IR 05000219/1989011: Difference between revisions
StriderTol (talk | contribs) (StriderTol Bot insert) |
StriderTol (talk | contribs) (StriderTol Bot change) |
||
| Line 20: | Line 20: | ||
=Text= | =Text= | ||
{{#Wiki_filter:__ | {{#Wiki_filter:__ | ||
.- | |||
. | |||
j | j | ||
.. | |||
- | |||
; | ; | ||
h p | h p | ||
U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION | |||
==REGION I== | ==REGION I== | ||
Report | Report No. | ||
50-219/89-11 Docket No. | |||
50-219 License No. DPR-16 Licensee: | |||
'GPU Nuclear Corporation P. O. Box 388 Forked River. New Jersev 08731-0388 Facility Name: Oyster Creek Nuclear Generatina Station Inspection At: | |||
Forked River and Lakewood. New Jersev Inspection Conducted: June 6-8. 1989 Inspectors: | |||
O ' 2 MI | |||
#S~dde //M C. G. Amatd, Emergency Preparedness | |||
# pate' | |||
Specialist, EPS, FRSSB, DRSS M. Banerjee, RI, Oyster Creek E. Collins, SRI, Oyster Creek A. Dromerick, LPM, NRR F. Kantor, Chief, East Sec. PEPB, NRR D. Lew, RI, Oyster Creek | Specialist, EPS, FRSSB, DRSS M. Banerjee, RI, Oyster Creek E. Collins, SRI, Oyster Creek A. Dromerick, LPM, NRR F. Kantor, Chief, East Sec. PEPB, NRR D. Lew, RI, Oyster Creek | ||
' Approved by: | |||
W. J. La2.arus, ChiefJ | k. A b % | ||
~/[05-/87 W. J. La2.arus, ChiefJ | |||
Areas Insoected: Routine, announced, emergency preparedness inspection of a full-participation exercise of the licensee's Emergency Plan conducted on June 7, 1989. The inspection was performed by a team of six NRC Region I and Headquarters | . | ||
_ _ _ _ - . _--- | I date Emergency Preparedness Section, FRSSB, DRSS Inspection Summary: Insoection on June 6-8, 1989 (Report No. 50-219/89-11) | ||
Areas Insoected: | |||
Routine, announced, emergency preparedness inspection of a full-participation exercise of the licensee's Emergency Plan conducted on June 7, 1989. The inspection was performed by a team of six NRC Region I and Headquarters personnel. | |||
Results: Due to similarities subsequently identified between the scenarios for the dress rehearsal and this annual exercise which included partic',pation by the same emergency response organization personnel, the exercise sc.caario was considered to be compromised and therefore this exercise did not meet the requirements for the annual test of the licensee's Emergency Plan. The licensee agreed with this determination and scheduled another exercise for the week of August 27, 1989. The exercise of June 7, 1989 was determined to be sufficient to close some specific previously identified exercise performance concerns, and to adequately test off-site activities. The other inspection findings detailed in this report are provided for the licensee's evaluation and corrective action. | |||
8908020282 890725 PDR ADOCK 05000219 o | |||
FDC | |||
_ _ _ _ -. _--- | |||
i | |||
_ _ _ _ - __ | _ _ _ _ - __ | ||
- | |||
. | |||
! | ! | ||
. | |||
... | |||
DETAILS. | |||
1.0 Persons Contacted The following GPU Nuclear Corporation _(GPUNC) personnel attended the exit meeting. | |||
J. Barton, Deputy Director, Oyster Creek Division,-GPUNC T. Blount, Lead Emergency Planner, Emergency Preparedness, Environmental and Radiological Controls (E&RC) Division, GPUNC J. Bontempo, Lead Emergency Planner, Emergency Preparedness Department, E&RC Division, GPUNC B. DeMerchant, Licensing Engineer, Licensing Dept., Nuclear Safety Division E. Fitzpatrick,' Director, Oyster Creek Division and Vice President GPUNC G.' Giangi, Manager, Emergency Preparedness Dept, E&RC Division, GPUNC J. Hildebrand, Director, E&RC Division and Vice President GPUNC S. Kempf, Jr., Lead Offsite Emergency Planner, Emergency Preparedness Dept., E&RC Division, GPUNC P. Scallon, Jr., Director, Rad Waste, Oyster Creek Division E. Scheyder, Director, Maintenance, Construction & Facilities R. Sullivan, Oyster Creek Emergency Preparedness Dept., Manager, E&RC Division, GPUNC M. Slobodien, Director Rad Control Dept., E&RC Division, GPUNC The inspectors also observed the actions of, and interviewed other licensee personnel. | |||
Personnel of the New Jersey State Department of Environmental Protection also attended the exit meeting. | |||
P. Clark, President of GPUNC observed the exercise. | |||
2.0 Emeraency Exercise The Oyster Creek announced, full-participation exercise was conducted on June 7, 1989, from 3:00 p.m. to 11:30 p.m. | |||
The State of New Jersey, Ocean County and 18 local governments and their agencies participated. | |||
The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) observed off-site activities. | |||
