PNO-II-06-001: Difference between revisions

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{{Adams
#REDIRECT [[PNO-II-06-001, A: Catawba Nuclear Station, Update - Loss of Offsite Power and Dual Unit Reactor Trip]]
| number = ML061460517
| issue date = 05/26/2006
| title = PNO-II-06-001A: Catawba Nuclear Station, Update - Loss of Offsite Power and Dual Unit Reactor Trip
| author name = Payne C, Rapp C
| author affiliation = NRC/RGN-II
| addressee name =
| addressee affiliation =
| docket = 05000413, 05000414
| license number = NPF-035, NPF-052
| contact person =
| document report number = PNO-II-06-001A
| document type = NRC Preliminary Notification of Event/Occurrence
| page count = 1
}}
{{#Wiki_filter:Date: May 26, 2006PRELIMINARY NOTIFICATION OF EVENT OR UNUSUAL OCCURRENCE  PNO-II-06-001AThis preliminary notification constitutes EARLY notice of events of POSSIBLE safety or publicinterest significance. The information is as initially received without verification or evaluation, and is basically all that is known by the Region II staff on this date.FACILITY: Licensee Emergency Classification:Plant: Catawba Nuclear Station        Notification of Unusual EventUnit:  1 & 2_____Alert Docket No(s).:  50-413, 50-414_____Site Area Emergency Location: Rock Hill, SC_____General Emergency X    Not Applicable
 
==SUBJECT:==
UPDATE - LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER AND DUAL UNIT REACTOR TRIPOn May 25, 2006, the licensee completed its investigation into the events of May 20, 2006, that opened multiple power circuit breakers (PCBs) in the Catawba switchyard and resulted in a loss of offsite power and dual unit reactor trip. The licensee identified several switchyard protective relay settings that were not set adequately to prevent inadvertent actuation, which in conjunction with an initial PCB current transformer failurelead to the dual unit trip. The licensee has completed repairs to switchyard components including adjustments of relay setpoints for the affected switchyard PCBs. The licensee commenced restart of Unit 2 on May 26, 2006. The reactor currently is at approximately 11% power with turbine warming in progress. Restart of Unit 1 will follow after Unit 2 is on-line. In a related event, on May 22, 2006, two days after the loss of offsite power, the licensee identified waterleaking through cable conduits into the 1A emergency diesel generator room. Region II amended the Augmented Inspection Team (AIT) charter on May 25, 2006, to review the circumstances and extent of thiscondition. Subsequent licensee investigation identified the apparent source of water as overflow from thecooling tower basins. The licensee has completed the appropriate repairs.The Augmented Inspection Team has independently reviewed the events relating to, and the licensee'sactivities during and following, the transient and is satisfied with the licensee's corrective actions in support of reactor startup. An exit and public meeting to discuss the results of this inspection will be held at 1:00 p.m., on May 31, 2006, in the City Council Chambers at City Hall in Rock Hill, South Carolina.The information presented herein has been discussed with the licensee, and is current as of 11:00 a.m., onMay 26, 2006.CONTACTS:C. Payne - (404) 562-4540C. Rapp - (404) 562-4674}}
 
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