ML17317B246

Requests NRC Hold Public Hearings Re Util Application to Increase Nuclear Waste Storage Capacity

ML17317B246
Person / Time
Site:	Cook
Issue date:	05/09/1979
From:	Levin C SENATE
To:	Hendrie J NRC COMMISSION (OCM)
Shared Package
ML17317B245	List: ML17317B244 ML17317B246
References
NUDOCS 7906070290
Download: ML17317B246 (108)

Text

CARL LEVIN t$fCHIOAN

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'Rl.'nHeb Wf~fee Wenrde WASHINGTON, D.C.

20510 May 9, 1979 Mr. Joseph M. Hendrie Nuclear Regulatory Corrnission Washington, D.C.

20555

Dear Mr. Hendrie:

I want to encourage the Nuclear Regulatoxy Comnission to hold a public hearing on Indiana and Michigan Power Co~y's application to increase nuclear waste storage capacity at its Cook plant in western Michigan.

Our nation is in a period in which many people have lost faith in their govexnIrent's resolve to do the right thing, particularly regarding nuclear power.

And we should do anyt1~g we can to help restore public confidence in government and give people the opportunity to voice their opinions.

Because persons with objections to the Cook plans inadvertently were not notified by the NRC, they did not have the opportunity to call for.a hearing at an earlier stage.

I am told, however, that persons with specific objections can ask for a public hearing within 45 days after the plans are reviewed and approved by the NRC. I think you should extend the opportunity that was missed earlier and make evexy effort to hear and consider all sides in this decision.

No one should be able to fairly say that the regulatory process was a sham in this case.

As you may knur, I have called for a oratorium on nuclear power plant construction not already underway.

I am concerned about nuclear power plant accidents, lmr-level radiation and waste.

I have serious doubt about our long-term ability to deal with the dangerous waste generated by the nuclear power plants.

But I have not ca1led for a shutdown of operating nuclear power-plants or plants under construction, and I realize we have to store the waste being generated by these plants.

I understand the need to expand waste facilities.

The only alternative would seem to be transportation of the waste to another storage site, and that would be dangerous for a number of reasons.

It does seem to me that requests for mare storage space oonfixm my doubts about the nuclear pcmer plant industxy's ability to solve the waste problem.

Consumers Power, for example, is asking for mre waste storage space for its Midland, Michigan, pcwer plant that is still under construction.

My doubts aside, I think the Cook situation calls for an extra effort, by the government to be responsive to its citizens.

Sincerely, Ogp~

Carl Levin U.S. Senator

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I C'ARL LEVIN MICNIOAN

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205 I0 May 9, 1979 Mr. Joseph M. Hendrie NI. uclear Regulatory Comission Washington, D.C.

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Dear Mr. Hendrie:

I want to encourage the Nuclear Regulatory Coamissian to hold a public hearing on Indiana and Michigan Poorer CoIopany's application to increase nuclear waste storage capacity at its Cook plant in western Michigan.

Our nation is in a period in which many people have lost faith in their government's resolve to do the right thing, p-Irticularly regarding nuclear power.

And we should do anytt~g we can to help restore public confidence in government and give people the opportunity to voice their opinions.

Because persons with objections to the Cook plans inadvertently were not notified by the NRC, they did not have the opportIzu.ty to call for a hearing at an earlier stage.

I am told, however, that persons with.specific objections can Mk for a public hearing within 45 days after the plans are reviewed and approved by the NRC. I think you should extend the opportunity that was missed earlier and make every effort to hear and consider all sides in this decision.

No one should be able to fairly say that the regulatory process was a sham in this case+

As you may know,. I have called for a IInratorium on nuclear pcarer

'lant construction not already underway. I am concerned about nuclear pcs~ plant accidents, lmr-level radiation and waste.

I have serious doubt about our long-term ability to deal with the dangerous waste generated by the nuclear power plants.

But I have not called for a shutdown of'perating nuclear power plants or plants under construction, and I ~ze we have to store the waste being generated by these plants.

I understand the need to expand waste facilities.

The only alternative would seem to be transportation of the waste to another storage site, and that would be dangerous for a numLmr of reasons.

It does seem to ae that requests for mre storage space confirm np doubts about the nuclear power plant industry's ability to solve the waste problem..

Consumers Pmer~ for example, is asking for a+re waste storage space for its Midland, Michigan, power plant that is still under construction.

My doubts aside, I think the Cook situation calls for an extra effort, by the government to be responsive to its citizens.

Sincerely, Carl Levin U.S. Senator

OCT 04 1S78 The Honorable Robert P. Griffin United States Senate Washington, D.C.

20510

Dear Senator Griffin:

As requested by your referral of September 15, 1978, enclosed is a copy of a letter to Mr. James C. HcGahey responding to his letter of September 8. 1978 to Dr. Clifford Y. Smith, Director of the Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards at t(RC.

Sincerely, (signed) iVilliamS. DirclN DctIV!, l.xccutivc Director (o

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Enclosure:

As stated DISTRIBUTION EDO-04555 EDO R/F MMalsch RFonner DSSS.-

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James C. McGahey, President United Plant Guard Morkers of America 25510 Kelly Road Roseville, Michigan 48066

Dear ter. HcGahey:

In your letter of September 8, 1978 to Dr. Clifford V. Smith, Director of the Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards, you raised several questions about the employment of sec'urity guards at the Donald C. Cook nuclear power plant in Bridgman, tlichigan.

Of particular concern to you is the fact that the utility is obtaining a new security force contractor by bidding.

You suggest NRC can through some applica-tion of "federal policyn prevent the change.

I know this answer will disappoint you, but the truth is that as a

general matter NRC has no author ity to intervene in the hiring practices of a utility for guards.

NRC has recently. through rulemaking, estab-lished some guard qualification, training, and equipment requirements but these requirements may be met by either proprietary or contract guard force.

(The net] regulation was published in the Federal Register on August 23, 1978 and will be effective on October 23, 1978 - a copy is enclosed).

Accordingly, NRC is in no position to institute "remedial action" as requested in your letter.

Me would be happy to discuss this subject with you further, if you think this would be useful.

Me certainly would be concerned if, f'r example, it appeared that a switch from a proprietary to a contract guard force did, contrary to our expectations, impact significantly on the effec-tiveness of the guard force.

Sincerely, (StgncIi) qVnttam J. birch gcputy i,Tccutiv

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Enclosure:

Federal Register Notice See previous yellow for concurrences orrIcs~

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Mr. James 'C. McGahey, President United Plant Guard llorker s of America 25510 Kelly Road Roseville, Michigan 48066

Dear Mr. McGahey:

In you letter of September 8,

1978 t Dr. Clifford V. Smith, Director of the Office of Nuclear Material Safe and Safeguards, you raised several questions about the emplo ent of security guards at the Donald C. Cook 'nuclear power pla in Bridgman, Michigan.

Of particular concern to you is the fact that he utility is obtaining a new security force contractor by bidding.

u suggest NRC can through some applica-tion of "federal policy" prev t the change.

I know this answer will dis ppoint you, -but the truth is that NRC has no authority to intervene n the hiring practices of a utility for guards.

NRC has recently.

throug rulemaking, established some guard qualification, training, and equipment equirements but these requirements may be met by either proprietary contract guard force.

(The new regulation was published in the Fede 1 Register on August 23, 1978 and will be effective on October 23, 1978 a copy is enclosed).,

Our attorneys advise me, however, that while IRC may under the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended.

prescribe guard qualification, training, and equipment for the physical pro ction of a licensed facility. the Act gives NRC no authority in th area of utilityunion relationships.

Accordingly, NRC is in no p sition to institute "remedial action" as requested in your letter.

Sincerely yours, En osure DISTRIBUTION M. Malsch R. Former OELD OELD Reading C. Smith G. McCorkle LgQ OrEICE~

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tf ULATIONS RULES AND REG 3V421 I

itself. The same reaso a bar on such fiUngs w sion also support a pr fiUngs with the subor tory bodies in the C

Commission has decid regulations accordingl EFFECTIVE DATE: A FOR FURTHER I

CONTACT:

Stephen S. Ostrach, the General Couns Regulatory Comm ton, D.C. 20555. 202-SUPPLEMENTARY I Because this amend matters of fnternal general notice of. prop fs unnecessary.

Pursuant to sectto Atomic Energy Act of 2201 and to 5 U.S.C.

U.S.C. 553, the next to 10 CFR 9.103 ls amend that support th the Commis-ltbttton against inate adjudica-mmission. The d to amend its

)gust 23, 1978.

FORMATION Esq.. Office of

, U.S. Nuclear

ion, Washing-34-3224.

FORMATION:

ent relates to ency

practice, sed rulemakfng 161 of the 1954, 42 U.S.C.

552b(g) and 5

last sentence of d to read:

$ 9.103 i General provisio

'uch stateme

pleaded, cited, or reU the Commtssfon or in under part 2 of these CFR part 2) except as may direct.

Dated at Washing 17th day of August 19 r For the Commfssion.

SAbr Sccrctar71 ofth (FR oc. '18-23588 Filed S.

ts may not be d upon before any proceeding regulations (10 he Commission n,

D.C.,

thts

81. J. CHIu(,

Commission. 78: 8:45 am]

'P5 0-01j PART 35HUMA IIYPRODUCT M USES OF TERIAL Application Form P LicenseM d r Materials ical ar Regulatory ending its reg-of a new form ons for Matcri-The new form n the one it re-asfs, has result-dence botwcen ts regarding de-catfons.

November 6,

"ulatory Commis.

ulc to thc Comp.

ccvicw as rllay bc eral Reports Act, 512. The drltc on cordkecpfng) re.

lccomcs effective, AGENCY: U.S.

Nuc)

Commission (NRC).

ACTION:Final rule.

SUMMARY

NRC fs ulatfons to require us NRC-313M, "AppUcat als LfccnseMedical" fs easier to ffftout th places, and, on a trial ed fn reduced corresp NRC and the applic ficfcncfes in their appl EFFECTIVE DATE:

1978.

NoTr.-Thc Nuc)csr R sion has submitted this troller General for such appropriate under the F as amended, 44 V.S.C.

which the reporting

(

qulrcmcnt ot this rule unless'hdviscd to the co reflects inclusion of thc 4 that statute allows for VD.C. 3512(cX2)).

FOR FURTHER trary. accordingly

~day period which such review (44 FORMATION CONTACT:

Edward Podolak, ards Development, ulatory Commissio D.C. 20555, phone 30 SUPPLEMENTARY I fice of Stand-S. Nuclear Reg-Washington,

-443-5946.

0RMATION:

for the medical ial are filed on Presently, applicatio use of byproduct mat the general appUcatfo with the aid of a guide (NUREG-0338, quests information n specific to the med Form AEC-313 does space and does not sp much of the fnformat the medical Ucensin form NRC-313M has specifically for the tion.

Form NRC-3 change the substanti that must bc met b medical licenses. The quired on the new fo that currently identff cal Ucensing guide.

the new form NRC-31 the medical licensing for the licensee to us

basis, has resulted in dence between NRC cants regarding defi applications.

Form NRC-313M an form AEC-313 edical Ucensing ev. 1) which re-essary for and al appUcation.

ot have enough (t iffealty address on requested in guide. A new been developed edical appUca-3M does not 0 requirements applicants for information re-is the same as ed In the medi-wever, because

)M fs taUored to uide, it is easier and, on a trial less correspon-and the appU-encies fn their the medical U-fable from the g Branch, Divi-and Material clear Material

, U.S. Nuclear n, Washington, censing guide are av Radfotsotopes Lfcensir sion of Fuel Cycle

Safety, OfQce of NLI Safety and Safeguard Regulatory Commtssf D.C.

20555.'ecause this notice ters of agency manag dure, general notice o making and public pr are unnecessary and can be effective 75 da relates to mat ent and proce-proposed rufe-cedure thereon he amendment s after publica-tfon.

Pursuant to the A of 1954, as amended, t 1 gamfzatton Act of 19)t Ic Energy Act e Energy Rcor-4, as amended 53 of title 5 of e, the foUowfng 10, Chapter I, iations, Part 35 ment subject to and sections 552 and the United States Co amendmcnts to Title Code of Federal Re are published as a doc reads as follows:

g 33.4 Application forrl ccnscs.

AppUcations for spe human usc under H 35.13 shall be filed 313M, "AppUcatton f cense Medical."

for specific li-ific licenses for 5.11, 35.12, and n form NRC-r Materials Li-codification.

A new section f35.

Is added which (Secs. 81. 161b, Pub. L. 8 68 Stat. 035, 948 (42 U.S.

201, Pub. L 93-438, as 1242 (42 U.S.C. 5841).)

Dated at Bethesda, of August 1978.

For the Nuclear R mission.

=

Lzg Execu

[

oc. 78-23340 Filed 703. as amended.

. 2111, 2201); sec.

ncnded.

88 Stat.

d., this 8th day gulatory Com-Gosslct(,

ive Director r Opera tions. 78: 8:45 am) 590-01]

ART 73 PHYSICAL PROTECTION OF PLANTS AND'ATERIALS Security Personnel Qualification Training and Equipmont Requirements AGENCY: U.S.

Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

ACTION:Final rule.

SUMMARY

On July 5,

1977, the Commission published for public com-ment proposed amendments to the Commission's regulations to impose upgraded guard quattffcatton, training, and equipping requirements for sccuri-ty personnel protecting against theft of special nuclear materials and indus-trial sabotage of nuclear faciUties or nuclear shipments In response to pubUc comments, the training and quaUficatlons section of thc proposed amendments has been extensively revised to specify perform-ance oriented requirements instead of the detailed training requirements as originally proposed on July 5, 1977.

The performance oriented require-ments give licensees flexlbiUty fn se-lecting and developing thc most cost-effective training programs to meet site specific needs. The Nuclear Regu-latory Commission now fs publishing these revised amendments in final form.

Concurrent with publication of these amendments, the NRC is issuing for pubUc comment guidance documents to assist the licensee in the develop-ment of security personnel training and quaUffcations plans required by the amendments. The effective date of the revised requirements has been set to permit pubUc comment on the guid-ance and its issuance in final form at the time the requirements become ef-fective..

EFFECTIVE DATE: October 23; 1978.

'Rom.-The Nuclear Rggu)atory'ommis-sion has submitted this rule to the Comp.

(roger General for review of its reporting rcquircmcnts under the Fcdcrai Reports Act. as amended.

44 U.S.C. 3512. The date on which thc reporting requfrcmcrlt of the rule bccomcs c(fcctivc. untcss advised Io the contrary.

includes a 45*day period which FEDERAL REGISTER, VOL 43, t(O. 154WKDt(ESDAY, AUGUST 23, )978 e

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3V422 that statute allov:s tor Comptro)lcr General review <44 U.S.C. 3512(c)(2)).

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:

Mr. R. J. Jones, Chief Materials Pro-tection Standards Branch, Division of Siting, Health and Safeguards Standards, Office of Standards De-velopment, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, D.C.

20555, 301-443-5907.

SUPPLZMENTARYINFORMATION:

In 1975; the security agency study (NUREG-0015, ES) concluded

thai, "Creation of a Federal guard force for maintaining securfty in the nuclear in-dustry would not result in a higher degree of guard force effectiveness than can be achieved by the use of pri-vate guards properly qualified, trained and certified (by the NRC)." In 19V6. a Joint ERDA-NRC task force was formed to propose a plan of action for improving the controls and protection of nuclear Iflaterfafs at NRC lfcensed fuel cycle facilftfes. The task force ad.

dressed the current status and future direction of physical security protec-tion at NRC licensed fuel cycle facilf-tfes now fn possession of certain quan-

'tities of special nuclear materials. The task force report issued in July 1976 included conclusions and rccommenda-tlons which provide a basis for rule-

. making. The Nuclear Regulatory Com-mission has determined, as a result of the security agency study conclusions, thc Joint task force findings and other subsequent dellberatlons, that security personnel qualification and training requfrements should be upgraded through public rulemaking. On July 5, 1977, the Nuclear Regulatory Commis-

• sion published in the FRDLslaL Rsors-xRR (42 FR 34321) proposed amend-ments to 10 CFR part V3 of its regula-tions. Interested'persons were invited to submit written comments and sug-gestions on the proposed amendments within 45 days after publication fn the FEDERAL RFAISTFR.

The comment period was subsequently extended 30 days. Based on the public comments and other considerations, the Commis-sion has adopted the proposed amend-ments, with modifications as set forth below.

'In adopting these amendments the Commfssion decided that the rcqulre-mcnts should not be made. effective until gufdancc had been'published to assist the )fcensccs In developing their security personnel training and quail.

fications plans. Concurrent with the publication of these amendments,

'hree guidance documents are being published for public comment. These are:

1. NUREG-0464

~ "SILe Sccurlty Pcr.

sonncl Training Manual,"

IIULBS ANI) REGULATiONS

't 2.

