 2

8 spray 1

9 submergence 0

10 radiation 1

11 test sequence 2

12 test failure 0

13 function test 0

14 instrument accuracy 0 15 duration margin' 2

16 margins 0

e NRC Category I.B Equipment Qualification Pending Modification II.A Equipment Qualification Not Established II.B Equipment Not Qualified

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NRC TER IB. IIA. 118 Cateeories i

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Limitoreue Motor Goerators e

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Nos.

(Model etc.)

Category Defletencies Resolution 1

(WDG-V3]

MVA SMB00 11.4

2. 3. 4 For Limitorgue motor operators, stellar-3

[DH-VI&2]

MYA SMB3 II.A

2. 3. 4 ity to units tested, aging analysis and 6

(CFV-28, 3A&38]

MVA SM8000 II.A

2. 3. 4 qualified life are established in the 7

[IC-V2. CA-VI.3.4A/8. CFV2A]

MVA SMB000 II.A

2. 3. 4 Limitorque generic report B0058. PWR 118 (CA-V13]

MVA SM8000 II.A 1.2.3.4 Report 600456 purchase orders and plant 120 (MU-V25]

MVA SM800 II.A 1.2.3.4 walkdowns. Material discrepancies found (W DLU-303]

during the plant walkdown are documented and are scheduled to be corrected and in complete compliance by March 1985.

2 (AH-V19&1C]

MVA SMB2 II.A

1. 2. 3. 4 All of the TER No. I comuments apply to -

these in-containment motor operators.

The Dings motor brake model 6-71010-6 is qualtfled by similarity to model 6-63009-50 which was tested as described in test report 600198 (F-C2232-01). Both 4

i models arc constructed of the same materials and rated for approximately the same torque, but differ only in stre.

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Soecific Emulement EO Deficianates A.

Limitareue Motor Goerators - Continued l

Previous TER Tag Description NRC Previous Proposed Mos.

Nos.

(Model etc.)

Cateeory Deficiencies Resolution The Dings brake is qualifted to 1 x 10 8 rads by GPUN analysis (material list from vendor) which is documented in GPUN calculation 1101X-5350-018. Rev. 1.

This calculation shows Polyimide (not Polyamide) as the limiting material [EPRI NP-1558 p C-2].

The specified 2 x 10' rads total integrated dose for these motor operators is based upon the DOR Guidelines.

7 IC-V2 MVA SM000 II.A 2,3,4 This in-containment motor operator (ICV-2) 119 MU-V2A/B MVA SMB00 II.A

2. 3. 4 is located below the flood level.

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[FW-V58]

MVA $83 II.A 1.2,3.4.7a Evaluation of operating time in process 11 (EF-V2A&28]

MVA SM80*

II.A 1.2,3.4,7a All of the above connents (for TER No. 2) 14

[FW-V928]

MVA SM800 II.A

1. 2, 3, 4. 7a apply to these out-of-containment motor 15

[EF-VIA&B]

MVA SM8000 II.A 1.2,3,4,7a operators except that these have Reliance class B insulated motors.

These motor operator are qualtfled by Limitorque Report 80003. A thermal lag analysis which shows that the operator will operate through the Intermediate Bldg MStB temperature spike of 322*F was developed (GPUN Calc. C-1101-424-5350-001 Rev. 2). l l

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Soecific Eeutament EO Deftetencies

[

8.

ASCO Solenoid Valves

'l Previous TER Tag Description Net Previous Proposed Nos.

Nos.

tModel etc.1 Cat ;r1 Deftciencies Resolution 26 (EFv304/5 (SV142)]

LS8210C94 II.A 1

As described in GPUN letter dated 83000C8G II.A

2. 3 August 2. 1982 (82-183) and May 10, 1984 28 (EFV3P4/5 (SV3&4)]

(5211-84-2114) GPUN has removed the EFW latch signal from the EFW control 4

valves. Therefore, this scienoid is no longer required to be qualtfted and was i

deleted from the Master List.

These TER ttees should be placed in the NaC SER Ouaitftcation Catesory III.B.

" Equipment Not in the Scope of the i

Review".

26 (FW-V16 B&178/SW3&SV4)]

L88210C94 II.A 1

These solenold valves are qualifted per i

10CFR50.49 Section F.

New ASCO Model NP831666E Oualtfled per Report A0867368 i

was installed in June 1984.

This TER Item should now be placed in the NGC SER Oualtftcation Category I.A.

" Equipment Qualtfted."

27

[FW-V178/$V142]

8300C68G II.A

2. 3 New ASCO Model NP 206-381-7RVF. cualtfled 29

[FW-V168/SV1&2]

8300C68G II.A

2. 3 by AOR 67368, were installed by June 1984.

These valves are qualtfted in accordance with 10CFR50.49 Section F.

i These TER Items should now be placed in the NaC SER Qualtftcation Category I.A

" Equipment Qualtfled".

1 1

32

[MS-V13A/S (SV)]

L843146 II.A 1

These valves are not required for hot shutdown. (See GPUN Letter dated 3/10/84 i

and 3/22/83.) This TER Item should be i

placed in the NaC SER Qualtftcation Category III.B.

" Equipment Not in the

,.. i e Scope of the Review". (See Section.I.G,1 1

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$3ecific Eeuinment EO Deficiencies k _Westinehouse Motors

'l Previous TER Tag Description NRC

~ Previous Proposed Mgs.

Nos.

(Model etc.)

Cate. err Deficiencies Resolution 45 (MUp-4]

182T II.A

2. 3. 4 & 6 Bearing Analysis showed that the bearings t

46 (MUp.1]

HP700 II.A 2, 3. 4, 6 & 10 can withstand a LOCA/HELB (ref. GPUN l

49 (8SP-1)

HP250 II.A

2. 3. 4, 6 & 10 calculation 1101X-5350-020).

50

[DHP-1]

HP350 II.A

2. 3. 4, 6, 7A.

B C.D.E Motor Lubrication (Exxon Tertsstic 32) is 51

[EFP-2]

HP450 II.A

2. 3. 4, 6. 7A controlled within the preventive mainten-B.C.D.E ance program by GPUN procedure E-41.

Qualtf tcation of lead splices is con-trolled within the corrective maintenance program by GPUN procedure 1420-Y-15.

Stellartty for the above Itsted motors *s established by Westinghouse Report WCAP i

7829.

4 Westinghouse Report WCAP 7829 thermally aged the motors for 21 days at 200*C and l

tested to 2 x 10' rads and LDCA (324*F at 80 psia and 9.5 pH).

WCAP 7829 tested the complete motor assembly.

3 Item 49 is also located in the Aux 11tary Butiding in an area where the GPUN analy-sis resulted in a TIO of 1.6 x 10' rads.

EFP-2 was analyzed in Westinghouse Report 80F31215 dated I/81 for motor insulation life analysts which envelopes the thermal j

lag peak for the Intermediate Butiding of 322*F.

See GPUN letter dated May 31, 1984 (5211-84-2122).

i These TER Items should be placed in the NRC SER Oualtftcation Category I.A.

"Eeutoment Qualtfled" with the exception of MUP-4 which should be placed in NRC r,

SER Oualtrication Category III.5,r.,

'Ivipment not in the scope of the t

Review."

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SDec.j f * : Eeutament EO DefIcienties I

0.

Vielorsed Radiation Monitor $

F, x

V

~

'l Previous

/

TER Tag Nos.

Nos.

Description

.' NGC Previous Proposed

~

fModel etc.)

53

[RM-A2:~A5.A6]'

'fateeory Deficiencies Resolution l

II.A 1

These radiation monitors are indicators s

of LOCA and are located outside contain-

~

l ment (subject to a atid environment).

b They are not required for a main steam itne or ferdwater Itne break. This TER

, Item should be placed in the NRC SER

'Oualtftcation Category III.B " Equipment Not in the Scope of the Review."

E.

Statj Q Rine Pressure Switch

~

(-

5 7 ' - [PS600-607]

9TA-845-NX II.A

1. 2, 4, 7 A.

These switches were replaced with qualt-

~

CIA-JJTT-X6 B. C. D&E fled SDR switches model N

L; 97A-845-NX-CIA JJTT-X6 in May of 1984.

~

QualtFtcation is based upon Action Report

-~

17344-82N-0.

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'y Specific teutament EO Deficiencies 1-y c.d.

j F.

Bailev E/PAfg3Crters,

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.s 4

-Previous p% -

-TEF. ~ Tab ~

' NRC Previous Proposed g g '~ Nos.

Cateeorv Deficiencies Resolution ] _

i

~;w 60 '(MSV-4.-En

'el%

48; !I,A 1

The MSV-4's are not required to mitigate the consequences of an HELB or LOCA for hot shutdown, and exkosure to harsh en-V wironmendl conditions cannot cause these valves ti, fall into the open posit 10na The limit switches provide indicatten Q.-.

the main control room only and there is no interconnection with other system functier,5 (See GPow'1etter dated 5/10/84)

Therefore the UP conserters for the MSV-4's need not be environmentally qualified. These converters should be v,.f, placed in the NRC SER Oualification Category III.B " Equipment Not in the Scope of the Review".

The EFV-30's converters were replaced by I/P converters Conoflow model GT45CA1826 (Cenoflow reports 3021 & 3419) & GPUN calculation C-Il01-424-5350-010) [See GPtM Ltrs. date 5/10/84. 5/31/84 and

'v.

8/6/84] which are fully qualified. This TER ttem should now be placed in NRC Category I.A " Equipment Qualified."

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Soecific Eeutament E0 Deftet,encies i

G.