2.1 Pre-Exercise Activities The exercise objectives submitted to NRC Region I on January 30, 1989 were reviewed and, following revision, determined to be adequate to test the licensee's Emergency Plan. On March 21, 1989, the licensee submitted the complete scenario package for NRC review and evaluation. | |||
Region I representatives had telephone conversations with the licensee's emergency preparedness staff to discuss the scope and content of the scenario. As a result, minor revisions were made to the scenario which | |||
; | |||
allowed adequate testing of the major portions of the Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station Plan and Procedures and also provided the opportunity for the licensee to demonstrate those areas previously identified by the NRC as in need of corrective action. Subsequent to this inspection, however, it was determined that in effect the exercise | allowed adequate testing of the major portions of the Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station Plan and Procedures and also provided the opportunity for the licensee to demonstrate those areas previously identified by the NRC as in need of corrective action. Subsequent to this inspection, however, it was determined that in effect the exercise | ||
_ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ __ __ | _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ | ||
__ | |||
_. | |||
-__ | |||
. | |||
~ | |||
. | |||
, | , | ||
scenario had been compromised, as a dress rehearsal conducted by the licensee on May 24, 1989 used a scenario which was very similar to that | scenario had been compromised, as a dress rehearsal conducted by the licensee on May 24, 1989 used a scenario which was very similar to that used for this exercise. The licensee agreed with this assessment and | ||
; | ; | ||
has scheduled another exercise for the week of August 27, 1989 which | |||
' | ' | ||
will be evaluated as the annual on-site exercise of the licensee's Emergency Plan. | |||
Loss of both diesel electric generatorr Isolation condenser tube rupture; Loss of offsite power; Loss of coolart accident; Core uncovery; and Containment by-pass release of radioactive material to the | |||
2.2 Exercise Scenario The exercise scenario included the following events: | |||
Loss of both diesel electric generatorr Isolation condenser tube rupture; Loss of offsite power; Loss of coolart accident; Core uncovery; and Containment by-pass release of radioactive material to the environment. | |||
2.3 Activities Observed During the conduct of the licensee's exercise, NRC team members made detailed observations of the activation and augmentation of the Emergency Response Facilities (ERFs) and the Emergency Response Organization (ER0) staff and actions of ERO staff during operation of the ERFs. | |||
The following activities were observed: | |||
1. | |||
Detection, classification, and assessment of scenario events; 2. | |||
Direction and coordination of emergency response; 3. | |||
Augmentation of the Initial Emergency Response and Support Organization and Emergency Response facilities; 4. | |||
Notification of licensee personnel and off-site agencies of pertinent plant ;tatus information; 5. | |||
Communications /information flow, and record keeping; and 6. | |||
Assessment and projection of off-site radiological dose and consideration of protective actions. | |||
3.0 Areas For Improvement The following findings should be evaluated for corrective action by the licensee. | |||
- _ - - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - | - | ||
_ - - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - | |||
-_ _ | -_ _ | ||
. | |||
,. | |||
, | |||
issued directives before completing the turn-over briefing and announcing he had assumed ED responsibility; The Technical Support Center's Radiological Assessment Center staff used a long release duration, default value for isolation condenser release and, as a result, an unnecessary Site Area Emergency was nearly declared (controller intervention prevented this declaration); The Environmental Assessment Command Center staff did not calculate dose savings when Protective Action Recommendations were being considered. This staff did not use correct nomenclature when expressing dose, dose rate and dose commitment; The Emergency Support Director in the EOF did not consider sheltering as an option when extending evacuation from five to ten miles; OSC team members outside of the OSC office or its immediate area were unable to hear staff briefings; Plant page announcements in the vicinity of the south west corner of the former rad waste building could not be heard; and On-site, out-of-plant monitoring teams failed to recognize surface | 1. | ||
