IR 05000255/2018003

NRC Integrated Inspection 05000255/2018003

ML18302A330
Person / Time
Site:	Palisades
Issue date:	10/29/2018
From:	Eric Duncan Region 3 Branch 3
To:	Arnone C Entergy Nuclear Operations
References
IR 2018003
Download: ML18302A330 (17)

Text

October 29, 2018

SUBJECT:

PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANTNRC INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000255/2018003

Dear Mr. Arnone:

On September 30, 2018, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at your Palisades Nuclear Plant. On October 18, 2018, the NRC inspectors discussed the results of this inspection with yourself and other members of your staff. The results of this inspection are documented in the enclosed report.

Based on the results of this inspection, the NRC has identified one issue that was evaluated under the risk significance determination process as having very low safety significance (Green). The NRC has also determined that a violation is associated with this issue. Because condition reports were initiated to address this issue, this violation is being treated as a Non-Cited Violation (NCV), consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy. The NCV is described in the subject inspection report If you contest the violation or significance of this NCV, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region III; the Director, Office of Enforcement; and the NRC Resident Inspector at the Palisades Nuclear Plant. If you disagree with a cross-cutting aspect assignment or a finding not associated with a regulatory requirement in this report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your disagreement, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region III; and the NRC resident inspector at the Palisades Nuclear Plant.

This letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be made available for public inspection and copying at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html and at the NRC Public Document Room in accordance with 10 CFR 2.390, Public Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding.

Sincerely,

/RA/

Eric R. Duncan, Chief Branch 3 Division of Reactor Projects

Docket Nos. 50-255;72-007 License No. DPR-20

Enclosure:

Inspection Report 05000255/2018003 cc: Distribution via LISTSERV

SUMMARY

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) continued monitoring licensee performance by conducting an integrated quarterly inspection at the Palisades Nuclear Plant in accordance with the Reactor Oversight Process. The Reactor Oversight Process is the NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors. Refer to https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/oversight.html for more information. The finding and violation being considered in the NRCs assessment is summarized in the table below.

List of Findings and Violations

Wire Not Landed on Safety Injection Initiation Relay Circuit Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Aspect Report Section Mitigating Systems Green NCV 05000255/2018003-01 Opened/Closed

[H.12] - Avoid Complacency 71111.22

The inspectors identified a Green finding and an associated non-cited violation (NCV) of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings, for the licensees failure to accomplish an activity affecting quality in accordance with the implementing procedure. Specifically, only one of two required wires was landed on terminal 13 of relay SIS-2 in the right channel of the safety injection system (SIS) actuation logic following surveillance testing that was performed on May 8, 2017. As a result, the right channel of the safety injection system actuation logic was inoperable until the problem was discovered during troubleshooting and the wire was subsequently re-landed on May 3, 2018.

Additional Tracking Items

Type Issue Number Title Report Section Status URI 05000255/2018011-02 Failure to Set Action Levels to Ensure that the Assumptions in the Engineering Analysis Remain Valid 71111.05XT Closed LER 05000255/2018-001-00 Safety Injection Inoperable for Longer than Allowed by Technical Specifications Due to Personnel Error 71153 Closed

PLANT STATUS

The plant began the inspection period at rated thermal power and remained at or near rated thermal power for the remainder of the inspection period.

INSPECTION SCOPES

Inspections were conducted using the appropriate portions of the inspection procedures (IPs) in effect at the beginning of the inspection unless otherwise noted. Currently approved IPs with their attached revision histories are located on the public website at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/insp-manual/inspection-procedure/index.html. Samples were declared complete when the IP requirements most appropriate to the inspection activity were met consistent with Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 2515, Light-Water Reactor Inspection Program - Operations Phase. The inspectors performed plant status activities described in IMC 2515 Appendix D, Plant Status and conducted routine reviews using IP 71152, Problem Identification and Resolution. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel to assess licensee performance and compliance with Commission rules and regulations, license conditions, site procedures, and standards.

REACTOR SAFETY

71111.04Equipment Alignment Partial Walkdown

The inspectors evaluated system configurations during partial walkdowns of the following systems/trains:

(1) P-52A left train component cooling water (CCW) on July 20, 2018;

(2) Critical service water system during molluscicide treatment on August 23 and 24, 2018; and (3)11 battery system on August 30, 2018.

Complete Walkdown (1 Sample)

The inspectors evaluated system configurations during a complete walkdown of the auxiliary feedwater (AFW) system from September 18 through 21, 2018.