Namco Limit Switches j

4 Prev 1ous TER Tag Description NRC Previous Proposed Nos.

Nos.

fModel etc.1 Catenorv Deftcieneiet Retalution 66 (MSV-6]

D2400X II.A 1

Under LOCA and MSLB sufflctent flow is 67

[MSV-13]

01200G2 II.A

1. 3. 4 provided to the OTSGs by a single motor driven EFW pump. (See GPUN 1etter dated 3/22/83). The steam driven EFW pump is only required for station blackout which does not produce a harsh environment.

l allure of the limit switch with MSV-6 open may result initially overfeeding the OTSG which could be.' educed tunedtately (manually) based on qualif;ed EFW flow and OTSG 1evel instrumentation. There-fore. the EFW system will function and the operato* will not be misled.

Failure of the limit switch (MSV-13) results in the inabtitty to monitor valve position and may result in Itfting re-liefs but because of quaitfled EFW flow and OTSG 1evel instrumentatten this will not mislead the operator. (See GPUN Ltr.

dtd. 5/10/d4).

These TER ttes=s should be reclassif ted to NRC SER Category III.B "Equipamt Not in Scope of the Review"..

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Sagstftc Eauinment EO Deftetencies j

i H.

Fisher Limit Switches t

'I Previous TER Tag Description NRC Previous Proposed Nos.

Mos.

(Model etc.)

Cateaory Deficiencies Resolution 71 (MSV-4/LS]

Gov. 304 II.A 1

(EF-V30A&B//LS]

These switches are used for diagnostic purposes only. Flow indication for the emergency feedwater system is provided by the qualtfled redundant flow indicators sensed by FT-779. 782. 788 & 791. They have been installed in accordance with the requirements of Item II.E.1.2 of NUREG 0737. A secondary indication of emergency feedwater flow is provided by the qualifted steam generator level indt-cation system.

See Bailey E/P Converter Proposed Resolution. These Itmit switches (MSV4) should be placed in NRC Category III.B

Equipment Not in the Scope of the Review". ;..,

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$I Saecific Eautament EO Deftet,encies

.j 1.

Foxboro Transmitters 1

e

'l Previous TER Tag Description NRC Previous Proposed Nos.

Nos.

(Model etc.1 Categorv Deficiencies Resolution (SP6A-PT1&PT2,SP68-PT1&PT2]

78 RC3A-PT314. RC38-PT3]

EllGH-HINM2 II.A 2, 3 Foxboro Peport 09-6005 quallfles these 81

[

E11GM-HSAE1 II.A 2, 3 transmitters to a HEL9 (318'F at 90 psig) and reart T2-1075 palifies the trans-mittf r*

o 2.4 X 10 (I Hour) rad limit set by the DOR Guidelines. The service life is based on the analysis provided in 8&W report 77-1127001-00 and test data from report Q9-6005 and Wyle Report 45592-4. The resultant service Ilfe (12.8 yrs, at 100*F) is based upon the Arrhenius data from the Wyle Report since this is the most conservative value.

(GPtm Calculation 110lX-5350-Oll) (See GPUN letter dated 5/31/84]

The LOCA duration of 19.5 Hours is enveloped within the 25 days tested by 09-6005.

T' 4 in-containment transmitters are qua..

ed per 10CFR50.49 Sections F and K.

1..se TER items should be placed in the NRC SER Qualification Category 1.A

" Equipment Qualified".

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Saectfic Eeuinment EO Deficiencies 1

b I.

Foxboro Transmitters

'l Previous TER Tag _

Descr1ption NRC Previous

' Proposed Nos.

Nos.

(Model etc.)

Cateaarv Deficiencies Resolution 79

[PT-282, 285. 288}

E11AM II.A 2, 4 These transmitters are located within the Auxtitary Side. which is a harsh area only because of 3.55 x 105 rads.

Radiation qualtftcation to 1 x 10' Rads is documented in Fo:. boro report T2-1075.

These out-of-centainment transattters are qualtfled per 10CFR50.49 Sections F and i

K.

This TER item should be placed in the NGC SER Ovaltftcation Category I.A.

"Equipuent Qualified".

93

[FT-20 thru 24]

E130PGC II.A 1

R8 Cooler Outlet flow These transmitters are classified as GPUN display instrumentation not requiring qualification. They should be reclassi-fled to the NGC SER Oualtftcation Category III.A " Equipment Exempt From QuallfIcation".

J.

GEMS Limit Switch 98

[WDL LS-116]

LS800 II.A 1

The Reactor Butiding Sump Level 4

R8 Sump Level instrumentation has been upgraded in accordance with NUREG 0737 Item II.F.1.

(See R.G.1.97 Sheet) Environmentally Qualtfled Level Transmitters LT 804 thru 807 have been installed.

This item will continue to be included by GPUN as display instrumentation not re-guiring qualification. It should be reclassified as NRC Category III.8

" Equipment not in the scope of the review."

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Cannan Eeuiseent EO Def tc$4nc1es

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l Previous i1 TER Description Net Previous Proposed Item N r. & Model No.1 Cat:r. v Deftetencies tesolutten 106 Kerite Cable II.A 2

A letter from Kerite report dated 5/16/84 ectabitshes the applicablitty of the Kerite dated 8/21/81 to TMI-1 cable pur-chased under P097099 dated 4/23/69. Power and control cable was qualtfled per Kerite Qualification Document HTK/FR cable" dated S/21/81. Power cable was qualtfled per Wyle 4

report 45453-2. See GPUN EO-TI-111.

3 This cable is gualtfled per 10CFR58.49 Sections F and K.

This TER tten should be placed in the NaC SER Qualifica-tion Category I.A. " Equipment Qualtfled".

107 Continental Cable

!!.A 2

Instrument cable procured per PO 40067 dated 6/9/70 is qualifted per 00R Guidelines as outilned in GPUN EQ-TI-109.

Instruarmt cable procured for EF.V30A and 8 is qualif ted to NUREG 0588 Cat si per GPUN EO-TI-108.

3 This cable is qualtfted per 10CFR50.49 Sections F and K.

This TER 1 tem should be placed in the NRC SER OualifIca-tion Category I.A. "Egulpment Qualifted".

i 108 Ray Chem Cable Spitce II.A 2

i GPUN has reviewed the appitcable Ray Chem Reports and de-termined that is appitcable to the splices at TMI-I be-cause the material composition is the same for all Ray Chem splices.

This sp1fce fs qualiffed per 10CFH50.49 Sectfor.s F and K.

This TER f ten should be placed in the NRC SER Qualf fica-i tion Category I.A. " Equipment Quellffed".

' 1 1

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I 1 4 l'Pl9t#

1 4

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ge

$1.

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. Eautument EO Deficiencies

}

-(Manf. & Model No.1 Cat: c,

Deficiencies Resolution

. 109 GE Penetration f01 II.A

3. 4. 8. 10 These G.L. Penetrations are qualific. se a service Itfe of 100*F/42 yrs., 1 x 10 R. LOCA (340*F. 78 psig.

8 9.5 pH). This data is based upon the F01 penetration qualtftcation test conducted by GE in April 30 1971 and on tests conducted by the 3M Company on the epoxy seal-ant. Additionally. there is no deterioration of the Epoxy caused by caustic spray. (This is based upon data obtained from the Oak Ridge National Lab Report ORNL-TM-2412.)

The irradiation data referenced on the SCEW sheet was not for the exact type of sealant used in the F01 penetra-tions. Subsequently, trradiation data has been obtained for the exact type of epoxy sealant used in the penetra-tion. This epoxy is a " Scotchcast

type produced by the 3MCoy0 ny.

The irradiation test data shows no damage at 1x1 rads and little or no damage at 5 x 10 rads.

8 The required TID dose for these containment penetrations is 2 x 10' Rad Gansna and 10% of 2x10 8 Rad Beta based. The above data is being verified by test and analysis conducted by General Electric for GPUN. GE will issue a formal report.

i The above data is being verified by test and analysts conducted by General Electric for GPUN.

G.E. will issue a formal report.

111 GE Terminal Block E825 II.A 2

G.E. letter GEN-8-18 states that there is very little difference between CR1518 and EB terminal blocks. They are made of the same : material (cellulose filled phenolic). Terminal Block LOCA Test for Electrical Penetration Assy by R.M. Schuster 11/6/73 was used to quality these Terminal Blocks.

The?e terminal blocks are qualtFied per 10CfR50.49 Sections F and K.

This TER ttem should be placed in the NRC SER Oualtftcation Category I.A. " Equipment Qualified".

114 Conax Connector SA-1000 II.A

1. 2 Conax connectors are mechanical pressure connectors which

Conex Connector PL1482 are used to puup Humidity out of electrical equipme9t.

j AClual Connectors used (PL-Series and 7590-100d-10thrui

23) are qualified by IPS 409. IPS 325. and 8dineyWppeM'*

l report OR-4201-1152 GPT.

i These pressure connectors are qualifted per 10CFR 50'.49 Sections F & K.

This TER ttem should be placed in the NRC Qualtftcation Cat;;ary I.A. " Equipment Qualified.".e 4

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$t i

Coculon Eeulement EO Deficiencies i

TER Description NGC Proposed LLtm (Manf. & Model No.)

Cat:;;. -

Deficiencies Resolution 116 Thyrectors CR2095100DJA II.A 1

These are suppression devices across DC calls. ?hese thyrectors have been replaced by a MIL oualtfled device.

MIL-S-19500/5071ranszorb Diodes. These transzorbs are only located within the THI-I Auxiliary Building which is only harsh due to low level radiation. A radiation test is being conducted to verify the radiation th eshold of the transzorb by March, 1985. Existing tota shows quall-fication to 2x10' Rads r.m===.

JIO is ;shmitted for appropriate solenoid valves. (JIO-T1-84-8)

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-- Equipment Qualification Deficiencies Resolution (NRCCategoryII.C-EquipmentSatisfiesAllRequiremeNYb Except Qualified Life or Replacement Schedule)

=.