items were not repeated and are | The manager designated to become the Emergency Director (ED) | ||
issued directives before completing the turn-over briefing and announcing he had assumed ED responsibility; 2. | |||
The Technical Support Center's Radiological Assessment Center staff used a long release duration, default value for isolation condenser release and, as a result, an unnecessary Site Area Emergency was nearly declared (controller intervention prevented this declaration); | |||
3. | |||
The Environmental Assessment Command Center staff did not calculate dose savings when Protective Action Recommendations were being considered. This staff did not use correct nomenclature when expressing dose, dose rate and dose commitment; 4. | |||
The Emergency Support Director in the EOF did not consider sheltering as an option when extending evacuation from five to ten miles; 5. | |||
OSC team members outside of the OSC office or its immediate area were unable to hear staff briefings; 6. | |||
Plant page announcements in the vicinity of the south west corner of the former rad waste building could not be heard; and 7. | |||
On-site, out-of-plant monitoring teams failed to recognize surface contamination. | |||
4.0 Licensee Action on Previous 1v Identified Insoection Findinas The following items were identified during the previous exercise. | |||
Based upon observations made by the NRC team during this exercise, review of the scenario and information provided by the controllers, the following | |||
.' | |||
items were not repeated and are closed. | |||
(CLOSED) (50-219/88-05-01) IFI Acceptable cordon control was not demonstrated. | |||
During this exercise an acceptable degree of cordon control was demonstrated. | |||
(CLOSED) (50-219/88-05-02) IFI Adequate contamination control techniques were not demonstrated. Contamination control techniques were satisfactory. One item related to this area is discussed in Detail 3.0 above. | |||
(CLOSED) (50-219/88-05-03) IFI The Technical Support Coordinator in the EOF did not always respond satisfactorily to requests from the Emergency Support Director. This coordinator responded to requests and handled 15 to 20 requests in a satisfactory manner. | |||
i | |||
! | |||
I i | I i | ||
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - | _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - | ||
| Line 74: | Line 170: | ||
___ | ___ | ||
_ | _ | ||
. | |||
* | |||
. | |||
l I | l I | ||
(CLOSED) (50-219/88-05-05) IFI OSC command was not clearly defined. OSC command and control was clearly defined, strong and effective. | |||
(CLOSED) (50-219/88-05-06) IFI OSC activity was based on a declaration of a Site Area Emergency one hour before it was declared. | |||
EAL classifications were correctly tracked and activities conducted in accord with these classifications. | |||
(CLOSED) (50-219/88-05-07) IFI Security radio channel and radio net control should be reviewed. The revi e was made and steps taken to increase channel capacity and effect channel control. | |||
5.0 Licensee Critiogg The NRC team attended the licensee's exercise critique on June 8, 1989 l | |||
during which the licensee's lead controllers discussed observations of the exercise. | |||
The licensee's critique was critical and thorough. | |||
6.0 Exit Meetina Follt. wing the licensee's self critique, the NRC team met with the licensee's representatives listed in Section 1 to discuss findings as detailed in this report. The NRC team leader summarized the observations made during the exercise. | |||
Following the exercise, the similarity between the dress rehearsal drill of May 24, 1989 and this exercise was identified. During a subsequent telephone conversation on July 5,1989, the issue of the similarity of the two scenarios was discussed and the licensee agreed to conduct another exercise during the week of August 27, 1989 as the required on-site annual test of the Emergency Plan. | |||
At no time during the course of the inspection did the inspectors provide any written information to the licensee. | |||
_ _ - - - _ _ - _ _ - | |||
}} | }} | ||
Latest revision as of 19:31, 1 December 2024
| ML20247N115 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Oyster Creek |
| Issue date: | 07/25/1989 |
| From: | Amato C, Lazarus W NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20247N114 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-219-89-11, NUDOCS 8908020282 | |
| Download: ML20247N115 (5) | |
Text
__
.-
.
j
..
-
h p
U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION I
Report No.
50-219/89-11 Docket No.