71111.05AQFire Protection Annual/Quarterly Quarterly Inspection

The inspectors evaluated fire protection program implementation in the following selected areas:

(1) Fire Area 24: AFW room, elevation 570, on July 20, 2018;

(2) Fire Area 22: turbine lube oil room, elevation 590, on July 9, 2018;

(3) Fire Area 9: screenhouse, elevation 590, on August 15, 2018;

(4) Fire Area 13A: auxiliary building main corridor, various elevations, on August 30, 2018; and

(5) Fire Area 56: diesel fire pump fuel oil day tank room, elevation 590, on August 15, 2018.

Annual Inspection (1 Sample)

The inspectors evaluated fire brigade performance during unannounced drills on September 7 and 10, 2018, and an announced drill on September 14, 2018.

===71111.05XTFire ProtectionNFPA 805 (Triennial) The inspectors evaluated the licensees actions associated with URI 05000255/2018011-02. No samples were completed.

71111.06Flood Protection Measures Internal Flooding===

The inspectors evaluated internal flooding mitigation protections in the cable spreading room, battery rooms, and 1D switchgear room during the week of September 9, 2018.

Cables (1 Sample)

The inspectors evaluated cable submergence protection in conduit exposed to moisture routed to the east engineered safeguards room documented on May 14, 2018.

71111.11Licensed Operator Requalification Program and Licensed Operator Performance Operator Requalification

The inspectors observed and evaluated a simulator scenario on September 11, 2018.

71111.12Maintenance Effectiveness Routine Maintenance Effectiveness

The inspectors evaluated the effectiveness of routine maintenance activities associated with the following equipment and/or safety significant functions:

(1) Control rod drive system beginning on August 14, 2018;

(2) Service water system during the week of September 9, 2018; and

(3) Radiation monitoring system as documented in CR-PLP-2018-03398 during the week of September 23, 2018.

71111.13Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control

The inspectors evaluated the risk assessments for the following planned and emergent work activities:

(1)1-2 EDG jacket water heat exchanger replacement during the week of July 15, 2018;

(2) Degraded flood barrier identification, subsequent limiting condition for operations entry, and repair activities on August 8, 2018;

(3) Fire detector malfunction in containment, subsequent containment entry, and replacement activities on August 17, 2018; and

(4) Elevated risk due to planned maintenance on P-66A high pressure safety injection (HPSI) pump, V-27B engineered safety feature (ESF) room cooler, and P-41 fire pump on September 26, 2018.

71111.15Operability Determinations and Functionality Assessments

The inspectors evaluated the following operability determinations and functionality assessments:

(1) Elevated control rod drive seal temperature as documented in CR-PLP-2018-03292 on July 23, 2018;

(2) Evaluation of lead lifted on safety injection actuation logic discovered on May 3, 2018;

(3) Operability evaluation of debris in battery #2, cell #26 on August 31, 2018; and

(4) Component cooling water heat exchanger south end bell non-destructive examination evaluation as documented in CR-PLP-2018-03538 and CR-PLP-2018-02980 on August 10, 2018.

71111.18Plant Modifications

The inspectors evaluated the following modification:

(1) Installation of pulse dampener on DPI-1476 on September 3, 2018.

71111.19Post Maintenance Testing

The inspectors evaluated the following post maintenance tests:

(1)1-2 EDG planned maintenance overhaul on July 18, 2018;

(2) P-7A service water pump packing repack activities on August 20, 2018; and

(3) QO-20 for P-67B after coupling inspection on September 5, 2018.

71111.22Surveillance Testing The inspectors evaluated the following surveillance tests: Routine

(1) QO-1, safety actuation test on May 2, 2018;

(2) QO-21C, P-8C AFW test on July 25, 2018; and

(3) QO-1, safety actuation test on August 13, 2018.

In-Service (1 Sample)

(1) QO-14B in-service test for service water pump P-7B on July 12, 2018.

71114.06Drill Evaluation Emergency Planning Drill

The inspectors evaluated an emergency response organization (ERO) drill that was conducted on September 5,

OTHER ACTIVITIES - BASELINE

71151Performance Indicator Verification

The inspectors verified the licensee performance indicator submittals listed below:

(1) MS07: High Pressure Injection Systems - 1 Sample, July 1, 2017 - June 30, 2018;

(2) MS09: Residual Heat Removal Systems - 1 Sample, July 1, 2017 - June 30, 2018; and

(3) BI01: Reactor Coolant System (RCS) Specific Activity Sample - 1 Sample, July 1, 2017 - June 30, 2018.

