ML20154B718

Forwards Info Requested by Suppl 1 to NRC Bulletin 85-003 on Nine Addl Valves,Including Applicability to Plant Program. HPCI & RCIC Turbine Exhaust Valves Not motor-operated Valves & Will Not Be Considered in Determining Operator Setpoints

ML20154B718
Person / Time
Site:	Hatch
Issue date:	09/06/1988
From:	Hairston W GEORGIA POWER CO.
To:	NRC OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATION & RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (ARM)
References
HL-50, IEB-85-003, IEB-85-3, NUDOCS 8809140092
Download: ML20154B718 (15)

Text

a Georg a Fbwer Company i

I 333 P:edmont Ave %e l

Atlantt Geoga 30308 Verhone 404 526 6526 MaAng Aness:

R;st Off ce Box 4545 Attaeta, Gevg a 30302 l

Ed"vcNa$ent w w c w anons i

l HL-50 0433I I

X7GJ17-H110 September 6, 1988 l

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Document Control Desk i

Hashington, D.C.

20555 t

PLANT HATCH - UNITS 1, 2 NRC DOCKETS 50-321, 50-366 OPERATING LICENSES DPR-57, NPF-5 NRC BULLETIN 85-03. SUPPLEMFMI_],

i l

Gentlemen:

l i

Supplement I to NRC Bulletin 85-03, "Motor-Operated Valve Common l

Mode Failures During Plant Transients Due to Improper Switch Settings,"

dated April 27, 1988, was issued to clarify:

1) which valves are to be r

included and

2) the meaning of the phrase ". s inadvertent equipment operations (such as inadvertent valve closures or openings)...". as used in the original bulletin.

Supplement I also required BWR licensees to review and document the design basis for the operation of safety-related motor-operated valves in th9 high-pressure coolant injection (HPCI) and reactor core isolation cooling (RCIC) systems, considering inadvertent recovery from such mispositionings.

Supplement I requested a written report be submitted to the NRC within 30 days, providing the information stated above for any valves not already included in the IEB 85-03 program, including maximum opening and closing diflerential pressure.

A schedule for completing the remaining portions of the program (items b through d cf the original bulletin) and a final report were also requested.

By letter dated May 27, 1988, Georgia Power Company (GPC) responded to the NRC regarding the subject bulletin supplement.

In that response, GPC committed to address inadvertent mispositioning of valves in the HPCI and RCIC systems, as evaluated by the BWR Owners Group (BWROG).

The Reference 1 letter documented that a total of nine additional valves should be considered by utilities, such as Georgia Power Company, that participated in the BWROG 85-03 Committee.

However, since Plant Hatch-specific calculations of maximua d;fferential pressure for the 8809140092 880906

/f PDR ADOCK 05')O0321 Q

PNU

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=

G0orgi$ Power d U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission September 6, 1988 Page Two Supplement i valves were dependent on a generic methodology developed by the BWROG, Georgia Power Company deferred its response to the bulletin supplement until the BHROG input was received.

The Reference 2 letter formally transmitted this input to GPC, t presents the information requested by Supplement 1 on the nine additional valves, including their applicability to the Plant Hatch Bulletir. 85-03 program, and a proposed schedule for completion of the program. The maximum expected differential pressure calculations are i

given in Enclosure 2.

It should be noted that GPC has recently completed the testing on Unit 2 for the original Bulletin 85-03 scope, has started testing on

{

Unit 1, and is in the process of scheduling a meeting with appropriate NRC staff personnel to discuss the GPC program.

l If you have any questions in this regard, please contact this office at any ti;.ie.

Sincerely, (h. -

H. G. Hairston, III Sr. Vice President i

Nuclear Operations GKH/ac i

Enclosures:

1.

Response to NRC Bulletin 85-03, Supplement 1.

2.

Differential Pressure Calculations for Supplement i Valves.

References:

1.

Letter, R.

F.

JanecA (BHROG) to 0 H.

Snlezek (NRC),

"IE Bulletin 85-03." dated March 28, 1988, 2.

Letter. H. G. Fiock (BWROG) to BHROG IEB 85-03 Conmittee Members, "BWROG Response to IEB 85-03, Supplement 1," dated August 4, 1988, c:

(See next page.)

