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Exam 50-338/2002-301, 50-339/2002-301 Draft Simulator Scenarios & Outlines
	ML022900736
Person / Time
Site:	North Anna
Issue date:	01/14/2002
From:	Ernstes M; Division of Reactor Safety II
To:	Christian D; Virginia Electric & Power Co (VEPCO)
References
	50-338/02-301, 50-339/02-301
	Download: ML022900736 (198)
	v • d • e

North Anna

Draft Sim

Scenarios

Appendix D

Scenario Outline

Facility: North Anna

Examiners:

Scenario No.: NRC 1

up-iest No.:

I/A

Operators:

Initial Conditions: EOL. 100% reactor power. A confirmed 10 gpd tube leak exists in A S/G.

1 H EDG is OOS for Maintenance.

Turnover: There are thunderstorms in the area.

POD: Maintain 100% power. Monitor A S/G leakage. Return 1H EDG to service as soon as

possible.

Event

Malf. No.

Event

No.

Type*

Description

1

N/A

N (B)

Swap condensate pumps.

2

RC0801

I (R)

Pressurizer level LT-459 spikes low (this should isolate

(N)

letdown.) (restore letdown) (T/S for SRO)

3

FW1201

I (B)

"A" S/G selected feed flow transmitter fails low.

(T/S for SRO)

4

CH1602

C (R)

1-CH-P-1B trips (bearing trouble). No auto-start of remaining

charging pumps.

5

RC0703

I (A)

PT-455 fails high, RCS leak (small steam space break)

6

N/A

R (A)

Ramp down due to exceeding RCS T/S leakage.

7

TU 101

C (B)

EH pump trips, standby pump fails to auto start.

8

RC48

M (A)

SBLOCA (Steam space break) 200 gpm.

9

EL01

C (A)

LOOP

(N)ormal,

(R)eactivity,

(I)nstrument,

(C)omponent,

(M)ajor

Form ES-D-1 (R8, S1)

O~p-TIest No.:

1A'

Facility: North Anna

Examiners:

Scenario No.: NRC 2

Op-Test No.:

1A

Operators:

Initial Conditions: EOL. 12% Rx power, main turbine startup in progress. 10 gpd tube leakage in

"A" S/G. 1H EDG is 0OS for maintenance.

Turnover: There are thunderstorms in the area.

POD: Sync main

"A" S/G leakage.

generator to grid; raise reactor power to 30% and hold for chemistry. Monitor

Return 1 H EDG to service as soon as possible.

Event

Malf.

Event Type*

Event

No.

Description

Oa

N/A

C (All)

Failure of BIT isolation valves to open.

0b

S10701

C (All)

Failure of a single train SI/phase A, equipment will function

S11303

manually.

0c

N/A

C (All)

Failure of benchboard 1 reactor trip switch.

1

N/A

N (BOP)

Sync main generator to grid, begin ramp to 30%.

2

MS16

I (RO)

PT-464 fails high.

3

N/A

R (RO)

Continue ramp to 30%.

4

BC0501

C (BOP)

Running bearing cooling pump trips, standby pump fails to

auto-start.

5

CH18

I (RO)

PCV-1145 fails closed, causing letdown high pressure.

6

FW0109

I (BOP)

"C" SG level channel III fails high resulting in the "C" FRV

going full closed.

7

RC0701

I (All)

PT-1444 fails high, PORV sticks open, block valve won't

close.

8

RC2403

M (All)

SGTR on "C" SG.

(N)ormal,

(R)eactivity,

(I)nstrument,

(C)omponent,

(M)ajor

Appendix D

Scenario Outline

Form ES-D-1 (R8, $1)

Facility: North Anna

Scenario No.: NI-C 3

up-lest No.:

I/A

Examiners:

Operators:

Initial Conditions: MOL. 100% reactor power. A confirmed 10 gpd tube leak exists in "A" S/G. 1H

EDG is OOS for Maintenance. PT-457 has failed, and is in test with maintenance working.

Turnover: There are thunderstorms in the area.

POD: Maintain 100% power. Monitor A S/G leakage. Return IH EDG to service as soon as

possible. Support maintenance by starting 1-CH-P-1B.

Event

Malf. No.

Event

No.

Type*

Description

0

N/A

C (All)

Failure of normal charging valve to reopen after SI. (1289B

breaker trips when valve is taken to open)

1

CV01

C (BOP)

Containment air in-leakage

2

N/A

N (RO)

Swap charging pumps.

3

CHI202

I (RO)

VCT level transmitter 115 fails high.

4

MS0201

I

PT-446 fails low.

(BOP/RO)

5

MS 1401

C

Small steam leak to occur on "A" S/G safety valve, enough to

(RO/BOP)

cause reactor power to rise, and a ramp-down to be required.

6

N/A

R (RO)

Ramp unit down for small steam leak.

7

EL1301

I (All)

Loss of !-I vital bus.

8

N/A

M (All)

Inadvertent SI due to loss of vital bus and PT-457 being in trip.

(normal charging valve 1289B fails to open from MCR)

(N)ormal,

(R)eactivity,

(I)nstrument,

(C)omponent,

(M)ajor

Appendix D

Scenario Outline

Op-lest No.:

"1A

Facility: North Anna

Scenario No.: NRG 3

Form ES-D-1 (R8, $1)

Facility: North Anna

Scenario No.: NXU 4

up-lest 'Jo.:

I/A

Examiners:

Operators:

Initial Conditions: EOL. 50% reactor power, in the process of shutting down for refueling. A

confirmed 10 gpd tube leak exists in "A" S/G. 1H EDG is OOS for maintenance.

Turnover: There are thunderstorms in the area.

POD: Shutdown a MFW pump, then continue with the unit shutdown. Monitor A S/G leakage.

Return 1H EDG to service as soon as possible.

Event

Malf. No.

Event

No.

Type*

Description

1

N/A

N (BOP)

Shutdown the second MFW pump.

2

N/A

R (RO)

Continue with the unit shutdown.

3

MSO1O3

I (BOP)

"B" SG selected steam flow channel fails low.

4

N/A

I (BOP)

"B" SG PORV fails open due to a failure of its pressure

transmitter.

5

CH1601

C (RO)

"A" charging pump trips and discharge check valve fails to

CH1201

close.

6

RC4601

C (RO)

PRZR spray valve PCV-1455A fails open (able to manually

close).

7

RC04

M (All)

When PRZR spray flow was initiated the spray line broke,

which caused a PRZR steam space LOCA, requiring a reactor

trip and safety injection.

8

RD32

M (All)

The reactor will not trip automatically or manually and the crew

RD38

will respond to the ATWS.

(N)ormal,

(R)eactivity,

(I)nstrument,

(C)omponent,

(M)ajor

Scenario Outline

Facility: North Anna

Scenario No.: 5

Applicants:

Scenario No.: NRC 4

Op-Test No.:

1A,

Facility: North Anna

Examiners:

Objectives: To evaluate the applicants' ability to reduce reactor power; to implement AP's,

AR's and Tech Specs in response to instrument failures, a loss of Service Water and a loss

of emergency bus; to respond to a loss of coolant outside containment (ECA-1.2) with

concurrent component malfunctions and subsequent Safety Injection termination (E-1 and

ES-1.1).

Initial Conditions: 100% power, BOL. The unit has just returned to full power following a

load reduction for seal repairs on B MFW pump. C MFW pump, which had been tagged

for coupling repairs, was returned to service while the unit was at reduced power.

Turnover: 1H EDG was tagged-out two hours ago for maintenance. The system operator

has reported thunderstorms in the area. There is a 10 gpd tube leak in "A" S/G. Shift

orders are to place unit 1 service water pumps in service and secure unit 2 service water

pumps in preparation for maintenance on 2-SW-P-1B. When requested, reduce power as

determined by Engineering in preparation for removing the C waterbox from service for

tube plugging.

Event

Malf.

Event Type*

Event

No.

Description

1

_

N:BOP/SRO

Shift SW pumps

2

C:ALL

Loss of H emergency bus

3

R:RO

Reduce reactor power (at least 5%)

4

I:RO/SRO

PT-145 fails low, PCV-145 closes fully

5

C:BOP/SRO

1-SW-P-1B trips, loss of B SW header flow

6

I:BOP/SRO

B SG steam flow channel fails high

7

M:ALL

Loss of coolant outside containment

8

C:ALL

Failure of Train B SI to actuate manually or

automatically

(N)ormal,

(R)eactivity,

(I)nstrument,

(C)omponent,

(M)ajor

NORTH ANNA TRAINING CENTER

SIMULATOR EXERCISE GUIDE SCENARIO NRC 1

DOCUMENT REVISION RECORD

REV I

TIR NUMBER IREASON

SCENARIO NRC- 1 -DRR

0

N02-0293

Develop scenario for NRC initial licensed operator exams,

2002

Page 1

DOMINION

NORTH ANNA POWER STATION

INITIAL LICENSE CLASS

NRC SIMULATOR EXAMINATION

SCENARIO NRC 1

NRC SIMULATOR EXAMINATION SCENARIO

EVENT

DESCRIPTION

1.

Swap condensate pumps

2.

PRZR LT-1459 failure

3.

"A" SG selected feed flow channel failure

4.

"B" charging pump trip w/no auto start of "A"

5.

PT-1455 fails low, RCS leak (steam space)

6.

Ramp down due to exceeding RCS T/S leakage

7.

EHC pump trips, standby pump fails to start

8.

SBLOCA (steam space - 200 gpm)

9.

LOOP

Scenario Recapitulation:

Malfunctions after BOP entry

Total Malfunctions

Abnormal Events

Major Transients

EOPs Entered

EOP Contingencies

Critical Tasks

1 (LOOP)

7 (PRZR LT-1459 fails low, "A" SG feed flow channel failure,

"B" charging pump trip w/no auto start of "A", PT-1455 fails

high, RCS leak, EHC pump trips and standby pump fails to start,

SBLOCA, LOOP)

5 (PRZR LT-1459 fails low, "A" SG feed flow channel failure,

"B" charging pump trip w/no auto start of "A", PT-1455 fails

low, RCS leak, EHC pump trips and standby pump fails to start)

2 (SBLOCA, LOOP)

2 (1-E-0, 1-E-1)

0

1 (Start a HHSI pump)

SCENARIO DURATION

120 Minutes

Scenario- NRC 2 -DRR

Page 1

SIMULATOR EXAMINATION SCENARIO SUMMARY

SCENARIO NRC 1

The scenario will begin with unit 1 at 100% power with a confirmed 10 gpd tube leak in

"A" SG and 1H diesel tagged for maintenance. Shift orders are to monitor "A" SG leakage and

return 1 H diesel to service when maintenance is complete.

The first event will be a normal evolution. The crew will get a request from predictive

analysis to swap the condensate pumps due to higher than normal vibrations on "C". The crew will

swap condensate pumps in accordance with 1 -OP-30.1, "Operation of Condensate System." The

next event will occur when the pump swap is complete.

Pressurizer level channel 459 will fail low. The crew will identify the failure and enter I

AP-3, "Loss of Vital Instrumentation." to take control of pressurizer level, select operable level

channels, and restore letdown. Crew will then return control to auto and reset the pressurizer

control heaters. After the crew has identified the appropriate MOP for placing the channel in TRIP,

the next event will occur.

The selected feedwater flow transmitter for "A" steam generator will fail low, causing the

"A" main feed regulating valve to go full open. The crew will enter 1 -AP-3, "Loss of Vital

Instrumentation," and the BOP will take manual control of the FRV and control level prior to

reaching the high level permissive. The crew will swap to an operable channel and return SG level

control to automatic. After technical specifications have been reviewed and the crew has identified

the appropriate MOP for placing the channel in TRIP, the next event will occur.

The "B" charging pump will trip and the "A" charging pump will not auto-start. The crew

will respond in accordance with the annunciator response for CH PP 1B 15J6 LOCKOUT and

manually start a charging pump. (Crew may enter 1-AP-49 and perform applicable actions.) The

SRO will declare the "A" and "B" charging pumps inoperable per technical specifications. The

next event will occur once technical specifications have been reviewed.

Pressurizer pressure transmitter PT-455 will fail low and a small pressurizer vapor space

leak will start. The crew will enter 1-AP- 3 for the failed channel and 1-AP-16 for excessive

RCS leakage, and take actions to ramp the unit offline.

During the ramp the running EHC pump will trip and the standby pump will fail to auto

start. The BOP will be required to manually start the standby pump, or the turbine will trip. If

the pump is successfully started maintenance will be requested to investigate the trip of the

running EHC pump. If the unit trips the next event will occur as the crew enters 1 -E-0.

The RCS leak will ramp to 200 gpm and will require the crew to trip and safety inject.

The next event will occur when the crew transitions out of 1 -E-0.

The plant will experience a loss of offsite power that will require entry into AP-10. Since

1H diesel is tagged out all "H" bus equipment will be lost. The crew will initiate the procedure

for energizing the 1 H bus from the SBO diesel. The scenario can be terminated when the team

enters 1-ES-1.2, or when the lead examiner is satisfied.

Scenario- NRC 2 -DRR

Page 1

SCENARIO TURNOVER SHEET

Read the following to the crew:

Purpose:

This examination is intended to evaluate the crew's performance of various tasks

associated with the Licensed Operator Training Program. All activities should be

completed in accordance with approved operations standards.

1. You are on a day shift during the week.

2. When conditions allow, utilize the computer log systems as you would in the plant.

Unit Status:

Unit 1 is at 100% power. There is a confirmed 10 gpd tube leak in "A" SG. All applicable actions

of 1 -AP-5 have been completed. RCS boron concentration is 52 ppm and core age is 17,000

MWD/MTU. The deborating IXs have not yet been placed in service. Both IXs are loaded with

fresh resin and available for use. The amount of RCS dilution required to raise temperature one

degree is 5,478 gallons and the boration required to lower temperature one degree is 18 gallons.

Aux steam is on unit 1. The maintenance rule window is green for all planned maintenance.

Unit 2 is at 100% power.

The system operator has reported thunderstorms in the area.

Equipment Status:

1H diesel is tagged for maintenance.

Shift Orders:

Monitor "A" SG tube leakage. Return 1 H diesel to service when maintenance is complete.

Predictive analysis is monitoring vibrations on "C" condensate pump and may request a pump

swap.

Scenario- NRC 2 -DRR

Page I

EVENT 11:

Gv

itjh

ot

idýiekiveanalysisreporshigh ibratids n a:

Srunhig main

,onde

wap pumps in acicodanc&+h 1-0?

S,~3;0V %Op*ertibn of Condnsate Sys.ett

>,

,

..

.t

... ....

TIM..

....

EXPECTD.AT

INSTCO

Scenario- NRC 2 -DRR

Page I

NOTE: Predictive analysis contacts

control room concerning higher than

usual vibrations on the "C" main

condensate pump. They request that "B"

pump be started and "C" stopped.

US requests BOP to obtain 1-OP-30.1 for

swapping condensate pumps.

BOP directs watchstander to verify 1 -CN-P

1B is ready to start.

BOP directs watchstander to throttle 1 -CN

P-1 B discharge valve.

BOP starts 1-CN-P-1B.

BOP directs watchstander to open 1 -CN-P

l B discharge valve.

BOP directs watchstander to clope the

l

CN-P- 1B discharge vent.

BOP directs watchstander to throttle I1-CN

P-I1C discharge valve.

BOP secures 1-CN-P-1C.

BOP directs watchstander to open I1-CN-P

1Cdscharge vent.

NOTE: The next event may occur once

condensate pumps are swapped, or at the

discretion of the lead evaluator.

EVE

2

e ta t

i s

d

.AdsvetIeL* e¶nnl

s failed low the crew will'

" TIE

.

, .

EXPECTED ACTION

NSTRUCTOR REMARKSý3/4

RO identifies annunciators B-F8, "PZR LO

LEVEL," B-G7, "PZR LO LVL HTRS

OFF-LETDOWN ISOL," and B-H7, "PZR

CONTROL GROUP HTRS OL TRIP."

RO identifies PRZR level channel 459

failing low.

US directs crew to enter 1 -AP-3.

RO verifies redundant channels normal.

BOP verifies SG level parameters normal.

BOP verifies turbine first stage pressure

indication normal.

RO verifies operable PRZR level channels

selected (NO.)

Crew takes manual control of PRZR

level.

Crew restores letdown.

BOP verifies TV-1204A and 1204B

V1145.

RO adjusts PCV-1145 to obtain 300

psig and returns to AUTO.

RO verifies PRZR control group heaters not

tripped (NO.)

RO resets PRZR control group heaters.

BOP verifies both turbine first stage pressure

channels normal.

BOP verifies operable channels selected for

SGWLC.

Scenario- NRC 2 -DRR

Page 1

Scenario- NRC 2 -DRR

,EVENT 2: Given that thte uit is: at poPwr and aP' RRlevel

be' eIxpected to respohd AI !Ss

of Vital Instrumentalull,

TIME

EXPETEDACION

INSTRUCTOR* REMA.'RKS

Crew refers to 1 -MOP-55.72 for placing the

failed channel in trip.

US refers to ITS-3.3.1 and determines that the

channel must be placed in trip within 72

hours.

NOTE: The next event will occur after the

crew identifies the appropriate MOP, or

I at the direction of the lead evaluator.

Page I

EVENT 3:*Giydnthat the unit is

M

pat&et*hwdjh eý6hri+ling SG feed flo.w charn*el has failed low

ý ?

the crew Will be ekpec t~

r

% LAW

43,tos of Vital*is

ntartionT.

',: ý

..

. .

.. ..

, , ' ý 1 1 1 ,I " 1,:

,

!

MEEXPECTED ACTION

INSTRUTOR.REMARKS.

BOP identifies "A" SG feedwater flow

channel III failing low.

US directs crew to enter 1 -AP-3.

RO verifies redundant channels normal.

BOP identifies "A" SG feedwater flow

channel III has failed low.

Crew manually controls steam

generator level.

RO verifies first stage pressure indications

normal.

RO verifies systems affected by PRZR level

channels normal.

RO verifies both first stage pressure

channels normal.

RO verifies all SGWLC channels selected to

an operable channel (NO)

RO swaps SGWLC channels to channel IV.

BOP verifies SG levels on program and

returns FRVs to automatic.

BOP verifies that "A" SG feedwater flow

channel III is the only failed channel.

US directs crew to enter 1-MOP-55.78.

US refers to ITS-3.3.1 and determines that

the channel must be placed in TRIP within

72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months .

NOTE: The next event will occur after

the crew identifies the appropriate MOP,

or at the direction of the lead evaluator.

Scenario- NRC 2 -DRR

Page I

EVENT 4: Given tihat the mt istpoer nd th rig

charging pum hs t

ip

start of &nother pipn

6he wrlt*11

t a chaging pump in accordance'with k7

annunciator responseftrtCZA('CWPP>1B 15J6LOCKOUT

or I AP

Losso

N.ormalCharging."

TIME

EXPECTED ATION

iNSTRUCTOR REMARKS

NOTE: The following actions pertain to

annunciator response procedure C-A6.

RO identifies annunciators C-B5 "CH PP

TO REGEN HX LO PRESS", C-A6 "CH

PP 1B 15J6 LOCKOUT", C-G6 "RCP lA

B-C LABYTH SEAL LO FLOW"

RO recognizes that there are no running

charging pumps.

Crew reviews annunciator responses.

US directs RO to start either "A" or "C"

charging pump.

Crew restores char in flow.

CRITICAL TASK: Manually

start a charging pump.

RO restores letdown as directed by the US.

US reviews ITS-3.5.2 and declares "A" and

"B" charging pumps inoperable.

NOTE: If an operator is sent to check the

"B" pump breaker he/she will report the

breaker tripped on overcurrent.

US requests maintenance investigate trip of

"B"CHP and auto-start failure of"A" CHP.

NOTE: The following actions pertain to

1-AP-49, which the crew may choose to

enter.

US directs crew to enter 1 -AP-49.

Crew checks charging pumps for gas

binding.

Crew identifies that a charging pump

manipulation has not taken place.

RO identifies letdown automatically

isolated.

Scenario- NRC 2 -DRR

Page I

EET4:, Gentat the iiit is at bwiadternngc cargn pmhas tripped with no auto'"

/

startofan~ther pump*

tIe4%r*NWi~j

ta

bharging p

in accordance with

anunicaor reP5Js6fo`t-A6t*RP

B 15J6LOCKOUT, or -AP-49, ",oss of

S:~~or a Chr ing"

s'::2* s;

TIMEEXPECTED

CTI

INSTRUCTOR REMARKS

RO verifies VCT level greater than 12%.

RO verifies charging pump suction MOVs

from VCT open.

RO verifies VCT pressure greater than 15

psig.

RO verifies charging pump discharge flow

path.

RO verifies charging parameters normal.

(NO)

Crew checks for piping rupture. (NO)

RO verifies running charging pump normal.

(NO)

US directs RO to start either "A" or "C"

I charging pump.

NOTE: Crew may have previously

started a charging pump IAW the

annunciator response procedure.

Crew restores char ing flow.

CRITICAL TASK: Manually

N

start a charging pump.

RO aligns RCS makeup via normal charging.

RO verifies seal injection flow.

Crew determines letdown should be placed in

service.

RO restores letdown as directed by the US.

RO verifies charging parameters normal.

NOTE: If crew started "C" charging

pump, then the "C" pump is operable per

ITS and 72-hour action applies.

US reviews ITS-3.5.2 and declares "A" and

"B" charging pumps inoperable.

NOTE: The next event will commence

after the US reviews Tech Specs, or at the

direction of the lead evaluator.

Scenario- NRC 2 -DRR

Page I

EVENT 5: Given that the nt t at pwt aridnd PTIý455 fails high, causing a RCS leak, the'crew

,,wi *llespon in:accordanceiwithi-AV31,

ELss ofVitl Inst

enin"

and:1-AP-16,

ncreas.ing Primar'y Plant Leakage- "

.. ....

r*, ,,

,*e,,*,e

.. .

.

. . ...

.

. ..

g.

.

..

I

Scenario- NRC 2 -DRR

TIME:

EXPECTED ACTIO1$

F

'INSTRUCTOR REMARKS,

NOTE: The following actions are from 1

AP-3. Once the RCS leak is identified the

crew may continue performance of this

procedure in conjunction with 1-AP-16.

RO identifies various annunciators

associated with the instrumentation failure.

RO identifies PRZR PT-1455 has failed

high and notifies the US.

US directs crew to enter 1-AP-3.

RO verifies redundant channels normal.

BOP verifies SG level control parameters

normal.

BOP verifies 1 " stage pressure indications

normal.

RO verifies systems affected by PRZR level

channels normal.

BOP verifies both turbine first stage

pressure channels normal.

BOP verifies operable channels selected for

all SGWLC instruments.

Crew identifies 1-MOP-55.73 for PRZR

pressure channel failures.

US directs crew to verify P-1I permissive

status per 1-MOP-55.73 within one hour.

US/STA consults ITS-3.3.1 and 3.3.2, and

enters action on failed channel to place in

trip within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months .

NOTE: The following actions concern the

RCS leak.

Crew identifies that charging flow has

increased and/or containment sump

I pumping frequency has increased.

US directs entry into 1-AP- 16.

Crew verifies that the unit is in mode 1.

RO

verifies

that

PRZR

level,

RCS

subcooling, and VCT level are under control.

Page 1

Scenario- NRC 2 -DRR

EVENT 5: Given that the unit isatp "e>rnd P15ý5 fails ih

asn nRSlatece

will respond in accordance with 1-P-3 "ss

of Vital Instrmentation and 1 AP,

....