71152Problem Identification and Resolution Annual Follow-Up of Selected Issues

The inspectors reviewed the licensees implementation of its corrective action program related to the following issue:

(1) Wire not landed on the maintained safety injection initiation relay circuit, as documented in CR-PLP-2018-02143.

71153Follow-Up of Events and Notices of Enforcement Discretion Licensee Event Reports

The inspectors evaluated the following licensee event report, which can be accessed at https://lersearch.inl.gov/LERSearchCriteria.aspx:

(1) Licensee Event Report (LER) 05000255/2018-001-00, Safety Injection Inoperable for Longer than Allowed by Technical Specifications Due to Personnel Error, from July 11 through August 22, 2018. The technical issue that was the subject of this LER was determined to be a finding of very low safety significance (i.e., Green) and a violation of regulatory requirements (NCV 05000255/2018003-01), which is documented in Section 71111.22 of this report.

INSPECTION RESULTS

71111.05XTFire ProtectionNFPA 805 (Triennial)

Unresolved Item (Closed)

Failure to Set Action Levels to Ensure that the Assumptions in the Engineering Analysis Remain Valid 05000255/2018011-02

71111.05XT

Description:

During a triennial fire protection inspection in 2018, the inspectors identified an unresolved item (URI) associated with the licensees National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) 805 Monitoring Program (ADAMS Accession Number ML18178A438). The inspectors questioned the licensees use of existing unavailability values published in the Maintenance Rule for the purpose of monitoring the unavailability of high safety significant equipment rather than the more conservative values assumed in the probabilistic risk assessment for fire. The inspectors opened an URI pending clarification from the NRCs Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR). On August 7, 2018, NRR issued a memorandum (ADAMS Accession Number ML18208A409) approving for use Revision 6 of Frequently Asked Question (FAQ) 10-0059 (ADAMS Accession Number ML18208A450). That FAQ stated, in part, that, The Maintenance Rule performance criteria for those SSCs [structures, systems, and components] promoted to or already considered high safety significant in the Maintenance Rule can be used as an acceptable action threshold.

Corrective Action Reference: CR-PLP-2018-01704

Closure Basis: The inspectors determined that the licensee could use the Maintenance Rule performance criteria for the High Pressure Air Compressor (C-6B) and High Pressure Safety Injection Pump (P-66B) as an acceptable action threshold per the revised guidance in FAQ 10-0059, Revision 6 in implementing their NFPA 805 Monitoring Program. The inspectors did not identify a violation at this time.

71111.22Surveillance Testing Wire Not Landed on Safety Injection Initiation Relay Circuit Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Aspect Report Sections Mitigating Systems Green NCV 05000255/2018003-01 Opened/Closed

[H.12] - Avoid Complacency 71111.22 71153

Introduction:

The inspectors identified a Green finding and an associated NCV of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings, for the licensees failure to accomplish an activity affecting quality in accordance with the implementing procedure. Specifically, only one of two required wires was landed on terminal 13 of relay SIS-2 in the right channel of the safety injection system (SIS) actuation logic following surveillance testing that was performed on May 8, 2017. As a result, the right channel of the safety injection system actuation logic was inoperable until the problem was discovered during troubleshooting and the wire was subsequently re-landed on May 3, 2018.

Description:

Description: On May 2, 2018, during performance of technical specification (TS) surveillance test QO-1, Safety Injection System, the inspectors noted that the right channel SIS test light had not lit as expected. Although this light was not part of the acceptance criteria for the surveillance test, the licensee commenced troubleshooting activities to determine why the SIS test light had unexpectedly not lit.

On May 3, 2018, during troubleshooting activities, the licensee identified that one of two wires was not landed, as required, on terminal 13 of relay SIS-2 in the right channel of the SIS actuation logic. As a result, the right channel of the SIS actuation logic was declared inoperable and TS limiting condition for operation (LCO) 3.3.4, Condition A was entered.

Subsequent review by the licensee revealed that the two wires had been lifted during the previous performance of step 5.6.8 of TS surveillance test RO-12, Containment High Pressure (CHP) and Spray System Tests, on May 8, 2017, during the previous refueling outage.

The licensees root cause evaluation identified that step 5.8.27 had not been performed correctly during the performance of RO-12 on May 8, 2017. Specifically, step 5.8.27 of RO-12 directed the performers to, Land the two wires on terminal 13 of relay SIS-2 that were removed in Step 5.6.8 Contrary to step 5.8.27, during the May 8, 2017 performance of RO-12 only one of the two wires was identified to have been properly landed on terminal 13 of relay SIS-2. It was also determined that no other maintenance or testing activities had been performed on SIS-2 since the performance of RO-12 on May 8, 2017.

