ML20140C788

Insp Repts 50-321/85-34 & 50-366/85-34 on 851110-1220. Violation Noted:Inadequate Procedure Resulting in Isolation of Shutdown Cooling During Refueling Operations & Backseated Valve Not Meeting Tech Spec Limits

ML20140C788
Person / Time
Site:	Hatch
Issue date:	01/14/1986
From:	Garner L, Holmesray P, Nejfelt G, Panciera V, Ponciera V NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
To:
Shared Package
ML20140C756	List: ML20140C750 ML20140C773 ML20140C788
References
50-321-85-34, 50-366-85-34, NUDOCS 8601280402
Download: ML20140C788 (6)

See also: IR 05000321/1985034

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UNITED STATES

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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

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101 MARIETTA STREET, N.W.

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ATLANTA, GEORGI A 30323

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Report Nos.:

50-321/85-34 and 50-366/85-34

Licensee: Georgia Power Company

P. O. Box 4545

Atlanta, GA 30302

Docket Nos..

50-321 and 50-366

License Nos.: DPR-57 and NPF-5

Facility Name:

Hatch 1 and 2

Inspection Conducted:

November 10 - December 20, 1985

Inspectors:

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P. Holmes-Ray, Seniorgsidfift'IHspector

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G.M.Nejfelt,ResiftI[pector

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Approved by: Y .{

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V. W.'Pa Wiera, Section Chief

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Division of Reactor Projects

SUMMARY

Scope:

This inspection involved 236 inspector-hours on site in the areas of

Technical

Specification

compliance, operator performance, overall

plant

operations, quality assurance practices, station and corporate management

practices, corrective and preventive maintenance activities, site security

procedures, radiation control activities, refueling (Unit 1), and surveillance

activities.

Results:

Of the areas inspected, three violations were identified.

An

inadequate procedure resulting in isolation of shutdown cooling during refueling

operations (Unit 1), an improperly performed procedure resulting in inadvertent

isolation of the Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) steam line with Unit 2 at

rated conditions, and in Unit 2,

a backseatea valve which could not meet

Technical Specification (TS) closing requirements (see paragraphs 5 and 7).

9601280402 860115

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REPORT DETAILS

1.

Persons Contacted

Licensee Employees

H. C. Nix, Site General Manager

• T. Greene, Deputy Site General Manager

• H. L. Summer, Operations Manager

• T. Seitz, Maintenance Manager

• C. T. Jones, Engineering Manager

• R. W. Zavodoski, Health Physics and Chemistry Manager

P. E. Fornel, Site 0.A. Manager

• S. B. Tipps, Superintendent of Regulatory Compliance

Other licensee employees contacted included technicians, operators, security

force members, and office personnel.

" Attended exit interview

2.

Exit Interview

The inspection scope and findings were summarized on December 20, 1985, with

those persons indicated in paragraph 1 above.

During the reporting period

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frequent discussions were held with the General Manager and/or his

assistants concerning inspection findings. The licensee acknowledged the

findings and took no exception.

The licensee did not identify as

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proprietary any of the materials provided to or reviewed by the inspectors

during this inspection.

3.

Licensee Action on Previous Findings

The following items have been reviewed by the inspectors and are considered

resolved.

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a.

(Closed) Violation (321/85-02-01) - Startup of Unit I with one

Automatic Depressurization System (ADS) valve inoperable,

b.

(Closed) Violation (321/85-02-02) - Procedures not adhered to.

c.

(Closed) Violation (321,366/85-09-03) - Personnel' error.

d.

(Closed) Violation (321,366/85-10-02) - Improper battery surveillance.

e.

(Closed) Violation (321/85-10-01) - Valve position error.

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f.

-(Closed) Violation (366/85-18-04) - Nitrogen valves out of position.

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g.

(Closed) Violation (321,366/85-22-02) - Lack of administrative control

of vendor manuals used in safety related calibration procedures.

h.

(Closed) Violar. ion (321/85-24-01) - Failure to make a four hour

notification,

i.