.Increasm* PrimarylateaKage.

TiME

EXPECTED ACTION

INSTRUCTOR REMARKS

RO checks that 1-CH-LCV-1115A is not

diverting.

Crew attempts to identify the source of the

leakage inside containment.

Crew quantifies RCS leakage as greater than

10 GPM.

US reviews ITS 3.4.13.

NOTE: If the US does not direct the crew

to ramp the unit off line, then the OMOC

will direct the US to remove the unit from

service.

US directs crew to ramp unit off line.

NOTE: The next event will be the crew

reducing unit power for the required

reactivity change.

Page I

EVENTI 6: Give In IIthat there is, an RUCS, leak that k66

f6ch spie& limits, the crew Will ramp the,

fflineinaccr

c w

O

"

t

eO'

.i..toMode

~ ~~.'..

...

< .. .. ,

, . .. .

..

TIME

EXPECTED A

ON ..

STRUTR REMARKS

NOTE: Crew is given reactivity

calculations from reactor engineer,

verified by STA.

US briefs crew on ramp.

RO commences lowering Tave using

boration/control rods.

BOP commences lowering main turbine

load.

"* Verifies load rate at .3%/min.

"* Lowers reference setter.

"" Pushes GO button.

BOP takes turbine to IMP-IN when power is

98%.

"* Pushes HOLD button

"* Matches reference and setter

"* Pulses VPL down until red light lit

"* Pulses VPL up until red light not lit

"* Verifies Governor tracking meter reads 0

"* Pushes IMP-IN button

Resumes ramp.

BOP directs turbine building watchstander

to place LP heater drain pumps on recirc and

shutdown when power is approximately

90%.

NOTE: The next event will occur when

the lead evaluator is satisfied with the

I amount of reactivity change.

Scenario- NRC 2 -DRR

Page I

Scenario- NRC 2 -DRR

EVENT,7,:G Giv Ien that Ian EHC, pu

has trp

id"

dtheb bakup EHIum

as not , ato ta'sta

the trew wi start tie b'ackuppum

1/2

TIME

EXPECTED ACTIN

INSTRUCTOR REMARKS....

BOP identifies K-F5, "TURB SUPERV

PANEL TROUBLE".

BOP identifies T-B4, "EH FLUID

RESERVOIR LOS-PRESSURE."

BOP identifies no EHC pump running.

US directs BOP to start EHC pump 1-TM

P4.

BOP manually starts EHC pump 1-TM-P-4.

NOTE: If the crew dispatches an

operator to look at EHC pumps, the

operator will report that 1-TM-P-3 is

unusually hot, and 1-TM-P-4 appears

normal.

US requests maintenance to investigate trip

of EHC pump, and start failure of backup

pump.-

NOTE: The next event will occur after

the backup EHC pump is running, or at

the direction of the lead evaluator.

Page I

EVENT 8: Given that the ,unift siat oe* afndaSBCOA has occured, the crekw

ill be expected

t orspond IAW ItAP" -

k

"

"'

ip"o

Sap e~jction,t'iad~-d4~

tdito

Secondatry Coolant.",,!

TIMEXECED TO

STRUCTORREMARKS

RO identifies charging flow increasing and

PRZR level decreasing.

US will refer back to step 2 of 1-AP-16.

RO verifies primary parameters under

operator control (NO).

RO isolates letdown and maximizes

charging flow.

RO commences a VCT makeup from the

blender.

RO informs US that PRZR level is still

decreasing.

US directs crew to manually trip the reactor

and enter 1 -E-0.

RO/BOP manually trips the reactor.

BOP verifies turbine trip.

RO verifies AC emergency busses

energized.

RO/BOP check if safety injection has

actuated (NO).

NOTE: Depending upon elapsed time, the

crew may determine SI is not required at

this time and transition to 1-ES-0.1. The

following actions are IAW 1-ES-0.1.

RO checks RCS Tavg.

BOP checks feedwater status.

RO verifies charging in service.

RO checks PRZR level control.

RO checks PRZR pressure control.

RO verifies all IRPIs 10 steps or less.

Scenario- NRC 2 -DRR

Page I

EVENTS: Given that the unitis 4~p

~andaLOCA has occurred, the

v Wi1fbe ekpde d;

torpond AW

iii

a

Plant Le age,,

0

JEZ?,?

atoTridhp or

Safeky lin ection, aR

d&toro0, Second ar*j

°al

-

TIMEX

INSTRUCTOR REMARKS

BOP verifies adequate HP turbine gland

steam pressure.

NOTE: The following actions will occur

after the crew identifies the need to SI

and are IAW 1-E-0.

Crew checks if safety injection is required.

US directs crew to manually initiate SI.

RO/BOP manually initiate SI.

BOP verifies FW isolation.

US directs RO/BOP to manually initiate

phase A isolation.

RO/BOP manually initiate phase A

isolation.

BOP verifies AFW pumps running.

NOTE: Crew may have already started

the second charging pump.

Crew verifies SI pumps running.

S

in

uly

one)

Low-head SI pumps running (YES)

BOP verifies SW pumps running.

Crew checks if MS should be isolated (NO).

BOP verifies SI flow.

BOP verifies AFW flow.

RO checks RCS temperature stable at or

trending to 547OF.

RO checks PRZR PORVs and spray valves.

RO checks RCP trip and charging pump

recirc criteria.