Corrective Actions: The licensee properly landed the wire that was previously not landed on terminal 13 of relay SIS-2 to restore the system to its proper configuration and subsequently declared the right channel of the SIS actuation logic operable. The licensee performed a root cause evaluation of this issue. See the Observations for Inspection Procedure (IP) 71152 for an additional discussion of the licensees corrective actions.

Corrective Action References: The licensee entered this issue into their corrective action program (CAP) as CR-PLP-2018-02110 and CR-PLP-2018-02143.

Performance Assessment:

Performance Deficiency: The inspectors determined that the failure to accomplish an activity affecting quality in accordance with documented instructions, procedures, or drawings appropriate to the circumstances was a performance deficiency that warranted a significance determination. Specifically, the licensee failed to perform step 5.8.27 of surveillance test RO-12, Containment High Pressure (CHP) and Spray System Tests, Revision 40, in accordance with the documented procedure when only one of two wires was landed on terminal 13 of relay SIS-2.

Screening: The inspectors determined the performance deficiency was more than minor because it was associated with the Human Performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone and adversely impacted the cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, as a result of the failure to follow step 5.8.27 of RO-12, the right channel of the SIS actuation logic was inoperable from May 8, 2017 to May 3, 2018.

Significance: The inspectors assessed the significance of the finding using SDP Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings at Power. The inspectors answered Yes to Question 3 of the Mitigating SSCs and Functionality screening questions in Exhibit 2 of IMC 0609, Appendix A. Consequently, a Detailed Risk Evaluation was performed by a Senior Reactor Analyst. The analysis quantified the increased risk as a result of the performance deficiency by using the NRC risk model and rendering the emergency core cooling system (ECCS) right channel equipment non-functional for approximately 1 year while allowing for potential recovery by reactor operators. The dominant core damage scenarios were steam generator tube ruptures and small break loss-of-coolant-accidents (LOCAs) during which the ECCS left channel equipment was failed for unrelated reasons and the operators did not successfully operate the right channel pumps and valves. The change in core damage frequency (CDF) above the normal baseline risk was determined to be 7.6 x 10-7/year, representing a finding of very low safety significance (i.e., Green).

Cross-Cutting Aspect: The finding had a cross-cutting aspect in the Avoid Complacency component of the Human Performance cross-cutting area, which states that the licensee will recognize and plan for the possibility of mistakes, latent issues, and inherent risk, even while expecting successful outcomes; and that individuals will implement appropriate error reduction tools. In this case and as associated with this finding, the licensee failed to ensure that error reduction tools appropriate to the situation were implemented during the performance of RO-12 (H.12).

Enforcement:

Violation: Title 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings, requires, in part, that activities affecting quality shall be prescribed by documented instructions, procedures, or drawings of a type appropriate to the circumstances and shall be accomplished in accordance with these instructions, procedures, or drawings.

Contrary to the above, on May 8, 2017, step 5.8.27 of RO-12, Containment High Pressure (CHP) and Spray System Tests, Revision 40, which was a procedure affecting quality, was not performed as written. Specifically, only one of two wires required by procedure RO-12 was landed on terminal 13 of relay SIS-2, which rendered the right channel of the safety injection system actuation logic inoperable from May 8, 2017 to May 3, 2018.

Enforcement Action: This violation is being treated as a Non-Cited Violation, consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.

The disposition of this finding and associated violation closes LER 05000255/2018-001-00.

71152Problem Identification and Resolution Observation

71152 - Annual Sample Review

On May 3, 2018, the licensee identified that one of two wires was not landed, as required, on terminal 13 of relay SIS-2 in the right channel of the SIS actuation logic. Additional information on the failure can be found in Section 71111.22 of this report.

The licensee identified this issue as a significant condition adverse to quality (SCAQ) and performed a root cause evaluation. The inspectors reviewed the licensees root cause evaluation to ensure that causes of the condition were identified and appropriate corrective actions were assigned. The licensee identified the root cause to be that the risk of human error was accepted instead of conducting a circuit check to ensure proper circuit restoration after performance of RO-12, Containment High Pressure (CHP) and Spray System Test.

