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| contact person =  
| contact person =  
| document report number = 88-3-1, NUDOCS 8809140459
| document report number = 88-3-1, NUDOCS 8809140459
| document type = REPORTABLE OCCURRENCE REPORT (SEE ALSO AO,LER), TEXT-SAFETY REPORT
| document type = REPORTABLE OCCURRENCE REPORT (SEE ALSO AO LER), TEXT-SAFETY REPORT
| page count = 5
| page count = 5
}}
}}


=Text=
=Text=
{{#Wiki_filter:PS~G Pu!:jl 1c Se:*vice E 1ec1ric and Ga~ Company P 0. Box E Hancocks Bridge, New-Jersey 08038 Saiem Generating Station September 6, 1988 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Document Control Desk Washington, DC                     20555
{{#Wiki_filter:*
PS~G Pu!:jl 1c Se:*vice E 1ec1ric and Ga~ Company P 0. Box E Hancocks Bridge, New-Jersey 08038 Saiem Generating Station U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555  


==Dear Sir:==
==Dear Sir:==
SALEM GENERATING STATION LICENSE NO. DPR-70 DOCKET NO. 50-272 UNIT NO. 1 SUPPLEMENTAL SPECIAL REPORT 88-3-1 September 6, 1988 This supplemental Special Report addresses additional fire barrier penetration impairments which have not been restored to functional status within seven (7) days.
These impairments have been discovered by the Penetration Seal Task Force.
This report satisfies the reporting requirements of Technical Specification Action 3.7.11.a pursuant to Technical Specification 6.9.2.
It is being submitted within thirty (30) days as per the Action Statement.
Sincerely yours, 8809140459 a006i~72 pDR ADOCK 0 5o pNU L. K. Miller General Manager-Salem Operations s
MJP:pc Distribution 95*2189111M112-8~
i


SALEM GENERATING STATION LICENSE NO. DPR-70 DOCKET NO. 50-272 UNIT NO. 1 SUPPLEMENTAL SPECIAL REPORT 88-3-1 This supplemental Special Report addresses additional fire barrier penetration impairments which have not been restored to functional status within seven (7) days.                        These impairments have been discovered by the Penetration Seal Task Force.                                  This report satisfies the reporting requirements of Technical Specification Action 3.7.11.a pursuant to Technical Specification 6.9.2.                                  It is being submitted within thirty (30) days as per the Action Statement.
UNIT 1 SPECIAL REPOR.8-3-1  
Sincerely yours, 809 140459            a 006i~72                                        L. K. Miller 8pDR        ADOCK 0 5 o pNU                                              General Manager-s                                                                        Salem Operations MJP:pc Distribution                                                                                                      I i
\\
95*2189111M112-8~
PLANT I*DENTIFICATION:
 
