NL-16-2466, Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1 Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report Completion: Difference between revisions
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{{#Wiki_filter:~ Southern Nuclear | {{#Wiki_filter:~ Southern Nuclear December 15, 2016 Docket Nos.: 50-321 50-366 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Document Control Desk Washington, D. C. 20555-0001 Charles R. Pierce Regulatory Affairs Director Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant-Units 1 and 2 Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1 Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report Completion | ||
==References:== | ==References:== | ||
40 Inverness Center Parkway Post Office Box 1295 Birmingham, AL 35242 205 992 7872 tel 205 992 7601 fax crpierce@ southernco.com NL-16-2466 | |||
: 1. NRC Letter, Request for Information Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.54(f) Regarding Recommendations 2.1, 2.3, and 9.3 of the NTTF Review of Insights from the Fukushima Daiichi Accident, dated March 12, 2012. | : 1. NRC Letter, Request for Information Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.54(f) Regarding Recommendations 2.1, 2.3, and 9.3 of the NTTF Review of Insights from the Fukushima Daiichi Accident, dated March 12, 2012. | ||
: 2. NEI Letter to NRC, Proposed Path Forward for NTTF Recommendation 2. 1: Seismic Reevaluations, dated April 9, 2013. | : 2. NEI Letter to NRC, Proposed Path Forward for NTTF Recommendation 2. 1: Seismic Reevaluations, dated April 9, 2013. | ||
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ML15049A502. | ML15049A502. | ||
: 5. Letter to NRC, Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant, Request for Additional Information Regarding Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report, April 16, 2015. ML15106A549. | : 5. Letter to NRC, Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant, Request for Additional Information Regarding Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report, April 16, 2015. ML15106A549. | ||
: 6. NRC letter, Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2- Staff Review of Interim Evaluation Associated with Reevaluated Seismic Hazard Implementation Associated with Reevaluated Seismic Hazard Implementation of the Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1, July 22,2015. ML15201A474. | : 6. NRC letter, Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2-Staff Review of Interim Evaluation Associated with Reevaluated Seismic Hazard Implementation Associated with Reevaluated Seismic Hazard Implementation of the Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1, July 22,2015. ML15201A474. | ||
Ladies and Gentlemen: | Ladies and Gentlemen: | ||
On March 12, 2012, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) issued a request for information pursuant to 10 CFR 50.54(f) associated with the recommendations of the Fukushima Near-Term Task Force (NTTF) (Reference 1). Enclosure 1 of Reference 1 requested each licensee to reevaluate the seismic hazards at their sites using present-day NRC requirements and guidance, and to identify actions taken or planned to address plant-specific vulnerabilities associated with the updated seismic hazards. | On March 12, 2012, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) issued a request for information pursuant to 10 CFR 50.54(f) associated with the recommendations of the Fukushima Near-Term Task Force (NTTF) (Reference 1 ). Enclosure 1 of Reference 1 requested each licensee to reevaluate the seismic hazards at their sites using present-day NRC requirements and guidance, and to identify actions taken or planned to address plant-specific vulnerabilities associated with the updated seismic hazards. | ||
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission NL-16-2466 Page2 The NRC endorsed Reference 3 as an acceptable alternative to the information requested in Reference 1. Reference 3 also provided NRC staff approval of the schedule modifications requested by Reference 2. Based on the modified schedule, Central and Eastern United States (CEUS) licensees were required to submit the reports resulting from the Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) by December 2014. Reference 4 provided the Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant ESEP Report for Units 1 and 2. | U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission NL-16-2466 Page2 The NRC endorsed Reference 3 as an acceptable alternative to the information requested in Reference 1. Reference 3 also provided NRC staff approval of the schedule modifications requested by Reference 2. Based on the modified schedule, Central and Eastern United States (CEUS) licensees were required to submit the reports resulting from the Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) by December 2014. Reference 4 provided the Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant ESEP Report for Units 1 and 2. | ||
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This letter completes the NRC commitments described in Enclosure 3 and contains no new NRC Commitments. If you have any questions, please contact John Giddens at 205.992.7924. | This letter completes the NRC commitments described in Enclosure 3 and contains no new NRC Commitments. If you have any questions, please contact John Giddens at 205.992.7924. | ||
Mr. C. R. Pierce states he is the Regulatory Affairs Director for Southern Nuclear Operating Company, is authorized to execute this oath on behalf of Southern Nuclear Operating Company and, to the best of his knowledge and belief, the facts set forth in this letter are true. | Mr. C. R. Pierce states he is the Regulatory Affairs Director for Southern Nuclear Operating Company, is authorized to execute this oath on behalf of Southern Nuclear Operating Company and, to the best of his knowledge and belief, the facts set forth in this letter are true. | ||
ReCc~*p;;* | |||
ReCc~*p;;* | C. R. Pierce Regulatory Affairs Director CRP/JMG/GLS Sworn to and subscribed before me this f.:jl'-day of :D.e.~.k | ||
C. R. Pierce | |||
Regulatory Affairs Director | |||
~M/ | ~M/ | ||
Notary Public | Notary Public D 12016. | ||
My commission expires: 1 WI B | |||
==Enclosures:== | ==Enclosures:== | ||
: 1. Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report- Revision 1 | : 1. Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report-Revision 1 | ||
: 2. Required Actions and Schedule for Completion of ESEP Activities- Updated | : 2. Required Actions and Schedule for Completion of ESEP Activities-Updated | ||
: 3. Table of Regulatory Commitments | : 3. Table of Regulatory Commitments | ||
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U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission NL-16-2466 Page 3 cc: | U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission NL-16-2466 Page 3 cc: | ||
Southern Nuclear Operating Company Mr. S. E. Kuczynski, Chairman, President & CEO Mr. D. G. Bost, Executive Vice President & Chief Nuclear Officer Mr. D. R. Vineyard, Vice President-Hatch Mr. M. D. Meier, Vice President-Regulatory Affairs Mr. D. R. Madison, Vice President-Fleet Operations Mr. B. J. Adams, Vice President-Engineering Mr. G. L. Johnson, Regulatory Affairs Manager-Hatch RType: CHA02.004 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Ms. C. Haney, Regional Administrator Mr. M. D. Orenak, NRR Project Manager-Hatch Mr. D. H. Hardage, Senior Resident Inspector-Hatch State of Georgia Mr. R.E. Dunn, Director-Environmental Protection Division | |||
Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant - Units 1 and 2 Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1 Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report Completion | Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant - Units 1 and 2 Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1 Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report Completion Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report Revision 1, dated December 1, 2016 (61 pages) | ||
Plant Hatch Units 1 and 2 Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) | Plant Hatch Units 1 and 2 Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) | ||
Report MPR-4121 Revision 1 December 1, 20 16 QUALITY ASSURANCE DOCUMENT This document has been prepared, reviewed, and approved in accordance with the Quality Assurance requirements of | Report MPR-4121 Revision 1 December 1, 20 16 QUALITY ASSURANCE DOCUMENT This document has been prepared, reviewed, and approved in accordance with the Quality Assurance requirements of 1 OCFR50 Appendix 8 and/or ASME NQA-1, as specified in the MPR Nuclear Quality Assurance Program. | ||
Prepared by: | Prepared by: '(~ | ||
Kimberly A. Keithline Reviewed by: | Q 'I(~ | ||
Mojtaba Oghbaei Approved by: | Kimberly A. Keithline Reviewed by: H. o/'~ | ||
Caroline S. Schlaseman Prepared for Southern Nuclear Operating Company 320 KING STREET | Mojtaba Oghbaei Approved by: ~d~ | ||
Caroline S. Schlaseman Prepared for Southern Nuclear Operating Company 320 KING STREET ALEXANDRIA, VA 22314-3230 703-519-0200 FAX: 703-519-0224 http:\\\\www.mpr.com | |||
RECORD OF REVISIONS | Revision 0 | ||
I MPR-4121 Revision I RECORD OF REVISIONS Affected Pages Description All Initial issue. | |||
Attachment A, Attachment B | i, ii, iii, 2, 3, 4, 5, 19, Updated to reflect revision of ESEL and completion of ESEP 23,24,25,27 for FLEX equipment installation. | ||
Attachment A, Attachment B Ill | |||
Contents Executive Summary ...................................................................................................... 1 1 | Contents Executive Summary...................................................................................................... 1 1 | ||
Purpose and Objective......................................................................................... 2 2 | |||
Brief Summary of the FLEX Seismic Implementation Strategies..................... 3 3 | |||
Equipment Selection Process and ESEL............................................................ 6 3.1 Equipment Selection Process and ESEL...................................................................... 6 3.1.1 ESEL Development............................................................................................. 6 3.1.2 Power Operated Valves....................................................................................... 7 3.1.3 Pull Boxes........................................................................................................... 7 3.1.4 Termination Cabinets.......................................................................................... 8 3.1.5 Critical Instrumentation Indicators..................................................................... 8 3.1.6 Phase 2 and Phase 3 Piping Connections............................................................ 8 3.1.7 Inaccessible Valve Interlocks.............................................................................. 8 3.2 Justification for Use of Equipment that is not the Primary Means for FLEX Implementation....................................................................................................................... 8 4 | |||
Ground Motion Response Spectrum (GMRS).................................................... 9 4.1 Plot of GMRS Submitted by Licensee.......................................................................... 9 4.2 Comparison to SSE..................................................................................................... I 0 5 | |||
Review Level Ground Motion (RLGM)............................................................... 14 5.I Description of RLGM Selected.................................................................................. 14 5.2 Method to Estimate In-Structure Response Spectrum (ISRS).................................... 16 6 | |||
Seismic Margin Evaluation Approach............................................................... 17 6.1 Summary of Methodologies Used.............................................................................. 17 6.2 HCLPF Screening Process.......................................................................................... 17 6.3 Seismic Walkdown Approach.................................................................................... 18 MPR-4121 Rev1sion I 6.3.1 Walkdown Approach........................................................................................ 18 6.3.2 Application of Previous Walkdown Information.............................................. 19 6.3.3 Significant Walkdown Findings........................................................................ 20 | |||
6.4 | 6.4 HCLPF Calculation Process....................................................................................... 20 6.5 Functional Evaluation of Relays................................................................................. 20 6.6 Tabulated ESEL HCLPF Values (Including Key Failure Modes)............................. 21 7 | ||
Inaccessible Items.............................................................................................. 22 7.1 Identification of ESEL Items Inaccessible for Walkdown......................................... 22 7.2 Planned Walkdown/Evaluation Schedule/Close Out.................................................. 23 8 | |||
ESEP Conclusions and Results........................................................................ 24 8.1 Supporting Information.............................................................................................. 24 8.2 Identification of Planned Modifications..................................................................... 25 8.3 Modification Implementation Schedule..................................................................... 25 8.4 Summary of Regulatory Commitments...................................................................... 25 9 | |||
References.......................................................................................................... 26 Attachment A: | |||
Attachment B: | |||
MPR*4121 Revision I Plant Hatch Unit 1 ESEL............................................................... A-1 Plant Hatch Unit 2 ESEL............................................................... B-1 v | |||
Tables Table 4-1. GMRS for Plant Hatch Units 1 and 2 ........................................................................... | Tables Table 4-1. GMRS for Plant Hatch Units 1 and 2........................................................................... 1 0 Table 4-2. Horizontal Design Basis Earthquake (DBE) for Plant Hatch Unit 1............................ 12 Table 4-3. Horizontal Design Basis Earthquake (DBE) for Plant Hatch Unit 2............................ 13 Table 5-1. Plant Hatch IPEEE RLE............................................................................................... 15 Table A-1. Plant Hatch Unit 1 ESEL Items and HCLPF Results............................................... A-1 Table B-1. Plant Hatch Unit 2 ESEL Items and HCLPF Results................................................ B-1 MPR-4121 Reviston I VI | ||
Figures Figure 2-1. Electrical Diagram for Plant Hatch FLEX Strategies (Reference 21) ......................... .4 Figure 2-2. Flow Diagram for Plant Hatch FLEX Strategies (Reference 21) ................................. 5 Figure 4-1. Plant Hatch GMRS ........................................................................................................ 9 Figure 4-2 . Horizontal Design Basis Earthquake (DBE) and GMRS for Plant Hatch .................. | Figures Figure 2-1. Electrical Diagram for Plant Hatch FLEX Strategies (Reference 21)..........................4 Figure 2-2. Flow Diagram for Plant Hatch FLEX Strategies (Reference 21)................................. 5 Figure 4-1. Plant Hatch GMRS........................................................................................................ 9 Figure 4-2. Horizontal Design Basis Earthquake (DBE) and GMRS for Plant Hatch.................. )) | ||
Figure 5-1. Hatch IPEEE RLE Compared to the Unit I and Unit 2 DBEs and the GMRS ........... l5 MPR-4121 | Figure 5-1. Hatch IPEEE RLE Compared to the Unit I and Unit 2 DBEs and the GMRS........... l5 MPR-4121 Revis1on I vii | ||
Executive Summary Plant Hatch Units I and 2 have performed the Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) as an interim action in response to the NRC's 50.54(f) letter (Reference 1). The purpose was to demonstrate seismic margin through a review of a subset of the plant equipment that can be relied upon to protect the reactor core following beyond design basis seismic events. The ESEP was performed using the methodologies in the NRC-endorsed industry guidance in EPRI 3002000704, Seismic Evaluation Guidance: Augmented Approach for the Resolution of Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1 - Seismic (Reference 2). As a result of the ESEP, no modifications have been identified as necessary to meet ESEP acceptance criteria specified in Reference 2. | Executive Summary Plant Hatch Units I and 2 have performed the Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) as an interim action in response to the NRC's 50.54(f) letter (Reference 1). The purpose was to demonstrate seismic margin through a review of a subset of the plant equipment that can be relied upon to protect the reactor core following beyond design basis seismic events. The ESEP was performed using the methodologies in the NRC-endorsed industry guidance in EPRI 3002000704, Seismic Evaluation Guidance: Augmented Approach for the Resolution of Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1 - Seismic (Reference 2). As a result of the ESEP, no modifications have been identified as necessary to meet ESEP acceptance criteria specified in Reference 2. | ||
MPR-4121 | MPR-4121 Revision I 1 | ||
1 | 1 Purpose and Objective Following the accident at the Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear power plant resulting from the March II, 20 II, Great Tohoku Earthquake and subsequent tsunami, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) established a Near Term Task Force (NTTF) to conduct a systematic review ofNRC processes and regulations and to determine if the agency should make additional improvements to its regulatory system. The NTTF developed a set of recommendations intended to clarify and strengthen the regulatory framework for protection against natural phenomena. | ||
Subsequently, the NRC issued a 50.54(f) letter on March I2, 20I2 (Reference I), requesting information to assure that these recommendations are addressed by all U.S. nuclear power plants. | Subsequently, the NRC issued a 50.54(f) letter on March I2, 20I2 (Reference I), requesting information to assure that these recommendations are addressed by all U.S. nuclear power plants. | ||
The 50.54(f) letter requests that licensees and holders of construction permits under I 0 CFR Part 50 reevaluate the seismic hazards at their sites against present-day NRC requirements and guidance. NRC has considered the need for further risk assessment based on a review of the re-evaluated hazard and available risk information and has concluded that a seismic probabilistic risk assessment (SPRA) is not warranted for Plant Hatch Units I and 2 (Reference I8). | The 50.54(f) letter requests that licensees and holders of construction permits under I 0 CFR Part 50 reevaluate the seismic hazards at their sites against present-day NRC requirements and guidance. NRC has considered the need for further risk assessment based on a review of the re-evaluated hazard and available risk information and has concluded that a seismic probabilistic risk assessment (SPRA) is not warranted for Plant Hatch Units I and 2 (Reference I8). | ||
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The objective of this report is to provide summary information describing the ESEP evaluations and results. The level of detail provided in the report is intended to enable NRC to understand the inputs used, the evaluations performed, and the decisions made as a result of the interim evaluations. | The objective of this report is to provide summary information describing the ESEP evaluations and results. The level of detail provided in the report is intended to enable NRC to understand the inputs used, the evaluations performed, and the decisions made as a result of the interim evaluations. | ||
In July 2015, NRC concluded that Plant Hatch Units I and 2 had responded appropriately to Enclosure I, Item (6) of the 50.54(f) letter (Reference I9). This conclusion was based on NRC's review of Revision 0 ofthis report and NRC's Aprii20I5 response to NRC requests for additional information (Reference 20). Revision I of this report documents completion ofESEP activities in accordance with References I9 and 20. | In July 2015, NRC concluded that Plant Hatch Units I and 2 had responded appropriately to Enclosure I, Item (6) of the 50.54(f) letter (Reference I9). This conclusion was based on NRC's review of Revision 0 ofthis report and NRC's Aprii20I5 response to NRC requests for additional information (Reference 20). Revision I of this report documents completion ofESEP activities in accordance with References I9 and 20. | ||
MPR-4121 Revision I 2 | MPR-4121 Revision I 2 | ||
2 | 2 Brief Summary of the FLEX Seismic Implementation Strategies The Plant Hatch FLEX strategies for Reactor Core Cooling and Containment Function are summarized below. This summary is derived from the Plant Hatch Overall Integrated Plan (OIP) in Response to the March 12, 2012, Commission Order EA-12-049 (Reference 3). | ||
During FLEX Phase 1, the primary strategy for reactor core cooling is to supply high quality water via reactor core isolation cooling (RCIC) with suction from the Condensate Storage Tank (CST). lfthe CST is depleted (in approximately 6-7 hours by analysis), suction will be taken from the torus. Reactor pressure is controlled using safety reliefvalves (SRVs) with DC control power and pneumatic pressure supplied by the station batteries and accumulators for each SRV. | During FLEX Phase 1, the primary strategy for reactor core cooling is to supply high quality water via reactor core isolation cooling (RCIC) with suction from the Condensate Storage Tank (CST). lfthe CST is depleted (in approximately 6-7 hours by analysis), suction will be taken from the torus. Reactor pressure is controlled using safety reliefvalves (SRVs) with DC control power and pneumatic pressure supplied by the station batteries and accumulators for each SRV. | ||
As torus temperature increases, operators reduce reactor pressure to provide margin to the heat capacity temperature limit curve. | As torus temperature increases, operators reduce reactor pressure to provide margin to the heat capacity temperature limit curve. | ||
During FLEX Phase 2, reactor core cooling will continue to be maintained using RCIC. After depletion of the initial CST inventory and while RCIC is taking suction from the torus, the CST will be replenished using the portable FLEX pump and water from the Ultimate Heat Sink (Aitamaha River). RCIC will continue to inject water from the torus until the torus level reaches the low level limit and suction must be re-aligned to the CST. The torus water level drops due to evaporation through the Hardened Containment Vent System (HCVS), which is operated to maintain containment parameters below design limits and RCIC operating parameters within acceptable limits. Reactor pressure will continue to be controlled using the SRVs. The 125V DC batteries will provide power for more than 12 hours without recharging. As shown in Figure 2-1 (Reference 21 ), the FLEX 600 VDC diesel generators will be connected at approximately 10-12 hours to power two 125/250 VDC Battery Chargers per division, RCIC Controls, and other loads necessary for event mitigation and monitoring. | During FLEX Phase 2, reactor core cooling will continue to be maintained using RCIC. After depletion of the initial CST inventory and while RCIC is taking suction from the torus, the CST will be replenished using the portable FLEX pump and water from the Ultimate Heat Sink (Aitamaha River). RCIC will continue to inject water from the torus until the torus level reaches the low level limit and suction must be re-aligned to the CST. The torus water level drops due to evaporation through the Hardened Containment Vent System (HCVS), which is operated to maintain containment parameters below design limits and RCIC operating parameters within acceptable limits. Reactor pressure will continue to be controlled using the SRVs. The 125V DC batteries will provide power for more than 12 hours without recharging. As shown in Figure 2-1 (Reference 21 ), the FLEX 600 VDC diesel generators will be connected at approximately 10-12 hours to power two 125/250 VDC Battery Chargers per division, RCIC Controls, and other loads necessary for event mitigation and monitoring. | ||
The FLEX Phase 3 coping strategy is to continue reactor core cooling up to and beyond 72 hours using FLEX Phase 2 on-site equipment with no immediate reliance on equipment from the National SAFER Response Center. RCIC will be used to cool the core until reactor pressure is insufficient to drive the RCIC turbine, at which time the Phase 2 FLEX pump will be used to inject directly to the reactor using the RHRSW-RHR cross tie valves as shown in Figure 2-2 (Reference 21 ). | The FLEX Phase 3 coping strategy is to continue reactor core cooling up to and beyond 72 hours using FLEX Phase 2 on-site equipment with no immediate reliance on equipment from the National SAFER Response Center. RCIC will be used to cool the core until reactor pressure is insufficient to drive the RCIC turbine, at which time the Phase 2 FLEX pump will be used to inject directly to the reactor using the RHRSW-RHR cross tie valves as shown in Figure 2-2 (Reference 21 ). | ||
MPR-4121 Revision I 3 | MPR-4121 Revision I 3 | ||
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3 | 3 Equipment Selection Process and ESEL The selection of equipment for the Expedited Seismic Equipment List (ESEL) followed the guidelines of EPRI 3002000704 (Reference 2). The ESELs for Units I and 2, presented in Attachments A and B, respectively, are based on SNCH106-PR-001 and SNCH106-PR-002 (References 4 and 5). | ||
3.1 EQUIPMENT SELECTION PROCESS AND ESEL The ESEL component selection followed the EPRI guidance outlined in Section 3.2 of Reference 2. The selection of equipment to be included on the ESEL was based on installed plant equipment credited in the FLEX strategies during Phase I, 2, and 3 mitigation of a Beyond Design Basis External Event (BDBEE), as outlined in the Plant Hatch Overall Integrated Plan (OIP) in Response to the March 12, 2012, Commission Order EA-12-049 (Reference 3). The OIP provides the Plant Hatch FLEX mitigation strategy and serves as the basis for equipment selected for the ESEP. | 3.1 EQUIPMENT SELECTION PROCESS AND ESEL The ESEL component selection followed the EPRI guidance outlined in Section 3.2 of Reference 2. The selection of equipment to be included on the ESEL was based on installed plant equipment credited in the FLEX strategies during Phase I, 2, and 3 mitigation of a Beyond Design Basis External Event (BDBEE), as outlined in the Plant Hatch Overall Integrated Plan (OIP) in Response to the March 12, 2012, Commission Order EA-12-049 (Reference 3). The OIP provides the Plant Hatch FLEX mitigation strategy and serves as the basis for equipment selected for the ESEP. | ||