The corrective action to preclude repetition was to revise RO-12 to include circuit checks as an additional barrier to ensure proper restoration of the SI actuation circuits. The licensee also identified a contributing cause to be inadequate worker understanding of the verification method prescribed in the procedure. Corrective actions were taken to address performance and application of verification methods used in the plant. A dynamic learning activity was also conducted with personnel in Operations, Maintenance, Chemistry, Radiation Protection, Production, and Projects to review each of the validation methods and ensure that expectations for their use were understood. The inspectors reviewed the assigned corrective actions to ensure that they addressed the root and contributing causes and that the planned corrective actions were scheduled to be completed in a timely manner.

Additionally, the inspectors reviewed the extent of condition and extent of cause for this event.

This included a review of other TS-related tests and maintenance in which electrical circuits were manipulated to ensure that appropriate steps for validation of circuit restoration were contained within the implementing procedures.

EXIT MEETINGS AND DEBRIEFS

The inspectors confirmed that proprietary information was controlled to protect it from public disclosure. No proprietary information was documented in this report.

• On October 18, 2018, the inspectors presented the quarterly integrated inspection results to Mr. C. Arnone, Site Vice President, and other members of the licensee staff.

DOCUMENTS REVIEWED

71111.04Equipment Alignment

- CR-PLP-2017-01976; Battery Post on Cell #46 Was Rising From Battery; 04/30/17

- CR-PLP-2018-03638; Auxiliary Feed Pump Room Penetration Abnormality; 08/07/18

- CR-PLP-2018-03740; ED-17 (Battery Charger #3) Would Not Go into Equalize as Expected;

08/15/18

- CR-PLP-2018-03768; ED-01 Cell 27 Low Specific Gravity; 08/16/18

- CR-PLP-2018-03873; Fire Protection System was Unable to Reach Desired Concentration;

08/23/2018

- CR-PLP-2018-04134; 125V DC Bus Ground; 09/11/18

- CR-PLP-2018-04147; AFW P-8A Discharge Check Valve 10 DPM Leak from Bolted Flange;

09/11/18

- DBD-1.07; Design Basis Document; Component Cooling Water System; Revision 9

- E-8; Single Line Meter & Relay Diagrams 125V DC; Revision 58

- Form Admin 7.14-1; P-55A Cubicle Temporary Shielding Request; 09/25/17

- JG-105; Tubing Tray Arrangement and Assembly Details; Revision 0

- JG-177; Instrument Installation Details Tubing Supports for FI-0783 A & B, Pumps 8 A & B

Recirc Flow; Revision 1

- M-205; Piping and Instrument Diagram Main Steam, Main and Auxiliary Turbine Systems;

Revision 94

- M-207; Piping & Instrument Diagram; Auxiliary Feedwater System; Revision 42

- M-208; Piping & Instrument Diagram; Service Water System; Sheet 1A, Revision 66

- M-208; Piping & Instrument Diagram; Service Water System; Sheet 1B, Revision 43

- M-209; Piping & Instrument Diagram; Component Cooling System; Sheet 1; Revision 69

- M-209; Piping & Instrument Diagram; Component Cooling System; Sheet 2; Revision 33

- M-209; Piping & Instrument Diagram; Component Cooling System; Sheet 3; Revision 60

- M-209; System Diagram; Component Cooling System; Sheet A; Revision 10

- M-213; Piping & Instrument Diagram; Service Water Screen Structure and Chlorinator;

Revision 96

- SOP-12; Feedwater System; Revision 78

- SOP-15; Service Water System; Revision 68

- SWSO-4; Molluscicide Treatment of Service Water and Fire Protection Systems; Revision 22

71111.05AQFire Protection Annual/Quarterly

- 2018 On-Site Medical Drill for Palisades; 09/07/2018

- AOP-40; Fire Which Threatens Safety-Related Equipment; Revision 3

- CR-PLP-2018-03992; NRC Identified Plastic Chairs and an Unattached Drip Catch in the

Vicinity of T-61 Clean Resin Transfer Tank; 08/30/2018

- CR-PLP-2018-04093; Public Address System Announcement was Difficult to

Hear/Understand; 09/07/2018

- EA-FPP-03-001; Analysis of Combustible Loading at Palisades Nuclear Plant; Revision 3

- EN-DC-161; Control of Combustibles; Revision 18

- EN-TQ-125; Attachment 1, Fire Drill Scenario; 09/07/2018

- EN-TQ-125; Attachment 1, Fire Drill Scenario; 09/14/2018

- EN-TQ-125; Fire Brigade Drills; Revision 6

- FPIP-4; Fire Protection Systems and Fire Protection Equipment; Revision 39

- Pre-Fire Plan 13A/Rooms 106, 121B, & 122, Main Corridor - South; Elevation 590; Revision 5