Scenario- NRC 2 -DRR

Page I

Scenario- NRC 2 -DRR

EVENT, 8: Givený that, the ýunit is, ýApo'W-r,;4ftd jEOC ha ocur

edi~cr

vi1

ekpe---d

qto

espond !AWA

eaa

Tr

~~~~~~

r..

..

o> an*}::

,<

,::>

TIME::

EXPECTED ACTION

INSTRUCTOR REMAR

BOP checks SGs not faulted (YES).

BOP checks SGs not ruptured (YES).

Crew checks if RCS is intact inside

containment (NO).

US directs crew to transition to l-E-1.

NOTE: The next event will occur once

the crew transitions out of 1-E-0, or at the

direction of the lead evaluator.-

Page I

EVENT 9: Given that the :umts tppett ndi&sf£ff-ite poer has &curred',te crew will be

ý,ei)eci~ke'd'to~respcin tnco

66<>Wit'0 O-P4 0,"Loss bfEectrical Thwer: -

TIME

EXPECTED ACTION-

<jFK>>

<INSTRUCTOR REMARKS

Crew identifies a loss of off-site power, loss

of"H" emergency bus.

US directs BOP to enter 0-AP-10 while RO

continues in E-0.

NOTE: The following steps refer to 0-AP

10 actions.

BOP performs 0-AP-10 diagnostics.

BOP reports results of diagnostics to US.

US directs BOP to initiate O-OP-6.4 to align

the SBO to supply tH emergency bus.

US directs an extra operator to initiate 0

MOP-26.64 to walk down the switchyard.

NOTE: The following steps refer to 1-E-1

actions.

RO checks intact SG levels.

RO checks secondary radiation.

RO checks PRZR PORVs and block valves.

RO checks if SI can be terminated (NO).

RO resets CDA

RO checks if QS is required. (NO)

RO checks QS pump status.

RO checks if low-head SI pumps can be

stopped. (YES)

RO resets SI and stops LHSI pumps.

RO/BOP checks RCS and SG pressures

RO/BOP checks if diesels should be

stopped. (NO)

RO/BOP verifies power available to at least

one train of cold leg recirculation. (YES)

Scenario- NRC 2 -DRR

Page I

NOTE: If SEM position not established, SRO(s) involved with scenario are to evaluate and

classify the event in accordance with EPIPs following the scenario but prior to the debrief

NOTE: Scenario may be terminated when all critical tasks have been met or at the discretion of the

Lead Evaluator.

Scenario- NRC 2 -DRR

EVENT 9: 'Given that the unit is trippedj and'a 1jss dfoff-site power has occurred, the crewU&wil be

t

t6 respond in accor dceVt*h0APt 0;, "Loss ofEleci

Power

TIME,

EXPECTED ACTION'1 >,

2

ISTRUCTOR'REMARK

RO/BOP checks auxiliary and safeguards

building status.

US requests SEM to direct chemistry to

sample RCS and containment.

US evaluates plant recovery equipment

RO/BOP checks containment hydrogen

concentration and initiates placing H2

analyzer in service.

Crew checks if RCS cooldown and

depressurizaion is required. (YES)

US directs transition to 1-ES-1.2

Note: Scenario can be terminated once

crew transitions to 1-ES-1.2, or at the

direction of the lead evaluator.

Page I

REFERENCES

SPR O

UREV,"

Operating Procedure 1-OP-30.1, "Operation of Condensate System."

27

Operating Procedure 1 -OP-2.2, "Unit Power Operation From Mode 1 to Mode 2."

47

Abnormal Procedure 1 -AP-3, "Loss of Vital Instrumentation."

17

Abnormal Procedure 1-AP-16, "Increasing Primary Plant Leakage."

18

Abnormal Procedure 0-AP-10, "Loss of Electrical Power."

30

Emergency Operating Procedure 1 -E-0, "Reactor Trip or Safety Injection."

28

Emergency Operating Procedure 1 -E- 1, "Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant."

16

Station Annunciator Response Procedures.

N/A

Administrative Procedure VPAP-1407, Verbal Communications.

2

INPO, Guideline for Teamwork and Diagnostic Skill Development: INPO 88-003,

Jan. 1988

INOP,

ACAD 90-022 Simulator Training Guidelines

Nov. 1990

Scenario- NRC 2 -DRR

Page I

ATTACHMENTS

ATTACHMENT 1 - LERs, SOERs, and/or RELATED INDUSTRY EVENTS

ATTACHMENT 2 - SIMULATOR OPERATOR'S COMPUTER PROGRAM

ATTACHMENT 3 - SCENARIO PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVES

ATTACHMENT 4 - SIMULATOR PERFORMANCE SUMMARY (SXG Only)*

ATTACHMENT 5 - SIMULATOR BOOTH OPERATOR CHECKLIST**

ATTACHMENT 6 - SEG INSTRUCTIONS**

ATTACHMENT 7 - SXG INSTRUCTIONS**

ATTACHMENT 8 - COMPETENCY AREA RATING FACTOR WORKSHEET **

ATTACHMENT 9 - SIMULATOR SCENARIO REVIEW CHECKLIST (SXG Only) *

ATTACHMENT 10 - SIMULATOR EXAMINATION PREBRIEF (SXG Only) **

Located on N:\\N\\LORP\\Simulator\\shl\\

*

Located in the Instructor Booth.

Scenario- NRC 2 -DRR

Page I

ATTACHMENT 1

LERs, SOERs, and/or RELATED INDUSTRY EVENTS

Scenario- NRC 2 -DRR

Page I

ATTACHMENT 1

LERs, SOERs, and/or RELATED INDUSTRY EVENTS

1. SEN 122, Recurring Event: Unisolable Reactor Coolant System Leak

Loviisa Units 1 & 2/VVER (May 16, 1994)

An unisolable reactor coolant system leak developed in the pressurizer shutdown spray valve due to

fatigue caused by thermal cycling and stratification.

Note: The VVER design includes two different pressurizer spray systems: normal pressurizer spray

and shutdown spray. The normal spray system consists of two spray valves with water for sprays

taken from the discharge side of two of the six reactor coolant pumps. The two normal spray paths

are identical, each consisting of four parallel spray lines and one warm-up line. The capacity of the

normal spray system is sufficient to avoid high reactor pressure during most anticipated transients.

The shutdown spray system, which is supplied either from the cold leg of one RCS loop or the

normal volume control system, is used for primary pressure decrease during normal reactor

shutdowns and also in some transients.

On May 16, 1994, during a routine weekly operator walk-down, fluid leakage was noted from the

insulation near the Unit 2 pressurizer shutdown spray valve. The source was determined to be a

through-wall crack in the 2-inch diameter valve body, and the plant was shutdown for five days to

conduct repairs. Similar crack indications were found on the corresponding valve on Unit 1, and

Unit 1 was shutdown for repair on May 23, 1994.

The failed valve had been in service for about 15 years. Although the original design did not

provide a means to maintain the pipe warm when the spray valve was closed, in 1980 a small hole

was drilled in the valve disc to minimize cyclic thermal stresses. While investigating the cause of

the May 16, 1994 crack, temperature stratification was also detected on the outlet side of the valve

(a 721F gradient existed from the top to the bottom of the horizontal run of pipe). The valve is

made of forged, titanium-stabilized, austenitic stainless steel.

Scenario- NRC 2 -DRR

Page I

ATTACHMENT 2

SIMULATOR OPERATOR'S COMPUTER PROGRAM

Scenario- NRC 2 -DRR

Page 1

SIMULATOR OPERATOR'S COMPUTER PROGRAM

Scenario NRC 1

Initial conditions

1. Recall 100% power end-of-life IC (IC-161).

2. Ensure Tave, Tref, PDTT level, and VCT level are selected on trend recorders.

3. Tagout IH diesel per MOP.

4. Pre-load 10 gpd tube leak on "A" SG (malfinction RC2401 = 8E-4) and allow to run until "A"

SG N-16 radiation monitor stabilizes at approximately 10.26 gpd.

5. Make sure LT-1459 is selected channel for pressurizer level.

6. Ensure "B" charging pump is running and "C" charging pump is powered from "J" bus.

7. Ensure "A" and "C" condensate pumps are running.

PRELOADS PRIOR TO SCENARIO START

CONDITION..

MALFUNCTION/OVERRIDE/ETC.

....

Auto start failure of "A" Enter the following switch overrides:

CHP

CHPIAIASTRT, delay time = 0, O/R = OFF, trigger =

N/A

CHPIAIASTP, delay time = 0, O/R = OFF, trigger =

N/A

CHP1A ASTP, delay time = 0, O/R = OFF, trigger = N/A

Auto start failure of EHC

Switch override: TMP4_ASTP, delay time = 0, O/R - OFF, trigger

Iump

= N/A.

Scenario- NRC 2 -DRR

Page I

SCENARIO EVENTS

EVENT,

.......

I.T,-OVERRID,/COMMUNICATIONS

1) Swap condensate pumps

S

.

. ...

.

. .

f

2) RC-LT-1459 failure

RC0801, delay time = 5, ramp = 5, severity value = -1, trigger = 1

NOTE: The next event will occur after the crew identifies the

appropriate MOP, or at the direction of the lead evaluator.

3) "A" SG feed flow channel

FW1201, delay time = 5, Ramp = 45, severity value = -1,

III failure

trigger = 2

NOTE: The next event will occur after the crew identifies the

appropriate MOP, or at the direction of the lead evaluator.

Scenario- NRC 2 -DRR

NOTE: Predictive analysis contacts control room concerning

higher than usual vibrations on the "C" main condensate

pump. They request that "B" pump be started and "C"

stopped.

NOTE: When directed to throttle closed "B" condensate pump

discharge valve 1-CN-22, use PNID screen and setup event

trigger to throttle the valve to 3% open over a two-minute

period.

NOTE: When directed to open "B" condensate pump

discharge valve 1-CN-22, use PNID screen and setup event

trigger to open the valve over a one minute period.

NOTE: When directed to close 1-CN-486, wait one minute,

then inform the crew that 1-CN-486 is closed (not modeled.)

NOTE: When directed to throttle closed "C" condensate pump

discharge valve 1-CN-34, use PNID screen and setup event

trigger to throttle the valve to 3% open over a two-minute

period.

NOTE: When directed to open "C" condensate pump

discharge valve 1-CN-34, use PNID screen and setup event

trigger to open the valve over a one minute period.

NOTE: When directed to open 1-CN-487, wait one minute,

then inform the crew that 1-CN-487 is open (not modeled.)

NOTE: The next event may occur once condensate pumps are

swapped, or at the discretion of the lead evaluator.

Page 1

NEVENT

MAL

TION/OVERDECOMMUNICATIONS

4)1-CH-P-1B trip

CH1602, delay time = 5, trigger = 3

NOTE: If an operator is sent to check the "B" pump breaker

he/she will report the breaker tripped on overcurrent.

NOTE: The next event will commence after the US reviews

Tech Specs, or at the direction of the lead evaluator.

5)PT-1455 failure and RCS

RC0703, delay time = 5, ramp = 5, severity value = +1, trigger = 4

leak

RC04, delay time = 5, ramp = 300, severity value = 10, trigger = 4.

NOTE: If the US does not direct the crew to ramp unit off

line, then call as the OMOC and direct the US to remove the

unit from service.

NOTE: The next event will be the crew reducing unit power

for the required reactivity change.

6) Unit rampdown

NOTE: Crew is given reactivity calculations from reactor

engineer, verified by STA.

NOTE: The next event will occur when the lead evaluator is

satisfied with the amount of reactivity change.

7)EHC pump trip

TU1101, delay time = 5, trigger = 5

NOTE: If the crew dispatches an operator to look at EHC

pumps, the operator will report that 1-TM-P-3 is unusually

hot, and 1-TM-P4 appears normal.

NOTE: The next event will occur after the backup EHC

pump is running, or at the direction of the lead evaluator.

8)SBLOCA

Update MRC04 to 45% (200 gpm), ramp = 5, delay = 0, trigger =

none.

NOTE: The next event will occur after the crew transitions

out of 1-E-0, or at the direction of the lead evaluator.

9)LOOP

ELOI, delay time = 5 see, trigger = 6

Note: Scenario can be terminated after the crew transitions to

1-ES-1.2, or at the direction of the lead evaluator

Scenario- NRC 2 -DRR

Page 1

ATTACHMENT 3

SCENARIO PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVES

Scenario- NRC 2 -DRR

Page 1

SIMULATOR REQUALIFICATION EXAMINATION

TERMINAL PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVE

Given equipment failures and operational situations, operate the plant in accordance with

Technical Specifications to bring the unit to a safe condition, using applicable procedures,

and applying effective teamwork, communication, and diagnostic skills.

GENERIC PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVES

A.

During shift operations the shift supervisor will take a conservative course of action,

especially when uncertain conditions exist, when dealing with core cooling or heat sink

availability, primary system and containment integrity, and reactivity control associated

with plant evolutions.

B.

During shift operations the shift supervisor will provide overall crew guidance by

prioritizing and integrating the actions of the shift crew in accordance with administrative

procedures.

C.

During shift operations each crew member will participate in a team effort that resolves

conflicts, provides input into the team decision and communicates all the necessary

information to enhance teamwork in accordance with administrative procedures.

D.

During shift operations the Shift Technical Advisor will independently assess events and

based on those assessments make recommendations to the crew regarding mitigation

strategy.

Scenario- NRC 2 -DRR

Page I

EVENT 1 PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVES

EVENT GOAL:

Given that the unit is at power and predictive analysis reports high

vibrations on a running main condensate pump, the crew will swap pumps

in accordance with 1-OP-30.1, "Operation of Condensate System."

NORTH ANNA SPECIFIC TASKS:

R403

Shift the main condensate pumps

CRITICAL TASK:

N/A

Scenario- NRC 2 -DRR

Page I

EVENT 2 PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVES

EVENT GOAL:

Given that the unit is at power and a PRZR level channel has failed, the

crew will be expected to respond IAW 1-AP-3, "Loss of Vital

Instrumentation."

NORTH ANNA SPECIFIC TASKS:

R633 Respond to a failure of the controlling pressurizer level channel

S70

Evaluate compliance with technical specifications

CRITICAL TASK:

See next page

Scenario- NRC 2 -DRR

Page 1

CT Statement:

Crew takes manual control of PRZR level, minimizes charging, and restores letdown.

Safety Significance:

Failure to take manual control of PRZR level constitutes a "mis-operation or incorrect crew

performance" which will result in an unnecessary reactor trip on high PRZR level.

Cues:

The controlling PRZR level channel is failed low, letdown is isolated.

Performance Indicator:

RO places controller for l-CH-FCV- 1122 in manual and controls PRZR level.

RO performs RNO step and selects operable channel.

RO restores charging and letdown as directed by the US.

Feedback:

PRZR level does not exceed trip setpoint.

WOG Reference:

None

Conditions:

Prior to a PRZR high level reactor trip.

Scenario- NRC 2 -DRR

Page 1

EVENT 3 PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVES

EVENT GOAL:

Given that the unit is at power and the controlling SG feed flow channel

has failed, the crew will be expected to respond lAW 1-AP-3, "Loss of

Vital Instrumentation."

NORTH ANNA SPECIFIC TASKS:

S70

Evaluate compliance with technical specifications.

CRITICAL TASK:

See next page.

Scenario- NRC 2 -DRR

Page I

CT Statement:

Crew takes manual control of steam generator level and restores level to normal range.

Safety Significance:

Failure to take manual control of SG level constitutes a "mis-operation or incorrect crew

performance" which will result in an unnecessary reactor trip on low SG level.

Cues:

The controlling SG feed flow channel has failed low.

Main feed reg valve is going open.

Actual SG level is increasing.

Performance Indicator:

BOP places controller for 1-FW-FCV-1478 in manual and controls "A" SG level.

Feedback:

SG level does not increase to P-14 setpoint.

WOG Reference:

None

Conditions:

Prior to turbine trip/feedwater isolation on high SG level.

Scenario- NRC 2 -DRR

Page 1

EVENT 4 PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVES

EVENT GOAL:

Given that the unit is at power and the running charging pump has tripped

with no auto start of another pump, the crew will start a charging pump in

accordance with annunciator response for C-A6 "CH PP 1B 15J6

LOCKOUT."

NORTH ANNA SPECIFIC TASKS:

R699 Respond to main control board annunciator alarms.

CRITICAL TASK:

N/A

Scenario- NRC 2 -DRR

Page I

EVENT 5 PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVES

EVENT GOAL:

Given that the unit is at power and PT-1455 fails, causing an RCS leak,

the crew will respond in accordance with 1-AP-3, "Loss of Vital

Instrumentation" and 1-AP-16, "Increasing Primary Plant Leakage."

NORTH ANNA SPECIFIC TASKS:

R520 Respond to increasing primary-plant leakage

S70

Evaluate compliance with technical specifications

CRITICAL TASK:

N/A

Scenario- NRC 2 -DRR

Page I

EVENT 6 PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVES

EVENT GOAL:

Given that there is an RCS leak that exceeds tech spec limits, the crew will

ramp the unit off line in accordance with 1 -OP-2.2, "Unit Power Operation

From Mode 1 to Mode 2."

NORTH ANNA SPECIFIC TASKS:

None

CRITICAL TASK:

N/A

Scenario- NRC 2 -DRR

Pagel1

EVENT 7 PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVES

EVENT GOAL:

Given that an EHC pump has tripped and the backup EHC pump has not

auto-started, the crew will start the backup pump and attempt to stabilize

conditions, or trip the unit.

NORTH ANNA SPECIFIC TASKS:

R699 Respond to main control board annunciator alarms.

CRITICAL TASK:

N/A

Scenario- NRC 2 -DRR

Page 1

EVENT 8 PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVES

EVENT GOAL:

Given that the unit is at power, and a SBLOCA has occurred, the crew will

be expected to respond IAW 1-AP-16, "Increasing Primary Plant

Leakage," l-E-0, "Reactor Trip or Safety Injection," and l-E-l, "Loss of

Reactor or Secondary Coolant."

NORTH ANNA SPECIFIC TASKS:

R185

R186

Perform the immediate operator actions in response to a reactor trip or safety injection.

Determine the appropriate recovery procedure following the actuation of a reactor trip with

a safety injection.

S69

Identify a reportable occurrence and make appropriate notifications.

S85

Notify the appropriate personnel of emergency events.

CRITICAL TASK:

See next page.

Scenario- NRC 2 -DRR

Page I

CT Statement:

Crew starts a second charging pump during safety injection.

Safety Significance:

Failure to start the second available charging pump constitutes a "mis-operation or incorrect

crew performance" which leads to degraded ECCS capacity."

Cues:

SI signal present

Only one charging pump is running with two available.

Performance Indicator:

RO manually starts second available charging pump.

Feedback:

Increase in HHSI flow.

WOG Reference:

None

Conditions:

Before exiting E-0.

Scenario- NRC 2 -DRR

Page I

EVENT 9 PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVES

EVENT GOAL:

Given that the unit is tripped, and a loss of off-site power has occurred, the

crew will be expected to respond in accordance with 0-AP-10, "Loss of

Electrical Power."

NORTH ANNA SPECIFIC TASKS:

S27

Direct the restoration of the electrical distribution system following the performance of the

loss of electrical power diagnostic

CRITICAL TASK:

N/A

NORTH ANNA TRAINING CENTER

SIMULATOR EXERCISE GUIDE SCENARIO NRC 2

DOCUMENT REVISION RECORD

REV

TIR NUMBER

REASON

0

N02-0293

Develop scenario for NRC initial licensed operator exams,

12002

4.

__________________ .1

I

I.

I .

II

I

i

I

4-

4.

1

+

Scenario- NRC 2 -DRR

I

Page I

Scenario- NRC 2 -DRR

NORTH ANNA TRAINING CENTER

SIMULATOR EXERCISE GUIDE SCENARIO NRC 2

DOCUMENT REVISION RECORD

REV

TIR NUMBER

REASON

I-

4

__________________ +/- __________________________________________________

Page I

DOMINION

NORTH ANNA POWER STATION

INITIAL LICENSE CLASS

NRC SIMULATOR EXAMINATION

SCENARIO 2

NRC SIMULATOR EXAMINATION SCENARIO

EVENT

DESCRIPTION

1.

Sync main generator to grid

2.

Main steam pressure transmitter PT-1464 fails high

3.

Continue ramping to 30%

4.

Loss of Bearing Cooling

5.

Letdown PCV fails closed

6.

"C" SG level channel III failure

7.

PT- 1444 fails high, PORV sticks open and block valve thermals

8.

SGTR on "C" SG

Scenario Recapitulation:

Malfunctions after EOP entry

Total Malfunctions

Abnormal Events

Major Transients

EOPs Entered

EOP Contingencies

Critical Tasks

3 (Single train SI, failure of BIT inlet valves, SGTR on "C" SG)

8 (PT-1464 failure, Loss of Bearing Cooling, PCV- 1145 failure,

"C" SG level channel III failure, PT-1444 failure/stuck

PORV/block valve failure, single train SI, failure of BIT inlet

valves, SGTR on "C" SG)

5 (PT-1464 failure, Loss of Bearing Cooling, PCV- 1145 failure,

"C" SG level channel III failure, PT-1444 failure)

1 (SGTR on "C" SG)

3 (I-E-0, 1-E-l, l-E-3)

1 (1-ECA-3.1)

2 (Establish HHSI flow; isolate AFW to "C" SG)

SCENARIO DURATION

120 Minutes

Scenario NRC 3 -DRR

Page I

SIMULATOR EXAMINATION SCENARIO SUMMARY

SCENARIO NRC 2

The first event will be a normal evolution to synchronize and load the main generator. The

unit is at 12% power with l-OP-15.2 and I-OP-2.1 completed through adjusting the setter ramp

rate to two percent per minute. Prior to entering the simulator, the crew will receive turnover and

conduct a pre-job brief for placing the unit on-line. Immediately after assuming the watch, the crew

will synchronize and load the main generator, then continue to increase turbine load. When the

condenser steam dumps are fully closed, the next event will occur.

Main steam header pressure transmitter PT-1464 will fail high over a 60-second period

causing the steam dumps to open. The crew will respond by entering 1-AP-38, "Excessive Load

Increase," which directs them to turn the steam dumps OFF. After the crew completes 1-AP-38,

they will continue ramping. If they are reluctant to do so because of steam dumps being

unavailable, the Operations Manager on Call will direct them to continue increasing power.

The third event will be a reactivity manipulation to continue the ramp to 30%. As soon as

the Lead Examiner observes the required ramp he will signal for the next event to occur.

The running BC pump will trip. The crew should identify annunciators associated with the

loss of BC and the US should direct the crew to enter 1-AP-19, "Loss of Bearing Cooling Water."

The crew will identify the failure of the standby BC pump to auto-start and manually start the

pump. After the crew stabilizes the unit, the next event will occur.

Letdown pressure controller will fail causing letdown PCV- 1145 to fully close and

actuating annunciator C-B2, LOW PRESS LETDWN LINE HI PRESS. The crew will refer to the

annunciator response, place PCV-1 145 in MANUAL and restore letdown parameters to normal.

After the crew has stabilized letdown, the next event will occur.

The "C" steam generator level channel III will fail high, causing the "C" main feed

regulating valve to go full closed. The crew will enter 1 -AP-3, "Loss of Vital Instrumentation,"

and the BOP will take manual control of the FRV and restore level prior to reaching the SG low

low level reactor trip setpoint. After the US refers to technical specifications and the crew has

identified the appropriate MOP for placing the channel in TRIP, the next event will occur.

PRZR PT-1444 will fail high causing the PORV and spray valves to fully open. The crew

will enter 1-AP-44, "Loss of RCS Pressure." The PORV will not close manually and the block

MOV will thermal out before it closes fully. RCS pressure will continue to decrease. The crew

will enter 1 -E-0, "Reactor Trip or Safety Injection." After tripping the unit, RCS pressure will

continue to decrease and SI will occur. One train of SI and phase A will fail to actuate

automatically, requiring the crew to manually align equipment. After HHSI flow is established, the

last event will occur.

Scenario NRC 3 -DRR

Pagel1

A 300-gpm tube rupture will develop in C S/G. The crew will identify increasing water

level in "C" SG coincident with decreasing RCS pressure. The crew will transition to 1-E-l,

"Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant," then to 1-ECA-3.1, "SGTR with Loss of Reactor

Coolant - Subcooled Recovery Desired." The scenario may be terminated after the crew

transitions to 1 -ECA-3.1 or at the direction of the lead examiner.

Scenario NRC 3 -DRR

Page I

SCENARIO TURNOVER SHEET

Read the following to the crew:

This examination is intended to evaluate the crew's performance of various tasks associated with

the Licensed Operator Training Program. All activities should be completed in accordance with

approved operations standards.

3. You are on a day shift during the week.

4. When conditions allow, utilize the computer log systems as you would in the plant.

Unit Status:

Unit 1 is at 12% power. The main generator is ready to be synchronized and loaded. RCS boron is

266 ppm and core age is 17,000 MWD/MTU. The amount of RCS dilution required to raise

temperature one degree is 569 gallons and the boration required to lower temperature one degree is

11 gallons. Aux steam is on unit 2. The Mrule window is green for all planned maintenance.

Unit 2 is at 100% power.

The system operator has reported thunderstorms in the area.

Equipment Status:

The main generator automatic synchronizing circuit is not functioning properly. A 10 gpd tube

leak exists in "A" SG. 1 H diesel was tagged-out two hours ago for maintenance.

Shift Orders:

Prior to entering the simulator, perform a pre-job brief for placing the unit on-line. After

assuming the watch, place the unit on-line without delay.

Place the unit on line by manually synchronizing and loading the main generator, then ramp to

30% power. Hold for chemistry cleanup. Continue to monitor "A" SG tube leakage.

Scenario NRC 3 -DRR

Page 1

EVENTI1 Gie thtt

4t>stt~4kAAhh

ain geert'

d'a

ihne the crew wll

ltlz

oad the min generator be pacoranced

`0

ffi

2

genrMfrehordfc

..

Scenario NRC 3 -DRR

}TIME

EXPECTED A*CTIO1

II*STRUCTORREMARKS,

NOTE: The following steps are from 1-OP-15.2.

BOP manually closes main generator output

breaker.

BOP verifies generator assumes some load or raises

setter to assume load.

BOP places synch key in OFF.

BOP zeroes balance volts as necessary.

BOP adjusts setter to .3 percent per minute.

BOP adjusts generator voltage as necessary.

US directs crew to release ERF computer point from

OFF SCAN.

US directs crew to return to l-OP-2.1 to continue

increasing power.

NOTE: The next event will occur after condenser

steam dumps are fully closed or at the direction

of the lead examiner.

Page 1

EVENT 2: Given that the unit is a&ow&er' th c..w. i1g

-resp ond to P

64 failing high and an

6 eected power increasei

Inacrdncewih

A-38,AP Excessive Load Increase"

TIME",

EXPECTED ACTION

?. INSTRUCTOR REMARKS

RO identifies steam dumps open and informs US.

US directs crew to enter l-AP-38.

Crew st ops Rower increase.

BOP checks S/G PORVs.

BOP checks turbine load normal.

RO checks reactor power stable.

BOP identifies PT-464 failed high and informs US.

BOP checks turbine load control.

Crew checks plant status - stable.

Crew checks plant steam systems.

Crew verifies cause of load increase corrected.