The Plant Hatch ESEL includes permanently installed plant equipment that could be relied upon to accomplish the core cooling and containment safety functions identified in Table 3-1 of Reference 2 in response to a beyond-design-basis earthquake. Per Reference 2, the ESEL does not include portable or pre-staged FLEX equipment (not permanently installed) or equipment that is used only for recovery strategies. The scope of equipment on the ESEL includes that required to support a single FLEX success path. Instrumentation monitoring requirements for core cooling and containment integrity functions are limited to those discussed in Reference 2. | The Plant Hatch ESEL includes permanently installed plant equipment that could be relied upon to accomplish the core cooling and containment safety functions identified in Table 3-1 of Reference 2 in response to a beyond-design-basis earthquake. Per Reference 2, the ESEL does not include portable or pre-staged FLEX equipment (not permanently installed) or equipment that is used only for recovery strategies. The scope of equipment on the ESEL includes that required to support a single FLEX success path. Instrumentation monitoring requirements for core cooling and containment integrity functions are limited to those discussed in Reference 2. | ||
In accordance with Reference 2, the following structures, systems, and components were excluded from the ESEL: | In accordance with Reference 2, the following structures, systems, and components were excluded from the ESEL: | ||
Structures (e.g., reactor building and control building) | |||
Piping, cabling, conduit, HV AC, and their supports Manual valves and check valves Power-operated valves not required to change state as part of the FLEX mitigation strategies Nuclear steam supply system components (e.g., reactor pressure vessel and internals) | |||
: 3. 1. 1 ESEL Development The ESEL was developed by reviewing the Plant Hatch FLEX OIP (Reference 3) to determine the major equipment involved in the FLEX strategies. Plant drawings (e.g., Process and MPR-4121 Revisaon I 6 | |||
: 3. 1. 1 ESEL Development The ESEL was developed by reviewing the Plant Hatch FLEX OIP (Reference 3) to determine the major equipment involved in the FLEX strategies. Plant drawings (e.g., Process and MPR-4121 Revisaon I 6 | |||
Instrumentation Diagrams (P&IDs) and electrical one-line diagrams) were reviewed to specify the boundaries of the flow paths used in the FLEX strategies and to identify other components needed to support operation of the systems credited in the FLEX strategies. Boundaries were established at an electrical or mechanical isolation device (e.g., isolation amplifier or valve) in branch circuits/branch lines off the defined strategy electrical or fluid flowpath. P&IDs were the primary reference documents used to identify mechanical components and instrumentation needed for FLEX. Once the flow paths were identified, specific components were selected using the guidance in Reference 2. Electrical components needed to support FLEX were identified using one-line diagrams and schematics. Based on this review, base list tables of components were developed for each of the methods credited with accomplishing key functions in the FLEX strategies. | Instrumentation Diagrams (P&IDs) and electrical one-line diagrams) were reviewed to specify the boundaries of the flow paths used in the FLEX strategies and to identify other components needed to support operation of the systems credited in the FLEX strategies. Boundaries were established at an electrical or mechanical isolation device (e.g., isolation amplifier or valve) in branch circuits/branch lines off the defined strategy electrical or fluid flowpath. P&IDs were the primary reference documents used to identify mechanical components and instrumentation needed for FLEX. Once the flow paths were identified, specific components were selected using the guidance in Reference 2. Electrical components needed to support FLEX were identified using one-line diagrams and schematics. Based on this review, base list tables of components were developed for each of the methods credited with accomplishing key functions in the FLEX strategies. | ||
The base list tables were then reviewed to determine which equipment should be included on the ESEL. Most of the equipment decisions were clearly outlined in the Reference 2 guidance; however, some judgments were necessary as discussed below. | The base list tables were then reviewed to determine which equipment should be included on the ESEL. Most of the equipment decisions were clearly outlined in the Reference 2 guidance; however, some judgments were necessary as discussed below. | ||
: 3. 1.2 Power Operated Valves Per the Reference 2 EPRI guidance, the ESEL does not need to include power-operated valves that are not required to change state as part of the FLEX mitigating strategies. However, Reference 2 also states, "In addition to the physical failure modes (load path and anchorage) of specific pieces of installed equipment, functional failure modes of electrical and mechanical portions of the installed Phase I equipment should be considered (e.g., RCIC)." Because relay chatter could cause a functional failure, the following criteria were used to determine whether specific power-operated valves should be included on the ESEL: | : 3. 1.2 Power Operated Valves Per the Reference 2 EPRI guidance, the ESEL does not need to include power-operated valves that are not required to change state as part of the FLEX mitigating strategies. However, Reference 2 also states, "In addition to the physical failure modes (load path and anchorage) of specific pieces of installed equipment, functional failure modes of electrical and mechanical portions of the installed Phase I equipment should be considered (e.g., RCIC)." Because relay chatter could cause a functional failure, the following criteria were used to determine whether specific power-operated valves should be included on the ESEL: | ||
Power operated valves in the primary success path will be included on the ESEL if they need to remain energized during Phase I in order to maintain core cooling and containment integrity (e.g., certain DC-powered valves). | |||
Power operated valves not required to change state as part of the FLEX mitigation strategies may be excluded from the ESEL if they would be de-energized by the event that causes the Extended Loss of all AC Power (ELAP) event. | |||
AC power-operated valves not required to change state as part of the Phase I FLEX mitigation strategies may be excluded from the ESEP if they are re-energized and operated during Phase 2 or 3 activities. | |||
3.1.3 Pull Boxes Pull boxes were deemed unnecessary to add to the ESELs as these components provide completely passive locations for pulling or installing cables. No breaks or connections in the cabling are included in pull boxes. Pull boxes were considered part of the conduit and cabling, which are excluded in accordance with Reference 2. | 3.1.3 Pull Boxes Pull boxes were deemed unnecessary to add to the ESELs as these components provide completely passive locations for pulling or installing cables. No breaks or connections in the cabling are included in pull boxes. Pull boxes were considered part of the conduit and cabling, which are excluded in accordance with Reference 2. | ||
MPR-4121 Rev1sion I 7 | MPR-4121 Rev1sion I 7 | ||
| Line 233: | Line 209: | ||
3.1.5 Critical Instrumentation Indicators Critical indicators and recorders are typically physically located on panels/cabinets and are included as separate components; however, seismic evaluation of the instrument indication may be included in the panel/cabinet seismic evaluation (rule-of-the-box). | 3.1.5 Critical Instrumentation Indicators Critical indicators and recorders are typically physically located on panels/cabinets and are included as separate components; however, seismic evaluation of the instrument indication may be included in the panel/cabinet seismic evaluation (rule-of-the-box). | ||
3.1.6 Phase 2 and Phase 3 Piping Connections As noted in Section 3.2 of Reference 2, "the scope of the ESEL is limited to installed plant equipment and FLEX equipment connections" and "the selection process for the ESEL should assume the FLEX strategies (modifications, equipment, procedures, etc.) have been implemented." Section 3.2 of Reference 2 also explains that "piping, cabling, conduit, HVAC, and their supports" are excluded from the ESEL scope. Therefore, piping and pipe supports associated with FLEX Phase 2 and Phase 3 connections are excluded from the scope of the ESEP evaluation. Except as described in Sections 3.1 and 3.1.2 above, valves required to change position to establish/maintain FLEX Phase 2 and Phase 3 flow paths (i.e., active valves) are included in the ESEL. | 3.1.6 Phase 2 and Phase 3 Piping Connections As noted in Section 3.2 of Reference 2, "the scope of the ESEL is limited to installed plant equipment and FLEX equipment connections" and "the selection process for the ESEL should assume the FLEX strategies (modifications, equipment, procedures, etc.) have been implemented." Section 3.2 of Reference 2 also explains that "piping, cabling, conduit, HVAC, and their supports" are excluded from the ESEL scope. Therefore, piping and pipe supports associated with FLEX Phase 2 and Phase 3 connections are excluded from the scope of the ESEP evaluation. Except as described in Sections 3.1 and 3.1.2 above, valves required to change position to establish/maintain FLEX Phase 2 and Phase 3 flow paths (i.e., active valves) are included in the ESEL. | ||
: 3. 1. ]Inaccessible Valve Interlocks Some components have interlocks that could potentially inhibit valve operation during Phase 2 or 3 of FLEX. Reference 2 specifically allows exclusion of interlock failures from the ESEL if plant procedures provide instructions for manual operation to ensure performance of the required FLEX function . For valves that cannot be operated locally due to location in containment or high radiation areas, this statement is interpreted as allowing the interlocks in the control circuit to be bypassed to allow remote manual operation. Therefore, these interlocks are excluded in Phase 3. | : 3. 1. ]Inaccessible Valve Interlocks Some components have interlocks that could potentially inhibit valve operation during Phase 2 or 3 of FLEX. Reference 2 specifically allows exclusion of interlock failures from the ESEL if plant procedures provide instructions for manual operation to ensure performance of the required FLEX function. For valves that cannot be operated locally due to location in containment or high radiation areas, this statement is interpreted as allowing the interlocks in the control circuit to be bypassed to allow remote manual operation. Therefore, these interlocks are excluded in Phase 3. | ||
3.2 | 3.2 JUSTIFICATION FOR USE OF EQUIPMENT THAT IS NOT THE PRIMARY MEANS FOR FLEX IMPLEMENTATION All components on the ESEL for Plant Hatch Units 1 and 2 are associated with the primary FLEX strategies. Therefore, since no alternate equipment is being used, no justification is needed. | ||
MPR-4 121 Rev1sion I 8 | MPR-4 121 Rev1sion I 8 | ||
4 | 4 Ground Motion Response Spectrum (GMRS) | ||
In response to the 50.54(f) letter (Reference I), SNC reevaluated the Plant Hatch seismic hazard in accordance with the NRC-endorsed industry guidance (Reference 6). | In response to the 50.54(f) letter (Reference I), SNC reevaluated the Plant Hatch seismic hazard in accordance with the NRC-endorsed industry guidance (Reference 6). | ||
4.1 | 4.1 PLOT OF GMRS SUBMITTED BY LICENSEE The plot of the Plant Hatch GMRS submitted by SNC to the NRC in Reference 7 is shown in Figure 4-I. Table 4-I contains the corresponding numerical values that were also included in Reference 7. The GMRS and Design Basis Earthquake (DBE) control point elevation is defined at Elevation I 29 feet, which is general plant grade. | ||
1.0£+00 | MPR-4121 Rev1sion 1 1.0£+00 0.1 | ||
- - | |||
* Method 3 (1E*S) | * Method 3 (1E*S) | ||
* Method 3 GMRS | |||
* Method 3 GMRS | -Method 3 (1E-4) 1 10 100 Frequency (Hz) | ||
Figure 4-1. Plant Hatch GMRS 9 | |||
Figure 4-1. Plant Hatch GMRS | |||
Table 4-1. GMRS for Plant Hatch Units 1 and 2 Frequency | Table 4-1. GMRS for Plant Hatch Units 1 and 2 Frequency Spectral Frequency Spectral Frequency Spectral (Hz) | ||
MPR-4121 Revis1on I 10 | Acceleration (Hz) | ||
Acceleration (Hz) | |||
Acceleration (g) | |||
(g) | |||
(g) 100 0.1422 12.5 0.2744 1.00 0.2206 90.0 0.1422 10.0 0.3039 0.900 0.2171 80.0 0.1427 9.00 0.3111 0.800 0.2009 70.0 0.1438 8.00 0.3142 0.700 0.1696 60.0 0.1452 7.00 0.3164 0.600 0.1452 50.0 0.1478 6.00 0.3203 0.500 0.1113 45.0 0.1508 5.00 0.3118 0.400 0.0737 40.0 0.1532 4.00 0.3080 0.300 0.0580 35.0 0.1583 3.00 0.3029 0.200 0.0437 30.0 0.1666 2.50 0.3096 0.167 0.0346 25.0 0.1790 2.00 0.3158 0.125 0.0203 20.0 0.2027 1.50 0.2844 0.100 0.0145 15.0 0.2459 1.25 0.2654 4.2 COMPARISON TO SSE The plots of the Plant Hatch Unit I DBE and Unit 2 DBE submitted by SNC to the NRC in Reference 7 are shown in Figure 4-2 along with the GMRS. Tables 4-2 and 4-3 contain the corresponding numerical values that were also included in Reference 7. Note that Reference 7 uses DBE and SSE interchangeably for Plant Hatch. | |||
MPR-4121 Revis1on I 10 | |||
1 | 1 0.8 | ||
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Figure 4-2. Horizontal Design Basis Earthquake (DBE) and GMRS for Plant Hatch MPR-4121 Revis1on I II | ""'~ ~ | ||
~ | |||
,::00....., | |||
1 10 Frequency (Hz) | |||
Figure 4-2. Horizontal Design Basis Earthquake (DBE) and GMRS for Plant Hatch MPR-4121 Revis1on I 100 II | |||
Table 4-2. Horizontal Design Basis Earthquake (DBE) for Plant Hatch Unit 1 Frequency (Hz) | Table 4-2. Horizontal Design Basis Earthquake (DBE) for Plant Hatch Unit 1 Frequency (Hz) | ||
MPR-4 121 Revision I 33.33 28.67 25.00 22.22 20.00 16.67 14.29 12.50 11.11 10.00 8.00 6.67 5.00 4.00 Spectral Acceleration (g) 0.150 0.150 0.150 0.150 0.150 0.150 0.150 0.156 0.163 0.169 0.188 0.206 0.216 0.221 Frequency (Hz) | |||
Spectral Acceleration (g) 3.33 0.221 2.86 0.225 2.50 0.221 2.22 0.216 2.00 0.206 1.67 0.178 1.43 0.165 1.25 0.150 1.11 0.133 1.00 0.128 0.67 0.092 0.50 0.069 0.33 0.051 0.10 0.015 12 | |||
Table 4-3. Horizontal Design Basis Earthquake (DBE) for Plant Hatch Unit 2 Frequency (Hz) | Table 4-3. Horizontal Design Basis Earthquake (DBE) for Plant Hatch Unit 2 Frequency (Hz) | ||
MPR-4121 Revision I 100.00 16.00 14.30 12.50 11.10 10.00 8.30 7.70 6.00 5.00 4.00 3.00 Spectral Acceleration (g) 0.150 0.150 0.165 0.180 0.200 0.210 0.240 0.260 0.320 0.320 0.320 0.320 Frequency (Hz) | |||
Spectral Acceleration (g) 2.50 0.320 2.00 0.320 1.50 0.240 1.25 0.200 1.00 0.160 0.70 0.110 0.50 0.080 0.33 0.050 0.22 0.036 0.14 0.015 0.10 0.007 13 | |||
5 | 5 Review Level Ground Motion (RLGM) | ||
Section 4 of Reference 2 states that the ESEP may be performed using either the GMRS or a linearly scaled version of the SSE (DBE for Plant Hatch) that bounds the GMRS between I and I 0 Hz. In many cases, scaling the SSE facilitates a more expedient evaluation by allowing use of existing SSE-based in-structure response spectra (ISRS) that are simply scaled by the same factor (Scenarios 2 and 3 in Figure 1-2 of Reference 2). However, for surface-mounted items (where ISRS estimates are not necessary), plants may decide to use the GMRS instead of the scaled SSE (Scenario 4 in Figure 1-2 of Reference 2). | Section 4 of Reference 2 states that the ESEP may be performed using either the GMRS or a linearly scaled version of the SSE (DBE for Plant Hatch) that bounds the GMRS between I and I 0 Hz. In many cases, scaling the SSE facilitates a more expedient evaluation by allowing use of existing SSE-based in-structure response spectra (ISRS) that are simply scaled by the same factor (Scenarios 2 and 3 in Figure 1-2 of Reference 2). However, for surface-mounted items (where ISRS estimates are not necessary), plants may decide to use the GMRS instead of the scaled SSE (Scenario 4 in Figure 1-2 of Reference 2). | ||
The Plant Hatch ESEP was performed using either the GMRS (for two surface-mounted items) or the RLGM used previously by the combined A-46/IPEEE Program at Plant Hatch as discussed below, which is consistent with the guidance in Reference 2. | The Plant Hatch ESEP was performed using either the GMRS (for two surface-mounted items) or the RLGM used previously by the combined A-46/IPEEE Program at Plant Hatch as discussed below, which is consistent with the guidance in Reference 2. | ||
==5.1 DESCRIPTION== | ==5.1 DESCRIPTION== | ||
| Line 288: | Line 270: | ||
To facilitate an early start (prior to obtaining the GMRS) and timely completion of the ESEP, the IPEEE RLE was used as the ESEP review level ground motion (RLGM) for most of the equipment in Plant Hatch Units I and 2. Only the surface-mounted condensate storage tanks (CSTs), which did not require ISRS, were evaluated to the GMRS. | To facilitate an early start (prior to obtaining the GMRS) and timely completion of the ESEP, the IPEEE RLE was used as the ESEP review level ground motion (RLGM) for most of the equipment in Plant Hatch Units I and 2. Only the surface-mounted condensate storage tanks (CSTs), which did not require ISRS, were evaluated to the GMRS. | ||
MPR-4121 Revision I 14 | MPR-4121 Revision I 14 | ||
:§ 1: | |||
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10 100 Figure 5-1. Hatch IPEEE RLE Compared to the Unit 1 and Unit 2 DBEs and the GMRS MPR-4121 Revision I Table 5-1. Plant Hatch IPEEE RLE Frequency {Hz) | |||
Spectral Acceleration (g) 100 0.3 33 0.3 20 0.38 12.5 0.45 10 0.54 8 | |||
0.637 2 | |||
0.637 1 | |||
0.3 0.5 0.15 15 | |||
Figure 5-1. Hatch IPEEE RLE Compared to the Unit 1 and Unit 2 DBEs and the GMRS Table 5-1. Plant Hatch IPEEE RLE Frequency {Hz) | |||
5.2 | 5.2 METHOD TO ESTIMATE IN-STRUCTURE RESPONSE SPECTRUM (ISRS) | ||
For structure-mounted equipment, the ESEP used the IPEEE RLE in-structure response spectra (ISRS). As stated in Section 5. I, the IPEEE ISRS are based on ground motion equal to or larger than twice the Hatch Unit I and Hatch Unit 2 DBEs. | For structure-mounted equipment, the ESEP used the IPEEE RLE in-structure response spectra (ISRS). As stated in Section 5. I, the IPEEE ISRS are based on ground motion equal to or larger than twice the Hatch Unit I and Hatch Unit 2 DBEs. | ||
MPR-4121 | MPR-4121 Revision I 16 | ||
6 | 6 Seismic Margin Evaluation Approach The objective of the ESEP is to demonstrate that the ESEL items have sufficient seismic capacity to meet or exceed the seismic demand associated with the RLGM. Section 5 of Reference 2 provides guidance for characterizing the seismic capacity by determining a high confidence of low probability of failure (HCLPF) using either the Seismic Margin Assessment (SMA) methodology of EPRI NP-6041-SL (Reference I 0) or the fragility analysis methodology of EPRI TR-1 03959 (Reference I2). The Plant Hatch ESEP used the EPRI NP-604I-SL SMA approach, consistent with the earlier combined A-46/IPEEE Program. | ||
The HCLPF capacity is based on the weakest or most seismically limiting attribute of the equipment (structural, anchorage, or functional). The HCLPF evaluation considers the dynamic response of the equipment, but the HCLPF value is expressed in terms of a peak ground acceleration (PGA) to provide a common point of reference relative to the RLGM. Per Reference 2, ESEL items have sufficient seismic capacity if the HCLPF capacity is equal to or greater than the RLGM PGA. | The HCLPF capacity is based on the weakest or most seismically limiting attribute of the equipment (structural, anchorage, or functional). The HCLPF evaluation considers the dynamic response of the equipment, but the HCLPF value is expressed in terms of a peak ground acceleration (PGA) to provide a common point of reference relative to the RLGM. Per Reference 2, ESEL items have sufficient seismic capacity if the HCLPF capacity is equal to or greater than the RLGM PGA. | ||
6.1 | 6.1 | ||
==SUMMARY== | ==SUMMARY== | ||
OF METHODOLOGIES USED Seismic Margin Assessments (SMAs) were performed for Plant Hatch Units I and 2 in the early I990s and are documented in References 8 and 9. Those SMAs were performed as part of the combined A-46/IPEEE program at Plant Hatch and included many of the items on the ESEL. As part of the ESEP, the Seismic Review Team (SRT) evaluated each accessible item on the ESEL for seismic capacity, anchorage, and relay functionality (when a FLEX methodology relay was identified in the ESEL). (Inaccessible items are discussed in Section 7.1.) The ESEP walkdowns and evaluations were documented in Screening and Evaluation Work Sheets (SEWS), which include checklists that were developed from Appendix F of EPRI NP-604I-SL (Reference | OF METHODOLOGIES USED Seismic Margin Assessments (SMAs) were performed for Plant Hatch Units I and 2 in the early I990s and are documented in References 8 and 9. Those SMAs were performed as part of the combined A-46/IPEEE program at Plant Hatch and included many of the items on the ESEL. As part of the ESEP, the Seismic Review Team (SRT) evaluated each accessible item on the ESEL for seismic capacity, anchorage, and relay functionality (when a FLEX methodology relay was identified in the ESEL). (Inaccessible items are discussed in Section 7.1.) The ESEP walkdowns and evaluations were documented in Screening and Evaluation Work Sheets (SEWS), which include checklists that were developed from Appendix F of EPRI NP-604I-SL (Reference 1 0). | ||
Each member of the SRT was trained as a SQUG Seismic Capability Engineer in accordance with the Generic Implementation Procedure (GIP) and trained in the use of EPRI NP-6041-SL. | Each member of the SRT was trained as a SQUG Seismic Capability Engineer in accordance with the Generic Implementation Procedure (GIP) and trained in the use of EPRI NP-6041-SL. | ||
Selected team members also took the EPRI HCLPF course, which was developed for the ESEP implementation and is based on EPRI NP-604I-SL. | Selected team members also took the EPRI HCLPF course, which was developed for the ESEP implementation and is based on EPRI NP-604I-SL. | ||
6.2 | 6.2 HCLPF SCREENING PROCESS ESEL items were evaluated for the Hatch IPEEE RLE, which is a median NUREG/CR-0098 type ground response spectrum anchored to 0.3g PGA, as shown in Figure 5-I. The only exception to this approach was used for the CSTs, as described below. The 5 percent damped Peak Spectral Acceleration of the Hatch IPEEE RLE allowed the use of the first column (<0.8g PSA) of Reference I 0 Table 2-4 "Summary of Equipment and Subsystems Screening Criteria for Seismic Margin Evaluation" in establishing HCLPFs greater than or equal to the RLE for ESEL MPR-4121 Revision I 17 | ||
items. Anchorage evaluations were performed using the in-structure response spectra developed for the A-46/IPEEE program's RLE (shown in Figure 5- I). | items. Anchorage evaluations were performed using the in-structure response spectra developed for the A-46/IPEEE program's RLE (shown in Figure 5-I). | ||
For the CSTs, the HCLPFs were established using the rigorous methodology of Reference I 0 Appendix H "Flat-Bottom Vertical Fluid Storage Tanks" and additional information provided during the EPRI HCLPF course (Reference 11 ). The review level earthquake for the CST HCLPF evaluations was the GMRS. | For the CSTs, the HCLPFs were established using the rigorous methodology of Reference I 0 Appendix H "Flat-Bottom Vertical Fluid Storage Tanks" and additional information provided during the EPRI HCLPF course (Reference 11 ). The review level earthquake for the CST HCLPF evaluations was the GMRS. | ||
6.3 | 6.3 SEISMIC WALKDOWN APPROACH 6.3.1 Walkdown Approach ESEP walkdowns were performed in accordance with the criteria provided in Section 5 of Reference 2, which refers to Reference 1 0 for the Seismic Margin Assessment process. Pages 2-26 through 2-30 of Reference I 0 describe the seismic walkdown guidance, including the following key points. | ||
MPR-4121 Revision I "The SRT {Seismic Review Team] should "walk by" 100% of all components which are reasonably accessible and in non-radioactive or low radioactive environments. Seismic capability assessment of components which are inaccessible, in high-radioactive environments, or possibly within contaminated containment, will have to rely more on alternate means such as photographic inspection, more reliance on seismic reanalysis, and possibly, smaller inspection teams and more hurried inspections. A 100% "walk by" does not mean complete inspection of each component, nor does it mean requiring an electrician or other technician to de-energize and open cabinets or panels for detailed inspection of all components. This walkdown is not intended to be a QA or QC review or a review of the adequacy of the component at the SSE level. | |||
If the SRT has a reasonable basis for assuming that the group of components are similar and are similarly anchored, then it is only necessary to inspect one component out of this group. The "similarity-basis" should be developed before the walkdown during the seismic capability preparatory work (Step 3) by reference to drawings, calculations or specifications. The one component or each type which is selected should be thoroughly inspected which probably does mean de-energizing and opening cabinets or panels for this very limited sample. Generally, a spare representative component can be found so as to enable the inspection to be performed while the plant is in operation. At least for the one component of each type which is selected, anchorage should be thoroughly inspected. | If the SRT has a reasonable basis for assuming that the group of components are similar and are similarly anchored, then it is only necessary to inspect one component out of this group. The "similarity-basis" should be developed before the walkdown during the seismic capability preparatory work (Step 3) by reference to drawings, calculations or specifications. The one component or each type which is selected should be thoroughly inspected which probably does mean de-energizing and opening cabinets or panels for this very limited sample. Generally, a spare representative component can be found so as to enable the inspection to be performed while the plant is in operation. At least for the one component of each type which is selected, anchorage should be thoroughly inspected. | ||
The walkdown procedure should be performed in an ad hoc manner. For each class of components the SRT should look closely at the first items and compare the field configurations with the construction drawings and/or specifications. If a one-to-one correspondence is found, then subsequent items do not have to be inspected in as great a detail. Ultimately the walkdown becomes a "walk by" of the component class as the SRT becomes | The walkdown procedure should be performed in an ad hoc manner. For each class of components the SRT should look closely at the first items and compare the field configurations with the construction drawings and/or specifications. If a one-to-one correspondence is found, then subsequent items do not have to be inspected in as great a detail. Ultimately the walkdown becomes a "walk by" of the component class as the SRT becomes I8 | ||
confident that the construction pattern is typical. This procedure for inspection should be repeated for each component class; although, during the actual walkdown the SRT may be inspecting several classes of components in parallel. If serious exceptions to the drawings or questionable construction practices are found then the system or component class must be inspected in closer detail until the systematic deficiency is defined. | confident that the construction pattern is typical. This procedure for inspection should be repeated for each component class; although, during the actual walkdown the SRT may be inspecting several classes of components in parallel. If serious exceptions to the drawings or questionable construction practices are found then the system or component class must be inspected in closer detail until the systematic deficiency is defined. | ||
| Line 349: | Line 329: | ||