04331 i

G00rgiaPower A I

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comission September 6, 1988 Page Three q

1 c: Georgia Power comoany l

4 j

Mr. H. C. Nix, General Manager - Hatch l

Mr. L. T. Gucwa, Manager Licensing and Engineering - Hatch l

GO-NORMS 1

)

U.S. Nuclear Reaulatory Commission. Washinoton. D.C.

l Mr. L. P. Crocker, Licensing Project Manager - Hatch t

)

U.S. Nuclear Reaulatory Comission. Reaion II i

Dr. J. N. Grace, Regional Administrator l

Mr. J. E. Henning, Senior Resident Inspector - Hatch i

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1

Geolgi Poner ENCLOSURE 1 PLANT HATCH - UNITS 1, 2 NRC DOCKETS 50-321, 50-366 OPERATING LICENSES OPR-57, NPF-5 RESPONSE TO NRC BULLETId 85-03. SUPPLEMENT 1 NRC Bulletin 85-03, Supplement 1, requested dHR owners to consider the inadvertent mispositioning of valves in the high-pressure cociant injection (HPCI) and reactor core isolation cooling (RCIC) systems in determining valve operator setpoints.

The BHROG report, Supplement 1 to NEDC-31322, (Reference 1) reviewed and documented the desLgn basis for valve operation and the methodology for determining expected differential pressure.

This analysis fulfills item "a" of the bulletin supplement on a generic basis for the nine selected safety-related valves.

The valves considered for Plant Hatch are discussed below.

Note that two of the nine valves discussed in Reference 1 are in the high-pressure core spray system (HPCS).

These two valves will not be considered since Plant Hatch is a 8HR/4 class of plant and does not have a HPCS system.

Also, the HPCI and RCIC turbine exhaust valves are not motor-operated valves and, therefore, will not be considered.

HPCI System Condensate Storage Tank (CST) Suction Valves HPCI system CST suction valve F004 is normally open and has an active safety function to close during abnormal events wher system suction is transferred from the CST to the suppression pool.

The maximum differential pressure (dP) for this event was used to determine the proper valve and operator setpoints for the original bulletin.

When considering valve mispositioning, the maximum opening dP must also be considered in determining the valve / operator setpoints.

The maximum expected dP is still low (about 35 psid) and only about 5 psi higher than that calculated for the original bulletin.

Opening or closing against the maximum expected dP is well within the capabilities of the motor, operator, and valve.

The Unit I and Unit 2 CST suction valves were already included in Georgia Power Company's (GPC) 85-03 program because of its safety action to close.

The program calculations and acceptance values will be modified to include consideration of mispositioning when satisfying items b through d of the original bullet 1n and bulletin supplement.

RCIC System CST Suction Valvet RCIC system CST suction valve F010 is similar in design and function to the HPCI system CST suction valve discussed above.

The maximum expected dP is only slightly higher in the opening direction.

GPC's 85-03 program calculations and acceptance values will be modified to include consideration of valve mispositioning when satisfying items b through d of the bulletin.

0433I El-1 9/6/88 HL-50

1 1

l l

l Georgia Poner ENCLOSURE I (Continued)

RESPONSE TO NRC BULLETIN 85-03. SUPPLEMENT 1 r

HPCI System Iniection Valve Test Valve HPCI system injection valve test valve F007 is normally open and is only closed during system maintenance or to perform operability testing of HPCI injection valve F006.

Since the valve had no safety function (i.e.,

it is simply required to remain open during HPCI operation), it was not included in GPC's original program.

If mispositioning is considered, the maximum dP is virtually identical to that of HPCI injection valve F006.

Tha Unit I and Unit 2 injection valve test valves will be added to GPC'sBulletin 85-03 program.

However, hooking up the Limitorque diagr'.. tic t

equipment to the operator may be difficult because of physical limitations (i.e., no accessibility).

Regardless of whether or not the equipment can be used to test the operator, GPC will calculate the valve operator setpoints consistent with the maximum dP due to mispositioning.

These setpoints should be very similar to or bounded by those for the HPCI injection valve.

Testing at the motor control center (MCC) will be performed to determine the as-found motor running amps and switch settings.

These parameters will be compared to those determined during testing of similar valves (e.g., HPCI injection valve F006). A review of the motor, operator, and valve capabilities indicates HOV F007 will be more than adequate to open against the maximum expected dP.

(The HCV appears to have been originally sized to open and close against well over 1000 psid.)

Only the valve opening is considered in the reposition action per the belletin supplement, and the torque switches are jumpered out in the open direction of valve travel.

However, since the valve is seldom used, GPC reserves the right to remove power to the operator and tag out the valve.

i RCIC System Injection Val.Yt_ Test Vi ht RCIC system injection valve test valve F012 it similar in design and function to HPCI valve F007 discussed above.

GPC has calculated the i

maximum dP, considering valve mispositioning, and intends to include the Unit I and Unit 2 valves in the Bulletin 85-03 program.

Also, if the i

motor, valve, or operator is undersized, the power to the operator may be removed and the valve tagged out.

RCIC Trio and Throttle Valve As stated in Reference 1, the function and active safety action of the RCIC trip and throttle valve is to trip closed when required to protect the pump and turbine.

