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{{#Wiki_filter:Draft submittal (Pink Paper)Senior Reactor Operator Written Exam HATCH DECEMBER 2007 EXAM 05000321/2007301 | {{#Wiki_filter:Draft submittal | ||
AND 05000366/2007301 | (Pink Paper) | ||
Senior Reactor Operator Written Exam | |||
QUESTIONS REPORT for SRO 76.201003A2.05 | HATCH DECEMBER 2007 EXAM | ||
OOl/2/2/CRDMINEW/FUND/HT2007-301/SRO/BLC/RFA | 05000321/2007301 AND 05000366/2007301 | ||
Unit 2 is performing | DECEMBER 3 - 6, 2007, AND | ||
a shutdown in accordance | DECEMBER 10, 2007, (WRITTEN) | ||
with 34GO-OPS-013-2, Normal Plant Shutdown.All control rods have b.een fully inserted per the selected rod sequence when the operator reaches this step in the procedure: | |||
WHEN all control rods are fully inserted, PLACE the Reactor Mode Switch in SHUTDOWN AND record the'time REACTOR placed in Condition 3 in the Operators Log AND below: Time in Condition 3---------- | QUESTIONS REPORT | ||
Which ONE of the following predicts how the CRD Mechanisms | for SRO | ||
will be affected and identifies | 76. 201003A2.05 OOl/2/2/CRDMINEW/FUND/HT2007-301/SRO/BLC/RFA | ||
the preferred procedure used to bypass the discharge volume high level trip and reset the scram after the mode switch is placed in the SHUTDOWN position?Reactor pressure WILL cause the CRDM internal ball valve to shift after the accumulator | Unit 2 is performing a shutdown in accordance with 34GO-OPS-013-2, Normal Plant | ||
depressurizes. | Shutdown. All control rods have b.een fully inserted per the selected rod sequence | ||
34GO-OPS-013-2, Normal Plant Shutdown B.Reactor pressure WILL cause the CRDM internal ball valve to shift after the accumul'ator | when the operator reaches this step in the procedure: | ||
depressurizes. | WHEN all control rods are fully inserted, PLACE the Reactor Mode Switch in | ||
34AB-C71-001-2, Scram Procedure C.All full-in (green)lights on the full core display will EXTINGUISH | SHUTDOWN AND record the' time REACTOR placed in Condition 3 in the | ||
until the scram is reset.34GO-OPS-013-2, Normal Plant Shutdown D.All full-in (green)lights on the full core display will EXTINGUISH | Operators Log AND below: | ||
until the scram is reset.34AB-C71-001-2, Scram Procedure A.Correct.B.Incorrect because the 34GO-OPS-013-2 | Time in Condition 3---------- | ||
procedure includes steps to reset the scram.Plausible if applicant does not know that the shutdown procedure contains the steps to bypass the high SDV level trip and reset the scram.C.Incorrect because the S51 (overtravel | Which ONE of the following predicts how the CRD Mechanisms will be affected and | ||
in)and S52 (normal full-in)reedswitches | identifies the preferred procedure used to bypass the discharge volume high level trip | ||
ensure the green full-in light remains illuminated. | and reset the scram after the mode switch is placed in the SHUTDOWN position? | ||
A~ Reactor pressure WILL cause the CRDM internal ball valve to shift after the | |||
position until the scram is reset.D.Incorrect because the S51 (overtravel | accumulator depressurizes. | ||
in)and S52 (normal full-in)reedswitches | 34GO-OPS-013-2, Normal Plant Shutdown | ||
ensure the green full-in light remains illuminated. | B. | ||
Also | Reactor pressure WILL cause the CRDM internal ball valve to shift after the | ||
34GO-OPS-013-2 | accumul'ator depressurizes. | ||
procedure includes steps to reset the scram.Plausible'since the applicant may know that the CRDM will be in the overtravel | 34AB-C71-001-2, Scram Procedure | ||
position until the scram is reset.Also plausible if applicant does not know that the shutdown procedure contains the steps to bypass the high SDV level | C. All full-in (green) lights on the full core display will EXTINGUISH until the scram is | ||
QUESTIONS REPORT for SRO A2.Ability to (a)predict the impacts of the following on the CONTROL ROD AND DRIVE MECHANISM; | reset. | ||