NUREG-0465, "Transportation Security Personnel Training Manual,"

arid

3. Regulatory Gufde 5.52, "Standard Format and Content for the Physical Protectfon Section of a I fcense Appli-cation <For Facilities Other Than Nu-clear Power Plants)," Revised Chapter

4. "Security Organization," and Chap-ter 18, "Security Personnel."

Copies of these three guidance docu-ments are being sent to persons who have expressed an interest In this matter. Comments are being requested by September 22, 1978 so that final guidance can be published by the time the rulc becomes effective October 23, 19V8.

A fourth document specific for nu-dear power plants, "Nuclear Security Personel for Power Plants, NUREG-0219, Draft 2," was published for com-ment fn April 1978. This document has been revised and published in final form. Copies of these doucmcnts also will be placed in the Commission's Public Document Room at, 1717 H

Street NW., Washfngton, D.C. Single copies of these four guidance docu-ments may be obtained by writing to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commis-sion. Attention: Bernadine Scharf. Dis-tribution Services

Branch, Washing-ton. D.C. 20555.

Significant dffferenccs from the pro-posed rule published for comment; on July 5, 19VV are: (1) titles and deffnf-tions used fn appendix B have been clarfffed and moved to 10 CFR V3;2 to be consolidated with other definitions applicable to 10 CFR part 73; (2) em-ployment suitablity criteria have been revised Lo be less restrictive on the hiring of unarmed security personnel, and more specific on the hiring of armed security personnel; (3) physical qualification criteria have been revised to require physical examinations for central alarm station operators and-armed security personnel; (4) the crite-ria for vision and hearing capability have been revised for clarification pur-poses, and to permit the use of hear-ing aids to qualifty to the hearing cri-

.teria; (5) mental qualffications criteria have been revised to delete the re-quirement for psychological testing of unarmed security personnel,

except, for central alarm station operators, and to allow for some flexfbflftyin the licensee psychological evaluation pro-gram; (6) physical fitness qualificat-.

ionss criteria have been revised to permit each Ifcensce to develop physi-cal fitness requirements to meet site specific needs; (7) contract security personnel criterion has been revised to be job related; (8) training and qualifi-cations crfte@a have been completely revised to delete specified training courses and Instead rewritten to re-quire the licensee to develop a plan that he will usc LD meet the proposed 0

fEDERAL REGISTER, VOL 43, NO. 164WEDNESDAY, AUGU criteria, in order to assure that, securi-ty personnel possess the required skill, knowledge and ability to perform as-signed security Job duties; (9) thc cri-teria which specify certain require-ments for security management.

and security supervisors have been deleted; (10) the criteria for weapons training

)lave been revised and the number of training hours has been deleted; (11) weapons qualification criteria have been simplified and clarified; (12) the phrases "' 'ot limited to '

and "' 's appropriate ' '" have been deleted; (13) the period of time

'llotted for submittal of a licensee plan to implement these proposed re.

quirements has been lengthened from 30 to 120 days for fuel cycle facilities and tranportation and 300 days for:

power reactors; and (14) fuel cycle fa-

~

cility and transportation licensees plans would be followed by 180 days after the effective date of the rule or 60 days after NRC approval of the plan, whichever fs )ater, and power re-actor licensees plans would be followed, by 500 days after the effective date of the rule or 60 days after the approval of the plan, whichever fs later.

The following discussion pertains to Items (1) through (14) above.

(1)

Titles and def(nitions.

Com-,

menters stated that titles and defini-tions contained fn appendix B should be Ilmited and clarified and suggested that all dcfinilfons appHcable to 10 CFR part 73 and appendix B should be located in 10 CFR 73.2.

In response to these comments the Commission has decided to limit, the number of titles used, to clarify such titles. and to remove titles and definf.

tions from appendix B. Accordingly, titles and definitions of fob dutfes, es.

sentfal to the effective operation of a licensee security

system, have been clarified, the term "armed escort" has been added and defined, and titles and definitions have been included in 10 CFR 73.2.

(2) SuitabQity critcri<L Some com-menters rccommendeg

that, criteria for suitability and physical qualifica-tion be deleted.

Some commenters stated that in view of the fact that Lhe age of ma]ority for voting. Joining the armed services and entering into legal transactions is 18 years, a minimum age of 21 years'for hiring security per-sonnel would present legal problelns if challenged under equal employment, laws. Other commenters stated that the criteria for a high school diploma.

or equiva)ent and the

~ prohibition agafnst felony convictions should be clarified to avoid any complications that might arise because of employ-ment opportunity laws.

In response to these comme)Its Lhe Commission has decided: <a) Lo permit licensees to employ unarmed securitv personnel under 21 years of age; (b) to ST 23, 1978

r elaborate on the meaning of high school equivalent: and (c) to be more explicit regarding types of felony con-victions to bc considered. The rule has been changed trr clarify the meaning

. of high school equivalent, fn terms of Job connection, and in requiring no felony convictions to show a direct re-latfonship between a felony conviction and the specific Job assignment being sought. However, the Commission be-lieves that because of the high level of responsibility assocfated with the Job duties of armed personnel, suitability crfteria are necessary. Accordfngfy, the minimum age requirement of 21 years has been retained for armed security personnel.

(3) Physfcal qualificatfons crfterfa.

Some commenters stated that the ri-gidity of physical qualifications would severely limit the number of candi-dates available to fill security job functions and that the. criteria speci-fied would result in a violation of Fed-eral age and sex discrimination laws.

In response to these comments the Commission has decided to delete the criteria requiring a physical examina-tion for unarmed security personnel except for central alarm station opera-tors and instead will require such per-sonnel to be physically capable of per-formfng assigned security job duties.

The criteria specifying the require-ment for physical examinations have been revised to apply only to armed se-curity personnel and central alarm sta-tion operators.

(4)

Visforr and hearfng crfterfa.

Commenters made the followingstate-ments about the proposed vision and hearing criteria; (a) they are overly re-strictive; (b) unarmed security person-nel should not be required to meet the criteria; (c) the requirement for recog-nizing basic colors should be clarified; (d) the use of a hearing aid should be allowed to correct hearing impairm-entt; (e) that additional clarification of these requirements Is essential; and (f) that ft would be preferable to.speci-fy minimum requirements In terms of the better ear.

In response to these comments the Commfsslon has decided that: (a) un.

armed security personnel should be exempt from vision and hearing re-quirements unless required by as-signed security related task identified In.the licensee's plan; (b) the criteria need to bc clarified; and (c) a hearing aid to correct hearing impairment should bc permitted..Accordingly, the criteria which specify vision and hear-ing requirements have been revised to:

(a) Apply explfcitiy to armed person-nel; (b) clarify the rcquirernents; and (c) permit, the use of a hearing aid to meet. hearing requirements.

(6) Mental qualifications criteri.

Some commenters stated that the re-qulremcnt for each security force RULES AND REGULATIONS member to bc examined by a licensed clinical psychologist or psychiatrist is unnecessary and overly restrictive. and that adequate psychological screening is within the capabilities of a gcncral physfcian who has experience In such matters.

Other commenters stated that an option to the mental cxamlna-tion should bc available, and suggest that Individuals employed by the same firm for more than 2 years with no sign of emotional instability should be excused from taking thc mental exam-ination.

In response to these comments the Commission has determined that: (a) psychological evaluations should be administered by a licensed psycholo-gist, or psychiatrist, or physician or other person professionally trained to identify emotional instability; (b) per-sons other than armed personnel and central alarm station operators need not undergo psychological evaluation; and (c) the granting og exemptions or exceptions to NRC requirements, properly supported and docume'nted, will continue to be a licensing respon-sibility. Accordingly, mental qualifica-tions criteria have been revised to re-quire only armed personnel and cen.

tral station operators to undergo psy-chological examination, and to permit subsequent identification of possible emotional instability for these and all other security personel by normal su-pervisory personnel, subject to veriff-cation by an'ppropriately lfcensed and trained person.

(6)

Contract security personneL Commenters stated that requirements for contract security personnel should be'ob duty related.

In response to these comments the Commission agrccd that contract secu-rity personnel should be required to meet the same criteria for specific se-curity job tasks and duties that would be required for a licensee proprietary guard for'ce. Accordingly, contract se-curity personnel criteria have been re-vised to be Job related, Just as for in-house sccurlty personnel.

(7)

Trafnfng and qualfficatfons.

Some commenters stated that the pro-posed training and qualifications crite-ria attempt to be too broad and all In-clusive in scope while sacrificing qual-ity, indepth educatfon and training.

Most commenters stated that the over-all concept of specifying in fine detail each course of instruction, the number of hours of instruction for each course, the individuals who would be required to attend each course, the do.

cumenting of names of instructors and places of instruction for each course, specific training requirements for li-censee management and security 'su-pervisory personnel, etc.,

would not neccessarily achieve the desired obJcc-tive of uniformly upgrading the qual-It,v of security personnel at licensed fa-37423 cilities and in transportation because training in itself would not measure an individual's capability to perform as-signed security job duties. In addition, commenters stated that there ap-peared to be much duplication among the proposed training programs, and that training programs and facilities would more properly be designed and fmplemented on a site specific basis.

In response to these comments the Commission has decided that, because of site specific requirements as they relate to security hardware, physical

barriers, material access and vital

areas, alarm systems, and procedures required to implement a

licensee's physical security and contingency plans, the training and qualifications criteria should be revised to give the li-censee greater latitude to design and develop site specific training require-ments and programs to meet site spe-cific needs.

In order to accomplish this, the training and qualifications criteria have been revised to require each 1!censee to submit.a training and qualifications plan which outlines the processes by which guards, watchmen, armed response persons, armed escorts and other members of the security or-ganization will be

selected, trained,

equipped, tested, and qualified to assure these individuals meet the re-quirements.

(8)

Security management.

Com.

menters stated that the criterion which specifies a training program and hours of Instruction for managers does not clearly defoe up to what level of management would be required to re-ceive,such trainfng. One commenter stated tBat rather than requiring spe-cific training for management, the NRC should specify minimum qualifi-cations for the various functions within management and that the NRC should provide any additional security training that the NRC deems neces-sary.

In response to these comments the Commission has decided to delete the requirement for security management training. The revised criteria for train-ing and qualifications described in (7) above willassure the Commission that the proper level of management will be Involved in the decision making and Implementation process fn the qualifi-cation and training of guards.

(9) 1Veapons training.

Most com-me>>ters stated that weapons training requirements:

(a) were excessive with respect to number of hours of instruc-tion required; (b) were not clear as to who should undergo the training: (c) specified unnecessary training time, since performance requirements are later specified in section IV of appen-dix 13; and (d) did not, take into ac.

count individuals wit,h previous weap-ons experience.

FEDERAL'EGISTER, VOL 43, NO. 164WEDNESDAY, AUGUSZ 23, 1970

I In, response to these comments the Commission has decided that the weapons training criteria should be stated in terms that would permit flexibilitywith respect to hours of in-struction required based on an individ; ual's experience and to permit'the li-censee to identify by security related job tasks or duties, which individuals

~

would be required to qualify with weapons and the weapon with which

~ they would qualify. To effect this change the weapons training criteria have been revised to delete the number of hours of training required to give the licensee the requisite.flexi-bility in determining by jon. assign-ment who willreceive training and the extent of training required to qualify with the assigned weapon.

(10)

Weapons qualijication.

Com-menters stated that: (a) It, would be difficult to establish and operate the firing ranges needed for weapons qualification because of training facili-ty limitations; (b) the requirements for both day and night range firing is not necessary to achieve and maintain ffrfng proficiency; (c) lighting present-ly required at nuclear facilities would preempt any need for night firing; and (d) firing ranges are not equipped to duplicate lighting at nuclear facilities.

This can only be done using military type battlefield illumination sources which are beyond the scope of private licensees.

In response to these comments the Commission has decided:

(a) That weapons qualification requirements should be relaxed to give the licensees

~ flexibility in designing their weapons qualifications programs and to permit licensee armed personnel to either fire the course specified or to select an equivalent course of fire; and (b) that it fs necessary to 'require armed indi-a viduals to perform nighttime or simu-lated nighttime firing for familiariza-tion only, because of the varying psy-chological effects on 'persons not ac-customed to night firing. Accordingly, weapons qualification criteria have been revised to permit the licensee to either select the course of fire speci-fied or to choose an equivalent course of fire to qualify. armed personnel. In addition, the criteria requires individ-uals to qualify only with assigned weapons as identified in the licensee's plan.

(1'1) Suggestive phrases. Commeriters noted that, phrases such as "'. '

but not limited to'," and "' 's ap.

propriate '

'," were suggestive, not definitive, and implicitlyrequire more

.to be done.

Thc criteria in, appendix" B have been changed to climinatc these phrases.

As revised, the requirements are stated broadly in terms of capabili-ty and performance to permit flexibil-

, ity in the design of training and quall-RULES ANO RMGULATIOMS fications programs.

The Commission believes that the revised rule will assure the upgraded quality of licens-ee security personnel so that opcn-cnded, suggestive wording is unneces-sary.

(12) and (13) Licensee plan subinit-tal and implementation.

Commenters stated that the Commission did not provide for adequate time to develop a plan in response to the proposed re.

quirements, or provide sufficient time to implement the plan after it has been approved.

The Commission agrees that ade;

'quate time must be allowed for proper planning and implementation to assure effective programs.

The rule has been changed to allow more time for planning and implementation.

In addition to the comments that re-sulted in changes, in the proposed amendments, a number of other issues were commented on which did not result in changes to the proposed amendments, but which warrant dis-cussion and explanation.

'1)

Security personnel training manuaL One commenter stated that the training manual should not be published as a NUREG document if the manual is intended to demonstrate one acceptable approach to satisfying the requirements of the proposed reg-ulation.

The Commission had intended

~ for the training manual to represent a

general course outline for training se-curity personnel and not to provide specific parallel guidance to meet each of the requirements of appendix B. It was not intended as a

regulatory guide.

Thc utility~ of the training manual will bo enhanced, as a general

document, in light of the revised amendments.

(2)

Environmental impact state-ment. A few commenters stated that as a practical matter the drastic in-crease in security personnel training requirements proposed by the amend-ments would undoubtedly require ad-ditional security, administrative, and recordkeeping staff, therefore affect ing other persons rather than dealing only with f,he training of existing secu-rity personnel; involve the potential employment rights and opportunities of numerous existing and future secu-rity personnel; and fnvolve the poten-tial Lssuance of advanced weaponry to private security forces. They believed that the Commission has too narrowly construed the term "environment" contrary to Commiss'ion policy as stated in 10 CFR 51.1(a), concluding that an environmental impact state-ment is required to satisfy NRC's obli-gations under NEPA and CEQ guide-lines.

The Commission has reviewed the criteria provided in 10 CFR Part, 51, the Council on E>>vironmcntal Quality (CEQ) and National En'vironmental Policy Act (NEPA) guidelines in light.

of. the comments rcceivcd and contin-ues to believe that an environmental impact statement for the proposed amendments to 10 CFR Part 'l3 is not required. The m'ain effect of the rule is to require training and qualification of security personnel and is basically procedural, with no environmental effeet worth noting.

(3)

Guard upgrading.

One com-menter stated that the entire upgrad.

ing of guard qualification, training and equipping was unwarranted be-cause his facility maintains liaison with local law enforcement authorities and that the local authorities have su-perior manpower, training and equip.

ment t,o deal with security contingen-cies beyond the control. of the site se-curity organization.

Based on the Joint ERDA-NRC Task Force on.Safeguards and the Se-curity Agency Study (SAS) reports, the Commission decided that the up-grading of lfcensee guard quality was necessary. In support of this decision, the Commission also compared the content and scope of training pro-grams submitted by each licensee to meet the present requirements with the guidance the NRC provided through regulatory guide 5.20. The re-sults of this comparison revealed that present training programs for nelv guards would not produce the quality needed to assure the effective protec-tion of special nuclear materials, facili-ties, or shipments.~The fact, that li-censees maintain liaison with local law enforcement authorities was consid-ered in the decision to require up-graded guard quality, accepting that proximity to, response time by, and the number of responding local au-thorities could bear on the degree of upgrading that would be required in onsite response force numbers and tac-tical training requirements.

(4) Tear gas or mace. Numerous com-ments were made that the,use of tear,,

gas or mace would violate certain State laws which prohibit thc use of sucli substances by private citizens.

Tear gas or other nonlethal gases will continue to be required, and where State,law prohibits such possession and.use by private citizens, adequately supported requests for exemption may be granted or* equivalent alternative profectfon measures'may be proposed

.In conjunctfon with a request for ex-ception from the specific requirement.

(5) Costs.