I.

Qualified Life A.

Limitornue Motor Operators TER Items 5, 17-22, 24 [BS-V-1; 2; 3; DH-V-3, 4, 6, 5 & 7: MU-V-12, 14, 16, 36, 37; NS-V-3"]

Qualified life is established by Impe11 Calculation 0370-079-026.

TER Item 19 (DH-V-5A, 5B) and TER Item 24 (MU-V-12, 36, 37) are not required to be environmentally qualified to mitigate a DBA and should be placed in NRC Category III.B." Equipment Not in the Scope of this Review".

B.

ASCO Solenoid Valves TER Items 33, 39 [SV/AHV-1A; SV/CAV-2, 189; SV/ ICV-6; SV/MUV-3, 26;

~ ~

SV/WDL-V304, V534, V535]

4 The qualified life is based upon an Arrhenius Analysis using Impe11 Calculation 0370-079-011, Rev. 1 and ASCO AQR67368, Rev. 1.

SV/CAV-5 and SV/CAV-6 should be placed in Category III.B.

'TER Item 36 [SV/CAV-5A, 5B]

I These solenoid valves are located in the Turbine Building mild environment area. This TER Item should be reclassified as NRC SER Qualification Category III.B " Equipment Not in the Scope of this r

Review".

s TER Item 40 [SV/CF-V'19A, V19B. V20A, V20B; SV/WDG-4]

i Qualified life is establ*shed by ASCO Test Report AQR 67368, Rev.

1, except for SV/WDG-4 which has been replaced with a qualified solenoid valve. Target Rock Model 802-14-008.

C.

Static-0-Ring Switches

-TER Item 56 [PS-672 through 675]

The qualified life is established upon an Arrhenius Analysis using GPUN Calculations (C-1101X-68, 70, 72 through 77, 85) [

These switches are qualified in accordance with 10CFR 50.49

. Sections F and K.

This TER Item should be reclassified as.'NRC SER Qualification Category I.A. " Equipment Qualified".

~

__ _.__ _ D.

Square D Switches 1.

TER Item 58 [PS 745]

-'k ThisswitchwasreplacedwithSORModel4N6-B4-NX-CIA {JJTTX6in

~~-

s June 1984 which is qualified in accordance with 10CFR.50.49 Section K by.Impe11 Calculation 0370-079-006, Rev. 0.

This TER item should reclassified as NRC Category I.A.

2.

TER Item 59 [PS-283, 284, 286, 287, 289 and 290]

The diaphragm in these swir.ches has been replaced with one made of Nitrile rubber. This qualifies these switches for 40 years based on an Arrhenius Analysis, Impell Calculation 0370-079-012. These switches should be reclassified as NRC Category I.A.

E.

NAMCO Snap Lock Switches TER Items 63, 64, 69 ](LSA, LSB) AHV-1A; (LSA, LSB) CAV-2; (LSB,

33) ICV-3; (LSA, LSB), MU-V-3,18, 20, 26; (LSA, LSB) WDL-V304, j;

V534, 535]

3 The material evaluation for a 40 year life of Nitrile rubber is correct based upon a Arrhenius Analysis (Impe11 Calculation 0370-079-015). The conflicting temperature data in the TER does not include an Arrhenious Analysis and therefore cannot be evaluated.

[

F.

Micro Switches TER Item 72 [(LSA, LSB) CFV-19, 20, CAV-189; (LSA, LSB) WDG-V4]

r The qualifici life is established by Impe11 Calculation 0370-079-055, Rev.

O., except for WDG-V4 which has qualified intern-s al limit switches in'the replacement solenoid valve described for l

TER Item 40.

[

II. Replacement Schedule.

The replacement schedule for all environmentally qualified equip-ment at TMI-1 is included in the computerized Preventive l

Maintenance schedule or Licensing Action Item List (for trans-mitters). The SCEW sheets specify qualified life on subcomponents,.

or materials when that life is less than 40 years.

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.a-Equipment Qualification Deficiencies and Resolutions

('iRC Category IV " Documentation Not Made Available" -I h_ --

I.

Generic The qualification documentation for these TER items is contained in the

)

GPUN File specified below for each plant specific items. The qualifi-cation status of each file is described in Attachment 5.

II.

Plant Specific Items A.

Ross Solenoid Valves TER Item 42 [SV/MUV-18, 20]

Qualification is established by File No. EQ-T1-138.

B.

GE Motors TER Item 44 [(A, B, C) MU-P-2, 3]

"" ~I Qualification is established by File No. EQ-T1-121.

C.

GE Motors TER Item 47 [(A, B, C) AH-E-1]

Qualification is established by File No. EQ-T1-123.

i These motors are qualified per 10CFR50.49 Sections F and K.

This TER item should be placed in the NRC SER Qualification Category I.A T

" Equipment Qualified".

s D.

Rosemount Pressure Transmitters TER Item 76 [(PT1, 2) RC3A, B]

Qualification is established by File No. EQ-T1-129.

These transmitters are qualified per 10CFR50.49 Sections F and K.

This TER item should be placed in the NRC SER Qualification Category I.A " Equipment Qualified".

E.

Barton D/P Switches TER Item 77 [EFW FI-S-77, 78, 79]

[

These flow switches are for the EFW pump recirculation line.

Per our discussion in GPUN letter dated February 4, 1983, th,g.vc1ves are now locked open.

- t ThisTERItemshouldbereclassifiedtotheNRCSER"Qus1(Ulc Category III.D " Equipment Not in the Scope Of This Review'J.

F.

Bailey Level Transmitters TER Items 85, 88 [(LT1, 2, 3) RC1; (LT2, 4) SP1A, B]

Qualification is established by File No. EQ-T1-128.

These transmitters are qualified per 10CFR50.49 Sections F and K.

This TER item should 'Te placed in the NRO SER Qualification Category I.A " Equipment Qualified".

G.

Bailey Level Transmitters TER Item 87 [(BS1)DPT1, 2; BS3-LT; BSS-LT]

BS-1 DPT 1 & 2 will be replaced prior to 3/31/85 by qualified

" " ~

transmitters. A justification for continued operation is attach-ed.

(Attachment 6)

These transmitters should be reclassified to NRC Category I.B.

Transmitters BS3-LT and BSS-LT should be reclassified to the NRC SER Qualification Category III.A " Equipment Exempt From i

Qualif ica'. ion".

H.

Rosemount Temperature RTD TER Items 90, 91 [(TE2, 3) RC4A, B:

(TEl, 2, 3, 4) RCSA, B]

s Qualification is est'ablished by File No. EQ-T1-130.

l s

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Summary MASTER LIST Three Mile Island Unit 1 Docket No. 50-289 (Class 1E Electrical Equipment Required To Function Under Postulated P

~

Accident Conditions) e 7

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e 6

HELB/LOCA MASTER LIST System Main Steam

~. - -

I hvice.

TER No.

Plant ID No.

Description location Mansfacturer 81 SP6A-PT1 OTSG Discharge Press RB Foxboro Transmitter E11GMSAE1 81 SP6A-PT2 OTSG Discharge Press RB Foxboro Transmitter E11GMSAE1 81 SP68-PT1 OTSG Discharge Press RB Foxboro Transmitter E11GMSAE1 81 SP6B-PT2 OTSG Discharge Press RB Foxboro Transmitter E11GMSAE1 PT-950 OTSG Discharge Press RB Rosemount Transmitter 1153GD9

~

PT-951 OTSG Discharge Press RB Rosemount Transmitter 1153GD9 MSV-2A/B Motorized Valve IB Limitorque Actuator SMB1 57 PS600-607 Pressure Switch FW RB Static 0 Ring i

Isolation 9TA-B45-NX-CIA

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g.

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.... 2 HELB/LOCA MASTER LIST

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System Feedwater/ Condensate YDdvice TER No.

Plant ID No.

Description Location Manufacturer 10 FWV-5B Feedwater Block Valve IB Limitorque SB3 14 FWV-928 FW Bypass Block Valve IB Limitorque SMB00 26 SV 3/FWV 16B FW Solencid Control Va.

IB ASCO NP831666E 26 SV 4/FWV 16B FW Solenoid Control Va.

IB ASCO NP831666E 26-SV 3&4/FWV 17B FW Solenoid Control IB ASCO NP831666E Valve 29 SV 102/FWV 16B FW Solenoid Control IB ASCO NP206-381-7RVF

~

Valve

"" -e 27 SV 1&2/FWV 17B FW Solenoid Control IB ASCO NP206-381-7RVF Valve COV 14A/B Condensate Tank IB Limitorque SMB-0 Isolation COV 111A/B Condensate Tank IB Limitorque SMB-000 Isolation g

11 EF-V2A&B Motorized Valve IB Limitorque SMB-0 Actuators 15 EF-VIA&B Motorized Valve IB Limitorque SMB-000 s

51 EF-P2A&B Pump Motors IB Westinghouse HP 450 77 FT-791, 799, Flow Transmitters IB Foxboro NE 13DM 782, 788 60

'FY-850A I/P Converters IB Conoflow GT45CA1826R

'FY-849A 8

HELB/LOCA MASTER LI_ST System Make-up and Purification f --

rDevice TER No.

Plant ID No.