Previous walkdown information was also used for evaluation of inaccessible equipment, as discussed in Section 7.1. | Previous walkdown information was also used for evaluation of inaccessible equipment, as discussed in Section 7.1. | ||
1 EPRI 3002000704 (Reference 2) page 5-4 limits the ESEP seismic interaction reviews to "nearby block walls" and "piping attached to tanks" which are reviewed "to address the possibility of failures due to differential displacements." | 1 EPRI 3002000704 (Reference 2) page 5-4 limits the ESEP seismic interaction reviews to "nearby block walls" and "piping attached to tanks" which are reviewed "to address the possibility of failures due to differential displacements." | ||
MPR-4121 Rev1s1on I 19 | MPR-4121 Rev1s1on I 19 | ||
6.3.3 Significant Walkdown Findings Consistent with guidance from Reference I 0, no significant seismic issues were identified at Plant Hatch during the final ESEP seismic walkdowns. | 6.3.3 Significant Walkdown Findings Consistent with guidance from Reference I 0, no significant seismic issues were identified at Plant Hatch during the final ESEP seismic walkdowns. | ||
During initial ESEP seismic walkdowns, one significant seismic issue was identified: | During initial ESEP seismic walkdowns, one significant seismic issue was identified: | ||
Anchorage for the nitrogen ambient vaporizer for each unit (I T48-B004 and 2T48-8002) was degraded at the time of the initial walkdown and condition reports (CRs) were written to resolve the problem. These components were re-evaluated after repairs were made and the HCLPFs for the anchorages now meet or exceed the Hatch IPEEE RLE. | |||
Smaller issues identified during the initial walkdowns (e.g., corrosion on anchor bolts for the Unit I outside nitrogen storage tank (I T48-AOO I)) were entered as condition reports, resolved, and then re-evaluated to confirm that the components have HCLPFs that meet or exceed the Hatch IPEEE RLE. | Smaller issues identified during the initial walkdowns (e.g., corrosion on anchor bolts for the Unit I outside nitrogen storage tank (I T48-AOO I)) were entered as condition reports, resolved, and then re-evaluated to confirm that the components have HCLPFs that meet or exceed the Hatch IPEEE RLE. | ||
Some block walls were identified in the proximity of ESEL equipment. During the A-46/IPEEE combined program, these block walls were assessed for their structural adequacy to withstand the seismic loads resulting from the Hatch IPEEE RLE. | Some block walls were identified in the proximity of ESEL equipment. During the A-46/IPEEE combined program, these block walls were assessed for their structural adequacy to withstand the seismic loads resulting from the Hatch IPEEE RLE. | ||
6.4 | 6.4 HCLPF CALCULATION PROCESS Consistent with the Reference I 0 deterministic/SMA methodology, the Plant Hatch ESEP acceptance criteria were that the equipment's structural/functional capacity, anchorage capacity, and relay functional capacity (when required) exceeded the seismic demand of the Hatch IPEEE RLE. Therefore, when these criteria were met, the HCLPF was defined as being at least as high as the IPEEE RLE (0.3g PGA), and calculation of specific HCLPF values in excess of0.3g PGA was not warranted. Specific HCLPF values were calculated for the CSTs so that both the tank capacities (e.g., shell failure modes) and anchorage capacities (e.g., cast-in-place L-bolts and anchor chairs) could be evaluated using the CDFM methodology in Appendix H of Reference 10 and additional information provided during the EPRI HCLPF course (Reference II). The CSTs were evaluated using the GMRS instead of the IPEEE RLE. | ||
6.5 | 6.5 FUNCTIONAL EVALUATION OF RELAYS Relays in four cabinets and three motor control centers (total for both units) required functional evaluations. Each relay was evaluated using the SMA relay evaluation criteria in Section 3 of Reference I 0. | ||
Seismic qualification test-based capacities were available for these specific relays in Plant Hatch documentation. For the twelve relays contained in four cabinets, capacity to demand evaluations were performed using the Plant Hatch relay seismic capacities and the IPEEE RLE ISRS scaled with the Reference I 0 in-cabinet amplification factors. The four relays contained in the three MCCs were qualified during dynamic testing of the MCCs; therefore, the in-cabinet amplification was included within the testing. In each case, the capacity exceeded the demand. | Seismic qualification test-based capacities were available for these specific relays in Plant Hatch documentation. For the twelve relays contained in four cabinets, capacity to demand evaluations were performed using the Plant Hatch relay seismic capacities and the IPEEE RLE ISRS scaled with the Reference I 0 in-cabinet amplification factors. The four relays contained in the three MCCs were qualified during dynamic testing of the MCCs; therefore, the in-cabinet amplification was included within the testing. In each case, the capacity exceeded the demand. | ||
MPR-4121 Revision I 20 | MPR-4121 Revision I 20 | ||
The ESEP relay functional evaluations were documented in the SEWS packages for these four cabinets and three motor control centers. | The ESEP relay functional evaluations were documented in the SEWS packages for these four cabinets and three motor control centers. | ||
6.6 | 6.6 TABULATED ESEL HCLPF VALUES (INCLUDING KEY FAILURE MODES) | ||
Tabulated ESEL HCLPF values are provided in Attachment A for Unit I and in Attachment B for Unit 2. The following notes apply to the information in the tables. | Tabulated ESEL HCLPF values are provided in Attachment A for Unit I and in Attachment B for Unit 2. The following notes apply to the information in the tables. | ||
Items which screened out of an explicit functional capacity analysis using EPRI NP-604 I-SL (Reference I 0) Table 2-4 have a HCLPF greater than or equal to the RLGM; therefore, the HCLPF is shown as "~RLGM" in Tables A-I and 8-I. This is consistent with the SMA methodology of not calculating an explicit HCLPF capacity if the criteria for functional capacity (e.g., EPRI NP-604 I -SL Table 2-4) are met and instead providing results as meeting or exceeding the seismic input level selected as the RLGM. | |||
It is unknown whether anchorage is the controlling failure mode for items that were screened for their functional capacity because the functional capacity may or may not be higher than the anchorage capacity. The one exception to this is that large, flat-bottom vertical tanks (e.g., the Condensate Storage Tanks (CSTs)) were evaluated using a methodology that includes all failure modes (i.e., anchorage failure modes and tank shell failure modes). The HCLPF values for these tanks are reported in Tables A-I and 8-I. | |||
Equipment containing FLEX Methodology ("FM") relays was assessed for relay functional capacity as described in Section 6.5 of this report. Because it is not known whether the capacity of the equipment containing the relay, the equipment's anchorage, or the relay's capacity is the controlling HCLPF, the HCLPF is shown as "~RLGM" in Tables A-I and 8-I, and the "Notes/Comments" column identifies the presence of FM relay(s). | |||
MPR-4121 | MPR-4121 Reviston I 21 | ||
7 | 7 Inaccessible Items 7.1 IDENTIFICATION OF ESEL ITEMS INACCESSIBLE FOR WALKDOWN The Plant Hatch ESELs contain about 70 items (total for both units) that are located in either the Drywells or Locked High Radiation Areas. In order to avoid dose (i.e., maintaining radiation exposure ALARA) and to reduce impact on refueling outages scheduled in 2015 and 2016, these ESEL items were evaluated to determine whether a walkdown was necessary. The inaccessible/high dose equipment includes the following classes: | ||
Accumulators (for the SRVs) | |||
Air-Operated Valves (SRVs) | |||
MOVs Temperature Elements Junction Boxes Pneumatic System Filters and PCV (Unit 2 only) | |||
Appendix D of Reference 10 provides information regarding "Sampling." Specifically, on page D-1, "sampling is technically valid for identical or similar components if there is evidence that the components are manufactured and installed in a consistent manner.... In some instances access is severely limited by radioactive environments and limited sampling is the only practical method of conducting a walkdown." | |||
Appendix D of Reference 10 provides information regarding "Sampling." Specifically, on page D-1, "sampling is technically valid for identical or similar components if there is evidence that the components are manufactured and installed in a consistent manner .... In some instances access is severely limited by radioactive environments and limited sampling is the only practical method of conducting a walkdown." | |||
Much of the inaccessible/high dose equipment was previously evaluated during the A-46/IPEEE program. Although 6 of the 18 SRV accumulators on the ESEL were not previously evaluated for the Plant Hatch IPEEE RLE, sampling is a practical approach for concluding that they also have HCLPFs that meet or exceed the ESEP RLGM. | Much of the inaccessible/high dose equipment was previously evaluated during the A-46/IPEEE program. Although 6 of the 18 SRV accumulators on the ESEL were not previously evaluated for the Plant Hatch IPEEE RLE, sampling is a practical approach for concluding that they also have HCLPFs that meet or exceed the ESEP RLGM. | ||
Like the SRV accumulators, most of the SRVs were also evaluated during the A-46/IPEEE program, and were found to meet SMA criteria for the IPEEE RLE. The SRVs, however, have been replaced since the A-46/IPEEE, or they are scheduled to be replaced in the next refueling outage (RFO). The replacement valves should be at least as robust as the SRVs that were evaluated during the A-46/IPEEE program. Additionally, in accordance with Reference 10, Table 2-4, active valves screen out from further SMA evaluations at the five percent-damped peak spectral acceleration for the Hatch IPEEE RLE (<0.8g). Therefore, additional ESEP walkdowns and the associated dose are not warranted. | Like the SRV accumulators, most of the SRVs were also evaluated during the A-46/IPEEE program, and were found to meet SMA criteria for the IPEEE RLE. The SRVs, however, have been replaced since the A-46/IPEEE, or they are scheduled to be replaced in the next refueling outage (RFO). The replacement valves should be at least as robust as the SRVs that were evaluated during the A-46/IPEEE program. Additionally, in accordance with Reference 10, Table 2-4, active valves screen out from further SMA evaluations at the five percent-damped peak spectral acceleration for the Hatch IPEEE RLE (<0.8g). Therefore, additional ESEP walkdowns and the associated dose are not warranted. | ||
A similar argument is made for the 8 MOVs (total for both units), where half of the MOVs were explicitly included in the A-46/IPEEE program. In accordance with Reference 10, Table 2-4, MPR-4121 | A similar argument is made for the 8 MOVs (total for both units), where half of the MOVs were explicitly included in the A-46/IPEEE program. In accordance with Reference 10, Table 2-4, MPR-4121 Revision I 22 | ||
active valves screen out from further SMA evaluations at the five percent-damped peak spectral acceleration for the Hatch IPEEE RLE (<0.8g). Therefore, additional ESEP walkdowns and the associated dose are not warranted. | active valves screen out from further SMA evaluations at the five percent-damped peak spectral acceleration for the Hatch IPEEE RLE (<0.8g). Therefore, additional ESEP walkdowns and the associated dose are not warranted. | ||
| Line 385: | Line 362: | ||
Junction boxes were not part of the A-46/IPEEE program, but dozens have been walked down during the ESEP, and no seismic issues have been identified; therefore, junction boxes in the drywell do not merit walkdowns. | Junction boxes were not part of the A-46/IPEEE program, but dozens have been walked down during the ESEP, and no seismic issues have been identified; therefore, junction boxes in the drywell do not merit walkdowns. | ||
Finally, there are three inaccessible/high dose devices related to the Unit 2 Drywell pneumatic system: two filters and one pressure control valve (PCV). Filters are passive devices and considered seismically rugged, as are typical PCVs. The Unit 1 pneumatic system filters and the PCV are in a Reactor Building diagonal (outside the drywell) and were walked down; no seismic issues were identified for these small passive devices. None of these devices merit a Drywell entry and the dose associated with performing walkdowns for the ESEP. | Finally, there are three inaccessible/high dose devices related to the Unit 2 Drywell pneumatic system: two filters and one pressure control valve (PCV). Filters are passive devices and considered seismically rugged, as are typical PCVs. The Unit 1 pneumatic system filters and the PCV are in a Reactor Building diagonal (outside the drywell) and were walked down; no seismic issues were identified for these small passive devices. None of these devices merit a Drywell entry and the dose associated with performing walkdowns for the ESEP. | ||
7.2 | 7.2 PLANNED WALKDOWN/EVALUATlON SCHEDULE/CLOSE OUT Walkdowns have been completed for installed accessible items on the ESELs. Section 7.1 discusses the disposition for inaccessible items. | ||
MPR-4 121 Revision I 23 | MPR-4 121 Revision I 23 | ||
8 | 8 ESEP Conclusions and Results 8.1 SUPPORTING INFORMATION Plant Hatch has performed the ESEP as an interim action in response to the NRC's 50.54(f) letter (Reference 1 ). It was performed using the methodologies in the NRC endorsed guidance in EPRI 3002000704 (Reference 2). | ||
The ESEP provides an important demonstration of seismic margin and expedites plant safety enhancements through evaluations and potential near-term modifications of plant equipment that can be relied upon to protect the reactor core following beyond design basis seismic events. | The ESEP provides an important demonstration of seismic margin and expedites plant safety enhancements through evaluations and potential near-term modifications of plant equipment that can be relied upon to protect the reactor core following beyond design basis seismic events. | ||
The ESEP is part of the overall Plant Hatch response to NRC's 50.54(f) letter (Reference 1). On March 12, 2014, NEI submitted to the NRC results of a study (Reference 13) of seismic core damage risk estimates based on updated seismic hazard information as it applies to operating nuclear reactors in the Central and Eastern United States (CEUS). The study concluded that site-specific seismic hazards show that there has not been an overall increase in seismic risk for the fleet of U.S. plants based on the re-evaluated hazard. As such, the "current seismic design of operating reactors continues to provide a safety margin to withstand potential earthquakes exceeding the seismic design basis." | The ESEP is part of the overall Plant Hatch response to NRC's 50.54(f) letter (Reference 1). On March 12, 2014, NEI submitted to the NRC results of a study (Reference 13) of seismic core damage risk estimates based on updated seismic hazard information as it applies to operating nuclear reactors in the Central and Eastern United States (CEUS). The study concluded that site-specific seismic hazards show that there has not been an overall increase in seismic risk for the fleet of U.S. plants based on the re-evaluated hazard. As such, the "current seismic design of operating reactors continues to provide a safety margin to withstand potential earthquakes exceeding the seismic design basis." | ||
| Line 395: | Line 372: | ||
In addition, the March 12, 2014 NEI letter (Reference 13) provided an attached "Perspectives on the Seismic Capacity of Operating Plants," which (I) assessed a number of qualitative reasons why the design of SSCs inherently contain margin beyond their design level, (2) discussed industrial seismic experience databases of performance of industry facility components similar to nuclear SSCs, and (3) discussed earthquake experience at operating plants. | In addition, the March 12, 2014 NEI letter (Reference 13) provided an attached "Perspectives on the Seismic Capacity of Operating Plants," which (I) assessed a number of qualitative reasons why the design of SSCs inherently contain margin beyond their design level, (2) discussed industrial seismic experience databases of performance of industry facility components similar to nuclear SSCs, and (3) discussed earthquake experience at operating plants. | ||
The fleet of currently operating nuclear power plants was designed using conservative practices, such that the plants have significant margin to withstand large ground motions safely. This has been borne out for those plants that have actually experienced significant earthquakes. The seismic design process has inherent (and intentional) conservatisms which result in significant seismic margins within structures, systems and components (SSCs). These conservatisms are reflected in several key aspects of the seismic design process, including: | The fleet of currently operating nuclear power plants was designed using conservative practices, such that the plants have significant margin to withstand large ground motions safely. This has been borne out for those plants that have actually experienced significant earthquakes. The seismic design process has inherent (and intentional) conservatisms which result in significant seismic margins within structures, systems and components (SSCs). These conservatisms are reflected in several key aspects of the seismic design process, including: | ||
MPR-4121 Revision I 24 | MPR-4121 Revision I 24 | ||
Safety factors applied in design calculations Damping values used in dynamic analysis of SSCs Bounding synthetic time histories for in-structure response spectra calculations Broadening criteria for in-structure response spectra Response spectra enveloping criteria typically used in SSC analysis and testing applications Response spectra based frequency domain analysis rather than explicit time history based time domain analysis Bounding requirements in codes and standards Use of minimum strength requirements of structural components (concrete and steel) | |||
Bounding testing requirements, and Ductile behavior of the primary materials (that is, not crediting the additional capacity of materials such as steel and reinforced concrete beyond the essentially elastic range, etc.). | |||
These design practices combine to result in margins such that the SSCs will continue to fulfill their functions at ground motions well above the SSE. | These design practices combine to result in margins such that the SSCs will continue to fulfill their functions at ground motions well above the SSE. | ||
8.2 | 8.2 IDENTIFICATION OF PLANNED MODIFICATIONS No modifications have been identified as necessary to meet ESEP acceptance criteria. | ||
8.3 | 8.3 MODIFICATION IMPLEMENTATION SCHEDULE No modifications have been identified for the items that have been evaluated. | ||
8.4 | 8.4 | ||
==SUMMARY== | ==SUMMARY== | ||
OF REGULATORY COMMITMENTS Please refer to the Table of Regulatory Commitments that will accompany this report. | OF REGULATORY COMMITMENTS Please refer to the Table of Regulatory Commitments that will accompany this report. | ||
MPR-4121 Revision 1 25 | MPR-4121 Revision 1 25 | ||
9 | 9 | ||
: 1. | : 1. | ||
: 2. | |||
: 3. | |||
: 4. | |||
: 5. | |||
: 6. | |||
: 7. | |||
: 8. | |||
: 9. | |||
: 10. | |||
: 11. | |||
References NRC Letter to All Power Reactor Licensees et al., "Request for Information Pursuant to Title IO ofthe Code ofFederal Regulations 50.54(f) Regarding Recommendations 2.I, 2.3, and 9.3 ofthe Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima Dai-ichi Accident," dated March 12, 2012 [ADAMS Accession Number ML12053A340]. | |||
EPRI Report 3002000704, "Seismic Evaluation Guidance: Augmented Approach for the Resolution of Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.I - Seismic," Electric Power Research Institute, May 20 I3. | |||
SNC Nuclear Letter NL-I4-0593, "Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant Units I and 2 Third Six-Month Status Report of the Implementation ofthe Requirements of the Commission Order with Regard to Mitigation Strategies for Beyond-Design-Basis External Events (EA-I2-049)," dated August 26, 20I4. | |||
ENERCON Engineering Report SNCH 1 06-PR-00 I, Rev. 4, "Equipment Selection for the Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process for Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc., | |||
Hatch Nuclear Plant Unit No. I." | Hatch Nuclear Plant Unit No. I." | ||
ENERCON Engineering Report SNCH 1 06-PR-002, Rev. 4, "Equipment Selection for the Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process for Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc., | |||
Hatch Nuclear Plant Unit No. 2." | Hatch Nuclear Plant Unit No. 2." | ||
EPRI Report I 025287, "Seismic Evaluation Guidance: Screening, Prioritization and Implementation Details (SPID) for the Resolution of Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.I: Seismic," Electric Power Research Institute, February 20I3. | |||
SNC Nuclear Letter NL-I4-0343, "Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant Units I and 2 Seismic Hazard and Screening Report for CEUS Sites," dated March 3I, 20I4. | |||
EPRI Report NP-72I7, "Seismic Margin Assessment of the Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant, Unit I," Electric Power Research Institute, June I991. | |||
"Individual Plant Examination for External Events, Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2" (Response to Generic Letter 88-20, Supplement 4). | |||
EPRI NP-604I-SL, "A Methodology for Assessment ofNuclear Power Plant Seismic Margin, Revision I," Electric Power Research Institute, August I99I. | |||
Hardy, Greg and Dr. Robert Kennedy, "High Confidence of a Low Probability of Failure (HCLPF) Calculation Training," EPRI, (August 20I3). | |||
MPR-4121 Rev1s1on I 26 | MPR-4121 Rev1s1on I 26 | ||
: 12. EPRI TR-1 03959, "Methodology for Developing Seismic Fragilities," Electric Power Research Institute, 1999. | : 12. | ||
: 13. NEI (A. Pietrangelo) letter to NRC (E. Leeds) dated March 12, 2014, "Seismic Risk Evaluations for Plants in the Central and Eastern United States." | EPRI TR-1 03959, "Methodology for Developing Seismic Fragilities," Electric Power Research Institute, 1999. | ||
: 14. NRC (E. Leeds) letter dated May 9, 2014, "Screening and Prioritization Results Regarding Information Pursuant to Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 50.54(f) Regarding Seismic Hazard Re-Evaluations for Recommendation 2.1 ofthe Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima Dai-ichi Accident." | : 13. | ||
: 15. NEI (A. Pietrangelo) letter to NRC (D. Skeen) dated April9, 2013, "Proposed Path Forward for NTTF Recommendation 2.1: Seismic Reevaluations." | NEI (A. Pietrangelo) letter to NRC (E. Leeds) dated March 12, 2014, "Seismic Risk Evaluations for Plants in the Central and Eastern United States." | ||
: 16. Dr. Robert Kennedy letter to Southern Company Services (D. Moore) dated August 13, 1993, "Re: Hatch Condensate Water Tank." | : 14. | ||
: 17. MPR Calculation No. 0380-0050-01, "Hatch Unit 2 Condensate Storage Tank," | NRC (E. Leeds) {{letter dated|date=May 9, 2014|text=letter dated May 9, 2014}}, "Screening and Prioritization Results Regarding Information Pursuant to Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 50.54(f) Regarding Seismic Hazard Re-Evaluations for Recommendation 2.1 ofthe Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima Dai-ichi Accident." | ||
: 15. | |||
NEI (A. Pietrangelo) letter to NRC (D. Skeen) dated April9, 2013, "Proposed Path Forward for NTTF Recommendation 2.1: Seismic Reevaluations." | |||
: 16. | |||
Dr. Robert Kennedy letter to Southern Company Services (D. Moore) dated August 13, 1993, "Re: Hatch Condensate Water Tank." | |||
: 17. | |||
MPR Calculation No. 0380-0050-01, "Hatch Unit 2 Condensate Storage Tank," | |||
Revision 0, December 15, 2014. | Revision 0, December 15, 2014. | ||
: 18. NRC Letter to All Power Reactor Licensees et at., "Final Determination of Licensee Seismic Probabilistic Risk Assessments Under the Request for Information Pursuant to Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 50.54(f) Regarding Recommendation 2.1 "Seismic" ofthe Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima Dai-ichi Accident," dated October 27,2015 [ADAMS Accession Number ML15194A015]. | : 18. | ||
: 19. NRC Letter to SNC, "Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2 - Staff Review of Interim Evaluation Associated with Reevaluated Seismic Hazard Implementation ofNear-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1 (TAC Nos. MF5243 and MF5244)," dated July 22, 2015 [ML1520IA474]. | NRC Letter to All Power Reactor Licensees et at., "Final Determination of Licensee Seismic Probabilistic Risk Assessments Under the Request for Information Pursuant to Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 50.54(f) Regarding Recommendation 2.1 "Seismic" ofthe Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima Dai-ichi Accident," dated October 27,2015 [ADAMS Accession Number ML15194A015]. | ||
: 20. SNC Nuclear Letter NL-15-0705 , "Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant - Units 1 and 2 Request for Additional Information Regarding Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report,' | : 19. | ||
NRC Letter to SNC, "Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2 - Staff Review of Interim Evaluation Associated with Reevaluated Seismic Hazard Implementation ofNear-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1 (TAC Nos. MF5243 and MF5244)," dated July 22, 2015 [ML1520IA474]. | |||
: 20. | |||
SNC Nuclear Letter NL-15-0705, "Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant - Units 1 and 2 Request for Additional Information Regarding Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report,' | |||
dated April 16, 2015 [ML15106A549]. | dated April 16, 2015 [ML15106A549]. | ||
: 21. Final Integrated Plan, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Order EA-12-049, Strategies for Beyond Design Basis External Events Hatch Nuclear Plant Units 1 and 2, Draft Rev. D, October 2016. | : 21. | ||
MPR-4 121 RevisiOn I 27 | Final Integrated Plan, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Order EA-12-049, Strategies for Beyond Design Basis External Events Hatch Nuclear Plant Units 1 and 2, Draft Rev. D, October 2016. | ||
MPR-4 121 RevisiOn I 27 | |||
Attachment A: | Attachment A: | ||
Plant Hatch Unit 1 ESEL ID 1621-A0036 1621-A003D 1621-A003E 1621-A003F 1621-A003G 1621-A003H 1621-A003J 1621-A003K 1621-A003L MPR-4121 Revision I Table A-1. Plant Hatch Unit 1 ESEL Items and HCLPF Results Equipment Operating State HCLPF Screening Notes/Comments Description Normal Desired Results Inaccessible/High SRV AIR ACCUMULATOR Available Available N/A Dose; See Section 7.1 Inaccessible/High SRV AIR ACCUMULATOR Available Available N/A Dose; See Section 7.1 Inaccessible/High SRV AIR ACCUMULATOR Available Available N/A Dose; See Section 7.1 Inaccessible/High SRV AIR ACCUMULATOR Available Available N/A Dose; See Section 7.1 Inaccessible/High SRV AIR ACCUMULATOR Available Available N/A Dose; See Section 7.1 Inaccessible/High SRV AIR ACCUMULATOR Available Available N/A Dose; See Section 7.1 Inaccessible/High SRV AIR ACCUMULATOR Available Available N/A Dose; See Section 7.1 Inaccessible/High SRV AIR ACCUMULATOR Available Available N/A Dose; See Section 7.1 Inaccessible/High SRV AIR ACCUMULATOR Available Available N/A Dose; See Section 7.1 A-1 | |||
Equipment | ID 1B21-F013B 1B21-F013D 1B21-F013E 1B21-F013F 1B21-F013G 1B21-F013H 1B21-F013J 1B21-F013K 1B21-F013L 1B21-N091B 1B21-N691B 1B21-R604B MPR-4121 Rev1s1on I Equipment Description MSL "A" RPV SRV (ADS) | ||