There werc a few com-ments made"relative to costs to imple-ment the proposed rcqulrements.

One commenter did provide. a cost estimate for training his existing guard force plus annual cost for 'rafning new hires. No basis was given to support, these or the other estlmatcs. Thc cost efSect, iveness of alternative training FKDSMAt ffCGISTN, VOL 43, NO. Id4V/EDHESDAY, AUGUST 23, 197S

gN ~

I

I I

RULES AND REGULATIONS.

3'7425 I

pr(Igrams wlII be investigated as part

. of the logist,ical managcmcnt st,udy Identified In paragraph

1. Staff has prepared a

value. impact assessment which has bccn placed in the public document room which provides a

breakdown of the cost estimates in-cluding statements of benefit when-ever possible. The Important aspect of the proposed regulation, as now writ

ten, Is that the job related perform-ance orientation will give the licensee greater fiexlbIIIty In developing the most cost-effective training program for his plant and transport system.

(6) A few comments were received in response to the Commission's request for comments, recommendations, and cost tradeoffs on the alternate ap-proaches available for training person-nel, and the alternative of certifying training programs vs. certifying of in-dividuals, to assist the Commission in arriving at a consensus as to the most cost-effective approach for conducting security personnel training.

These comments can be categorized generally as follows:

(I) Central and regional training versus local training.

(Ii) Certification of training pro-grams versus certification of individ-uals.

(lii)Training costs.'he following discussion pertains to items (I) through (Ili)above.

(I) Comments received were both in favor of and opposed to the need for establishing central or regional train-ing facIIItics. Persons favoring the es-tablishment of central or regional training facilities stated that such fa-cilities could be established by or under contract to the NRC, possibly using existing Federal installations.

Since there would be only a few in-structors available with the expcrtisc ncccssary to teach some of the courses required, the staffing of central or re-gional facilities would not be difficult, whild the simultaneous staffing of lo-calized training facilities may not be achievable.

Such commenters also stated that with central or regional training facilities, changes in the Com-mission's regulations could be Imple-mented directly; and that the skill levels of graduates would be consistent throughout the industry. No cost fig-ures werc provided by commenters ad'-

vocating the 'establishment of central or regional facilitics.

Commenters opposing central or re-gional training facilltics stated that the expenses for transporting, fccding, and housing individuals at a central or regional facilities would add, substan-tially to the cost for training. Under clther of thcsc training arrangcmcnts, lt; would bc difficult to provide site specific training sufficient to meet the needs of each licensee.

Additionally, regional centers or a central facility would necessitate pooling of security personnel from various licensees for each class "of students, which would in-crease the probability of unauthorized.

'disclosure of sensitive and proprietary licensee physical security system in-formation. No cost comparison esti-mates were provided to support the position of commenters opposed to central or regional training of security personnel.

(Ii) Commenters stated that the al-ternative of certifying training pro-grams for a specific training center versus certification of security person-nel would only be acceptable from a cost effective standpoint ifeach licens-ee or the employer of the personnel could operate its own certified training centers.

One commenter stated that the requirements should be defined, methods for certification identified, and actual training programs be made available prior to.implementation of the proposed rule.

(ill)A few commenters provided gen-eralized and unsupported costs for im-plementing the proposed amendments.

They also expressed concern that they were limited in attracting younger per-sonnel who might meet the require-ments, and historically, they have ex-perienced a high turnover rate in secu-rity personnel which would drive the costs for training and retraining even higher.

The Commission agrees that there are economic advantages and disad-vantages and other problems associat-ed with the alternative means availa-ble for training licensee security pcr-sonel. The revised amendmcnts tahe into consideration the Commission's objective to assure that security per-sonnel quality be uniformly upgraded at licensee facilities and in transporta-tion. This can be achieved by either close coordination with all training programs, or by a means for assuring that each >erson assigned to perform security tasks is properly equipped and qualified to do so. The revised amendments follow the latter ap-proach and do not specifically address training

.details.

Nevertheless, the Commission is still concerned that some level of uniformity of perform-ance should be established for all af-fected licensees.

As stated in July 1977, the Commission willstudy alter-native approaches to training person-nel and the alternative of certifying training programs or individuals.

There ls underway a logistical manage-ment study which should assist the Commission In deciding on the most cost-effective approach available for certification, and will provide the li-censees information on the cost effec-tiveness of each of the training altcr-nativcs to meet NRC requirements. In

addition, the results of the study should provide information on the availability of instructors with the ex-pertise necessary to train security per-sonnel.

The results of this study should bc available around November

-15, 1978. These results, along with the experience gained from implementa-tion of the effective rule, will be used in the decision making process by thc Commission to determine whether a

more structured system of training of security personnel should be recom-mended to licensees.

The Commission has determined under Council of Environmental Qual-ity guidelines and the criteria in 10 CFR Part 51.5(d)(3), that neither an environmental impact statement nor environmental impact appraisal to support a negative declaration for the proposed amendmcnts to 10 CFR Part 73 is required because the amend-ments deal primarily with the qualifi-cation and training of existing security personnel and do not directly or Indi-rectly affect the environment.

Pursuant to the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended. the Energy Reor-ganization Act of 1974, as amended, and sections 552 and 553 of title 5 of the United States

Code, notice Is hereby given that the following amendments to Title 10, Chapter 1,

Code of Federal Regulations, Part 73 are published as a document subject to codification.

1. Section 73.2 of 10 CFR Part 73 is am'ended to add - paragraphs (t) through (w).

g 73.2 Deiinltlons.

As used ln this part:

~

~

(t)

"Armed response personnel" means

persons, not necessarily uni-formed, whose primary duty in the event of attempted theft of special nu-clear material or industrial sabotage shall be to

respond, armed and equipped, to prevent or delay such ac.

tions.

(u) "Armed escort" means an armed personnot necessarily uniformed, whose primary duty Is to accompany shipments of special nuclear material for'the protection of such shipments against theft or industrial sabotage.,

(v) "Security management" means persons responsible for sccurlty at the policy and general management level.

(w) "Security supervision" means persons, not necessarily uniformed or armed.

whose primary duties'are su-pervision and direction of security.at the day-to day operating level.

2, Paragraphs 73.30(d) and 73.30(e) of 10 CFR Part, 73 arc revised to read as follows:

g 73.30 General requirements.

FEDERAL REGISTER, Vol. 43, NO. 164WEDNESDAY, AUGUST 23, 'l918

rI' I

ra 3'l~i2G (d) When armed escorts are use

. pursuant to H73.31(c)(1), 73.31(c)(2 73.33, and 73.35, the licenscc shall n permit an individual to act as a

armed escort unless such individu has been trained. equipped, and qual fied to perform each assigned security job duty in accordance with Appendix B, "General Criteria for Security Per-sonnel," of this part. Upon the request of an authorized representative of the Commission the licensee shall demon-strate the ability of the physical secu-rity personnel to carry out their as-signed.

duties and responsibilities.

Armed escorts shall requalify in ac-cordance with appendix B of this part at least every 12 months. Such requali-

'icatloIIshall be documented.

(e) Prior to transporting special nu-clear material subject to the physical protection requirements of this part, each licensee shall submit a plan out-lining the procedures that willbe used to meet the requirements of 073.30 through 73.36 and 73.70(g). By (120

days after the rule becomes effective) each licensee shall submit a training and qualifications plan outlining the processes by which armed escorts will be selected, trained, equipped,

tested, and qualified to assure these individ-uals meet, the requirements of para-graph (d) of this section.

The training and qualifications plan shall include a schedule to show how all armed escorts will be qualified by (within 2 years after the rule becomes effective) or within 2 years after the submitted plan is approved. whichever is later. The training and qualifica-tions.plan shall be followed by the li-censee after (180 days after the rule becomes effective) or 60 days after the submitted plan is approved by the NRC, whichever Is later.

(h) By (120 days after the rule be-comes effective) each licensee shall submit a training and qualifications plan outlining the processes by which

guards, watchmen.

armed response persons and other members of the se-curity organization will be

selected, trained,

equipped, tested, and quali.

fied to assure these Mdividuals meet the requirements of paragraph (a)(4) of this section. The training and quali-fications plan shall include a schedule to show how all security personnel will be qualified by (within 2 years after the rule becomes effective) or within two years after the submitted plan is

approved, whichever is later.

The training and qualifications plan shall be followed by the licensee after (180 days after the rule becomes effective) or 60 days after the submitted plan is approved by the NRC, whichever is later.

4. Paragraph 73.55(b)(4) of 10 CFR Part V3 ls revised to read as follows:

'73.65 Requirements I'or physical protec-tion of licensed activities In nuclear power reactors agztlIIst Industrial snbo.

(age.

~

~ '

(b)(4) Thc licensee shall not permit an individual to act as a guard, watch-man. armed response person, or other member of the security organization unless such individual has been

trained, equipped, and qualified to perform each assigned security job duty in accordance with Appendix B, "General Criteria for Security Person-

3. Paragraph 73.50(a)(4) and 'V3.50(h) of 10 CFR Part 73 are revised to read as follows:

$ 73.60 Requirements for physical protec-tIDIIof licensed activities.

~

~

~

(a) ' '4) The licensee shall not permit an individual to act as a guard, watchman, armed response person, or other member of the security organiza-tion unless such individual has been

- trained, equipped.

and qualified to perform.each assigned security job duty in accordance with Appendix B,

."General Criteria for Security Person-nel," of this part. Upon the request of an authorized representative of the Commission the licensee shall demon-strate the ability of the physical secu-rity personnel to carry out their as-signed duties and responsibilities.

Each

guard, watchman, armed rc-nel," of this part. Upon thc request of an authorized representative of the

. Commission the licensee shall demon-strate the ability of thc physical secu-rity personnel to carry out their as-signed duties and responsibuities.

Each

guard, watchman, armed re-sponse person, and other member of the security organization shall rcqua-lify in accordance with appendix B of

'his part at least every 12 months.

Such requalification shall be docu-mented. By (300 days after the rule becomes effective) each licensee shall submit a training and qualifications plan outlining the processes by which

guards, watchmen, armed response persons, and other mcmbcrs of the se-curity organization will bc sclccted,

trained, equipped,

tested, and quail.

fied to assure these Individuals mcct RULES hND REGULATIONS d

sponse

person, and other member of

),

the security organization shall requa-ot lify in accordance with appendix B of n

this part at least every 12 months.

al Such requalification shall be docu-I-

mented.

the requirements of this paragraph.

The training and qualifications plan shall include a schedule to show how all security personnel will be qualified by (within 2 years after the rule be-comes effective) or within 2

years after the submitted plan Is approved, whichever is later. The training and qualifications plan shall be followed by the licensee after (500 days after the rule becomes effective) or 60 days after the submitted plan is approved by the NRC, whichever is later.

5. A new Appendix B entitled -Gen-eral Criteria for Security Personnel" is added to 10 CFR Part, V3 to read as follows:

APPENDIX B GENERAL CRITERIA FOR SECURITF PERSONNEL TABLE OF CONTENTS IntroductIDIL Definitions.

Criteria.

L Employment suitability and qualifica-tion.

A. Suitability.

B. Physical and mental qualifications.

~ C. Physical fitness qualifications.

D. Contract security personnel.

E. Physical requalification.

F. Documentation.

. ~ -II.Training and quallflcatloILs.

A. Training requirements.

B. Qualification requirements.

C. Contract personnel.

D. Security knowledge, skills, and abill.

tICB.

E. RequallficatioIL III.Weapons training and qualification.

IV. Weapons qualification and requalifica.

tion program.

V. Guard, armed response personnel

~ and armed escort equipment.

A. FIxed site.

B. TransportatloIL INTRDDUcrIoN Pursuant to the provisions of 73.50 and 73.55 of 10 CFR part 73, Requirements for Physical Protection of Plants and Materials, each licensee who Is authorized to conduct certain activities with specI(lcd quMItltles of special nuclear material pursuant to 10 CFR Part 70 and each Ilccnscc who Is authorized to operate a production or utlllzatlon facill~

ty pursuant to 10 CFR part 60, respectively, Is required to establish a security organiza.

tion,. Including trained and equipped guards to physically protect BPCcial nuclear materi.

al in their possess/on BIId their facilities against theft MId Industrial sabotage.

Further, pursuant to the provisions of V3.30 through V3:36 of 10 CFR part 73, cer-talII shipments of epeclal nuclear material are rcqulrcd to bc accompanied by armed es-corts.

Security personnel who are responsible for the protection of special nuclear materi ~

al oILslle aIId In transit and for the protec.

tlon of the facility or shipment vehicle against Industrial sabotage

should, IlkC other elements of the bhyslcBI= security system. be required to meet minimum crite.

rla to assure thILt they wIII effectively per.

form Ihe(r asslgIICd security related job duties. In order to assure that those Indivld.

uaIs responsible for security are properly equipped and qualified to execu(c the Iob FEDNAE REOISTEII, Voto 43, NO. 164 VVEDNESDAY, AUGUST 23, 1978

PUKS ANO REGULATJONS 3V42V duties prescribed fofthem, l,he NRC has de.

v9)oped general criteria which specifies se.

curity personnel qua))fie>Lion rcqulremenl".

These general criteria establish require.

ments for thc selection. training. equipping, testing, and qualification of Individuals who willbc responsible for protecting special nu.

clear rnaterlals, nuclear facll!ties, and nuclc.

ar shipments.

DzrINrrloNS Terms defined In parts 50, 70, and ')3 of this chapter have the same meaning when used in this appendix.

CRITERlh I. Emp!oyment su!tab)Bty and qualification.

A. Suitability: 1. Prior to employment, or assignment to the security organization, an Individual shall meet the following su)tab)I.

Ity criteria:

a.

Educational development-Possess a

high school diploma or pass an equivalent performance examination designed to meas-ure basic Job related mathematical, lan.

guagc, and reasoning skills, ability, and knowledge, required to perform security Job duties.

b.

Felony convictions-Have no felony convictions Involving the use of a weapon and no felony convictions that reflect on the Individual's reliability.

2. Prior to employment or ass)gnment to the security organization ln an armed capac.

.Ity, thc Individual, In addition to (a) and (b) above, must be 21 years of age or older.

B. Physical and mental qual)Bcations.

1.

Physical qualifications:

a. Individuals whose security tasks and Job duties are directly associated with the effec-tive implementation of the licensee physical sccurlty and cont)ngcncy plans shall have no physical weaknesses or abnorma))t)es thaL v:ould adversely affect their perform.

ance of assigned security job duties.

b; In addition to a. above, guards, armed response pcrsonncl, armed escorts, and ccn.

tral alarm station operators shall successful-ly pass a physical examination administered by a licensed physician. Thc examination shall be designed to measure the lndivld.

ual's physical ability to pe'rform assigned se-curity Job duties as identified In thc licensee physical security and contingency P)ans.

Armed personnel shall meet the following additional physical requirements:

(I) Vision: (a) For each'ndividual. distant

~

visual acuity in each cyc shall bc correctable to 20/30 (Snellcn or equivalent) ln the better eye and 20/40 In the other cyc w'ith eycglasscs or contact lenses. If uncorrected distance vision is'not at least 20/40 Jn thc better eyc, the individual shall ca>ry an extra pair of corrccL)vc )cnses.

Near vtsua) acuity, corrected or uncorrected, shall bc at

)cast 20/40 ln the better eye. Field of vision.

must be at )cast 70'orizontal meridian ln

~ each cyc. Thc ability to distinguish red.

green, and yellow colors Is required. Loss of vision In onc eye Is disqualifying. Glaucoma shall be disqualifying, unless control)cd by acccptablc medical or surgical means, pro-vided such medlcatlons as may be used for control)lng glaucoma do not cause undesira-ble side effects vrhlch adversely, affect, thc Individual's ability to perform assigned su.

curlty Job duties, and provided the visual acuity and field of vision rcqulrcmcnts stated above are met. On. the-job evaluation shall bc used for individuals v:ho cxhlb)L a mild eo)or vision dcfcct.

(b) Where corrective eyeglasses are re.

quired, they shall bc of the safety glass type.

(c) The use of corrective eyeglasses or con.

tact lenses shall not Intcrferc with an Indi.

vidual's ability to effectively perform es.

signed security job duties during normal or cmcrgency operations.

(2) Hearing. (a) Individuals shall have no hcarlru: loss In thc better car greater than 30 decibcls average at 500 hz, 1.000 Hz. and 2.000 EIz, with no level greater than 40 decl.

bels at any one frequency (by ISO 1964 or ANSI 1969 audiometry).

(b) A hearing aid is accepablc provided suitable testing procedures demonstrate hu.

dltory acuity equivalent to the above stated requirement.

(c) Thc usc of a hearing aid shall not de.

crease the effective performance of the Indi-vidual's assigned security Job duties during normal or emergency opcratlons.