50-219 License No. DPR-16 Licensee:
'GPU Nuclear Corporation P. O. Box 388 Forked River. New Jersev 08731-0388 Facility Name: Oyster Creek Nuclear Generatina Station Inspection At:
Forked River and Lakewood. New Jersev Inspection Conducted: June 6-8. 1989 Inspectors:
O ' 2 MI
- S~dde //M C. G. Amatd, Emergency Preparedness
- pate'
Specialist, EPS, FRSSB, DRSS M. Banerjee, RI, Oyster Creek E. Collins, SRI, Oyster Creek A. Dromerick, LPM, NRR F. Kantor, Chief, East Sec. PEPB, NRR D. Lew, RI, Oyster Creek
' Approved by:
k. A b %
~/[05-/87 W. J. La2.arus, ChiefJ
.
I date Emergency Preparedness Section, FRSSB, DRSS Inspection Summary: Insoection on June 6-8, 1989 (Report No. 50-219/89-11)
Areas Insoected:
Routine, announced, emergency preparedness inspection of a full-participation exercise of the licensee's Emergency Plan conducted on June 7, 1989. The inspection was performed by a team of six NRC Region I and Headquarters personnel.
Results: Due to similarities subsequently identified between the scenarios for the dress rehearsal and this annual exercise which included partic',pation by the same emergency response organization personnel, the exercise sc.caario was considered to be compromised and therefore this exercise did not meet the requirements for the annual test of the licensee's Emergency Plan. The licensee agreed with this determination and scheduled another exercise for the week of August 27, 1989. The exercise of June 7, 1989 was determined to be sufficient to close some specific previously identified exercise performance concerns, and to adequately test off-site activities. The other inspection findings detailed in this report are provided for the licensee's evaluation and corrective action.
8908020282 890725 PDR ADOCK 05000219 o
FDC
_ _ _ _ -. _---
i
_ _ _ _ - __
-
.
!
.
...
DETAILS.
1.0 Persons Contacted The following GPU Nuclear Corporation _(GPUNC) personnel attended the exit meeting.
J. Barton, Deputy Director, Oyster Creek Division,-GPUNC T. Blount, Lead Emergency Planner, Emergency Preparedness, Environmental and Radiological Controls (E&RC) Division, GPUNC J. Bontempo, Lead Emergency Planner, Emergency Preparedness Department, E&RC Division, GPUNC B. DeMerchant, Licensing Engineer, Licensing Dept., Nuclear Safety Division E. Fitzpatrick,' Director, Oyster Creek Division and Vice President GPUNC G.' Giangi, Manager, Emergency Preparedness Dept, E&RC Division, GPUNC J. Hildebrand, Director, E&RC Division and Vice President GPUNC S. Kempf, Jr., Lead Offsite Emergency Planner, Emergency Preparedness Dept., E&RC Division, GPUNC P. Scallon, Jr., Director, Rad Waste, Oyster Creek Division E. Scheyder, Director, Maintenance, Construction & Facilities R. Sullivan, Oyster Creek Emergency Preparedness Dept., Manager, E&RC Division, GPUNC M. Slobodien, Director Rad Control Dept., E&RC Division, GPUNC The inspectors also observed the actions of, and interviewed other licensee personnel.
Personnel of the New Jersey State Department of Environmental Protection also attended the exit meeting.
P. Clark, President of GPUNC observed the exercise.
2.0 Emeraency Exercise The Oyster Creek announced, full-participation exercise was conducted on June 7, 1989, from 3:00 p.m. to 11:30 p.m.
The State of New Jersey, Ocean County and 18 local governments and their agencies participated.
The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) observed off-site activities.
2.1 Pre-Exercise Activities The exercise objectives submitted to NRC Region I on January 30, 1989 were reviewed and, following revision, determined to be adequate to test the licensee's Emergency Plan. On March 21, 1989, the licensee submitted the complete scenario package for NRC review and evaluation.
Region I representatives had telephone conversations with the licensee's emergency preparedness staff to discuss the scope and content of the scenario. As a result, minor revisions were made to the scenario which
allowed adequate testing of the major portions of the Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station Plan and Procedures and also provided the opportunity for the licensee to demonstrate those areas previously identified by the NRC as in need of corrective action. Subsequent to this inspection, however, it was determined that in effect the exercise
_ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _
__
_.
-__
.
~
.
,
scenario had been compromised, as a dress rehearsal conducted by the licensee on May 24, 1989 used a scenario which was very similar to that used for this exercise. The licensee agreed with this assessment and
has scheduled another exercise for the week of August 27, 1989 which
'
will be evaluated as the annual on-site exercise of the licensee's Emergency Plan.