Salem Generating Station - Unit 1 Public Service Electric & Gas Company Hancock's Bridge, New Jersey 08038  
  \
~
UNIT 1 SPECIAL REPOR.8-3-1 PLANT I*DENTIFICATION:
IDENTIFICATION OF OCCURRENCE:
Salem Generating Station - Unit 1 Public Service Electric & Gas Company Hancock's Bridge, New Jersey     08038
Technical Specification 3.7.11; Fire Barriers Impaired For Greater Than 7 Days Event Date(s):
~   IDENTIFICATION OF OCCURRENCE:
7/20/88, 8/09/88 Report Date:
Technical Specification 3.7.11; Fire Barriers Impaired For Greater Than 7 Days Event Date(s):     7/20/88, 8/09/88 Report Date:     9/06/88 This report was initiated by Incident Report No. 88-268.
9/06/88 This report was initiated by Incident Report No. 88-268.
CONDITIONS PRIOR TO OCCURRENCE:
CONDITIONS PRIOR TO OCCURRENCE:
Mode 1   Reactor Power 100%     Unit Load 1138 MWe DESCRIPTION OF OCCURRENC_Jt.;_
Mode 1 Reactor Power 100%
As identified in PSE&G letter NLR-N88037 dated March 4, 1988, PSE&G has initiated a comprehensive review/inspection of fire barrier penetration seals. Due to the additional review by the Penetration Seal Task Force, penetrations found impaired are not being repaired within seven days as specified by Technical Specification Action Statement 3.7.11.a. This report summarizes the task force findings associated with inadequate penetration seals. The inadequate penetration seals found, to the date of issue of this report, include:
Unit Load 1138 MWe DESCRIPTION OF OCCURRENC_Jt.;_
On July 13, 1988 two fire Barrier cable penetration were found degraded. The penetration contained electrical sleeving containing an electrical cable surrounded by foam type fire sealant. The area (approximately 1/8" gap and 1/4" gap respectively) surrounding the electrical sleeves were not sealed thereby constituting an impaired seal. The fire barrier is in the east wall of the 100' Elevation Relay Room.
As identified in PSE&G letter NLR-N88037 dated March 4, 1988, PSE&G has initiated a comprehensive review/inspection of fire barrier penetration seals.
On July 25, 1988 three (3) degraded fire barrier cable penetration seals were found on the south wall in the 100' Elevation Relay Room. Two (2) of these penetrations are 3" in diameter and the other is 5.5" (located -is feet above the flooi}. The 3" penetrations contain fire wrapped cabling. This fire wrap extends over the penetration. There is no foam behind the fire wrap. It provides a 1 hour rated barrier, however, the wall is a 3 hour barrier. The 5.5" penetration contains a 4" conduit surrounded by foam. The foam contains an 1/8" gap at the base of the conduit.
Due to the additional review by the Penetration Seal Task Force, penetrations found impaired are not being repaired within seven days as specified by Technical Specification Action Statement 3.7.11.a.
On July 28, 1988 one (1) 3.5" degraded fire barrier cable penetration seal was found on the north wall in the 100' Elevation Relay Room. The penetration contains cabling surrounded by foam. The foam contains an 1/2" diamet~r hole.
This report summarizes the task force findings associated with inadequate penetration seals.
The inadequate penetration seals found, to the date of issue of this report, include:
On July 13, 1988 two fire Barrier cable penetration were found degraded.
The penetration contained electrical sleeving containing an electrical cable surrounded by foam type fire sealant.
The area (approximately 1/8" gap and 1/4" gap respectively) surrounding the electrical sleeves were not sealed thereby constituting an impaired seal.
The fire barrier is in the east wall of the 100' Elevation Relay Room.
On July 25, 1988 three (3) degraded fire barrier cable penetration seals were found on the south wall in the 100' Elevation Relay Room.
Two (2) of these penetrations are 3" in diameter and the other is 5.5" (located -is feet above the flooi}.
The 3" penetrations contain fire wrapped cabling.
This fire wrap extends over the penetration.
There is no foam behind the fire wrap.
It provides a 1 hour rated barrier, however, the wall is a 3 hour barrier.
The 5.5" penetration contains a 4" conduit surrounded by foam.
The foam contains an 1/8" gap at the base of the conduit.
On July 28, 1988 one (1) 3.5" degraded fire barrier cable penetration seal was found on the north wall in the 100' Elevation Relay Room.
The penetration contains cabling surrounded by foam.
The foam contains an 1/2" diamet~r hole.  