- Pre-Fire Plan 13A/Rooms 106, 709, & 741, Main Corridor - North; Elevation 590 Revision 5

- Pre-Fire Plan 13A/Rooms 150 & 152, Main Corridor - Pipeway; Elevation 602; Revision 5

- Pre-Fire Plan 13A/Rooms 333 & 339, Main Corridor - Resin Drum Storage Room;

Elevation 625; Revision 5

- Pre-Fire Plan 24/Room 7; Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps Room; Elevation 571; Revision 5

- Pre-Fire Plan 9/Room 136 & 136A; Screen House/Intake Structure; Elevation 590; Revision 5

71111.05XTFire ProtectionNFPA 805 (Triennial)

- CR-PLP-2018-01704; Resolution of Monitoring Program FAQ 10-0059; 04/06/2018

- EN-DC-357; NFPA 805 Monitoring Program; Revision 2

71111.06Flood Protection Measures

- AOP-39; Internal Plant Flooding; Revision 1

- CR-PLP-1998-00064; Unsecured Ladders in DG Room 1-2; 06/24/98

- CR-PLP-2009-04120; Electrical Penetration Conduit was Leaking; 08/29/2009

- CR-PLP-2018-02315; NRC Questioned the Presence of Water Coming Out of Conduit;

05/14/2018

- CR-PLP-2018-03502; During Flushing Activities Floor Drain Piping Leaked; 07/27/2018

- CR-PLP-2018-04142; NRC Questioned Approval for Ladder Storage Area; 09/11/2018

- CR-PLP-2018-04174; NRC Questioned Securing Ladders to Floor Drain Piping; 09/12/2018

- DBD-7.08; Plant Protection Against Flooding; Revision 6

- WO 51622461; PM-Breaker/Starter 52-2439 (MO-3199); 12/20/2007

- WO 51803659; EEQ-Megger ESF Room Cooler Motor EMB-0211; 12/30/2009

- WO 52229591; EEQ-Megger ESF Room Cooler Motor EMB-0211; 10/28/2011

- WO 52246276; 52-2439 (MO-3199) PM Breaker/Starter; 12/21/2011

- WO 52377284; EEQ-Megger ESF Room Cooler Motor EMB-0211; 06/28/2013

- WO 52547520; PM-Breaker/Starter 52-2439 (MO-3199); 09/02/2015

- WO 52773249; Diesel Generator and D Bus Floor Drain Flow Verification; 07/27/2018

71111.11Licensed Operator Requalification Program and Licensed Operator Performance

- PLSEG-LOR-18D-01; CPE Diagnostic; 09/11/18

71111.12Maintenance Effectiveness

- AOP-23; Primary Coolant Leak; Revision 2

- CR-PLP-2016-04620; Tracking CR for Maintenance Rule Evaluations; 01/25/17

- CR-PLP-2017-00648; A Trend was Identified for the EK-0971 SPI (Secondary Position

Indication) Trouble Alarm; 02/23/2017

- CR-PLP-2017-00977; Control Rod Drive Mechanism Seal Leakoff Measurement Exceeds

ODMI Trigger Point; 03/17/2017

- CR-PLP-2017-02576; CRD-40 Indicated a Step Change in Leak Off Temperature; 05/17/2017

- CR-PLP-2017-03721; Equipment Failure Evaluation P-45 A/B Turbine Building Sump Pumps

Tripping on Thermals; 08/08/2017

- CR-PLP-2017-04984; Maintenance Rule Functional Failure Both Turbine Building Sump

Pumps; 10/31/2017

- CR-PLP-2017-05383; Control Rod Seal Leakoff Temperature Rise Noted; 11/28/2017

- CR-PLP-2018-00080; Turbine Building Sump Pump P-45B Spinning Backwards; 01/04/2018

- CR-PLP-2018-00340; Pathway of Foreign Particulate to Enter a Control Rod Drive (CRD) Seal

While Testing; 01/17/2018

- CR-PLP-2018-01444; Control Rod Drive 13 Green Rod Bottom Light did not Illuminate;

03/26/2018

- CR-PLP-2018-01501; Control Rod Drive Shroud has Large Gaps Between Panels; 03/27/2018

- CR-PLP-2018-01563; Secondary Rod Position Indication for CRD-21 Consistently Lagged

Behind the Primary Rod Position; 03/29/2018

- CR-PLP-2018-01592; While Working on Removed CRD #28/SN 231 for Rebuild, Found

Damage to the Internal Cavity of the Drive Shaft/Seal Area; 03/30/2018

- CR-PLP-2018-02341; Locked Rotor Event Turbine Building Sump Pump P-45A; 05/15/2018