US references VPAP-1410 and makes required

notifications.

US directs crew to continue increasing power.

Scenario NRC 3 -DRR

Page I

Scenario NRC 3 -DRR

EVEY

NT,2*,: di

neiithat theuni i 'a p x

rh ew ~ill respondIto

T-464 failing ihada

nexitete power ie

accr

~~

wih -P3"xessivet 1d'InraeX

TIME

EXPECTED ACTIO....

...

i.

INSTRUCTOR REMARKS

NOTE: If crew is reluctant to continue power

increase due to unavailability of steam dumps,

the Operations Manager on Call will direct them

to continue increasing power and transfer steam

dumps to Tavg mode when directed by

procedure.

NOTE: The next event will be the crew

increasing unit power for the required reactivity

manipulation.

Page I

Scenario NRC 3 -DRR

EVENT 3: Given that t

t;iha j

"as

placed on-line, the c re w w iell continue increasing

Iepoxro 30a/&in acc6#d~ne

i iw4i1

Kjnit Operation -fom Mode2 to Mode:

TIME

EXPECTED ACTIO

INSTRUCTOR REMARKS

NOTE: Crew is given reactivity calculations

from reactor engineer, verified by STA.

RO commences raising Tave using dilution/control

rods.

BOP commences increasing main turbine

load

"* Verifies load rate at .3%/min

"* Raises reference setter.

"* Pushes GO button.

NOTE: The next event will occur when the lead

examiner is satisfied with the reactivity change.

Page I

EVENT 4: Given that the jilit isat

"

w

and teM uning BCE pump has tripped, tihe &crew' wilVl,

respond AW

I 1-AP-I9

Bfeng, C

,ooling Water."

TIME 1,

EXPECTED ACTION ..

INSTRUCTORREMARKS

BOP identifies annunciators F-E4, "BC WTR

DISCH HDR LO PRESS," and F-F4, "BC WTR PP

1A-lB AUTO TRIP SYS MISALIGNED," and

informs US.

US directs the crew to enter 1-AP-19.

BOP identifies "A" BC pump tripped and informs

US.

BOP starts "B" BC pump.

BOP verifies BC pump running with normal

indications.

BOP verifies BC system operating normally in

tower mode.

Crew monitors main generator temperatures.

Crew dispatches an operator to locally check

equipment.

NOTE: The next event will occur after the crew

has started the standby BC pump and stabilized

the plant, or as directed by the lead evaluator.

Scenario NRC 3 -DRR

Page I

Scenario NRC 3 -DRR

EVENTS: -,,Given that the unit is; ~t~vr

n

-EP-45,

Letdown Low4Pressureconrle

Output, has failed idw theewil rspond lA W aann

atbr 1 C-B2,_ LW PRSS

L..

ETDWNLDINE HI PkSSt

.

...

....

TIME'

J

XETDATO

NSTRUCTOR REMARKS

RO identifies annunciator C-B2, "LOW PRESS

LETDWN LINE HI PRESS".

RO identifies 1-CH-PC- 1145 failed low and informs

US.

Crew refers to annunciator response procedure.

RO takes manual control of l-CH-PCV- 1145 and

opens it to reestablish 300 psig.

US notifies instrument department to investigate.

NOTE: The next event will occur after the RO

has stabilized letdown, or at the direction of the

lead evaluator.

Page I

EVENT 6: OGitn:that the unit, isat'ppe *th

con6tolling SG, evel channel hga failed'high,

thew

l

o

in

-o

a

i

?fo

ital In struimenttation'

Scenario NRC 3 -DRR

TJIME,

,:EXPECTED ACTIOISItK 9>

NSTRUCTOR REMARKS,,

BOP identifies "C" SG level channel III failing high

and informs US.

US directs crew to enter 1-AP-3.

BOP verifies redundant channels normal.

BOP identifies "C" SG level channel III has failed

high.

Crew manually controls steam generator

level.

RO verifies first stage pressure indications normal.

RO verifies systems affected by PRZR level channels

normal.

RO verifies both first stage pressure channels

normal.

BOP verifies all SGWLC channels selected to an

operable channel. (NO)

BOP verifies that "C" SG level channel III is the

only failed channel.

US directs crew to enter 1-MOP-55.76.

US refers to ITS-3.3.1 and 3.3.2, and determines

that the channel must be placed in TRIP within 72

hours.

NOTE: The next event will occur after the crew

identifies the appropriate MOP, or at the

direction of the lead evaluator.

Page 1

ýEVENT 7:' Given that PT- 1444 hasi failed hih wIth a stW cWkopnPR

and blck MOVthe',

crew will respond ig

Pccordaiie

wi

-AP-44, "Loss of RCS Pressure, and 1E-O,

" "'Reactoi Trip Or Safpt

Inie*b,

el

e4

TIME

EXPECTED ATION

INSTRUCTOR REMARKS

RO identifies alarms associated with PT-1444

failing high and PRZR PORV open, and informs

US.

US directs crew to enter 1-AP-44.

RO attempts to close PRZR PORV and identifies

valve stuck open.

RO attempts to close PORV block MOV and

identifies valve closed partially, then thermalled out.

RO closes PRZR spray valves and identifies RCS

pressure continuing to decrease.

US directs crew to enter 1 -E-0.

RO/BOP trip the reactor.

BOP trips the turbine.

RO verifies AC emergency busses energized.

RO/BOP check if SI has actuated or is required.

RO identifies RCS pressure continuing to decrease,

requiring manual initiation of SI.

US directs crew to manually initiate SI.

RO/BOP manually initiate SI.

Crew identifies that train "A" SI did not actuate.

Scenario NRC 3 -DRR

Page 1

EVENT 7: Given that PT-I444has failed high with a stuck open PQRV and block MOV, the

creiwill respond i~coch~W6t64AP4,ts

fRSPesr,

n

EO

"R 'aci6rt'1 1rip, drS

ýIk'

TIME.-

EXPETEDATIO

I STRCTOR REMARKS'

BOP verifies feedwater isolation (NO).

BOP closes main feed MOVs, stops 1-FW-P-1A1

and 1C 1, and places standby feed pump in PTL.

RO/BOP manually initiate phase A.

US initiates phase A attachment.

BOP verifies AFW pumps are running.

RO/BOP verifies SI pumps are running (NO).

Crew starts SI u

s.

BOP verifies SW pumps running (NO.)

BOP starts 1-SW-P-lA.

Crew checks if MS lines should be isolated. (NO)

Crew verifies cold leg SI flow (NO).

US directs BOP to perform l-E-0 attachment to

verify SI flow path.

Scenario NRC 3 -DRR

Page 1

EVENT 7: Gien that PT-1444 hasftafiled ighwit

l

a stuck'l

-oe

PORV and bloc MO

t

ScreWwillrespond i, aýord&w

!it-AP-44,

"oss of RCS Pressure, and 1-EO

"Reactor Tfip or Safety'mjct4

JIME

..

EXP..T.D......ON.

INSTRUCTOR REMARKSý

NOTE: Crew may have previously identified

lack of SI flow and established SI flow lAW the

CAP.

Crew establishes HHSI flow.

CRITICAL TASK: Open

"* BOP checks charging pump alignment.

BIT inlet valve 1867A.

"* BOP checks BIT recircs closed.

"* BOP checks BIT outlet valves open.

"* BOP checks BIT inlet valves open (NO.)

BOP verifies SI flow.

BOP verifies AFW flow.

RO checks RCS Tavg.

RO checks PRZR PORVs and block valves.

US directs transition to 1-E-1.

NOTE: The next event will occur after the crew

establishes HHSI flow, or at the direction of the

lead evaluator.

Scenario NRC 3 -DRR

Page I

EVENt 8: Giye4 that a SGTh ha

R

Pk

en an cannot be,.

is~f" wil rej~oid jwith

I E3 SeamrGnertrTb

Rup'e

I

nd !jECA:3,

fSGT

swiflEoss5f ReactorCoolant

Subcooled..

R~qeitDesird

,,>

,

g

TIME

EXPECTED>ACT

INSTRUCTOR REMARKS

RO checks RCP trip and charging pump recirc

criteria.

BOP checks SGs not faulted.

BOP checks intact SG levels and identifies "C" SG

level continuing to increase after isolating AFW.

BOP checks secondary radiation and identifies "C"

SG MS line radiation monitor increasing.

US directs transition to 1 -E-3.

RO checks RCP trip and charging pump recirc

criteria.

Crew identifies ruptured generator.

Crew isolates flow from ruptured SG.

0

BOP checks "C" PORV closed

RO checks decay heat release valve closed

BOP verifies "C" blowdown trip valves closed

0

BOP closes "C" MSTV

US initiates attachment 2 for local turbine building

operations.

RO checks pressurizer PORVs and block valves.

CRITICAL TASK:

Isolate AFW to "C" SG

Scenario NRC 3 -DRR

Page I

EVENT 8: GiVr that a SGER has b6eR'd a

a aZR PORV is stfk open and cannot be

isdlated theew will responhd ~a4cprc with 1 E=3j:teamGenetatorTube

ui'k;pe"'n

I

-EA3:jGR7~~~so

eco

olrtSub

obled

Desired

ýp

N

0"::

TIME

EXPECTED ACTI

....

INSTRUCTOR REMARKS

US directs crew to enter 1 -ECA-3.1.

RO resets both trains of SI.

RO resets both trains of phase A.

BOP establish instrument air to containment.

Crew verifies all AC busses energized by offsite.

RO places all pressurizer heaters in PTL.

Crew checks if CDA reset is required. (NO)

Crew checks if QS is required. (NO)

BOP checks QS pump status.

BOP monitors "C" SG level.

Crew checks if low heads should be stopped (YES).

BOP places low-heads in AUTO.

BOP checks auxiliary building status.

Scenario NRC 3 -DRR

Page I

i>

sohatd;tlie 4re wil &espq*d i aeccqrdance with 1 -ES; "Steam Generator Tube

R ~it,

n

ECA, 3tA BTtk*Niht5S of Reactor :Coh~nt -Subcoobed::

R

P*

t~

i5 d."

?

t;

7

r

TIME.

P

SXPECTED ACTION

,

INSTRUCTOR REMARKS

US asks station emergency manager to request

chemistry samples.

Crew evaluates plant recovery equipment.

BOP places hydrogen analyzer in service.

BOP checks SGs not faulted.

BOP checks intact SG levels.

Crew initiates RCS cooldown.

NOTE: Scenario may be terminated after the

crew transitions to 1-ECA-3.1 or at the direction

of the lead examiner.

NOTE: If SEM position not established, SRO(s) involved with scenario are to evaluate and

classify the event in accordance with EPIPs following the scenario but prior to the debrief.

NOTE: Scenario may be terminated when all critical tasks have been met or at the discretion of the

Lead Evaluator.

Scenario NRC 3 -DRR

Page I

REFERENCES

PROCDUR>

&REV.'

Operation Procedure l-OP-15.2, "Main Generator Operation."

35

Abnormal Procedure 1 -AP-38, "Excessive Load Increase."

11

Operation Procedure 1-OP-2.1, "Unit Operation From Mode 2 to Mode 1."

68

Abnormal Procedure 1 -AP-3, "Loss of Vital Instrumentation."

17

Abnormal Procedure 1-AP- 19, "Loss of Bearing Cooling."

13

Abnormal Procedure 1 -AP-44, "Loss of Reactor Coolant System Pressure."

14

Emergency Operating Procedure 1 -E-0, "Reactor Trip or Safety Injection."

28

Emergency Operating Procedure 1 -E-1, "Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant."

16

Emergency Operating Procedure 1 -E-3, "Steam Generator Tube Rupture."

19

Emergency Contingency Action 1-ECA-3.1, "SGTR With Loss of Reactor Coolant

15

- Subcooled Recovery Desired."

Station Annunciator Response Procedures.

N/A

Administrative Procedure VPAP-1407, Verbal Communications.

2

INPO, Guideline for Teamwork and Diagnostic Skill Development: INPO 88-003,

Jan. 1988

INPO, ACAD 90-022 Simulator Training Guidelines

Nov. 1990

Scenario NRC 3 -DRR

Page I

ATTACHMENTS

ATTACHMENT 1 - LERs, SOERs, and/or RELATED INDUSTRY EVENTS

ATTACHMENT 2 - SIMULATOR OPERATOR'S COMPUTER PROGRAM

ATTACHMENT 3 - SCENARIO PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVES

ATTACHMENT 4 - SIMULATOR PERFORMANCE SUMMARY (SXG Only)*

ATTACHMENT 5 - SIMULATOR BOOTH OPERATOR CHECKLIST**

ATTACHMENT 6 - SEG INSTRUCTIONS**

ATTACHMENT 7 - SXG INSTRUCTIONS**

ATTACHMENT 8 - COMPETENCY AREA RATING FACTOR WORKSHEET **

ATTACHMENT 9 - SIMULATOR SCENARIO REVIEW CHECKLIST (SXG Only) *

ATTACHMENT 10 - SIMULATOR EXAMINATION PREBRIEF (SXG Only) **

Located on N:\\N"LORP\\Simulator\\shl\\

*

Located in the Instructor Booth.

Scenario NRC 3 -DRR

Page I

ATTACHMENT 1

LERs, SOERs, and/or RELATED INDUSTRY EVENTS

Scenario NRC 3 -DRR

Page I

ATTACHMENT 1

LERs, SOERs, and/or RELATED INDUSTRY EVENTS

1.

SOER 83-2 Steam Generator Tube Rupture.

2.

NRC IE Bulletin N90-49 Stress Corrosion Cracking in PWR Steam Generator Tubes.

Scenario NRC 3 -DRR

Page I

ATTACHMENT 2

SIMULATOR OPERATOR'S COMPUTER PROGRAM

Scenario NRC 3 -DRR

Page 1

SIMULATOR OPERATOR'S COMPUTER PROGRAM

Scenario NRC 2

Initial conditions

8. Recall IC for 12% power (IC163).

9. Ensure Tave, Tref, PDTT level, and VCT level are selected on trend recorders.

10. Tagout lH diesel per MOP.

11. Ensure "B" charging pump and both unit-2 SW pumps running.

12. Show 10 gpd leak on "A" SG (8E-4).

13. Provide copy of 1-OP-2.1 signed off through step 5.2.20.

14. Provide copy of l-OP-15.2 signed off through step 5.1.20.

15. Recall monitor screen: scenario2.

PRELOADS PRIOR TO SCENARIO START

CONDITIONM

FUNCTION/OVERRIDE/ETC.

BIT inlet valves fail to open SIMOV867B RACKIN = RACKOUT, delay time =0, event

on SI

trigger = S12: safetyinj on

MOV867 GREEN, override = ON

Failure of SI train A and S10701, delay time = 0, event trigger = none

phase A train A

S11303, delay time = 0, event trigger

none

PORV

sticks

in

open Remote function - reactor coolant: RC1901, delay time = 0, event

position

trigger = none

Trigger 11 = RCMOV536_CLOSE

MOV control: RCMOV536_Rackin = rackout, delay time = 0,

trigger = 11

Failure of BC pump auto-

BCPAUTODEFEAT = true

start

Failure of reactor trip switch

Switch overrides:

on benchboard 1

RXTRIPTRIP, override = OFF, delay time = 0, trigger

none

RXTRIPATRIP, override = OFF, delay time = 0, trigger

= none

Scenario NRC 3 -DRR

Page 1

SCENARIO EVENTS

EVENT

MALFUNCTION/OVERRIDE/COMMUNICATIONS

1) Sync

main

generator, NOTE: The next event will occur after condenser steam

ramp

dumps are fully closed or at the direction of the lead

examiner.

2) PT-1464 failure

MS16, delay time = 5, ramp = 240, severity value = .5, trigger = 1

NOTE: If crew is reluctant to continue power increase due to

unavailability of steam dumps, the Operations Manager on

Call will direct them to continue increasing power and

transfer steam dumps to Tavg mode when directed by

procedure.

NOTE: The next event will be the crew increasing unit power

for the required reactivity manipulation.

3) Ramp continues

NOTE: The next event will occur when the lead examiner is

satisfied with the reactivity change.

4) Loss of Bearing Cooling

BCP1_PROTECT(1) = true

NOTE: The next event will occur after the crew has started the

standby BC pump and stabilized the plant, or as directed by

the lead evaluator.

5) PCV-1 145 fails closed

CHI8, delay time = 5 see, ramp = 5 see, severity value = +1,

trigger = 3

NOTE:

If contacted to visually observe 1-CH-PCV-1145,

report that you see nothing abnormal.

NOTE: The next event will occur after the RO has stabilized

letdown, or at the direction of the lead evaluator.

6) "C" SG level channel

FW0109, delay time = 5, ramp = 5, severity value = +1, trigger = 4

failure

NOTE: The next event will occur after the crew identifies the

appropriate MOP, or at the direction of the lead evaluator.

7) PT-1444 failure

RC0701, delay time = 5, ramp = 5, severity value = 1, trigger = 5

NOTE: The next event will occur after the crew establishes

HHSI flow, or at the direction of the lead evaluator.

Scenario NRC 3 -DRR

PagelI

Scenario NRC 3 -DRR

EVENT

,ýMALFUNCTION/OVERRJDE/COMMUNICATIONS.

8) SGTR on "C" SG

RC2403, delay time = 5, ramp = 60, severity value = 35, trigger = 6

NOTE: When called, pick up attachment(s) for local operations

to isolate "C" SG.

NOTE: If contacted to check breaker for block valve report

that breaker is tripped and the thermal cannot be reset.

NOTE: If contacted to close PORV using Appendix R switch

report that you took the switch to the ISOLATE position, but

it felt "loose" and you don't believe it actually operated.

NOTE: Scenario may be terminated after the crew transitions

to 1-ECA-3.1 or at the direction of the lead examiner.

Page I

ATTACHMENT 3

SCENARIO PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVES

Scenario NRC 3 -DRR

Page I

SIMULATOR REQUALIFICATION EXAMINATION

TERMINAL PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVE

Given equipment failures and operational situations, operate the plant in accordance with

Technical Specifications to bring the unit to a safe condition, using applicable procedures,

and applying effective teamwork, communication, and diagnostic skills.

GENERIC PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVES

A.

During shift operations the shift supervisor will take a conservative course of action,

especially when uncertain conditions exist, when dealing with core cooling or heat sink

availability, primary system and containment integrity, and reactivity control associated

with plant evolutions.

B.

During shift operations the shift supervisor will provide overall crew guidance by

prioritizing and integrating the actions of the shift crew in accordance with administrative

procedures.

C.

During shift operations each crew member will participate in a team effort that resolves

conflicts, provides input into the team decision and communicates all the necessary

information to enhance teamwork in accordance with administrative procedures.

D.

During shift operations the Shift Technical Advisor will independently assess events and

based on those assessments make recommendations to the crew regarding mitigation

strategy.

Scenario NRC 3 -DRR

Page I

EVENT 1 PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVES

EVENT GOAL:

Given that the unit is at 12% power with the main generator ready to be

placed on line, the crew will manually synchronize and load the main

generator in accordance with 1-OP-15.2, "Main Generator Operation."

NORTH ANNA SPECIFIC TASKS:

R379 Synchronize the main generator

CRITICAL TASK:

N/A

Scenario NRC 3 -DRR

Page 1

EVENT 2 PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVES

EVENT GOAL:

Given that the unit is at power, the crew will respond to an unexpected

power increase in accordance with l-AP-38, "Excessive Load Increase".

NORTH ANNA SPECIFIC TASKS:

R539 Perform the immediate operator actions in response to an excessive load increase.

S69

Identify a reportable occurrence and make appropriate notifications

CRITICAL TASK:

See next page

Scenario NRC 3 -DRR

Page I

CT Statement:

Crew stops power increase

Safety Significance:

Failure to stop power increase and coolant temperature decrease would cause average

coolant temperature to drop below the minimum temperature for criticality, and the following

can not be assured : 1) Moderator temperature coefficient is within its analyzed temperature

range, 2) Protective instrumentation is within its normal operating range, 3) P-12 interlock is

above its setpoint, and 4) Compliance with Appendix G to 10 CFR part 50.

Cues:

Indication of power increase:

"* Several annunciators. (i.e. Pzr Hi/Lo Press, Pzr Lo Level)

"* Reactor power increasing.

"* Steam flow increasing.

Performance Indicator:

RO place both steam dump interlock switches to OFF/RESET.

Feedback:

"* Reactor power increase stopped

"* Steam dumps indicate closed

"* Steam flow decreased

WOG Reference:

N/A

Conditions:

Prior to receiving an automatic Rx trip on over power

Scenario NRC 3 -DRR

Page I

EVENT 3 PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVES

EVENT GOAL:

Given that the unit has just been placed on-line, the crew will continue

increasing power to 30% in accordance with 1-OP-2.1, "Unit Operation

from Mode 2 to Mode 1."

NORTH ANNA SPECIFIC TASKS:

N/A

CRITICAL TASK:

N/A

Scenario NRC 3 -DRR

PagelI

EVENT 4 PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVES

EVENT GOAL:

Given that the unit is at power and the running BC pump has tripped, the

crew will respond IAW l-AP-19, "Loss of Bearing Cooling Water."

NORTH ANNA SPECIFIC TASKS:

R522

Stabilize the unit following a loss of Bearing Cooling Water

CRITICAL TASK:

N/A

Scenario NRC 3 -DRR

Page I

EVENT 5 PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVES

EVENT GOAL:

Given that the unit is at power, and 1-CH-PC- 1145, Letdown Low Pressure

controller output, has failed low, the crew will respond in accordance with

annunciator 1C-B2, "LOW PRESS LETDWN LINE HI PRESS".

NORTH ANNA SPECIFIC TASKS:

R699 Respond to main control board annunciator alarms.

CRITICAL TASK:

N/A

Scenario NRC 3 -DRR

Page I

EVENT 6 PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVES

EVENT GOAL:

Given that the unit is at power and a controlling SG level channel has

failed, the crew will respond in accordance with 1-AP-3, "Loss of Vital

Instrumentation."

NORTH ANNA SPECIFIC TASKS:

R626 Respond to a steam generator water level control channel failure

S70

Evaluate compliance with technical specifications.

CRITICAL TASK:

See next page.

Scenario NRC 3 -DRR

PagelI

CT Statement:

Crew takes manual control of steam generator level and restores level to normal range.

Safety Significance:

Failure to take manual control of SG level constitutes a "mis-operation or incorrect crew

performance" which will result in an unnecessary reactor trip on low SG level.

Cues:

The controlling SG level channel has failed high.

Main feed reg valve is going closed.

Actual SG level is decreasing.

Performance Indicator:

BOP places controller for I-FW-FCV-1498 in manual and controls "C" SG level.

Feedback:

SG level does not decrease to SG low-low level reactor trip setpoint.

WOG Reference:

None

Conditions:

Prior to reactor trip on low-low SG level.

Scenario NRC 3 -DRR

PagelI

EVENT 7 PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVES

EVENT GOAL:

Given that a SGTR has occurred, the crew will respond in accordance with

1-AP-24, "Steam Generator Tube Leak," 1 -E-0, "Reactor Trip or Safety

Injection," and 1-E-3, "Steam Generator Tube Rupture."

NORTH ANNA SPECIFIC TASKS:

R185

Perform the immediate operator actions in response to a reactor trip or safety injection.

CRITICAL TASK:

N/A

Scenario NRC 3 -DRR

PagelI

EVENT 8 PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVES

EVENT GOAL:

Given that a SGTR has occurred and a PRZR PORV is stuck open and

cannot be isolated, the crew will respond in accordance with t-ECA-3.1,

"SGTR with Loss of Reactor Coolant - Subcooled Recovery Desired."

NORTH ANNA SPECIFIC TASKS:

R634 Respond to a loss of reactor coolant system pressure.

R730

Verify safety injection flow

R187 Identify and isolate a ruptured steam generator.

R211

Depressurize the reactor coolant system using a subcooled recovery following a steam

generator tube rupture coincident with a loss of reactor coolant.

R469 Place a containment hydrogen analyzer in operation

CRITICAL TASK:

See Following Pages

Scenario NRC 3 -DRR

Page I

CT Statement:

Crew isolates flow to/from ruptured S/G.

Safety Significance:

Failure to isolate the ruptured SG causes a loss of differential pressure between the ruptured SG and

the intact SGs. Upon loss of differential pressure, the crew must transition to a contingency

procedure that constitutes an incorrect performance that "...necessitates the crew taking

compensating action which complicates the event mitigation strategy..."

Cues:

Indication of unexpected increasing SG water level

Performance Indicator:

BOP adjusts ruptured SG PORV setpoint at 1050 PSIG.

RO/BOP directs an auxiliary operator to locally close 1-MS-95, Steam to the Terry Turbine from

"C" SG.

BOP closes 1-FW-HCV-100C.

Feedback:

Indication of:

"* stable or increasing pressure in the ruptured SG.

"* decreasing or zero feedwater flow rate to the ruptured SG.

WOG Reference:

E-3 Background

Conditions:

Isolate before a transition to ECA-3.1 occurs.

Scenario NRC 3 -DRR

Page I

CT Statement:

Crew manually aligns the BIT.

Safety Sianificance:

Failure to establish HHSI flow constitutes a "mis-operation or incorrect crew performance

which leads to degraded ECCS capacity."

Cues:

Indication/annunciation of:

"* reactor trip and safety injection

"* no SI flow

"* BIT inlet and outlet valves closed

Performance Indicator:

BOP opens 1 -SI-MOV- I 867A.

Feedback:

BIT inlet and outlet valves indicate open and BIT flow indicated.

WOG Reference:

E-0 Background

Conditions:

Prior to exiting E-0.

NORTH ANNA TRAINING CENTER

SIMULATOR EXERCISE GUIDE SCENARIO NRC 3

DOCUMENT REVISION RECORD

REV

TIR NUMBER

REASON

0

N02-0293

Develop scenario for NRC initial licensed operator exams,

2002

Scenario NRC 3 -DRR

Page 1

NORTH ANNA TRAINING CENTER

SIMULATOR EXERCISE GUIDE SCENARIO NRC 3

DOCUMENT REVISION RECORD

REV

TIR NUMBER

I

REASON

Scenario NRC 3 -DRR

I

PagelI

DOMINION

NORTH ANNA POWER STATION

INITIAL LICENSE CLASS

NRC SIMULATOR EXAMINATION

SCENARIO NRC 3

NRC SIMULATOR EXAMINATION SCENARIO

DESCRIPTION

EVENT

1.

Containment air inleakage

2.

Swap charging pumps

3.

VCT level channel failure

4.

First stage pressure failure

5.

Steam leak on MS safety valve

6.

Unit rampdown for steam leak

7.

Loss of 1-I vital bus

8.

Inadvertent SI

Scenario Recapitulation:

Malfinctions after EOP entry

Total Malfunctions

Abnormal Events

Major Transients

EOPs Entered

EOP Contingencies

Critical Tasks

1 (Failure of 1-CH-MOV-1289B to open from control room)

6 (Containment air inleakage, VCT level channel failure, first

stage pressure failure, steam leak on "A" safety, loss of 1-I vital

bus, failure of 1-CH-MOV-1289B to open)

6 (Containment air inleakage, VCT level channel failure, first

stage pressure failure, steam leak on "A" safety, loss of 1-I vital

bus, failure of 1-CH-MOV-1289B to open)

1 (Inadvertent SI due to loss of vital bus 1-I)

1 (E-0)

0

2 (Prevent loss of charging pump suction; isolate AFW to "A"

SG)

SCENARIO DURATION

105 minutes

SCENARIO NRC- 4 -DRR

Page 1

SIMULATOR EXAMINATION SCENARIO SUMMARY

SCENARIO NRC 3

The scenario begins with unit I at 100% power with a 10 gpd tube leak in "A" SG,

lH diesel is tagged for maintenance, and 1-RC-PT-1457 in test. Shift orders are to monitor "A"

SG tube leakage, support maintenance in repair of PT-1457, and return lH EDG to service when

released by maintenance

Once the crew assumes the watch, a leak will occur on a containment purge line, resulting

in excessive air in-leakage to the containment. The crew should identify this in-leakage by

annunciators and increasing containment partial pressure, and manually start the containment

vacuum pumps in order to reduce containment pressure. The crew should identify that the

containment vacuum pumps are unable to maintain vacuum and refer to 1 -AP- 18, "Increasing

Containment Pressure", and ITS 3.6.4 for allowable containment pressure. There will be a report

from the field that a loud whistling sound is coming from the containment vacuum breaker, and if

requested can be isolated by hand torquing. Once the crew has isolated and stopped the leak, the

next event will occur.

Maintenance will request operations to swap to "B" charging pump per the shift orders.

The crew will swap pumps using 1-OP-8.9, "Transferring Running Charging Pumps." After the

charging pump swap is complete, the next event will occur.

VCT Level transmitter 115 will fail high. The crew will respond in accordance with the AR

for VCT HI-LO LEVEL L-1 15, by opening the breaker to stop 11 15A from diverting to the

stripper and starting a manual makeup to restore VCT level. The crew should discuss the loss of

the RWST swapover on low level, and the loss of auto makeup capability. Once the designated