Description Location Ma6uf'acturer 46 MU-P1A Makeup AB Westinghouse Pump Motor Style 68F20835 46 MU-PIB Makeup AB Westinghouse Pump Motor Style 68F20835 46 MU-PIC Makeup AB Westinghouse Pump Motor Style 68F20835 44 MU-P3A Makeup AB General Electric

~~~"'-

Pump Motor (Main 011) 5K37JG403 44 MU-P3B Makeup AB General Electric Pump Motor (Main 011)

SK37JG403 44 MU-P3C Makeup AB General Electric Pump Motor (Main Oil) 5K37JG403 119 MU-V2A Letdown cooler outlet RB Limitorque Valve Motor Operator SMB00 119 MU-V2B Letdown cooler outlet RB Limitorque i

Valve Motor Operator SMB00

_ 63 LSA/MU-V3 Letdown cooler outlet AB NAMCO Valve Limit Switch SLM8 63 LSB/MU-V3 Letdown cooler outlet AB NAMCO Valve Limit Switch SLM8 39 SV/MU-V3 Letdown cooler outlet AB ASCO Valve Solenoid Valve HT8321AB 18 MU-V14A Pump Suction From BWST AB Limitorque Valve Motor Operator SMB1 18 MU-V14B Pump Suction From BWST AB Limitorque Valve Motor Operator SMB1 Limikorque 17 MU-V16A Pump discharge AB Valve Motor Operator SMBl.

HELB/LOCA MASTER LIST

..1 System Make-up and Purification y f -~~

Device TER No.

Plant ID No.

Description Location Manufacturer.

17 MU-V163 Pump discharge AB Limitorque Valve Motor Operator SMB1 17 MU-V16C Pump discharge AB Limitorque Valve Motor Operator SMB1 17 MU-V16D Pump discharge AB Limitorque Valve Motor Operator SMB1 42 SV/MU-V18 Charging Line Isolation AB Ross Valve-Solenoid Valve 2676A4011 64 LSA/MU-V18 Charging Line Isolation AB NAMCO

~

~,,

Valve-Limit Switch SL 3B2L 64 LSB/MU-V18 Charging Line Isolation AB NAMCO Valve-Limit Switch SL 3B2L 42 SV/MU-V20 Seal Isolation Valve-AB Ross Solenoid Valve 2676A4011 i

64 LSA/MU-V20 Seal Isolation Valve-AB NAMCO Limit Switch SL 3B2L

- 64 LSB/MU-V20 Seal Isolation Valve-AB NAMCO.

Limit Switch SL 3B2L s

120 MU-V25 RC'P Letdown Cooler Isola-RB Limitorque tion Valve-Motor Operator SMB00 i

39 SV/MU-V26 RCP Letdown Cooler Isola-AB ASCO tion Valve-Solenoid Valve HT8321A8 l

63 LSA/MU-V26 ACP Letdown Cooler Isola-AB NAMCO tion Valve-Limit Switch SLM8 63 LSB/MU-V26 RCP Letdown Cooler Isola-AB NAMCO tion Valve-Limit Switch SLM8 v

58 PS745A Pressure Switch AB Static-0-Ring Lube Oil 4fi6fB4-NX-CIA-JJTT-X6 l

58 PS745B Pressure Switch AB Static-0-Ring Lube Oil 4N6-B4-N:;-CIA-JJTT-X6

1..

i l

_ HELB/LOCA MASTER LIST System Make-up and Purification NDevice TER No.

Plant ID No.

Description Location ManuPacturer 58 PS745C Pressure Switch AB Static-0-Ring Lube Oil 4N6-B4-NX-CIA-JJTT-X6 MU-23-DPT 1,2, HPI Flow Transmitter AB Rosemount 1153HB6PA*

3,4 MU-42-DPT Seal Injection Flow AB Rosemount 1153HB5PA*

Transmitter 86 MU-14-LT Makeup Tank Level AB Rosemount 1153DB4PA*

LT-778 Transmitter 44 FUP-2A B.C Aux. Lube Oil Pump AB General Electric SK37JC403 PS 479 A,B,C Pressure Switch Aux.

AB ASCO Lube Oil SA21AR t

s

Not presently installed O

a HELB/LOCA MASTER LIST System Decay Heat Removal

-k

'~

. [ ---

.I K'vice TER No.

Plant ID No.

Description Location Maou[acturer

~

50 DH-PIA DE Pump Motor AB Westingh'ouse HP350 50 DH-PIB DH Pump Motor A3 Westinghouse HP350 20 DH-V4A Discharge Valve-Motor AB Limitorque Operator SMB3 20 DH-V4B Discharge Valve-Motor AB Limitorque Operator SMB3 21 DH-V6A RB Sump Pump Suction AB Limitorque Valve-Motor Operator SMB0 21 DH-V6B RB Sump Pump Suction AB Limitorque Valve-Motor Operator SMB0 24 Dd-V7A MU System Suction AB Limitorque Valve-Motor Operator SMB000 24 DH-V7B MU System Suction AB Limitorque g

Valve-Motor Operator SMB000 DH-1-DPT-1 DH Flow Transmitter AB Rosemount*

1153DB5PA DH-1-DPT-2 DH Flow Transmitter AB Rosemount*

s 1153DB5PA 3

DH-V1 DH Dropline Isolation RB Limitorque Valve-Motor Operator SMB3 3

DH-V2 DH Dropline Isolation RB Limitorque Valve-Motor Operator SMB3 22 DH-V3 DH Dropline Isolation AB Limitorque Valve-Motor Operator SMB3 RC-V3 Pressurizer Spray Line RB Limitorgue Isolation Valve-Motor SMB00 Operator d

RC-V4 DH Injection Line Iso-RB Limitorque tion Valve-Motor SMB00 Operator

Not presently installed HELB/LOCA MASTER LIST System Reactor Building Isolation 5k

~l ice TER No.

Plant ID No.

Description Location ManuEacturer 63 LSA/AH-VIA RB Purge Valve-Limit AB NAMCO Switch SLM82 63 LSB/AH-V1A RB Purge Valve-Limit AB NAMCO Switch SLM82 33 SV/AH-VIA1 RB Purge Valve-Solencid AB ASCO Valve 7LB8316C35MO 33 SV/AH-VIA2 RB Purge Valve-Solenoid AB ASCO Valve 7LB8316C35MO 7

CA-V1 Pzr. Sample Valve Motor RB Limitorque Oper.

SMB000

~#

69 LSA/CA-V2 RCS Sample Valve-Limit AB NAMCO Valve M8300 69 LSB/CA-V2 RCS Sample Valve-Limit AB NAMCO Valve M8300 39 SV/CA-V2 RCS Sample Valve-Solenoid AB ASCO i

Valve LB8321A5 7

CA-V3 Pzr. Water Sample Valve-RB Limitorque r

Motor Operator SMB000 s

7 CA-V4A OT,SG FW Isolation Valve-RB Limitorque

~

Motor Operator SMB000 7

CA-V4B OTSG FW Isolation Valve-RB Limitorque Motor Operator SMB000 l

118 CA-V13 RCS Letdown Sample RB Limitorque Valve-Motor Operator SMB000 69 LSA/CA-V189 Demin. Water Isolation AB Micro Switch Valve-Limit Switch BZE62RN 69 LSB/CA-V189 Demin. Water Isolation AB Micr'o Switch Valve-Limit Switch DTE6'2RN 39 SV/CA-V189 Demin. Water Isolation AB ASCO*.

~

Valve-Solenoid HT8321A5 2

AH-V1B' RB Purge Valve-Motor RB Limitorque Oper.

SMB2 HELB/LOCA MASTER LIST

-1 System Reactor Building Isolation

.Ddhice TER No.

Plant ID No.

Description Location Manufacturer, PS932, 933, RB Iso. Pressure Switch AB Static-0-Ring 937, 934, 935, 6NN-AA3-M4-C2A-936 GGTT-X3 2

AH-VIC RB Purge Valve-Motor RB Limitorque Operator SMB2 7

IC-V2 IC Closed Loop Isolation RB Limitorque Valve-Motor Operator SMB000 35 SV/IC-V3 IC Return Isolation AB ASCO Solenoid Valve LB8320A35 63 LSA/IC-V3 IC Return Isolation AB NAMCO Valve-Limit Switch SLM82 63 LSB/IC-V3 IC Return Isolation AB NAMCO Valve-Limit Switch SLD2400X-2 1

WDG-V3 RB Vent Header Isolation RB Limitorque Valve-Motor Operator SMB00 4~

SV/WDG-V4 RB Vent Header Isolation AB Target Rock Valve-Solenoid Valve 80Z-14-008 120 WDL-V303 RCS Drain Tank Outlet RB Limitorque Is,ola. Valve-Motor Oper.

SMB000 63 LSA/WDL-V304 RCS Drain Isolation AB NAMCO Valve-Limit Switch SLM32 63 LSB/WDL-V304 RC Drain Isolation Valve-AB NAMCO Limit Switch SLM82 39 SV/WDL-V304 RC Drain Isolation Valve-AB ASCO Solenoid Valve FT8321A5 l

63 LSA/WDL-V534 RB Sump Isolation Valve-AB NAMCO Limit Switch SLM82 63 LSB/WDL-V534 RB Sump Isolation Valve-AB NAMCO Limit Switch SLM82.~

39 SV/WDL-V534 RB Sump Isolation Valve-AB ASCO Solenoid Valve FT8321A5 k

_9_

HELB/LOCA MASTER LIST System Reactor Building Isolation 2'k

@5 _..

ice TER No.

Plant ID No.

Description Location Mahufacturer 63 LSA/WDL-V535 RB Sump Isolation Valve-AB NAMCO Limit Switch SLM82 63 LSB/WDL-V535 RB Sump Isolation Valve-AB NAMCO Limit Switch SLM82 39 SV/WDL-V535 RB Sump Isolation Valve-AB ASCO Solenoid Valve LB8321A5 O

M -

=>..

' k 7

s

~

i te e

. ~

4 HELB/LOCA MASTER LIST

{

System Reactor Protection

g fDyice

~'

~

TER No.

Plant ID No.

Description Location Manufac turer 76 RC3A-PT1 RC NR RB Rosemount Pressure Transmitter 1152 CP9A92T0010PB 76 RC3A-PT2 RC NR RB Rosemount Pressure Transmitter 1152 GP9A92T0010PB 76 RC3B-PT1 RC NR RB Rosemount Pressure Transmitter 1152 GP9A92T0010PB 76 RC3B-PT2 RC NR RB Rosemount Pressure Transmitter 1152 GP9A92T0010PB 90 RC4A-TE2 RC Outlet Temp RTD RB Rosemount 177 HW2 90 RC4A-TE3 RC Outlet Temp RTD RB Rosemount 177 HW2 90 RC4B-TE2 RC Outlet Temp RTD RB Rosemount' 177 HW2 90 RC4B-TE3 RC Outlet Temp RTD RB Rosemount 177 HW2 1

56 PS-672 RB Pressure Switch AB Static-0-Ring 7

12NK45CMRR 56 PS-673 RB Pressure Switch AB Static-0-Ring 12NK45CMRR r

56 PS-674 RB Pressure Switch AB Static-0-Ring 12NK45CMRR 56-PS-675 RB Pressure Switch AB Static-0-Ring 12NK45CM3RRY O

HELB/LOCA MASTER LIST System Engineered Safeguards Actuation

~k E---

. Wice.

TER No.

Plant ID No.

Description Location Mahufacturer 78 RC3A-PT3 RC WR Pressure RB Foxboro Transmitter E11GH 78 RC3A-PT4 RC WR Pressure RB Foxboro Transmitter E11GH 78 RC3B-PT3 RC WR Pressure RB Foxboro Transmitter E11CF 79 PT-282 RB Pressure AB Foxboro Transmitter E11AM 79 PT-285 RB Pressure AB Foxboro Transmitter EllAM

"" -?

79 PT-288 RB Pressure AB Foxboro Transmitter EllAM e 59 PS-283, 284, RB Pressure Switch RB Square D 286, 287, 289, Class 9013 AMG-5 290 t

W

~

Y i

=

a

1

- HELB/LOCA MASTER LIST System Reactor Building Emergency Cooling

'I ice TER No.

Plant ID No.

Description Location Manufacturer 47 AH-E1A RB Cooler Fan Motor RB General Electric SK810037Al 47 AH-ElB RB Cooler Fan Motor RB General Electric SK810037Al 47 AH-E1C RB Cooler Fan Motor RB General Electric 5K810037Al

- e O

p

0 e

=

4

,~

e HELB/LOCA MASTER LIST System Core Flood 5

j _{ ice m

TER No.

Plant ID No.

Description Location Manu6ecturer 7