and (b)based on those predictions, use procedures | 34GO-OPS-013-2, Normal Plant Shutdown | ||
to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences | D. All full-in (green) lights on the full core display will EXTINGUISH until the scram is | ||
of those abnormal conditions | reset. | ||
or operations: (CFR: 41.5/45.6) | 34AB-C71-001-2, Scram Procedure | ||
A2. | A. Correct. | ||
4.1*/4.1 SRO-only (tie to 10CFR55.43(5): | B. Incorrect because the 34GO-OPS-013-2 procedure includes steps to reset the | ||
Assessment | scram. Plausible if applicant does not know that the shutdown procedure contains the | ||
of facility conditions | steps to bypass the high SDV level trip and reset the scram. | ||
and selection | C. Incorrect because the S51 (overtravel in) and S52 (normal full-in) reedswitches | ||
procedures | ensure the green full-in light remains illuminated. Plausible since the applicant may | ||
know that the CROM will be in the overtravel position until the scram is reset. | |||
D. Incorrect because the S51 (overtravel in) and S52 (normal full-in) reedswitches | |||
ensure the green full-in light remains illuminated. Also incorrect because the | |||
34GO-OPS-013-2 procedure includes steps to reset the scram. Plausible 'since the | |||
applicant may know that the CRDM will be in the overtravel position until the scram is | |||
reset. Also plausible if applicant does not know that the shutdown procedure contains | |||
the steps to bypass the high SDV level trip and reset the scram. | |||
Friday, September 28, 2007 9:24:38 AM | |||
1 | |||
QUESTIONS REPORT | |||
for SRO | |||
A2. Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following on the CONTROL ROD AND DRIVE MECHANISM; | |||
and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those | |||
abnormal conditions or operations: (CFR: 41.5/45.6) A2.05 Reactor Scram | |||
4.1*/4.1 | |||
SRO-only (tie to 10CFR55.43(5): Assessment of facility conditions and selection ofappropriatae procedures during | |||
norrmal, abnormal, and emergency situations. | |||
References | References | ||
34GO-OPS-013-2, Normal Plant Shutdown | 34GO-OPS-013-2, Normal Plant Shutdown | ||
34AB-C71-001-2, Scram Procedure | |||
C11-CRDM-LP-00102, Control Rod Drive Mechanism lesson plan | |||
Tier: | |||
2 | |||
Group: | |||
Keyword: | |||
CRDM | |||
Source: | |||
Cog Level: | |||
FUND | |||
Exam: | |||
Test: | |||
SRO | |||
Test | |||
Author/Reviewer: | Author/Reviewer: | ||
BLC/ | Friday, September 28, 2007 9:24:39 AM | ||
QUESTIONS REPORT for SRO 79.212000A2.20 | 2 | ||
NEW | |||
/HIGHERJHT2007 | HT2007-301 | ||
-30 l/SRO/BLC/ | BLC/RFA | ||
2 | |||
is in progress on seven hydraulic control units'(HCUs) | |||
to replace the scram valve diaphrams. | QUESTIONS REPORT | ||
The following conditions | for SRO | ||
currently exist: Mode switch: REFUEL position, all rods inserted Discharge volume isolation test switch: ISOLATE position, under clearance Scram discharge volume high level bypass switch: NORMAL position Due to a clearance error, one of the HCUs begins to slowly fill the discharge volume as the mechanics begin working and the following alarm is received: SCRAM DISCH VOL NOT DRAINED (603-119)With these current conditions, which ONE of the following describes the operation of the RPS logic and the technical specification | 77. 204000G2.1.2 001/2/2/RWCU/BANK-MOD/HIGHER/HT2007-30 l/SRO/BLC/RFA | ||
allowan'ces | A leak has developed on the RWCU system. The following conditions currently exist: | ||
associated | RWCU HX room ambient temperature (N016C) | ||
with the high level bypass switch?At:I A reactor scram has NOT occurred.Placing the high level bypass switch in the bypass position will PREVENT a scram.Bypassing this trip does NOT require entering ,.an RPS Instrumentation | 195° F | ||
LCO action.B.A reactor scram has NOT o*ccurred. | RWCU HX room ambient temperature (N016D) | ||
Placing the high level bypass switch in the bypass position will PREVENT a scram.Bypassing this trip does requires entering an RPS Instrumentation | 195° F | ||