Operating | MSL "B" RPV SRV (ADS) | ||
Operating | MSL "B" RPV SRV (ADS) | ||
MSL "C' RPV SRV (ADS) | |||
MSL "C" RPV SRV (LLSL) | |||
MSL "D" RPV SRV (LLSL) | |||
MSL "D" RPV SRV (ADS) | |||
MSL "B" RPV SRV (ADS) | |||
MSL 'C' RPV SRV (ADS) | |||
RPV Levels 2 & 1 LT-Div II - | |||
Batt LPCI RX Water Level MTU LIS | |||
- Div II - Batt RPV Level (Hot Leg) L1 - Div II - | |||
Batt Operating State HCLPF Screening Notes/Comments Normal Desired Results Inaccessible/High Closed Closed/Open N/A Dose; See Section 7.1 Inaccessible/High Closed Closed/Open N/A Dose; See Section 7.1 Inaccessible/High Closed Closed/Open N/A Dose; See Section 7.1 Inaccessible/High Closed Closed/Open N/A Dose; See Section 7.1 Inaccessible/High Closed Closed/Open N/A Dose; See Section 7.1 Inaccessible/High Closed Closed/Open N/A Dose; See Section 7.1 Inaccessible/High Closed Closed/Open N/A Dose; See Section 7.1 Inaccessible/High Closed Closed/Open N/A Dose; See Section 7.1 Inaccessible/High Closed Closed/Open N/A Dose; See Section 7.1 Operating Operating | |||
<!: RLGM Operating Operating | |||
<!: RLGM Operating Operating | |||
<!:RLGM A-2 | |||
ID 1C32-K655C 1C32-K902 1C32-NOOSC 1C32-R605C 1C82-POOl 1C82-P002 lEll-BOOlA lEll-F003A lEll-F008 lEll-FOlSA lEU-F017A lEll-F048A lEU-F068A lEll-F073A MPR-4121 Revtsion I Equipment Description FWC RX Pressure Transmitter C-Div II - Batt RX WTR LVL RFP TRIP C FWC RX Water Level PT-Div II-Batt FWC RX PI-Div II-Batt REMOTE SHUTDOWN PANEL-ESl REMOTE SHUTDOWN PANEL RHR HEAT EXCHANGER RHR HX OUTLT 16" GATE MOV Shutdown Cooling Outboard I so Inboard Injection Gate MOV (RHR lnbd lnj Vlv) | |||
Outboard Injection Gate MOV (RHR Outbd lnj Vlv) | |||
RHR HX Bypass Globe MOV (Hx Bypass Vlv) | |||
HX SW FLOW CONTROLLER MOV RHRSW TO RHR CROSSTIE MOV Operating State HCLPF Screening Notes/Comments Normal Desired Results Operating Operating | |||
<!:RLGM Operating Operating | |||
<!: RLGM Operating Operating | |||
<!: RLGM Operating Operating | |||
<!: RLGM Available Available | |||
<!:RLGM Available Available | |||
<!:RLGM Available Available | |||
<!:RLGM Open Closed | |||
<!: RLGM Inaccessible/High Closed Closed N/A Dose; See Section 7.1 Inaccessible/High Closed Open N/A Dose; See Section 7.1 Inaccessible/High Open Throttled N/A Dose; See Section 7.1 Open Closed | |||
<!:RLGM Closed Closed | |||
<!: RLGM Closed Closed/Open | |||
<!: RLGM A-3 | |||
Equipment | ID lEU-F075A lEU-N027B lESl-AOOl lESl-BOOl lESl-COOl lESl-C002 lESl-F008 lESl-FOlD lESl-F012 lESl-F013 lESl-FOlS lESl-F019 lESl-F029 lESl-F031 MPR-4121 Revision I Equipment Description RHRSW TO RHR CROSSTIE MOV RHR HX Discharge TE-Div II RCIC BAROMETRIC CONDENSER RCIC LUBE OIL COOLER RCIC REACTOR MAKEUP PUMP RCIC TURBINE STEAM SUPPLY ISO GATE VLV Pump Suction 6" Gate MOV (CST Suction Valve) | ||
RCIC PUMP DISCHARGE GATE MOV Pump Disch 4" Gate MOV (Pump Discharge Valve) | |||
RCIC COOLING WATER PCV Min Flow 2" Bypass MOV (RCIC Min-Flow Valve) | |||
PUMP SUCTION GATE VALVE (Suppression Pool Suction) | |||
PUMP SUCTION GATE VALVE (Suppression Pool Suction) | |||
Operating State HCLPF Screening Notes/Comments Normal Desired Results Closed Closed/Open | |||
;;:: RLGM Operating Operating | |||
<!: RLGM Standby Operating | |||
;;:: RLGM Standby Operating | |||
<!:RLGM Standby Operating | |||
;;:: RLGM Standby Operating | |||
;;:: RLGM Inaccessible/High Open Open N/A Dose; See Section 7.1 Open Open/Closed | |||
<!: RLGM Open Open | |||
<!:RLGM Closed Open | |||
;;:: RLGM Open Operating | |||
<!: RLGM Closed Closed/Open | |||
~ RLGM Closed Closed/Open | |||
~ RLGM Closed Closed/Open | |||
~ RLGM A-4 | |||
ID lESl-F033 lESl-F045 lESl-F046 lESl-F523 lESl-F524 lESl-N060 lESl-N061 lHll-P601 lHll-P602 lHll-P603 lHll-P612 lHll-P621 lHll-P622 MPR-4121 ReVISIOn I Equipment Description RCIC BAROMETRIC CONDENSER RELIEF VALVE RCIC STEAM SUPPLY GLB MOV COOLING WATER GLOBE VALVE MOV (From Pump Discharge) | |||
Steam Supply 3" Governing | Steam Supply 3" Governing Gate HOV (RCIC Governor Valve) | ||
Steam Supply 3" Trip Throttle | Steam Supply 3" Trip Throttle MOV {RCIC Trip & Throttle Valve) | ||
RCIC CST LO LS-Div I - Batt RCIC CST LO LS - Div I - Batt RX & CTMT CLG & ISO PNL RWCU & RECIRC PNL Reac Control BN BD - Panel FW/Recirc INST Panel RCIC RELAY VB Inboard lso Valve Vert Panel Operating State HCLPF Screening Notes/Comments Normal Desired Results Standby Standby | |||
<!: RLGM Closed Open | |||
<!: RLGM Closed Open | |||
<!: RLGM Open Operating | |||
<!:RLGM Open Open | |||
<!: RLGM Operating Operating | |||
<!: RLGM Operating Operating | |||
<!: RLGM Available Available | |||
<!: RLGM Available Available | |||
<!: RLGM Available Available | |||
<!: RLGM Available Available | |||
<!: RLGM Includes FM Available Available | |||
<!: RLGM Relays; See Section 6.5 Available Available | |||
<!: RLGM A-5 | |||
Equipment | ID 1H11-P623 1H11-P628 1H11-P654 1H11-P655 1H11-P657 1H11-P691B 1H11-P700 1H11-P925 1H11-P926 1H11-P927 1H11-P928 1H21-P004 1H21-P0 51 1H21-P173 MPR-4121 Revision I Equipment Description Outboard lso Valve Vert Panel AUTO DEPRESS RELAY VB Gas Treat Vent Vert BD - | ||
Available | Panel BEARING TEMP & BAT MON VB VENT & DRYWELL INERTING V Analog Signal Converter Panel ANAL/VENT & LEAK DET PNL ATIS ECCS MCR Panel ATIS ECCS MCR Panel ATIS ECCS Trip Unit Cabinet-Panel ATIS ECCS Trip Unit Cabinet-Panel RV LEVEL/PRESS LOC PNL A RCIC SYSTEM ESl PANEL SHUTDOWN INSTRUMENT PANEL Operating State HCLPF Screening Notes/Comments Normal Desired Results Includes FM Available Available | ||
~RLGM Relays; See Section 6.5 Available Available | |||
~RLGM Available Available | |||
<!: RLGM Available Available | |||
~RLGM Available Available | |||
<!: RLGM Available Available | |||
<!:RLGM Available Available | |||
~RLGM Available Available | |||
<!: RLGM Available Available | |||
~RLGM Available Available | |||
~ RLGM Available Available | |||
<!:RLGM Available Available | |||
<!: RLGM Available Available | |||
<!:RLGM Available Available | |||
<!: RLGM A-6 | |||
ID 1H21-P255 1H21-P40SA 1P11-A100 1P52-A027A 1P52-A027B 1P52-F1312 1P70-A001 1P70-DOOBA 1P70-D009A 1P70-F001A 1P70-F103A 1R11-S004 1R22-5016 1R22-S017 MPR-4121 Revis1on I Equipment Description MOV AND FUEL PMP CP 1A RX VESSEL INST RACK Condensate Storage Tank AIR ACC (BKUP AIR ACCUMULATOR TANK A) | |||
Relief Valve N2 Cylinder | AIR ACC (BKUP AIR ACCUMULATOR TANK B) | ||
Relief Valve N2 Cylinder Supply Manifold Overpressure Protection D/W N2 SYSTEM RECEIVER 100 MICRON NOM FILTER 5 MICRON NOM FILTER D/W PNEUMATIC N2 SPLY AOV D/W PNEUMATIC HEADER PCV 600-120/208V LGT&MSC XFM 125/250VDC Switchgear 1A 125/2SOVDC Switchgear 1B Operating State HCLPF Screening Notes/Comments Normal Desired Results Available Available | |||
~ RLGM Available Available | |||
~RLGM Screened to GMRS Available Available 0.15g instead of IPEEE RLE; Reference 16 Available Available | |||
~ RLGM Available Available | |||
~RLGM Standby Standby | |||
~ RLGM Available Available | |||
~ RLGM Available Available | |||
~ RLGM Available Available | |||
~RLGM Closed Open | |||
~RLGM Operating Operating | |||
~ RLGM Energized Energized | |||
~ RLGM Energized Energized | |||
~ RLGM Energized Energized | |||
~ RLGM A-7 | |||
ID 1R23-S003 1R23-S004 1R24-S021 1R24-S021A 1R24-S022 1R24-S025 1R25-S001 1R25-S002 1R25-S029 1R25-S064 1R25-S065 1R25-S066 1R25-S067 1R25-S069 MPR-4121 Revis1on I Equipment Description 600VAC Bus 1C - | |||
Switchgear/XFMR 600VAC Bus 1D-Switchgear/XFMR 250VDC MCC lA 250VDC MCC 1A-1 250VDC MCC 1B 600/208V MCC lA ESS DIV 1 125VDC Distribution Cabinet lA 125VDC Distribution Cabinet 1B 120/208V AC CABINET 1J 120/208VAC Instrument Bus 1A-Div I 120/208VAC Instrument Bus 1B-Div II 120VAC CRITICAL INSTRUMENT CABINET 1A 120VAC CRITICAL INSTRUMENT CABINET 1B Emergency Lighting Cabinet-Div II Operating State HCLPF Screening Notes/Comments Normal Desired Results Energized Energized | |||
~RLGM Energized Energized | |||
~ RLGM Includes FM Energized Energized | |||
~ RLGM Relays; See Section 6.5 Includes FM Energized Energized | |||
~ RLGM Relays; See Section 6.5 Energized Energized/ | |||
~RLGM De-Energized Energized Energized | |||
~ RLGM Energized Energized | |||
~ RLGM Energized Energized | |||
~ RLGM Energized Energized | |||
~ RLGM Available Available | |||
~ RLGM Available Available | |||
~ RLGM Energized Energized | |||
~ RLGM Energized Energized | |||
~ RLGM Energized Energized | |||
~RLGM A-8 | |||
Equipment | ID 1R25-S094 1R25-S106 1R25-S112 1R26-M031A 1R26-M031B 1R26-M031C 1R26-M031D 1R26-Ml34 1R26-M135 1R26-M136 1R26-M137 1R26-Ml39 1R26-M140 1R26-M144 1R26-M145 MPR-4121 Rev1s1on I Equipment Description Emergency Lighting Cabinet - | ||
Energized | Divll 12SVDC Distribution Cabinet 1E FUSE BOX 12SVDC THROWOVER SW 1A 125VDC THROWOVER SW 1B 125VDC THROWOVER SW 1C 12SVDC THROWOVER SW 1D DC INPUT SWITCH FOR INVERTER 1A DC INPUT SWITCH FOR INVERTER 1B FLEX TRANSFER SWITCH 1A FLEX TRANSFER SWITCH 1B FLEX TRANSFER SWITCH 1D FLEX TRANSFER SWITCH 1E BYPASS SWITCH FOR INVERTER 1A BYPASS SWITCH FOR INVERTER 1B Operating State HCLPF Screening Notes/Comments Normal Desired Results Energized Energized | ||
;:: RLGM Energized Energized | |||
;:: RLGM Available Available | |||
;:: RLGM Standby/ | |||
Standby/ | |||
<::RLGM Closed Closed Standby/ | |||
Standby/ | |||
<::RLGM Closed Closed Standby/ | |||
Standby/ | |||
<::RLGM Closed Closed Standby/ | |||
Standby/ | |||
;:: RLGM Closed Closed Normal Normal | |||
;:: RLGM Normal Normal | |||
;:: RLGM Normal Normal | |||
;:: RLGM Normal Normal | |||
<::RLGM Normal Normal | |||
<::RLGM Normal Normal | |||
;:: RLGM Normal Normal | |||
;:: RLGM Normal Normal | |||
;:: RLGM A-9 | |||
ID 1R42-SOOlA 1R42-SOOlB 1R42-S026 1R42-S027 1R42-S029 1R42-S030 1R43-A002C 1R44-S006 1R44-S007 1T46-FOOS 1T47-K600 1T47-K602 1T47-K603 1T47-K604 MPR-4121 Revision I Equipment Description 125/250VDC Station Battery lA 125/250VDC Station Battery 18 Battery Charger lA-Div I Battery Charger lB - Div I Battery Charger lD-Div II Battery Charger lE-Div II DSL FO STOR TANK lC 250VDC/120VAC INVERTER lA 250VDC/120VAC INVERTER lB SBGT ISOL TO MAIN STACK SIGNAL CONVERTER R/V NOOlA,B SIGNAL CONV R/V NOOlM, N003 SIG CONV R/V NOOS, N007 SIG CONV R/V Operating State HCLPF Screening Notes/Comments Normal Desired Results Energized Energized 2: RLGM Energized Energized 2: RLGM Energized Energized 2: RLGM Energized Energized 2: RLGM Energized Energized 2: RLGM Energized Energized 2: RLGM Available Available 2: RLGM Energized Energized 2: RLGM Energized Energized 2: RLGM Open Closed 2: RLGM Operating Operating 2: RLGM Operating Operating 2: RLGM Operating Operating 2: RLGM Operating Operating 2: RLGM A-10 | |||
Equipment | ID 1T47-K605 1T47-NOOlA 1T47-NOOlB 1T47-NOOlM 1T47-N003 1T47-NOOS 1T47-N007 1T47-NOlO 1T47-R612 1T48-AOOl 1T48-8004 MPR-4121 Rev1s1on I Equipment Description NOlO SIGNAL CONV R/V B009A Inlet Air TE-Div II OW CLG Dome Area TE-Div II B009A&B Inlet Air TE-Div II OW CLG Midlevel Area TE-Div II OW Lower Level Area TE-Div II OW Lower Level Area TE-Div II Sacrificial Shield Top TE-Div II OW CLG CRD/Torus Area TR-Divll NITROGEN STORAGE TANK N2 TANK AMBIENT VAPORIZER Operating State HCLPF Screening Notes/Comments Normal Desired Results Operating Operating | ||
Repaired under | ~ RLGM Inaccessible/High Operating Operating N/A Dose; See Section 7.1 Inaccessible/High Operating Operating N/A Dose; See Section 7.1 Inaccessible/High Operating Operating N/A Dose; See Section 7.1 Inaccessible/High Operating Operating N/A Dose; See Section 7.1 Inaccessible/High Operating Operating N/A Dose; See Section 7.1 Inaccessible/High Operating Operating N/A Dose; See Section 7.1 Inaccessible/High Operating Operating N/A Dose; See Section 7.1 Operating Operating | ||
~RLGM Repaired under Available Available | |||
~ RLGM CAP and re-walked down; See Section 6.3.3. | |||
Repaired under Available Available | |||
~RLGM CAP and re-walked down; See Section 6.3.3. | |||
A-ll | |||
ID 1T48-F072 1T48-F075 1T48-F081 1T48-F082 1T48-F318 1T48-F319 1T48-F320 1T48-F326 1T48-F408 1T48-K6088 1T48-K6098 1T48-K6238 1T48-N0088 1T48-N0098 1T48-N009D MPR-4121 Revis1on I Equipment Description 8004 DISCH LINE RELIEF VALVE 8004 DISCHARGE PCV (N2 system) | |||
TORUS VENT SGTS ISO VLV HCVS Vent Control AOV HCVS Containment Isolation AOV HCVS Containment Isolation AOV HCVS Containment Isolation AOV HCVS Containment Isolation AOV Relief Valve Argon Supply Overpressure Protection DW Pressure lnst 1/V-Div II OW/Torus Pressure lnst 1/V-Div II Torus Levellnst 1/V-Div II Torus Midrange PT-Div II Torus Water TE-Div II Torus Water TE-Div II Operating State HCLPF Screening Notes/Comments Normal Desired Results Standby Standby 2: RLGM Operating Operating 2: RLGM Open Closed 2: RLGM Closed Closed/Open 2: RLGM Closed Closed/Open 2: RLGM Closed Closed 2: RLGM Closed Closed 2: RLGM Closed Closed/Open 2: RLGM Standby Standby 2: RLGM Operating Operating 2: RLGM Operating Operating 2: RLGM Operating Operating 2: RLGM Operating Operating 2: RLGM Operating Operating 2: RLGM Operating Operating 2: RLGM A-12 | |||
ID 1T48-N009F 1T48-N009H 1T48-N020B 1T48-N021B 1T48-N023B 1T48-R607B 1T48-R609 1X86-S003 1X86-S004 1Y52-COOlC ESS J379 ESS J423 ESS J422 J614 MPR-4121 Revis10n I Equipment Description Torus Air TE-Div II Torus Air TE-Div II DW Narrow Range PT-Div II Narrow Range Torus LT-Div II DW Midrange PT-Div II DW and Torus Narrow Range L/PR-Div II OW/Torus Midrange PR-Div II 600V FLEX Diesel Generator (FLEX Connection Box lA) 600V FLEX Diesel Generator (FLEX Connection Box lB) | |||
FUEL OIL PMP lCl DSL lC JUNCTION BOX JUNCTION BOX JUNCTION BOX JUNCTION BOX Operating State HCLPF Screening Notes/Comments Normal Desired Results Operating Operating 2: RLGM Operating Operating 2: RLGM Operating Operating 2: RLGM Operating Operating 2: RLGM Operating Operating 2: RLGM Operating Operating 2: RLGM Operating Operating 2: RLGM Standby Standby 2: RLGM Standby Standby 2: RLGM Available Available | |||
~RLGM Available Available | |||
~ RLGM Available Available | |||
~ RLGM Available Available | |||
~ RLGM Inaccessible/High Available Available N/A Dose; See Section 7.1 A-13 | |||
Equipment | ID J615 J617 J618 J619 J620 J621 J647 J648 TB1-1529-7 MPR-4121 Revis1on I Equipment Description JUNCTION BOX JUNCTION BOX JUNCTION BOX JUNCTION BOX JUNCTION BOX JUNCTION BOX JUNCTION BOX JUNCTION BOX TERMINATION BOX Operating State Normal Desired Available Available Available Available Available Available Available Available Available Available Available Available Available Available Available Available Available Available HCLPF Screening Notes/Comments Results Inaccessible/High N/A Dose; See Section 7.1 Inaccessible/High N/A Dose; See Section 7.1 Inaccessible/High N/A Dose; See Section 7.1 Inaccessible/High N/A Dose; See Section 7.1 Inaccessible/High N/A Dose; See Section 7.1 Inaccessible/High N/A Dose; See Section 7.1 Inaccessible/High N/A Dose; See Section 7.1 Inaccessible/High N/A Dose; See Section 7.1 | ||
~ RLGM A-14 Plant Hatch Unit 2 ESEL ID 2821-A003A 2821-A0038 2621-A003C 2821-A003E 2621-A003F 2821-A003H 2621-A003K 2821-A003L 2821-A003M MPR-4121 Rev1s1on I Table B-1. Plant Hatch Unit 2 ESEL Items and HCLPF Results Equipment Operating State HCLPF Screening Notes/Comments Description Normal Desired Results Inaccessible/High SRV AIR ACCUMULATOR Available Available N/A Dose; See Section 7.1 Inaccessible/High SRV AIR ACCUMULATOR Available Available N/A Dose; See Section 7.1 Inaccessible/High SRV AIR ACCUMULATOR Available Available N/A Dose; See Section 7.1 Inaccessible/High SRV AIR ACCUMULATOR Available Available N/A Dose; See Section 7.1 Inaccessible/High SRV AIR ACCUMULATOR Available Available N/A Dose; See Section 7.1 Inaccessible/High SRV AIR ACCUMULATOR Available Available N/A Dose; See Section 7.1 Inaccessible/High SRV AIR ACCUMULATOR Available Available N/A Dose; See Section 7.1 Inaccessible/High SRV AIR ACCUMULATOR Available Available N/A Dose; See Section 7.1 Inaccessible/High SRV AIR ACCUMULATOR Available Available N/A Dose; See Section 7.1 B-1 | |||
Equipment | ID 2B21-F013A 2B21-F013B 2B21-F013C 2B21-F013E 2B21-F013F 2B21-F013H 2B21-F013K 2B21-F013L 2B21-F013M 2B21-N091B 2B21-N691B 2B21-R604B MPR-4121 Revision I Equipment Description MSL "A" RPV SRV (ADS) | ||
MSL "B" RPV SRV (LLSL) | |||
MSL "C" RPV SRV (ADS) | |||
MSL "A" RPV SRV (ADS) | |||
MSL "B" RPV SRV (LLSL) | |||
MSL "D" RPV SRV (ADS) | |||
MSL "B" RPV SRV (ADS) | |||
MSL "B" RPV SRV (ADS) | |||
MSL 'C' RPV SRV (ADS) | |||
RPV Levels 2 & 1 LT-Div II | |||
-Batt LPCI RX Water Level MTU LIS - Div II - Batt RPV Level (Hot Leg) L1-Div II - Batt Operating State HCLPF Screening Notes/Comments Normal Desired Results Inaccessible/High Closed Closed/Open N/A Dose; See Section 7.1 Inaccessible/High Closed Closed/Open N/A Dose; See Section 7.1 Inaccessible/High Closed Closed/Open N/A Dose; See Section 7.1 Inaccessible/High Closed Closed/Open N/A Dose; See Section 7.1 Inaccessible/High Closed Closed/Open N/A Dose; See Section 7.1 Inaccessible/High Closed Closed/Open N/A Dose; See Section 7.1 Inaccessible/High Closed Closed/Open N/A Dose; See Section 7.1 Inaccessible/High Closed Closed/Open N/A Dose; See Section 7.1 Inaccessible/High Closed Closed/Open N/A Dose; See Section 7.1 Operating Operating | |||
~ RLGM Operating Operating | |||
~ RLGM Operating Operating | |||
~RLGM B-2 | |||
ID 2C32-IN02 2C32-K655C 2C32-NOOSC 2C32-R60SC 2C82-POOl 2Ell-BOOlA 2Ell-F003A 2Ell-F008 2Ell-FOlSA 2Ell-F017A 2Ell-F048A 2Ell-F068A 2Ell-F073A 2Ell-F07SA MPR-4121 Rev1s1on I Equipment Description RX WTR LVL RFP TRIP C FWC RX Pressure Transmitter C-Div II - Batt FWC RX Water level PT-Div II-Batt FWC RX PI - Div II - Batt REMOTE S/D PANEL RHR HEAT EXCHANGER RHR HX OUTLT 16" GATE MOV Shutdown Cooling Outboard lso Inboard Injection Gate MOV (RHR lnbd lnj Vlv) | |||
Outboard Injection Gate MOV (RHR Outbd lnj Vlv) | |||
RHR HX Bypass Globe MOV (Hx Bypass Vlv) | |||
HX SW FLOW CONTROLLER MOV RHRSW CROSSTIE VALVE RHRSW CROSSTIE VALVE Operating State HCLPF Screening Notes/Comments Normal Desired Results Operating Operating | |||
<!:RLGM Operating Operating | |||
<!: RLGM Operating Operating | |||
<!: RLGM Operating Operating | |||
<!: RLGM Available Available | |||
<!: RLGM Available Available | |||
<!: RLGM Open Closed | |||
<!:RLGM Inaccessible/High Closed Closed N/A Dose; See Section 7.1 Inaccessible/High Closed Open N/A Dose; See Section 7.1 Inaccessible/High Open Throttled N/A Dose; See Section 7.1 Open Closed | |||
<!: RLGM Closed Closed | |||
<!: RLGM Closed Closed/Open | |||
<!:RLGM Closed Closed/Open | |||
<!: RLGM B-3 | |||
Equipment | ID 2E11-N027B 2E51-AOOl 2E51-BOOl 2E51-COOl 2E51-C002 2E51-F008 2E51-FOlO 2E51-F012 2E51-F013 2E51-FOlS 2E51-F019 2E51-F022 2E51-F029 2E51-F031 MPR-4121 Revision I Equipment Description RHR HX Discharge TE-Div II RCIC BAROMETRIC CONDENSER RCIC LUBE OIL COOLER RCIC REACTOR MAKEUP PUMP RCIC TURBINE STEAM SUPPLY ISO GATE VLV Pump Suction 6" Gate MOV (CST Suction Valve) | ||
RCIC PUMP DISCHARGE GATE MOV Pump Disch 4" Gate MOV (Pump Discharge Valve) | |||
RCIC COOLING WATER PCV Min Flow 2" Bypass MOV (RCIC Min-Flow Valve) | |||
TESTTHROTILE GLOBE VALVE PUMP SUCTION GATE VALVE PUMP SUCTION GATE VALVE Operating State HCLPF Screening Notes/Comments Normal Desired Results Operating Operating | |||
<!: RLGM Standby Operating | |||
<!: RLGM Standby Operating | |||
<!: RLGM Standby Operating | |||
<!:RLGM Standby Operating | |||
<!: RLGM Inaccessible/High Open Open N/A Dose; See Section 7.1 Open Open/Closed | |||
<!:RLGM Open Open | |||
<!:RLGM Closed Open | |||
<!:RLGM Open Operating | |||
<!:RLGM Closed Closed/Open | |||
<!:RLGM Closed Closed | |||
<!:RLGM Closed Closed/Open | |||
<!:RLGM Closed Closed/Open | |||
<!:RLGM B-4 | |||
ID 2E51-F033 2E51-F045 2E51-F046 2E51-F523 2E51-F524 2E51-NOGO 2E51-N061 2H11-P601 2H11-P602 2H11-P603 2H11-PGOSB 2H11-P612 2H11-P621 MPR-4121 Rev1sion I Equipment Description RCIC BAROMETRIC CONDENSER RELIEF VALVE RCIC STEAM SUPPLY GLB MOV COOLING WATER GLOBE VALVE MOV (RHR Suction Valve) | |||
Steam Supply 3" Governing | Steam Supply 3" Governing Gate HOV (RCIC Governor Valve) | ||
Steam Supply 3" Trip | Steam Supply 3" Trip Throttle MOV (RCIC Trip & Throttle Valve) | ||
RCIC CST LO LS - Div I - Batt RCIC CST LO LS - Div I - Batt RX & CTMT CLG & ISO PNL RWCU & RECIRC PNL Reac Control BN BD-Panel CLS lE Analog Signal Converter/IS Panel FW/Recirc INST Panel RCIC RELAY VB Operating State HCLPF Screening Notes/Comments Normal Desired Results Standby Standby | |||
<!: RLGM Closed Open | |||
<!: RLGM Closed Open | |||
<!: RLGM Open Operating | |||
<!: RLGM Open Open | |||
<!: RLGM Operating Operating | |||
<!:RLGM Operating Operating | |||
<!: RLGM Available Available | |||
<!: RLGM Available Available | |||
<!: RLGM Available Available | |||
<!: RLGM Available Available | |||
<!: RLGM Available Available | |||
<!: RLGM Includes FM Available Available | |||
<!: RLGM Relays; See Section 6.5 B-5 | |||
ID 2H11-P622 2H11-P623 2H11-P628 2H11-PGSO 2H11-P654 2H11-PGSS 2H11-P656 2H11-P657 2H11-P691B 2H11-P925 2H11-P926 2H11-P927 2H11-P928 2H21-P004 MPR-4121 Revision I Equipment Description INBD ISO VLV VERT PNL Outboard lso Valve Vert Panel AUTO DEPRESS RELAY VB TURB FDWTR & COND CON PNL Gas Treat Vent Vert BD - | |||
Panel BEARING TEMP & BAT MONVB STARTUP BOILER VERT PANEL VENT & DRYWELL INERT VER Analog Signal Converter Panel ATTS ECCS Trip Unit Cabinet - Panel ATTS ECCS MCR Panel ATTS ECCS Trip Unit Cabinet-Panel ATTS ECCS Trip Unit Cabinet-Panel RV LEVEL/PRESS LOC PNL A Operating State HCLPF Screening Notes/Comments Normal Desired Results Available Available | |||
~ RLGM Includes FM Available Available | |||
~ RLGM Relays; See Section 6.5 Available Available | |||
~ RLGM Available Available | |||
~ RLGM Available Available | |||
~ RLGM Available Available | |||
~ RLGM Available Available | |||
~ RLGM Available Available | |||
~ RLGM Available Available | |||
~ RLGM Available Available | |||
~ RLGM Available Available | |||
~ RLGM Available Available | |||
~ RLGM Available Available | |||
~ RLGM Available Available | |||
~ RLGM B-6 | |||
Equipment | ID 2H21-P0 51 2H21-P0 53 2H21-P405A 2JE1891 2JE2712 2JE2798 2JM7873 2P11-A001 2P52-A027A 2P52-A027B 2P52-F1228 2P70-DOOBA 2P70-D009A 2P70-F103A MPR-4121 Rev1s1on I Equipment Description RCIC SYSTEM 2E51 PANEL RCIC TEST VALVE PI PANEL RX VESSELINST RACK JUNCTION BOX JUNCTION BOX JUNCTION BOX JUNCTION BOX Condensate Storage Tank BKUP AIR ACCUMULATOR TANKA BKUP AIR ACCUMULATOR TANKB Relief Valve N2 Cylinder Supply Manifold Overpressure Protection 100 MICRON NOM FILTER 5 MICRON NOM FILTER D/W PNEUMATIC HEADER PCV Operating State HCLPF Screening Notes/Comments Normal Desired Results Available Available | ||
~RLGM Available Available | |||
~RLGM Available Available | |||
~RLGM Available Available | |||
~RLGM Available Available | |||
~ RLGM Available Available | |||
~ RLGM Inaccessible/High Available Available N/A Dose; See Section 7.1 Screened to GMRS Available Available 0.18g instead of IPEEE RLE; Ref. 17 Available Available | |||
~ RLGM Available Available | |||
~RLGM Standby Standby | |||
~ RLGM Inaccessible/High Available Available N/A Dose; See Section 7.1 Inaccessible/High Available Available N/A Dose; See Section 7.1 Inaccessible/High Operating Operating N/A Dose; See Section 7.1 B-7 | |||
ID 2R22-S016 2R22-5017 2R23-S003 2R23-S004 2R24-S021 2R24-S022 2R25-SOOl 2R25-S002 2R25-S064 2R25-S065 2R25-S066 2R25-S067 2R25-S069 2R25-S094 MPR-4121 Revision I Equipment Description 125/250VDC Switchgear 2A 125/250VDC Switchgear 2B 600VAC Bus 2C-Switchgear/XFMR 600VAC Bus 2D-Switchgear/XFMR 250VDC MCC 2A 250VDC MCC 2B 125VDC Distribution Cabinet 2A 125VDC Distribution Cabinet 2B 120/208VAC Instrument Bus 2A-Div I 120/208VAC Instrument Bus 2B-Div II 120VAC Critical Instrument Cabinet 2A 120VAC Critical Instrument Cabinet 2B Emergency Lighting Cabinet | |||
250VDC MCC 2B | - Div II Emergency Lighting Cabinet | ||
- Div II Operating State HCLPF Screening Notes/Comments Normal Desired Results Energized Energized | |||
~ RLGM Energized Energized | |||
~ RLGM Energized Energized | |||
~ RLGM Energized Energized | |||
~ RLGM Includes FM Energized Energized | |||
~ RLGM Relays; See Section 6.5 Energized Energized/ | |||
~ RLGM De-Energized Energized Energized | |||
~ RLGM Energized Energized | |||
~ RLGM Available Available | |||
~ RLGM Available Available | |||
~ RLGM Energized Energized | |||
~ RLGM Energized Energized | |||
~ RLGM Energized Energized | |||
~ RLGM Energized Energized | |||
~ RLGM B-8 | |||
Equipment | ID 2R25-Sl30 2R26-M031A 2R26-M031B 2R26-M031C 2R26-M031D 2R26-M126 2R26-M127 2R26-M129 2R26-M130 2R26-M135 2R26-M136 2R26-M137 2R26-Ml38 2R27-S096 2R42-SOOlA MPR-4121 Rev1s1on I Equipment Description 125VDC Distribution Cabinet 2E 125VDC THROWOVER SW 2A 125VDC THROWOVER SW 2B 125VDC THROWOVER SW 2C 125VDC THROWOVER SW 20 FLEX Transfer Switch 2A FLEX Transfer Switch 2B FLEX Transfer Switch 2D FLEX Transfer Switch 2E DC INPUT SWITCH FOR INVERTER 2A BYPASS SWITCH FOR INVERTER 2A DC INPUT SWITCH FOR INVERTER 2B BYPASS SWITCH FOR INVERTER 2B LOCAL STARTER 2Ell-F008 125/250VDC Station Battery 2A Operating State HCLPF Screening Notes/Comments Normal Desired Results Energized Energized 2: RLGM Standby/ | ||
Standby/ | |||
2: RLGM | 2: RLGM Closed Closed Standby/ | ||
2: RLGM | Standby/ | ||
2: RLGM | 2: RLGM Closed Closed Standby/ | ||
2: RLGM | Standby/ | ||
2: RLGM Closed Closed Standby/ | |||
Standby/ | |||
2: RLGM Closed Closed Normal Normal 2: RLGM Normal Normal 2: RLGM Normal Normal 2: RLGM Normal Normal 2: RLGM Normal Normal 2: RLGM Normal Normal | |||
<:: RLGM Normal Normal 2: RLGM Normal Normal 2: RLGM Energized De-Energized | |||
<::RLGM Energized Energized 2: RLGM B-9 | |||
ID 2R42-SOOlB 2R42-S026 2R42-S027 2R42-S029 2R42-S030 2R44-SOOG 2R44-S007 2T46-F002A 2T46-F002B 2T47-KGOO 2T47-K602 2T47-K603 2T47-K604 2T47-KGOS MPR-4121 Revision I Equipment Description 125/250VDC Station Battery 2B Battery Charger 2A-Div I Battery Charger 2B-Div I Battery Charger 20 - Div II Battery Charger 2E - Div II 250VDC/120VAC FLEX Inverter 2A 250VDC/120VAC FLEX Inverter 2B FLTR TRAIN OUT BUTIERFLY FLTR TRAIN OUT BUTIERFLY SIGNAL CONVERTER R/V NOOlJ,K SIGNAL CONV R/V NOOlM, N003 SIG CONV R/V NOOS, N007 SIG CONV R/V NOlO SIGNAL CONV R/V Operating State HCLPF Screening Notes/Comments Normal Desired Results Energized Energized | |||
~ RLGM Energized Energized | |||
~RLGM Energized Energized | |||
~ RLGM Energized Energized | |||
~ RLGM Energized Energized | |||
~ RLGM Energized Energized | |||
~ RLGM Energized Energized | |||
~ RLGM Open Closed | |||
~ RLGM Open Closed | |||
~ RLGM Operating Operating | |||
~RLGM Operating Operating | |||
~ RLGM Operating Operating | |||
~ RLGM Operating Operating | |||
~RLGM Operating Operating | |||
~RLGM B-10 | |||
Equipment | ID 2T47-NOOlJ 2T47-NOOlK 2T47-NOOlM 2T47-N003 2T47-NOOS 2T47-N007 2T47-NOlO 2T47-R627 2T48-AOOl 2T48-8002 2T48-F081 2T48-F082 MPR-4121 Rev1sion I Equipment Description B009A Inlet Air TE-Div II OW CLG Dome Area TE-Div II B009A&B Inlet Air TE-Div II OW CLG Midlevel Area TE-Div II OW Lower Level Area TE-Div II OW Lower Level Area TE-Div II Sacrificial Shield Top TE-Div II OW CLG CRD/Torus Area TR | ||
- Div II NITROGEN STORAGE TANK N2 TANK AMBIENT VAPORIZER TORUS VENT SGTS ISO VLV HCVS Vent Control AOV Operating State HCLPF Screening Notes/Comments Normal Desired Results Inaccessible/High Operating Operating N/A Dose; See Section 7.1 Inaccessible/High Operating Operating N/A Dose; See Section 7.1 Inaccessible/High Operating Operating N/A Dose; See Section 7.1 Inaccessible/High Operating Operating N/A Dose; See Section 7.1 Inaccessible/High Operating Operating N/A Dose; See Section 7.1 Inaccessible/High Operating Operating N/A Dose; See Section 7.1 Inaccessible/High Operating Operating N/A Dose; See Section 7.1 Operating Operating | |||
<!: RLGM Available Available | |||
<!: RLGM Repaired under Available Available | |||
<!: RLGM CAP and re-walked down; See Section 6.3.3. | |||
Open Closed | |||
<!: RLGM Closed Closed/Open | |||