(3) Diseases Individuals shall have no es-tablished medical history or medical diagno-sis of epilepsy or diabetes, or. where such a condition exists, the Individual shall provide medical evidence that the condition can bc controlled with proper medication so that the Individual will not lapse Into a coma or unconscious state while performing assigned security job duties.

(4) Addiction-Individuals shall have no es.

tabllshed medical history or medical diagno-'is of habitual alcoholism or drug addiction, or. where such a condition has existed, the individual shall provide certified documen-tation of having completed a rehabilitation program which would give a

reasonable degree of confidence that the individual would be capable of performing assigned se-curity Job duties.

(5) Other physical requirements-An Indi-vidual who has been incapacitated due to a serious illness. injury, disease, or operation, which could Interfere with the effective per-formance of assigned security Job duties shall. prior to resumption of such duties.

provide medical evidence of recovery and ability to perform such security Job dut)es.

2. Ifenta) quaBficatlons:

a. 'Individuals whose security tasks and Job duties arc di-rectly associated with the effective implc-mcntatlon of the licensee physical security and contingency plans shall demonstrate mental alertness and the capabi)ILy to cxcr-clse good Judgment. Implement Instructions, assimilate assigned security tasks, and pos.

sess thc acuity of scnscs and ability of ex-pression sufficient to permit accurate com-munication by v:ritten. spoken. audible, visi-ble, or other signals required by assigned Job duties.

b. Armed Individuals, and central alarm station operators, in addition to meeting thc requirement stated in paragraph

a. above, shall. have no emotional instability that.

would Interfere with the effective perform.

ance of assigned security Job duties. The de-termination shall be made by a licensed psy-chologisL or psychiatrist.

or physician. or other person professionally trained to iden.

tlfyemotional instability.

c. The licensee shall arrange for continued observai,ion of security pcrsonne) and for appropriate corrective measures by respon-sible supervisors for indications of emotion:

al Instabi)ILy of individuals in Lhe course of performing assigned security Job duties.

Identification oi" emotional instability by re.

sponsible supervisors shall be subJcct, to ver-ification by a liccnscd. trained person.

C. Physical fltncss qualifications-SubJect, to a medical examination conducted v:ithln the preceding 30 days and to a detennlna-tlon and written certification by a licensed physician that there are no medical contra-indlcaL ns to participation by the Individu-al as disclosed by the medical examination.

guards.

armed response personnel and armed escorts shall demonstrate physical fitness fr assigned security Job duties by perform)ng a practical physical cxcrcise pro-gram within a specific time period. The ex-ercise program performance objectives shall bc described In the licensee training and qualifications plan, and shall consider such Job related functions as strenuous activity.

physical exertion, levels of stress, and expo-sure to the elements as tney pertain to each individual's assigned security Job duties for both normal and emergency operations. The physical fitness qualification of each guard, armed response person

~ and armed escort shall be documented and attested'y a li-censee security supervisor.

D. Contract security personnel-Contract security personnel shall bc required to meet the suitability, physical, and mental require.

ments as appropriate to their assigned secu.

rity Job duties in accordance with section I of this appendix.

E. Physical requallflcatlon-At least every 12 months, central alarm station operators shall be required to meet the physical re-quirements of B.l.b of this section and

guards, armed response personnel and armed escorts, shall bc required to meet the physical requirements of paragraphs B.l.b (1) and (2), and C of this section.

F. Documentation-The results of suit abll)Ly, physical, and mental qualifications data and test results shall be documented by thc licensee or his agent.

G. Nothing herein authorizes or requires a llcenscc to investigate Into or Judge the reading habits, poll),ical or religious beliefs.

or attitudes on social. economic, or politica)

Issues of any person.

ILTraining and qualifications.

A. Train)ng requirements-Each lndlvldu.

al who requires training to perform assigned security related Job tasks or Job duties as Identlflcd In the licensee physical security or contingency plans, shall prior to assign-ment, bc trained to perform such tasks and duties In accordance with the licensee or h)s agent's documented training and qualificat-ionss plan.

Qua))flcatlon requ)rements-Each person who performs security related Job tasks or Job duL)cs required to Imp)ement thc licensee physical security or contlngen.

cy plan shall. prior to being assigned to such tasks or duties, bc qualified in accordance wiLh thc licensee's NRC approved training and qualifications plan. The qualifications of each Individual shall bc documented and attested by a licensee security supervisor.

C. Contract, personnel-Contract pcrsnn-ncl shall bc trained, equipped, and qualified as appropriate to their assigned security re-lated Job tasks or Job duties, In accordance tvith sections II, III, IV. and V of this ap.

pcndlx. The qualifications of each Individu.

al shall bc documented and attested by a li-censee security supervisor.

D. Security knowledge, skills. and abili-ties-Each Individual assigned to perform the security related teak Identified In the li-cense( physical security or contingency plan siva)i demonstrate thc required knowledge.

skill. Rnd ability In accordance v;ith the specified standards for each task as stated FEDERAL REGISTER, VOI 43, NO. )64WEDNESDAY, AUGUST 23, 1978

37498 RULES AND REGUULTIONS ln thc NRC approved licensee training and qualitications plan. The areas of knowledge, skills, and abilities that shall be considered In the llccnsec's training'nnd qualifications plan arc as follows:

1. Protection of nuclear facilities. trans.

port vehicles, and special nuclear material.

2. NRC requirements and guidance for physical security at nuclear facilities and for trallsportatlon.

3. The private security guard's role in pro-viding physical protection for the nuclear industry.

4.The authority of private guards.

5. The use of nonlethal weapons.

B. Theuseof deadly force.

'I.

Power ot arrest and authority to detain individuals.

8. Authority to search Individuals and seize property.

9. Adversary group operations.

10. Motlvatlon and objectives of adversary groups.

11. Tactics and force that might be used by adversary groups to achieve their objec-tives.

12. Recognltlon of sabotage related de-vlccs and equipment that might be used agahlst the licensee's facility or shipment vehicle.

13. Facility security organization and op-eration.

14.Types of physical barriers.

15. Weapons, lock and key control system operation.

16. Locatton of SNM and/or vital areas withtn a facility.

17. Protcctcd ares security and vulnerabil.

Ity.

18. Types of alarm systems used.

19. Response nnd assessment to alarm an-nunclations and other Indications of Intru-sion.

20. Familiarization with types of special nuclear material processed.

21. General concepts of flxcd site security system".

22. Vulnerabllltles nnd consequences of theft of special nuclear material or industri-

. al'sabotage of a facility.

23. Protection. of security system Infonna-tlon.

24. Personal equipment usc and operation for normal and contingency operations.

25: Surveillance and asscssmcnt systems and techniques.

26.

Communications systems operation, fixed site.

27. Access control systems and operation for individuals, packages. nnd vehicles.

28.

Contraband detection systems and techniques.

29.

Barriers and other'elay systems around material access or vital areas.

30. Fxtcrior and interior alarm systcnls operation.

~

31. Duress alarm operation.

32. Alarm stations operation.

33. Response force organization.

34. Response force mission

35. Response force operation.

30. Response force cngngcmcnt.

37. Security command nnd control system

'uring nornnt operation.

38. Security comnland nnd control system during contingency operation.

35. Transportation systenlS seCurity orgn.

nizatlon nnd operation.

40. Types of SNM trnnsporC vehicles.

41. 'I'ypcs of SNM cscorL vehicles.

42. Modes of trnnsportnLion for SNM.

43. Road transport security system ccm-mind and control structure.

44. Usc of weapons.

45. Communications systems operation for transportation, shtpmenC to control center and lntraconvoy.

46. Vulnerabllitles and consequences of theft of special nuclear material or Industrl.

nl sabotage of a transport vehicle.

47. Protection of transport system securi.

ty information.

48. Control of area around transport vehi-cle.

49. Normal convoy techniques and oper-,

ations.

50. Familiarization with types of special nuclear materials shipped.

51. Fixed post, station operations.

52. Access control system operation.

53. Search techniques and systems for In-dividuals, packages and vehicles.

54. Escort and patrol responsibilities and operation.

55. Contengency rcsponsc to confirmed in-trusion or attempted Intrusion.

56. Security system operation after com-ponent failure.

57. Fixed site security Information protec-tion.

58. Security coordination with local law enforcement agencies.

59. Security and situation reporting, docu.

mentation and rcport writing.

60. Contingency duties.

61. Selt defense.

82. Use of and defenses against Incapaci-tating agents.

63. Security equipment testing.

84. Contingency procedures.

65. Night vtston devices and systems.

66. Mechanics of detention.

67. Basic armed and unarmed defensive tactics.

68. Response force deployment.

69. Security alert procedures.

'10. Securii,y brieflng procedures.

'll. Response force tactical movement.

-72. Response force withdrawal.

73. Rcponse force use of support fire.

74. Response to bomb and attack threats.

75.. Response.

to civil disturbances (e.g.,

strikes, demonstrators).

'lB.

Response

to confirmed attempted thefC ot special nuclear material and/or In-dustrial sabotage of tacilltles.

77. Response to hostage situations.

78. Site specific armed tactical procedures and operation.

79. Security response to emergency situa.

tions other than security incidents.

80.

Basic transportation

.dctcnslve re-sponse tactics.

81. Armed escort dcploymcnt.

82. Armed escort adversary engagement.

83. Armed escort formations.

84. Armed escort use of weapons fire (tac-t!cat and combat).

85. Armed escort and shipment movement under fire.

86. Tactical convoying techniques and op.

crations.

87, Armed escort tactical excrcLses.

88. Armed escort response to bomb nnd at tack threats.

89. Verification of shipment documcnta.

tion and contents.

90. Continuous surveillance of shtpmcnt vehicle.

91. Normal and contingency operation for shtpmenL mode transfer.

52. Armed personnel procedures and oper.

ation during temporary storage. between mode transfers of shipments.

93. Armed escort threat assessment and response.

94. System for and operation of shipment vehicle lock and key control.

95. Tcchnlques and procedures for Isola-tlon of shipment vehicle during a contlngen.

ey situation.

96. Transportation coordination with local law enforccmcnt agencies.

97. Procedures for verification of ship.

ment locks and seals.

98. Transportation security and situation rcportlng, documentation, and report, writ-ing.

99. Procedures for shipment delivery nnd pickup.

100. Transportation security system for escort by road, rail, atr and sca.

E.

Requallfication-Security personnel shall be requalified at least every 12 months to perform assigned security related job tasks and duties for both normal and con-tingency operations.

Requallfication shall bc tn accordance with the NRC approved li-censee training and qualifications plan. The results of rcqualification shall be document-ed and attested by a licensee security super-visor.

III.Weapons training.

A. Guards, armed response personnel and.

armed escorts requiring weapons training to perform assigned security related job tasks

'or job duties shall be trained In accordance with thc licensees'ocumented weapons tralnlng programs. Each Individual shall be proficient in the use of his assigned weapon(s) and shall meet prescribed stand.

ards In the following areas:

I~

Mechanical

assembly, dissasembly, range penetration capnbllltity of weapon,'nd bullseye firing.

2. Weapons cleaning and storage.

3. Combat firing. day and night.

4. Safe weapons handling.

5. Clearing, loading, unloading, and re-loading.

6. When to draw and point a weapon.

7. Rapid fire techniques.

8. Close quarter firing.

10. Zeroing assigned wenpon(s).

IV. Weapons qualification nnd requalifica.

tlon program.

Qualification firing for the handgun and thc rNc shall be for dayltght firing, and each Individual shall.perform night firing for familiarization with assigned weapons(s). The results of weapons quallfi.

cation and requallfication shall bc docu-mcntcd by the licensee or his agent.

A. Handgun-Guards, armed escorts and armed response personnel shall qualify v:I(h

,a revolver or sdmlautomatic pistol firing the national police course. or an equivalent nn.

ttonnlly recognized course. Qualifying score shall be ari accumulated Lotnl of 'l0 llcrcent of the maximum obtainable score.

B. Scmtautomatic Rifle-Guards.

armed escorts and armed response pcrsollnel. as-signed to use thc semiautomatic rifle by the Ilccnsee training and qualifications

plan, shall qualify with a scmLautomatlc rifle by firingthc 100-yard course of fire specified in section 17.5(1) ot thc National Rifle Associ.

, nLlon, High Power Itltlc Rules book (effcc.

tive March 15, 1970).'r a nationally rccog.

'Copies of the "NRA High Power Rifle Rules" may be examined at, or obtained from, thc National Rifle Association, 1600 Rhode Island Avenue NXV., Washington.

D.C. 20036.

TEDERAL REGISTER/ VOL 43 NO I54 llVEDNESDAYi AUGUST 23'978

RULES AND REGULATIOtlS 3V429 n7zed equivalent course o! fire. Targets used shall be as stated In section 17.5 for the 100.,

yard course.

Time limits for Individuals shall be as speci(led In section 8.2 of thc NRA rulc book, regardless of the course fired. Qualifying score shall bc an accurnu-lated total of 80 percent of the maximum obtainable score.

C. Shotgun-Guards.

armed escorts.

and armed response personnel assigned to use the 12 gauge shotgun by the licensee train.

Ing and qualifications plan shall qualify with a full choke or improved modified choke 12 gauge shotgun firing the following course:

Range Posiuon No.

Rounds'arsct'5 yds..

Hip Cire point.

ZS yds.

Shoulder..

~The 4 rounds shall be fired at 4 separate iarseis within IO seconds usins m) gauze (9 pellet) shotgun shells.

~As scL (orth by the National Rl(ic Association (NRA) In Iis oflicial rules and rerrulanorrs. -NRA Target Manufacturers Index," December 197$.

~To.qualify thc Individual shall be required to place 50 percent of all pellets (36 pellets) within the black silhouette.

D. Rcquallflcatlon-Individuals shall bc weapons requalified at least every 12 months In accordance with the NRC ap-proved liccnsec training and qualifications plan, and In accordance with the require-ments stated In A, B, and C of this section.

V. Guard, armed response personnel, and armed escort equipment.

A. Fixed Site-Fixed site guards and armed response personnel shall either be equipped with or hate available thc follow-Ing security equipment appropriate to the Individual's assigned contingency security rclatcd tasks or job duties as described In thc licenscc physical security and contin.

gency plans:

1. Semiautomatic rifles with following

.nominal mlnlmum specifications:

(a).223 caliber.

(b) Muzzle velocity, 1980 ft/sec.

(c) Mruzie energy, 955 foot pounds.

(d) Magazine or clip load of 10 rounds.

(c) Magazine reload, 0 10 seconds.

(f)operable In any environment In which It wDI bemused.

2. 12 gauge shotguns with the following capabilities:

(a) 4 round pump or semiautomatic.

(b) Operable In any environment In which It willbc used..

(c) Full or modified choke.

3. Semiautomatic pistols or revolvcrs with the following nominal minimum spec!flea.

(fons:

(a).354 caliber.

(b) Muzzle energy. 250 foot-pounds.

(c) Full magazine or cylinder reload capa-bility0 6 seconds.

(d) Muzzle velocity, 850 ft/sec.

(c) Full cylinder or magazine capacity, 6 rourlds.

(f) Operable In any environment In which Itwillbe used.

4. Ammunition:

(a) For each assigned weapon as appropri ~

atc to thc Individual's assigned contingency security Job duties and as readily available as thc weapon:

(I) 18 rounds per handgun.

(2) 100 rounds pcr semiautomatic rifle.

(3) 12 rounds each per shotgun (00 gauge and slur).

(b) Ammunition available on site-two (2) times the amount stated In (a) above for each weapon.

5. Personal equipment to be readily availa-ble for Individuals whose assigned contin.

gency security job duties. as described In the licensee physical security and contingency plans, warrant such equipment:

(a) Helmet, combat.

(b) Gas mask, full face.

~

(c) Body armor (bullet.resistant vest).

(d) Flashlights and batteries.

(e) Baton.

(f) Handcuffs.

(g) Ai(lmunltlon/equipment belt.

6. Binocula..

7. Night vision aids, I.e., hand fired llluml.

nation flares or equivalent.

8. Tear gas or other nonlethal gas.

9. Duress alarms.

10. Two.way portable radios (handl tallde) 2 channels

minimum, 1 operating and 1

emergency.

B. Transportation-Armed escorts shall either be equipped with or have rcadlly available the following security equipment appropriate to the Individual's assigned con.

tlngency security related tasks or Job duties, as described in the licensee physical security and contingency plans:

1. Semiautomatic rifles with the following nominal minimum specifications:

(a).223 caliber.

(b) Muzzle velocity, 1.980 ft/sec.

(c) Muzzle energy, 955 Coot pounds.

(d) Magazine or clip of 10 rounds.

(e) Reload capability10 seconds.

(f) Operable In any environment ln which Itwillbe used.

