ML20062L694: Difference between revisions
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l-4.4 | l-4.4 EMERGENCY INSTRUCTION l-4.4 cp LOSS OF COOLANT (LE.AKAGE GREATER THAN MAXIMUM CHARGING FLOW) 1.0 PUCPOSE l.1 IH!$ INSTRUCT!CN PROVIDES Tb! NECESSARY CPERATOR ACTIONS REQUIRED TO PROVIDE MAXIMUM CORE COOLING TO MINIMlZE CORE DAMAGE FOLLOWING A LOSS OF COOLANT ACCIDENT. | ||
1.2 THIS INSTRUCTION CONTAINS THE STEPS REQUIRED OF THE OPERATOR TO SWITCH FROM THE INJEC-T10N TO RECIRCULATION PHASES OF CORE C0 CLING AT THE APPROPRIATE TIMES. | 1.2 THIS INSTRUCTION CONTAINS THE STEPS REQUIRED OF THE OPERATOR TO SWITCH FROM THE INJEC-T10N TO RECIRCULATION PHASES OF CORE C0 CLING AT THE APPROPRIATE TIMES. | ||
1.3 THIS INSTRUCTION INCLUDES THE APPROPRIATE OPERATOR ACTIONS REGUIRED TO COPE WITH THE FOLLOW!NG FAILURES. | 1.3 THIS INSTRUCTION INCLUDES THE APPROPRIATE OPERATOR ACTIONS REGUIRED TO COPE WITH THE FOLLOW!NG FAILURES. | ||
1.3.1 LOSS OF A RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL PUMP DUE TO EITHER OF THE FOLLOWING: | 1.3.1 LOSS OF A RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL PUMP DUE TO EITHER OF THE FOLLOWING: | ||
A. FAILURE OF THE ASCCCIATED SJ44, SIS SUMP VALVE, TO OPEN. | A. | ||
FAILURE OF THE ASCCCIATED SJ44, SIS SUMP VALVE, TO OPEN. | |||
s. | |||
FA! LURE OF AN RHE ? UMP. | |||
1.3.2 LOSS OF 0FFSITE power WITH: | 1.3.2 LOSS OF 0FFSITE power WITH: | ||
A. ALL DIESELS OPERA *!NG B. . FAILURE OF A $1NGLE DIESEL. | A. | ||
ALL DIESELS OPERA *!NG B.. FAILURE OF A $1NGLE DIESEL. | |||
2.] INITIAL CO'iDI UDSS 2.1 SAFETY INJECTION HAS BEEN IN:TIATED AND IT HAS BEEN DETERMINED 3Y USE OF SECTION 5.0, "lDENTIFICATION OF FOLt0w-UP. ACTIONS' 0F El 1-4.0, " SAFETY INJECT 10N INITIATION",THAT A LOSS OF COOLANT ACCIDENT H;S OCCURRED. | 2.] INITIAL CO'iDI UDSS 2.1 SAFETY INJECTION HAS BEEN IN:TIATED AND IT HAS BEEN DETERMINED 3Y USE OF SECTION 5.0, "lDENTIFICATION OF FOLt0w-UP. ACTIONS' 0F El 1-4.0, " SAFETY INJECT 10N INITIATION",THAT A LOSS OF COOLANT ACCIDENT H;S OCCURRED. | ||
3.0 I M DIAT: ACTIONS 3.1 VERIFY THAT ALL IMPEDIATE ANC SUBSECUENT ACTIONS DESCRIBED IN El 1-4.0, " SAFETY INJECTION INITIATION" HAVE BEEN PERFORTED. COMPLETE ANY ACTIONS WHICH HAVE NOT BEEN PREVICUSLY COMPLETED. | 3.0 I M DIAT: ACTIONS 3.1 VERIFY THAT ALL IMPEDIATE ANC SUBSECUENT ACTIONS DESCRIBED IN El 1-4.0, " SAFETY INJECTION INITIATION" HAVE BEEN PERFORTED. COMPLETE ANY ACTIONS WHICH HAVE NOT BEEN PREVICUSLY COMPLETED. | ||