<!: RLGM B-11 | |||
Equipment | 10 2T48-F318 2T48-F319 2T48-F320 2T48-F326 2T48-F408 2T48-F465 2T48-F468 2T48-K6088 2T48-K6208 2T48-K6218 2T48-N0088 2T48-N0098 2T48-N009D 2T48-N009E 2T48-N009H MPR-4121 Revision I Equipment Description HCVS Containment Isolation AOV HCVS Containment Isolation AOV HCVS Containment Isolation AOV HCVS Containment Isolation AOV Relief Valve Argon Supply Overpressure Protection 8002 DISCH LINE SRV 8002 DISCHARGE PCV (N2 system) | ||
DW Pressure lnst 1/V-Div II OW/Torus Pressure lnst 1/V | |||
- Div II Torus Levellnst 1/V-Div II Torus Midrange PT-Div II Torus Water TE-Div II Torus Water TE-Div II Torus Air TE-Div II Torus Air TE-Div II Operating State HCLPF Screening Notes/Comments Normal Desired Results Closed Closed/Open | |||
<!:RLGM Closed Closed | |||
<!: RLGM Closed Closed | |||
<!: RLGM Closed Closed/Open | |||
<!:RLGM Standby Standby | |||
<!: RLGM Standby Standby | |||
<!: RLGM Operating Operating | |||
<!:RLGM Operating Operating | |||
<!: RLGM Operating Operating | |||
<!:RLGM Operating Operating | |||
<!: RLGM Operating Operating | |||
<!: RLGM Operating Operating | |||
<!: RLGM Operating Operating | |||
<!:RLGM Operating Operating | |||
<!: RLGM Operating Operating | |||
<!:RLGM B-12 | |||
ID 2T48-N020B 2T48-N021B 2T48-N023B 2T48-R607B 2T48-R609 2T48-R631B 2T48-R632B 2X86-S003 2X86-S004 MPR-4121 Revis1on I Equipment Description OW Narrow Range PT-Div II Narrow Range Torus LT-Divll OW Midrange PT-Div II OW and Torus Narrow Range L/PR - Div II OW/Torus Midrange PR-Div II 0/W MIDRANGE PI TORUS MIDRANGE PI FLEX Connection Box 2A FLEX Connection Box 2B Operating State HCLPF Screening Notes/Comments Normal Desired Results Operating Operating 2: RLGM Operating Operating 2: RLGM Operating Operating 2: RLGM Operating Operating 2: RLGM Operating Operating 2: RLGM Operating Operating 2: RLGM Operating Operating 2: RLGM Standby Standby 2: RLGM Standby Standby 2: RLGM B-13 | |||
Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant- Units 1 and 2 Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1 Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report Completion | Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant-Units 1 and 2 Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1 Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report Completion Required Actions and Schedule for Completion of ESEP Activities (Updated) to NL-16-2466 Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant-Units 1 and 2 Required Actions and Schedule for Completion of ESEP Activities Hatch Unit 1 Required Actions and Schedule for ESEL Items Not Installed as of Walkdowns/Report Issuance Equipment Outage Required Scheduled Number Required Action Completion Date 1 | ||
1R26-M136 FLEX Transfer Switch 1A After the items were December 2016 1 R26-M 137 FLEX Transfer Switch 1 B installed, ESEP activities 1R26-M139 FLEX Transfer Switch 1D Did NOT require outage to were completed, HCLPF (2 years after ESEP 1 R26-M140 FLEX Transfer Switch 1 E walk down. Walkdowns are evaluations were Report submittal) 1T48-F408 Relief Argon Supply Overpressure complete. No modifications generated in accordance Protection were necessary. | |||
with EPRI 3002000704 Actual Completion: | |||
1X86-S003 600V FLEX Diesel Generator (FLEX and EPRI NP-6041-SL. | |||
December 2016 Connection Box 1A) | |||
No modifications 1X86-S004 600V FLEX Diesel Generator (FLEX necessary to meet ESEP Connection Box 1 B) requirements Note: 1 R26-M132 and 1 R26-M133 are no longer on the ESEL 2 | |||
1 P52-A027 A BKUP Air Accumulator Tank A After the items were Spring outage 2018 1 P52-A027B BKUP Air Accumulator Tank B Took advantage of outages installed, ESEP activities (2 outages after 1P52-F1312 Relief Valve N2 Cylinder Supply and other opportunities to were completed, HCLPF December 2014) | |||
Manifold Overpressure Protection perform walkdowns. | |||
evaluations were 1R25-S066 120VAC Critical instrument Cabinet 1A Walkdowns are complete. | |||
Manifold Overpressure Protection | |||
generated in accordance Actual Completion: | generated in accordance Actual Completion: | ||
1R25-S067 120VAC Critical instrument Cabinet 1B No modifications were with EPRI 3002000704 December 2016 1 R42-S026 Battery Charger 1A-Div I and EPRI NP-6041-SL. No necessary. | |||
modifications necessary to 1 R42-S027 Battery Charger 1 B - Div I 1R44-S006 250VDC/120VAC Inverter 1A meet ESEP requirements. | |||
1R44-S007 250VDC/120VAC Inverter 1B E2-1 to NL-16-2466 Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant - Units 1 and 2 Required Actions and Schedule for Completion of ESEP Activities Hatch Unit 1 Required Actions and Schedule for ESEL Items Not Installed as of Walkdowns/Report Issuance Equipment Outage Required Scheduled Number Required Action Completion Date 3 | |||
modifications necessary to | N/A N/A This letter to NRC 90 days following summarizes results of Unit completion of ESEP 1 Items 1 and 2 and activities, no later than provides confirmation that 90 days after Spring no plant modifications 2018 outage (if an associations with Items 1 outage is required). | ||
E2-1 to NL-16-2466 Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant - Units 1 and 2 Required Actions and Schedule for Completion of ESEP Activities Hatch Unit 1 Required Actions and Schedule for ESEL Items Not Installed as of Walkdowns/Report Issuance | |||
and 2 were necessary. | and 2 were necessary. | ||
Actual Completion: | Actual Completion: | ||
* December 2016 | * December 2016 Continued on next page for Unit 2 E2-2 to NL-16-2466 Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant-Units 1 and 2 Required Actions and Schedule for Completion of ESEP Activities Hatch Unit 2 Required Actions and Schedule for ESEL Items Not Installed as of Walkdowns/Report Issuance Equipment Description Remaining Completion Date Number Scope 1 | ||
* 2R26-M126 FLEX Transfer Switch 2A After the items were December 2016 | |||
Continued on next page for Unit 2 E2-2 to NL-16-2466 Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant- Units 1 and 2 Required Actions and Schedule for Completion of ESEP Activities Hatch Unit 2 Required Actions and Schedule for ESEL Items Not Installed as of Walkdowns/Report Issuance | * 2R26-M127 FLEX Transfer Switch 2B Did NOT require outage to installed, ESEP activities (2 years after ESEP | ||
* 2R26-M129 FLEX Transfer Switch 2D walk down. Walkdowns are were completed, HCLPF Report submittals) evaluations were generated | |||
* 2R26-M126 FLEX Transfer Switch 2A | * 2R26-M130 FLEX Transfer Switch 2E complete. No modifications in accordance with EPRI | ||
* 2R26-M127 FLEX Transfer Switch 2B | * 2R42-S026 Battery Charger 2A - Div I were necessary. | ||
* 2R26-M129 FLEX Transfer Switch 2D | 3002000704 and EPRI NP-Actual Completion: | ||
* 2R26-M130 FLEX Transfer Switch 2E | * 2R42-S027 Battery Charger 2B - Div I 6041-SL. No modifications December 2016 | ||
* 2R42-S026 Battery Charger 2A - Div I | * 2T4B-F40B Relief Argon Supply Overpressure necessary to meet ESEP Protection requirements. | ||
* 2R42-S027 Battery Charger 2B - Div I | |||
* 2T4B-F40B Relief Argon Supply Overpressure Protection | |||
* 2X86-S003 600V FLEX Diesel Generator (FLEX Connection Box 2A) | * 2X86-S003 600V FLEX Diesel Generator (FLEX Connection Box 2A) | ||
* 2XB6-S004 600V FLEX Diesel Generator (FLEX Connection Box 2B) 2 | * 2XB6-S004 600V FLEX Diesel Generator (FLEX Connection Box 2B) 2 | ||
* 2P52-A027A BKUP Air Accumulator Tank A | * 2P52-A027A BKUP Air Accumulator Tank A Took advantage of outages After the items were Spring outage 2017 | ||
* 2P52-A027B BKUP Air Accumulator Tank B | * 2P52-A027B BKUP Air Accumulator Tank B and other opportunities to installed, ESEP activities (2 outages after perform walkdowns. | ||
* 2P52-F122B Relief Valve N2 Cylinder Supply | were completed, HCLPF | ||
Walkdowns are complete. | * 2P52-F122B Relief Valve N2 Cylinder Supply Walkdowns are complete. | ||
* 2R25-S066 120VAC Critical instrument Cabinet 2A | evaluations were generated December 2014) | ||
* 2R25-S067 120VAC Critical instrument Cabinet 2B | Manifold Overpressure Protection No modifications were in accordance with EPRI Actual Completion: | ||
* 2R44-S006 250VDC/120VAC Inverter 2A | * 2R25-S066 120VAC Critical instrument Cabinet 2A necessary. | ||
* 2R44-S007 250VDC/120VAC Inverter 2B Note: 2R26-M132 and 2R26-M133 are no longer on the ESEL | 3002000704 and EPRI NP-December 2016 | ||
* 2R25-S067 120VAC Critical instrument Cabinet 2B 6041-SL. No modifications | |||
E2-3 to NL-16-2466 Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant - Units 1 and 2 Required Actions and Schedule for Completion of ESEP Activities Hatch Unit 2 Required Actions and Schedule for ESEL Items Not Installed as of Walkdowns/Report Issuance | * 2R44-S006 250VDC/120VAC Inverter 2A necessary to meet ESEP | ||
* 2R44-S007 250VDC/120VAC Inverter 2B requirements. | |||
Note: 2R26-M132 and 2R26-M133 are no longer on the ESEL E2-3 to NL-16-2466 Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant - Units 1 and 2 Required Actions and Schedule for Completion of ESEP Activities Hatch Unit 2 Required Actions and Schedule for ESEL Items Not Installed as of Walkdowns/Report Issuance Equipment Description Remaining Completion Date Number Scope 3 | |||
NA NA This letter to NRC 90 days following summarizes results of Unit 2 completion of ESEP Items 1 and 2 and provides activities, no later than confirmation that no plant 90 days after Spring modifications associations 2017 outage (if an with Items 1 and 2 were outage is required). | |||
necessary. | necessary. | ||
Actual Completion: | Actual Completion: | ||
December 2016 E2-4 | December 2016 E2-4 | ||
Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant - Units 1 and 2 Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1 Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report Completion | Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant - Units 1 and 2 Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1 Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report Completion Table of Regulatory Commitments to NL-16-2466 Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant - Units 1 and 2 Table of Regulatory Commitments Commitment One-Time Action Hatch Unit 1 Complete the remaining NTTF 2.1 X | ||
Action Hatch Unit 1 Complete the remaining NTTF 2.1 | Unit 1 ESEL walkdowns | ||
/evaluations for items that are not currently installed. These items are identified in Attachment A of the Hatch Units 1 and 2 ESEP Report (Enclosure 1 of this letter) and summarized in Enclosure 2. | |||
identified in Attachment A of the | Hatch Unit 2 Complete the remaining NTTF 2.1 X | ||
Hatch Unit 2 Complete the remaining NTTF 2.1 | Unit 2 ESEL walkdowns/evaluations for items that are not currently installed. These items are identified in Attachment B of the Hatch Units 1 and 2 ESEP Report (Enclosure 1 of this letter) and summarized in Enclosure 2. | ||
in Attachment B of the Hatch | Type Continuing Compliance E3-1 Actual Completion Date (If Required) | ||
Work is complete with this transmittal - December, 2016 Note: | |||
1 R26-M 132 and 1 R26-M 133 are no longer on the ESEL 1 | |||
and therefore no walkdowns/evaluations were necessary. | |||
Work is complete with this transmittal-December, 2016 Note: | |||
2R26-M132 and 2R26-M133 are no longer on the ESEL and therefore no walkdowns/evaluations were necessary.}} | |||
Latest revision as of 16:13, 9 January 2025
| ML16350A329 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Hatch |
| Issue date: | 12/15/2016 |
| From: | Pierce C Southern Nuclear Operating Co |
| To: | Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| NL-16-2466 | |
| Download: ML16350A329 (71) | |
Text
~ Southern Nuclear December 15, 2016 Docket Nos.: 50-321 50-366 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Document Control Desk Washington, D. C. 20555-0001 Charles R. Pierce Regulatory Affairs Director Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant-Units 1 and 2 Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1 Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report Completion
References:
40 Inverness Center Parkway Post Office Box 1295 Birmingham, AL 35242 205 992 7872 tel 205 992 7601 fax crpierce@ southernco.com NL-16-2466
- 1. NRC Letter, Request for Information Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.54(f) Regarding Recommendations 2.1, 2.3, and 9.3 of the NTTF Review of Insights from the Fukushima Daiichi Accident, dated March 12, 2012.
- 2. NEI Letter to NRC, Proposed Path Forward for NTTF Recommendation 2. 1: Seismic Reevaluations, dated April 9, 2013.
- 3. NRC Letter, EPRI Final Draft Report XXXXXX, "Seismic Evaluation Guidance: Augmented Approach for the Resolution of Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2. 1:
Seismic" as an Acceptable Alternative to the March 12, 2012, Information Request for Seismic Reevaluations, dated May 7, 2013.
- 4. Letter to NRC, Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant, Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report -
Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1, December 30, 2014.
- 5. Letter to NRC, Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant, Request for Additional Information Regarding Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report, April 16, 2015. ML15106A549.
- 6. NRC letter, Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2-Staff Review of Interim Evaluation Associated with Reevaluated Seismic Hazard Implementation Associated with Reevaluated Seismic Hazard Implementation of the Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1, July 22,2015. ML15201A474.
Ladies and Gentlemen:
On March 12, 2012, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) issued a request for information pursuant to 10 CFR 50.54(f) associated with the recommendations of the Fukushima Near-Term Task Force (NTTF) (Reference 1 ). Enclosure 1 of Reference 1 requested each licensee to reevaluate the seismic hazards at their sites using present-day NRC requirements and guidance, and to identify actions taken or planned to address plant-specific vulnerabilities associated with the updated seismic hazards.
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission NL-16-2466 Page2 The NRC endorsed Reference 3 as an acceptable alternative to the information requested in Reference 1. Reference 3 also provided NRC staff approval of the schedule modifications requested by Reference 2. Based on the modified schedule, Central and Eastern United States (CEUS) licensees were required to submit the reports resulting from the Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) by December 2014. Reference 4 provided the Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant ESEP Report for Units 1 and 2.
Following the submittal of the Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant ESEP Report, Southern Nuclear Operating Company (SNC) received a request for additional information (transmitted electronically) by the NRC on April 7, 2015 and Reference 5 provided a SNC response to the NRC. In Reference 6, the NRC staff concluded that the licensee's implementation of the interim evaluation meets the intent of the guidance. Reference 4 contained regulatory commitments to complete walkdowns, evaluations and any necessary modifications not requiring an outage by December 2016 and submit results letters to NRC within 90 days following completion of ESEP activities. Accordingly, walkdowns and evaluations have been completed and no modifications were determined to be necessary. Revision 1 of the Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant ESEP Report is provided in Enclosure 1. An updated table of the actions associated with completion of the ESEP Activities, with an updated schedule for each, is provided in Enclosure 2.
This letter completes the NRC commitments described in Enclosure 3 and contains no new NRC Commitments. If you have any questions, please contact John Giddens at 205.992.7924.
Mr. C. R. Pierce states he is the Regulatory Affairs Director for Southern Nuclear Operating Company, is authorized to execute this oath on behalf of Southern Nuclear Operating Company and, to the best of his knowledge and belief, the facts set forth in this letter are true.
ReCc~*p;;*
C. R. Pierce Regulatory Affairs Director CRP/JMG/GLS Sworn to and subscribed before me this f.:jl'-day of :D.e.~.k
~M/
Notary Public D 12016.
My commission expires: 1 WI B
Enclosures:
- 1. Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report-Revision 1
- 2. Required Actions and Schedule for Completion of ESEP Activities-Updated
- 3. Table of Regulatory Commitments
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U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission NL-16-2466 Page 3 cc:
Southern Nuclear Operating Company Mr. S. E. Kuczynski, Chairman, President & CEO Mr. D. G. Bost, Executive Vice President & Chief Nuclear Officer Mr. D. R. Vineyard, Vice President-Hatch Mr. M. D. Meier, Vice President-Regulatory Affairs Mr. D. R. Madison, Vice President-Fleet Operations Mr. B. J. Adams, Vice President-Engineering Mr. G. L. Johnson, Regulatory Affairs Manager-Hatch RType: CHA02.004 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Ms. C. Haney, Regional Administrator Mr. M. D. Orenak, NRR Project Manager-Hatch Mr. D. H. Hardage, Senior Resident Inspector-Hatch State of Georgia Mr. R.E. Dunn, Director-Environmental Protection Division
Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant - Units 1 and 2 Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1 Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report Completion Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report Revision 1, dated December 1, 2016 (61 pages)
Plant Hatch Units 1 and 2 Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP)
Report MPR-4121 Revision 1 December 1, 20 16 QUALITY ASSURANCE DOCUMENT This document has been prepared, reviewed, and approved in accordance with the Quality Assurance requirements of 1 OCFR50 Appendix 8 and/or ASME NQA-1, as specified in the MPR Nuclear Quality Assurance Program.
Prepared by: '(~
Q 'I(~
Kimberly A. Keithline Reviewed by: H. o/'~
Mojtaba Oghbaei Approved by: ~d~
Caroline S. Schlaseman Prepared for Southern Nuclear Operating Company 320 KING STREET ALEXANDRIA, VA 22314-3230 703-519-0200 FAX: 703-519-0224 http:\\\\www.mpr.com
Revision 0
I MPR-4121 Revision I RECORD OF REVISIONS Affected Pages Description All Initial issue.
i, ii, iii, 2, 3, 4, 5, 19, Updated to reflect revision of ESEL and completion of ESEP 23,24,25,27 for FLEX equipment installation.
Attachment A, Attachment B Ill
Contents Executive Summary...................................................................................................... 1 1
Purpose and Objective......................................................................................... 2 2
Brief Summary of the FLEX Seismic Implementation Strategies..................... 3 3
Equipment Selection Process and ESEL............................................................ 6 3.1 Equipment Selection Process and ESEL...................................................................... 6 3.1.1 ESEL Development............................................................................................. 6 3.1.2 Power Operated Valves....................................................................................... 7 3.1.3 Pull Boxes........................................................................................................... 7 3.1.4 Termination Cabinets.......................................................................................... 8 3.1.5 Critical Instrumentation Indicators..................................................................... 8 3.1.6 Phase 2 and Phase 3 Piping Connections............................................................ 8 3.1.7 Inaccessible Valve Interlocks.............................................................................. 8 3.2 Justification for Use of Equipment that is not the Primary Means for FLEX Implementation....................................................................................................................... 8 4
Ground Motion Response Spectrum (GMRS).................................................... 9 4.1 Plot of GMRS Submitted by Licensee.......................................................................... 9 4.2 Comparison to SSE..................................................................................................... I 0 5
Review Level Ground Motion (RLGM)............................................................... 14 5.I Description of RLGM Selected.................................................................................. 14 5.2 Method to Estimate In-Structure Response Spectrum (ISRS).................................... 16 6
Seismic Margin Evaluation Approach............................................................... 17 6.1 Summary of Methodologies Used.............................................................................. 17 6.2 HCLPF Screening Process.......................................................................................... 17 6.3 Seismic Walkdown Approach.................................................................................... 18 MPR-4121 Rev1sion I 6.3.1 Walkdown Approach........................................................................................ 18 6.3.2 Application of Previous Walkdown Information.............................................. 19 6.3.3 Significant Walkdown Findings........................................................................ 20
6.4 HCLPF Calculation Process....................................................................................... 20 6.5 Functional Evaluation of Relays................................................................................. 20 6.6 Tabulated ESEL HCLPF Values (Including Key Failure Modes)............................. 21 7
Inaccessible Items.............................................................................................. 22 7.1 Identification of ESEL Items Inaccessible for Walkdown......................................... 22 7.2 Planned Walkdown/Evaluation Schedule/Close Out.................................................. 23 8
ESEP Conclusions and Results........................................................................ 24 8.1 Supporting Information.............................................................................................. 24 8.2 Identification of Planned Modifications..................................................................... 25 8.3 Modification Implementation Schedule..................................................................... 25 8.4 Summary of Regulatory Commitments...................................................................... 25 9
References.......................................................................................................... 26 Attachment A:
Attachment B:
MPR*4121 Revision I Plant Hatch Unit 1 ESEL............................................................... A-1 Plant Hatch Unit 2 ESEL............................................................... B-1 v
Tables Table 4-1. GMRS for Plant Hatch Units 1 and 2........................................................................... 1 0 Table 4-2. Horizontal Design Basis Earthquake (DBE) for Plant Hatch Unit 1............................ 12 Table 4-3. Horizontal Design Basis Earthquake (DBE) for Plant Hatch Unit 2............................ 13 Table 5-1. Plant Hatch IPEEE RLE............................................................................................... 15 Table A-1. Plant Hatch Unit 1 ESEL Items and HCLPF Results............................................... A-1 Table B-1. Plant Hatch Unit 2 ESEL Items and HCLPF Results................................................ B-1 MPR-4121 Reviston I VI
Figures Figure 2-1. Electrical Diagram for Plant Hatch FLEX Strategies (Reference 21)..........................4 Figure 2-2. Flow Diagram for Plant Hatch FLEX Strategies (Reference 21)................................. 5 Figure 4-1. Plant Hatch GMRS........................................................................................................ 9 Figure 4-2. Horizontal Design Basis Earthquake (DBE) and GMRS for Plant Hatch.................. ))
Figure 5-1. Hatch IPEEE RLE Compared to the Unit I and Unit 2 DBEs and the GMRS........... l5 MPR-4121 Revis1on I vii
Executive Summary Plant Hatch Units I and 2 have performed the Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) as an interim action in response to the NRC's 50.54(f) letter (Reference 1). The purpose was to demonstrate seismic margin through a review of a subset of the plant equipment that can be relied upon to protect the reactor core following beyond design basis seismic events. The ESEP was performed using the methodologies in the NRC-endorsed industry guidance in EPRI 3002000704, Seismic Evaluation Guidance: Augmented Approach for the Resolution of Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1 - Seismic (Reference 2). As a result of the ESEP, no modifications have been identified as necessary to meet ESEP acceptance criteria specified in Reference 2.
MPR-4121 Revision I 1
1 Purpose and Objective Following the accident at the Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear power plant resulting from the March II, 20 II, Great Tohoku Earthquake and subsequent tsunami, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) established a Near Term Task Force (NTTF) to conduct a systematic review ofNRC processes and regulations and to determine if the agency should make additional improvements to its regulatory system. The NTTF developed a set of recommendations intended to clarify and strengthen the regulatory framework for protection against natural phenomena.
Subsequently, the NRC issued a 50.54(f) letter on March I2, 20I2 (Reference I), requesting information to assure that these recommendations are addressed by all U.S. nuclear power plants.
The 50.54(f) letter requests that licensees and holders of construction permits under I 0 CFR Part 50 reevaluate the seismic hazards at their sites against present-day NRC requirements and guidance. NRC has considered the need for further risk assessment based on a review of the re-evaluated hazard and available risk information and has concluded that a seismic probabilistic risk assessment (SPRA) is not warranted for Plant Hatch Units I and 2 (Reference I8).
This report describes the Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) undertaken for Plant Hatch Units I and 2. The intent of the ESEP is to perform an interim action in response to the NRC's 50.54(f) letter (Reference I) to demonstrate seismic margin through a review of a subset of the plant equipment that can be relied upon to protect the reactor core following beyond design basis seismic events.
The ESEP is implemented using the methodologies in the NRC-endorsed industry guidance in EPRI 3002000704, Seismic Evaluation Guidance: Augmented Approach for the Resolution of Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.I - Seismic (Reference 2).
The objective of this report is to provide summary information describing the ESEP evaluations and results. The level of detail provided in the report is intended to enable NRC to understand the inputs used, the evaluations performed, and the decisions made as a result of the interim evaluations.
In July 2015, NRC concluded that Plant Hatch Units I and 2 had responded appropriately to Enclosure I, Item (6) of the 50.54(f) letter (Reference I9). This conclusion was based on NRC's review of Revision 0 ofthis report and NRC's Aprii20I5 response to NRC requests for additional information (Reference 20). Revision I of this report documents completion ofESEP activities in accordance with References I9 and 20.