CF-V2A CF Sample Isolation RB Limitorque Valve-Motor Operator SMB000 6

CF-V2B CF Sample Isolation RB Limitorque Valve-Motor Operator SMB000 72 LSA/CF-V19A CF Makeup Valve-Limit AB Micro Switch Switch BZE62RN 72 LSB/CF-V19A CF Makeup Valve-Limit AB Micro Switch Switch BZE62RN 40 SV/CF-V19A CF Makeup Valve-Solenoid AB ASCO Valve 2063815RVF I

72 LSA/CF-V19B CF Makeup Valve-Limit AB Micro Switch Switch BZE62RN 72 LSB/CF-V19B CF Makeup Valve-Limit AB Micro Switch Switch BZE62RN 40 SV/CF-V19B CF Makeup Valve-Solenoid AB ASCO l

i Valve 2063815RVF 4

72 LSA/CF-V20A CF Sample Isolation AB Micro Switch r

Valve-Limit Switch BZE62RN l

s 72 LSB/CF-V20A CF, Sample Isolation AB Micro Switch Valve-Limit Switch BZE62RN 40 SV/CF-V20A CF Sample Isolation AB ASCO Valve-Solenoid Valve 2063815RVF 72 LSA/CF-V20B CF Sample Isolation AB Micro Switch Valve-Limit Switch BZE62RN 72 LSB/CF-V20B CF Sample Isolation AB Micro Switch Valve-Limit Switch BZE62RN 40 SV/CF-V20B CF Sample Isolation AB ASCO[

Valve-Solenoid Valve 2063815RVF k

i HELB/LOCA MASTER LIST System RB Spray 21

)

ice TER No.

Plant ID No.

Description Location Manu&acturer 49 BS-P1A RB Spray Pump AB Westinghouse HP250 49 BS-PIB RB Spray Pump AB Westinghouse HP250 18 BS-VIA RBS Pump Discharge Valve AB Limitorque SMB1 18 BS-V1B RBS Pump Discharge Valve AB Limitorque SMB1

~_

24 BSV-2A RBS Pump Suction NaOH AB Limitorque

.~

SMB000 24 BSV-2B RBS Pump Suction NaOH AB Limitorque SMB000 24 BSV-3A RBS Pump Suction NaOH AB Limitorque SMB000 24 BSV-3B RBS Pump Suction NaOH AB Limitorque i

SMB00 87 BS1-DPT-1 RB Spray Flow AB Rosemont*

1153PP5 s

87 BS1-DPT-2 RB, Spray Flow AB Rosemont*

1153PP5

Not presently installed

. HELB/LOCA MASTER LIST System Nuclear Services Closed Loop Cooling 2k ice TER No.

Plant ID No.

Description Location MapufIacturer

~

23 NS-V4 RCP Cooler Isolation AB Limitorque

~

Valve-Motor Operator SMB00 23 NS-V15 RCP Cooler Inlet AB Limitorque Isolation Valve-Motor SMB00 Operator 5

NS-V35 RBI for NS Cooling RB Limitorque SMB-00 WP

,*S D

t i

6 O

. ~ -

d

. _. - _ ~.

- - -. _, _ _ _ -. _.. _. _, _ -.... _., - _... _,. -.,, ~

HELB/LOCA MASTER LIST System Additional Accident Monitoring Equipment

,1 Ids TER No.

Plant ID No.

Description Location Minuucturer 88 SPlA-LT2 OTSG Level Transmitter RB Bailey ~

BY8B41XA SPIA-LT3 OTSG Level Transmitter RB Bailey BY8B41XA 88 SPIB-LT2 OTSG Level Transmitter RB Bailey BY8B41XA SPIB-LT3 OTSG Level Transmitter RB Bailey BY8B41XA 85 RCl-LTl PZR Level Transmitter RB Bailey BY3B40X-A

.[

85 RCl-LT2 PZR Level Transmitter RB Bailey BY3B40X-A 85 RCl-LT3 P2R Level Transmitter RB Bailey BY3B40X-A LT-777 PZR Level Transmitter RB Rosemount 1153DD5 t

91 RC5A-TEl RC Inlet Temp RID RB Rosemount 177HW2 91 RCSA-TE2 RC Inlet Temp RTD RB Rosemount 177HW2 91 RC5A-TE3 RC Inlet Temp RTD RB Rosemount 177HW2 91 RC5A-TE4 RC Inlet Temp RTD RB Rosemount 177HW2 i

91 RC5B-TE1 RC Inlet Temp RTD RB Rosemount 177HW2 l

91~

RC5B-TE2 RC Inlet Temp RID RB Rosemount 177RW2 ;

91 RC5B-TE3 RC Inlet Temp RTD RB Rosebount 177H'W2

l HELB/LOCA MASTER LIST System Additional Accident Monitoring Equipment

-~k ice TER No.

Plant ID No.

Description Loca tion Manufacturer

~

91 RC5B-TE4 RC Inlet Temp RID RB Rosemount 177HW2 88 SPIA-LT4 OTSG Level Transmitter RB Bailey BY8B41XA SP1A-LT5 OTSG Level Transmitter RB Bailey BY8B41XA 88 SPIB-LT4 OTSG Level Transmitter RB Bailey BY8B41XA SPIB-LT5 OTSG Level Transmitter RB Bailey BY8B41XA PT-949 RC Pressure Transmitter RB Rosemount 1153GD9 i

m*

O 1

. ~ '

i

, HELB/LOCA MASTER LIST System Additional Accident Monitoring Equipment 2~k J

tce.

TER No.

Plant ID No.

Description Location Msoudicturer PT-963 RC Pressure Transmitter RB Rosemount 1153GD9 RC-4A-TE1 RC Tn.

RTD RB Rosemount 117GY-2 RC-4A-TE4 RC Tw.

RTD RB Rosemount 177GY-2 RC-4B-TE1 RC Tn.

RTD RB Rosemount 177HW-2 RC-4B-TE4 RC In.. RTD RB Rosemount 177HW-2 77-938 RC Tn.. RTD RB Weed 1AOD/612D-1B-D-6-C-20-0-0 TE-960 RC Tn.

RTD RB Weed 1AOD/612D-1B-D-6-C-20-0-0 TE-959 RC Tc.ie RTD RB Weed g

1AOD/612D-1B-C-6-C-20-0-0 TE-961 RC Te.ie RTD RB Weed 1AOD/612D-1B-C-6-C-20-0-0 PT-981A RB Pressure Transmitter RB Rosemount 1153GD7 s

PT-981B RB Pressure Transmitter RB Rosemount 1153GD5 PT-982A RB Pressure Transmitter RB Rosemount 1153GD7 l

PT-982B RB Pressure Transmitter RB Rosemount 1153GD5 LT-775 OTSG Level Transmitter RB Rosemount l

1153DD5 r

LT-776 OTSG Level Transmitter RB Rosemount 1153DD5 LT-788 OTSG Level Transmitter RB Rosemount 1153DD57 LT-789 OTSG Level Transmitter RB Rosemount i

1153DD5 t

HELB/LOCA MASTER LIST System Hydrogen Recombiner I

'I ice

-TER No.

Plant ID No.

Description Location Manuketurer HR-V22A/B,.23A/B RB Isolation Solenoid RB Target Rock 80Z-14-003 HR-R-1/2 Hydrogen Recombiner AB-Rockwell Int'l.

190MM23001 e

b a-e

.,e e

S s

G h

G g

HELB/LOCA MASTER LIST

~~

System Common Equipment

-l ice TER No.

Plant ID No.

Description Location ManuCecturer

~

108 Heat Shrink Tubing RB/AB/IB Raychem WCSFN, WCSF-200-N 110 Terminal Block RB/AB/IB States # NT 109 Electrical Penetration RB GE #F01 107 Instrument Cable RB/AB/IB Continental (CC-2193)

(Anaconda) 106 Power & Control Cable RB/AB/IB Kerite 600V (EK-3A)

.~

Kerite SKV

[,,

HTK Insulation 115 Press Seal Modules RB/AB/IB Conax PL Series 114 Press Seal Modules RB/AB/IB Conax 7590-100000-01 thru 23 i

116 Suppression Diode AB General Semiconductor TransZorb

~~

JTXIN6071A 112 Ter,minal Block AB/IB CE #CR-151 111 Terminal Block AB/IB CE #EB-25 Instrument Cable (FREP)

IB Continental (EK 15E)

(Anconda)

Instrument Cable IB Boston Insul. Wire EK 15A Splice ($kV)

IB Kerite S-)NSgNUC-DISC Instrument Cable IB Samuel,_ Moore

. MASTER LIST (RG1.97)

k Devi Manulfc Plant ID No.

Description Location re r' System Containment Hz

~. '

AE-42A/B Hz Analyzer IB Comsip K-III HM-V03A/B, 4A/B PA Sampling Solenoid RB Valcor V526-5296 System-Decay Heat DH2-TEl&2 DH Heat Exchanger AB Bailey Outlet B3032685F

~.

System Safety & Relief Valve Flow

~

DPT-921, 922, 923 Flow Transmitter RB Foxboro PORV Safety NE-13DM System Incore Thermocouple Incore Detector Assy RB B&W DA7L-1B-1T-1C-128 Elec. Connector RB Bendix JT07A-14-19P(302)

Cable RB Continental GAI B/M EK15L s

TE-9520, 953C Inc' ore T/C Penet.

RB Weed Inst. Co.

954C, 955C RTD 1AOD/611-15-C -

C-2-A2-0 TE-952A, 953A Incore T/C Penet.

RB Rosemount 954A, 955A RTD 1390 u*

__ MASTER LIST (RG1.97)

~i Devih-'-

Plant ID No.

Description Location Manufeewrer System Containment Sump LT-804, 805 Containment Level RB Delaval (GEM) 806 & 807 XM54854 XM54852-90-1500 System Radiation Monitors RMG22&23 Containment Hi Range RB Victoreen 877-1 u>

ge G

9 G

.t l-m_

Master List (NUREG 0737)

TER NO.

PLANT ID NO.

DESCRIPTION LOCATION DEYI E MANF.

g __ _

DPT 1079, 1080 Par / Loop / Head RB Foibco 1081, 1082 Vent Transmitter N-E13-DH RC-V-40A/B, Par / Loop Vent RB Target Rock 41A/B, Solenoid 80Z-14-005 44 802-14-006-GW 90 e

"o e

..t

_ [---

=

Changes to the FRC/TER Master List An Explanation 2.

W e

e r-

a.

M r

4 0

O m.

e 1

_1_

TER vs. Current Master List lk

~

TER Components Current 1 ___

TER No.

Components ML Commenta}{

1.

WDGV-3 Y

'[

2.

AHV-1B+C Y

3.

DHV-1+2 Y

4.

CFV-1A/B N

Exempt (III.A) 5.

NSV-35 Y

6.

CFV-3A/B+2B Y

CFV-3A/B deleted (Notel) 7.

ICV-2, CAV-4A/B, CAV-3 Y

CAV-1, CFV-2A 8.

FWV-5A N

Out of Scope (III.8) 9.

FWV-92A N

Out of Scope (III.B) 10.

FWV-5B Y

11.

EFV-2A/B Y

12.

RRV-4A, B.C&D, RRV-3A,B&C N

Out of Scope (III.8) 13.

RBV-2A/B N

Out of Scope (III.8) 14.

FWV-928 Y

15.

EFV-1A/B Y

16.

RBV-7 N

Out of Scope (III.8) 17.

MUV-16 A, B, C, D Y

18.

BSV-1A/B, MUV-14A/B Y

19.

DNV-5A/B N

Exempt (Note 2) 20.

DHV-4A/B Y

21.

DHV-6A/B Y

22.

DNV-3 Y

23.

NSV-32, 1564 Y

Exempt NSV32 (Note 1)

I 24.

BSV-2A/B, 3A/B, MUV-12 Y

Exempt MUV12 and MUV 36 & 37 DHV-7A/B, MUV-36 & 37 (Note 2)

-- 25.

SV 364/FWV-16A & 17A N

Out of Scope (III.8) 26.

SV 364/FWV-168 & 178 Y

27.

SV 1 & 2/FWV-178 Y

28.

SV 1 & 2/EFV-30A/B N

Exempt (Note 3) 29.

SV 1 & 2/FWV-168 Y

30.

SV 1 & 2/FWV-17A & 16A N

Out of Scope (III.8) 31.

SV/EFV 8 A, B & C N

Exempt (III.A) (Note 3) 32.

SV/MSV-13A/B N

Exempt (5/10/84) (Note 1) 33.

Sv/AHV-1A1, 2 Y

34.

SV/ARV-1D1 N

Out of Scope (III.8) 35.

SV/ ICV-3, 4 Y

Exempt ICV-4 (Note 4) 36.

SV/CAV-5A/B N

Out of Scope (Note 4) 37.

SV/CMV-1, 2, 3 & 4 N

Out of Scope (III.8) 38.~

SV/DCV-19A/B N

Out of Scope (III.8) 39.

SV/WDLV-534, 535, 304, ICV-6 Y

Exempt ICV-6 (Note 4)

CAV-2, 189, MUV-3, 26 40.

9V/CFV 19A/S, CFV-20A/B Y

~

41.

SV/NSV-52 A.B.C. 53A,B,C N

Out of Scope (III,5).-

42.

SV/MUV-18 & 20 Y

TER Components Current TER No Components ML Comments 43.

NSP-1 A, B, & C N

Out of Scope (III.B 44 MUP-3 A, B. & C Y