LCO action.C.A reactor scram has occurred.If the high level switch had been in the bypass position, the scram would have still occurred.Bypassing this trip does NOT require entering an RPS Instrumentation | RWCU HX room differential temperature (N022C/N023C) 105°F ~T | ||
LCO action.D.A high level scram has occurred.If the high level switch had been in the bypass position, the scram would have been PREVENTED. | RWCU HX room differential temperature (N022D/NO*23D) 105°F ~T | ||
Bypassing this trip requires entering an RPS Instrumentation | 158' elevation south east area (2D21-K601 B) | ||
LCO action.Friday, September 28, 2007 9:24:39 AM 7 | 1100mR/Hr | ||
Group: 1 Source: NEW Exam: HT2007-301 | Based on these current plant conditions, which ONE of the following choices describes | ||
the required operator actions in accordance with the Secondary Containment Control? | |||
[Reference provided] | |||
A. A reactor shutdown per 34GO-OPS-013 or 34GO-OPS-014 is required. | |||
An immediate reactor scram is currently not re'quired~ | |||
B~ An immediate reactor scram is required. | |||
Emergency depressurization is not required. | |||
C. An immediate reactor scram is required. | |||
Emergency depressurization is required. | |||
D. A reactor shutdown is currently not required. | |||
Operate the HVAC per 34S0-T41-005 and attempt to isolate the RWCU leak. | |||
A. Incorrect because a primary system is discharging into secondary containment and | |||
the differential temperature and area radiation level is greater than max safe. These | |||
conditions require an immediate reactor scram. Plausible if the applicant knows that a | |||
reactor shutdown is required when an area is above max safe and the leak is NOT a | |||
primary system. | |||
B. Correct. | |||
C. Incorrect because an emergency depressurization is not required. Plausible since | |||
the applicant may not know that the two area temps (or two ambient temps) are in the | |||
same area (and therefore do not meet the intent of two areas above max safe.) | |||
D. Incorrect because ventilation systems should NOT be operated when a secondary | |||
containment radiation condition exists. Also incorrect because a reactor scram is | |||
required based on a primary system discharging with one area differential temperature | |||
above max safe. Plausible if applicant interprets the differential temperature as an | |||
ambient temperature. | |||
Friday, September 28, 2007 9:24:39 AM | |||
3 | |||
QUESTIONS REPORT | |||
for SRO | |||
This question is SRO only because it is tied to 10CFR55.43(5). | |||
Do NOT provide the flowchart to the applicant as a reference. Provide ONLY Table 4 and Table 6 as a | |||
reference to the applicant. | |||
SYSTEM: 204000 Reactor Water Cleanup System | |||
2.1.2 Knowledge of operator responsibilities during all modes ofplant operation. (CFR: 41.10/45.13) | |||
IMPORTANCE 3.0/4.0 | |||
References | |||
31EO-EOP-014-2, Secondary Containment Control Flowchart | |||
Tier: | |||
2 | |||
Group: | |||
2 | |||
Keyword: | |||
RWCU | |||
Source: | |||
BANK-MOD | |||
Cog Level: | |||
HIGHER | |||
Exam: | |||
HT2007-301 | |||
Test: | |||
SRO | |||
Author/Reviewer: | |||
BLC/RFA | |||
Friday, September 28, 2007 9:24:39 AM | |||
4 | |||
QUESTIONS REPORT | |||
for SRO | |||
78. 211000G2.1.14 002/2/1/E-PLANINEW/HIGHER/HT2007-30I/SRO/BLC/RFA | |||
A transient has occurred involving a failure to scram (ATWS) that requires Standby | |||
Liquid Control (SLC) intiation per the emergency operating procedure guidance. | |||
Based on this status, which ONE of the following identifies the required personnel | |||
notifications in accordance with 73EP-EIP-004-0, Duties of Emergency Director? | |||
At:' Dismissal of non-essential personnel from the plant site is mandatory. | |||
Notification of protective action recommendations (PARS) to state and local | |||
authorities is NOT mandatory for these conditions. | |||