2. 12 gauge shotguns.

(a) 4 round pump or semiautomatic.

(b) Operable In any environment In which Itwillbe used.

(c) Full or modified choke.

3..Semiautomatic phtols or revolvers with the following nominal minimum spec!flea.

Lions:

(a).354 caliber.

(b) Muzzle energy, 250 foot-pounds.

(c) Full magazine or cylinder reload capa-bilitys 6 seconds.

(d) Muzzle velocity, 850 ft/sec.

(e) Full cylinder or magazine capacity, 6

rounds.

(f) Operable ln any environment In which itwillbe used.

4. Ammunition for each shipment.

(a) For each assigned weapon as appropri-ate to thc Individual's assigned contingency security Job duties and as readily available as the weapon:

(1) 36 rounds per handgun.

(2) 120 rounds pcr semiautomatic rifie.

(3) 12 rounds each pcr shotgun (00 gauge and slug).

5.

Escort

vehicles, bullet resisting, equipped with communications systems, rcd flares, first aid kit, emcrgcncy tool kit, Lire changing equipment, battery chargcrs, for radios (where appropriate, for rccharglng portable radio battcrlcs).

6. Personal cqulpmcnt to be readily avalla.

ble for Individuals whose assigned cont(n.

gcncy security Job duties, as described ln thc licensee physical security and contingency plans. warrant such equipment:

(a) Hehnet. combat (b) Gas mask, full face.

(c) Body armor (bullet resistant vesL).

(d) Flaslillghts and batteries.

[6750-01]

Titlo 16Commor CHAPTER 1

FED COMMIS

[Docket 8 ial Practices RAL TRADE ON 20]

PART 13PROHI BITE TICES, AND AfFI TIVE ACTIONS Rotaii Cr AGENCY: Federal Tr ACTION:Final order.

SUMMARY

'This or things, reqtiires an At tor and seilcr of cons mation to divest I

within I year, of the Saiein, Oreg. (CB Wes Credit Bureau of W subject to Commissio provide purchaser, f copies of its current that will permit acq and sell credit reports tionally bars the fi from entering into tracts with divested c

from acquiring, witho sion sanction, any col the business of colic ing consumer credit I DATES: Complaint 1973. Final order issu FOR FURTHER CONTACl".

Alfred F. Dougher Bureau of Com Trade Commission, Pennsylvania Avenu ton, D.C. 20580, 202 SUPPLEMENTARY I In the matter of retai TRADE PRAC-TIVE CORREC-t Co.

de Commission.

r, among other nta, Ga. collec-er credit Irrfor-elf completely.

redit Bureau of Coast), and the

hington, D.C.,

) approval; and 3 years, with.

files in a form

'rer to prepare The order addi-

for 10 years, nagement con-rporations. and t prior Contmis-ern engaged in ing and report-ormation.

ucd March 9.

July 7, 1978 '

FORMATION

, Jr., Director,

tition, Federal 6th Stteet and NW. ~ Wosbing-23-3601.

ORMATION:

credit company,

'Copies of thc complai opinion and final order I nal document.

it. Initial decision, led with Lhe origl-(e) Baton.

(f) Ammunition/equipment belt.

(g) Pager/duress alarms.

7. Binoculars.

8. Night vision aids, I.e.," hand fired llluml.

nation flares or equivalent.

9. Tear gas or other nonlethal gas.

Effective date: October 23, 1978.

(Sec. 161I, Pub.

1 83-703, 68 Stat. 948. Pub.

L 93-377, 88 Stat. 475: Sec. 201 ~ Pub. L 93-438, 88 Stat.

1242-1243.

Pub. L 94-79.

89 Stat. 413 (42 US.C. 2201, 5841).)

Dated at Washington, D.C.,

this 16th day of August 1978.

For the Nuclear Regulatory Com-mission.

SAMUELJ. CHILK, Secrcfar)/of fhg Commission.

[FR Doc. 78-23605 Flied 8-22-'78; 8:45 am1 FEDERAL REGISTERr VOI 4'O' 54 IYEDNESDAYe AUGUST 23'910

qqik UNITED~ES NUCLEAR REGULARLY COMMISSION WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555 September 29, 1978 NOTE TO:

Marty Malsch Marty:

McGahey saidIin his,'l,etter 'that he knew we were going to say that we did not have authority to step into this problem area; but he also went on the say that we should be concerned about the issue.

Shouldn't we leave the door open a bit for McGahey to feel free to come in and discuss the problem further with us?

Nil iam J.

Dircks III,II:

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FROM:

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Q CHAIRMAN P

EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR OTHER:

DESCRIPTION Q LETTER Q MEMO Q REPORT Q OTHER E',!'iZ'7'"":."SC,id'.~'IQ~~

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SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS OR REMARKS DOCUMENT/COPY NO.

CLASSIFIED DATA CLASS IF IGATI0 N NUMBER OF PAGES POSTAL REGISTRY NO.

ASSIGNED TO:

DATE CATEGORY Q

NSI QRD Q FRD INFORMATIONROUTING LEGALREVIEW Q

FINAL Q

COPY g ~g I'SSIGNED TO:

DATE NO LEGAL OBJECTIONS NOTIFY:

Q EDO ADMIN&CORRES BR EXT.

COMMENTS, NOTIFY:

EXT.

JCAE NOTIFICATION RECOMMENDED:

GYES 0

NO NRC FORM 232 I11-75 I EXECUTIVEDIRECTOR FOR OPERATIONS "DO NO7 RE/IfOI/E 7HIS COPY PRINCIPAL CORRESPONDENCE CONTROL

J8-1353 NRC SEC R ETAR IAT TO:

CI Commissioner XEt Exec. Dir (Oper CI Cong. Liaison O Public Affairs CI Logging Date Date CI Gen. Counsel CI Solicitor Q

Secretary Incoming:

From:

e 0

. Griffin USS TQ Subject

... ~5-7 ld C.

Cook nuclear ower lant XK3 Prepare reply for sign'ature of:

CI Chairman CI Commissioner X&EDO, GC, CL, SOL, PA, SECY Cj Signature block omitted Date due Sept., 29 CI Return original of incoming with response Cj For direct reply Cl For appropriate action CI For information CI For recommendation Remarks:

C s Co:

D&SS OCA Co Acknowled e NRC$2 For the Commission:

'Send three (3) copies of reply to Secy Mail Facility ACTION SLIP

Respectfully referred to Congressional Liaison Nuclear Regulatory Com.

Please send me a copy of the reply to the attached letter.

Thanks, Robert P. Griffin U.

S.

Senator RPG:nf Eorm No.3

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JAMES C. McCAHEY I IICIIOINT FRANCIS E. FITZPATRICK

~ RCIIEYANV71CAIUIIM TELEPHONE (3) 3) 772-7250

~ l'r September 8, l978

+...'-

UII TEIj PIjIlT BURHD WOHKEHS Ot HmEHIlH (UPBWH)

International HeadquarIeis:

25510 Kelly Rood, Roseville, Michigan 48066 k~ c~,c.

+~IS OT 1+~

Dr. Clifford'V. Smith U.

S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D. C.

20555

Dear Dr. Smith:

I wish to direct your attention to a developing situation at the Donald C.

Cook Nuclear Plant in Bridgman, Michigan.

The details of the problem are set forth in a letter dated August 24, l978, to the U. S.

Department of Energy, a copy of which is enclosed.

In the event that R.

R.

S. Security, Inc. and/or Indiana Michigan Power Company do not retain the current security force of competent and experi-enced employees, the consequences set forth in my letter to the Depart-ment of Energy will be realized.

It is inconceivable that a federal regulatory agency should directly or indirectly foster, support or condone any action which is contrary to "federal policy" generally.

I would like to assume that government policies in the areas of labor relations, full employment, equal rights and others are coordinated among the federal agencies.

It begs the question for any federal agency to assert that they have no authority to correct a pending problem and/or to refer that problem to another agency.

Whether or not a federal agency has specific statutory authority or jurisdiction in a given area, it is nonetheless in a position'o institute remedial action by the sheer application of "federal policy".

The time has

come, and the Donald C.

Cook Nuclear Plant illustrates the problem, for the federal government to be both concerned and involved where private companies contravene various federal policies while operating under federal control and approval.

Unchecked bidding on federally regulated projects has numerous adverse consequences.

First, there is unnecessary cost to the taxpayer in terms of new security clearances, recruitment and training of employees, unem-ployment and welfare costs, and overall financial loss to a community in tax and consumer dollars.

Second, there is peril to the security of a facility in that continuity of operations is broken and former employees who have an intimate knowledge of the facility tend to remain in the community.

Third, the situation is productive of labor unrest contrary to the mandate of the National Labor Relations Act to promote and preserve industrial stability.

And, finally, the loss and hardship suffered by employees and their families is incalculable.

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, Dr.~ Clifford V. Smith (NRC)

Page 9-8-78 The problem I have described is not limited to 'the Cook Nuclear Plant at Bridgman, Michigan. It is mushrooming throughout the Country.

Security guards who have given many years of dedicated and competent service to a federally owned and/or privately owned but federally regulated facility are suddenly advised that their employment is terminated.

They neither influence nor control that decision and are powerless to reverse it.

They are simply victims of a bidding system which various federal agencies have "failed to regulate in the best interest of a security performance, employee job security and taxpayer welfare.

Only the contractor and sub-contractor benefit by system which abrogates collective bargaining agreements and employee job 'security, and perpetuates sub-standard wages and benefits.

It is no wonder that guard agency operations are marked by high employee turnover and reduced security performance.

Yet when employees through collective action raise their wages',

benefits, and job security to a decent level, the principal contractor relets the bid to an unorganized guard agency.

Unfortunately, the Service Contract Act and other legislation is not adequate to correct the situation.

There is both a compelling need for specific legislation

and, most particularly, for a new attitude and means of communication and cooperation among federal regulatory agencies.

For many years our Union had similar problems at NASA facilities throughout the Country.

In large measure these problems were solved by the Service Contract Act and the cooperation of NASA administrators.

Such a program and attitude is now urgently needed at both federally owned and privately owned, but federally regulated, nuclear power plants.

The future of one hundred security guards and their families and the fortunes of a small community in Western Michigan are at stake in this matter.

The situation demands corrective action which can be of future application to emerging situations at nuclear plants throughout the Country.

S On behalf of the International Union (UPGWA), and its members throughOut the Country, I urgently request that you give this matter your immediate attention.

It is imperative that every concerned legislator and agency official coordinate their efforts and become involved to the extent possible to correct the ever recurring problem that has now arisen at the Donald C.

Cook Nuclear Plant.

Very truly yours, S C.

Mc HEY, Pr student nternational Union UPGWA JCM/gf opeiu42 Encl.

'c:President Jimmy Carter Secretary of Labor, F.

Ray Marshall Senator Harrison A. Williams Congressman Frank Thompson, Jr.

Stuart Broad, Department of Energy SEG-IR rTACh'~p t iS t ot-HL7DITZod+L-

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UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555 OFFICE OF NUCLEAR MATERIALSAFETY ANDSAFEGUARDS

JAMES C. McGAHEY PR 44 IOCNT FRANCIS E. FITZPATRICK 44CRCTART TRCA4URKR

'=-'...,..'='ll TED PLHllT GUHHD WORHEHS Of HmEH GH (UPGWH)

International Headquarters:

25510 Kelly Road, Roseville, Michigan 48066

+0 A>C e~s 0F is~'ELEPHONE (313) 772-7250

~ lT September 8, l978 Dr. Clifford V. Smith U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D. C.

20555

Dear Dr. Smith:

I wish to direct your attention to a dev'eloping situation at the

'onald C. Cook Nuclear Plant inBridgman, Mich';gan.

The details of the problem are set.'orth in a letter dated August 24, l978, to the U. S.

Department of Energy, a copy of whi'ch 'is enclosed.

In the event that R.

R. S. Sec'urity., Inc. and/or Indiana Michigan Power Company do not retain the'urrent security force of competent and experi-enced employees, the 'consequences'et forth 'in my letter'o the 'Depart-ment, of Energy will be'ea'lized.

It 'is inconcei'vable 'that a federal regulatory agency should directly or indirectly foster, support, or condone any action whi'ch 'is contrary to "federal policy" gen'er'ally.

I would like to assume that, government policies'n the 'areas of labor relations, full employmen't, equal rights and others are coordinated among the federal agencies.

It begs the question for any federal agency to assert that they have no authority to cor t a pending probl'em and/or to refer that problem to another agency.

Whether'r not a federal agency has specific statutory authority or jurz.s iction in a given area, it is nonetheless in a position to institute remedial action by'heshh'er'pplication of "federal policy".'he'ime has

come, and the Donald C.

Cook Nuclear Plant illustrates the problem,,for'the 'federal government to Pe both 'cpncer'ned and involved where private, companies contravene 'various 'feder'al policies whi'le operating under federal control and approval.

Unchecked bidding on federally regulated projects has numerous adverse consequences.

First, ther'e 'is unnec'es'sary cost to the 'taxpayer in terms of new security clea'rances',

recruitment and training of employees, unem-ployment and wel'fare costs, and overall financial loss to a community in tax and consumer dollars.'econd, there 'is peril to the security of a facility in that. continuity of operations is broken'nd former'mployees who have an intimate kn'owledge of the facility tend to remain in the community.

Thi'rd, the situation is productive of labor unrest contrary to the mandate of the National Labor Rel'ations Act to promote and preserve industrial stability.

And, finally, the 'loss and hardship suffered by employees and their families is incalculable.

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The problem I have desciibed is not limited to the Cook Nuclear Plant at Bridgman, Michigan. It is mushr'ooming thr'oughout the Country.

Security guards who have given many years of dedicated and competent service to a federally owned and/or privately owned.but federally regulated facility are suddenly advised that their employment is terminated.

They neither influence nor control that decision and are powerless to reverse it.

They

'are simply victims of a bidding system wh'ich various federal agencies have failed to regulate in the best interest of,a security performance, employee job security and taxpayer welfare.

Only the contractor and sub-contractor benefit by system whi'ch abrogates'ollec'tive bargaining agreements and employee job security, and perpetuates sub-standard wages and benefits.

It is no wonder 'that guard agency operations are marked by high employee turnover and reduced. security performance.

Yet when employees through collective action raise their wages, benefits, and job security to a decent level, the principal contractor relets the bid to an unorganized guard agency.

Unfortunately, the Service Contract Act and other legislation is not adequate to correct, the 'situation.

Ther'e is both 'a compelling need for specific legislation and, most particularly, for a new, attitude and means of communication and cooperation among federal regulatory agencies.

For many years our Union'ad similar problems at NASA facilities throughout the Country.

'In large measure these problems were solved by the Service Contract Act and the cooperation of NASA administrators.

Such a program and attitude is now urgently needed at both 'federally owned and privately owned, but federally regulated, nuclear power plants.

The future of one hundred security guards and their families and the fortunes of a small community in Western Michigan are at stake in this matter.

The situation demands corrective action which can be of future application to emerging situations at nuclear plants throughout the Country.

On behalf of the International Union (UPGWA), and its.members through5ut the Country, I urgently recjuest that you give this matter your immediate attention. It is imperative that every concerned legislator and agency official coordinate their efforts and become involved to the extent possible to correct the ever recurring problem that has 'now arisen at the Donald C. Cook Nuclear Plant.

Very truly yours, S C.

Mc HEY, Pr student nternational Union UPGWA JCM/gf opeiu42 Encl.

cc:

President Jimmy Carter Secretary of Labor,'.

Ray Marshall Senator Harrison A. Williams Congressman Frank Thompson, Jr.

Stuart Broad, Department of Ener'gy

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JAMES C. McGAHEY I RCSIOCRT FRANCIS E. FITZPATRICK SCCRCTART TRCASURCR August 24, l978 Ull TED PLHElT GUHRD WOHIItHS Of Hmffl GH (UPGWH)

Mr. Stewart Broad, Director Office of Contractor's Industrial Relations U. S.

Department of Energy Mail Station Al-4025 washington, D. C.

20545 Dear Mr. Broads REt DONALD CD COOK NUCLEAR PLANT SRIDGMAN, MICHIGAN Sinoe the inception of the Oonald C. Cook Nuolear plant in Bridgman, Michigan, security servioes have been provided by the Naokenhut Corporation under aontraot with the Indiana Miohigan Power Company.

Xn January 1972, the Xnternational Union, United Plant Guard Workers of America (UPGWA) was certified as the exclusive bargaining representative of all guards and security officers.

Our Union has entered into successive collective bax'gaining agreements with Nackenhut, the last of which will not expixo until Hay 18, 1979.

Recently, the Xndiana Michigan Power Company let bids for security services.

It is significant to note that the bid was let approximately six weeks after the UP%% had negotiated increased wages and benefits for security oHVXcers under a wage reopenex.