~~~

~

45.

MUP-4 A, B, & C N

Exempt (11/9/84 (Note 5) 46.

MUP-1 A, B, & C Y

47.

AH-E-1 A, B, & C Y

~

48.

DCP-1 A, B N

Out of Scope (III.B) 49.

BSP-1 A, B Y

50.

DHP-1A/B Y

51.

"~,_2A/B Y

52.

NI-5, 6, 7 & 8 N

Exempt (Note 1) 53.

RMA-2, 5 & 6 N

Exempt (2/10/84) (Note 4) 54.

MU-24-DPT N

Exempt (Note 6) 55.

NI-1, 2 N

Exempt (III.A) 56.

PS 672-675 (RBP)

Y 57.

PS 600-607 (FW)

Y

~~-

58.

PS 480 A, B, & C Y

Exempt PS480 A,B,&C (11/9/84) 745 A, B, & C (MUP)

(Note 5) 59.

PS 283, 284, 286, 287, Y

(Note 1 and Note 6) 289, 290 (RBP) 60.

SPV-4A/B (MSV-4) SPV-5A/B Y

SPV-5A/B replaced 5/10/84 (Note 6) s.

(EFV30A)

SPV-4A/B exempt (5/10/84) (Note 1) 61.

LSB (AHV-1B) & LSA (AHV-1D)

N Out of Scope (III.8) 62.

LSB (ICV-6) LSB (ICV-4)

N Exempt (Note 4) 63.

LSA/B (MUV-26) LSB (ICV-3)

Y LSA/B (WDLV304) LSA/B (WDLV-534, 535)

LSA/B (MUV-3) LSA/B (AHV-1A) 64.

LSA/B (MUV-18) LSA/B (MUV-20)

Y 65.

LSA/B (DCV-19A/B)

N Out of Scope (III.B) 66.

LSA/B (MSV-6)

N Exempt (5/10/84) (Note 1) 67.

LSA/B (MSV-13A/B)

N Exempt (5/10/84) (Note 1) 68.

LSA/B (CMV 1, 2, 3, 4)

N Out of Scope (III.8) 69.

LSB (CAV-189), LSA/B-(CAV-2)

Y 70.

LSA/B (NSV-52 A,B,C & 53 A,B.C N

Out of Scope (III.8) 71.

LSA (MSV-4A/B)

N Exempt (5/10/84) (Note 1) 72.

LSA/B (WDGV-4) LSA/B (CFV Y

Removed LSA/B (WDGV-4) (Note 6) 20A/B, 19A/B Y

73.

LSA/B (CAV 5A/B)

N Out of Scope (III.8) 74.

RC 14A/B DPT 1, 2, 3, 4 N

Exempt (III.A) 75.

MU-17-PT N

Exempt (III.A) 76.

RC 3A/B-PT 1 & 2 Y

77.

FIS-77, 78, 79 (EFW)

N Replaced by DPT 779, 782, 788, 791 (Note 6) 78.

RC 3A/B-PT 3&4 Y

79.

DT282, 285 & 288 (RBP)

Y 4

80.

CF-PT 1, 2, 3 & 4 N

Exempt (!!!.A) 81.

SP 6A/8-PT 1 & 2 Y

TER Components Current TER No.