B. Dismissal of non-essential personnel from the plant site is mandatory. | |||
Notification of protective action recommendations (PARS) to state and local | |||
authorities IS mandatory for these conditions. | |||
C. Dismissal of non-essential personnel from the plant site is NOT mandatory. | |||
Staff augmentation MUST be performed if the emergency event is occurring outside | |||
of normal working hours, on the weekend, or on a holiday by activating the HNP | |||
Autodialer System in the control room. | |||
D. Dismissal of non-essential personnel from the plant site is NOT mandatory. | |||
The emergency response facilities (ERFs) MUST be activated. | |||
A. Correct. | |||
B. Incorrect because these conditions represent a site area classification, (new E-Plan | |||
classification is SS2) which does not necessarily require a mandatory PAR. Plausible | |||
if applicant thinks that this is a general emergency classification. | |||
C. Incorrect because a site *evacuation is required (73EP-EIP-004-0, Step 7.4.11). | |||
Plausible if applicant thinks that this is an Alert classification. | |||
D. Incorrect because a site evacuation is required (73EP-EIP-004-0, Step 7.4.11). | |||
Plausible if the applicant thinks that this is an Alert classification. | |||
SRO only based on 10CFR55.43 (5): assessment of facility conditions and selection of procedures | |||
Do NOT provide any references for this question. | |||
SYSTEM: 211000 Standby Liquid Control System | |||
2.1.14 Knowledge of system status criteria which require the notification ofplant personnel. (CFR: 43.5 / 45.12) | |||
IMPORTANCE 2.5 / 3.3 | |||
References | |||
DRAFT 73EP-EIP-OOI-0, Emergency Classification and Initial Actions | |||
73EP-EIP-004-0, Duties ofEmergency Director | |||
Friday, September 28, 2007 9:24:39 AM | |||
5 | |||
Tier: | |||
Keyword: | |||
Cog Level: | |||
Test: | |||
2 | |||
E-PLAN | |||
HIGHER | |||
SRO | |||
QUESTIONS REPORT | |||
for SRO | |||
Group: | |||
1 | |||
Source: | |||
NEW | |||
Exam: | |||
HT2007-301 | |||
Author/Reviewer: | |||
BLC/RFA | |||
Friday, September 28, 2007 9:24:39 AM | |||
6 | |||
QUESTIONS REPORT | |||
for SRO | |||
79. 212000A2.20 001/2/1/RPS/NEW/HIGHERJHT2007-30 l/SRO/BLC/RFA | |||
During an outage, maintenance is in progress on seven hydraulic control units'(HCUs) | |||
to replace the scram valve diaphrams. The following conditions currently exist: | |||
Mode switch: REFUEL position, all rods inserted | |||
Discharge volume isolation test switch: ISOLATE position, under clearance | |||
Scram discharge volume high level bypass switch: NORMAL position | |||
Due to a clearance error, one of the HCUs begins to slowly fill the discharge volume as | |||
the mechanics begin working and the following alarm is received: | |||
SCRAM DISCH VOL NOT DRAINED (603-119) | |||
With these current conditions, which ONE of the following describes the operation of | |||
the RPS logic and the technical specification allowan'ces associated with the high level | |||
bypass switch? | |||
At:I A reactor scram has NOT occurred. | |||
Placing the high level bypass switch in the bypass position will PREVENT a scram. | |||
Bypassing this trip does NOT require entering ,.an RPS Instrumentation LCO action. | |||
B. A reactor scram has NOT o*ccurred. | |||
Placing the high level bypass switch in the bypass position will PREVENT a scram. | |||
Bypassing this trip does requires entering an RPS Instrumentation LCO action. | |||
C. A reactor scram has occurred. | |||
If the high level switch had been in the bypass position, the scram would have still | |||
occurred. | |||
Bypassing this trip does NOT require entering an RPS Instrumentation LCO action. | |||
D. A high level scram has occurred. | |||
If the high level switch had been in the bypass position, the scram would have been | |||
PREVENTED. | |||
Bypassing this trip requires entering an RPS Instrumentation LCO action. | |||
Friday, September 28, 2007 9:24:39 AM | |||