(Closed) IFI (321,366/85-18-01) - Diesel

lube oil

temperature

monitoring.

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(Closed) IFI (321,366/85-18-02) - Diesel water jacket limits.

k.

(Closed) IFI (321,366/85-18-03) - Diesel lube oil level check.

4.

Unresolved Items

URI 321,366/85-05-06: The inspector reviewed the Final Safety Analysis

Report (FSAR) and Technical Specifications (TSs) for both Units to detareine

if the load ratings specified in Hatch procedures for the diesel generator

operation were correct even though differing from vendor recommendations.

The ordering data for the diesels was also reviewed.

The Unit 1 FSAR does

not specify load ratings for the diesel generators; but Unit 2 FSAR does,

and the operating procedures agree with these requirements.

Hatch

procedures were revised to reflect 2850 KW as the upper limit beyond which

the_ diesel should never be loaded during normal surveillance. This item is

closed.

URI 321/84-48-01c

Procedure 42FH-ENG-004 has been issued and contains

adequate instructions to control the placement of new fuel into the fuel

pool.

Included is the requirement for two persons to independently verify

that the fuel is placed in its proper location and to document the spent

fuel storage location in the post-inspection fuel bundle location log. This

item is closed.

5.

Plant Tours (Units 1 and 2)

The inspector (s) conducted plant tours periodically during the inspection

interval to verify that monitoring equipment was recording as required,

equipment was properly tagged, operations personnel were aware of plant

conditions, and plant housekeeping efforts were adequate.

The inspectors

also determined that appropriate radiation controls were

properly

established, critical clean areas were being controlled in accordance with

procedures, excess equipment or material was stored properly and combustible

material and debris were disposed of expeditiously.

During tours the

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inspectors looked for the existence of unusual fluid leaks, piping

vibrations, pipe hanger and seismic restraint settings, various valve and

breaker positions, equipment danger tags, component positions, adequacy of

fire fighting equipment, and instrument calibration dates. Some tours were

conducted on backshifts and/or weekends.

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The inspector routinely conduct partial walkdowns of Emergency Core Cooling

Systems (ECCS).

Valve and breaker / switch lineups and equipment conditions

are randomly verified both locally and in the control room.

During a centrol board walkdown on November 18, 1985, in Unit 2,

the

inspector observed an information tag (2-85-31) which indicated that valve

2E51-F008 (RCIC inboard steam line isolation valve) had been electrically

backseated on November 7,

1985.

Operating personnel indicated that they

were not aware of any testing which had been performed to verify that the

closure time requirement in TS could still be met from the backseated

position.

Valve 1G31-F001 (Reactor Water Cleanup System [RWCU] inboard

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isolation valve) was also tagged on its backseat (tag 1-85-44 of

September 26, 1985). Upon failure to locate evidence that testing had been

done from the backseat position, the licensee tested both valves.

Valve

2E51-F008 tested satisfactorily, however valve IG31-F001 exceeded the time

specified in TS Table 3.7-1 by four seconds (34 vs. 30 sec.). The valve was

timed again from its normal open, not backseated, position. On this second

attempt when the timing was performed in accordance with the surveillance

procedure, the time was 29 seconds and therefore within specifications. The

valve was reopened and ' eft off its backseat. The major difference between

the two tests was that t a first time was determined from when the control

switch was turned until the fully closed indication was received.

By the

licensee's surveillance procedure, the method used the second time, the time

was recorded from the illumination of the closure light (dual indication,

both open and closed light lit) to the extinguishing of the open light (only

the closed light lit).

Therefore, the normal method used by the licensee

did not include the breakaway and initial valve movement time.

Failure to

maintain the RWCU valve, 1G312-F001, in a condition such that the specified

closure time in TS Table 3.7-1 could be met is a violation (321/85-34-01).

6.

Plant Operations Review (Units 1 and 2)

The inspectors periodically during the inspection interval reviewed shift

logs and operations records, including data sheets, instrument traces, and

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records of equipment malfunctions.