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3.2.1 CONTAINMENT SPRAY ACTUATION 3.2.2 CCNTAINMENT PHASE '3" !SCLATION i | 3.2.1 CONTAINMENT SPRAY ACTUATION 3.2.2 CCNTAINMENT PHASE '3" !SCLATION i | ||
3.2.3 MA!N STEAM ISCLATION 8202170 % | 3.2.3 MA!N STEAM ISCLATION 8202170 % | ||
SALEM UNIT l'/ UNIT 2 | SALEM UNIT l'/ UNIT 2 1 CF 37 REv. 10}} | ||
Latest revision as of 22:30, 16 December 2024
| ML20062L694 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Salem  |
| Issue date: | 01/15/1981 |
| From: | Public Service Enterprise Group |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML18085A819 | List: |
| References | |
| I-4.4-01, I-4.4-1, NUDOCS 8102170392 | |
| Download: ML20062L694 (37) | |
Text
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l-4.4 EMERGENCY INSTRUCTION l-4.4 cp LOSS OF COOLANT (LE.AKAGE GREATER THAN MAXIMUM CHARGING FLOW) 1.0 PUCPOSE l.1 IH!$ INSTRUCT!CN PROVIDES Tb! NECESSARY CPERATOR ACTIONS REQUIRED TO PROVIDE MAXIMUM CORE COOLING TO MINIMlZE CORE DAMAGE FOLLOWING A LOSS OF COOLANT ACCIDENT.
1.2 THIS INSTRUCTION CONTAINS THE STEPS REQUIRED OF THE OPERATOR TO SWITCH FROM THE INJEC-T10N TO RECIRCULATION PHASES OF CORE C0 CLING AT THE APPROPRIATE TIMES.
1.3 THIS INSTRUCTION INCLUDES THE APPROPRIATE OPERATOR ACTIONS REGUIRED TO COPE WITH THE FOLLOW!NG FAILURES.
1.3.1 LOSS OF A RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL PUMP DUE TO EITHER OF THE FOLLOWING:
A.
FAILURE OF THE ASCCCIATED SJ44, SIS SUMP VALVE, TO OPEN.
s.
FA! LURE OF AN RHE ? UMP.
1.3.2 LOSS OF 0FFSITE power WITH:
A.
ALL DIESELS OPERA *!NG B.. FAILURE OF A $1NGLE DIESEL.
2.] INITIAL CO'iDI UDSS 2.1 SAFETY INJECTION HAS BEEN IN:TIATED AND IT HAS BEEN DETERMINED 3Y USE OF SECTION 5.0, "lDENTIFICATION OF FOLt0w-UP. ACTIONS' 0F El 1-4.0, " SAFETY INJECT 10N INITIATION",THAT A LOSS OF COOLANT ACCIDENT H;S OCCURRED.
3.0 I M DIAT: ACTIONS 3.1 VERIFY THAT ALL IMPEDIATE ANC SUBSECUENT ACTIONS DESCRIBED IN El 1-4.0, " SAFETY INJECTION INITIATION" HAVE BEEN PERFORTED. COMPLETE ANY ACTIONS WHICH HAVE NOT BEEN PREVICUSLY COMPLETED.
3.2 IF CONTAINMENT PRESSURE REAchig inE HI-HI SETPCINT OF 23.5 PSIG, VERIFY HE FOLL0wlNG AUTOMATIC ACTIONS MvE TAAEP: ' LACE BY CBSERVING TnE INDICATIONS ON THE STATUS PANEL CN RP-4.
3.2.1 CONTAINMENT SPRAY ACTUATION 3.2.2 CCNTAINMENT PHASE '3" !SCLATION i
3.2.3 MA!N STEAM ISCLATION 8202170 %
SALEM UNIT l'/ UNIT 2 1 CF 37 REv. 10