7 | |||
Group: | |||
1 | |||
Source: | |||
NEW | |||
Exam: | |||
HT2007-301 | |||
Author/Reviewer: | Author/Reviewer: | ||
BLC/ | BLC/RFA | ||
for SRO A.Correct.B.Incorrect | QUESTIONS REPORT | ||
Also incorrect because the high level trip is only required in Mode 5 IF a rod is withdrawn. | for SRO | ||
Plausible if applicant doesn't know that the bypass switch also works when the mode swtich is in the refuel position (versus only the shutdown position). | A. Correct. | ||
C.Incorrect because the not drained alarm comes in at 3 gallons;whereas the high level trip occurs at 63 gallons, i.e., a scram has not occurred yet.Also incorrect because the bypass switch will prevent the high level trip when the mode switch is in Refuel (or shutdown). | B. Incorrect because the bypass switch will work when the mode switch is in Refuel (or | ||
Plausible if applicant doesn't know alarm setpoint and thinks that the bypass switch only works when the mode switch is in the shutdown position.D.Incorrect because the not drained alarm comes in at 3 gallons;whereas the high level trip occurs at 63 gallons, i.e., a scram has not occurred yet.Also incorrect because the high level trip is only required in Mode 5 IF a rod is withdrawn. | shutdown). Also incorrect because the high level trip is only required in Mode 5 IF a | ||
Plausible if applicant doesn't know alarm setpoint and thinks that this trip feature is required during mode 5 with all rods inserted.SRO only because | rod is withdrawn. Plausible if applicant doesn't know that the bypass switch also works | ||
(2): Facility operating limitations | when the mode swtich is in the refuel position (versus only the shutdown position). | ||
in the technical specfications | C. Incorrect because the not drained alarm comes in at 3 gallons; whereas the high | ||
level trip occurs at 63 gallons, i.e., a scram has not occurred yet. Also incorrect | |||
SYSTEM;and (b)based on those predictions, use procedures | because the bypass switch will prevent the high level trip when the mode switch is in | ||
to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences | Refuel (or shutdown). Plausible if applicant doesn't know alarm setpoint and thinks that | ||
the bypass switch only works when the mode switch is in the shutdown position. | |||
or operations: (CFR: 41.5/45.6)A2.20 Full system activation (full-SCRAM) | D. Incorrect because the not drained alarm comes in at 3 gallons; whereas the high | ||
..4.1*/4.2*References | level trip occurs at 63 gallons, i.e., a scram has not occurred yet. Also incorrect | ||
34AR-603-119-1, Scram Disch Vol Not Drained annunciator | because the high level trip is only required in Mode 5 IF a rod is withdrawn. Plausible if | ||
applicant doesn't know alarm setpoint and thinks that this trip feature is required during | |||
Tier: 2 Keyword: RPS Cog Level: HIGHER Test: SRO Friday, September 28, 2007 9:24:39 AM 8 | mode 5 with all rods inserted. | ||
QUESTIONS REPORT for SRO 80.215004A2.02 | SRO only because ofA2 K&A and 10CFR55.43 (2): Facility operating limitations in the technical specfications and | ||
002/2/1/REFUEL/NEW/HIGHERlHT2007-301/SRO/BLC/RFA | their bases. | ||
A complete core offload was performed at the begining of a refueling outage.Four bundles have just been reloaded around SRM"0" and the prescribed | A2. Ability to (a) predict the impacts ofthe following on the REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM; and (b) based | ||
fuel reload sequence continues by spiralling | on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences ofthose abnormal conditions | ||
outward from SRM"D." The operability | or operations: (CFR: 41.5 / 45.6) A2.20 Full system activation (full-SCRAM) .. 4.1 */ 4.2* | ||
status of the remaining SRMs are: SRM"A" is inoperable; | References | ||
post maintenance | 34AR-603-119-1, Scram Disch Vol Not Drained annunciator procedure | ||