breaker has been opened the next event will occur.

The selected first stage pressure channel will fail low. The crew will respond in accordance

with t-AP-3, "Loss of Vital Instrumentation." The RO will place rod control in manual. The BOP

will either take manual control of SG level, or allow SG level to control at 33% in automatic, as

directed by the US. The US should refer to technical specifications and determine that trips and

permissives must be checked within one hour and the channel must be placed in trip within 72

hours. After the crew has determined the appropriate MOP for placing the channel in trip, the next

event will occur.

"A" S/G safety valve will develop a steam leak. The crew should identify the increase in

reactor power and enter I -AP-3 8. The crew should reduce power to * 100% by ramping the

turbine. A call from a security officer will help the crew identify the leak location as a steam

generator safety valve. The US will consult ITS and determine that the safety is inoperable and the

units needs to be ramped to *52% within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months . Operations management will direct the crew to

ramp the unit down to a lower power level while attempts to repair the valve are planned.

The crew will start a ramp-down in accordance with 1 -OP-2.2, "Unit Power Operation

From Mode 1 to Mode 2," when the lead examiner signals that the reactivity change is sufficient

then the next event will occur.

SCENARIO NRC- 4 -DRR

Page I

The vital bus inverter for vital bus 1-I will fail, this will de-energize channel I

instrumentation and, along with PT-457 being failed, will initiate a SI. The crew will enter l-E-0

and stabilize the unit. The US will then direct the BOP to enter 0-AP-10 and make preparations to

reenergize the bus from the SOLA. When the crew gets to the point of securing SI flow, the normal

charging valve will not open (breaker will trip when the switch is taken to open). The crew will

direct the valve be opened locally. The scenario will end once team transitions to 1-ES-I. 1, or at

the discretion of the lead evaluator.

SCENARIO NRC- 4 -DRR

Page 1

SCENARIO TURNOVER SHEET

Read the following to the crew:

This examination is intended to evaluate the crew's performance of various tasks associated with

the Licensed Operator Training Program. All activities should be completed in accordance with

approved operations standards.

5. You are on a day shift during the week.

6. When conditions allow, utilize the computer log systems as you would in the plant.

Unit Status:

Unit 1 is at 100% power. RCS boron is 864 ppm and core age is 9000 MWD/MTU. The amount of

RCS dilution required to raise temperature one degree is 235 gallons and the boration required to

lower temperature one degree is 15 gallons. Aux steam is on unit 1. The Mrule window is green for

all planned maintenance.

Unit 2 is at 100% power.

The system operator has reported thunderstorms reported in the area.

Equipment Status:

There is a confirmed 10 gpd tube leak in "A" SG. 1H diesel was tagged-out two hours ago for

maintenance. I-RC-PT-1457 has failed and has been placed in TRIP.

Shift Orders:

Monitor "A" SG tube leakage. Support maintenance in repair of PT-1457. Place "B" charging

pump in service for maintenance to observe seal leakage. After "B" charging pump is verified

normal, stop "A" charging pump and leave in AUTO. Note that "B" charging pump was last run

last week when boron concentration was 872 ppm, so boron adjustment/purge will not be

necessary.

SCENARIO NRC- 4 -DRR

Page I

EVENT 1: Given that the unit is, at powerand indications exist of exces

air

inleakage to, the

!

containment

lrespond

t

annunciato

rso

nsad

-AP-8"Increasinq

Cotainment Pesr.

TiME

EXPECTED ACTIO'N

I:*iNSTRUCTOR REMARS;

BOP identifies annunciators J-F2,

CONTAINMENT PARTIAL PRESS+O.1 PSI CH

1-I1.

BOP identifies increasing containment partial

pressure.

BOP starts a containment vacuum pump.

BOP identifies containment partial pressure

continues to increase.

US directs crew to enter 1 -AP- 18.

US refers to ITS-3.6.4 to determine

containment partial pressure limit.

BOP checks containment vacuum pump flow.

BOP checks condenser air ejector radiation monitor

and discharge lineup.

BOP identifies containment partial pressure

continues to increase.

BOP starts another containment vacuum

pump.

Crew dispatches watchstanders to locate leakage

source.

SCENARIO NRC- 4 -DRR

Page I

EVENT 1:' Given that the unit istpwer an

atios exist: f excessive air

inleakag to the..

cnimetherwwllespond lAW the applicable,

annunciator respoOse, and1 AP 8asin

ontainment Pressure.!'

S.............K........

EXPE.CTEDIA*CTION

iU:*!

NOTE: APPROXIMATELY 3 MINUTES

AFTER BEING DISPATCHED, AN

OPERATOR WILL REPORT THAT

CONTAINMENT VACUUM BREAKER 1

HV-MOV-102 IS MAKING A LOUD

WHISTLING SOUND.

US refers to TRM-5.1 and ITS-3.6.3 to

determine containment isolation valve

operability, and ITS-3.6.1 to determine

containment integirity requirements.

Crew directs operator to hand torque the MOV

to stop the leak.

-4

NOTE: The next event will occur after the crew

stabilizes containment partial pressure, or as

directed by the lead evaluator.

SCENARIO NRC- 4 -DRR

TIME

Page I

SIN STIRUCT£ :O RRMARKS"

%ii!iii!i*i!*iii!!i

'EVENT 2: Given'that~the unit is'uat7 powernd c haggpu

s are td be swappedthe cre'w"wifl

swap

hargng pmps AW 17 -P1-S.9,

'Transfein Runnin Chargingj Pumps.",

TIME

EXPECTED ACTION A>

]

INSTRUCTOR REMARKS

NOTE: The SS will call the US and request the

crew to place "B" charging pump in service

without delay for maintenance to observe seal

leakage per the shift orders.

US/RO reviews precautions and limitations, and

verifies that pump was recently in service.

RO places P-250 trend block on a short interval

trend for "B" CHP bearing temperatures.

US determines that boron concentration will not be

adversely affected by pump start.

RO requests auxiliary building operator to verify

that the auxiliary oil pump for "B" CHP is in auto

and running.

NOTE: Auxiliary building operator will report

that the auxiliary oil pump for "B" charging

pump is running in AUTO.

RO starts 1-CH-P-lB.

Crew identifies annunciator C-A8, "CH PP 1 C 15J7

LOCKOUT," as expected alarm due to both "A"

and "B" charging pumps running.

RO resets "C" charging pump lockout by placing

control switch in PTL then to AUTO.

Crew verifies charging pump lube oil temperature is

<1280F.

NOTE: After "B" charging pump is started, the

auxiliary building operator will report that the

pump looks fine and there is no seal leakage.

RO stops 1-CH-P-lA.

SCENARIO NRC- 4 -DRR

Page 1

EVE T

.2..Gventha.

th.u.t.i.at.......chrgig.pmpsaretobe swapped, the crew will:

s

chargng pumps IAW

W-frOP9'8

Transfenng R

g Chrn Pmp"

XPECTED ACTIOA

N

[INSTRUCTOR REMARKS

NOTE: If requested, the auxiliary building

operator will report that seal leakage is zero on

"A" charging pump.

RO monitors trend block until temperatures stable.

NOTE: The next event will occur after charging

pumps have been swapped, or at the direction of

the lead evaluator.

SCENARIO NRC- 4 -DRR

Page 1

SCENARIO NRC- 4 -DRR

EVENT 3 Givefrthdt the unit is at, power acV

ieye transmitter 115 has failed 'hig th crew

w*ill r~espqndin adcordance&wt

Wi

a*~~~ ~uleao *pne

'Wi ll

24lth

4 ,tphe

p 1i c t annunci at or regp9le,

.7

TIME

EXPECTED "<TO

INSTRUCTOR REMARIS

RO identifies annunciator C-Al, "VCT HI-LO

LEVEL L- 115."

RO identifies LT-l 115 is failed high and VCT is

diverting to stripper.

NOTE: Depending on VCT level the RO may

start a manual makeup.

US reads note in AR about 1-CH-LT- 1115 failing

high - loss of auto swapover capability, full divert to

stripper, loss of auto makeup capability.

CREW TAKES ACTION TO

CRITICAL TASK:

PREVENT LOSS OF CHARGING

Direct an operator to

PUMP SUCTION.

open the breaker to de

energize 1-CH-LCV

1115A, or makeup to

We

.VCT

to prevent loss of

charging pump suction.

US makes notifications about LT- 1115 failure and

requests instrument shop assistance.

NOTE: The next event may occur once the

letdown divert valve has been de-energized, or at

the discretion of the lead evaluator.

Page I

EVENT

Ge

at the unit is atowier, and th*P' oolling first st

presse channel has failed

ive,

rolin-frs sage prese h

the crew wi! respwnilAl

1ZA 3*"Lps

Vital Jnstr ment.tion..

TIME T,

EXPECTED ACTfON

INSTRUCTOR REMARKS

BOP identifies SG level error alarms and high

steam flow alarms.

RO identifies annunciator B-A7, "MEDIAN/HI

TAVG < > TREF DEVIATION."

BOP identifies first stage pressure channel III

failing low.

US directs entry into 1 -AP-3.

BOP verifies redundant instrument channel

indication normal.

BOP verifies SG level control parameters normal.

NOTE: US may instruct BOP to place MFRVs in

manual and control OR allows SG levels to

control at 33%.

BOP verifies turbine first stage pressure indication

normal (NO).

CREW TAKES ACTION TO

PREVENT EXCESSIVE CONTROL

ROD INSERTION.

RO verifies PRZR level indications normal.

BOP verifies both turbine first stage pressure

channels normal (NO).

RO transfers condenser steam dumps to steam

pressure mode.

BOP verifies operable channels selected for

SGWLC (NO).

SCENARIO NRC- 4 -DRR

Page I

SCENARIO NRC- 4 -DRR

EVE 4:Giv~~ta

th uni isat ower an th conrolingfiirst stage pressure channeihas failed

lowthecre

wil~rs~oxdtki+44

ss fV

Vital nstrum entation.

_v**?

i

l:*<

***

! **

? i!*{* *[ *!5 !3

i

i ! i,¸

!!; *

'

%

o~ ~

~~r

vV w

On

!)

a

??:

r?

)

TIME

EXPECTED ACTIONV

INSTRUCTOR REMARKS

RO/BOP swap SGWLC channels as directed by the

US.

BOP verifies SG levels on program and returns

MFRVs to automatic.

RO verifies Tave and Tref matched and returns rod

control to automatic.

Crew refers to 1-MOP-55.81 for placing the failed

channel in trip.

US refers to ITS-3.3.1 (condition R) and 3.3.2

(condition D) and determines that trips/permissives

must be checked within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months and the failed channel

must be placed in trip within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months .

NOTE: The next event will occur after the crew

identifies the applicable MOP, and rods have

been restored to fully withdrawn and placed back

I in AUTO, or as directed by the lead evaluator.

Page 1

EVENTV 5 Given that te unit is atpowei and&steam leak has developed on the A"SGthe

,:crew, wil respond iti ii- Acrdai e with -AP-,

ieLa Increase.',

!

NOTE: The next event will be the crew reducing

unit power for the required reactivity

manipulation.

SCENARIO NRC- 4 -DRR

TIMEEXPECTED

ACTION

INSTRUCTOR REMARKS

RO notices a decrease in Tave and an increase in

reactor power.

US directs crew to perform immediate actions of 1

AP-38.

RO verifies steam dumps closed.

BOP verifies SG PORVs closed.

Crew determines that turbine must be ramped down

to reduce power below 100%.

CREW STOPS POWER INCREASE.

NOTE: A security officer will inform the crew

that steam can be seen coming from the roof of

the unit 1 MSVH.

Crew sends an operator to investigate steam leak.

NOTE: The operator sent to the MSVH will

report that a safety valve on "A" SG appears to

be leaking by the seat.

US requests maintenance help to repair/gag the

leaking SG safety valve.

US refers to ITS 3.7.1 and determines need to ramp

unit to 52% within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months .

NOTE: The Operations Manager on Call will

request that the unit be ramped to 50% power.

Page I

EVENT 6: Given that there is a 'stamfge

,,raorf

s

v(*ale leak jng by, the crew will reduce

tn,

ower inaccordaiictwit'lO1

2,2ti Powe Oprti

From Mode 1 to,

M6&I

2."...1K

S;

}2[ 2 :

? ? 2 ?

i

! ) )

;)

}: iM

,:

S

TIME,

EXPECTED ACTION

INSTRUCTOR REMARKS

US briefs crew on ramp.

NOTE: When the US directs the RO to

determine the reactivity required to ramp the

unit, lead examiner will provide the crew with

reactivity calculations from the reactor engineer,

verified by the STA.

RO commences lowering Tave using

boration/control rods.

BOP commences lowering main turbine load.

"* Verifies load rate at .3%/min.

"* Lowers reference setter.

"* Pushes GO button.

BOP takes turbine to IMP-IN when power is <98%.

"* Pushes HOLD button

"* Matches reference and setter

"* Pulses VPL down until red light lit

"* Pulses VPL up until red light not lit

"* Verifies governor tracking meter reads 0

"* Pushes IMP-IN button

"* Resumes ramp.

BOP directs turbine building watchstander to place

LP heater drain pumps on recirc and shutdown

when power is approximately 90%.

NOTE: The next event will occur when the lead

evaluator is satisfied with the reactivity change.

SCENARIO NRC- 4 -DRR

Page 1

I

EVENT 7: Given that the uInfitis a1 40wer ad4d. fia bus 1A has 6c6urredýJ

-the

H

respdid n 1-aeddace' >#tI)+0

4 L6,ý! df Electrical

9

Wwil

7-AP-,werI.P

'

TIMEe

EXPECTED ACION

INSTRUCTOR RE MARKS

NOTE: The loss of vital bus 1-I will cause a

safety injection on PRZR low-low pressure. The

crew will proceed to 1-E-0 (event 8) until the

plant is stable.

NOTE: The following steps refer to 0-AP-10

actions. 1-E-0 actions begin with event 8.

US directs BOP to initiate 0-AP-10.

BOP performs 0-AP-10 diagnostics.

BOP reports results of diagnostics to US.

US directs BOP to initiate 1-MOP-26.60 for loss of

vital bus 1-I.

Crew directs safeguards operator to investigate loss

of vital bus 1-I.

NOTE: Operator sent to check inverter 1-I will

report that the inverter cabinet is charred on the

outside and a strong odor of burnt insulation is

apparent in the area near the inverter.

US directs electrical department to investigate 1-I

vital bus and inverter.

NOTE: Electricians sent to check inverter 1-I will

report that the inverter is apparently damaged

and cannot be re-energized.

NOTE: Electricians sent to check vital bus 1-I will

report that the bus has been checked and that

there is no evidence of damage.

US directs backboards to perform 1-MOP-26.60 and

re-energize the vital bus via the SOLA transformer.

SCENARIO NRC- 4 -DRR

Page I

SCENARIO NRC- 4 -DRR

EVENT 7Give, that the uint is atj oWer and ajlosdsof vtal bus, I has occurred, the crew will

respond in accordance wlth' O-APJO 'dsspof Electrical Power."..

r

<>6

EXPECTEDACTION

INSTRUCTOR REMARKS

Crew monitors RCP stator/bearing temperatures due

to loss of CC flow and stops any RCPs that exceed

limits.

Crew refers to l-AP-3, l-AP-4.3 and 1-AP-6.

US refers to ITS 3.8.7 and 3.8.9 declares the vital bus

and inverter inoperable.

Crew energizes the vital bus via the SOLA

transformer.

NOTE: Event 8 will occur concurrently with this

event.

Page I

,EVENT 8: GiveI 'hat the unit 1atp

rndwf!ioss of vital bus 17 has caused a inadvertent

S1

chrew will rspdh

Trip or Safetv

SInet.on .

.. ..

TIME

EXPECTED *CTION

INSTRUCTOR REMARKS

US directs crew to enter l-E-0.

RO verifies reactor tripped.

BOP verifies turbine tripped.

RO verifies AC emergency buses energized.

Crew checks if safety injection has actuated. (YES)

RO/BOP manually initiate safety injection.

NOTE: At this point, the US may choose to

direct the BOP to perform 0-AP-10.

BOP verifies feediwater isolation.

RO/BOP manually initiate phase A isolation.

BOP verifies AFW pumps running.

RO/BOP verify SI pumps running.

BOP verifies SW pumps running.

Crew checks if MS lines should be isolated (NO).

SCENARIO NRC- 4 -DRR

Page 1

EVENT 8: Gi'enhat the umnt is atii*t

4oe

'n

t

of oitalbusjlK has caused an iadv*etent

S.....

SI* he&

ceWw ll epo~ *a o l*

th -1

E-ho 0

eaqtor Tflp or Safety.....

..

Injection".

.

..

i

III* r-*

.....

o.......e-

f

TXAC

TION..INSTRUCTORREMARKS

Crew checks if CDA is required (NO).

Crew checks if QS is required (NO).

RO/BOP verify SI flow.

RO/BOP verifies AFW flow.

RO checks RCS average temperature.

RO checks pressurizer PORVs and spray valves.

RO checks RCP trip and charging pump recirc

criteria.

BOP checks SG not faulted (NO)

US directs transition to 1 -E-2.

BOP verifies MSTVs and MSTV bypass valves

closed (NO).

BOP closes MSTVs.

BOP checks pressures in all SGs.

BOP identifies that only "A" SG is faulted.

SCENARIO NRC- 4 -DRR

Page I

EVENT 8: Giveh

Ihat the unit is at4powiSer-ad :

tss f vitalb Iu 1I has caused an inadvertent

<SI~~~t~',

coe wil-soaht9teWhi9,

"RcttTrip) or Sfet

eci

i*>

>

TIME

EX PEC TED: AdQT ION"

!,

INSTRUCTORREMARKS

Crew isolates the faulted SG.

CRITICAL TASK: Isolate

BOP verifies MFW isolated.

AFW to "A" SG

BOP verifies 1-FW-HCV-100A closed.

BOP verifies A SG PORV closed.

BOP verifies all SG blowdown trip valves

closed.

Crew dispatches an operator to locally close 1

MS-18.

Crew dispatches an operator to verify closed 1

MS-19.

BOP checks ECST level.

BOP establishes IA to containment.

BOP checks secondary radiation.

Crew checks if SI can be terminated (YES).

US directs crew to transition to 1-ES-1.1.

RO resets SI.

RO stops one charging pump and places it in auto.

RO checks RCS pressure stable or increasing

(YES).

BOP isolates the BIT.

SCENARIO NRC- 4 -DRR

Page 1

'EVENT 8: Giyen. that te'unit is8-44*ierp andh

ý :s fvital lbpus <14 -ha& caused a4n inadvertent~i1

crew wll respin4 i accordacev wth IE-O, *teactor Trip or Safty

"".jeS tiofi.

1

.

..

7 ..

a

I

...... ....

..

¢,

<

C

C

SCENARIO NRC- 4 -DRR

TIME

EXPECTED ACTiON

INSTRUCTOR REMARKS

RO puts FCV-l 122 in manual and closes.

RO verifies HCV-1 311 closed.

RO attempts to open normal charging valves.

RO reports that breaker for 1-CH-MOV-1289B

appears to have tripped.

Crew dispatches operator/electrician to investigate.

NOTE: Operator/electrician sent to breaker will

report that it can not be re-closed.

US will request an operator to hand-crank the MOV

open.

NOTE: MOV-1289B will be handcranked open

when requested.

RO will establish 25 gpm charging.

RO will control charging flow to maintain

pressurizer level.

US will announce transition to 1-ES-1.1, step 7.

NOTE: The scenario may be terminated when

the crew transitions to 1-ES-1.1, or at the

discretion of the lead evaluator.

Page I

REFERENCES

SCENARIO NRC- 4 -DRR

PROCEDR

REV.

Operating Procedure 1-OP-8.9, "Transferring Running Charging Pumps."

6

Abnormal Procedure 1-AP-18, "Increasing Containment Pressure."

6

Abnormal Procedure I -AP-3, "Loss of Vital Instrumentation."

17

Abnormal Procedure 1-AP-38, "Excessive Load Increase."

11

Abnormal Procedure 0-AP-10, "Loss of Electrical Power."

30

Operating Procedure 1 -OP-2.2, "Unit Power Operation From Mode 1 to Mode 2."

47

Emergency Procedure 1 -E-0, "Reactor Trip or Safety Injection."

28

Station Annunciator Response Procedures.

N/A

Administrative Procedure VPAP- 1407, Verbal Communications.

2

INPO, Guideline for Teamwork and Diagnostic Skill Development: INPO 88-003,

Jan.,1988

INPO, ACAD 90-022 Simulator Training Guidelines

Nov. 1990

Page I

ATTACHMENTS

ATTACHMENT 1 - LERs, SOERs, and/or RELATED INDUSTRY EVENTS

ATTACHMENT 2 - SIMULATOR OPERATOR'S COMPUTER PROGRAM

ATTACHMENT 3 - SCENARIO PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVES

ATTACHMENT 4 - SIMULATOR PERFORMANCE SUMMARY (SXG Only)*

ATTACHMENT 5 - SIMULATOR BOOTH OPERATOR CHECKLIST**

ATTACHMENT 6 - SEG INSTRUCTIONS**

ATTACHMENT 7 - SXG INSTRUCTIONS**

ATTACHMENT 8 - COMPETENCY AREA RATING FACTOR WORKSHEET **

ATTACHMENT 9 - SIMULATOR SCENARIO REVIEW CHECKLIST (SXG Only) *

ATTACHMENT 10 - SIMULATOR EXAMINATION PREBRIEF (SXG Only) **

Located on N:\\N\\LORP\\Simulator\\shl\\

*

Located in the Instructor Booth.

SCENARIO NRC- 4 -DRR

Page I

ATTACHMENT 1

LERs, SOERs, and/or RELATED INDUSTRY EVENTS

SCENARIO NRC- 4 -DRR

Page 1

ATTACHMENT 1

LERs, SOERs, and/or RELATED INDUSTRY EVENTS

1.

San Onofre 1, Westinghouse PWR.

Automatic Reactor Trip Upon Transfer of Vital Bus #1 With Pre-Existing Failure of High

Startup Rate Block Relay. At 1:14 p.m. on October 17, 1991, during the performance of

corrective maintenance on an alarm module powered from vital bus #1, and with pre-existing

failure of the high startup rate (SUR) block relay, unit 1 automatically tripped from 91 percent

power on a spurious high SUR signal. The spurious SUR signal was generated when a

momentary power interruption occurred during an automatic transfer of vital bus # 1 to its

alternate power source, which was initiated due to a momentary ground fault on the bus. As a

taped alarm module power lead was being routed through a grooming hole in the module chassis,

the lead arced apparently through the tape to the module chassis, causing the ground. Plant

response to the scram was normal. Laboratory analysis of the taped lead revealed that the

insulating capability of the tape had apparently been degraded during handling. This is

postulated to have occurred when the taped lead contacted a sharp edge of the grooming hole on

the alarm module chassis when the lead was inserted through the hole. The methodology used to

route insulated live leads will be reviewed. Any methodology enhancements identified by this

review will be implemented as appropriate. There is no safety significance to this event since all

RPS and AFW components actuated in accordance with design.

2.

Commonwealth Edison ZION 2 Westinghouse

With unit 2 at full power, operating personnel reported excessive steam leak around the bonnet

of the main steam safety valve, 2ms0026. Aged, worn, and deteriorated body to bonnet gaskets

and possible steam cuts on gasket surfaces caused the bonnet steam leak on the mainsteam safety

valve 2ms0026. Mechanical maintenance personnel made a temporary repair by injecting

furmanite sealing compound into existing injection plugs on the main steam safety valve.

Another work request has been written for a permanent repair later.

3.

Florida Power & Light Company TURKEY POINT 4 Westinghouse

Operations personnel noted during rounds that the main steam line '4c' steam safety valve inlet

flange had a steam leak. The external leakage presented a personnel safety hazard, unacceptable

loss of secondary steam and degradation of the valve's fluid containment function. The main steam

system and unit 4, at full power, were not affected. A related '4c' steam line safety, rv-4-1413 , was

also found leaking concurrently and was reported separately. Gasket wearout or material defect /

flaw or loose inlet flange bolting are possible causes of the steam leakage; root cause was not

determined. Leakage was stopped by sealing compound injection / temporary on-line leak repair.

Post maintenance testing was satisfactory noting no further leakage.

SCENARIO NRC- 4 -DRR

Page I

ATTACHMENT 2

SIMULATOR OPERATOR'S COMPUTER PROGRAM

SCENARIO NRC- 4 -DRR

Page I

SIMULATOR OPERATOR'S COMPUTER PROGRAM

Scenario NRC 3

Initial conditions

16. Recall 100% power middle-of-life IC.

17. Ensure Tave, Tref, PDTT level, and VCT level are selected on trend recorders.

18. Tagout lH diesel per MOP.

19. Pre-load 10 gpd tube leak on "A" SG (malfunction RC2401 = 8E-4) and

SG N-16 radiation monitor stabilizes at approximately 10.26 gpd.

allow to run until "A"

20. Place PT-1457 in trip per MOP-55.73.

21. Ensure VCT level is 40%.

22. Ensure "A" charging pump running.

PRELOADS PRIOR TO SCENARIO START

S CQNDITION

MALFUNCTION/OVERRIDE/ETC*

PT-1457 failure

RC0705, delay time = 0, ramp = 0, severity level = -1, trigger =

N/A

Failure oflI115B and 1115D

MOVl15B MP=OFF

to auto-open

MOV115D MP = OFF

CH-MOV-1289B failure to

Using PNID, setup event trigger to take CHMOV289B_RACKIN

re-open

= F when control switch is taken to OPEN.

SCENARIO NRC- 4 -DRR

Page I

SCENARIO EVENTS

EVENT

MALFUNCTION/OVERRDE/C:OMMUiCATiONS

1)

Containment

air CVO 1, delay time = 5, ramp = 5, severity value = 20, trigger = 1

inleakage

NOTE: APPROXIMATELY 3 MINUTES AFTER

BEING DISPATCHED, AN OPERATORWILL

REPORT THAT CONTAINMENT VACUUM

BREAKER 1-HV-MOV-102 IS MAKING A

LOUD WHISTLING SOUND.

NOTE: If told to attempt to hand-torque the MOV:

Delete CV01 malfunction, then inform the MCR crew that the

valve has been closed and that the whistling noise has stopped.

NOTE: If asked why the valve was open, report that there are

some painters in the area, however, they said that they did

nothing to the valve.

NOTE: The next event will occur after the crew stabilizes

containment partial pressure, or as directed by the lead

evaluator.

2) VCT level transmitter

CH1202, delay time = 5, ramp = 5, severity value = 1, trigger = 2.

1115 failure

NOTE: When requested to open breaker 7 in 1-EP-CB-26B,

activate event trigger 6 on a one-minute timer with the following

overrides:

"* Lamp override LCV115A_LTR, override OFF

"* Lamp override LCV1L5A_RT R, override OFF

"* Switch override LCV115AAUTO, override OFF

"* Switch override LCV115ADIVERT, override OFF

"* Switch override LCV1l5ANORM, override ON

NOTE: IF crew does not request breaker 7 opened, and has

NOT manually opened charging pump suction valves from

RWST, observe VCT level. If VCT is allowed to empty, take

PNID variable CHMOV115ERACKIN = F and CHMOV115E

= 0, then set CH1201_DEG and CH1202 both = -1. If crew does

NOT restore a suction source within 30 seconds after VCT

empties, trip running charging pumps.

NOTE: The next event may occur once the letdown divert

valve has been de-energized, or at the discretion of the lead

evaluator.

SCENARIO NRC- 4 -DRR

Page I

"EVENT

MAFNTION/OVERRIDE/COMMUNMIC ATIONS,

3) Swap charging pumps

NOTE: As the SS, call the US and request the crew to place

"B" charging pump in service without delay for maintenance

to observe seal leakage per the shift orders.

NOTE: Auxiliary building operator will report that the

auxiliary oil pump for "B" charging pump is running in

AUTO.

NOTE: After "B" charging pump is started, report to RO that

pump looks fine and there is no seal leakage.

NOTE: If requested, the auxiliary building operator will

report that seal leakage is zero on "A" charging pump.

NOTE: The next event may occur once charging pumps have

been swapped, or at the direction of the lead evaluator.

4)

First

stage

pressure

MS0201, delay time = 5, ramp = 45, severity value = -1, trigger = 3

failure

NOTE: The next event will occur after the crew identifies the

applicable MOP, and rods have been restored to fully

withdrawn and placed back in AUTO, or as directed by the lead

evaluator.

5) Small steam leak

MS1401, delay time = 5, ramp = 5, severity value = 75, trigger = 4

NOTE: After MS1401 is fully implemented, setup event trigger