The bid was awarded to R.R.S.,

Xncorpoxated of South Send>

Indiana, a non-union guard agency. 'o date has been set for R.R.S. to take-over security services from Hackenhut.

On August 23, 1978, I sent a certified lettex to R.R.S. requesting that it retain the seourity fox'ce and honor the existent collective bargaining agreement.

A oopy of that lettex's enclosed.

X am writing to enlist your support in preventing a situation at Donald C.Cook which aould be detrimental to employees and their families, contrary -to federal labor policy, inconsistent with nuclectr power plant

security, and costly to the taxpayer.

What rules, rogulahions and policies does the Department of Energy have to regulate the transfer of subaontracts and to prevent the unfair and discriminatory dislocation of employees7 It must be pxesumed that individual employees of Mackenhut have perfonnad effioiently and well.

Otherwise they would have been sub)ected to px'ior discharge or discipline.

Thus the entployoes should not be pawns in a contracting game over which they have no voice or control.

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, hlr. Stewart Broad U.S. Department of Energy Page.

8/24/78 Should R.R.S.

attempt to avoid its obligation to incumbent employees and their chosen bargaining representative, several adverse results will occur as follows:

l.

The UPGWA will, of course, take appropriate action under federal labor law to protect the employees and the collec" tive bargaining agreement.

2.

Displaced employees would join the swelling ranks of the unemployed and therefore increase unemployment and welfare costs.'.

Any new employees would have to be security cleared trained and otherwise processed at great and unnecessary expense to the taxpayer.

4.

Displaced employees would remain in the small community of Bridgman and therefore pose an additional and unnecessary problem to site security.

I understand that there is a current concern with nigh employee turnover and the threat it poses to security.

5.

Xt is impossible to measure the human misery and hardship caused to incumbent employees, their families, and the community.

This is an urgent. problem which I trust will receive the immediate atten-tion of the Department of Energy.

Xt is inconceivable that the U. S.

Government would stand idly by while federal policy is violated at a

federally regulated nuclear site.

By "federal policy" I have reference to full employment, saving costs, encouraging stability in labor relations, preventing age,

sex, race and handicap discrimination, and a host of otQers.'he problem at Donald C. Cook epitomizes the often adverse consequences of unregulated bidding for federal services.

Nay I please hear from you immediately.

Sincerely yours, JCH/gf opeiu42 Encl.

cc: Indiana l~lichigan Power Company The ttlackenhut Corporation henry E. Applen Charles E.

Lamb Gordon Gregory JAMES C.

McGAHEY, President International Union U.P.G.N.A.

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"Dr. Clifford V. Smit Director, Ofc. of Nuclear Materials Safety 8 Safeguard TO (Nemo and unit)

IHITIALS NRC IRITIALS RESIARKS TO (Name and unit)

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20545 g,UG go 3978 Mr. James C. McGahey, President United Plant Guard Workers of America (UPGWA) 25510 Kelly Road Roseville, Michigan 48066

Dear Mr. McGahey:

I am responding to your letter of August 24, 1978, regarding certain guard union problems at the Donald C.

Cook Nuclear Plant in Bridgman, Michigan.

Regretably, this office is unable to respond to your request since the Department of Energy does not have industrial relations responsibility at commercial nuclear power plants.

I note,

however, that you have indicated concerns regarding security at this plant.

Accordingly, I have forwarded your letter to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC).

I am sure that NRC will review the security concerns outlined in your letter.

Sincerely, gg( Stuart 8~~4 Stuart Broad Director, Office of Contractor ndustrial Relations

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Dr. Clifford Y. Smith, NRC

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25510 Kelly Road, Roseville, Michigan 48066 JAMES C, McGAHEY PRESIDENT FRANC(S E. FIT?PATRtCK SCCRCTARY TRCARURCR August 24, 1978 UR TED PLHRT GUHRD WOHHEHS Of HNEH CH (UPGWH)

Mr. Stewart Broad, Director Office of Contractor's Industrial Relations U. S. Department of Energy Mail Station Al-4025 Washington, D.

C.

20545

Dear Mr. Broad:

RE:

DONALD C.

COOK NUCLEAR PLANT BRIDGMAN, MICHIGAN Since the inception of the Donald C.

Cook Nuclear plant in Bridgman, Michigan, security services have been provided by the Wackenhut. Corporation under contract with the Indiana Michigan Power Company.

In January

1972, the International Union, United Plant Guard Workers of America

{UPGWA) was certified as the exclusive bargaining representative of all-guards and security officers.

Our Union has entered into successive collective bargaining agreements with Wackenhut, the last. of which 'will not expire until May 18, 1979.

Recently, the Indiana Michigan Power Company let bids for security services.

It is significant to note that the bid was let approximately six weeks after the

'UPGWA had negotiated increa'sed wages and benefits for security officers under a wage reopener.

The bid was awarded to R.R.S.,

Incorporated of South Bend, Indiana, a non-union guard agency.

No date has been set for R.R.S. to take-over security services from Wackenhut.

On August 23, 1978, I sent a certified letter to R.R.S. requesting that it retain the security force and honor the existent collective bargaining agreement.

A copy of that letter is enclosed.

I am writing to enlist your support in preventing a situation at Donald C.Cook which 'could be detrimental to employees and their families,-

contrary to federal labor policy, inconsistent with 'nuclear power plant

security, and costly to the taxpayer.

What rules, regulations and policies does the Department of Energy have to regulate the'ransfer of subcontracts and to prevent the unfair and discriminatory dislocation of employees?

It must be presumed that individual employees of Wackenhut have.

per'formed efficiently and well.

Othe'rwise 'they would have been subjected to prior discharge or discipline.

Thus the employees should not be pawns in a contracting game over which they have no voice or control.

6129

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Mr. Stewart Broad U.S. Department of Energy Page

'-2-.

8/24/78-Sho'uld R.R.S.

attempt to avoid its obligation to incunbent employee's and their chosen bargaining representative, several adverse results will occur as follows:.

1.

The UPGNA will, of course, take appropriate action under federal labor law to protect, the employees'nd the'ollec-tive bargaining agreement.

2..

Displaced employees would join the swelling ranks of the unemployed and therefore 'increase

'unemployment and wel'fare costs'

Any new.employees would have 'to be 'security cleared trained and otherwise proces'sed at.'great and unn'eces'sary expen'se 'to the taxpayer.

4.

Displaced employees would remain in the small community of Bridgman'and therefore "pose-'an additional and unnec'essary problem to site 'security.

I under'stand that there 'is a current concern with 'high employee 'turnover and the threat it poses'o sec'urity.

S. It is-impossible to mea'sure the human misery and hardship caused to incumbent employees,'heir families',

and the community.

This is an urgent problem which.I 'trust will.receive the'mmediate 'atten-tion of the Department, of Energy.. It is inconceivable that, the 'U. S.

Government would stand idly by while federal policy is violated at a federally regulated nuclear site.

By "federal policy" I have 'referen'ce to full employment, saving costs,* encouraging stability in labor rel'ations,.

preventing age, sex,'ace

'and nandicap disciimination, and a heist of others.

The problem at Donald C. Cook epitomizes theoften adverse consequences of unregulated bidding for federal ser'vices.'ay I please hea'r from you immediatel'y.

Si:ncerely yours, JCM/gf opeiu42 Encl.

cc: Indiana Michi:gan Power Company The Elackenhut Corporation Henry E.

Applen'harles E.

Lamb Gordon Gregory KS C.

NcGAHEY,, Pr sident nternational Union'.PE G.N A.

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UR TtD PLHRT BUHHD WOHtIfHS Of HIMCH (UPBWH) 0

'nternational KeodquorIers:

25510 Kelly Road, Roseville, Michigan 48066 Mr. Donald Quad, Area Manager R.R.S.,

Incorporated 403 Dixie Way North South Bend, Indiana 46637

Dear Mr. Quad:

lt has been brought to the attention of this International Union that your Company is the successful bidder to provide security services at the Donald C.

Cook Nuclear Power Site in Bridgman, Michigan.

This International, and its Amalgamated Local No.

37, has been the exclusive bargaining agent for all Patrolmen and Sergeants at that site since 1972.

Currently, there is a Labor Agreement in effect between the Wackenhut Corporation and the International Union, United Plant Guard Workers of America (UPGWA) and its Amalgamated Local No.

37.

That Agreement expires at 0700 hours0.0081 days <br />0.194 hours <br />0.00116 weeks <br />2.6635e-4 months <br /> on May 1S, 1979.

Please accept this letter as our request for a meeting with your Company for the purpose of working out a smooth transition where-in your Company accepts the employees and the Contract now in effect.

The Union is willing to make modifications such as the change in the Company's name and in other areas if not-applicable to your Company.

We request your immediate reply because we feel that this transi-tion is of a serious nature; and it is important that we get it resolved as early as possible.

Very truly yours, J AME C.

McGAHEY President International Union U.P.G.W.A.

JCM/esb opeiu42 cc:

James Six, R.R.S., Inc.

William Stewart, President, Local 37 UPGWA Charles E.

Lamb, Director, Region 2

UPGWA

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~ J9 78 Respectfully referred to Congressional Liaison Nuclear Regulatory Com..

Please send me a copy of the reply to the attached letter.

Thanks, Robert P. Griffin U.

S. Senator RPG:nf FOtZZ1 ilOo3

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~ l7 lntornarional Headciuorrvra: 25510 lc:ally Road, Roseville, Michigan 48065 JAMES C. McGAHEY I'IICIIOINr September 8,

1978 FRANCIS E. FITZPATRICK ICCIIC'rANV.VIICAIVIISA UllTE LflllTBUflHD NOHHE Ot flftlEHGflCUPBNH)

Dr. Clifford'. Smith U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Nashington, D. C.

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Dear Dr. Smith:

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I wish to direct your attention to a developing situation at the Donald C. Cook Nuclear Plant in Bridgman, Michigan.

The details of the

~ problem are set forth in a letter dated August 24, 1978, to the U. S.

Department of Energy, a copy of which is enclosed.

In the event that R.

R.

S. Security, Inc. and/or Indiana Michigan Power Company do not, retain the current security force of competent and experi-enced employees, the consequences set forth in my letter to the Depart-ment of Energy will be realized.

Xt is inconceivable that a federal regulatory agency should directly or indirectly foster, support or condone any action which is contrary to "federal policy" generally.

I would like to assume that government policies in the areas of labor relations, full employment, equal rights and others are coordinated among the federal agencies.

It begs the question for any federal agency to assert that they have no authority to correct a pending problem and/or to refer that problem to another agency.

whether or not a federal agency has specific statutory authority or jurisdiction in a given area, it is nonetheless in a position to institute remedial action by the sheer application of "federal policy".

The time has

come, and the Donald C. Cook Nuclear Plant illustrates the problem, for the federal government to be both concerned and involved where private companies contravene various federal policies while operatin under federal control and approval.

Unchecked bidding on federally regulated projects has numerous adverse consequences.

First, there is unnecessary cost to the taxpayer in terms of new security clearances, recruitment and training of employees, unem-ployment and welfare costs, and overall financial loss to a community in tax and consumer dollars.

Second, there is peril to the security of a facility in that continuity of operations is broken and former employees who have an intimate knowledge of the facility tend to remain in the community.

Third, the situation is productive of labor unrest contrary to the mandate of the National Labor Relations Act to promote and preserv industrial stability.

And, finally, the loss and hardship suffered by employees and their families is incalculable.

Dr. Clifford V. Smith NRC)

Page 9-&-7&

The problem I have described is not limited to the Cook Nuclear Plant at Bridgman, Michigan. It is mushrooming throughout the Country.

Security guards who have given many years of dedicated and competent service to a federally owned and/or privately owned but federally regulated facility are suddenly advised that their employment is terminated.

They neither influence nor control that decision and are powerless to reverse it.

They are simply victims of a bidding system which various federal agencies have "failed to regulate in the best interest of a security performance, employee job security and taxpayer welfare.

Only the contractor and sub-contractor benefit by system which abrogates collective bargaining agreements and empl,oyee job 'security, and perpetuates sub-standard wages and benefits.

It is no wonder that guard agency operations are marked by high employee turnover and reduced security performance.

Yet when employees through collective action raise their wages,

benefits, and job security to a decent level, the principal contractor relets the bid to an unorganized guard agency.

Unfortunately, the Service Contract Act and other legislation is not adequate to correct the situation.

There is both a compelling need for specific legislation and, most particularly, for a new attitude and means of communication and cooperation among federal regulatory agencies.

Fox'any years our Union had similar problems at NASA facilities throughout the Country.

In large measure these problems were solved by the Service Contract Act and the cooperation of NASA administrators.

Such a program and attitude is now urgently needed at both federally owned and privately owned, but federally regulated, nuclear power plants.

The future of one hundred security guaxds and their families and the fortunes of a small community in Western Michigan are at stake in this matter.

The situation demands corrective action which can be of future application to emerging situations at nuclear plants throughout the Country.

On behalf of the International Union (UPGWA), and its members throughdut the Country, I urgently request that you give this matter your immediate attention.

It is imperative that every" concerned legislator and agency official coordinate their efforts and become involved to the extent possible to correct the ever recurring problem that has now arisen at the Donald C. Cook Nuclear Plant.

Very truly yours, S C.

Mc HEY, Pr student ntexnational Union UPGWA JCM/gf opeiu42 Encl.

cc:

President Jimmy Carter Secretary of Labor, F.

Ray Marshall Senator Harrison A. Williams Congressman Frank Thompson, Jr.

Stuart Broad, Department of Energy SEE-RT~ae Hap L is(

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June 14, 1976 The Honorable Edward Hutchinson United States House of Representatives Washington, D. C.

20515 Dear Congressman Hutchinson:

This is in response to your letter of May 21, 1976 to the NRC Office of Congressional Affairs requesting a reply to various concerns of your constituent, Miss Mitzi Johnston.

Miss Johnston raises several questions related to the safe operation of nuclear power plants, and these will be discussed below.

Some of her questions

are, as you know, addressed directly to you, and we will try to provide some background on the subjects involved, where appropriate.

Though it is not Miss Johnston's first question, it seems best to begin by identifying NRC.

The Nuclear Regulatory Conmission came into being by enactment of-the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974 and began official operation on January 19, 1975.

Prior to that time, the Atomic Energy Commission was responsible for both developmental and regulatory activities associated with nuclear energy, including power plants, under the-Atomic Energy Act of 1954.

The AEC was dissolved by the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974 which placed its regulatory functions under the NRC and its developmental functions under the Energy Research and Development Administration.

The NRC is also governed by provisions of the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969.

As set forth in these

statutes, the primary mission of the NRC is to assure that civilian nuclear activities are conducted in a manner which will protect-public health and safety, national security and environmental quality.

This is done through a system of licensing and regulation which involves standards setting, safety reviews and studies, inspection of licensed operation and enforcement of NRC rules, and confirmatory research to verify the adequacy of regulations and reveal any need to augment, replace or improve them.

I am enclosing for Miss Johnston's information a copy of NRC's 1975 Annual Report which contains a comprehensive presentation of this agency's functions and current activities in regulating nuclear energy uses,.including nuclear power plants, on behalf of the public..

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The Konorable Edward Kutchinson The particular incident to which tliss Johnston refers was a minor event that occurred at the Donald C.

Cook nuclear facility in Berrien County, Michigan.

The facility consists of two separate reactor units, one in operation and the other under construction.

On thy 10, 1976.

a slight increase abovevt;he very low level of radioactivity normally present in the air was detected in the auxiliary building for the facility. 'his building is separate from the reactor containment buildings and houses such apparatus as water-treatment systems, electrical

systems, and the "Emergency Core Cooling System" (a back-up system to supply cooling water in the event of loss of the normal reactor coolant).

The cause of the rise in radioactivity was leakage from a valve which had not been completely closed following a scheduled shutdown of the reactor for routine inspection and maintenance.

The officials at the, plant thought it prudent to evacuate the auxiliary building at once, due to tlie increase in the level of airborne radioactivity.

Construction workers fn the reactor building under construction heard the public-address announcement intended to apply only to those in the auxiliary building.

The workers evacuated the reactor building, some of them leaving the gob site entirely. It was that action, apparently. that attracted media attention and led to the newspaper item cited by Miss Johnston.

Plant personnel were able to enter the auxiliary building right away, with protective clothing, and the situation was resolved in a matter of a few hours.

No personnel exposure in excess of regulatory limits resulted from the increase in airborne radioactivity, and no off-site release of radioactivity in excess of regulatory limits occurred.

Thus, the incident was not of the type that must be reported to the NRC.

Nevertheless, because of public interest evoked by the media coverage, NRC was notified.