- CR-PLP-2018-02342; Z Phase Amps Too High in the Open Direction; 05/15/2018

- CR-PLP-2018-02533; Turbine Building Sump Pump P-45B Tripped; 05/25/2018

- CR-PLP-2018-02925; New Maintenance Rule Functional Failure for the Turbine Building

Sump Pumps; 06/19/2018

- CR-PLP-2018-03292; CRD-40 Control Rod Drive Mechanism Temperature Rose from 135

Degrees; 07/16/2018

- CR-PLP-2018-03398; Radiation Monitoring System is in Maintenance Rule Near (a)(1) Status;

09/19/18

- CR-PLP-2018-03596; Received PPC Alarm Rod 3 Difference PIP and SPI Unexpectedly;

08/03/2018

- CR-PLP-2018-04366; Radiation Monitoring System Maintenance Rule Component Failure

Performance Criteria Exceeded; 09/24/18

- EN-DC-204; Maintenance Rule Scope and Basis; Revision 4

- EN-DC-205; Maintenance Rule Monitoring; Revision 6

- EN-DC-206; Maintenance Rule (a)(1) Process; Revision 3

- Maintenance Rule (a)(1) Action Plan Turbine Building Sump Pumps P-45A and P-45B;

Revision 6

- PLP-RPT-12-00026; EGAD-EP-10 Palisades Maintenance Rule Scoping Document;

Revision 2

- Radiation Monitoring System Health Report 2nd Quarter 2018; 09/25/18

- SOP-39; Area Radiation Monitoring System; Revision 18

- System Health Report for Control Rod Drive System; Q1-2018

- System Health Report for Liquid Radwaste System; Q4-2017

- Top Ten Equipment Reliability Action Plan for Control Rod Drive Seal Reliability; 07/25/2018

- WO 451615; RSPT-3 (CRD-3); Reed Stack Needs to Be Repaired Based Upon Technical

Specifications; 05/13/2017

71111.13Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control

- Admin 4.02; Control of Equipment; Revision 81

- CR-PLP-2018-03770; E/U-258, Smoke Detector for Containment Interior Instrument Area;

08/17/18

- Curtiss-Wright Nuclear Division, Anatec Report: EN051-PN1-01; EDG 1.2 K6B Jacket Water

Cooler E-22B Installed; 07/17/2018

- DBD-5.01; Diesel Engine and Auxiliary Systems; Revision 7

- HP 2.6; Containment Entry with the Reactor Critical; Revision 14

- Operators Risk Report for 09/26/2018

- WO 493577; EVI-1213 DC; Repair or Replace DC Voltmeter; Revision 0

- WO 52751431; PCV-1489, K-6B Air Start PCV Post-Maintenance Test; Revision 0

71111.15Operability Determinations and Functionality Assessments

- CR-PLP-04382; ED-02 Battery Cell #33 was Found to Have a Green Goo Substance on

Positive Post; 09/24/18

- CR-PLP-2018-02759; The NRC Identified a Drawing Error on E-17 Sheet 3; 06/07/2018

- CR-PLP-2018-03330; Rod Drive Seal Leakoff Hi Temp; 07/17/18

- CR-PLP-2018-03974; Debris Laying Across the Separator Plates Inside Cell #26 of ED-02,

Station Battery 2; 08/30/18

- E-17; Logic Diagram Safety Injection Initiation; Sheet 3; Revision 19

- E-18; Sheet 4, Safety Injection Actuation; Revision 17

- E-209; Safety Injection and Sequence Loading Circuit No. 2; Sheet 2A; Revision 4

- E-209; Safety Injection and Sequence Loading Circuit No. 2; Sheet 1A; Revision 12

- E-209; Safety Injection and Sequence Loading Circuits; Sheet 4; Revision 31

- EC-79224; ED-02 Foreign Material Reasonable Assurance of Operability Evaluation;

Revision 0

- EOP Supplement 4; Checklist for Safeguards Equipment Following SIAS; Revision 7

- EOP-1.0; Standard Post-Trip Actions; Revision 20

- Operations Log, 05/2/2018-05/3/2018

- Procedure 4.11; Safety Function Determination Program; Revision 7

- VEN-M201; Console Section C13-1L/C13-1R (Partial); Sheet 38; Revision 62

- VEN-M201; Console Section C13-1L/C13-1R (Partial); Sheet 39; Revision 39

- VEN-M201; Sub Panel for Vertical Section C13R (C13-5); Sheet 43; Revision 67

71111.18Plant Modifications

- CR-PLP-2018-00028; Fuel Oil Secondary D/P for F-89B, Fuel Oil Booster Pump P-209A