MPR-4121 Revision I 2
2 Brief Summary of the FLEX Seismic Implementation Strategies The Plant Hatch FLEX strategies for Reactor Core Cooling and Containment Function are summarized below. This summary is derived from the Plant Hatch Overall Integrated Plan (OIP) in Response to the March 12, 2012, Commission Order EA-12-049 (Reference 3).
During FLEX Phase 1, the primary strategy for reactor core cooling is to supply high quality water via reactor core isolation cooling (RCIC) with suction from the Condensate Storage Tank (CST). lfthe CST is depleted (in approximately 6-7 hours by analysis), suction will be taken from the torus. Reactor pressure is controlled using safety reliefvalves (SRVs) with DC control power and pneumatic pressure supplied by the station batteries and accumulators for each SRV.
As torus temperature increases, operators reduce reactor pressure to provide margin to the heat capacity temperature limit curve.
During FLEX Phase 2, reactor core cooling will continue to be maintained using RCIC. After depletion of the initial CST inventory and while RCIC is taking suction from the torus, the CST will be replenished using the portable FLEX pump and water from the Ultimate Heat Sink (Aitamaha River). RCIC will continue to inject water from the torus until the torus level reaches the low level limit and suction must be re-aligned to the CST. The torus water level drops due to evaporation through the Hardened Containment Vent System (HCVS), which is operated to maintain containment parameters below design limits and RCIC operating parameters within acceptable limits. Reactor pressure will continue to be controlled using the SRVs. The 125V DC batteries will provide power for more than 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> without recharging. As shown in Figure 2-1 (Reference 21 ), the FLEX 600 VDC diesel generators will be connected at approximately 10-12 hours to power two 125/250 VDC Battery Chargers per division, RCIC Controls, and other loads necessary for event mitigation and monitoring.
The FLEX Phase 3 coping strategy is to continue reactor core cooling up to and beyond 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> using FLEX Phase 2 on-site equipment with no immediate reliance on equipment from the National SAFER Response Center. RCIC will be used to cool the core until reactor pressure is insufficient to drive the RCIC turbine, at which time the Phase 2 FLEX pump will be used to inject directly to the reactor using the RHRSW-RHR cross tie valves as shown in Figure 2-2 (Reference 21 ).
MPR-4121 Revision I 3
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MPR-4121 Revis1on I
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5
3 Equipment Selection Process and ESEL The selection of equipment for the Expedited Seismic Equipment List (ESEL) followed the guidelines of EPRI 3002000704 (Reference 2). The ESELs for Units I and 2, presented in Attachments A and B, respectively, are based on SNCH106-PR-001 and SNCH106-PR-002 (References 4 and 5).
3.1 EQUIPMENT SELECTION PROCESS AND ESEL The ESEL component selection followed the EPRI guidance outlined in Section 3.2 of Reference 2. The selection of equipment to be included on the ESEL was based on installed plant equipment credited in the FLEX strategies during Phase I, 2, and 3 mitigation of a Beyond Design Basis External Event (BDBEE), as outlined in the Plant Hatch Overall Integrated Plan (OIP) in Response to the March 12, 2012, Commission Order EA-12-049 (Reference 3). The OIP provides the Plant Hatch FLEX mitigation strategy and serves as the basis for equipment selected for the ESEP.
The Plant Hatch ESEL includes permanently installed plant equipment that could be relied upon to accomplish the core cooling and containment safety functions identified in Table 3-1 of Reference 2 in response to a beyond-design-basis earthquake. Per Reference 2, the ESEL does not include portable or pre-staged FLEX equipment (not permanently installed) or equipment that is used only for recovery strategies. The scope of equipment on the ESEL includes that required to support a single FLEX success path. Instrumentation monitoring requirements for core cooling and containment integrity functions are limited to those discussed in Reference 2.
In accordance with Reference 2, the following structures, systems, and components were excluded from the ESEL:
Structures (e.g., reactor building and control building)
Piping, cabling, conduit, HV AC, and their supports Manual valves and check valves Power-operated valves not required to change state as part of the FLEX mitigation strategies Nuclear steam supply system components (e.g., reactor pressure vessel and internals)
- 3. 1. 1 ESEL Development The ESEL was developed by reviewing the Plant Hatch FLEX OIP (Reference 3) to determine the major equipment involved in the FLEX strategies. Plant drawings (e.g., Process and MPR-4121 Revisaon I 6
Instrumentation Diagrams (P&IDs) and electrical one-line diagrams) were reviewed to specify the boundaries of the flow paths used in the FLEX strategies and to identify other components needed to support operation of the systems credited in the FLEX strategies. Boundaries were established at an electrical or mechanical isolation device (e.g., isolation amplifier or valve) in branch circuits/branch lines off the defined strategy electrical or fluid flowpath. P&IDs were the primary reference documents used to identify mechanical components and instrumentation needed for FLEX. Once the flow paths were identified, specific components were selected using the guidance in Reference 2. Electrical components needed to support FLEX were identified using one-line diagrams and schematics. Based on this review, base list tables of components were developed for each of the methods credited with accomplishing key functions in the FLEX strategies.
The base list tables were then reviewed to determine which equipment should be included on the ESEL. Most of the equipment decisions were clearly outlined in the Reference 2 guidance; however, some judgments were necessary as discussed below.
- 3. 1.2 Power Operated Valves Per the Reference 2 EPRI guidance, the ESEL does not need to include power-operated valves that are not required to change state as part of the FLEX mitigating strategies. However, Reference 2 also states, "In addition to the physical failure modes (load path and anchorage) of specific pieces of installed equipment, functional failure modes of electrical and mechanical portions of the installed Phase I equipment should be considered (e.g., RCIC)." Because relay chatter could cause a functional failure, the following criteria were used to determine whether specific power-operated valves should be included on the ESEL:
Power operated valves in the primary success path will be included on the ESEL if they need to remain energized during Phase I in order to maintain core cooling and containment integrity (e.g., certain DC-powered valves).
Power operated valves not required to change state as part of the FLEX mitigation strategies may be excluded from the ESEL if they would be de-energized by the event that causes the Extended Loss of all AC Power (ELAP) event.
AC power-operated valves not required to change state as part of the Phase I FLEX mitigation strategies may be excluded from the ESEP if they are re-energized and operated during Phase 2 or 3 activities.
3.1.3 Pull Boxes Pull boxes were deemed unnecessary to add to the ESELs as these components provide completely passive locations for pulling or installing cables. No breaks or connections in the cabling are included in pull boxes. Pull boxes were considered part of the conduit and cabling, which are excluded in accordance with Reference 2.
MPR-4121 Rev1sion I 7
- 3. 1.4 Termination Cabinets Although termination cabinets and junction boxes provide a passive function similar to pull boxes, they were included on the ESEL to ensure industry knowledge on panel/anchorage failure vulnerabilities is addressed.
3.1.5 Critical Instrumentation Indicators Critical indicators and recorders are typically physically located on panels/cabinets and are included as separate components; however, seismic evaluation of the instrument indication may be included in the panel/cabinet seismic evaluation (rule-of-the-box).
3.1.6 Phase 2 and Phase 3 Piping Connections As noted in Section 3.2 of Reference 2, "the scope of the ESEL is limited to installed plant equipment and FLEX equipment connections" and "the selection process for the ESEL should assume the FLEX strategies (modifications, equipment, procedures, etc.) have been implemented." Section 3.2 of Reference 2 also explains that "piping, cabling, conduit, HVAC, and their supports" are excluded from the ESEL scope. Therefore, piping and pipe supports associated with FLEX Phase 2 and Phase 3 connections are excluded from the scope of the ESEP evaluation. Except as described in Sections 3.1 and 3.1.2 above, valves required to change position to establish/maintain FLEX Phase 2 and Phase 3 flow paths (i.e., active valves) are included in the ESEL.
- 3. 1. ]Inaccessible Valve Interlocks Some components have interlocks that could potentially inhibit valve operation during Phase 2 or 3 of FLEX. Reference 2 specifically allows exclusion of interlock failures from the ESEL if plant procedures provide instructions for manual operation to ensure performance of the required FLEX function. For valves that cannot be operated locally due to location in containment or high radiation areas, this statement is interpreted as allowing the interlocks in the control circuit to be bypassed to allow remote manual operation. Therefore, these interlocks are excluded in Phase 3.
3.2 JUSTIFICATION FOR USE OF EQUIPMENT THAT IS NOT THE PRIMARY MEANS FOR FLEX IMPLEMENTATION All components on the ESEL for Plant Hatch Units 1 and 2 are associated with the primary FLEX strategies. Therefore, since no alternate equipment is being used, no justification is needed.
MPR-4 121 Rev1sion I 8
4 Ground Motion Response Spectrum (GMRS)
In response to the 50.54(f) letter (Reference I), SNC reevaluated the Plant Hatch seismic hazard in accordance with the NRC-endorsed industry guidance (Reference 6).
4.1 PLOT OF GMRS SUBMITTED BY LICENSEE The plot of the Plant Hatch GMRS submitted by SNC to the NRC in Reference 7 is shown in Figure 4-I. Table 4-I contains the corresponding numerical values that were also included in Reference 7. The GMRS and Design Basis Earthquake (DBE) control point elevation is defined at Elevation I 29 feet, which is general plant grade.
MPR-4121 Rev1sion 1 1.0£+00 0.1
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Figure 4-1. Plant Hatch GMRS 9
Table 4-1. GMRS for Plant Hatch Units 1 and 2 Frequency Spectral Frequency Spectral Frequency Spectral (Hz)
Acceleration (Hz)
Acceleration (Hz)
Acceleration (g)
(g)
(g) 100 0.1422 12.5 0.2744 1.00 0.2206 90.0 0.1422 10.0 0.3039 0.900 0.2171 80.0 0.1427 9.00 0.3111 0.800 0.2009 70.0 0.1438 8.00 0.3142 0.700 0.1696 60.0 0.1452 7.00 0.3164 0.600 0.1452 50.0 0.1478 6.00 0.3203 0.500 0.1113 45.0 0.1508 5.00 0.3118 0.400 0.0737 40.0 0.1532 4.00 0.3080 0.300 0.0580 35.0 0.1583 3.00 0.3029 0.200 0.0437 30.0 0.1666 2.50 0.3096 0.167 0.0346 25.0 0.1790 2.00 0.3158 0.125 0.0203 20.0 0.2027 1.50 0.2844 0.100 0.0145 15.0 0.2459 1.25 0.2654 4.2 COMPARISON TO SSE The plots of the Plant Hatch Unit I DBE and Unit 2 DBE submitted by SNC to the NRC in Reference 7 are shown in Figure 4-2 along with the GMRS. Tables 4-2 and 4-3 contain the corresponding numerical values that were also included in Reference 7. Note that Reference 7 uses DBE and SSE interchangeably for Plant Hatch.
MPR-4121 Revis1on I 10
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Table 4-2. Horizontal Design Basis Earthquake (DBE) for Plant Hatch Unit 1 Frequency (Hz)
MPR-4 121 Revision I 33.33 28.67 25.00 22.22 20.00 16.67 14.29 12.50 11.11 10.00 8.00 6.67 5.00 4.00 Spectral Acceleration (g) 0.150 0.150 0.150 0.150 0.150 0.150 0.150 0.156 0.163 0.169 0.188 0.206 0.216 0.221 Frequency (Hz)
Spectral Acceleration (g) 3.33 0.221 2.86 0.225 2.50 0.221 2.22 0.216 2.00 0.206 1.67 0.178 1.43 0.165 1.25 0.150 1.11 0.133 1.00 0.128 0.67 0.092 0.50 0.069 0.33 0.051 0.10 0.015 12
Table 4-3. Horizontal Design Basis Earthquake (DBE) for Plant Hatch Unit 2 Frequency (Hz)
MPR-4121 Revision I 100.00 16.00 14.30 12.50 11.10 10.00 8.30 7.70 6.00 5.00 4.00 3.00 Spectral Acceleration (g) 0.150 0.150 0.165 0.180 0.200 0.210 0.240 0.260 0.320 0.320 0.320 0.320 Frequency (Hz)
Spectral Acceleration (g) 2.50 0.320 2.00 0.320 1.50 0.240 1.25 0.200 1.00 0.160 0.70 0.110 0.50 0.080 0.33 0.050 0.22 0.036 0.14 0.015 0.10 0.007 13
5 Review Level Ground Motion (RLGM)
Section 4 of Reference 2 states that the ESEP may be performed using either the GMRS or a linearly scaled version of the SSE (DBE for Plant Hatch) that bounds the GMRS between I and I 0 Hz. In many cases, scaling the SSE facilitates a more expedient evaluation by allowing use of existing SSE-based in-structure response spectra (ISRS) that are simply scaled by the same factor (Scenarios 2 and 3 in Figure 1-2 of Reference 2). However, for surface-mounted items (where ISRS estimates are not necessary), plants may decide to use the GMRS instead of the scaled SSE (Scenario 4 in Figure 1-2 of Reference 2).
The Plant Hatch ESEP was performed using either the GMRS (for two surface-mounted items) or the RLGM used previously by the combined A-46/IPEEE Program at Plant Hatch as discussed below, which is consistent with the guidance in Reference 2.
5.1 DESCRIPTION
OF RLGM SELECTED As discussed in Reference 7 and documented in the 1991 EPRI Report NP-7217 (Reference 8) a full EPRI Seismic Margin Assessment (SMA) was previously performed for Plant Hatch Unit I as a trial BWR assessment of the EPRI SMA methodology. That SMA project included a soil failure evaluation and a full relay evaluation and was peer reviewed by several review panels.
As part of the Independent Plant Examination of External Events (IPEEE), a focused scope SMA and a full SQUG GIP relay review were performed for Plant Hatch Unit 2 (Reference 9). The Review Level Earthquake (RLE) for both of those SMAs was a median NUREG/CR-0098 type ground response spectrum anchored to 0.3g peak ground acceleration (PGA) as shown in Table 5-1 (Reference 7). As described in Reference 8, a soil-structure interaction analysis was performed and new ISRS were developed for the IPEEE RLE. For comparison purposes, Figure 5-1 includes the Hatch IPEEE RLE, the Hatch Unit I DBE, the Hatch Unit 2 DBE, and the Hatch GMRS. Above I Hz, the Hatch Units I and 2 IPEEE RLE spectrum is at least two times or larger than the Hatch Unit I DBE and the Hatch Unit 2 DBE, and is about twice the Hatch GMRS.
To facilitate an early start (prior to obtaining the GMRS) and timely completion of the ESEP, the IPEEE RLE was used as the ESEP review level ground motion (RLGM) for most of the equipment in Plant Hatch Units I and 2. Only the surface-mounted condensate storage tanks (CSTs), which did not require ISRS, were evaluated to the GMRS.
MPR-4121 Revision I 14
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Spectral Acceleration (g) 100 0.3 33 0.3 20 0.38 12.5 0.45 10 0.54 8
0.637 2
0.637 1
0.3 0.5 0.15 15
5.2 METHOD TO ESTIMATE IN-STRUCTURE RESPONSE SPECTRUM (ISRS)
For structure-mounted equipment, the ESEP used the IPEEE RLE in-structure response spectra (ISRS). As stated in Section 5. I, the IPEEE ISRS are based on ground motion equal to or larger than twice the Hatch Unit I and Hatch Unit 2 DBEs.
MPR-4121 Revision I 16
6 Seismic Margin Evaluation Approach The objective of the ESEP is to demonstrate that the ESEL items have sufficient seismic capacity to meet or exceed the seismic demand associated with the RLGM. Section 5 of Reference 2 provides guidance for characterizing the seismic capacity by determining a high confidence of low probability of failure (HCLPF) using either the Seismic Margin Assessment (SMA) methodology of EPRI NP-6041-SL (Reference I 0) or the fragility analysis methodology of EPRI TR-1 03959 (Reference I2). The Plant Hatch ESEP used the EPRI NP-604I-SL SMA approach, consistent with the earlier combined A-46/IPEEE Program.
The HCLPF capacity is based on the weakest or most seismically limiting attribute of the equipment (structural, anchorage, or functional). The HCLPF evaluation considers the dynamic response of the equipment, but the HCLPF value is expressed in terms of a peak ground acceleration (PGA) to provide a common point of reference relative to the RLGM. Per Reference 2, ESEL items have sufficient seismic capacity if the HCLPF capacity is equal to or greater than the RLGM PGA.
6.1
SUMMARY
OF METHODOLOGIES USED Seismic Margin Assessments (SMAs) were performed for Plant Hatch Units I and 2 in the early I990s and are documented in References 8 and 9. Those SMAs were performed as part of the combined A-46/IPEEE program at Plant Hatch and included many of the items on the ESEL. As part of the ESEP, the Seismic Review Team (SRT) evaluated each accessible item on the ESEL for seismic capacity, anchorage, and relay functionality (when a FLEX methodology relay was identified in the ESEL). (Inaccessible items are discussed in Section 7.1.) The ESEP walkdowns and evaluations were documented in Screening and Evaluation Work Sheets (SEWS), which include checklists that were developed from Appendix F of EPRI NP-604I-SL (Reference 1 0).
Each member of the SRT was trained as a SQUG Seismic Capability Engineer in accordance with the Generic Implementation Procedure (GIP) and trained in the use of EPRI NP-6041-SL.
Selected team members also took the EPRI HCLPF course, which was developed for the ESEP implementation and is based on EPRI NP-604I-SL.
6.2 HCLPF SCREENING PROCESS ESEL items were evaluated for the Hatch IPEEE RLE, which is a median NUREG/CR-0098 type ground response spectrum anchored to 0.3g PGA, as shown in Figure 5-I. The only exception to this approach was used for the CSTs, as described below. The 5 percent damped Peak Spectral Acceleration of the Hatch IPEEE RLE allowed the use of the first column (<0.8g PSA) of Reference I 0 Table 2-4 "Summary of Equipment and Subsystems Screening Criteria for Seismic Margin Evaluation" in establishing HCLPFs greater than or equal to the RLE for ESEL MPR-4121 Revision I 17
items. Anchorage evaluations were performed using the in-structure response spectra developed for the A-46/IPEEE program's RLE (shown in Figure 5-I).
For the CSTs, the HCLPFs were established using the rigorous methodology of Reference I 0 Appendix H "Flat-Bottom Vertical Fluid Storage Tanks" and additional information provided during the EPRI HCLPF course (Reference 11 ). The review level earthquake for the CST HCLPF evaluations was the GMRS.
6.3 SEISMIC WALKDOWN APPROACH 6.3.1 Walkdown Approach ESEP walkdowns were performed in accordance with the criteria provided in Section 5 of Reference 2, which refers to Reference 1 0 for the Seismic Margin Assessment process. Pages 2-26 through 2-30 of Reference I 0 describe the seismic walkdown guidance, including the following key points.
MPR-4121 Revision I "The SRT {Seismic Review Team] should "walk by" 100% of all components which are reasonably accessible and in non-radioactive or low radioactive environments. Seismic capability assessment of components which are inaccessible, in high-radioactive environments, or possibly within contaminated containment, will have to rely more on alternate means such as photographic inspection, more reliance on seismic reanalysis, and possibly, smaller inspection teams and more hurried inspections. A 100% "walk by" does not mean complete inspection of each component, nor does it mean requiring an electrician or other technician to de-energize and open cabinets or panels for detailed inspection of all components. This walkdown is not intended to be a QA or QC review or a review of the adequacy of the component at the SSE level.
If the SRT has a reasonable basis for assuming that the group of components are similar and are similarly anchored, then it is only necessary to inspect one component out of this group. The "similarity-basis" should be developed before the walkdown during the seismic capability preparatory work (Step 3) by reference to drawings, calculations or specifications. The one component or each type which is selected should be thoroughly inspected which probably does mean de-energizing and opening cabinets or panels for this very limited sample. Generally, a spare representative component can be found so as to enable the inspection to be performed while the plant is in operation. At least for the one component of each type which is selected, anchorage should be thoroughly inspected.
The walkdown procedure should be performed in an ad hoc manner. For each class of components the SRT should look closely at the first items and compare the field configurations with the construction drawings and/or specifications. If a one-to-one correspondence is found, then subsequent items do not have to be inspected in as great a detail. Ultimately the walkdown becomes a "walk by" of the component class as the SRT becomes I8
confident that the construction pattern is typical. This procedure for inspection should be repeated for each component class; although, during the actual walkdown the SRT may be inspecting several classes of components in parallel. If serious exceptions to the drawings or questionable construction practices are found then the system or component class must be inspected in closer detail until the systematic deficiency is defined.
The 100% "walk by" is to look for outliers, lack of similarity, anchorage which is different from that shown on drmvings or prescribed in criteria for that component, potential Sf [Seismic Interaction 1] problems, situations that are at odds with the team members' past experience, and any other areas of serious seismic concern. If any such concerns surface, then the limited sample size of one component of each type for thorough inspection will have to be increased. The increase in sample size which should be inspected will depend upon the number of outliers and different anchorages, etc., which are observed. It is up to the SRT to ultimately select the sample size since they are the ones who are responsible for the seismic adequacy of all elements which they screen from the margin review. Appendix D gives guidance for sampling selection. "
6.3.2 Application of Previous Walkdown Information Many ESEL items were previously walked down during the Plant Hatch A-46/IPEEE program using an IPEEE RLE that was equal to or greater than twice the DBEs. Consistent with the guidance in References 2 and 10, the A-46/IPEEE documentation for some electrical items was used to eliminate the need for electrical bus outages and minimize the risk of tripping the plant by not opening some energized electrical equipment that had been opened during the A-46/
IPEEE program.
Specifically, some ESEL items evaluated during the A-46/IPEEE program and shown to have a seismic capacity greater than or equal to the IPEEE RLE were evaluated but not opened to view anchorage. The ESEP walkdowns were performed to confirm consistency of these items with their A-46/IPEEE condition and address seismic capacity questions that could be answered without opening the equipment. Based on this information, which included documentation from the A-46/IPEEE SEWS, NTTF 2.3 seismic information, drawings, and calculations, the SRTs were able to evaluate the equipment capacity and anchorage without electrical bus outages or risk of tripping the plant by opening these items.
Previous walkdown information was also used for evaluation of inaccessible equipment, as discussed in Section 7.1.
1 EPRI 3002000704 (Reference 2) page 5-4 limits the ESEP seismic interaction reviews to "nearby block walls" and "piping attached to tanks" which are reviewed "to address the possibility of failures due to differential displacements."
MPR-4121 Rev1s1on I 19
6.3.3 Significant Walkdown Findings Consistent with guidance from Reference I 0, no significant seismic issues were identified at Plant Hatch during the final ESEP seismic walkdowns.
During initial ESEP seismic walkdowns, one significant seismic issue was identified:
Anchorage for the nitrogen ambient vaporizer for each unit (I T48-B004 and 2T48-8002) was degraded at the time of the initial walkdown and condition reports (CRs) were written to resolve the problem. These components were re-evaluated after repairs were made and the HCLPFs for the anchorages now meet or exceed the Hatch IPEEE RLE.
Smaller issues identified during the initial walkdowns (e.g., corrosion on anchor bolts for the Unit I outside nitrogen storage tank (I T48-AOO I)) were entered as condition reports, resolved, and then re-evaluated to confirm that the components have HCLPFs that meet or exceed the Hatch IPEEE RLE.
Some block walls were identified in the proximity of ESEL equipment. During the A-46/IPEEE combined program, these block walls were assessed for their structural adequacy to withstand the seismic loads resulting from the Hatch IPEEE RLE.
6.4 HCLPF CALCULATION PROCESS Consistent with the Reference I 0 deterministic/SMA methodology, the Plant Hatch ESEP acceptance criteria were that the equipment's structural/functional capacity, anchorage capacity, and relay functional capacity (when required) exceeded the seismic demand of the Hatch IPEEE RLE. Therefore, when these criteria were met, the HCLPF was defined as being at least as high as the IPEEE RLE (0.3g PGA), and calculation of specific HCLPF values in excess of0.3g PGA was not warranted. Specific HCLPF values were calculated for the CSTs so that both the tank capacities (e.g., shell failure modes) and anchorage capacities (e.g., cast-in-place L-bolts and anchor chairs) could be evaluated using the CDFM methodology in Appendix H of Reference 10 and additional information provided during the EPRI HCLPF course (Reference II). The CSTs were evaluated using the GMRS instead of the IPEEE RLE.
6.5 FUNCTIONAL EVALUATION OF RELAYS Relays in four cabinets and three motor control centers (total for both units) required functional evaluations. Each relay was evaluated using the SMA relay evaluation criteria in Section 3 of Reference I 0.
Seismic qualification test-based capacities were available for these specific relays in Plant Hatch documentation. For the twelve relays contained in four cabinets, capacity to demand evaluations were performed using the Plant Hatch relay seismic capacities and the IPEEE RLE ISRS scaled with the Reference I 0 in-cabinet amplification factors. The four relays contained in the three MCCs were qualified during dynamic testing of the MCCs; therefore, the in-cabinet amplification was included within the testing. In each case, the capacity exceeded the demand.
MPR-4121 Revision I 20
The ESEP relay functional evaluations were documented in the SEWS packages for these four cabinets and three motor control centers.
6.6 TABULATED ESEL HCLPF VALUES (INCLUDING KEY FAILURE MODES)
Tabulated ESEL HCLPF values are provided in Attachment A for Unit I and in Attachment B for Unit 2. The following notes apply to the information in the tables.
Items which screened out of an explicit functional capacity analysis using EPRI NP-604 I-SL (Reference I 0) Table 2-4 have a HCLPF greater than or equal to the RLGM; therefore, the HCLPF is shown as "~RLGM" in Tables A-I and 8-I. This is consistent with the SMA methodology of not calculating an explicit HCLPF capacity if the criteria for functional capacity (e.g., EPRI NP-604 I -SL Table 2-4) are met and instead providing results as meeting or exceeding the seismic input level selected as the RLGM.
It is unknown whether anchorage is the controlling failure mode for items that were screened for their functional capacity because the functional capacity may or may not be higher than the anchorage capacity. The one exception to this is that large, flat-bottom vertical tanks (e.g., the Condensate Storage Tanks (CSTs)) were evaluated using a methodology that includes all failure modes (i.e., anchorage failure modes and tank shell failure modes). The HCLPF values for these tanks are reported in Tables A-I and 8-I.
Equipment containing FLEX Methodology ("FM") relays was assessed for relay functional capacity as described in Section 6.5 of this report. Because it is not known whether the capacity of the equipment containing the relay, the equipment's anchorage, or the relay's capacity is the controlling HCLPF, the HCLPF is shown as "~RLGM" in Tables A-I and 8-I, and the "Notes/Comments" column identifies the presence of FM relay(s).
MPR-4121 Reviston I 21
7 Inaccessible Items 7.1 IDENTIFICATION OF ESEL ITEMS INACCESSIBLE FOR WALKDOWN The Plant Hatch ESELs contain about 70 items (total for both units) that are located in either the Drywells or Locked High Radiation Areas. In order to avoid dose (i.e., maintaining radiation exposure ALARA) and to reduce impact on refueling outages scheduled in 2015 and 2016, these ESEL items were evaluated to determine whether a walkdown was necessary. The inaccessible/high dose equipment includes the following classes:
Accumulators (for the SRVs)
Air-Operated Valves (SRVs)
MOVs Temperature Elements Junction Boxes Pneumatic System Filters and PCV (Unit 2 only)
Appendix D of Reference 10 provides information regarding "Sampling." Specifically, on page D-1, "sampling is technically valid for identical or similar components if there is evidence that the components are manufactured and installed in a consistent manner.... In some instances access is severely limited by radioactive environments and limited sampling is the only practical method of conducting a walkdown."