UNIT 1 SPECIAL REPOR.8-3-1 DESCRIP"TION OF OCCURRENCE:
UNIT 1 SPECIAL REPOR.8-3-1
* DESCRIP"TION OF OCCURRENCE:
(cont'd)
(cont'd)
Between August 2, 1988 and August 30, 1988, 138 additional penetration seals were found impaired of which 134 penetrations are located in the Unit 1 Relay Room and 4 penetrations are located in the Unit 1 lA 125 V Battery Room. The penetrations range in size from -3 inches to -6 inches in diameter. The nature of the impairments include 6 with no seal, 14 with a hole in the seal (unknown cause), 2 with foreign material imbedded.in the seal {one imbedded with a rag and the other with duct tape),
Between August 2, 1988 and August 30, 1988, 138 additional penetration seals were found impaired of which 134 penetrations are located in the Unit 1 Relay Room and 4 penetrations are located in the Unit 1 lA 125 V Battery Room.
The penetrations range in size from -3 inches to -6 inches in diameter.
The nature of the impairments include 6 with no seal, 14 with a hole in the seal (unknown cause), 2 with foreign material imbedded.in the seal {one imbedded with a rag and the other with duct tape),
10 with a void in the seal {due to inadequate quantity of foam injection upon installation), 6 with apparent degradation {e.g.,
10 with a void in the seal {due to inadequate quantity of foam injection upon installation), 6 with apparent degradation {e.g.,
cable pulled through) 47 with inadequate color/cell structure (reference LER 272/88-013-00) and 32 that are not deep enough into the penetration per design {les~ than 6 inches).
cable pulled through) 47 with inadequate color/cell structure (reference LER 272/88-013-00) and 32 that are not deep enough into the penetration per design
{les~ than 6 inches).
An hourly fire watch had been established for.the Relay Room and Battery Room areas previously due to other fire protection concerns.
An hourly fire watch had been established for.the Relay Room and Battery Room areas previously due to other fire protection concerns.
Therefore, the requirements of Technical Specification Action Statement 3.7.11.a are met.
Therefore, the requirements of Technical Specification Action Statement 3.7.11.a are met.
Technical Specification 3.7.11 states:
Technical Specification 3.7.11 states:  
          "All fire penetrations {including cable penetration barriers, fire doors and fire dampers), in fire zone boundaries, protecting safety related areas shall be functional."
"All fire penetrations {including cable penetration barriers, fire doors and fire dampers), in fire zone boundaries, protecting safety related areas shall be functional."
Technical Specification Action Statement 3.7.11.a states:
Technical Specification Action Statement 3.7.11.a states:  
          "With one or more of the above required fire barrier penetrations non-functional, within one (1) hour either establish a continuous fire watch on at least one (1) side of the affected penetration, or verify the OPERABILITY of fire detectors on at least one (1) side of the non-functional fire barrier and establish an hourly fire watch patrol. Restore the non-functional fire barrier penetration(s) to functional status within 7 days or, in lieu of any other report required by Specification 6.9.l, prepare and submit a Special Report to the Commission pursuant to Specification 6.9.2 within the next 30 days outlining the action taken, the cause of the non-functional penetration and plans and schedule for restoring the fire barrier penetration{s) to functional status."
"With one or more of the above required fire barrier penetrations non-functional, within one (1) hour either establish a continuous fire watch on at least one (1) side of the affected penetration, or verify the OPERABILITY of fire detectors on at least one (1) side of the non-functional fire barrier and establish an hourly fire watch patrol.
Restore the non-functional fire barrier penetration(s) to functional status within 7 days or, in lieu of any other report required by Specification 6.9.l, prepare and submit a Special Report to the Commission pursuant to Specification 6.9.2 within the next 30 days outlining the action taken, the cause of the non-functional penetration and plans and schedule for restoring the fire barrier penetration{s) to functional status."
APPARENT CAUSE OF OCCURRENCE:
APPARENT CAUSE OF OCCURRENCE:
The cause of the degraded fire barrier penetrations could not be positively determined.
The cause of the degraded fire barrier penetrations could not be positively determined.
The east wall penetrations (discovered 7/13/88) from the Relay Room side "appeared" sealed visually due to the use of a bushing on the sleeve which hid the gap. The 3.5" south wall penetrations (discovered 7/25/88) also appeared sealed from the Relay Room side, as de~cribed in the Description of Occurrence section. Closer inspection, as required by the Seal Penetration Review Group procedures, revealed the nature of the impairments. Technical Specification Surveillance 4.7.11 requires verification of the functional status of fire barrier penetrations every eighteen months
The east wall penetrations (discovered 7/13/88) from the Relay Room side "appeared" sealed visually due to the use of a bushing on the sleeve which hid the gap.
The 3.5" south wall penetrations (discovered 7/25/88) also appeared sealed from the Relay Room side, as de~cribed in the Description of Occurrence section.
Closer inspection, as required by the Seal Penetration Review Group procedures, revealed the nature of the impairments.
Technical Specification Surveillance 4.7.11 requires verification of the functional status of fire barrier penetrations every eighteen months  