Closure of this valve is spring actuated.

The RCIC system will not be able to recover immediately from an inadvertent closure of this valve, since the function of the valve is 04331 El-2 9/6/88 HL-50 j

Gi'OrgillPOWCI ENC'.0SURE (Continued)

RESEQRSE TO NRC BULLETIN 85-OL.1UPILfS1JiI_1.

to shut off the steam supply to the turbine.

If the valve trips closed, the dP on opening will be negligible, because prior to resetting the RCIC turbine trip and throttle valve, RCIC svstem steam admission valve F045 located u) stream of the trip and throttie valve would first be closed.

This actlon resets th:

RCIC system startup logic (l.s.,

the ramp generator for the RCIC turt,ine).

The RCIC turbine trip and throttle valve above the seat drain upstream of the valve will vent steam trapped between the closed steam admission valv* and the trip 2nd throttle valve to the turbine exhaust line drain pot.

This will reduce the dP across the turbine trip and throttle valve to a negligible value prior to valve opening.

Therefore, GPC is not planning to include the trip and throttle valve in itsBulletin 85-03 program.

EIOSEam Schedule As stated in the cover letter, GPC has almost completed the testing on Unit 2 for the original Bulletin 85-03 scope.

The 7ero dP testing was r

completed during the last outage, and selected valves have been tested during system operability tests (at high dP) subsequent to that outage.

Testing has started on Unit I and will be performed during the upcoming outage scheduled to begin on September 28, 1988.

The additional valves discussed above, which are being added to GPC'sBulletin 85-03 program because of the bulletin supplement, will be included in the testing on Unit I this fall.

The Unit 2 valves added to the program because of the bulletin supplement will be tested during the next Unit 2 maintenance / refueling outage currently scheduled for Spring 1989.

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REFERENCE:

I 1.

Supplement I to NEOC-31322 "BHR Ownsrs' Group Report on the L

Operational Design Basis of Selected Safety-Related Motor-Operated I

l Valves," dated July, 1988, i

0433I El-3 9/6/88 HL-50

J I

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Georgialbwer d i

ENCLOSURE 2 PLANT HATCH - UNITS 1, 2 I

NRC DOCKETS 50-321. 50-366 j

OPERATING LICENSES OPR-57. NPF-5 l

j DIFFERENTIAL PRESSURE CALCUL&l10NS FOR_$UPPLEMENT 1 VALVES

}

The Nuclear Regulatory Comission (NRC) issued Supplement 1 to IEd 85-03 on April 27, 1986.

The supplement requested BWR owners to consider L

j inadvertent valve mispositioning when determining maximum dP.

While BWR high-pressure reactor inventory makeup systems are not required to regain

[

j operability following an operator error resulting in inadvertent valve r

]

mispositioning, the BHROG agreed to evaluate selected valves, considering inadvertent valve mispositioning.

The objective of this calculation is j

to determine the maximum dP in response to that commitment.

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• E'.'I Hatch nuclear Plant unit 1 du N'N.sSS I

sucject/ Title Rev'e*ec Hy Date Unit 1 HPCI Motor Operated Valve

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Calculation Numt>er 1

Differential Pressure Calculation fjNH-86-015 Supplement 1 Sneeko' 8 l

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CRITERIA i

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General Electric "BWR Owner's Group Report on l

i Operational Design Basis of Selected Safety-Related Motor-Operated valves, "DRF-E12-00100-75 Supplement 1,

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ASSUMPTIONS

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The elevation of 1E41FOO4 is conservatively assumed to l

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MPL VALVE SAFETY REPO55flON MAX i

NUMBER DESCRIPTION ACTION AC7;ON DP l

1 E41FOO4 CST SUCTION CLOSE OPEN 34,37 E41FOO7 INJECTION VALVE TEST NONE OPEN 433.51

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Design Calculations SouthernCompanyServices A Project PreDared 8 g

Date E.I. Hatch Nuclear Plant Unit 1 8 a f(s SA su e,ect a, tie a e....a s e cate Unit 1 RCIC Motor Operated Valve gg/g(gj$d_

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Differential Pressure Calculation SNH-86-016 Supplement 1 2, at 9 I

i CRITERIA l

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Generai Eloctric "5WR Owner's Group Repot't on i

Operational Oesign Basis of Selected Safety-Related Motor-Operated Valves. "DRF-E12-OO100-75 Supplement 1 are assumed to be correct.

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ASSUMPTIONS 1

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The elevation of 1E51rO10 is conservatively assumed to be 89' - 8 7/8".

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NUMBER DESCRIPTION ACTION ACTION DP I

E51F010 CST SUCTION CLOSE OPEN 34.52 l

1 E51FO12 INJECTION VALVE TEST NONE OPEN 390.66 I

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