Components ML Comments

'_.W 82.

RCDT PT 323 N

Exempt (III.A)

. [- -

83.

SP-10A/B PT 1 & 2 N

Exempt (III.A) f K,

84.

RC-3A PT5 N

Exempt (III.A) 85.

RCl-LT-1, 2, 3 Y

86.

MU-14-LT Y

Replaced (Note 6) 87.

BSI-DPT 1, 2 Y

88.

SPI A/B-LT-4 & 2 Y

89.

CF2-LT-1, 2. 3 & 4 N

Exempt (III.A) 90.

RC 4A/B-TE-2 & 3 Y

91.

RC SA/B-TE-1, 2, 3, 4 Y

92.

RCDT-TF-605 N

Exempt (III.A) 93.

RBEC (Flow Out) FT 20-24 N

Exempt 94.

RBEC (Flow Error) DFA-23A, N

Exempt (III.A) 24B, 25C 95.

RBEC (Flow Error) FC-23A, N

Exempt (III.A) 245, 25C 96.

RBEC (Temp Comp) FY-23A, N

Exempt (III.A) 248, 25C 97.

RCDT (LT-115)

N Exempt (III.A) 98.

RB Sump (LS-116)

N Exempt 99.

RBEC (Flow In) (FE-20A, 21B, N

Exempt (III.A) 22C, 23A, 24B, 25C) 100.

RC-21-TE24. TE6 N

Exempt (III.A) 101.

RC-(5-8) TE2 N

Exempt (III.A) 102.

RC2-TE1 N

Exempt (III.A) 103.

RB-TE-655A-X N

Exempt (III.A) g 104 CRPM 1-69 N

Exempt (III.A) 105.

RBEC (Flow Error) (FI-23A, N

Exempt (III.A) 248, & 25C)

N Exempt (III.A) r106.

Kerite Cable Y

107.

Continental Cable Y

108.

Ray Chem Y

s 109.

GE Elect. Penetration' Y

110.

States TB Y

111.

GE TB EB-25 Y

112.

GE TB CR151 Y

113.

Stanwich TB6 N

Exempt (Note 3) 114.

Conax SA 1000 Y

115.

Conax PL14B2 Y

116.

Thyrector CR2095200 PJA N

Replaced by Transzorb (Note 6) 117.

MCC 1ABC-ES VLV-CC N

Out of Scope (III.8) 118.

CAV 13 Y

119.

MUV 2A Y

120.

WDLV-303. MUV-25 Y

e' Notes - Deletions 1.

These comporents are not required to perform a safety functiOH uring or following exposure to a harsh environment by a HELB/LOCA and f luce of, the equipment will not affect safety.

e 2.

These components perform their required function prior to being' exposed to the harsh environment due to recirculated radioactive fluids and their subsequent possible failure as a result of the harsh environment will not affect safety.

3.

Equipment no longer installed or electrically disconnected.

4.

Equipment located in a mild environment for post accident HELB/LOCA.

5.