UNIT 1 SPECIAL REPOR.8-3-1 APPAREN~ CAUSE OF OCCURRENC_E_:~~(c_o_n~t_'_d_,_)
UNIT 1 SPECIAL REPOR.8-3-1
via a visual inspection. This inspection would not necessarily identify the non-functional status of the subject penetrations.
* APPAREN~ CAUSE OF OCCURRENC_E_:~~(c_o_n~t_'_d_,_)
The 5.5" south wall penetration (found July 25) is located in a difficult to reach location. The gap in the seal may have formed due to shrinkage. It does not appear as though a cable was pulled (forming the gap).
via a visual inspection.
The 3.5" north wall penetration (found July 28) is also located in a difficult to reach location. The gap in the seal appears to have formed as a result of a cable pull.             It has not been determined when or by whom the cable was pulled.
This inspection would not necessarily identify the non-functional status of the subject penetrations.
The 5.5" south wall penetration (found July 25) is located in a difficult to reach location.
The gap in the seal may have formed due to shrinkage.
It does not appear as though a cable was pulled (forming the gap).
The 3.5" north wall penetration (found July 28) is also located in a difficult to reach location.
The gap in the seal appears to have formed as a result of a cable pull.
It has not been determined when or by whom the cable was pulled.
The penetrations with non-functional seals, found between August 2, 1988 and August 30, 1988, are similar in configuration to the penetrations identified in the origial issue of this Special Report.
The penetrations with non-functional seals, found between August 2, 1988 and August 30, 1988, are similar in configuration to the penetrations identified in the origial issue of this Special Report.
The cause of their degraded condition also could not positively be determined.
The cause of their degraded condition also could not positively be determined.
ANALYSIS OF OCCURRENCE:
ANALYSIS OF OCCURRENCE:
The functional integrity of the penetration fire barri~rs ensures that fires will be confined or adequately retarded from spreading to adjacent portions of the facility.             This design feature minimizes the possibility of a single fire involving several areas of the facility. The fire barrier penetration seals are a passive element in the facility fire protection program and are subject to periodic inspections. This report satisfies the reporting requirements of Technical Specification 3.7.11.a pursuant to Technical Specification.
The functional integrity of the penetration fire barri~rs ensures that fires will be confined or adequately retarded from spreading to adjacent portions of the facility.
6.9.2 since the time between discovery and eventual repair of the fire barrier impairments is greater than seven (7) days. Appropriate actions were already in place in accordance with the requirements of Technical Specification Action Statement 3.7.11.a to establish a one hour roving fire watch for the impaired fire barriers once the impairments were identified.
This design feature minimizes the possibility of a single fire involving several areas of the facility.
The subject fire area contains detection in addition to the roving fire watch patrol. Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that a fire in either area would be detected before it could involve an adjacent area. This occurrence therefore involved no undue risk to the health or safety of the public.
The fire barrier penetration seals are a passive element in the facility fire protection program and are subject to periodic inspections.
This report satisfies the reporting requirements of Technical Specification 3.7.11.a pursuant to Technical Specification.
6.9.2 since the time between discovery and eventual repair of the fire barrier impairments is greater than seven (7) days.
Appropriate actions were already in place in accordance with the requirements of Technical Specification Action Statement 3.7.11.a to establish a one hour roving fire watch for the impaired fire barriers once the impairments were identified.
The subject fire area contains detection in addition to the roving fire watch patrol.
Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that a fire in either area would be detected before it could involve an adjacent area.
This occurrence therefore involved no undue risk to the health or safety of the public.
CORRECTIVE ACTION:
CORRECTIVE ACTION:
The hourly fire watch, as addressed in the Description of Occurrence section, will continue until all fire protection concerns associated with these areas are resolved.
The hourly fire watch, as addressed in the Description of Occurrence section, will continue until all fire protection concerns associated with these areas are resolved.
The repair of the penetrations was not accomplished within seven (7) days due to the additional review being conducted by the Penetration Seal Task Force. Upon completion of this review the penetrations will be sealed.
The repair of the penetrations was not accomplished within seven (7) days due to the additional review being conducted by the Penetration Seal Task Force.
This review and corrective action will be completed in accordance
Upon completion of this review the penetrations will be sealed.
This review and corrective action will be completed in accordance  


UNIT 1 SPECIAL REPOR'. .8-3-1 CORREC~IVE ACTION:   (cont'd) with PSE&G letter NLR-N88037, dated March 4, 1988, to the NRC which discusses the Penetration Seal Review Program schedule and the telecommunication between PSE&G and the NRC Region 1 office conducted on August 26, 1988.
UNIT 1 SPECIAL REPOR'..
General Manager -
8-3-1
Salem Operations MJP:pc SORC Mtg. 88-073}}
* CORREC~IVE ACTION:
(cont'd) with PSE&G letter NLR-N88037, dated March 4, 1988, to the NRC which discusses the Penetration Seal Review Program schedule and the telecommunication between PSE&G and the NRC Region 1 office conducted on August 26, 1988.
MJP:pc SORC Mtg. 88-073 General Manager -
Salem Operations}}