Much of the inaccessible/high dose equipment was previously evaluated during the A-46/IPEEE program. Although 6 of the 18 SRV accumulators on the ESEL were not previously evaluated for the Plant Hatch IPEEE RLE, sampling is a practical approach for concluding that they also have HCLPFs that meet or exceed the ESEP RLGM.
Like the SRV accumulators, most of the SRVs were also evaluated during the A-46/IPEEE program, and were found to meet SMA criteria for the IPEEE RLE. The SRVs, however, have been replaced since the A-46/IPEEE, or they are scheduled to be replaced in the next refueling outage (RFO). The replacement valves should be at least as robust as the SRVs that were evaluated during the A-46/IPEEE program. Additionally, in accordance with Reference 10, Table 2-4, active valves screen out from further SMA evaluations at the five percent-damped peak spectral acceleration for the Hatch IPEEE RLE (<0.8g). Therefore, additional ESEP walkdowns and the associated dose are not warranted.
A similar argument is made for the 8 MOVs (total for both units), where half of the MOVs were explicitly included in the A-46/IPEEE program. In accordance with Reference 10, Table 2-4, MPR-4121 Revision I 22
active valves screen out from further SMA evaluations at the five percent-damped peak spectral acceleration for the Hatch IPEEE RLE (<0.8g). Therefore, additional ESEP walkdowns and the associated dose are not warranted.
The temperature elements in the Drywell are considered to be represented by the ten temperature elements that were walked down (total for both units) and no seismic issues were identified; therefore, the inaccessible temperature elements do not merit specific walkdowns.
Junction boxes were not part of the A-46/IPEEE program, but dozens have been walked down during the ESEP, and no seismic issues have been identified; therefore, junction boxes in the drywell do not merit walkdowns.
Finally, there are three inaccessible/high dose devices related to the Unit 2 Drywell pneumatic system: two filters and one pressure control valve (PCV). Filters are passive devices and considered seismically rugged, as are typical PCVs. The Unit 1 pneumatic system filters and the PCV are in a Reactor Building diagonal (outside the drywell) and were walked down; no seismic issues were identified for these small passive devices. None of these devices merit a Drywell entry and the dose associated with performing walkdowns for the ESEP.
7.2 PLANNED WALKDOWN/EVALUATlON SCHEDULE/CLOSE OUT Walkdowns have been completed for installed accessible items on the ESELs. Section 7.1 discusses the disposition for inaccessible items.
MPR-4 121 Revision I 23
8 ESEP Conclusions and Results 8.1 SUPPORTING INFORMATION Plant Hatch has performed the ESEP as an interim action in response to the NRC's 50.54(f) letter (Reference 1 ). It was performed using the methodologies in the NRC endorsed guidance in EPRI 3002000704 (Reference 2).
The ESEP provides an important demonstration of seismic margin and expedites plant safety enhancements through evaluations and potential near-term modifications of plant equipment that can be relied upon to protect the reactor core following beyond design basis seismic events.
The ESEP is part of the overall Plant Hatch response to NRC's 50.54(f) letter (Reference 1). On March 12, 2014, NEI submitted to the NRC results of a study (Reference 13) of seismic core damage risk estimates based on updated seismic hazard information as it applies to operating nuclear reactors in the Central and Eastern United States (CEUS). The study concluded that site-specific seismic hazards show that there has not been an overall increase in seismic risk for the fleet of U.S. plants based on the re-evaluated hazard. As such, the "current seismic design of operating reactors continues to provide a safety margin to withstand potential earthquakes exceeding the seismic design basis."
The NRC's May 9, 2014 NTTF 2.1 Screening and Prioritization letter (Reference 14) concluded that the "fleetwide seismic risk estimates are consistent with the approach and results used in the GI-199 safety/risk assessment." The letter also stated that "As a result, the staff has confirmed that the conclusions reached in GI-199 safety/risk assessment remain valid and that the plants can continue to operate while additional evaluations are conducted."
An assessment of the change in seismic risk for Plant Hatch was included in the fleet risk evaluation submitted in the March 12, 2014 NEI letter (Reference 13); therefore, the conclusions in the NRC's May 9 letter (Reference 14) also apply to Plant Hatch.
In addition, the March 12, 2014 NEI letter (Reference 13) provided an attached "Perspectives on the Seismic Capacity of Operating Plants," which (I) assessed a number of qualitative reasons why the design of SSCs inherently contain margin beyond their design level, (2) discussed industrial seismic experience databases of performance of industry facility components similar to nuclear SSCs, and (3) discussed earthquake experience at operating plants.
The fleet of currently operating nuclear power plants was designed using conservative practices, such that the plants have significant margin to withstand large ground motions safely. This has been borne out for those plants that have actually experienced significant earthquakes. The seismic design process has inherent (and intentional) conservatisms which result in significant seismic margins within structures, systems and components (SSCs). These conservatisms are reflected in several key aspects of the seismic design process, including:
MPR-4121 Revision I 24
Safety factors applied in design calculations Damping values used in dynamic analysis of SSCs Bounding synthetic time histories for in-structure response spectra calculations Broadening criteria for in-structure response spectra Response spectra enveloping criteria typically used in SSC analysis and testing applications Response spectra based frequency domain analysis rather than explicit time history based time domain analysis Bounding requirements in codes and standards Use of minimum strength requirements of structural components (concrete and steel)
Bounding testing requirements, and Ductile behavior of the primary materials (that is, not crediting the additional capacity of materials such as steel and reinforced concrete beyond the essentially elastic range, etc.).
These design practices combine to result in margins such that the SSCs will continue to fulfill their functions at ground motions well above the SSE.
8.2 IDENTIFICATION OF PLANNED MODIFICATIONS No modifications have been identified as necessary to meet ESEP acceptance criteria.
8.3 MODIFICATION IMPLEMENTATION SCHEDULE No modifications have been identified for the items that have been evaluated.
8.4
SUMMARY
OF REGULATORY COMMITMENTS Please refer to the Table of Regulatory Commitments that will accompany this report.
MPR-4121 Revision 1 25
9
- 1.
- 2.
- 3.
- 4.
- 5.
- 6.
- 7.
- 8.
- 9.
- 10.
- 11.
References NRC Letter to All Power Reactor Licensees et al., "Request for Information Pursuant to Title IO ofthe Code ofFederal Regulations 50.54(f) Regarding Recommendations 2.I, 2.3, and 9.3 ofthe Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima Dai-ichi Accident," dated March 12, 2012 [ADAMS Accession Number ML12053A340].
EPRI Report 3002000704, "Seismic Evaluation Guidance: Augmented Approach for the Resolution of Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.I - Seismic," Electric Power Research Institute, May 20 I3.
SNC Nuclear Letter NL-I4-0593, "Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant Units I and 2 Third Six-Month Status Report of the Implementation ofthe Requirements of the Commission Order with Regard to Mitigation Strategies for Beyond-Design-Basis External Events (EA-I2-049)," dated August 26, 20I4.
ENERCON Engineering Report SNCH 1 06-PR-00 I, Rev. 4, "Equipment Selection for the Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process for Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc.,
Hatch Nuclear Plant Unit No. I."
ENERCON Engineering Report SNCH 1 06-PR-002, Rev. 4, "Equipment Selection for the Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process for Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc.,
Hatch Nuclear Plant Unit No. 2."
EPRI Report I 025287, "Seismic Evaluation Guidance: Screening, Prioritization and Implementation Details (SPID) for the Resolution of Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.I: Seismic," Electric Power Research Institute, February 20I3.
SNC Nuclear Letter NL-I4-0343, "Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant Units I and 2 Seismic Hazard and Screening Report for CEUS Sites," dated March 3I, 20I4.
EPRI Report NP-72I7, "Seismic Margin Assessment of the Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant, Unit I," Electric Power Research Institute, June I991.
"Individual Plant Examination for External Events, Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2" (Response to Generic Letter 88-20, Supplement 4).
EPRI NP-604I-SL, "A Methodology for Assessment ofNuclear Power Plant Seismic Margin, Revision I," Electric Power Research Institute, August I99I.
Hardy, Greg and Dr. Robert Kennedy, "High Confidence of a Low Probability of Failure (HCLPF) Calculation Training," EPRI, (August 20I3).
MPR-4121 Rev1s1on I 26
- 12.
EPRI TR-1 03959, "Methodology for Developing Seismic Fragilities," Electric Power Research Institute, 1999.
- 13.
NEI (A. Pietrangelo) letter to NRC (E. Leeds) dated March 12, 2014, "Seismic Risk Evaluations for Plants in the Central and Eastern United States."
- 14.
NRC (E. Leeds) letter dated May 9, 2014, "Screening and Prioritization Results Regarding Information Pursuant to Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 50.54(f) Regarding Seismic Hazard Re-Evaluations for Recommendation 2.1 ofthe Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima Dai-ichi Accident."
- 15.
NEI (A. Pietrangelo) letter to NRC (D. Skeen) dated April9, 2013, "Proposed Path Forward for NTTF Recommendation 2.1: Seismic Reevaluations."
- 16.
Dr. Robert Kennedy letter to Southern Company Services (D. Moore) dated August 13, 1993, "Re: Hatch Condensate Water Tank."
- 17.
MPR Calculation No. 0380-0050-01, "Hatch Unit 2 Condensate Storage Tank,"
Revision 0, December 15, 2014.
- 18.
NRC Letter to All Power Reactor Licensees et at., "Final Determination of Licensee Seismic Probabilistic Risk Assessments Under the Request for Information Pursuant to Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 50.54(f) Regarding Recommendation 2.1 "Seismic" ofthe Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima Dai-ichi Accident," dated October 27,2015 [ADAMS Accession Number ML15194A015].
- 19.
NRC Letter to SNC, "Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2 - Staff Review of Interim Evaluation Associated with Reevaluated Seismic Hazard Implementation ofNear-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1 (TAC Nos. MF5243 and MF5244)," dated July 22, 2015 [ML1520IA474].
- 20.
SNC Nuclear Letter NL-15-0705, "Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant - Units 1 and 2 Request for Additional Information Regarding Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report,'
dated April 16, 2015 [ML15106A549].
- 21.
Final Integrated Plan, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Order EA-12-049, Strategies for Beyond Design Basis External Events Hatch Nuclear Plant Units 1 and 2, Draft Rev. D, October 2016.
MPR-4 121 RevisiOn I 27
Attachment A:
Plant Hatch Unit 1 ESEL ID 1621-A0036 1621-A003D 1621-A003E 1621-A003F 1621-A003G 1621-A003H 1621-A003J 1621-A003K 1621-A003L MPR-4121 Revision I Table A-1. Plant Hatch Unit 1 ESEL Items and HCLPF Results Equipment Operating State HCLPF Screening Notes/Comments Description Normal Desired Results Inaccessible/High SRV AIR ACCUMULATOR Available Available N/A Dose; See Section 7.1 Inaccessible/High SRV AIR ACCUMULATOR Available Available N/A Dose; See Section 7.1 Inaccessible/High SRV AIR ACCUMULATOR Available Available N/A Dose; See Section 7.1 Inaccessible/High SRV AIR ACCUMULATOR Available Available N/A Dose; See Section 7.1 Inaccessible/High SRV AIR ACCUMULATOR Available Available N/A Dose; See Section 7.1 Inaccessible/High SRV AIR ACCUMULATOR Available Available N/A Dose; See Section 7.1 Inaccessible/High SRV AIR ACCUMULATOR Available Available N/A Dose; See Section 7.1 Inaccessible/High SRV AIR ACCUMULATOR Available Available N/A Dose; See Section 7.1 Inaccessible/High SRV AIR ACCUMULATOR Available Available N/A Dose; See Section 7.1 A-1
ID 1B21-F013B 1B21-F013D 1B21-F013E 1B21-F013F 1B21-F013G 1B21-F013H 1B21-F013J 1B21-F013K 1B21-F013L 1B21-N091B 1B21-N691B 1B21-R604B MPR-4121 Rev1s1on I Equipment Description MSL "A" RPV SRV (ADS)
RPV Levels 2 & 1 LT-Div II -
Batt LPCI RX Water Level MTU LIS
- Div II - Batt RPV Level (Hot Leg) L1 - Div II -
Batt Operating State HCLPF Screening Notes/Comments Normal Desired Results Inaccessible/High Closed Closed/Open N/A Dose; See Section 7.1 Inaccessible/High Closed Closed/Open N/A Dose; See Section 7.1 Inaccessible/High Closed Closed/Open N/A Dose; See Section 7.1 Inaccessible/High Closed Closed/Open N/A Dose; See Section 7.1 Inaccessible/High Closed Closed/Open N/A Dose; See Section 7.1 Inaccessible/High Closed Closed/Open N/A Dose; See Section 7.1 Inaccessible/High Closed Closed/Open N/A Dose; See Section 7.1 Inaccessible/High Closed Closed/Open N/A Dose; See Section 7.1 Inaccessible/High Closed Closed/Open N/A Dose; See Section 7.1 Operating Operating
<!: RLGM Operating Operating
<!: RLGM Operating Operating
<!:RLGM A-2
ID 1C32-K655C 1C32-K902 1C32-NOOSC 1C32-R605C 1C82-POOl 1C82-P002 lEll-BOOlA lEll-F003A lEll-F008 lEll-FOlSA lEU-F017A lEll-F048A lEU-F068A lEll-F073A MPR-4121 Revtsion I Equipment Description FWC RX Pressure Transmitter C-Div II - Batt RX WTR LVL RFP TRIP C FWC RX Water Level PT-Div II-Batt FWC RX PI-Div II-Batt REMOTE SHUTDOWN PANEL-ESl REMOTE SHUTDOWN PANEL RHR HEAT EXCHANGER RHR HX OUTLT 16" GATE MOV Shutdown Cooling Outboard I so Inboard Injection Gate MOV (RHR lnbd lnj Vlv)
Outboard Injection Gate MOV (RHR Outbd lnj Vlv)
RHR HX Bypass Globe MOV (Hx Bypass Vlv)
HX SW FLOW CONTROLLER MOV RHRSW TO RHR CROSSTIE MOV Operating State HCLPF Screening Notes/Comments Normal Desired Results Operating Operating
<!:RLGM Operating Operating
<!: RLGM Operating Operating
<!: RLGM Operating Operating
<!: RLGM Available Available
<!:RLGM Available Available
<!:RLGM Available Available
<!:RLGM Open Closed
<!: RLGM Inaccessible/High Closed Closed N/A Dose; See Section 7.1 Inaccessible/High Closed Open N/A Dose; See Section 7.1 Inaccessible/High Open Throttled N/A Dose; See Section 7.1 Open Closed
<!:RLGM Closed Closed
<!: RLGM Closed Closed/Open
<!: RLGM A-3
ID lEU-F075A lEU-N027B lESl-AOOl lESl-BOOl lESl-COOl lESl-C002 lESl-F008 lESl-FOlD lESl-F012 lESl-F013 lESl-FOlS lESl-F019 lESl-F029 lESl-F031 MPR-4121 Revision I Equipment Description RHRSW TO RHR CROSSTIE MOV RHR HX Discharge TE-Div II RCIC BAROMETRIC CONDENSER RCIC LUBE OIL COOLER RCIC REACTOR MAKEUP PUMP RCIC TURBINE STEAM SUPPLY ISO GATE VLV Pump Suction 6" Gate MOV (CST Suction Valve)
RCIC PUMP DISCHARGE GATE MOV Pump Disch 4" Gate MOV (Pump Discharge Valve)
RCIC COOLING WATER PCV Min Flow 2" Bypass MOV (RCIC Min-Flow Valve)
PUMP SUCTION GATE VALVE (Suppression Pool Suction)
PUMP SUCTION GATE VALVE (Suppression Pool Suction)
Operating State HCLPF Screening Notes/Comments Normal Desired Results Closed Closed/Open
- RLGM Operating Operating
<!: RLGM Standby Operating
- RLGM Standby Operating
<!:RLGM Standby Operating
- RLGM Standby Operating
- RLGM Inaccessible/High Open Open N/A Dose; See Section 7.1 Open Open/Closed
<!: RLGM Open Open
<!:RLGM Closed Open
- RLGM Open Operating
<!: RLGM Closed Closed/Open
~ RLGM Closed Closed/Open
~ RLGM Closed Closed/Open
~ RLGM A-4
ID lESl-F033 lESl-F045 lESl-F046 lESl-F523 lESl-F524 lESl-N060 lESl-N061 lHll-P601 lHll-P602 lHll-P603 lHll-P612 lHll-P621 lHll-P622 MPR-4121 ReVISIOn I Equipment Description RCIC BAROMETRIC CONDENSER RELIEF VALVE RCIC STEAM SUPPLY GLB MOV COOLING WATER GLOBE VALVE MOV (From Pump Discharge)
Steam Supply 3" Governing Gate HOV (RCIC Governor Valve)
Steam Supply 3" Trip Throttle MOV {RCIC Trip & Throttle Valve)
RCIC CST LO LS-Div I - Batt RCIC CST LO LS - Div I - Batt RX & CTMT CLG & ISO PNL RWCU & RECIRC PNL Reac Control BN BD - Panel FW/Recirc INST Panel RCIC RELAY VB Inboard lso Valve Vert Panel Operating State HCLPF Screening Notes/Comments Normal Desired Results Standby Standby
<!: RLGM Closed Open
<!: RLGM Closed Open
<!: RLGM Open Operating
<!:RLGM Open Open
<!: RLGM Operating Operating
<!: RLGM Operating Operating
<!: RLGM Available Available
<!: RLGM Available Available
<!: RLGM Available Available
<!: RLGM Available Available
<!: RLGM Includes FM Available Available
<!: RLGM Relays; See Section 6.5 Available Available
<!: RLGM A-5
ID 1H11-P623 1H11-P628 1H11-P654 1H11-P655 1H11-P657 1H11-P691B 1H11-P700 1H11-P925 1H11-P926 1H11-P927 1H11-P928 1H21-P004 1H21-P0 51 1H21-P173 MPR-4121 Revision I Equipment Description Outboard lso Valve Vert Panel AUTO DEPRESS RELAY VB Gas Treat Vent Vert BD -
Panel BEARING TEMP & BAT MON VB VENT & DRYWELL INERTING V Analog Signal Converter Panel ANAL/VENT & LEAK DET PNL ATIS ECCS MCR Panel ATIS ECCS MCR Panel ATIS ECCS Trip Unit Cabinet-Panel ATIS ECCS Trip Unit Cabinet-Panel RV LEVEL/PRESS LOC PNL A RCIC SYSTEM ESl PANEL SHUTDOWN INSTRUMENT PANEL Operating State HCLPF Screening Notes/Comments Normal Desired Results Includes FM Available Available
~RLGM Relays; See Section 6.5 Available Available
~RLGM Available Available
<!: RLGM Available Available
~RLGM Available Available
<!: RLGM Available Available
<!:RLGM Available Available
~RLGM Available Available
<!: RLGM Available Available
~RLGM Available Available
~ RLGM Available Available
<!:RLGM Available Available
<!: RLGM Available Available
<!:RLGM Available Available
<!: RLGM A-6
ID 1H21-P255 1H21-P40SA 1P11-A100 1P52-A027A 1P52-A027B 1P52-F1312 1P70-A001 1P70-DOOBA 1P70-D009A 1P70-F001A 1P70-F103A 1R11-S004 1R22-5016 1R22-S017 MPR-4121 Revis1on I Equipment Description MOV AND FUEL PMP CP 1A RX VESSEL INST RACK Condensate Storage Tank AIR ACC (BKUP AIR ACCUMULATOR TANK A)
AIR ACC (BKUP AIR ACCUMULATOR TANK B)
Relief Valve N2 Cylinder Supply Manifold Overpressure Protection D/W N2 SYSTEM RECEIVER 100 MICRON NOM FILTER 5 MICRON NOM FILTER D/W PNEUMATIC N2 SPLY AOV D/W PNEUMATIC HEADER PCV 600-120/208V LGT&MSC XFM 125/250VDC Switchgear 1A 125/2SOVDC Switchgear 1B Operating State HCLPF Screening Notes/Comments Normal Desired Results Available Available
~ RLGM Available Available
~RLGM Screened to GMRS Available Available 0.15g instead of IPEEE RLE; Reference 16 Available Available
~ RLGM Available Available
~RLGM Standby Standby
~ RLGM Available Available
~ RLGM Available Available
~ RLGM Available Available
~RLGM Closed Open
~RLGM Operating Operating
~ RLGM Energized Energized
~ RLGM Energized Energized
~ RLGM Energized Energized
~ RLGM A-7
ID 1R23-S003 1R23-S004 1R24-S021 1R24-S021A 1R24-S022 1R24-S025 1R25-S001 1R25-S002 1R25-S029 1R25-S064 1R25-S065 1R25-S066 1R25-S067 1R25-S069 MPR-4121 Revis1on I Equipment Description 600VAC Bus 1C -
Switchgear/XFMR 600VAC Bus 1D-Switchgear/XFMR 250VDC MCC lA 250VDC MCC 1A-1 250VDC MCC 1B 600/208V MCC lA ESS DIV 1 125VDC Distribution Cabinet lA 125VDC Distribution Cabinet 1B 120/208V AC CABINET 1J 120/208VAC Instrument Bus 1A-Div I 120/208VAC Instrument Bus 1B-Div II 120VAC CRITICAL INSTRUMENT CABINET 1A 120VAC CRITICAL INSTRUMENT CABINET 1B Emergency Lighting Cabinet-Div II Operating State HCLPF Screening Notes/Comments Normal Desired Results Energized Energized
~RLGM Energized Energized
~ RLGM Includes FM Energized Energized
~ RLGM Relays; See Section 6.5 Includes FM Energized Energized
~ RLGM Relays; See Section 6.5 Energized Energized/
~RLGM De-Energized Energized Energized
~ RLGM Energized Energized
~ RLGM Energized Energized
~ RLGM Energized Energized
~ RLGM Available Available
~ RLGM Available Available
~ RLGM Energized Energized
~ RLGM Energized Energized
~ RLGM Energized Energized
~RLGM A-8
ID 1R25-S094 1R25-S106 1R25-S112 1R26-M031A 1R26-M031B 1R26-M031C 1R26-M031D 1R26-Ml34 1R26-M135 1R26-M136 1R26-M137 1R26-Ml39 1R26-M140 1R26-M144 1R26-M145 MPR-4121 Rev1s1on I Equipment Description Emergency Lighting Cabinet -
Divll 12SVDC Distribution Cabinet 1E FUSE BOX 12SVDC THROWOVER SW 1A 125VDC THROWOVER SW 1B 125VDC THROWOVER SW 1C 12SVDC THROWOVER SW 1D DC INPUT SWITCH FOR INVERTER 1A DC INPUT SWITCH FOR INVERTER 1B FLEX TRANSFER SWITCH 1A FLEX TRANSFER SWITCH 1B FLEX TRANSFER SWITCH 1D FLEX TRANSFER SWITCH 1E BYPASS SWITCH FOR INVERTER 1A BYPASS SWITCH FOR INVERTER 1B Operating State HCLPF Screening Notes/Comments Normal Desired Results Energized Energized
- RLGM Energized Energized
- RLGM Available Available
- RLGM Standby/
Standby/
<::RLGM Closed Closed Standby/
Standby/
<::RLGM Closed Closed Standby/
Standby/
<::RLGM Closed Closed Standby/
Standby/
- RLGM Closed Closed Normal Normal
- RLGM Normal Normal
- RLGM Normal Normal
- RLGM Normal Normal
<::RLGM Normal Normal
<::RLGM Normal Normal
- RLGM Normal Normal
- RLGM Normal Normal
- RLGM A-9
ID 1R42-SOOlA 1R42-SOOlB 1R42-S026 1R42-S027 1R42-S029 1R42-S030 1R43-A002C 1R44-S006 1R44-S007 1T46-FOOS 1T47-K600 1T47-K602 1T47-K603 1T47-K604 MPR-4121 Revision I Equipment Description 125/250VDC Station Battery lA 125/250VDC Station Battery 18 Battery Charger lA-Div I Battery Charger lB - Div I Battery Charger lD-Div II Battery Charger lE-Div II DSL FO STOR TANK lC 250VDC/120VAC INVERTER lA 250VDC/120VAC INVERTER lB SBGT ISOL TO MAIN STACK SIGNAL CONVERTER R/V NOOlA,B SIGNAL CONV R/V NOOlM, N003 SIG CONV R/V NOOS, N007 SIG CONV R/V Operating State HCLPF Screening Notes/Comments Normal Desired Results Energized Energized 2: RLGM Energized Energized 2: RLGM Energized Energized 2: RLGM Energized Energized 2: RLGM Energized Energized 2: RLGM Energized Energized 2: RLGM Available Available 2: RLGM Energized Energized 2: RLGM Energized Energized 2: RLGM Open Closed 2: RLGM Operating Operating 2: RLGM Operating Operating 2: RLGM Operating Operating 2: RLGM Operating Operating 2: RLGM A-10
ID 1T47-K605 1T47-NOOlA 1T47-NOOlB 1T47-NOOlM 1T47-N003 1T47-NOOS 1T47-N007 1T47-NOlO 1T47-R612 1T48-AOOl 1T48-8004 MPR-4121 Rev1s1on I Equipment Description NOlO SIGNAL CONV R/V B009A Inlet Air TE-Div II OW CLG Dome Area TE-Div II B009A&B Inlet Air TE-Div II OW CLG Midlevel Area TE-Div II OW Lower Level Area TE-Div II OW Lower Level Area TE-Div II Sacrificial Shield Top TE-Div II OW CLG CRD/Torus Area TR-Divll NITROGEN STORAGE TANK N2 TANK AMBIENT VAPORIZER Operating State HCLPF Screening Notes/Comments Normal Desired Results Operating Operating
~ RLGM Inaccessible/High Operating Operating N/A Dose; See Section 7.1 Inaccessible/High Operating Operating N/A Dose; See Section 7.1 Inaccessible/High Operating Operating N/A Dose; See Section 7.1 Inaccessible/High Operating Operating N/A Dose; See Section 7.1 Inaccessible/High Operating Operating N/A Dose; See Section 7.1 Inaccessible/High Operating Operating N/A Dose; See Section 7.1 Inaccessible/High Operating Operating N/A Dose; See Section 7.1 Operating Operating
~RLGM Repaired under Available Available
~ RLGM CAP and re-walked down; See Section 6.3.3.
Repaired under Available Available
~RLGM CAP and re-walked down; See Section 6.3.3.