On Hay 11, the next day, an-NRC inspector and an 5RC radiation protection specialist visited the auxiliary building and confirmed that conditions were normal and that there had been no danger to the public.

Plant officials have taken steps to assure that all valves will be secured and checked after maintenance and to improve communication with the construction crews at work on the new unit.

Your constituent asks what is to prevent an occurrence of greater consequence, if these kinds of incidents are allowed to occur. It is

-an understandable and valid question, of course, though I would point out again that %his particular occurrence was actually of no consequence to safety and the licensee would have liked to prevent it on the basis of economic operation alone.

The NRC's primary concern is protection of public health and safety against serious accidents, and a "def nse-in-depth" co cept is required and employed in the OFFICE~

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The Honorable Edward Hutchinson design, construction and operation of each nuclear plant.

This involves three successive and mutually reinforcing echelons of defense.

The first emphasizes accident prevention by requiring sound and conservative design in accord with stringent quality standards and engineering practices, with a high degree of freedom from faults and errors.

The second echelon of defense and this is perhaps most pe~tinent to Miss Johnston's concern -- assumes that failures or operating errors that potentially could lead to safety problems will occur during the service life of a nuclear power plant despite all the care taken to prevent them.

Accordingly, NRC requires the provision of redundant safety systems to detect off-normal conditions and prevent escalation of minor incidents into major ones.

The third echelon of defense supplements the first two through features that provide additional margins of safety to protect the public against unlikely accidents.

Your constituent will find detailed descriptions of the NRC's safety measures concerning power reactors in Chapter 2 of the enclosed Annual Report.

Since the NRC's functions relate primarily to protection of public health and safety, national security and environmental quality, we can offer only general comment concerning Hiss Johnston's questions about the future of nuclear power and the cost of nuclear plants.

The Energy Research and Development Administration, whibII is charged with developing all promising modes of energy to meet national needs.

has identified coal and nuclear energy as the most realistic alternatives to oil among energy sources presently available and technically usable.

Nuclear energy also is prominent in recent forecasts of the Federal Energy Administration for the next two decades.

Details as to the expenditure of public funds on development of nuclear plants and fore-casts for all forms of energy can be obtained from these two agencies.

Construction of nuclear power plants has, of course, required billions of dollars of investment by electric utilities.

Nevertheless, their choices of generating sources have been dictated by economics, and they have indicated that high capital costs have been offset by savings in nuclear fuel costs.

Nore information on factors influencing this private investment may be obtained from the Edison Electric Institute, 90 Park Avenue, New York, New York 10016.

In conclusion, I would note that the NRC neither promotes nor opposes nuclear power per se, and that we share the concern of the Congress, other Federal agencies and the vast majority of scientists and engineers Ohh ICE W

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The Honorable Edward Hutchinson that members of the public, such as Miss Johnston, be given the most comprehensive and accurate information available as they make their judgments concerning the future of nuclear energy.

Sincerely.

Willi"rn J, Dircks esistant;:ncutivo Direcfcgf for GpeLations

Enclosure:

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UNITED STATES CLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555 JUN 14 1976 The Honorable Edward Hutchinson United States House of Representatives Mashington, D.

C.

20515 Dear'ongressman Hutchinson; This is in response to your letter of May 21, 1976 to the NRC Office of Congressional Affairs requesting a reply to various concerns of your constituent, Miss Mitzi Johnston.

Miss'ohnston raises several questions related to the safe operation of nuclear power plants, and these will be discussed below.

Some of her questions

are, as you know, addressed directly to you, and we will try to provide some background on the subjects involved, where appropriate.

Though it is not Miss Johnston s first question, it seems best to begin by identifying NRC.

The Nuclear Regulatory COIImrission came into being by enactment of the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974 and began official operation on January 19, 1975.

Prior to that time, the Atomic Energy Commission was responsible for both developmental and regulatory activities associated with nuclear energy, including power plants, under the Atomic Energy Act of 1954.

The AEC was dissolved by the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974 which placed its regulatory functions unde'r the NRC and its developmental functions under, the Energy Research and Development Administration.

The NRC is also governed by provisions of the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969.

As set forth in these

statutes, the primary mission of the NRC is to assure that civilian-nuclear activities are conducted in a manner which will protect public health and safety, national security and environmental quality.

This is done through a system of licensing and regulation which involves standards setting, safety reviews and studies, inspection of licensed operation and

. enforcement of NRC rules, and confirmatory research to verify the adequacy of regulations and reveal any need to augment, replace or improve them.

I am enclosing for Miss Johnston's information a copy of NRC's 1975 Annual Report which contains a comprehensive presentation of this agency's functions and current activities in regulating nuclear energy

uses, including nuclear power plants, on behalf of the public.

1

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The Honorable Edward Hutchinson e, The particular incident to which Miss'Johnston refers was a minor event that occurred at the Donald C.

Cook nuclear facility in Berrien County, Michigan.

The facility consists of two separate reactor units, one in operation and the other under construction.

On May 10, 1976, a slight increase above the very low level of radioactivity normally present in the air was detected in the auxiliary building for the facility.

This building is separate from the reactor containment buildings and houses such apparatus as water-treatment systems, electrical

systems, and the "Emergency Core Cooling System" (a back-up system to supply cooling water in the event of loss of the normal reactor coolant).

The cause of the rise in radioactivity was leakage from a valve which had not been completely closed following a scheduled shutdown of the reactor for routine reinspection and maintenance.

The officials at the plant thought it prudent to evacuate the auxiliary building at once, due to the increase in the level of airborne radioactivity.. Construction workers in the reactor building under construction heard the public-address announcement intended to apply only to those in the auxiliary building.

The workers evacuated the reactor building, some of them leaving the job site entirely.

It was that action, apparently, that attracted media attention and led to.the newspaper item cited by Miss Johnston.

Plant personnel were able to enter the auxiliary building right away, with protective clothing, and the situation was resolved in a matter of a'few hours.

No personnel exposure "in excess of regulatory limits resulted from the increase in airborne. radioactivity, and no off-site release of radioactivity in excess of regulatory limits occurred.

Thus, the incident was not of the type that must be reported to the NRC.

Nevertheless, because of public interest evoked by the media coverage, NRC was notified.

On May ll, the next day, an NRC inspector and an NRC radiation protection specialist visited the auxiliary building and confirmed that conditions were normal and that there had been no danger to the public.

Plant officials have taken steps to assure that all valves will be secured and checked after maintenance and to improve communication with the construction crews at work on the new unit.

Your constituent asks what is to prevent an occurrence of greater consequence, if these kinds of incidents are allowed to occur.

It is an understandable and valid question, of course, though I would point out again that this particular occurrence was actually of no consequence to safety and the licensee would have liked to prevent it on the basis of economic operation alone.

The NRC's primary concern is protection of public health and safety against serious accidents, and a "defense-in-depth" concept is required and employed in the

0 The Honorable Edward Hutchinson

- 3 '-

design, construction and operation of"each nuclear plant.

This involves three successive and mutually reinforcing echelons of defense.

The first emphasizes accident prevention by requiring sound and conservative design in accord with stringent quality standards and engineering practices, with a high degree of freedom from faults and errors.

The second echelon of defense -- and this is perhaps most pertinent to Hiss Johnston's concern -- assumes that failures or operating errors that potentially could lead to safety problems will occur during the service life of a nuclear power plant despite all the care taken to prevent them.

Accordingly, NRC requires the provision of redundant safety systems to detect off-normal conditions and prevent escalation of minor incidents into major ones.

The third echelon of defense supplements the first two through features that provide additional margins of safety to protect the public against unlikely accidents.

Your constituent will find detailed descriptions of the NRC's safety measures concerning power reactors in Chapter 2 of the enclosed Annual Report.

Since the NRC's functions relate primarily to protection of public health and safety, national security and environmental quality, we can offer only general comment concerning Hiss Johnston's questions about the future of nuclear power and the cost of nuclear plants.

The Energy Research and Development Administration, which is charged with developing all promising modes of energy to meet national

needs, has identified coal and nuclear energy as the most realistic alternatives to oil among energy sources presently available and technically usable.

Nuclear energy also is prominent in recent forecasts of the Federal Energy Administration for the next two decades.

Details as to the expenditure of public funds on development of nuclear plants and fore-casts for all forms of energy can be obtained from these two agencies.

Construction of nuclear power plants has, of course, required billions of dollars of investment by electric utilities.

Nevertheless, their choices of generating sources have been dictated by economics, and they have indicated that high capital costs have been offset by savings in nuclear fuel costs.

More information on factors influencing this private investment may be obtained from the Edison Electric Institute, 90 Par k Avenue, New York, New York 10016.

In conclusion, I would note that the NRC neither promotes nor opposes nuclear power per se, and that we share the concern of the Congress, other Federal agencies and the vast majority of scientists and engineers

s The Honorable Edward Hutchinson 4 ",',

that members of the public, such as Hiss Johnston, be given the most comprehensive and accurate information available as they make their Judgments concerning the future of nuclear energy.

Sincerety, William J Dircks Assistant ExecUtive Diredot.'or Operations

Enclosure:

NRC's 1975 Annual Report DISTRIBUTION:

R. J.

N 1, EDO:SPB W.

G. Dooly, EDO:SPB J.

H. Cook, EDO:SPB EDO Reading File (00428)

E. Volgenau, IE B. Warnick, IE CA(3)

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20515 CO MMIT1EESI RANKINOMINORITYMEMOER, COMMITTEEON THC JUDIClhRY 1

STANDARDS OF OFF ICIAI CONDUCT MRS< Ae O. SCHUI TZ ADMINI4TRATIVE A44IATANl'336 HOUSE OFF IC&BUILDING PHONE; (202) 225-3761 Hay 21, 1976 Congressional Liaison Office Nuclear Regulatory Commission 1717 H Street, N.W.

Washington, D.C.

20555 Gentlemen:

Prompted by the reporting of a small radioactive le'ak at the Donald C.

Cook nuclear energy plant at Bridgman, Hichigan, I have received the attached letter from Hiss Hitzi Johnston of Stevensville, IKchi-gan raising a number of questions about the future and safety of nuclear plants.

I would appreciate as thorough a response to the questions she has raised as you can give in a letter I may forward her in reply.

Thank you for your cooperation.

Sincerely, Encl.

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Nitzi Johnston

..., pp, 2236 Pawnee Path Stevensvil le, NI 49127 Nay:"1'4, 1976 Honorable Edward Hutchinson House of Representatives 2336 Rayburn Office Building Washington, D.C.

20515

Dear Sir:

As a concerned resident of'Michigan, I am writing to you about an issue that has recently been given a considerable amount of adverse publicity.

The issue I am referring to is that of nuclear power plant safety.

Because I am living in Stevensville, I have a particular interest in the Donald C.

Cook Nuclear facility near Bridgman.

An article that appeared in the "Herald-Palladium" on Tuesday, May 11th indicated there had been a small radioactive release in a part of the Cook Plant.

If an incident such as this is allowed to happen, what is to prevent an occurrence of greater consequence?

Are there any organizations or federal commissions set up to monitor and safeguard against any possible nuclear accidents?. If so, do they strictly regulate the activities at nuclear plants involving safety requirements?

Do you favor stricter regulations for nuclear plants?

Do you feel the outcome of the nuclear initiative due to go before California voters on June 8th will have, any effect on other states, in particular our state of Michigan?

Also, has there been any recent legislation before congress on nuclear power plants; and if so, what has your stand been?

Do you see a definite future for atomic power as compared to conventional types of power?

Can you see any justification for the billions of dollars being spent on present plants and the development of future plants?

Any information you can give me on this subject would be greatly appreciated.

Sincerely yours,

.Nitzi Johnston

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20515 2336 HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING PHONEI (202) 225 3761 May 21, 1976 RANKINGMINORITYMEMBER, COMMITIEEON THE JUDICIARY STANDARDSOF OFFICIAI CONDUCT MRS. A. O. SCHULT2 ADMIRISTRATIVSASSISTAlrr Congressional Liaison Office Nuclear Regulatory Commission 1717 H Street, N.W.

Washington, D.C.

20555 Gentlement Prompted by the reporting of a small radioactive leak at the Donald C.

Cook nuclear energy plant at Bridgman, Michigan, I have received the attached letter from Miss Mitzi Johnston of Stevensville, Michi-gan raising a number of questions about the future and safety of nuclear plants.

I would appreciate as thorough a response to the questions she has raised as you can give in a letter I may forward her in reply.

Thank you for your cooperation.

Sincerely, Encl.

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Mitzi Johnston 2236 Pawnee Path Stevensvi1 1 e, MI 49127 May 14, 1976 Honorable Edward Hutchinson House of Representatives 2336 Rayburn Office Building Washington, D.C.

20515

Dear Sir:

As a concerned resident of Michigan, I am writing to you about an issue that has recently been given a considerable amount of adverse publicity.

The issue

'I am referring to is that of nuclear power plant safety.

Because I am living in Stevensville, I have a particular interest in the Donald C.

Cook Nuclear facility near Bridgman.

An article that appeared in the "Herald-Palladium" on Tuesday, May 11th indicated there had been a small radioactive release in a part of the Cook,Plant.

If an incident such as this is allowed to happen, what is to prevent an occurrence of greater consequence?

Are there any organizations or federal commissions set up to monitor and safeguard against any possible nuclear accidents?

If so, do they strictly regulate the activities at nuclear plants involving safety requirements?

Do you favor stricter regulations for nuclear plants?

Do you feel the outcome of the nuclear initiative due to go before California voters on June 8th will have any effect on other states, in particular our state of Michigan?

Also, has there been any recent legislation before congress on nuclear power plants; and if so, what has your stand been?

Do you see a definite future for atomic power as compared to conventional types of power?

Can you see any justification for the billions of dollars being spent on present plants and the development of future plants?

Any information you can give me on this subject would be greatly appreciated.

Sincerely yours, Mitzi Johnston

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~ UNITED STATES NUCLEAWREGULATORYCOMMISSION WASHINGTON, O. C. 20555 July 1, 1976 OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY Director Office of the Federal Register National Archives and Records Service Washington, D. C.

20408

Dear Sir:

Enclosed for publication in the Federal Register are an original and two certified copies of a document entitled:

INDIANA AND HICHIGAN ELECTRIC COHPANY, ET AL Docket No. 50-3i5 NOTICE OF ISSUANCE OF AN"NDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE Publication of the above document at the earliest possible date would be appreciated.

Sincerely, Samuel J. Chilk Secretary of the Commission

Enclosures:

Original and 2 certified copies bcc:

Central Files n o ation Services Legal Director Office of Congressional Affairs OGC SECY Files

UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION DOCKET NO. 50-315 INDIANA AND MICHIGAN ELECTRIC COMPANY NDIANA AND MICHIGAN POWER COMPANY I

DONALD C.

COOK NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT I NOTICE OF ISSUANCE OF AMENDMENT TO CILITY PERATING LICENSE Notice is hereby given that the U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has issued Amendment No. 16 to Facility Operating License No. DPR-58 issued to Indiana and Michigan Electric Company and Indiana IO and Michigan Power Company.

The amendment revises the Technical Specifica-tions for operation of the Donald C. Cook Nuclear Plant Unit 1 located in Berrien County, Michigan, and is effective as of the date of its issuance.

The amendment changes certain Technical Specifications to extend the time interval within which the first demonstration of diesel generator operability following initial criticality may be performed.

The application for the amendment complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's rules and regulations.

The Commission has made appropriate findings required by the Act and the Coomission's rules and regulations in 10 CFR Chapter I.

These findings are set forth in the license amendment.

Prior public notice of this amendment is not required because the amendment does not involve a significant hazards consideration.

The Commission has determined that the issuance of this amendment will not result in any significant environmental impact and that, pursuant

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to 10 CFR 5 51.5(d)(4),

an environmental statement, negative declaration or environmental impact appraisal need not be prepared in connection with issuance of this amendment.

For further details with respect to this action, see (1) the June 11; 1976 and June 24, 1976 letters of application for amendment, (2) Amendment No. 16 to License. No. DPR-58, (3) the Commission's letter to the licensee dated June 25,

1976, and (4) the Commission's related safety evaluation.

All of these items are available for. public inspection at the Comoission.'s Public Document

Room, 1717 H Street, NW, Washington, D. C., and at the St. Joseph Public Library, 500 Market Street, St. Joseph, Michigan 49085.

A copy of items (2), (3), and (4) may be obtained upon request addressed to the U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, D. C.

20555, Attention:

Director, Division of Project Management.

Dated at Bethesda, Maryland, this 25th day of June 1976.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY OMMISSION:

Karl Kniel, Chief Light'ater Reactors Branch No. 2 Division of Project Management,

UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION DOCKET NO. 50-315 INDIANA AND MICHIGAN ELECTRIC COMPANY INDIANA AND MICHIGAN POKIER COMPANY I

DONALD C.