Latest revision as of 03:55, 6 January 2025

Supplemental Special Rept 88-3-1:on 880720 & 0809,fire Barriers Impaired for Greater than 7 Days.Cause Unknown. Hourly Watch Continued Until Concerns W/Area Resolved. Penetrations Sealed
ML18093B064
Person / Time
Site: Salem PSEG icon.png
Issue date: 09/06/1988
From: Miller L
Public Service Enterprise Group
To:
NRC OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATION & RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (ARM)
References
88-3-1, NUDOCS 8809140459
Download: ML18093B064 (5)
v • d • e


Text

PS~G Pu!:jl 1c Se:*vice E 1ec1ric and Ga~ Company P 0. Box E Hancocks Bridge, New-Jersey 08038 Saiem Generating Station U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555

Dear Sir:

SALEM GENERATING STATION LICENSE NO. DPR-70 DOCKET NO. 50-272 UNIT NO. 1 SUPPLEMENTAL SPECIAL REPORT 88-3-1 September 6, 1988 This supplemental Special Report addresses additional fire barrier penetration impairments which have not been restored to functional status within seven (7) days.

These impairments have been discovered by the Penetration Seal Task Force.

This report satisfies the reporting requirements of Technical Specification Action 3.7.11.a pursuant to Technical Specification 6.9.2.

It is being submitted within thirty (30) days as per the Action Statement.

Sincerely yours, 8809140459 a006i~72 pDR ADOCK 0 5o pNU L. K. Miller General Manager-Salem Operations s

MJP:pc Distribution 95*2189111M112-8~

i

UNIT 1 SPECIAL REPOR.8-3-1

\\

PLANT I*DENTIFICATION:

Salem Generating Station - Unit 1 Public Service Electric & Gas Company Hancock's Bridge, New Jersey 08038

~

IDENTIFICATION OF OCCURRENCE:

Technical Specification 3.7.11; Fire Barriers Impaired For Greater Than 7 Days Event Date(s):

7/20/88, 8/09/88 Report Date:

9/06/88 This report was initiated by Incident Report No.88-268.

CONDITIONS PRIOR TO OCCURRENCE:

Mode 1 Reactor Power 100%

Unit Load 1138 MWe DESCRIPTION OF OCCURRENC_Jt.;_

As identified in PSE&G letter NLR-N88037 dated March 4, 1988, PSE&G has initiated a comprehensive review/inspection of fire barrier penetration seals.

Due to the additional review by the Penetration Seal Task Force, penetrations found impaired are not being repaired within seven days as specified by Technical Specification Action Statement 3.7.11.a.

This report summarizes the task force findings associated with inadequate penetration seals.

The inadequate penetration seals found, to the date of issue of this report, include:

On July 13, 1988 two fire Barrier cable penetration were found degraded.

The penetration contained electrical sleeving containing an electrical cable surrounded by foam type fire sealant.

The area (approximately 1/8" gap and 1/4" gap respectively) surrounding the electrical sleeves were not sealed thereby constituting an impaired seal.

The fire barrier is in the east wall of the 100' Elevation Relay Room.

On July 25, 1988 three (3) degraded fire barrier cable penetration seals were found on the south wall in the 100' Elevation Relay Room.

Two (2) of these penetrations are 3" in diameter and the other is 5.5" (located -is feet above the flooi}.

The 3" penetrations contain fire wrapped cabling.

This fire wrap extends over the penetration.

There is no foam behind the fire wrap.

It provides a 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> rated barrier, however, the wall is a 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> barrier.

The 5.5" penetration contains a 4" conduit surrounded by foam.

The foam contains an 1/8" gap at the base of the conduit.

On July 28, 1988 one (1) 3.5" degraded fire barrier cable penetration seal was found on the north wall in the 100' Elevation Relay Room.

The penetration contains cabling surrounded by foam.

The foam contains an 1/2" diamet~r hole.

UNIT 1 SPECIAL REPOR.8-3-1

  • DESCRIP"TION OF OCCURRENCE:

(cont'd)

Between August 2, 1988 and August 30, 1988, 138 additional penetration seals were found impaired of which 134 penetrations are located in the Unit 1 Relay Room and 4 penetrations are located in the Unit 1 lA 125 V Battery Room.

The penetrations range in size from -3 inches to -6 inches in diameter.

The nature of the impairments include 6 with no seal, 14 with a hole in the seal (unknown cause), 2 with foreign material imbedded.in the seal {one imbedded with a rag and the other with duct tape),

10 with a void in the seal {due to inadequate quantity of foam injection upon installation), 6 with apparent degradation {e.g.,

cable pulled through) 47 with inadequate color/cell structure (reference LER 272/88-013-00) and 32 that are not deep enough into the penetration per design

{les~ than 6 inches).