2.2 Exercise Scenario The exercise scenario included the following events:
Loss of both diesel electric generatorr Isolation condenser tube rupture; Loss of offsite power; Loss of coolart accident; Core uncovery; and Containment by-pass release of radioactive material to the environment.
2.3 Activities Observed During the conduct of the licensee's exercise, NRC team members made detailed observations of the activation and augmentation of the Emergency Response Facilities (ERFs) and the Emergency Response Organization (ER0) staff and actions of ERO staff during operation of the ERFs.
The following activities were observed:
1.
Detection, classification, and assessment of scenario events; 2.
Direction and coordination of emergency response; 3.
Augmentation of the Initial Emergency Response and Support Organization and Emergency Response facilities; 4.
Notification of licensee personnel and off-site agencies of pertinent plant ;tatus information; 5.
Communications /information flow, and record keeping; and 6.
Assessment and projection of off-site radiological dose and consideration of protective actions.
3.0 Areas For Improvement The following findings should be evaluated for corrective action by the licensee.
-
_ - - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ -
-_ _
.
,.
,
1.
The manager designated to become the Emergency Director (ED)
issued directives before completing the turn-over briefing and announcing he had assumed ED responsibility; 2.
The Technical Support Center's Radiological Assessment Center staff used a long release duration, default value for isolation condenser release and, as a result, an unnecessary Site Area Emergency was nearly declared (controller intervention prevented this declaration);
3.
The Environmental Assessment Command Center staff did not calculate dose savings when Protective Action Recommendations were being considered. This staff did not use correct nomenclature when expressing dose, dose rate and dose commitment; 4.
The Emergency Support Director in the EOF did not consider sheltering as an option when extending evacuation from five to ten miles; 5.
OSC team members outside of the OSC office or its immediate area were unable to hear staff briefings; 6.
Plant page announcements in the vicinity of the south west corner of the former rad waste building could not be heard; and 7.
On-site, out-of-plant monitoring teams failed to recognize surface contamination.
4.0 Licensee Action on Previous 1v Identified Insoection Findinas The following items were identified during the previous exercise.
Based upon observations made by the NRC team during this exercise, review of the scenario and information provided by the controllers, the following
.'
items were not repeated and are closed.
(CLOSED) (50-219/88-05-01) IFI Acceptable cordon control was not demonstrated.
During this exercise an acceptable degree of cordon control was demonstrated.
(CLOSED) (50-219/88-05-02) IFI Adequate contamination control techniques were not demonstrated. Contamination control techniques were satisfactory. One item related to this area is discussed in Detail 3.0 above.
(CLOSED) (50-219/88-05-03) IFI The Technical Support Coordinator in the EOF did not always respond satisfactorily to requests from the Emergency Support Director. This coordinator responded to requests and handled 15 to 20 requests in a satisfactory manner.
i
!
I i
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ -
___
_
.
.
l I
(CLOSED) (50-219/88-05-05) IFI OSC command was not clearly defined. OSC command and control was clearly defined, strong and effective.
(CLOSED) (50-219/88-05-06) IFI OSC activity was based on a declaration of a Site Area Emergency one hour before it was declared.
EAL classifications were correctly tracked and activities conducted in accord with these classifications.
(CLOSED) (50-219/88-05-07) IFI Security radio channel and radio net control should be reviewed. The revi e was made and steps taken to increase channel capacity and effect channel control.
5.0 Licensee Critiogg The NRC team attended the licensee's exercise critique on June 8, 1989 l
during which the licensee's lead controllers discussed observations of the exercise.
The licensee's critique was critical and thorough.
6.0 Exit Meetina Follt. wing the licensee's self critique, the NRC team met with the licensee's representatives listed in Section 1 to discuss findings as detailed in this report. The NRC team leader summarized the observations made during the exercise.
Following the exercise, the similarity between the dress rehearsal drill of May 24, 1989 and this exercise was identified. During a subsequent telephone conversation on July 5,1989, the issue of the similarity of the two scenarios was discussed and the licensee agreed to conduct another exercise during the week of August 27, 1989 as the required on-site annual test of the Emergency Plan.
At no time during the course of the inspection did the inspectors provide any written information to the licensee.
_ _ - - - _ _ - _ _ -