testing is in progress All other SRMs are operable During the testing on SRM"A", the operator inadvertently | 34AR-603-101-1, Scram Disch Vol High Level Trip alarm procedure | ||
withdraws the SRM"c" detector a small amount and the following alarms are received: SRM DETECTOR RETRACTED WHEN NOT*PERMITTED | 34AR-603-110-1, Scram Disch Vol High Level Trip Bypass alarm procedure | ||
(603-222)ROD OUT BLOCK (603-238)Which ONE of the following identifies | Tech Spec 3.3.1.1, RPS Instrumentation | ||
the impact on refueling operations? | Tier: | ||
A.Core alterations | 2 | ||
must now be suspended.Core alterations | Keyword: | ||
may continue in the northwest quadrant.C.Core alterations | RPS | ||
may continue only in the northeast quadrant.D.Core alterations | Cog Level: | ||
may continue anywhere in the core except in the quadrant where SRM"A" is located.A.Incorrect because core alterations | HIGHER | ||
are allowed in a quadrant without an a9jacent operable SRM provided that the bundles being spiral reloaded are in a single fueled region containing | Test: | ||
an operable SRM.Plausible if applicant does not know that tech specs allows refueling with only one operable detector.B.Correct.C.Incorrect | SRO | ||
the partially withdrawn SRM is inoperable. | Friday, September 28, 2007 9:24:39 AM | ||
Plausible if applicant knows that the single fueled region tech spec LCO provision was exercised to begin the reload.D.Incorrect because SRM C is inoperable | 8 | ||
due to being partially withdrawn. | |||
QUESTIONS REPORT | |||
may not be performed in the southwest quadrant where SRM"c" is located.Friday, September 28, 2007 9:24:39 AM 9 | for SRO | ||
Group: 1 Source: NEW Exam: HT2007-301 | 80. 215004A2.02 002/2/1/REFUEL/NEW/HIGHERlHT2007-301/SRO/BLC/RFA | ||
A complete core offload was performed at the begining of a refueling outage. | |||
Four bundles have just been reloaded around SRM "0" and the prescribed fuel reload | |||
sequence continues by spiralling outward from SRM "D." The operability status of the | |||
remaining SRMs are: | |||
SRM "A" is inoperable; post maintenance testing is in progress | |||
All other SRMs are operable | |||
During the testing on SRM "A", the operator inadvertently withdraws the SRM "c" | |||
detector a small amount and the following alarms are received: | |||
SRM DETECTOR RETRACTED WHEN NOT *PERMITTED (603-222) | |||
ROD OUT BLOCK (603-238) | |||
Which ONE of the following identifies the impact on refueling operations? | |||
A. Core alterations must now be suspended. | |||
B~ Core alterations may continue in the northwest quadrant. | |||
C. Core alterations may continue only in the northeast quadrant. | |||
D. Core alterations may continue anywhere in the core except in the quadrant where | |||
SRM "A" is located. | |||
A. Incorrect because core alterations are allowed in a quadrant without an a9jacent | |||
operable SRM provided that the bundles being spiral reloaded are in a single fueled | |||
region containing an operable SRM. Plausible if applicant does not know that tech | |||
specs allows refueling with only one operable detector. | |||
B. Correct. | |||
C. Incorrect becaus~ the partially withdrawn SRM is inoperable. Plausible if applicant | |||
knows that the single fueled region tech spec LCO provision was exercised to begin the | |||
reload. | |||
D. Incorrect because SRM C is inoperable due to being partially withdrawn. Also | |||
incorrect because core alterations may not be performed in the southwest quadrant | |||
where SRM "c" is located. | |||
Friday, September 28, 2007 9:24:39 AM | |||
9 | |||
Group: | |||
1 | |||
Source: | |||
NEW | |||
Exam: | |||
HT2007-301 | |||
Author/Reviewer: | Author/Reviewer: | ||
BLC/ | BLC/RFA | ||
Procedures | QUESTIONS REPORT | ||
and limitations | for SRO | ||
involved in intial core loading, alterations | SRO only because this is linked to 10CFR55.43(6): Procedures and limitations involved in intial core loading, | ||