from either RTB open to ramp severity value from 75% to

50% over a 5 second period.

NOTE: A security officer will inform crew that steam can be

seen coming from the roof of the unit I MSVH.

The operator sent to the MSVH will report that a safety valve

on "A" SG appears to be leaking by the seat.

NOTE: If the crew does not begin a ramp, then have the OMOC

request the crew begin a controlled ramp to 50% power.

NOTE: The next event will be the crew reducing unit power for the

required reactivity manipulation.

6) Ramp down

NOTE: The next event will occur when the lead evaluator

considers the reactivity change to be sufficient.

SCENARIO NRC- 4 -DRR

Page I

SCENARIO NRC- 4 -DRR

SEVENT

,

MALFUCO

OVERRIDECOMMUNICATIONS

7) Loss of VB 1-I

EL1301, delay time = 5, event trigger= 5.

NOTE: Operator sent to check inverter 1-I will report that the

inverter cabinet is charred on the outside and a strong odor of

burnt insulation is apparent in the area near the inverter.

NOTE: Electricians sent to check inverter 1-I will report that

the inverter is apparently damaged and cannot be re-energized.

NOTE: Electricians sent to check vital bus 1-I will report that

the bus has been checked and that there is no evidence of

damage.

NOTE: When crew requests SOLA transformer supply breaker

closed, wait 2 minutes and then call back and tell them the

breaker is closed.

8) Inadvertent SI

NOTE: Operator sent to breaker for 1-CH-MOV-1289B will

report that it cannot be re-closed.

NOTE: When the crew requests MOV-1289B be handcranked

open, use PNID to open valve.

NOTE: The scenario may be terminated when the crew

transitions to 1-ES-1.1, or at the discretion of the lead

evaluator.

Page I

ATTACHMENT 3

SCENARIO PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVES

SCENARIO NRC- 4 -DRR

Page I

SIMULATOR REQUALIFICATION EXAMINATION

TERMINAL PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVE

Given equipment failures and operational situations, operate the plant in accordance with

Technical Specifications to bring the unit to a safe condition, using applicable procedures,

and applying effective teamwork, communication, and diagnostic skills.

GENERIC PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVES

A.

During shift operations the shift supervisor will take a conservative course of action,

especially when uncertain conditions exist, when dealing with core cooling or heat sink

availability, primary system and containment integrity, and reactivity control associated

with plant evolutions.

B.

During shift operations the shift supervisor will provide overall crew guidance by

prioritizing and integrating the actions of the shift crew in accordance with administrative

procedures.

C.

During shift operations each crew member will participate in a team effort that resolves

conflicts, provides input into the team decision and communicates all the necessary

information to enhance teamwork in accordance with administrative procedures.

D.

During shift operations the Shift Technical Advisor will independently assess events and

based on those assessments make recommendations to the crew regarding mitigation

strategy.

SCENARIO NRC- 4 -DRR

Page I

EVENT 1 PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVES

EVENT GOAL:

Given that the unit is at power and indications exist of excessive

air inleakage to the containment, the crew will respond IAW the

applicable annunciator response, and 1 -AP- 18, "Increasing

Containment Pressure."

NORTH ANNA SPECIFIC TASKS:

R521 Respond to increasing containment pressure.

S70

Evaluate compliance with technical specifications.

CRITICAL TASK:

N/A

SCENARIO NRC- 4 -DRR

Page I

EVENT 2 PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVES

EVENT GOAL:

Given that the unit is at power and VCT level transmitter 1115 is failed,

the crew will respond in accordance with the applicable annunciator

response.

NORTH ANNA SPECIFIC TASKS:

R699 Respond to main control board annunciator alarms.

CRITICAL TASK:

See next page

SCENARIO NRC- 4 -DRR

Page I

CT Statement:

Crew takes action to prevent loss of charging pump suction.

Safety Significance:

With VCT level transmitter LT- 115 failed high the auto swapover to the RWST is lost,

letdown is on full divert to the gas stripper, and makeup capability is lost. If the level

decrease is not stopped the charging pumps will lose suction. Failure to stop the level

decrease constitutes a "mis-operation or incorrect crew performance which leads

to degraded ECCS capacity."

Cues:

VCT HI-LO LEVEL L-1 15 annunciator

Letdown on full divert to gas stripper

Performance Indicator:

Operator is instructed to open breaker 7 in 1 -EP-CB-26B.

Manual makeup is started to restore VCT level.

Feedback:

VCT level stable or increasing.

WOG Reference:

None

Conditions:

Before charging pumps lose suction from the VCT.

SCENARIO NRC- 4 -DRR

Page I

EVENT 3 PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVES

EVENT GOAL:

Given that the unit is at power and charging pumps are to be swapped, the

crew will swap charging pumps IAW 1-OP-8.9, "Transferring Running

Charging Pumps."

NORTH ANNA SPECIFIC TASKS:

R593 Transfer the running charging pump

CRITICAL TASK:

N/A

SCENARIO NRC- 4 -DRR

Page I

EVENT 4 PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVES

EVENT GOAL:

Given that the unit is at power, and the controlling first stage pressure

channel has failed, the crew will respond IAW 1-AP-3, "Loss of Vital

Instrumentation."

NORTH ANNA SPECIFIC TASKS:

R719 Respond to a failure of the controlling first-stage pressure channel.

S70

Evaluate compliance with technical specifications.

CRITICAL TASK:

See next page.

SCENARIO NRC- 4 -DRR

Page I

CT Statement:

RO places rods in manual to stop rod insertion.

Safety Significance:

A rod insertion caused by a failed first stage pressure transmitter causes an unnecessary

transient and could allow rods to insert below the low-low insertion limit.

Cues:

Control rods stepping in.

Failed first stage pressure transmitter.

Performance Indicator:

Crew identifies first stage pressure failure.

RO places rod control to MANUAL.

Feedback:

Rods stop stepping.

WOG Reference:

None

Conditions:

Before rod low-low insertion limit alarm.

SCENARIO NRC- 4 -DRR

Page I

EVENT 5 PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVES

EVENT GOAL:

Given that the unit is at power and a steam leak has developed on the "A"

SG, the crew will respond in accordance with 1-AP-38, "Excessive Load

Increase."

NORTH ANNA SPECIFIC TASKS:

R539 Perform the immediate operator actions in response to an excessive load increase

CRITICAL TASK:

See next page

SCENARIO NRC- 4 -DRR

Page I

CT Statement:

Crew stops power increase.

Safety Significance:

Failure to stop power increase and coolant temperature decrease would cause average coolant

temperature to drop below the minimum temperature for criticality.

This would mean the

following could not be assured: 1) Moderator temperature coefficient is within its analyzed

temperature range, 2) Protective instrumentation is within its normal operating range, 3) P-12

interlock is above its setpoint, and 4) Compliance with Appendix G to 10 CFR part 50.

Cues:

Indication of power increase:

"* Several annunciators. (i.e. PRZR Hi/Lo Press, PRZR Lo Level)

"* Reactor power increasing.

"* Steam flow increasing.

Performance Indicator:

BOP ramps turbine back until reactor power < 100%.

Feedback:

Reactor power increase stopped

Steam flow decreased

WOG Reference:

None

Conditions:

Prior to receiving an automatic reactor trip on over power.

SCENARIO NRC- 4 -DRR

Page 1

EVENT 6 PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVES

EVENT GOAL:

Given that there is a steam generator safety valve leaking by, the crew will

reduce unit power in accordance with 1 -OP-2.2, "Unit Power Operation

From Mode 1 to Mode 2."

NORTH ANNA SPECIFIC TASKS:

N/A

CRITICAL TASK:

N/A

SCENARIO NRC- 4 -DRR

Page I

EVENT 7 PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVES

EVENT GOAL:

Given that the unit is at power and a loss of vital bus 1-I has occurred, the

crew will respond in accordance with 0-AP-10, "Loss of Electrical

Power."

NORTH ANNA SPECIFIC TASKS:

S27

Direct the restoration of the electrical distribution system following the performance of the

loss of electrical power diagnostic

CRITICAL TASK:

N/A

SCENARIO NRC- 4 -DRR

Page I

EVENT 8 PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVES

EVENT GOAL:

Given that the unit is at power and the loss of vital bus 1-I has caused an

inadvertent SI, the crew will respond in accordance with l-E-0, "Reactor

Trip or Safety Injection".

NORTH ANNA SPECIFIC TASKS:

R185

Perform the immediate operator actions in response to a reactor trip or safety injection.

CRITICAL TASK:

N/A

NORTH ANNA TRAINING CENTER

SIMULATOR EXERCISE GUIDE SCENARIO NRC 4

DOCUMENT REVISION RECORD

REV

TIR NUMBER

REASON

0

N02-0293

Develop scenario for NRC initial licensed operator exams,

2002

SCENARIO NRC- 4 -DRR

Page I

SCENARIO NRC- 4 -DRR

NORTH ANNA TRAINING CENTER

SIMULATOR EXERCISE GUIDE SCENARIO NRC 4

DOCUMENT REVISION RECORD

REV

TIR NUMBER

REASON

Page I

DOMINION

NORTH ANNA POWER STATION

INITIAL LICENSE CLASS

NRC SIMULATOR EXAMINATION

SCENARIO NRC 4

NRC SIMULATOR EXAMINATION SCENARIO

DESCRIPTION

Shutdown a MFW pump

Continue the unit shutdown for refueling

"B" SG selected steam flow channel fails

"B" SG PORV fails open due to failure of pressure transmitter

"A" charging pump trips and discharge check valve fails to close

PRZR spray valve PCV-1455A fails open (able to manually close)

SBLOCA

ATWS

Scenario Recapitulation:

Malfunctions after EOP entry

Total Malfunctions

Abnormal Events

Major Transients

EOPs Entered

EOP Contingencies

Critical Tasks

1 (ATWS)

6 ("B" SG steam flow channel failure, "B" SG PORV failure, "A"

charging pump trip w/failure of discharge check valve, PRZR

spray valve failure, SBLOCA, ATWS)

4 ("B" SG steam flow channel failure, "B" SG PORV failure, "A"

charging pump trip w/failure of discharge check valve, PRZR

spray valve failure)

1 (SBLOCA)

2 (1-E-O, 1-E-1)

1 (1-FR-S.1)

1 (Bring reactor subcritical)

SCENARIO DURATION

120 Minutes

Scenario NRC 5-DRR

EVENT

1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

6.

7.

8.

Pagel1

SIMULATOR EXAMINATION SCENARIO SUMMARY

SCENARIO NRC 4

The scenario will begin with unit 1 at 50% power in the process of shutting down for

refueling. A confirmed 10 gpd tube leak exists in "A" SG and 1 H diesel is tagged for

maintenance. Shift orders are to shutdown "C" main feedwater pump and continue with the unit

shutdown, monitor "A" SG leakage, and return 1 H diesel to service when maintenance is

complete.

The first event will be a normal evolution. The crew will shutdown "C" main feedwater

pump in accordance with 1 -OP-3 1.1, "Main Feedwater System," prior to continuing with the unit

shutdown. After the pump is shutdown, the next event will occur.

The next event will be the required reactivity manipulation. The crew will continue with

the unit shutdown for refueling in accordance with 1 -OP-2.2, "Unit Power Operation from Mode 1

to Mode 2." When the lead examiner is satisfied with the reactivity change, the next event will

occur.

The selected steam flow transmitter for "B" steam generator will fail low, causing the "B"

main feed regulating valve to go full closed. The crew will enter 1 -AP-3, "Loss of Vital

Instrumentation," and the BOP will take manual cdntrol of the FRV and control level prior to

reaching the low-low level reactor trip setpoint. The crew will swap to an operable channel and

return SG level control to automatic. After technical specifications have been reviewed and the

crew has identified the appropriate MOP for placing the channel in TRIP, the next event will occur.

The "B" SG PORV will fail open due to a failure of its pressure transmitter. The

crew will respond in accordance with 1-AP-38, "Excessive Load Increase," and manually

close the valve. After the crew stabilizes the unit, the next event will occur.

The "A" charging pump will trip and its discharge check valve will fail to close following

the automatic start of "B" charging pump. The crew will respond in accordance with I -AP-49,

"Loss of Normal Charging," and restore normal charging flow. The US will declare "A" charging

pump inoperable IAW technical specifications. After the crew has stabilized the unit and the US

has reviewed technical specifications, the next event will occur.

Pressurizer spray valve PCV-1455A will fail open causing RCS pressure to decrease.

The crew will respond in accordance with 1-AP-44, "Loss of RCS Pressure," and manually close

the valve. After the crew has stabilized the unit, the next event will occur.

The PRZR spray line piping fails causing a RCS leak, which eventually degrades to

a small-break LOCA. The crew will respond in accordance with 1-AP-16, "Increasing

Primary Plant Leakage," and determine that a reactor trip is required. The next event will

occur when the crew attempts to manually trip the reactor.

Scenario NRC 5-DRR

Page 1

The reactor will not trip manually or automatically and the crew will respond in

accordance with 1-FR-S. 1, "Response to Nuclear Power Generation/ATWS." The reactor

trip breakers will be locally opened and the crew will eventually transition back to I-E-0,

"Reactor Trip or Safety Injection." After completing the diagnostic steps, the crew will

transition to 1-E-1, "Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant," and determine that a post

LOCA cooldown and depressurization is required. The scenario can be terminated when

the team enters 1-ES- 1.2, "Post-LOCA Cooldown and Depressurization," or when the lead

examiner is satisfied.

Scenario NRC 5-DRR

Page I

SCENARIO TURNOVER SHEET

Read the following to the crew:

Purpose:

This examination is intended to evaluate the crew's performance of various tasks

associated with the Licensed Operator Training Program. All activities should be

completed in accordance with approved operations standards.

7. You are on a day shift during the week.

8. When conditions allow, utilize the computer log systems as you would in the plant.

Unit Status:

Unit 1 is at 50% power in the process of shutting down for refueling. The unit ramp is being held

for turnover. There is a confirmed 10 gpd tube leak in "A" SG. All applicable actions of 1-AP-5

have been completed. RCS boron concentration is 120 ppm and core age is 17,000 MWD/MTU.

The amount of RCS dilution required to raise temperature one degree is 2097 gallons and the

boration required to lower temperature one degree is 17.7 gallons. Xenon is increasing. Aux steam

is on unit 2. The maintenance rule window is green for all planned maintenance.

Unit 2 is at 100% power.

The system operator has reported thunderstorms in the area.

Equipment Status:

1 H diesel was tagged-out two hours ago for maintenance.

Shift Orders:

Monitor "A" SG tube leakage. Shutdown "C" main feedwater pump, then continue with the unit

shutdown.

Scenario NRC 5-DRR

Page I

EVENT* 1 Given that a unit shutdo(jwn fo refI

'.n:'is9Jin progress th erew w i ll sutd

"C"

maifn eedwaterrpump, lAW

OP73 1jiMain Feedwaer System,"before contining

wilt the unit

sliddown.

Scenario NRC 5-DRR

TIME

E

EA

I

K

.

INSTRUCTOR REMARKS

BOP reviews initial conditions, and precautions and

limitations.

BOP places control switches for "B" MFW pump in

PULL-TO-LOCK.

BOP closes discharge MOV for "B" MFW pump.

BOP verifies either "A" or "C" MFW pump

recirculation valve is open.

BOP closes discharge MOV for "C" MFW pump.

BOP verifies "C" MFW pump motor amps and

discharge pressure decrease.

BOP places control switches for "C" MFW pump in

PULL-TO-LOCK.

BOP requests turbine building operator to place the

"C" MFW pump auxiliary oil pump in HAND.

BOP places MFW pump recirculation valve in

AUTO.

BOP requests turbine building operator to observe

local MFW pump flow indication.

NOTE: Turbine building operator will report

"A" MFW pump flow indication is

approximately 8,000 gpm.

BOP places control switches for "C" MFW pump in

AUTO and verifies discharge MOV opens.

BOP requests turbine building operator to verify

alignment of warm-up lines.

NOTE: The next event will occur after feedwater

pump has been shutdown, or at the direction of

the lead evaluator.

Page I

Scenario NRC 5-DRR

EVENT2for

fefthelig

is nproggess,' the&crew will continue Withe

, jin,

s ,

o}',

......

r

ce-

h: 1:

'

OP.,-22'ý, '

}g

niiP6

'

ftmd

ft

i-ViL2

Oqperatidnl

nmtstt~on jA

~

2Uit

fom Mde

t

~e2."

'TIME

..

EXPECTEDACTION

..

INSTRUCTOR REMARKS

NOTE: Crew is given reactivity calculations

from reactor engineer, verified by STA, to be

provided prior entering the simulator.

US briefs crew on ramp prior to entering the

simulator.

RO commences lowering Tave using

boration/control rods.

BOP commences lowering main turbine load.

"* Verifies load rate at .3%/min.

"* Lowers reference setter.

"* Pushes GO button.

NOTE: The next event will occur when the lead

evaluator is satisfied with the amount of

reactivity change.

Page I

'EV IENT 3:,Given ,ithat the: unit is at powet anid a5 controlling SG: steam iflow 'channel Msfailfed!:

Ao~ "the crew,

"ilisdi

44AP-; tos bf"iq antrmnti

TIME

EXPECTED ACTION

INSTRUCTOR RMAR

S

BOP identifies "B" SG steam flow channel III

failing low.

US directs crew to perform immediate actions of 1

AP-3.

BOP verifies redundant channels normal.

BOP identifies "B" SG steam flow channel III has

failed low.

Crew manually controls steam generator

level.

RO verifies first stage pressure indications normal.

RO verifies systems affected by PRZR level channels

normal.

RO verifies both first stage pressure channels

normal.

RO selects all SGWLC channels to an operable

channel.

BOP verifies that "B" SG steam flow channel III is

the only failed channel.

US directs RO to enter 1-MOP-55.77.

US refers to ITS-3.3.1 and 3.3.2 and determines the

channel must be placed in TRIP within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months .

NOTE: The next event will occur after the crew

identifies the appropriate MOP, or at the

direction of the lead evaluator.

Scenario NRC 5-DRR

Page I

EVENT 4 Giventhatithe uit is at6ower and a SOGPRV has failedopen, the crew will respond

' <A-38, Excesi eo, a<I aicrse

,'TIME-,

EA4N

j

INSTRUCTOR

REMARKS

BOP identifies loss of MW and RO identifies

increase in reactor power.

US directs crew to enter 1-AP-38.

RO verifies all steam dumps closed.

BOP identifies "B" SG PORV open.

CREW STOPS POWER INCREASE.

NOTE: Security will report a loud noise and

steam coming from the top of the unit-1 main

steam valve house.

BOP verifies turbine load normal.

RO verifies reactor power is less than or equal to

100% power.

Crew dispatches an operator to check for the source

of steam.

Crew checks plant stable.

BOP checks all steam flow indications normal.

BOP checks turbine control in operator auto.

NOTE: The operator will report that the "B"

steam generator PORV is open.

Crew directs the operator to isolate the "B" SG

PORV by closing l-MS-59.

NOTE: The next event will occur after the crew

has stabilized the unit, or at the direction of the

lead evaluator.

Scenario NRC 5-DRR

Page I

EVENT5: G iven, that the unit i:atp 4poe ,,.x tda flssof the runnin cagin:g pup

concrren

-ýw'ith &~faile'l open d'is'h~rge cf&k4 h:ý

as,v woccutid

rvwl epnj

accptdanceith I-AP,49, 'tops Of-ormal Chargiinig ?

TIME

EXPECTED ACT.IO.

..

INSTUCTOR.REMARKS

RO identifies loss of"A" charging pump.

US directs crew to enter I -AP-49.

RO checks "B" charging pump for gas binding.

RO identifies that a charging pump manipulation

has taken place.

BOP closes discharge MOVs for "A" charging

pump.

RO verifies charging flow returns to normal.

RO restores letdown as directed by the US.

NOTE: Operator/electricians will report "A"

charging pump breaker has an instantaneous

overcurrent drop.

US reviews ITS 3.5.2 for having only one operable

HHSI pump.

NOTE: During the time that the "A" charging

pump is tripped with both discharge MOVs open

(and a failed-open check valve) ITS 3.5.2

condition C states that ITS 3.0.3 actions apply.

NOTE: The next event will occur after the crew

stabilizes the unit, or at the direction of the lead

evaluator.

Scenario NRC 5-DRR

Page I

,EVENT 6: Giypfrthat the

lt~6d~d

RRsry~ac~has faileap dp'nh6'ceWwiVl1.'ý

beexpeqte~d to respnhd i

l-X-4'"oss ofkactdr dS01nt SWste

"Ptset<

on+

11 '{

,

-

TIME

......

EXPECTED ACTION:

INSTRUCTORREMASRK

Crew identifies RCS pressure decreasing.

US directs crew to enter 1-AP-44.

RO checks PRZR PORV closed.

RO checks PRZR master controller normal.

RO identifies that one spray valve is open.

CREW STOPS RCS PRESSURE

DECREASE.

Crew verifies all PRZR heaters energized.

RO checks auxiliary spray valve closed.

Crew checks PRZR safety valves and PORVs

closed.

Crew verifies RCS pressure stable or increasing.

Crew verifies RCS pressure returned to normal.

US requests I&C to investigate problem with spray

valve.

NOTE: The next event will occur after the crew

stabilizes the unit, or at the direction of the lead

evaluator.

Scenario NRC 5-DRR

Page I

EVENT 7: Giyen 'that the unit, is-at powaýrind a:PRZR spray> line fails causing a sma1!-break

YJOCA,

the

-:ew

willresp6nd inP a4dodac wit

"PiA-lln

a

a nd Ldaio

rciio& tý

Ij

etin

indreasng

mary Pant

i

Legate, an

nj

&

l5o ~

eqv ion.,'*

4TIMEB

ýýEXPECTED ATONtz

INSTRUCTOR REMARKS

Crew identifies that charging flow has increased

and/or containment sump pumping frequency has

increased.

US directs crew to enter 1-AP-16.

Crew verifies that the unit is in mode 1.

RO checks PRZR level, RCS subcooling, and VCT

level under control. (NO)

RO isolates letdown by closing HCV-1200B and

LCV-1460A and B.

RO manually opens FCV- 1122 to maximize

charging flow.

RO starts a manual makeup to the VCT from the

blender.

Crew determines that PRZR level cannot be

maintained and a reactor trip is required.

US directs the crew to enter 1 -E-0.

Crew attempts to manually trip the reactor. (NO)

NOTE: The next event will occur when the crew

identifies the failure of the reactor to trip.

Scenario NRC 5-DRR

PagelI

EET 8:Given tat theuiisto

r and a:valid-ATWS qonditidn exists conicpx~e~yith aftýýý-ý

SBLOA, te creW, \\Wi1 ie~priil lAW

I"R,~,

'Respofis t5 Nuclea Powe

ReaetorrSecondr

Cooaht."

a

& 1

TIME

INSTRUCTOR REMARKS

Crew identifies the reactor did not trip

CRITICAL TASK:

and takes action to bring the reactor

Ensure control rods insert

subcritical.

and initiate emergency

US directs crew to enter l-FR-S.1.

boration, or dispatch

operator to trip reactor

BOP manually trips the turbine.

locally.

BOP checks AFW pumps running.

RO verifies at least one char ing ump running.

"* Crew verifies adequate negative reactivity

insertion.

"* RO checks PRZR pressure.

RO checks if reactor trip has occurred (NO.)

NOTE: The following action satisfies the critical

task of bringing the reactor subcritical.

Crew identifies the reactor did not trip

and takes action to bring the reactor

subcritical.

BOP checks if turbine trip has occurred.

BOP checks SG levels.

RO verifies all dilution paths isolated.

Crew checks for reactivity insertion from

uncontrolled RCS cooldown (NO).

Scenario NRC 5-DRR

Page I

'EVENT 8: Given that t

uie t is at oxvrand a yaldAW$ conditidh eist cnurnt with a

e ...

BLOCA.thecrew will respond lAW' 17FR- S~ "1*......Response

to .......

Pucea* Pdwer

...

........

ear

Pow*

Generation/ATWS,7 i-E-0ReactorTior Safet Inection,' and *-E-l1, Loss of

R..... tor o.. Seco dar$. C

a61afit:

TIME .EXPECTED

ATON

.INSTRUCTOR

REMARKS

RO checks CETCs.

RO verifies reactor subcritical.

US directs crew to return to l-E-0.

RO verifies reactor tripped.

BOP verifies turbine trip.

RO verifies AC emergency busses energized.

Crew checks if safety injection has actuated. (YES)

US directs crew to manually initiate SI.

RO/BOP manually initiate SI.

BOP verifies FW isolation.

US directs RO/BOP to manually initiate phase A

isolation.

RO/BOP manually initiate phase A isolation.

BOP verifies AFW pumps running.

Scenario NRC 5-DRR

Page I

EVENT 8: Givrenthat the unit is atP'f

r'

aalidATWS condtn

n exists c*neu*etithla

SBLOCA, the crew williespfid

JAW

1R- 1' ".Respdnseidl

xckle Pw..

Generation/ATWS," 1E£0

actot Trip or Safet Injecio* ,n*'d

IZEI, k 0ss of

Reactor or Seoai C~oo~",

TIME

EXPECTEP~~~A-T:~ISRUTRBAK

ROIPvrf

iSSTRUpTOmprMAuninS

RO/BOP verify SW pumps running.

BOP verifies SW pumps running.

Crew checks if MS should be isolated (NO).

BOP verifies SI flow.

BOP verifies AFW flow.

RO checks RCS temperature stable at or trending to

5470F.

BOP adjusts AFW flow.

RO checks PRZR PORVs and spray valves.

RO checks RCP trip and charging pump recite

criteria.

BOP checks SGs not faulted (YES).

BOP checks SGs not ruptured (YES).

Crew checks if RCS is intact inside containment

(NO).

US directs crew to transition to 1 -E- 1.

Scenario NRC 5-DRR

PagelI

EVENTS: Given that the uit'is44Aqwet axndavaaidAýTWS66fnidfi6fr~exists cpnuet wi tha

SBLOCA,~spn

thes

cr

Pi1

-R.;n

Generation/ATWS*t1 'SO,'tý0ReactorTrip or Safety Injetj!,n,

i-S

, "Loss of

Si, Reactor orS S6d6nd:iy doo:

TIM

..

EXPECTEDACTION

.

,NSTRUCTOR

REMARKS

RO checks RCP trip and charging pump recirc

criteria.

BOP checks SGs not faulted (YES).

BOP checks SGs not ruptured (YES).

BOP checks secondary radiation.

RO checks PRZR PORVs and block valves.

RO checks if SI can be terminated (NO).

RO resets CDA.

RO checks if QS is required. (NO)

RO checks QS pump status.

RO checks if low-head SI pumps can be stopped.

(YES)

RO resets SI and stops LHSI pumps.

Note: Scenario can be terminated once the crew

stops LHSI pumps, or at the direction of the lead

evaluator.

NOTE: If SEM position not established, SRO(s) involved with scenario are to evaluate and

classify the event in accordance with EPIPs following the scenario but prior to the debrief

NOTE: Scenario may be terminated when all critical tasks have been met or at the discretion of the

Lead Evaluator.

Scenario NRC 5-DRR

Page I

REFERENCES

Scenario NRC 5-DRR

PROCEDURS

REV4

Operating Procedure 1 -OP-3 1.1, "Main Feedwater System."

6

Operating Procedure 1 -OP-2.2, "Unit Power Operation From Mode 1 to Mode 2."

47

Abnormal Procedure 1 -AP-3, "Loss of Vital Instrumentation."