COOK NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT l NOTICE OF ISSUANCE OF AMENDMENT TO CILITY OPERATING LICENSE Notice is hereby given that the U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commsssion (the Commission) has issued Amendment No. 16 to Facility Operating License No. DPR-58 issued to Indiana and Michigan, Electric Company and Indiana and Michigan Power Company.

The amendment revises the Technical Specifica-tions for operation of the Donald C. Cook Nuclear Plant Unit 1 located in Berrien County, Michigan, and is effective as of the date of its issuance.

The amendment changes certain Technical Specifications to extend the time interval within which the first demonstration of diesel generator operability following initial criticality may be performed.

The application for the amendment complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's rules and regulations.

The Commission has made appropriate findings required by the Act and the Comnission's rules and regulations in 10 CFR Chapter I.

These findings are set forth in the license amendment.

Prior public notice of this amendment is not required because the amendment does not involve a significant hazards consideration.

The Commission has determined that the issuance of this amendment will C:

not result in any significant environmental impact and that, pursuant

to 10 CFR 5 51.5(d)(4),

an environmental statement, negative declaration or environmental impact appraisal need not be prepared in connection with issuance, of this amendment.

For further details with respect to this action, see (1) the June 11; 1976 and June 24, 1976 letters of application for amendment, (2) Amendment I

No. 16 to License No. DPR-58, (3) the Commission's letter to the licensee dated June 25, 1976, and (4) the Commission's related safety evaluation.

All of these items are available for public inspection at the Comnission's Public Document

Room, 1717 H Street, NW, Washington, D. C., and at the St. Joseph Public Library, 500 Market Street, St. Joseph, Michigan 49085.

A copy of items (2), (3), and (4) may be obtained upon request addressed

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to the U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, D. C.

20555, Attention:

Director, D-'vision of Project Management.

Dated at Bethesda, Maryland, this 25th day of June 1976.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY OMMISSION:

Karl Kniel, Chief Light Water Reactors Branch No. 2 Division of Project Management

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Docket Hos.

E 50-316 Honorable Birch Eayh United States Senate Dear Senator Bayh:

In their letter of E'arch 3, l975 to the President, Coauaission, Thomas Davis and Linda Sue Jacobs

have, of why construction work has stopped at the Donald Sridgman, Hichigan.

Explanation of the problem is to the problem is not.

which you forwarded to the asked for an explanation C.

Cook nuclear Plant near simple, but the solution The operator of the D.C.

Cook Plant, Indiana and Hichigan Electric Company, has told us that the company does not have enough money now to continue construction work on the second unit at the site.

The Cook plant consists of two nuclear units.

Unit 1 is now in the later stages of operational testing and, if the testing continues as smoothly as it has so far, Unit 1 should be fully operational later this spring.

Con-struction of Unit 2 was about 6OX cor1plete when. construction work was stopped-in late 1974.

Ve do not know when construction vill be resumed.

The financial problems qf the Cook plant are not unique.

Construction of several othe" nuclear power plants has been delayed by other electric utility companies for the same reason:

lack of funds.

High interest rates on borrowed money and higher construction costs due to.inflation are two of the major factors that have affected utilities'bility to raise the money needed to build new plants.

Although the Huclear Pegulatory Commission is aware of this problem, it is, as you know, not in a position to foster a solution.

The financial problems of the utilities are entwined in the economic problems that are national in scope.

I I hope that this letter will be helpful to you in replying'o Hr.

Davis'nd Hs. Jacobs 'nouiry.

Sincerely, Original Signed Bg A. Giambusso A. Ciambusso, Director

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Sincerely, I

Birch Bayh United States nator 8417

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OFC 6" 'OdiNiSTAATOR 16ll West Clinton

Goshen, TN,. 4652$

March 3, lj~tjg@R 2b Nl 9 08 The President of the United States 1600 Pennsylvania Avenue Wash1ngton, D.

C.,

Nr. President:

In order to become more informed about one of the =steps be1ng taken, to bring about a national independence of energy, we

'-"went todgy to the s 1te 0f the Cook i'uclear Powei Stat 1Gll Gn Lake Michigan.

When we arr1ved at the site we were informed that tours and, information sessions were not; being given and.

that all work on the proJect; was at a'tandstill.

r As you can understand, we were anzalled.

We have been bombarded from everv source wit)> the assuza-ce that we had a problem with an energy shortage, but that every oossible stem was being taken to insure the ra~id transition of 1nternational sources to nationalindependence.

We do,not know how much money has been expended at this site to date, but to droo it no'~ is a waste.

Each month our light bill rises t;.o account for increases in a fuel adJustment.

Everv evening we read.

new statist;1cs on unemployment.

It would seem that this >>asting proJect; could be a source of cure for both energy and unemployment problems.

May we please have an exolanation as to why work has been stopped on this oroJect and

~hat we may expect 1n the oroJect's future.

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Sincerely, Thomas

u. Davis Ec Linda Sue Jacob.

cc:

Vance Hartke Birch HayhM John Bradamas

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'lHttiteu Stated &mate MEMORANDuM Please note the attached letter from a constituent which I am forwarding for your considexati'on.

Xt.would be greatly appxeciated if'ou.vould check into this u" tter.

Upon completion of your investigation, please advise me of the status of this case in duplicate and return the original letter in an envelope Thank you for your assistance.

Sincerely,

/

Birch Eayh United States nator

lg U.S. tN:. RGY PW lwCIIY OF C, OF PiQI ll,'ilS'iBATOR 1611 t1est Clinton

Goshen, IN, 46526

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C The President of the United States 1600 Pennsylvania Avenue Washington, D. C.,

Nr. President:

In order to become more informed about one of the steps being taken to bring about a national independence of energy, we e s wenU today to L he site of the Cook k~uclear Power Sv vi011 oil Lake Michigan.

Nhen we arrived. at the site we were informed.

that tours and. information sessions were not being given and that all work on the prospect was at a standstill.

As you can understand.,

we were appalled.

Ve have been bombarded from everv sou ce <<1th the assuzat;ce that we had a problem w1th an energy shortage, but that everv possible sten was being taken to insure the ra~id transition of international sources to national.independence.

Ve do not know how much money has been exoended at this site to date, but to droo it no's a <<aste.

Each month our light bill rises to account for increases in a fuel ad,)ustment.

Every evening we read new statist1cs on unemployment.

It.

would seem that this i'asting prospect could be a source of cure for both energv and unemployment problems.

Nay we please have an explanation as to whv work has been stopped on this oroJect and

.'hat we may exoect in the pro)ect's future.

Sincerelv, Thomas

~. Davis

& Linda Sue Jacobs cc:

Vance Hartke Birch BayhM John Bradamas

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Docket Nos. 50-315 50-316 MAR 2 5 1975 Honorable John Brademas House of Representatives

Dear Mr.'rademas:

In their letter of March 3, 1975 to the President, which you forwarded to the Commission, Thames Davis and Linda Sue Jacobs have asked for an expla-nat1on of why construct1on work has stopped at the Donald C. Cook Nuclear Plant near Bridgman, Michigan.

Explanation of the problem is a&pie, but the solution to the problem is not.

The operator of the D.C. Cook Plant, Indiana and Michigan Electric Company, has told us that the company doesn't have enough money now to continue construction work an the second unit at the site.

The Cook plant consists of two nuclear units.

Unit 1 is now in the later stages of operational testing and, if the. testing program continues as smoothly as it has so far, Unit 1 should be fully operational later this spring.

Construction of Unit 2 was about 60/ complete when construction work was stopped in late 1974.

He do not know when construction will be resumed.

The financial problems of the Cook plant are'not unique.

Construction of several other nuclear power plants has been delayed by other electric ut1lity conpanies for the same reason:

lack of funds.

High interest rates on borrawed money and h1gher construction costs due to inflation are two of the ma)or factors that have affected utilities'bilityto raise the money needed to build new plants.

Although the Nuclear Regulatory Commission is aware of this problem; it is, as you know, not in a position to foster a solution.

The financial problems of the utilities are entwined 1n the economic problems'that are national in scope.

I hope that this letter will be helpful to you in replying to Mf. Dilvis' and Ms. Jacobs'nqu1ry.

Sincerely, Original Sjgncd By A. GiRInbuSSO A. Giambusso,, Director Division of Reactor Licensing Office of Nuclear eactp& Regulatian OPPICR~

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D'ocket File NRC PDR NRR REading LWR 2-2 File EGCase ELD OCL Q)

G. Ertter (DR-8343)

J.

Cook M. Groff E. Hughes A. Ferguson R.

A. Benedict M. Service VAMoore IE (3)

K. Kniel J. Stolz A. Schwencer O. Parr W. Butler D. Vassallo P.

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To KRC CONTROL NUMBER8343-DATE OF DOCUMENT 3/10/75 ACTION PROCESSING DATES Acknowiedrted 3/1 f/75 Interi pl F;no >

FILE OCATION ACTION COMPLETION DEADLINE 3/24/75 PREPARE FOR SIGNATURE OF:

'hoirman Director oi Regulation Giambusso DFSCRIPTION Ltr

@orig ai Q Copy C3 Other

<c P" ?ITIS

">>ncl ltr fm Thomas G.>G Linda Sue Jacobs inquiring xe the status of the Donald C. Cook plant REMARKS itfark envelop'e to Attn:

Linda Hoffman LPDR?

!UCt REFFRRED TO Giembus so f/ac tion 3/17/75 IS HOTIFICATIOIITO THE JC~A~~ g II

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RECOMMENDED?~

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Case Docket Piles) 50-315 PDR 50 316 DO NOT DETACH THIS COPY DIRECTOR OF REGULATION COMMUtilCATIONS'CONTROL Form HQ-32 (1-73)

USAEC

FROM Rep.

John Brademas (l:nd.)

0 HRC CONTROL NUMSER 8343 DATE OF DOCUMENT 3/10/75 ACTION PROCESSING DATES Acr<now!edged 3/14'/75 Interi pl Fin. ~ P FILE 'CATION ACTION COMPLETION DEADLINE ~

3/m 75 PREPARF: FOR SIGNATURE OF:

Chairman Director of Regulation

~ X Giambusso DESCRIPTION Ltr K)original Q Copy Q Other Encl ltr fm Thomas G

>t 7 Case Docket Piles) 50>>315 PDR 50-316 DO NOT DETACH THIS COPY DIRECTOR OF REGULATION COMMUNICATIONS'CONTROL Form HQ-32 (1-73) USAEC I (Congress of ffje Rafts States %)ouse of Scpccs'cntatibes 5Hnsgfngton, Ã).C. / 19 75 Nuclear RegulatoryC'o'mIoLsion Sir: The attached. communication is sent for your consideration. Pleas'e investigate he statements contained. therein and. forward me I thh necessary information for re- - ply, re re-4 SP Yours truly, John Brademas, M C. 3rd D., Ind. Attn: Linda Hoffman ~h I s 1611 West Clin'ton

Goshen, IN 46526 March 3, 19'75 The President of the United States 1600 Pennsylvania Avenue Washington, D.

C. Mr. President: t In order to become more 1nformed about one of the',, s$ eos be1ng taken to bring about a national indenendence of energy, we wenc today to the site of the Cook."nuclear Power Station on Lake M1chigan. When we arrived at the s1te we were'. 1nformed that tours and information sessions were not being given and. that all work on the proJect was at a standst111. As you can understand, we were arvalled. We have been bombarded from everv source with the assurance that we had a problem with an energy shortage, but that every'ossible sCen was be1ng taken to insure the ra~id transition,'of international sources to national independence. We do not know how much money has been expended at this site to date, but to drov it no" is a waste. Each month our light bill rises to account for increases 1n a fuel adJustment. Every evening we read new statistics on unemployment. It would seem that this wasting proJect could be a source of cure for both energv and unemployment problems. May we please have an explanation as to whv work has been stopped on this oroJect and ~hat we may expect in the oroJect's future. V Sincerely, Thomas ~. Davis Ec Linda Sue Jacobs cc: Vance Hartke Birch Bayh John Bradamas~ ~)~ /~/" ~/ <~~~ ge~ gL It'wc mate~ TIIA8~~- I t It 1 Congress of tfje 'Snitch Statee goose of Repeedentntibes 58asgnotoa, 33.C. ,l9 75 Nuclear Regulatory CommLaion Sir: Tne attached communication is sent for your consideration. Please investigate the statements contained therein and forward. me the necessary information for re-ply, re re-Yours truly, ~ John Brademas, ~ C. 3rd D., Ind. Attn: Linda Hoffman C<< ~ ~V'<<<<<<'<<: <<<<% '<<<<*4 <<, 1611 West Clinton

Goshen, IN 4'526 March 3, 1975

.The President of the United St;ates 1600 Pennsylvania Avenue Washington, D. C. Mr. President;: In order to become more inform d about one of the steas be1ng taken to bring about a national independence of energy, we we.~ today to the site of the Coo'- N"cle"- Power Station on Zake Michigan. When 'e arr1ved at; the sit;e we were 1nformed that tours and information sessions were not being given and that all work on the proJect was at a standst111. As you can understand. we were a.z.alled. We have been tombarded from everv source with the assu:a"ce that ve had a problem with an energy shortage, but that everv oossiole ster.was,.being taken to insure the ra"id transit'.on nf international sources to national indeoendence. We do'not; know how much money has been exoended at this site to date, but to droe it no's a waste. >~ch month our light bill rises to account for increases in a fuel adJustment. Every evening we read. new statistics on unemployment. It would seem=that this rasting proJect could. be a source of cure for both energv and unem~loyzent rroblems. May we please have an explanation as to vhv work has been st;opped on this aroJect and .~hat we may expect 1n the oroJect',s future. Sincerelv,'homas ~. Dav1s & L,inda Sue Jacobs cc: Vance Hartke Birch Eayh John Bradamas~ e ,) ~ s. Al, 'A C l h I 5 1 E( C 1 4-4 H' I ~ '" u P FPOM'repk:Jetra szsrtrerrs, (to@.yy CONTROL NUMBER .8343 DATE OF DOCUMENT F ILE LOCATION TION COMPLETION DEADLINE ~/~~j'n TO ACTION PROCESSING DATES Acknowledged 0/i4 79 5RC Inteiim Reply Final PREPARE FOR SIGNATURE OF: Chairman Director of Regulation Z If iaCmSOO DESCRIPTION LCC'Original Q Copy Q Other REMARKS Eeet Lee 5a Xhoaus G. 5 Linda Sue Jacal ~string rc thf: elates ef the Qanaid C. Cook phmt Marlc cavHoge to the At.tn: Ands 1Mfeen REFERRED TO DATE CLambveso SfactLen Sfi7)7$ IS NOTIFICATION TO THE JCAE RECOMMENDED? Cye: Cgse Boche 0 les} 50-M5 PSR 59-315 t. DO NOT DETACH THIS COPY DIRECTOR OF REGULATION COMMUNICATIONS CONTROL Form HQ.32 (I 73),'SAEC p~ ~ 8 ~ % g$ ~ 1 .r 1 C I I 1 p tc b V I q Congress Of tfje Knits) State5 P)ouse of Bepeedentatibes 58asfjlnglon, Q.C. ,l9 75 Nuclear Regulatory CommLBion The attached. communication is sent for your consideration. Please investigate the statements contained. therein and forward. me the necessary information for re-ply, re re-SP g.r. Yours truly, John Brademas, M C. 3rd D., End. Attn: Linda HoMnan ~, ~ 1611 West Clinton

Goshen, IN 46526 Narch 3, 1975 The President o.

the United States 1600 Pennsylvania Avenue Washington, D. C. llr. President: Xn order to become more 1nformed about one of the steas being taken to bring about a national indenendence of energy, we wene today to the site 'of the Cook "ucle Power St tioxl Gl1 Lake Michigan. When we arrived at the site we were informed that tours and informat1on sessions were not being given and that all work on the pro)ect was at a standstill. As you can understand, we ~cere

a. palled.

Ve have beer. Lombarded from everv source with the assura",ce that ve had a problem w1th an energy shortage, but that everv possible sten was being taken to insure the ra"id transit!on nf 1nternational sources to national indeoendence. We do not know how much money has been exoended at this s1te to date, but to droo it no's a waste. Each month our 11ght bill rises to account for increases in a fuel ad,]ustment. Everv even1ng we read new statist1cs on unemployment. It would seem that'his iasting pro)ect could be a source of. cure for both energv and unemoloyvent problems. Nay we please have an explanation as to vhv work has been stopped on'this oro)ect and .~hat ve mav expect 1n the oroJect's future. Sincerelv, cc: Vance Hartke Birch Eayh John Bradaaas~ Thomas ~. Dav1s 4 L1nda Sue Jacobs

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