An hourly fire watch had been established for.the Relay Room and Battery Room areas previously due to other fire protection concerns.

Therefore, the requirements of Technical Specification Action Statement 3.7.11.a are met.

Technical Specification 3.7.11 states:

"All fire penetrations {including cable penetration barriers, fire doors and fire dampers), in fire zone boundaries, protecting safety related areas shall be functional."

Technical Specification Action Statement 3.7.11.a states:

"With one or more of the above required fire barrier penetrations non-functional, within one (1) hour either establish a continuous fire watch on at least one (1) side of the affected penetration, or verify the OPERABILITY of fire detectors on at least one (1) side of the non-functional fire barrier and establish an hourly fire watch patrol.

Restore the non-functional fire barrier penetration(s) to functional status within 7 days or, in lieu of any other report required by Specification 6.9.l, prepare and submit a Special Report to the Commission pursuant to Specification 6.9.2 within the next 30 days outlining the action taken, the cause of the non-functional penetration and plans and schedule for restoring the fire barrier penetration{s) to functional status."

APPARENT CAUSE OF OCCURRENCE:

The cause of the degraded fire barrier penetrations could not be positively determined.

The east wall penetrations (discovered 7/13/88) from the Relay Room side "appeared" sealed visually due to the use of a bushing on the sleeve which hid the gap.

The 3.5" south wall penetrations (discovered 7/25/88) also appeared sealed from the Relay Room side, as de~cribed in the Description of Occurrence section.

Closer inspection, as required by the Seal Penetration Review Group procedures, revealed the nature of the impairments.

Technical Specification Surveillance 4.7.11 requires verification of the functional status of fire barrier penetrations every eighteen months

UNIT 1 SPECIAL REPOR.8-3-1

  • APPAREN~ CAUSE OF OCCURRENC_E_:~~(c_o_n~t_'_d_,_)

via a visual inspection.

This inspection would not necessarily identify the non-functional status of the subject penetrations.

The 5.5" south wall penetration (found July 25) is located in a difficult to reach location.

The gap in the seal may have formed due to shrinkage.

It does not appear as though a cable was pulled (forming the gap).

The 3.5" north wall penetration (found July 28) is also located in a difficult to reach location.

The gap in the seal appears to have formed as a result of a cable pull.

It has not been determined when or by whom the cable was pulled.

The penetrations with non-functional seals, found between August 2, 1988 and August 30, 1988, are similar in configuration to the penetrations identified in the origial issue of this Special Report.

The cause of their degraded condition also could not positively be determined.

ANALYSIS OF OCCURRENCE:

The functional integrity of the penetration fire barri~rs ensures that fires will be confined or adequately retarded from spreading to adjacent portions of the facility.

This design feature minimizes the possibility of a single fire involving several areas of the facility.

The fire barrier penetration seals are a passive element in the facility fire protection program and are subject to periodic inspections.

This report satisfies the reporting requirements of Technical Specification 3.7.11.a pursuant to Technical Specification.

6.9.2 since the time between discovery and eventual repair of the fire barrier impairments is greater than seven (7) days.

Appropriate actions were already in place in accordance with the requirements of Technical Specification Action Statement 3.7.11.a to establish a one hour roving fire watch for the impaired fire barriers once the impairments were identified.

The subject fire area contains detection in addition to the roving fire watch patrol.

Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that a fire in either area would be detected before it could involve an adjacent area.

This occurrence therefore involved no undue risk to the health or safety of the public.

CORRECTIVE ACTION:

The hourly fire watch, as addressed in the Description of Occurrence section, will continue until all fire protection concerns associated with these areas are resolved.

The repair of the penetrations was not accomplished within seven (7) days due to the additional review being conducted by the Penetration Seal Task Force.

Upon completion of this review the penetrations will be sealed.

This review and corrective action will be completed in accordance

UNIT 1 SPECIAL REPOR'..

8-3-1

  • CORREC~IVE ACTION:

(cont'd) with PSE&G letter NLR-N88037, dated March 4, 1988, to the NRC which discusses the Penetration Seal Review Program schedule and the telecommunication between PSE&G and the NRC Region 1 office conducted on August 26, 1988.

MJP:pc SORC Mtg.88-073 General Manager -

Salem Operations

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