17

Abnormal Procedure 1 -AP-38, "Excessive Load Increase."

12

Abnormal Procedure 0-AP- 10, "Loss of Electrical Power."

30

Abnormal Procedure l-AP-49, "Loss of Normal Charging."

Abnormal Procedure 1 -AP- 16, "Increasing Primary Plant Leakage."

18

Function Restoration Procedure 1-FR-S. 1, "Response to Nuclear Power

12

Generation/ATWS."

Emergency Procedure 1 -E-0, "Reactor Trip or Safety Injection."

28

Emergency Procedure 1 -E- 1, "Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant."

16

Station Annunciator Response Procedures.

N/A

Administrative Procedure VPAP-1407, Verbal Communications.

2

INPO, Guideline for Teamwork and Diagnostic Skill Development: INPO 88-003,

Jan. 1988

INPO, ACAD 90-022 Simulator Training Guidelines

Nov. 1990

Page I

ATTACHMENTS

ATTACHMENT 1 - LERs, SOERs, and/or RELATED INDUSTRY EVENTS

ATTACHMENT

2 - SIMULATOR OPERATOR'S COMPUTER PROGRAM

3 - SCENARIO PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVES

4 - SIMULATOR PERFORMANCE SUMMARY (SXG Only)*

5 - SIMULATOR BOOTH OPERATOR CHECKLIST**

6 - SEG INSTRUCTIONS**

7 - SXG INSTRUCTIONS**

8 - COMPETENCY AREA RATING FACTOR WORKSHEET **

9 - SIMULATOR SCENARIO REVIEW CHECKLIST (SXG Only) *

10 - SIMULATOR EXAMINATION PREBRIEF (SXG Only) **

Located on N:\\N\\LORP\\Simulator\\shl\\

Located in the Instructor Booth.

Scenario NRC 5-DRR

Page I

ATTACHMENT 1

LERs, SOERs, and/or RELATED INDUSTRY EVENTS

Scenario NRC 5-DRR

Page I

ATTACHMENT 1

LERs, SOERs, and/or RELATED INDUSTRY EVENTS

1. SEN 122, Recurring Event: Unisolable Reactor Coolant System Leak

Loviisa Units 1 & 2/VVER (May 16, 1994)

An unisolable reactor coolant system leak developed in the pressurizer shutdown spray valve due to

fatigue caused by thermal cycling and stratification.

Note: The VVER design includes two different pressurizer spray systems: normal pressurizer spray

and shutdown spray. The normal spray system consists of two spray valves with water for

sprays taken from the discharge side of two of the six reactor coolant pumps. The two

normal spray paths are identical, each consisting of four parallel spray lines and one warm

up line. The capacity of the normal spray system is sufficient to avoid high reactor pressure

during most anticipated transients. The shutdown spray system, which is supplied either

from the cold leg of one RCS loop or the normal volume control system, is used for primary

pressure decrease during normal reactor shutdowns and also in some transients.

On May 16, 1994, during a routine weekly operator walk-down, fluid leakage was noted from the

insulation near the Unit 2 pressurizer shutdown spray valve. The source was determined to be a

through-wall crack in the 2-inch diameter valve body, and the plant was shutdown for five days to

conduct repairs. Similar crack indications were found on the corresponding valve on Unit 1, and

Unit 1 was shutdown for repair on May 23, 1994.

The failed valve had been in service for about 15 years. Although the original design did not

provide a means to maintain the pipe warm when the spray valve was closed, in 1980 a small hole

was drilled in the valve disc to minimize cyclic thermal stresses. While investigating the cause of

the May 16, 1994 crack, temperature stratification was also detected on the outlet side of the valve

(a 720F gradient existed from the top to the bottom of the horizontal run of pipe). The valve is

made of forged, titanium-stabilized, austenitic stainless steel.

Scenario NRC 5-DRR

Page I

ATTACHMENT 2

SIMULATOR OPERATORS COMPUTER PROGRAM

Scenario NRC 5-DRR

Page I

SIMULATOR OPERATOR'S COMPUTER PROGRAM

Scenario NRC 4

Initial conditions

23. Recall 50% power end-of-life IC (IC-166).

24. Sign off a copy of l-OP-2.2 to the appropriate step. Print a copy of 1-OP-31.1 with the

applicable sections removed.

25. Ensure Tave, Tref, PDTT level, and VCT level are selected on trend recorders.

26. Tagout 1H diesel per MOP.

27. Pre-load 10 gpd tube leak on "A" SG (malfunction RC2401 = 8E-4) and allow to run until "A"

SG N-16 radiation monitor stabilizes at approximately 10.26 gpd.

28. Ensure "A" and "C" MFW pumps are running, and "A" charging pump is running.

PRELOADS PRIOR TO SCENARIO START

CONDITION

.ALFNCTION/OVERRlDEET.

Reactor trip failure.

Remote function - rod control: RD32 and RD38, delay time = 0,

trigger = none.

Remote function - SSPS: AMSACDEFEAT = T, delay time =0,

trigger = none.

"A" charging pump

CH2101, delay time = 0, trigger = none.

discharge check valve

failure.

SCENARIO EVENTS

EVENT

MALFUNCTION/OVERRIDE/COMMUNICATIONS

1) Shutdown

"C"

MFW NOTE: Turbine building operator will report "A" MFW

pump

pump flow indication is approximately 8,000 gpm.

NOTE: Approximately five minutes after crew directs an

operator to align MFW pump warmup lines, report that the

warmup lines are aligned.

NOTE: The next event will occur after feedwater pump has

been shutdown, or at the direction of the lead evaluator.

Scenario NRC 5-DRR

Page 1

EVENT:

MALFUNCTION/OVERRIDEXOMMUIATIONS

2)

Unit

shutdown

for NOTE: Crew is given reactivity calculations from reactor

refueling

engineer, verified by STA, to be provided prior to entering

the simulator.

NOTE: The next event will occur when the lead evaluator is

satisfied with the amount of reactivity change.

3) "B" SG steam flow

MS0103, delay time = 5, ramp = 30, severity value = -1,

channel III failure

trigger = 1

NOTE: The next event will occur after the crew identifies the

appropriate MOP, or at the direction of the lead evaluator.

4) "B" SG PORV failure

Remote function - main steam: MSPCV101B_K, delay time = 5,

ramp = 5, remote value = 100, trigger = 2

NOTE: Security will report a loud noise and steam coming

from the top of the unit-1 main steam valve house.

NOTE: Approximately two minutes after crew dispatches an

operator to the MSVH, report that the "B" steam generator

PORV is open.

NOTE: When the crew directs the operator to close 1-MS-59,

use the PNID screen to ramp the valve shut over 20 seconds.

NOTE: The next event will occur after the crew has stabilized

the unit, or at the direction of the lead evaluator.

5) "A" charging pump trip

CH1601, delay time = 5, trigger = 3

and check valve failure

NOTE: Operator/electricians will report "A" charging pump

breaker has an instantaneous overcurrent drop.

NOTE: The next event will occur after the crew stabilizes the

unit, or at the direction of the lead evaluator.

6) PRZR spray valve failure

RC4601, delay time = 5, ramp = 150, severity value = 2, trigger = 4

NOTE: The next event will occur after the crew stabilizes the

unit, or at the direction of the lead evaluator.

Scenario NRC 5-DRR

Page 1

Scenario NRC 5-DRR

EVENT

~MALFUNTION/OVERRIDE/COMMU$JICtIN

7) SBLOCA

RC04, delay time = 5, ramp = 5, severity value = 100, trigger = 5

NOTE: The next event will occur when the crew identifies the

failure of the reactor to trip.

8) ATWS

NOTE: Reactor trip will be initiated approximately 2 minutes

after an operator is dispatched to locally open the reactor trip

breakers. Use PNID to open the breakers.

NOTE: Scenario can be terminated once the crew stops LHSI

pumps, or at the direction of the lead evaluator.

Page I

ATTACHMENT 3

SCENARIO PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVES

Scenario NRC 5-DRR

Page 1

SIMULATOR REQUALIFICATION EXAMINATION

TERMINAL PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVE

Given equipment failures and operational situations, operate the plant in accordance with

Technical Specifications to bring the unit to a safe condition, using applicable procedures,

and applying effective teamwork, communication, and diagnostic skills.

GENERIC PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVES

A.

During shift operations the shift supervisor will take a conservative course of action,

especially when uncertain conditions exist, when dealing with core cooling or heat sink

availability, primary system and containment integrity, and reactivity control associated

with plant evolutions.

B.

During shift operations the shift supervisor will provide overall crew guidance by

prioritizing and integrating the actions of the shift crew in accordance with administrative

procedures.

C.

During shift operations each crew member will participate in a team effort that resolves

conflicts, provides input into the team decision and communicates all the necessary

information to enhance teamwork in accordance with administrative procedures.

D.

During shift operations the Shift Technical Advisor will independently assess events and

based on those assessments make recommendations to the crew regarding mitigation

strategy.

Scenario NRC 5-DRR

Page 1

EVENT 1 PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVES

EVENT GOAL:

Given that aunit shutdown for refueling is in progress, the crew will

shutdown "C" main feedwater pump IAW 1 -OP-3 1.1, "Main Feedwater

System," before continuing with the unit shutdown.

NORTH ANNA SPECIFIC TASKS:

R407

Remove a main feedwater pump from operation

CRITICAL TASK:

N/A

Scenario NRC 5-DRR

Page 1

EVENT 2 PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVES

EVENT GOAL:

Given that a unit shutdown for refueling is in progress, the crew will

continue with the unit shutdown in accordance with 1 -OP-2.2, "Unit Power

Operation from Mode 1 to Mode 2."

NORTH ANNA SPECIFIC TASKS:

None

CRITICAL TASK:

N/A

Scenario NRC 5-DRR

PagelI

EVENT 3 PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVES

EVENT GOAL:

Given that the unit is at power and a controlling SG steam flow channel

has failed, the crew will respond JAW 1-AP-3, "Loss of Vital

Instrumentation."

NORTH ANNA SPECIFIC TASKS:

R626 Respond to a steam generator water level control channel failure

S70

Evaluate compliance with technical specifications.

CRITICAL TASK:

See next page.

Scenario NRC 5-DRR

Page I

CT Statement:

Crew takes manual control of steam generator level and restores level to normal range.

Safety Significance:

Failure to take manual control of SG level constitutes a "mis-operation or incorrect crew

performance" which will result in an unnecessary reactor trip on low SG level.

Cues:

The controlling SG steam flow channel has failed low.

Main feed reg valve is going closed.

Actual SG level is decreasing.

Performance Indicator:

BOP places controller for 1-FW-FCV-1478 in manual and controls "A" SG level.

Feedback:

SG level does not decrease to reactor trip setpoint.

WOG Reference:

None

Conditions:

Prior to reactor trip on low SG level.

Scenario NRC 5-DRR

Page I

EVENT 4 PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVES

EVENT GOAL:

Given that the unit is at power and a SG PORV has failed open, the crew

will respond IAW l-AP-38, "Excessive Load Increase".

NORTH ANNA SPECIFIC TASKS:

R539 Perform the immediate operator actions in response to an excessive load increase

CRITICAL TASK:

See next page

Scenario NRC 5-DRR

Page I

CT Statement:

Crew stops power increase.

Safety Significance:

Failure to stop power increase and coolant temperature decrease would cause average coolant

temperature to drop below the minimum temperature for criticality. This would mean the

following could not be assured: 1) Moderator temperature coefficient is within its analyzed

temperature range, 2) Protective instrumentation is within its normal operating range, 3) P- 12

interlock is above its setpoint, and 4) Compliance with Appendix G to 10 CFR part 50.

Cues:

Indication of power increase:

"* Several annunciators. (i.e. PRZR Hi/Lo Press, PRZR Lo Level)

"* Reactor power increasing.

"* Steam flow increasing.

Performance Indicator:

BOP reduces turbine load until power is < pre-event value.

Feedback:

Reactor power increase stopped

Steam flow decreased

WOG Reference:

None

Conditions:

Prior to receiving an automatic reactor trip on over power.

Scenario NRC 5-DRR

Page 1

EVENT 5 PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVES

EVENT GOAL:

Given that the unit is at power and a loss of the running charging pump

concurrent with a failed open discharge check valve has occurred, the crew

will respond in accordance with l-AP-49, "Loss of Normal Charging."

NORTH ANNA SPECIFIC TASKS:

R572 Restore charging flow following a loss of normal charging

CRITICAL TASK:

N/A

Scenario NRC 5-DRR

Page 1

EVENT 6 PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVES

EVENT GOAL:

Given that the unit is at power and a PRZR spray valve has failed open,

the crew will be expected to respond LAW 1-AP-44, "Loss of Reactor

Coolant System."

NORTH ANNA SPECIFIC TASKS:

R634 Respond to a loss of Reactor Coolant System pressure

CRITICAL TASK:

See next page

Scenario NRC 5-DRR

Page 1

CT Statement:

Crew stops RCS pressure decrease.

Safety Significance:

Failure to close the RCS spray valve under the postulated plant conditions constitutes

"mis-operation or incorrect crew performance which leads to degradation of any barrier to

fission product release." In this case, DNBR is reduced. Therefore, failure to close the

spray valve represents a "demonstrated inability by the crew to take an action or

combination of actions that would prevent a challenge to plant safety."

Cues:

Valid indication of pressure decreasing by the presence of various annunciators, indication

of RCS spray valve open, and RCS pressure indication decreasing and procedurally directed

by 1-AP-44.

Performance Indicator:

RO places controller for 1-RC-PCV-1455A in MANUAL

RO closes 1-RC-PCV-1455A.

Feedback:

RCS pressure decrease stopped.

WOG Reference:

N/A

Conditions:

Prior to reaching an automatic reactor trip on low pressure.

Scenario NRC 5-DRR

Page I

EVENT 7 PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVES

EVENT GOAL:

Given that the unit is at power and a PRZR spray line fails causing a

small-break LOCA, the crew will respond in accordance with l-AP-16,

"Increasing Primary Plant Leakage," and l-E-0, "Reactor Trip or Safety

Injection."

NORTH ANNA SPECIFIC TASKS:

R520

R185

R186

Respond to increasing primary-plant leakage

Perform the immediate operator actions in response to a reactor trip or safety injection.

Determine the appropriate recovery procedure following the actuation of a reactor trip with

a safety injection.

S69

Identify a reportable occurrence and make appropriate notifications.

CRITICAL TASK:

N/A

Scenario NRC 5-DRR

Page I

EVENT 8 PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVES

EVENT GOAL:

Given that the unit is at power, and a valid ATWS condition exists

concurrent with a SBLOCA, the crew will respond IAW 1-FR-S. 1,

"Response to Nuclear Power Generation/ATWS," 1 -E-0, "Reactor Trip or

Safety Injection," and 1-E-1, "Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant."

NORTH ANNA SPECIFIC TASKS:

R224 Perform the immediate operator actions in response to a nuclear power generation/ATWS

S94

Classify an emergency event

S85

Notify the appropriate personnel of emergency events.

CRITICAL TASK:

See next page.

Scenario NRC 5-DRR

Page I

CT Statement:

Crew take actions to bring the reactor subcritical.

Safety Significance:

Failure to insert negative reactivity under the postulated plant conditions results in an

unnecessary situation in which the reactor remains critical. Failure to insert negative

reactivity constitutes "mis-operation or incorrect crew performance which leads to incorrect

reactivity control."

Cues:

Valid indication of a required reactor trip by the presence of a first out annunciator, with a

failure of the reactor to trip automatically or manually from the control room.

Performance Indicator:

RO manually insert control rods if rod speed decreases to < 72 spin.

RO place in-service boric acid transfer pump in fast speed.

RO open emergency borate valve 1-CH-MOV-1350

- OR

Crew dispatch operator to locally trip the reactor using attachment #3, Remote

Reactor Trip.

Feedback:

"* Control rods moving in or fully inserted.

"* Emergency boration flow indicated.

"* Neutron flux decreasing.

"* Pressurizer pressure less than 2335 psig.

OR

"* Rod bottom lights on.

"* IRPIs indicating zero.

"* Neutron flux < 5%.

WOG Reference:

FR-S. 1 - Background Document

Conditions:

Prior to completion of step requiring its performance.

NORTH ANNA TRAINING CENTER

SIMULATOR EXERCISE GUIDE SCENARIO NRC 5

REV

TIR NUMBER

REASON

Scenario NRC 5-DRR

Page I

NORTH ANNA TRAINING CENTER

SIMULATOR EXERCISE GUIDE SCENARIO NRC 5

REV

TIR NUMBER

REASON

1

N02-0293

Revised old scenario for use as a "spare."

Scenario NRC 5-DRR

Page I

DOMINION

NORTH ANNA POWER STATION

INITIAL LICENSE CLASS

NRC SIMULATOR EXAMINATION

SCENARIO NRC 5

NRC SIMULATOR EXAMINATION SCENARIO

EVENT

DESCRIPTION

1.

Shift Service Water pumps

2.

Loss of "H" emergency bus

3.

Ramp unit for waterbox repairs

4.

Letdown PT-145 fails low

5.

"B" SW pump trips/loss of SW header flow

6.

"B" SG steam flow channel fails high

7.

LOCA outside CTMT

Scenario Recapitulation:

Malfunctions after EOP entry

Total Malfunctions

Abnormal Events

Major Transients

EOPs Entered

EOP Contingencies

Critical Tasks

2 (LOCA outside containment, failure of charging pump suction

to swap to RWST.)

6 (Loss of 1 H emergency bus, LOCA outside containment,

Letdown pressure transmitter failure, Service Water pumps trip,

SG steam flow transmitter failure, failure of charging pump

suction to swap to RWST.)

4 (Loss of 1 H emergency bus, Service Water pumps trip, SG

steam flow transmitter failure, failure of charging pump suction to

swap to RWST.)

1 (LOCA outside containment)

1 (E-O)

1 (ECA- 1.2)

2 (Manually align charging pump suction to RWST, isolate LOCA

outside containment)

SCENARIO DURATION

90 Minutes

Scenario NRC

P

Revision 0

Page 2

SIMULATOR EXAMINATION SCENARIO SUMMARY

SCENARIO NRC 5

The scenario begins with both units at 100% power. Unit 1 has just returned to full power

following a load reduction for seal repairs to 1-FW-P-1B.

C MFW pump had been tagged for

coupling repairs, which were completed while the unit was at reduced power.

1H EDG was

tagged-out two hours ago for maintenance. The system operator has reported thunderstorms in the

area. There is a 10 gpd tube leak in "A" S/G. Shift orders are to place both unit-l service water

pumps in service and secure both unit-2 service water pumps in preparation for maintenance on 2

SW-P-1B.

When requested, reduce power as determined by Engineering in preparation for

removing the "C" waterbox from service for tube plugging.

The first event will be for the BOP to shift Service Water pumps as directed by the

turnover. After the BOP has shifted Service Water pumps, the next event will occur.

The "H" emergency bus normal feeder breaker will trip due to a breaker relay failure. 1H

emergency diesel will auto-start but will fail to load. The resulting secondary transient will cause

reactor power to increase, and the crew will be expected to respond IAW 1-AP-38, "EXCESSIVE

LOAD INCREASE," and reduce reactor power to less than 100%. Once the crew has stabilized the

unit, the crew will be expected to respond IAW 0-AP-10, "LOSS OF ELECTRICAL POWER,"

and restore power to the 1H 4160-volt bus. After power has been restored, the next event will

occur.

The crew will receive a request to reduce unit power for waterbox repairs and will

commence reducing unit power. Once the crew has ramped the unit a sufficient amount, the next

event will occur.

Letdown PT-145 will fail low causing PCV-145 to close fully. The RO will be expected to

determine that the transmitter has failed and respond IAW annunciator C-B11, "LO PRESS

LETDWN REL LINE HI TEMP," and isolate letdown. Once the RO has isolated letdown and

placed excess letdown in service, the next event will occur.

1-SW-P-1B will trip, resulting in a loss of"B" SW header flow. The crew will be expected

to respond JAW 0-AP-12, "LOSS OF SERVICE WATER," and direct the unit-2 operator to start 2

SW-P-lA. The pump will trip on restart and the crew must direct unit-2 operator to start 2-SW-P

1B and align to "B" header. After flow has been restored and the SW system verified stable, the

next event will occur.

B SG steam flow channel fails high causing "B" SG MFRV to open. The BOP will be

expected to respond IAW 1-AP-3, "LOSS OF VITAL INSTRUMENTATION," and take manual

control of SG level. After the crew has referred to the MOP to place the channel in trip, the next

event will occur.

The check valves from the RCS Cold Legs to the LHSI Pumps will begin to experience

backleakage. The LHSI pump discharge check valves will hold causing relief valves 1-SI

RV-1 845A, B, & C to lift. This will result in a "SFGDS AREA SUMP HI/HI-HI LEVEL"

annunciator A-CI and a high and high-high alarm on I -RM-VG-1 12/113. The crew should

determine that based on increased charging, the increased pumping of the safeguards sump,

Scenario NRC I

Page 3

Revision 0

and the alarm on the "B" vent stack that there is an RCS leak outside the containment. The

crew will be expected to respond IAW l-AP-16, "INCREASING PRIMARY PLANT

LEAKAGE," and isolate letdown, maximize charging, and start a VCT makeup. The leak

will degrade until PRZR level cannot be maintained, and the crew will manually trip the

reactor and enter l-E-0, "REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION." After verifying

the immediate actions, the crew will be unable to maintain PRZR level and will manually

initiate SI. Train B Sl will fail to actuate. VCT level will decrease and the charging pump

suction will not auto-swap to the RWST. The crew will manually open the charging pump

suctions from the RWST. The crew will continue in l-E-0 until directed to transition to I

ECA-1.2, "LOCA OUTSIDE CONTAINMENT". The scenario may be terminated after

the LOCA is isolated IAW l-ECA-1.2, or as directed by the Chief Examiner.

Scenario NRC 1

Page 4

Revision 0

SCENARIO TURNOVER SHEET

Read the following to the crew:

Purpose:

This examination is intended to evaluate the crew's performance of various tasks

associated with the Licensed Operator Training Program. All activities should be

completed in accordance with approved operations standards.

9. You are on a day shift during the week.

10. When conditions allow, utilize the computer log systems as you would in the plant.

Unit Status:

Unit 1 is at 100% power. RCS boron is 1442 and core age is 2000. The amount of RCS dilution

required to raise temperature one degree is

gallons and the boration required to lower temperature

one degree is

gallons. Aux steam is on unit 1. The unit has just returned to full power following a

load reduction for seal repairs on B MFW pump. C MFW pump, which had been tagged for

coupling repairs, was returned to service while the unit was at reduced power.

Unit 2 is at 100% power.

Equipment Status:

1H EDG was tagged-out two hours ago for maintenance. The system operator has reported

thunderstorms in the area. There is a 10 gpd tube leak in "A" S/G.

Shift Orders:

Place unit 1 service water pumps in service and secure unit 2 service water pumps

in preparation for maintenance on 2-SW-P-1B. When requested, reduce power as

determined by Engineering in preparation for removing the C waterbox from service

for tube plugging.

Scenario NRC 1

Page 5

Revision 0

EVENT 1: Ginen ashi 6rdersrequir& serqie water pumps to be swapped to uht inj seve

thec*r6*il! st*t *nd sto pupJ

I

O

P-44

Shifhng Servce

rat

r Comp nens'.

..

TIMEEXPECTEAC

INSTRUCTORREMARKS

BOP dispatches watchstander to locally verify that 1

SW-P-lA and 1-SW-P-1B are ready to start.

BOP verifies service water spray valves and bypass

valves aligned.

BOP starts 1-SW-P-lA.

BOP directs unit-2 operator to stop 2-SW-P-lB

BOP verifies service water parameters normal.

BOP starts 1-SW-P-1B.

BOP directs unit-2 operator to stop 2-SW-P-IA.

BOP verifies service water parameters normal.

BOP informs US that PT-62.2.1 must be performed on

both units.

NOTE: The next event may occur once unit 1 SW

pumps are running, or at the direction of the lead

evaluator.

Scenario NRC 1

Page 6

Revision 0

>>the buisn m codnewt

,10,

"tLss>>6:f Eie~ctiaiPowver ."

..

~TIME

K

EkPCTE AGJN:4>K

K7

INSTRUCTOR REMARKS",'

Crew identifies numerous control board annunciators

and the loss of various "H" bus equipment.

Crew notes reactor power increasing above 100%.

US directs crew to perform actions of 1-AP-38,

"EXCESSIVE LOAD INCREASE."

RO verifies steam dumps closed.

BOP verifies SG PORVs closed.

BOP reduces reactor power by reducing turbine load.

Crew stabilizes power at less than or equal to 100%.

US directs crew to perform actions of 0-AP- 10,

"LOSS OF ELECTRICAL POWER."

BOP checks unit- 1 emergency buses.

BOP gives attachment 24 to RO.

BOP checks radioactive releases from both units

secured.

BOP checks unit-2 emergency buses.

BOP gives attachment 23 to unit-2 RO.

BOP checks status of all buses.

Revision 0

Scenario NRC I

Page 7

EF-VENT 2: GOiveu that power to l14iýi

e

6rge'c, bu~ has been lost, tlicr#iwill'resp4

"

td'"othe

resulting powerlncrease in accordance with l -ANP3 8, Excessive Lo'a6 Ierease1 tdie

loss of

the bus i adcordance w'ith 0-AbPg

4

tt&&EiStEl~ial Power."

TIME

EPECTED ACTION .

INSTRUC TOR REMARKS ......

BOP verifies EDGs not the sole source of power to

emergency buses.

BOP notifies US of results of electrical system

diagnosis.

US directs BOP to initiate l-MOP-6.70 for 1H

emergency bus.

Crew directs watchstander/electricians to check the

bus.

US reviews ITS 3.8.1 for more restrictive LCO time

requirements and actions.

NOTE: The watchstander/electricians will report

that the bus has no apparent problems and an

electrician doing routine breaker inspections

accidentally tripped the feeder breaker. There are

no drops in on the bus.

The US will direct that the bus be re-energized from

the "F" transfer bus.

The crew will place various equipment in PTL to

prepare for bus restoration.

The BOP will verify power available to the bus

breakers.

The BOP will dispatch two operators to the rack room

to defeat the UV trip of the feeder breakers OR

dispatch an operator to the SBO building to place the

interlock defeat for 43-15F3 in the SBO position.

The BOP will close 15F3.

The BOP will turn on the sync key for 15H1 1 and

If the BOP chose the SBO

close 15H 11.

switch above he must hold the

C/S in close for 15 seconds.

Scenario NRC 1

Page 8

Revision 0

Scenario NRC 1

EVIENT 2: Givenith'at power ýto' IH 6m&gqicy' ~W~

eri lost, th6ecrew #11i~ 4t

d

the,