Backup equipment not required when employing single failure criteria for LOCA/HELB.

~~~~'

6.

New equipment added to replace older equipment which has been deleted.

GW dQ e

G 6

.f

.~

a

-- Additions / Replacements to the Master List Since the TER Components Conunents PT 950, 951, OTSG Press GPUN Ltr dtd 8/23/84 (Note 1

~

LT 775, 776, 788, 789 OTSG GPUN Ltr dtd 8/23/84 (Note 1

~"

SP1A/B LT 3 & 5 OTSG GPUN Ltr dtd 8/23/84 (Note'2 RC-4A/B-TE 1 & 4 T Not GPUN Ltr dtd 8/23/84 (Note 27 DH-1-DFT 1 & 2 LPI Flow GPUN Ltr dtd 11/9/84 (Note 3)

MSV 2A/B GPUN Ltr dtd 5/10/84 (Note 2)

TE-959, 961 T Cold WR GPUN Ltr dtd 8/23/84 (Notes 1 & 3)

TE-955C, 954C GPUN Ltr dtd 5/16/84 (Note 5)

TE-958, 960 GPUN Ltr dtd 8/23/84 (Note 5)

PT-949, 963 RCS(WR) Press GP'.'N Ltr dtd 5/16/83 (Notes 1 & 3)

LT-777 Par Lvl GPUN Ltr dtd 8/23/84 (Notes 1 & 2) j PT-981A/S, 982A/B RB Press GPUN Ltr dtd 8/23/84 (Note 1)

LT-778 MUT Lvl GPUN Ltr dtd 11/9/84 (Note 4)

FT 791, 779, 782.788 EFW GPUN Ltr dtd 5/10/84 (Note 4)

COV-111A/B GPUN Ltr 8/6/84 (Note 3)

COV-14A/B GPUN Ltr 8/6/84 (Note 3)

MU-23DPT 1, 2, 3, & 4.

GPUN Ltr dtd 11/9/84 (Note 3)

Cable Samuel Moore GPUN Ltr dtd 5/31/84 (Note 5)

Cable BIW GPUN Ltr dtd 5/10/84 (Note 5)

Kerite Spilce GPUN Ltr dtd 5/31/84 (Note 2) 5 PS 479 A, B & C GPUN Ltr dtd 11/9/84 (Note 6)

MUP 2 A, B, & C GPUN Ltr dtd 11/9/84 (Note 6)

MU-42-DFT GPUN Ltr dtd 11/9/84 (Note 4)

RCV-3 GPUN Ltr dtd 8/23/84 (Note 3)

RCV-4 GPUN Ltr dtd 8/23/84 (Note 3)

Diode Transorb GPUN Ltr dtd 11/9/84 (Note 4)

NMV-3A/B & 4A/B GPUN Ltr dtd 5/16/83 & 10/2/84 (Note 5) t AE-42A/B GPUN Ltr dtd 5/16/83 & 10/2/84 (Note 5)

RMG 22 & 23 GPUN Ltr dtd 5/16/83 & 10/2/84 (Note 5)

.LT 804-807 (RB Sump)

GPUN Ltr dtd 5/16/83 & 10/2/84 (Note 5)

PS 932-937 GPUN Ltr dtd 5/16/83 & 10/2/84 (Note 4)

TE 952A/C, 953A/C 954A, 955A CPUN Ler dtd 5/16/83 & 10/2/84 (Note 3)

{

Incore T/C GPUN Ler dtd 5/16/83 & 10/2/84 (Note 3) i l

Incore T/C Connector CPUN Ltr dtd 5/16/83 & 10/2/84 (Note 3)

~

DFT 921, 922 & 923 GPUN Ltr dtd 5/16/83 & 10/2/84 (Note 5)

Continental Cable GAI B/M EK15 GPUN Ltr 5/1/83 (Note 5)

DN2-TE 1 & 2 GPUN Ltr 10/2/84 (Note 5)

RM-V3A/B; 4A/B CPUN Ltr dtd 5/16/83 (Note 5) l l

LSA/CAV-189 GPUN Ltr dtd 9/4/80 (Note 7) i MUV-2B GPUN Ltr dtd 9/4/80 (Note 7) l RC-V40A/B, 41A/B GPUN Ltr dtd 5/16/83 (Note 5) l DPT-1079-1082 GPUN Ltr dtd 5/16/83 (Note 5)

RCV-44 GPUN Ltr dtd 5/16/83 (Note 5) i NR-R-1/2 GPUN Ltr dtd 5/16/83 (Note.5)

NR-V22A/B & 23 A/B GPUN Ltr dtd 5/16/83 (Note 5)s i

SV/WDGV-4 CPUN Ltr dtd 5/16/83 (Notg 4)

FY-849A, 850A GPUN Ltr dtd 5/10/84 (Note,4)-.

'l

s 2

Notes - Additions / Replacements

~t 1.

New Equipment added for ICS/NNI independence.

2.

Equipment added to prevent misleading to operator and are id n[ical to other qualified items included in the master list.

3.

Changes in procedural guidance now requires the use of this equipment (i.e. ATOC-symptom oriented procedures) 4.

New equipment added to replace other equipment deleted.

e 5.

New equipment added by NUREG 0737 or RG1.97.

6.

Redundant equipment needed for greater operational flexibility.

7.

Item omitted by TER but on CPUN Master List.

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1 E FTI-?O3 1.imitorque Qualified subject to ccafir 1 tion Various (Centain.ent) of electrical interface, Valve Motor Operators acceptability of plant specific spplicatien, and revuw/ revision to reselve action items.

The review of ICV-2 to perform its function prior to subaergence is t.nder rtview.

EQ-T1-105 Limitorque' Qualified sut ject to review end S.':E-0, 0, -000.

-1,

-2, -3 revision to resolve action iffns.

Valve Actuators C

( Aa>:iliary Leilding)

EQ-T1-113 ASCO Qualified subject to

_L 206-3SI-5RVF verification of cyc!ing 206-351-7KVF ti ne, and field verif:cstion r

SP S316 66E of installation.

Solenoid Valses EQ-T1-114 ASCO Qualified subject to T

S316,.S321 Series confiridtion of material's solenoid Valves aging te;r.perature, field verifi-cation of installation, and qualification of voltage suppression devices.

EQ-T1-115 Square D Qualified subject te verifi-9013-M10-5 cation of installation.

Presture Switch interf ace, and confire.ation that

1ubricant used is not cegraded by specifled radiation.

EQ-T1-117 Static-0-Ring Qualified subject to 9TA, AN6,and 12N6 Series completion of evaluation Presrure Switches of variation in switch perform-ance, demonstrated accuracy-during LOCA test ing and confirm--

ation of vendor aging analysis.

I m_

-. EQ-TI-118 Rosemount Qualified subject to completion 1153 Series D of evaluation of demonstrated Pressure Transmitters accuracy during testing.

(Re-I place Eaileys with Fosemount Trausmitters (J10-T1-St-1, 2, 3

& 4)

EQ-TI-119

'w'e s t inghouse Qualified subject to confirr.ation Class 1E Large A.C.

of electrical interface Pump Motors qualification.

EQ-T1-121 Ceneral Electric Qualified subject to confirmation 5K37JG403 of electrical interface Pump Motor qualification.

EQ-T1-123 Ceneral Electric Qualified subject to 5K810037Al verification of type of terminal

-Pump Motors lugs utilized.

EQ-TI-124 Transamerica Delaval (GEMS)

Qualified subject to confirmation XM54852 of suitability of qualified Level Transmitter connecting cable, and dacumenta-tion that the acceptance cri-teria for percent of full scale and submergence is acceptable for plant-specific application.

EQ-T1-127 Namco

, Qualified subject to model-MS, D2400X and SL Series number verification and Limit Switches confirmation of materials trarcability.

EQ-T1-128 Eailey Meter Qualified subject to confirmation BY 8B41X-A of,rientation/ mounting.

BY 3B40X-A (JIC-T1-84-2)

Level Transmitter EQ-T1-129 Rosemount Qualified subject to review of 1152 short qualification life, test Pressure Transmitter data, operating time, calculation methodology, and potential failure effects.

EQ-T1-130 Rosemount Qualified subject'to audit of 177HW-2 test data, verification of i

177GY conduit seal installatlon, and 1390 confirmation that accuracy is i

compatible with plant specific a ppi lca t ion.

Radiation qualifi-cation cannot be established for 1390.

Replaced by Restart or JIO.

(J10-T1-84-7)

L

s:

-3 EQ-T1-131 Conax Qualified subject to Modified PL Series /

clarification of pcst-accident 7590-10000-01 through 23 operability and similarity and Conduit Connector ccnfirmation that configuration is not degraded by radiation.

- Q-T1-132 Micro Switch Qualified subject to verification E

EZE6-2RN of type of terminal lugs bfE6-2RN utilized.

Limit Switches EQ-T1-133 Ceneral Semiconductor Radiation qualification JTXIN6071A cannot be established due Voltage Suppression Diode to insufficient test data.

Radiation testing being perform-ed.

See JIO-T1-84-8 (Attachment 6).

EQ-T1-134 Raychem Qualified.

This is a revision WCSF-200-N to existing EFW file to account Low Voltage Splice (IKV) for worst case environ: rental conditions for non -EFW compon-ents.

EQ-T1-135 Target Rock Qualified subject to field 50Z-14-003, S0Z-14-005, verification' of tennination 802-14-008 temperature rating of the Solenoid Valves interfacing cable; confirmation that test cycles are conserva-tive, internal heat rise has no affect on aging, and beta dose is reduced.

EQ-T1-137 General Electric Qualification documentation F01 Series being prepared.

Interim Containment Electrical letter report concludes that, Fenetration based on a preliminary review of ~

documents, there is a high degree of confidence that quali-fication will be documented.

EQ-T1-138 Ross Qualified subject to confirmation 2676A4011 (Pilot and Solenoid of interface, traceability of Assembly, Part No. 233C93) analyzed materials, and plant' Solenoid Assembly specific application effect on-aging.

I l

?

-L-t EQ-T1-139 Eabcock 4 'Wilcox Docusentation is not available l

Incore Monitoring System to demonstrate that the (xternal L

extension teflon cable and connector are qualified.

Quali-fication is being pursued through further analysis and l-testing.

(J10-T1-S4-6) i EQ-T1-141 Valcor Qualified subject to V525-5296 verif2 cation of cycling time,

[

Solenoid Valves field verification of installa-tion configuration, and confir-mation that of traceability of I -

internal wiring, and-internal beat rise has no affect on aging, and that test anomalies l

are odequately addressed.

t i

EQ-T1-142 Rockwell International Qualified subject to assurance 190MM23001 of qualification of differential Thermal Hydrogen Recombiner pressure transmitter, internal wiring and motor / gas cooler electrical interfaces; trace-f ability of material; confirma-l tionaof percentage reduction in i

properties utilized; and confir-l mation of harsh environment

. parameters. utilized.

EQ-T1-143 Compsip Qualified' subject to confirmation l

KIII/KIV of electrical interface Hydrogen Analyzer System qualification.

l EQ-T1-144 Victoreen Detector qualified.

877-1 Documentation is not available to l

Radiation Detector support qualification for the existing cable assembly.

See JIO-T1-84-9 (Attachment 6).

EQ-T1-147 ASCO Qualified subject to confirnation l

SA21AR of installation documentation.

Pressure Switches

(

_EQ-T1-148 Bailey Meter Not qualified. Replacement B3032685F RTDs being purchased.

See RTD J10-TI-84-5 (Attachment 6).

EQ-T1-149 Rosemount Qualified subject to completion 1153 Series B of evaluation of demonstrated Pressure Transmitters accuracy during testing.

r

v 4

t Attachaant 5 EQ File Index EQ-T1-101 BIW Cable EQ-T1-102 States Terminal Block EQ-T1-103.Limi torcue VMO (R/Bl_dg. )

MUV-2A/B; MUV-25; DHV-1, 2; CFV-2A/B, 3A/B; WDO-3; WDLV-303; NSV 35; ICV-2; CAV-1,.3, 13, 4A/B; AHV-1B, IC; RCV-3, 4 EQ-T1-104 Limitorcue Vko (Interned! ate E!de.)

EEV-1A/B, 2A/B; FWV-5B, 92B; MSV-2A/B; COV-14A/B, 111A/B EQ-T1-105 LimitorSue VMO (Auxiliary Bldg.)

MUV14A/B, 16 AEC&D, 36, 37; DHV-3, 6A/B, 7A/B; BSV-2A/B, 3A/B, i

l A/ B ; '.'SV-4, 15, DHV-4A/B EQ-T1-106 Conoflow FY S49A, 850A EQ-T1-107 Westinghouse Motors EFP-2A/B EQ-T1-108 Continental Cable (FREP)

EQ-T1-109 Continental _ Cable (C-2193)

EQ-T1-110 Foxboro DPT-1079-1082; DPT-921-923, FT-779, 782, 788, 791 EQ-T1-111 Kerite Cable EQ-T1-112 G.E. Terminal Block EQ-Il-113 ASCO Solenoid (588)

CFV-19A/B, 20A/B; FWV-16B, 17B EQ-T1-114 ASCO (DOR]

s MUV-3, 26; ICV-3; CAV-2, 189; WDLV-304, 534, 535 AHV-1A1, 1A2 EQ-T1-115 Square D Pressure [ Switch PS-284, 286, 257, 289, 290, 293 EQ-T1-116 Static 0-Ring Presstire Switch (DOR)

PS-932-937; 672-675 EQ-T1-117 Static 0-Ring Pressure Switch (SSS)

PS-600-607; PS-745 A,B,C; PS 648 A,B,C EQ-T1-118 Rosemount Transmitter (1153D)

LT 778, MU23-DPT 1-4; MU-14-LT, MU-42 DPT, LT-777, DH1-DPT 1 &

.9, PT 949-951, LT 775, 776, 778, 789; PT 963, PT 981A/B, PT 982/B EQ-T1-119 Westinghouse Motors MUP-1 A,B,C; DHP 1 A/B; BSP-1 A/B EQ-T1-120 Deleted EQ-T1-121 General Electric Motors MUP-2 A,B & C, 3 A,B, & C EQ-T1-122 Foxboro Transmitters SP6A/B-PT 1 & 2, RC3A-PT 3 & 4; RC3B-PT3; PT 282, 285, 288 EQ-T1-123 General Electric Motors AHE-1, A.B.C EQ-T1-124 Delaval_(CEM) Transmitters LT 804-807

s

, EQ-TI-125 Delete

.EQ-T1-126 Kerite SKV_ Cable Splice EQ-T1-127 jf1]C0_Li mi t__ Sri t c h LSA/S (MUV-3, 18, 20, 26; CAV-2: ICV-3; WDLV-304, 534, 535 AHV-1A)

EQ-T1-12S Ba_iley__ T_ransmi t t e rs SP 1 A/BLT 2, 3,

4, 5; BS 1-DPI 1 & 2; RCl-LT 1 & 2 & 3 EQ-T1-129 Rosemount Transmitters RC 3A/B PT 1 & E EQ-T1-130 Rosemount RID RC4A/BTEl-4, TE 959, 961; RC5A/BTEl-4; TE952A-955A EQ-T1-131 Conax (PL & 75900)

EQ-T1-132 Microswitch CAV-189; CFV 19A/B, 20A/B EQ-T1-133 Transorb Diede EQ-TI-134 Raychem Heat Shrink Tuting EQ-T1-135. Target Rock Solenoid RCV-40A/B, 41A/B, 44; WhV-22A/B, 23A/B; WDG V-4 EQ-T1-136 -Weed RTD t

TE 952-955C; TE 95S-961 EQ-T1-137 GE Penetration F01 EQ-T1-138 Ross MUV-18 & 20 EQ-T1-139 Incore Detectors & Electrical Connectors & Cable EQ-T1-140 Samuel Moore Cable EQ-T1-141 Valcor HMV-3A/B, 4A/B EQ-T1-142 Rockwell International HR-R-1, 2 EQ-T1-143 Comsip_Delphi AE 42A/B EQ-T1-144 Victorcen RMG -22, 23 EQ-T1-145 Delete EQ-T1-146 Delete EQ-T1-147 ASCO Pressure Switch PS 479 A,B.C EQ-T1-148 Bailey RTD DH2-TEl, 2 EQ-T1-149 Rosemount 1153B m

.

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