A-ll
ID 1T48-F072 1T48-F075 1T48-F081 1T48-F082 1T48-F318 1T48-F319 1T48-F320 1T48-F326 1T48-F408 1T48-K6088 1T48-K6098 1T48-K6238 1T48-N0088 1T48-N0098 1T48-N009D MPR-4121 Revis1on I Equipment Description 8004 DISCH LINE RELIEF VALVE 8004 DISCHARGE PCV (N2 system)
TORUS VENT SGTS ISO VLV HCVS Vent Control AOV HCVS Containment Isolation AOV HCVS Containment Isolation AOV HCVS Containment Isolation AOV HCVS Containment Isolation AOV Relief Valve Argon Supply Overpressure Protection DW Pressure lnst 1/V-Div II OW/Torus Pressure lnst 1/V-Div II Torus Levellnst 1/V-Div II Torus Midrange PT-Div II Torus Water TE-Div II Torus Water TE-Div II Operating State HCLPF Screening Notes/Comments Normal Desired Results Standby Standby 2: RLGM Operating Operating 2: RLGM Open Closed 2: RLGM Closed Closed/Open 2: RLGM Closed Closed/Open 2: RLGM Closed Closed 2: RLGM Closed Closed 2: RLGM Closed Closed/Open 2: RLGM Standby Standby 2: RLGM Operating Operating 2: RLGM Operating Operating 2: RLGM Operating Operating 2: RLGM Operating Operating 2: RLGM Operating Operating 2: RLGM Operating Operating 2: RLGM A-12
ID 1T48-N009F 1T48-N009H 1T48-N020B 1T48-N021B 1T48-N023B 1T48-R607B 1T48-R609 1X86-S003 1X86-S004 1Y52-COOlC ESS J379 ESS J423 ESS J422 J614 MPR-4121 Revis10n I Equipment Description Torus Air TE-Div II Torus Air TE-Div II DW Narrow Range PT-Div II Narrow Range Torus LT-Div II DW Midrange PT-Div II DW and Torus Narrow Range L/PR-Div II OW/Torus Midrange PR-Div II 600V FLEX Diesel Generator (FLEX Connection Box lA) 600V FLEX Diesel Generator (FLEX Connection Box lB)
FUEL OIL PMP lCl DSL lC JUNCTION BOX JUNCTION BOX JUNCTION BOX JUNCTION BOX Operating State HCLPF Screening Notes/Comments Normal Desired Results Operating Operating 2: RLGM Operating Operating 2: RLGM Operating Operating 2: RLGM Operating Operating 2: RLGM Operating Operating 2: RLGM Operating Operating 2: RLGM Operating Operating 2: RLGM Standby Standby 2: RLGM Standby Standby 2: RLGM Available Available
~RLGM Available Available
~ RLGM Available Available
~ RLGM Available Available
~ RLGM Inaccessible/High Available Available N/A Dose; See Section 7.1 A-13
ID J615 J617 J618 J619 J620 J621 J647 J648 TB1-1529-7 MPR-4121 Revis1on I Equipment Description JUNCTION BOX JUNCTION BOX JUNCTION BOX JUNCTION BOX JUNCTION BOX JUNCTION BOX JUNCTION BOX JUNCTION BOX TERMINATION BOX Operating State Normal Desired Available Available Available Available Available Available Available Available Available Available Available Available Available Available Available Available Available Available HCLPF Screening Notes/Comments Results Inaccessible/High N/A Dose; See Section 7.1 Inaccessible/High N/A Dose; See Section 7.1 Inaccessible/High N/A Dose; See Section 7.1 Inaccessible/High N/A Dose; See Section 7.1 Inaccessible/High N/A Dose; See Section 7.1 Inaccessible/High N/A Dose; See Section 7.1 Inaccessible/High N/A Dose; See Section 7.1 Inaccessible/High N/A Dose; See Section 7.1
~ RLGM A-14 Plant Hatch Unit 2 ESEL ID 2821-A003A 2821-A0038 2621-A003C 2821-A003E 2621-A003F 2821-A003H 2621-A003K 2821-A003L 2821-A003M MPR-4121 Rev1s1on I Table B-1. Plant Hatch Unit 2 ESEL Items and HCLPF Results Equipment Operating State HCLPF Screening Notes/Comments Description Normal Desired Results Inaccessible/High SRV AIR ACCUMULATOR Available Available N/A Dose; See Section 7.1 Inaccessible/High SRV AIR ACCUMULATOR Available Available N/A Dose; See Section 7.1 Inaccessible/High SRV AIR ACCUMULATOR Available Available N/A Dose; See Section 7.1 Inaccessible/High SRV AIR ACCUMULATOR Available Available N/A Dose; See Section 7.1 Inaccessible/High SRV AIR ACCUMULATOR Available Available N/A Dose; See Section 7.1 Inaccessible/High SRV AIR ACCUMULATOR Available Available N/A Dose; See Section 7.1 Inaccessible/High SRV AIR ACCUMULATOR Available Available N/A Dose; See Section 7.1 Inaccessible/High SRV AIR ACCUMULATOR Available Available N/A Dose; See Section 7.1 Inaccessible/High SRV AIR ACCUMULATOR Available Available N/A Dose; See Section 7.1 B-1
ID 2B21-F013A 2B21-F013B 2B21-F013C 2B21-F013E 2B21-F013F 2B21-F013H 2B21-F013K 2B21-F013L 2B21-F013M 2B21-N091B 2B21-N691B 2B21-R604B MPR-4121 Revision I Equipment Description MSL "A" RPV SRV (ADS)
RPV Levels 2 & 1 LT-Div II
-Batt LPCI RX Water Level MTU LIS - Div II - Batt RPV Level (Hot Leg) L1-Div II - Batt Operating State HCLPF Screening Notes/Comments Normal Desired Results Inaccessible/High Closed Closed/Open N/A Dose; See Section 7.1 Inaccessible/High Closed Closed/Open N/A Dose; See Section 7.1 Inaccessible/High Closed Closed/Open N/A Dose; See Section 7.1 Inaccessible/High Closed Closed/Open N/A Dose; See Section 7.1 Inaccessible/High Closed Closed/Open N/A Dose; See Section 7.1 Inaccessible/High Closed Closed/Open N/A Dose; See Section 7.1 Inaccessible/High Closed Closed/Open N/A Dose; See Section 7.1 Inaccessible/High Closed Closed/Open N/A Dose; See Section 7.1 Inaccessible/High Closed Closed/Open N/A Dose; See Section 7.1 Operating Operating
~ RLGM Operating Operating
~ RLGM Operating Operating
~RLGM B-2
ID 2C32-IN02 2C32-K655C 2C32-NOOSC 2C32-R60SC 2C82-POOl 2Ell-BOOlA 2Ell-F003A 2Ell-F008 2Ell-FOlSA 2Ell-F017A 2Ell-F048A 2Ell-F068A 2Ell-F073A 2Ell-F07SA MPR-4121 Rev1s1on I Equipment Description RX WTR LVL RFP TRIP C FWC RX Pressure Transmitter C-Div II - Batt FWC RX Water level PT-Div II-Batt FWC RX PI - Div II - Batt REMOTE S/D PANEL RHR HEAT EXCHANGER RHR HX OUTLT 16" GATE MOV Shutdown Cooling Outboard lso Inboard Injection Gate MOV (RHR lnbd lnj Vlv)
Outboard Injection Gate MOV (RHR Outbd lnj Vlv)
RHR HX Bypass Globe MOV (Hx Bypass Vlv)
HX SW FLOW CONTROLLER MOV RHRSW CROSSTIE VALVE RHRSW CROSSTIE VALVE Operating State HCLPF Screening Notes/Comments Normal Desired Results Operating Operating
<!:RLGM Operating Operating
<!: RLGM Operating Operating
<!: RLGM Operating Operating
<!: RLGM Available Available
<!: RLGM Available Available
<!: RLGM Open Closed
<!:RLGM Inaccessible/High Closed Closed N/A Dose; See Section 7.1 Inaccessible/High Closed Open N/A Dose; See Section 7.1 Inaccessible/High Open Throttled N/A Dose; See Section 7.1 Open Closed
<!: RLGM Closed Closed
<!: RLGM Closed Closed/Open
<!:RLGM Closed Closed/Open
<!: RLGM B-3
ID 2E11-N027B 2E51-AOOl 2E51-BOOl 2E51-COOl 2E51-C002 2E51-F008 2E51-FOlO 2E51-F012 2E51-F013 2E51-FOlS 2E51-F019 2E51-F022 2E51-F029 2E51-F031 MPR-4121 Revision I Equipment Description RHR HX Discharge TE-Div II RCIC BAROMETRIC CONDENSER RCIC LUBE OIL COOLER RCIC REACTOR MAKEUP PUMP RCIC TURBINE STEAM SUPPLY ISO GATE VLV Pump Suction 6" Gate MOV (CST Suction Valve)
RCIC PUMP DISCHARGE GATE MOV Pump Disch 4" Gate MOV (Pump Discharge Valve)
RCIC COOLING WATER PCV Min Flow 2" Bypass MOV (RCIC Min-Flow Valve)
TESTTHROTILE GLOBE VALVE PUMP SUCTION GATE VALVE PUMP SUCTION GATE VALVE Operating State HCLPF Screening Notes/Comments Normal Desired Results Operating Operating
<!: RLGM Standby Operating
<!: RLGM Standby Operating
<!: RLGM Standby Operating
<!:RLGM Standby Operating
<!: RLGM Inaccessible/High Open Open N/A Dose; See Section 7.1 Open Open/Closed
<!:RLGM Open Open
<!:RLGM Closed Open
<!:RLGM Open Operating
<!:RLGM Closed Closed/Open
<!:RLGM Closed Closed
<!:RLGM Closed Closed/Open
<!:RLGM Closed Closed/Open
<!:RLGM B-4
ID 2E51-F033 2E51-F045 2E51-F046 2E51-F523 2E51-F524 2E51-NOGO 2E51-N061 2H11-P601 2H11-P602 2H11-P603 2H11-PGOSB 2H11-P612 2H11-P621 MPR-4121 Rev1sion I Equipment Description RCIC BAROMETRIC CONDENSER RELIEF VALVE RCIC STEAM SUPPLY GLB MOV COOLING WATER GLOBE VALVE MOV (RHR Suction Valve)
Steam Supply 3" Governing Gate HOV (RCIC Governor Valve)
Steam Supply 3" Trip Throttle MOV (RCIC Trip & Throttle Valve)
RCIC CST LO LS - Div I - Batt RCIC CST LO LS - Div I - Batt RX & CTMT CLG & ISO PNL RWCU & RECIRC PNL Reac Control BN BD-Panel CLS lE Analog Signal Converter/IS Panel FW/Recirc INST Panel RCIC RELAY VB Operating State HCLPF Screening Notes/Comments Normal Desired Results Standby Standby
<!: RLGM Closed Open
<!: RLGM Closed Open
<!: RLGM Open Operating
<!: RLGM Open Open
<!: RLGM Operating Operating
<!:RLGM Operating Operating
<!: RLGM Available Available
<!: RLGM Available Available
<!: RLGM Available Available
<!: RLGM Available Available
<!: RLGM Available Available
<!: RLGM Includes FM Available Available
<!: RLGM Relays; See Section 6.5 B-5
ID 2H11-P622 2H11-P623 2H11-P628 2H11-PGSO 2H11-P654 2H11-PGSS 2H11-P656 2H11-P657 2H11-P691B 2H11-P925 2H11-P926 2H11-P927 2H11-P928 2H21-P004 MPR-4121 Revision I Equipment Description INBD ISO VLV VERT PNL Outboard lso Valve Vert Panel AUTO DEPRESS RELAY VB TURB FDWTR & COND CON PNL Gas Treat Vent Vert BD -
Panel BEARING TEMP & BAT MONVB STARTUP BOILER VERT PANEL VENT & DRYWELL INERT VER Analog Signal Converter Panel ATTS ECCS Trip Unit Cabinet - Panel ATTS ECCS MCR Panel ATTS ECCS Trip Unit Cabinet-Panel ATTS ECCS Trip Unit Cabinet-Panel RV LEVEL/PRESS LOC PNL A Operating State HCLPF Screening Notes/Comments Normal Desired Results Available Available
~ RLGM Includes FM Available Available
~ RLGM Relays; See Section 6.5 Available Available
~ RLGM Available Available
~ RLGM Available Available
~ RLGM Available Available
~ RLGM Available Available
~ RLGM Available Available
~ RLGM Available Available
~ RLGM Available Available
~ RLGM Available Available
~ RLGM Available Available
~ RLGM Available Available
~ RLGM Available Available
~ RLGM B-6
ID 2H21-P0 51 2H21-P0 53 2H21-P405A 2JE1891 2JE2712 2JE2798 2JM7873 2P11-A001 2P52-A027A 2P52-A027B 2P52-F1228 2P70-DOOBA 2P70-D009A 2P70-F103A MPR-4121 Rev1s1on I Equipment Description RCIC SYSTEM 2E51 PANEL RCIC TEST VALVE PI PANEL RX VESSELINST RACK JUNCTION BOX JUNCTION BOX JUNCTION BOX JUNCTION BOX Condensate Storage Tank BKUP AIR ACCUMULATOR TANKA BKUP AIR ACCUMULATOR TANKB Relief Valve N2 Cylinder Supply Manifold Overpressure Protection 100 MICRON NOM FILTER 5 MICRON NOM FILTER D/W PNEUMATIC HEADER PCV Operating State HCLPF Screening Notes/Comments Normal Desired Results Available Available
~RLGM Available Available
~RLGM Available Available
~RLGM Available Available
~RLGM Available Available
~ RLGM Available Available
~ RLGM Inaccessible/High Available Available N/A Dose; See Section 7.1 Screened to GMRS Available Available 0.18g instead of IPEEE RLE; Ref. 17 Available Available
~ RLGM Available Available
~RLGM Standby Standby
~ RLGM Inaccessible/High Available Available N/A Dose; See Section 7.1 Inaccessible/High Available Available N/A Dose; See Section 7.1 Inaccessible/High Operating Operating N/A Dose; See Section 7.1 B-7
ID 2R22-S016 2R22-5017 2R23-S003 2R23-S004 2R24-S021 2R24-S022 2R25-SOOl 2R25-S002 2R25-S064 2R25-S065 2R25-S066 2R25-S067 2R25-S069 2R25-S094 MPR-4121 Revision I Equipment Description 125/250VDC Switchgear 2A 125/250VDC Switchgear 2B 600VAC Bus 2C-Switchgear/XFMR 600VAC Bus 2D-Switchgear/XFMR 250VDC MCC 2A 250VDC MCC 2B 125VDC Distribution Cabinet 2A 125VDC Distribution Cabinet 2B 120/208VAC Instrument Bus 2A-Div I 120/208VAC Instrument Bus 2B-Div II 120VAC Critical Instrument Cabinet 2A 120VAC Critical Instrument Cabinet 2B Emergency Lighting Cabinet
- Div II Emergency Lighting Cabinet
- Div II Operating State HCLPF Screening Notes/Comments Normal Desired Results Energized Energized
~ RLGM Energized Energized
~ RLGM Energized Energized
~ RLGM Energized Energized
~ RLGM Includes FM Energized Energized
~ RLGM Relays; See Section 6.5 Energized Energized/
~ RLGM De-Energized Energized Energized
~ RLGM Energized Energized
~ RLGM Available Available
~ RLGM Available Available
~ RLGM Energized Energized
~ RLGM Energized Energized
~ RLGM Energized Energized
~ RLGM Energized Energized
~ RLGM B-8
ID 2R25-Sl30 2R26-M031A 2R26-M031B 2R26-M031C 2R26-M031D 2R26-M126 2R26-M127 2R26-M129 2R26-M130 2R26-M135 2R26-M136 2R26-M137 2R26-Ml38 2R27-S096 2R42-SOOlA MPR-4121 Rev1s1on I Equipment Description 125VDC Distribution Cabinet 2E 125VDC THROWOVER SW 2A 125VDC THROWOVER SW 2B 125VDC THROWOVER SW 2C 125VDC THROWOVER SW 20 FLEX Transfer Switch 2A FLEX Transfer Switch 2B FLEX Transfer Switch 2D FLEX Transfer Switch 2E DC INPUT SWITCH FOR INVERTER 2A BYPASS SWITCH FOR INVERTER 2A DC INPUT SWITCH FOR INVERTER 2B BYPASS SWITCH FOR INVERTER 2B LOCAL STARTER 2Ell-F008 125/250VDC Station Battery 2A Operating State HCLPF Screening Notes/Comments Normal Desired Results Energized Energized 2: RLGM Standby/
Standby/
2: RLGM Closed Closed Standby/
Standby/
2: RLGM Closed Closed Standby/
Standby/
2: RLGM Closed Closed Standby/
Standby/
2: RLGM Closed Closed Normal Normal 2: RLGM Normal Normal 2: RLGM Normal Normal 2: RLGM Normal Normal 2: RLGM Normal Normal 2: RLGM Normal Normal
<:: RLGM Normal Normal 2: RLGM Normal Normal 2: RLGM Energized De-Energized
<::RLGM Energized Energized 2: RLGM B-9
ID 2R42-SOOlB 2R42-S026 2R42-S027 2R42-S029 2R42-S030 2R44-SOOG 2R44-S007 2T46-F002A 2T46-F002B 2T47-KGOO 2T47-K602 2T47-K603 2T47-K604 2T47-KGOS MPR-4121 Revision I Equipment Description 125/250VDC Station Battery 2B Battery Charger 2A-Div I Battery Charger 2B-Div I Battery Charger 20 - Div II Battery Charger 2E - Div II 250VDC/120VAC FLEX Inverter 2A 250VDC/120VAC FLEX Inverter 2B FLTR TRAIN OUT BUTIERFLY FLTR TRAIN OUT BUTIERFLY SIGNAL CONVERTER R/V NOOlJ,K SIGNAL CONV R/V NOOlM, N003 SIG CONV R/V NOOS, N007 SIG CONV R/V NOlO SIGNAL CONV R/V Operating State HCLPF Screening Notes/Comments Normal Desired Results Energized Energized
~ RLGM Energized Energized
~RLGM Energized Energized
~ RLGM Energized Energized
~ RLGM Energized Energized
~ RLGM Energized Energized
~ RLGM Energized Energized
~ RLGM Open Closed
~ RLGM Open Closed
~ RLGM Operating Operating
~RLGM Operating Operating
~ RLGM Operating Operating
~ RLGM Operating Operating
~RLGM Operating Operating
~RLGM B-10
ID 2T47-NOOlJ 2T47-NOOlK 2T47-NOOlM 2T47-N003 2T47-NOOS 2T47-N007 2T47-NOlO 2T47-R627 2T48-AOOl 2T48-8002 2T48-F081 2T48-F082 MPR-4121 Rev1sion I Equipment Description B009A Inlet Air TE-Div II OW CLG Dome Area TE-Div II B009A&B Inlet Air TE-Div II OW CLG Midlevel Area TE-Div II OW Lower Level Area TE-Div II OW Lower Level Area TE-Div II Sacrificial Shield Top TE-Div II OW CLG CRD/Torus Area TR
- Div II NITROGEN STORAGE TANK N2 TANK AMBIENT VAPORIZER TORUS VENT SGTS ISO VLV HCVS Vent Control AOV Operating State HCLPF Screening Notes/Comments Normal Desired Results Inaccessible/High Operating Operating N/A Dose; See Section 7.1 Inaccessible/High Operating Operating N/A Dose; See Section 7.1 Inaccessible/High Operating Operating N/A Dose; See Section 7.1 Inaccessible/High Operating Operating N/A Dose; See Section 7.1 Inaccessible/High Operating Operating N/A Dose; See Section 7.1 Inaccessible/High Operating Operating N/A Dose; See Section 7.1 Inaccessible/High Operating Operating N/A Dose; See Section 7.1 Operating Operating
<!: RLGM Available Available
<!: RLGM Repaired under Available Available
<!: RLGM CAP and re-walked down; See Section 6.3.3.
Open Closed
<!: RLGM Closed Closed/Open
<!: RLGM B-11
10 2T48-F318 2T48-F319 2T48-F320 2T48-F326 2T48-F408 2T48-F465 2T48-F468 2T48-K6088 2T48-K6208 2T48-K6218 2T48-N0088 2T48-N0098 2T48-N009D 2T48-N009E 2T48-N009H MPR-4121 Revision I Equipment Description HCVS Containment Isolation AOV HCVS Containment Isolation AOV HCVS Containment Isolation AOV HCVS Containment Isolation AOV Relief Valve Argon Supply Overpressure Protection 8002 DISCH LINE SRV 8002 DISCHARGE PCV (N2 system)
DW Pressure lnst 1/V-Div II OW/Torus Pressure lnst 1/V
- Div II Torus Levellnst 1/V-Div II Torus Midrange PT-Div II Torus Water TE-Div II Torus Water TE-Div II Torus Air TE-Div II Torus Air TE-Div II Operating State HCLPF Screening Notes/Comments Normal Desired Results Closed Closed/Open
<!:RLGM Closed Closed
<!: RLGM Closed Closed
<!: RLGM Closed Closed/Open
<!:RLGM Standby Standby
<!: RLGM Standby Standby
<!: RLGM Operating Operating
<!:RLGM Operating Operating
<!: RLGM Operating Operating
<!:RLGM Operating Operating
<!: RLGM Operating Operating
<!: RLGM Operating Operating
<!: RLGM Operating Operating
<!:RLGM Operating Operating
<!: RLGM Operating Operating
<!:RLGM B-12
ID 2T48-N020B 2T48-N021B 2T48-N023B 2T48-R607B 2T48-R609 2T48-R631B 2T48-R632B 2X86-S003 2X86-S004 MPR-4121 Revis1on I Equipment Description OW Narrow Range PT-Div II Narrow Range Torus LT-Divll OW Midrange PT-Div II OW and Torus Narrow Range L/PR - Div II OW/Torus Midrange PR-Div II 0/W MIDRANGE PI TORUS MIDRANGE PI FLEX Connection Box 2A FLEX Connection Box 2B Operating State HCLPF Screening Notes/Comments Normal Desired Results Operating Operating 2: RLGM Operating Operating 2: RLGM Operating Operating 2: RLGM Operating Operating 2: RLGM Operating Operating 2: RLGM Operating Operating 2: RLGM Operating Operating 2: RLGM Standby Standby 2: RLGM Standby Standby 2: RLGM B-13
Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant-Units 1 and 2 Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1 Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report Completion Required Actions and Schedule for Completion of ESEP Activities (Updated) to NL-16-2466 Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant-Units 1 and 2 Required Actions and Schedule for Completion of ESEP Activities Hatch Unit 1 Required Actions and Schedule for ESEL Items Not Installed as of Walkdowns/Report Issuance Equipment Outage Required Scheduled Number Required Action Completion Date 1
1R26-M136 FLEX Transfer Switch 1A After the items were December 2016 1 R26-M 137 FLEX Transfer Switch 1 B installed, ESEP activities 1R26-M139 FLEX Transfer Switch 1D Did NOT require outage to were completed, HCLPF (2 years after ESEP 1 R26-M140 FLEX Transfer Switch 1 E walk down. Walkdowns are evaluations were Report submittal) 1T48-F408 Relief Argon Supply Overpressure complete. No modifications generated in accordance Protection were necessary.
with EPRI 3002000704 Actual Completion:
1X86-S003 600V FLEX Diesel Generator (FLEX and EPRI NP-6041-SL.
December 2016 Connection Box 1A)
No modifications 1X86-S004 600V FLEX Diesel Generator (FLEX necessary to meet ESEP Connection Box 1 B) requirements Note: 1 R26-M132 and 1 R26-M133 are no longer on the ESEL 2
1 P52-A027 A BKUP Air Accumulator Tank A After the items were Spring outage 2018 1 P52-A027B BKUP Air Accumulator Tank B Took advantage of outages installed, ESEP activities (2 outages after 1P52-F1312 Relief Valve N2 Cylinder Supply and other opportunities to were completed, HCLPF December 2014)
Manifold Overpressure Protection perform walkdowns.
evaluations were 1R25-S066 120VAC Critical instrument Cabinet 1A Walkdowns are complete.
generated in accordance Actual Completion:
1R25-S067 120VAC Critical instrument Cabinet 1B No modifications were with EPRI 3002000704 December 2016 1 R42-S026 Battery Charger 1A-Div I and EPRI NP-6041-SL. No necessary.
modifications necessary to 1 R42-S027 Battery Charger 1 B - Div I 1R44-S006 250VDC/120VAC Inverter 1A meet ESEP requirements.
1R44-S007 250VDC/120VAC Inverter 1B E2-1 to NL-16-2466 Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant - Units 1 and 2 Required Actions and Schedule for Completion of ESEP Activities Hatch Unit 1 Required Actions and Schedule for ESEL Items Not Installed as of Walkdowns/Report Issuance Equipment Outage Required Scheduled Number Required Action Completion Date 3
N/A N/A This letter to NRC 90 days following summarizes results of Unit completion of ESEP 1 Items 1 and 2 and activities, no later than provides confirmation that 90 days after Spring no plant modifications 2018 outage (if an associations with Items 1 outage is required).
and 2 were necessary.
Actual Completion:
- December 2016 Continued on next page for Unit 2 E2-2 to NL-16-2466 Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant-Units 1 and 2 Required Actions and Schedule for Completion of ESEP Activities Hatch Unit 2 Required Actions and Schedule for ESEL Items Not Installed as of Walkdowns/Report Issuance Equipment Description Remaining Completion Date Number Scope 1
- 2R26-M127 FLEX Transfer Switch 2B Did NOT require outage to installed, ESEP activities (2 years after ESEP
- 2R26-M129 FLEX Transfer Switch 2D walk down. Walkdowns are were completed, HCLPF Report submittals) evaluations were generated
- 2R42-S026 Battery Charger 2A - Div I were necessary.
3002000704 and EPRI NP-Actual Completion:
- 2R42-S027 Battery Charger 2B - Div I 6041-SL. No modifications December 2016
- 2P52-A027A BKUP Air Accumulator Tank A Took advantage of outages After the items were Spring outage 2017
- 2P52-A027B BKUP Air Accumulator Tank B and other opportunities to installed, ESEP activities (2 outages after perform walkdowns.
were completed, HCLPF
- 2P52-F122B Relief Valve N2 Cylinder Supply Walkdowns are complete.
evaluations were generated December 2014)
Manifold Overpressure Protection No modifications were in accordance with EPRI Actual Completion:
- 2R25-S066 120VAC Critical instrument Cabinet 2A necessary.
3002000704 and EPRI NP-December 2016
- 2R25-S067 120VAC Critical instrument Cabinet 2B 6041-SL. No modifications
- 2R44-S007 250VDC/120VAC Inverter 2B requirements.
Note: 2R26-M132 and 2R26-M133 are no longer on the ESEL E2-3 to NL-16-2466 Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant - Units 1 and 2 Required Actions and Schedule for Completion of ESEP Activities Hatch Unit 2 Required Actions and Schedule for ESEL Items Not Installed as of Walkdowns/Report Issuance Equipment Description Remaining Completion Date Number Scope 3
NA NA This letter to NRC 90 days following summarizes results of Unit 2 completion of ESEP Items 1 and 2 and provides activities, no later than confirmation that no plant 90 days after Spring modifications associations 2017 outage (if an with Items 1 and 2 were outage is required).
necessary.
Actual Completion:
December 2016 E2-4
Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant - Units 1 and 2 Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1 Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report Completion Table of Regulatory Commitments to NL-16-2466 Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant - Units 1 and 2 Table of Regulatory Commitments Commitment One-Time Action Hatch Unit 1 Complete the remaining NTTF 2.1 X
Unit 1 ESEL walkdowns
/evaluations for items that are not currently installed. These items are identified in Attachment A of the Hatch Units 1 and 2 ESEP Report (Enclosure 1 of this letter) and summarized in Enclosure 2.
Hatch Unit 2 Complete the remaining NTTF 2.1 X
Unit 2 ESEL walkdowns/evaluations for items that are not currently installed. These items are identified in Attachment B of the Hatch Units 1 and 2 ESEP Report (Enclosure 1 of this letter) and summarized in Enclosure 2.
Type Continuing Compliance E3-1 Actual Completion Date (If Required)
Work is complete with this transmittal - December, 2016 Note:
1 R26-M 132 and 1 R26-M 133 are no longer on the ESEL 1
and therefore no walkdowns/evaluations were necessary.
Work is complete with this transmittal-December, 2016 Note:
2R26-M132 and 2R26-M133 are no longer on the ESEL and therefore no walkdowns/evaluations were necessary.