~~~~~a

e,

8

.

..

...

<<-

,

ess

ivql

>

resulting power incredsein accorda'~

wit l'N8

"Ecsiet'~c

"m

telos

'thf busji accordafc wit &A

,

,Ls:f~lir~

Pow~er.

K'

~

TIME

,EXPECTED ACTiON

INSTRUCTORREMARKS

The BOP will check bus parameters and turn of the

sync key.

The BOP will tell the rack room operators that the

defeat switch may be released OR tell the operator in

the SBO room to return the switch to NORM.

If necessary, the BOP will direct an operator to close

the stub bus breaker.

The BOP will direct an operator to re-energize the

480-volt busses.

The crew will direct an operator to shutdown the

diesel fire pump and return it to Auto.

The crew will return equipment switches to their

initial positions.

NOTE: The crew will restore CC flow to the RCPs

and reset rad monitors.

NOTE: The next event will occur once equipment

has been returned to normal, or as directed by the

lead evaluator.

Page 9

Revision 0

Page 10

EVENT 3: G6ivp thatthe uniitsis required tq ke iarnp& dont allow awaterbpx.to be'removed

rom service , q crew wil: idwet p6wer i acbordanee with-

21

i

e

flm Mode

24 tMod& 1...

'TIME

EXPECTED ACTION

INSTRUCTOR RMARKS

US briefs crew on ramp.

NOTE: Crew is given reactivity calculations from

reactor engineer, verified by STA.

RO commences lowering Tave using boration/control

rods.

BOP places turbine control in IMP-IN.

BOP commences decreasing main turbine load

"* Verifies load rate at .3%/rmin

"* Lowers reference setter.

"* Pushes GO button.

NOTE: The next event will occur when the lead

examiner is satisfied with the reactivity change.

Revision 0

Scenario NRC I

,EVENT 4: Giejni that letdown pr&ssure transmitter) 1

has faid l

thcr

wi

pond in

accordance* wilithe annuinciMto responseV C'or

"LOW PRESS LTtX

tB

L1NE WI

T E I

. .. ...... . .. . .. .. . . .

.. .... .. . . .. . ... . . . . ..

P.

. . . . .. ... . .. .. .... . ..

... . .. .. . .. ..

TIME

EXPECTED.

INSTRUTORREMARKCS

RO identifies letdown flow decreasing/fluctuating and

indicated pressure decreasing to zero.

RO identifies annunciator C-B1

, "LOW PRESS

LETDWN REL LINE HI TEMP."

RO determines letdown relief valve is lifting

RO isolates letdown by closing letdown orifices

isolation valves and letdown isolation valves.

RO places excess letdown in service:

"* Closes 1-CH-HCV-1137

"* Has operator energize loop drains

"* Places 1-CH-HCV-1389 in VCT position

"* Places 1 -CH-FCV- 1122 in manual and closes

"* Opens a loop drain valve

"* Opens I-CH-HCV-1201

"* Slowly opens 1-CH-HCV- 1137

"* Maintains parameters

US informs Instrument Department of failure

NOTE: The next event may occur once excess

letdown has been placed in service, or at the

discretion of the lead evaluator.

Scenario NRC 1

Page Ill

Revision 0

EVENT 5: Giyen1

that th6 unitlis4 powetand a service wate

ha 'trippd the crew wil l 1

r6efrona iha&ordance wlih0-APl, "Loss f

S :W9

te

.TIME,

.... EXPECTED ACTION

....

INS

UOTORRMARKS

BOP identifies annunciators J-H3, "SW PP 1-PiB, 2

PIB AUTO TRIP" and J-B3, "SERV WTR RETURN

HDR LO FLOW."

BOP identifies 1-SW-P-1B tripped and low flow on

"B" service water header.

US directs crew to enter O-AP-12, "Loss of Service

Water."

BOP checks service water reservoir level normal.

Crew checks for indications of flooding.

Crew verifies service water supply headers intact.

BOP verifies at least one service water pump running

on each supply header. (NO)

Crew performs RNO step and directs unit-2 operator

to start 2-SW-P-lA.

NOTE: The unit 2 operator will report that

2-SW-P-IA started, then tripped.

Crew directs unit-2 operator to start 2-SW-P-1B.

Crew directs watchstander to throttle open 2-SW-Il

and then throttle closed 2-SW-13 to align 2-SW-P-lB

to "B" service water header.

Crew dispatches watchstanders/electricians to

determine reason for pump trips.

BOP verifies service water return header flow normal.

BOP verifies service water system stable.

Revision 0

Scenario NRC I

Page 12

Page 13

EVENT, 5;: Givthat theuit is ~ipe

dsrk

ater pum hras rpete

rWl

tiespond inu accorane w"ith 0-API 23, "Los bfS

'cb Watr.

.3/4

3/4 3/4

..

.

..

TIME

'EXPECTED A,

!kCTI

CTRUCTORREMARKS ;

i

US refers to ITS-3.7.8 and enters action "b" due to two

service water pumps inoperable.

NOTE: The next event may occur once SW flow is

restored, or at the discretion of the lead evaluator.

Revision 0

Scenario NRC 1

,EVENT 6:. Give ii that, fth u InIit Iis at pow~er adfida sdkcted steam I flo I6 chanh ,el hias failed high, thez

crew Will res6nd in accordance with-ARPA

',LOSS OF ,VITALJ NSTRUMENTATION

4

+

.

.

..

,:

'

4

{..

.

TIME

<EXPECTEDQ

ACTION

K

INSTRUCTOR REMARKS

BOP identifies "B" SG steam flow channel III failing

high.

US directs crew to perform immediate actions of I

AP-3.

BOP verifies redundant channels normal.

Crew manually controls steam generator level.

"* BOP places "B" MFRV in MANUAL.

"* BOP restores level in "B" SG to normal.

BOP verifies turbine 1st stage pressure channels

normal.

RO verifies systems affected by PRZR level channels

normal.

RO verifies both first stage pressure channels normal.

RO selects all SGWLC channels to an operable

channel.

BOP verifies that "B" SG steam flow channel III is the

only failed channel.

US directs RO to enter 1-MOP-55.77.

US refers to ITS-3.3.1 and 3.3.2 and determines the

channel must be placed in TRIP within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months .

NOTE: The next event will occur after the crew

identifies the appropriate MOP, or at the direction

of the lead evaluator.

Scenario NRC 1

Revision 0

Page 14

i

cVEN c

7e Gie tat there are

cdiIaions of a LOCA outside containment;ýthe crW-wili respo*d,

mracordancewh1-AP-1 6; "IncreasinhgPrimdry Plant ,Leaage," ! -EýýO "Reat6o tTi or Safety

Inpettion,4 'anOd 1 ECA-f.2 "LOCA Outside Contaiment,'

S[J

5

,

rE

TIME',

EXPECTED CIN-

INSTRUCTOR REMARKS

Crew identifies annunciator A-C l, "SFGDS AREA

SUMP HI/HI-HI LEVEL".

RO identifies PRZR level decreasing.

US directs crew to perform actions of 1-AP-16,

"INCREASING PRIMARY PLANT LEAKAGE."

RO identifies PRZR level decreasing, isolates

letdown, maximizes charging, and starts a VCT

makeup.

Crew identifies Vent Stack "B" high radiation alarm.

RO identifies PRZR level continuing to decrease.

US directs crew to perform actions of I-E-0,

"REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION."

Crew trips reactor.

BOP trips turbine.

RO verifies AC buses energized.

Crew manually initiates Safety Injection.

Crew identifies that train "A" SI did not actuate.

BOP verifies feedwater isolation (NO).

Scenario NRC 1

Revision 0

Page 15

EVNT'7 Gve

tatthr 4 iflat~h d aLOAoutside, cotizn

te,, re

v'll-respond

,in accordance" with 1"-'AP-,16,; jlntreasirigPrim'ary Plant"Le~akage," lT-EtO "R~~tp

aet

Injectionan

1-ECA-l .2,"LOCA Optside Cntinznen"

TIME

7

EXPECTED ACTION

INSTUCTORRRMARKS

BOP closes main feed MOVs, stops 1-FW-P-lA1 and

1 C1, and places standby feed pump in PTL.

RO/BOP manually initiate phase A.

US initiates phase A attachment.

BOP verifies AFW pumps are running.

RO/BOP verifies SI pumps are running (NO).

Crew starts SI u

s.

BOP verifies available SW pumps running

Crew checks if MS should be isolated (NO).

BOP verifies SI flow.

BOP verifies AFW flow.

NOTE: CREW SHOULD IDENTIFY

CRITICAL TASK

DECREASING VCT LEVEL AS LEAK SIZE IS

INCREASED TO 280 GPM AND

MANUALLY SWAP CHARGING PUMP

SUCTION TO RWST.

Scenario NRC 1

Revision 0

Page 16

EVEN

7:Gi'eh hafthere arefifdicatii~t

O~~tieh~htt~ddcc~i~e~td

an eeodan

e-*

I AP*6*

ncrasing, Primary Plant eakage, tB E-;

ReactotT ip> o Safet

'in accordance-w~ith Kp~ %A'luraide

imrPLLk

prafety

Inectionand t-C7-*1.2,"OCA, Outside

iontaimnment."

P

<

TIME

EXPECTED ACTION

INSTRUCTOR REMARKS

NOTE: THE CREW MAY CHOOSE

TO BREAK OFF THE BOP TO

ISOLATE THE LEAK USING 1-ECA

1.2 AS GUIDANCE. THESE STEPS

ARE LISTED LATER

RO checks RCS Tavg.

RO checks PRZR PORVs and block valves.

RO checks RCP trip and charging pump recirc criteria.

BOP checks SGs not faulted.

BOP checks SGs not ruptured.

Crew checks RCS is intact inside containment.

Crew checks if SI should be reduced (NO).

(IS directs (U-2 OATC to initiate O-AP-47

Crew checks RCS conditions normal outside

containment (NO)

US directs transition to 1-ECA-1.2, "LOCA Outside

Containment."

NOTE: The crew may have chosen to perform

these actions ahead of time.

Scenario NRC 1

Page 17

Revision 0

EVENT ~7

itnthafttier&ae Thdi6Af6h~taLC

usd

otinxt

Si

Ir~~i

r

fdso

,in accordanhc&with, 1

ary6,lan Leakage',". 1

ý-S- eRaci

or:n f

JulJ etiofl"t' aid -`ECM 2,LOQA> Outsid Continmet.

TIME

EXPECTED ACTI*N

INSTRUCTOR REMARKS ' .

NOTE: THE FOLLOWING ACTIONS

ARE FROM 1-ECA-1.2.

BOP verifies LHSI pump Hot Leg Injection valves

closed.

BOP verifies SI accumulator sample valves closed.

Crew isolates LOCA outside containment.

CRITICAL TASK

BOP closes LHSI pump Cold Leg Injection valves.

"* I-SI-MOV-1890C

"* I-SI-MOV-1890D

BOP closes LHSI pump discharge valves I-SI-MOV

1864A/B.

RO checks RCS pressure increasing. (YES)

US directs transition to 1-E-1, "Loss Of Reactor Or

Secondary Coolant".

NOTE: The scenario may be terminated once crew

acknowl'edges transition to 1-E-d, or at the

discretion of the lead evaluator.

NOTE: THE FOLLOWING STEPS

ARE FROM 1-E-1.

RO checks RCP trip and charging pump recirc criteria.

BOP checks SGs not faulted.

BOP checks SG levels.

Scenario NRC

P

Revision 0

Page 18

EVENT 7 Giveli that thb are

aiiidic*as ofa LO" Aout~side containmen the crev wi1l resjon4

ij accordne

thd !EAP-

16; fi&nrasing Pme y1ant Leaage,"

"Reactor TnporSafety

TIME

& EC

EXPE

L CTE ACTO

NTUCO

SAK

J ~ 6...

.

Oft....

SEXPECTEDORAREMARK

Crew checks secondary radiation.

RO checks PRZR PORVs and block valves.

Check if SI can be terminated (YES).

US directs transition to 1-ES-1.1, "SI Termination."

NOTE: Scenario may be terminated when all critical tasks have been met or at the discretion of the

Lead Evaluator.

Scenario NRC I

Page 19

Revision 0

REFERENCES

Scenario NRC 1

PROQ EDA

HJ.

REV.

3 z

Operating Procedure 0-OP-49.4, "Shifting Service Water Components."

12

Operating Procedure l-OP-2.1, "Unit Operation From Mode 2 to Mode 1."

68

Operating Procedure 1-OP-8.5, "Operation of Excess Letdown."

14

Maintenance Operating Procedure 1-MOP-6.70, "1-EE-SW- 1H, 4160-Volt

25

Emergency Bus."

Abnormal Procedure 1 -AP-3, "Loss of Vital Instrumentation."

17

Abnormal Procedure 0-AP-10, "Loss of Electrical Power."

32

Abnormal Procedure 0-AP- 12, "Loss of Service Water."

25

Abnormal Procedure 1 -AP- 16, "Increasing Primary Plant Leakage."

18

Abnormal Procedure 1 -AP-38, "Excessive Load Increase."

12

Emergency Operating Procedure 1 -E-0, "Reactor Trip or Safety Injection."

28

Emergency Operating Procedure 1 -E- 1, "Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant."

16

Emergency Contingency Procedure l-ECA-1.2, "LOCA Outside Containment."

4

Station Annunciator Response Procedures.

N/A

Administrative Procedure VPAP-1407, Verbal Communications.

2

INPO, Guideline for Teamwork and Diagnostic Skill Development: INPO 88-003,

Jan. 1988

INPO, ACAD 90-022 Simulator Training Guidelines

Nov. 1990

Page 20

Revision 0

ATTACHMENTS

ATTACHMENT

I - LERs, SOERs, and/or RELATED INDUSTRY EVENTS

2 - SIMULATOR OPERATOR'S COMPUTER PROGRAM

3 - SCENARIO PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVES

4 - SIMULATOR PERFORMANCE SUMMARY (SXG Only)*

5 - SIMULATOR BOOTH OPERATOR CHECKLIST**

6 - SEG INSTRUCTIONS**

7 - SXG INSTRUCTIONS**

8 - COMPETENCY AREA RATING FACTOR WORKSHEET **

9 - SIMULATOR SCENARIO REVIEW CHECKLIST (SXG Only) *

10 - SIMULATOR EXAMINATION PREBRIEF (SXG Only) **

Located on N:\\N\\LORP\\Simulator\\shl\\

Located in the Instructor Booth.

Scenario NRC I

Revision 0

Page 21

ATTACHMENT 2

SIMULATOR OPERATOR'S COMPUTER PROGRAM

Scenario NRC 1

Page 22

Revision 0

SIMULATOR OPERATOR'S COMPUTER PROGRAM

Scenario NRC 5

Initial conditions

29. Recall 100% power beginning-of-life IC (IC 173).

30. Ensure Tave, Tref, PDTT level, and VCT level are selected on trend recorders.

31. Tag-out 1H EDG per MOP.

32. Pre-load 10 gpd tube leak on "A" SG (malfunction RC2401 = 1.1E-3) and allow to

run until "A" SG N-16 radiation monitor stabilizes at approximately 10.26 gpd.

PRELOADS PRIOR TO SCENARIO START

CONDITION

M........

............

E..

.

Failure of train B SI

SI10702, delay time = 0, trigger = none.

Failure of ll15B and ll15D MOV115B MP=OFF

to auto open

MOV115D MP= OFF

SCENARIO EVENTS

.EVENT

.AL

..

F.UN.TION/OVERRIDS/COM

!UNIýATIONS

1) Shift SW pumps

NOTE: If directed to verify unit 1 SW pumps ready to start,

report that both pumps are ready to start.

NOTE: May need to call and inform BOP as each pump

started that they look fine.

NOTE: If directed to do PT-62.2.1 on both units, reply that you

will print the PTs and perform them at the designated times.

NOTE: The next event may occur once unit 1 SW pumps are

running, or at the direction of the lead evaluator.

Scenario NRC 1

Revision 0

Page 23

EVEN!

I

MTTALFU NCTIJON/OVERRIDE/COMM.NICA.

2) Loss of"H" bus

EL0301, delay time = 5, trigger = 2.

NOTE: The watchstander/electricians will report that the bus

has no apparent problems and an electrician doing routine

breaker inspections accidentally tripped the feeder breaker.

There are no drops in on the bus.

NOTE: Report back as necessary from the SBO or rack room

on necessary switch positions.

NOTE: When directed to stop the diesel fire pump and place

it in Auto - wait several minutes and then use trigger 12.

NOTE: The next event will occur once equipment has been

returned to normal, or as directed by the lead evaluator.

3) Reduce power for

NOTE: AFTER CREW RESTORES RCP THERMAL

waterbox repairs

BARRIER FLOW AND RESETS R/M HI-HI

ALARMS, CALL IN AS SHIFT SUPERVISORAND

DIRECT CREW TO REDUCE POWER (5% LESS

THAN THE CURRENT POWER) FOR WATERBOX

REPAIRS.

NOTE: The next event will occur when the lead examiner is

satisfied with the reactivity change.

4) Letdown pressure

CH04, delay time = 5, ramp = 30, severity value = -1, trigger = 4

transmitter fails low

NOTE: When contacted to energize loop drains, wait 1 minute

then use trigger 13.

NOTE: The next event may occur once excess letdown has

been placed in service, or at the discretion of the lead

evaluator.

Scenario NRC

P

Revision 0

Page 24

VzENt

I*

LFUNCTION/OVERRIDE!COMMUtC ATIONS

5) Unit I"B" SW pump trip,

Unit 2 "A" SW pump trip

Unit 1 "B" pump SWO 102, delay time = 5, trigger = 5

NOTE: When crew directs unit 2 to start 2-SW-P-lA,

implement the following malfunction:

Unit 2 "A" pump SWO104, delay time = 5, trigger 6

NOTE: WHEN DIRECTED TO CHECK SW

PUMP BREAKER(S), REPORT

OVERCURRENT TRIPS.

NOTE: When directed to align 2-SW-P-1B to B header, after 2

minutes use PNID to ramp 2-SW-l1 open and 2-SW-13 closed.

NOTE: The next event may occur once SW flow is restored,

or at the discretion of the lead evaluator.

6) CH.111 "B" steam flow

MS0103, delay time = 5, ramp = 30, severity level = +1, trigger 7

fails high

NOTE: The next event will occur after the crew identifies the

appropriate MOP, or at the direction of the lead evaluator.

Scenario NRC 1

Revision 0

Page25

EVENT

I. <MALFUNCTION/OV**

!*i

LFF NVERRIDE/COMMUNICATIONS.

Scenario NRC 1

7)

LOCA

outside (109 gpm leak) SI16 = 10, ramp = 5

containment

NOTE: IF DIRECTED TO CHECK

SAFEGUARDS BUILDING, REPORT STEAM

ISSUING FROM UNDER THE DOOR

(280 gpm leak) update S116 to 30, ramp =

NOTE: IF PRESSURIZER LEVEL AND

PRESSURE STABILIZE OR RECOVERTOO

SOON, THEN DO THE FOLLOWING:

(490 gpm leak) update S116 to 55%.

NOTE: IF crew has NOT manually opened charging pump

suction valves from RWST, observe VCT level if VCT is

allowed to empty, take PNID variable CHMOV115E_RACKIN

= F and CHMOV115E = 0, then set CH1201_DEG and

CH1202 both = -1. If crew does NOT restore a suction source

within 30 seconds after VCT empties, trip running charging

pumps.

NOTE: THE SCENARIO MAY BE

TERMINATED ONCE CREW

ACKNOWLEDGES TRANSITION TO 1-E-1,

ORAT THE DISCRETION OF THE LEAD

EVALUATORt

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