Discharge Filter was Recorded as 11 psid; 01/02/2018

- DBD-5.01; Design Basis Document for Diesel Engine and Auxiliary Systems; Revision 7

- DBD-5.03; Design Basis Document for Emergency Diesel Generator Performance Criteria;

Revision 9

- EC-79027; DPI-1476 Install Pulsation Dampener; Revision 0

- EN-DC-115; Engineering Change Process; Revision 25

- WO 491692; DPI-1476; Reading is Out of Specification - Investigate VLC; 09/04/2018

- WO 52827053; MO-7A-1 - Emergency Diesel Generator 1-1 (K6A); 09/03/2018

71111.19Post Maintenance Testing

- CR-PLP-2018-03744; Service Water Pump-7A 3/16 Packing Adjustment; 08/15/18

- CR-PLP-2018-03746; Service Water Pump-7A Basket Strainer Hi DP Unexpected Alarm;

08/15/18

- CR-PLP-2018-03785; P-7A Packing Gland Temperature Rising during PMT; 08/19/18

- CR-PLP-2018-03786; P-7A Service Water Pump IST CSI-2130 Froze Up during Vibration

Data Acquisition; 08/19/18

- QO-20; Inservice Test Procedure - Low Pressure Safety Injection Pumps; Revision 27

- WO 442700; P-67B; Seal CLG Line Disconnect & Reseal Joint - MDM; 09/05/2018

- WO 496138; E-22B; Replace Jacket Water Cooler Heat Exchanger Tube Bundle; 07/18/2018

- WO 504484-02; P-7A PMT(OPS): Repack of Service Water Pump; 08/20/2018

- WO 52787626; P-67B, LPSI Pump; Coupling, Visual Inspection; 09/05/2018

- WO 52814147; MO-7A-2 Emergency Diesel Generator 1-2 (K-6B); 07/18/2018

71111.22Surveillance Testing

- CR-PLP-2018-02107; Shutter for the Racking Mechanism on Breaker 52-1206 was Open

About 1/4; 05/02/2018

- CR-PLP-2018-02110; During QO-1 Safety Injection System the Right Channel Safety

Injection Actuated Red Light on Control Room Panel C-13 Failed to Illuminate; 05/02/2018

- CR-PLP-2018-02143; Wire Not Landed on the Maintained Safety Injection Initiation Relay

Circuit; 05/03/2018

- QO-1; Technical Specification Surveillance Procedure Basis Document; Safety Injection

System, Revision 4

- QO-1; Technical Specification Surveillance Procedure; Safety Injection System; Revision 70

- QO-1; Technical Specification Surveillance Procedure; Safety Injection System; Revision 69

- QO-14; Inservice Test Procedure - Service Water Pumps; Revision 42

- QO-21; Inservice Test Procedure - Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps; Revision 49

- WO 52807108; QO-1 Safety Injection Actuation System Test; 05/02/2018

- WO 52816569; P-7B, QO-14B, IST Service Water Pump; 07/12/2018

71151Performance Indicator Verification

- Performance Indicator Derivation Report for the Last 2 Quarters of 2017 and the First 2

Quarters of 2018

71152Problem Identification and Resolution

- CR-PLP-2018-02143; Wire Not Landed on the Maintained Safety Injection Initiation Relay

Circuit; 05/03/2018

- CR-PLP-2018-02440; IV/CV Checkouts Differed in Expectation and Interpretation of

EN-HU-102, Human Performance Traps & Tools; 05/17/2018

- CR-PLP-2018-02578; Verification Method may Not be Appropriate; 05/29/2018

- CR-PLP-2018-04511; NRC Identified: Audit of Operations Attendance Sheets; 10/02/2018

- EN-LI-118; Cause Evaluation Process; Revision 26

- RO-12; Containment High Pressure (CHP) and Spray System Tests; Revision 41

- RT-8D; Basis Document for RT-8D; Revision 7

- WO 429030; RO-12 - Containment High Pressure (CHP) and Spray System Test; 05/08/2017

- WO 501028; SIAS Activated Red Light - Right Channel Did Not Light; 05/02/2018

- WT-WTPLP-2018-00331; Work Task to Track Personnel that Still Need to Complete

IV/CV/Peer-Check/Self-Check Demonstration; 08/02/2018

71153Follow-Up of Events and Notices of Enforcement Discretion

- EN-LI-108; Event Notification and Reporting; Revision 15