This review included control room logs

and auxiliary logs, operating orders, standing orders, jumper logs and

equipment tagout records.

The inspectors routinely observed operator

alertness and demeanor during plant tours.

During normal events, operator

performance and response actions were observed and evaluated.

The

inspectors conducted random off-hours inspections during the reporting

interval to assure that operations and security remained at acceptable

levels. Shift turnovers were observed to verify that they were conducted in

accordance with approved licensee procedures.

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Within the areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identified.

7.

Technical Specification Compliance (Units 1 and 2)

During this reporting interval, the inspectors verified compliance with

selected Limiting Conditions for Operations (LCOs) and results of selected

surveillance tests.

These verifications were accomplished by direct

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observation

of monitoring instrumentation, valve positions,

switch

positions, and review of completed logs and records.

The licensee's

compliance with selected LC0 action statements were reviewed on selected

occurrences as they happened.

On December 6, 1985, with Unit 1 in the process of being defueled, the

shutdown cooling mode of the Residual Heat Removal (RHR) system was

inadvertently isolated, while performing design

change

instruction

42SP-DCI-009-1S " Terminations for ECCS Loop "G" per DCR 81-138". When link

CC 80 was opened in panel

1H11,

in accordance with procedure

42SP-DCI-009-15, relay K 30 dropped out causing valve 1E11-F008 to shut

isolating shutdown cooling. As soon as the valve went shut, the licensee

realized what had happen and closed the link and reestablished the shutdown

cooling lineup.

Shutdown cooling was isolated for arproximately eight

minutes. The licensee reviewed the procedure for the other loop of RHR and

found the same error in that procedure. This inadequate procedure affecting

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a safety system is a violation (321/85-34-02).

On December 18, 1985, with Unit 2 at rated conditions, the procedure for

High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) differential pressure instrument

functional test and calibration, 575V-E41-003-2, was being performed. The

Instrument and Control (I&C) technician plugged into the RCIC module rather

than the HPCI module causing valve 2E51-F008 to close, thereby isolating the-

RCIC steam line.

The error was immediately recognized and the 2E51-F008

valve was reopened, returning RCIC to its standby lineup. This failure to

follow procedure is a violation (366/85-34-03).

8.

Physical Protection (Units 1 and 2)

The inspectors verified by observation and interviews during the reporting

interval that measures taken to assure the physical protection of the

facility met

current

requirements.

Areas

inspected

included

the

organization of the security force, the establishment and maintenance of

gates, doors and isciation zones in proper condition, that access control

and badging was proper, and procedures were followed.

During this reporting period the licensee issued a unrestricted access badge

to a person authorized only escorted access. The person gained entry to the

protected area and the vital area using this badge. The details of this

event and any enforcement action will be contained in report 321,366/85-36.

9.

Review of Nonroutine Events Reported by the Licensee

The following Licensee Event Reports (LERs) were reviewed for potential

generic impact, to detect trends, and to determine whether corrective

actions appeared appropriate.

Events which were reported immediately were

also reviewed as they occurred to determine that Technical Specifications

were being met and the public health and safety were of utmost considera-

tion.

The following LERs are considered closed:

Unit 1: 85-15, 85-18*, 85-19, 85-22

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Unit 2:

84-11, 84-18*, 85-16, 85-18, 85-20, 85-21

• In-depth review performed

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10.

Refue',ing (Unit 1)

During this reporting interval the inspectors verified by observation,

interviews, and procedure review that the refueling was being conducted in

accordance with regulations.

Areas inspected included adequacy of

procedures, inspection of fuel to be reused, Technical Specification

compliance and refueling floor housekeeping.

During this reporting interval, Unit I core was unloaded with no major

problems. Also preparation for recovery of the new fuel bundle, which had

been-dropped into the fuel pool, continued. The method and procedures have

been established and the lift expected to take place on December 21, 1985.

Within the areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identified.

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