in core configuration, control rod programming, and determination | alterations in core configuration, control rod programming, and determination ofvarious internal and external effects | ||
on core reactivity. Also linked to Tech specs 3.3.1.2 | |||
Also linked to | A2. Ability to (a) predict the impacts ofthe following on the SOURCE RANGE MONITOR (SRM) SYSTEM; and | ||
A2.Ability to (a)predict the impacts | (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences ofthose abnormal | ||
to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences | conditions or operations: (CFR: 41.5 / 45.6) A2.02 SRM inop condition. .. . | ||
3.4 / 3.7 | |||
or operations: (CFR: 41.5/45.6)A2.02 SRM inop condition. | References: | ||
...3.4/3.7 References: | C51-SRM-LP-01201, SRM lesson plan | ||
C51-SRM-LP-01201, SRM lesson plan TS 3.3.1.2, SRM Instrumentation | TS 3.3.1.2, SRM Instrumentation | ||
34AR-603-222, SRM Detector Retracted When Not Permitted annunciator | 34AR-603-222, SRM Detector Retracted When Not Permitted annunciator procedure | ||
34AR-603-238, Rod Out Block annunciator procedure | |||
F15-RF-LP-04502, Refueling | |||
QUESTIONS REPORT for SRO 81.245000A2.07 | Tier: | ||
2 | |||
/HIGHER/HT2007 | Keyword: | ||
-30 l/SRO/BLC/ | REFUEL | ||
Cog Level: | |||
are: 285 MW(e)Condenser vacuum at 25.0"Hg and steady The SRO is evaluating | HIGHER | ||
whether the current power configuration | Test: | ||
will facilitate | SRO | ||
a manual turbine trip while maintaining | Friday, September 28, 2007 9:24:39 AM | ||
the reactor critical.Which ONE of the following predicts the plant response if the turbine is manually tripped at this power, including the required procedure to be implemented | 10 | ||
after the turbine is manually tripped?A.Steam flow will be within the capacity of the bypass valves.Enter 34GO-OPS-005-1, Power Changes, to adjust reactor power if necessary after the turbine is manually tripped.B.Steam flow will be within the capacity of the bypass valves.Enter 34GO-OPS-013-1, Normal Plant | |||
285 MW(e)is also above the first stage turbine pressure bypass point (27.60/0 power=260 MW(e).Also incorrect because 34GO-OPS-005-1 | QUESTIONS REPORT | ||
is only used when reactor power level is greater than 350/0.Plausible if applicant doesn't know rated electrical | for SRO | ||
81 . 245000A2.07 001/2/2/EHC/NEW/HIGHER/HT2007-30 l/SRO/BLC/RFA | |||
285 MW(e)is also above the first stage turbine pressure bypass point (27.60/0 power=260 MW(e).Plausible if applicant doesn't know rated electrical | Due to a slowly degrading condenser vacuum leak on Unit 1, the control room crew | ||
on Unit 1 (-915 MW(e)C.Correct.D.Incorrect because 34GO-OPS-005-1 | has reduced reactor power from rated power over the last several hours. Current plant | ||
is only used when reactor power level is greater than 35%.Plausible if the applicant thinks that the RPS turbine trip will be bypassed but forgets that the Reactor High Pressure scram will cause a scram.Plausible if applicant reasons that this procedure was previously | conditions are: | ||
being used during the preceding power reduction(s). | 285 MW(e) | ||
Friday, September 28, 2007 9:24:39 AM 11 | Condenser vacuum at 25.0 "Hg and steady | ||
QUESTIONS REPORT for SRO SRO-only due to link to lOCFR55.43 | The SRO is evaluating whether the current power configuration will facilitate a manual | ||
(5): Assessment | turbine trip while maintaining the reactor critical. | ||
of plant conditions | Which ONE of the following predicts the plant response if the turbine is manually | ||
and selection of appropriate | tripped at this power, including the required procedure to be implemented after the | ||
turbine is manually tripped? | |||
A. Steam flow will be within the capacity of the bypass valves. | |||
Enter 34GO-OPS-005-1, Power Changes, to adjust reactor power if necessary after | |||
the turbine is manually tripped. | |||
B. Steam flow will be within the capacity of the bypass valves. | |||
Enter 34GO-OPS-013-1, Normal Plant Shutdown | |||
C~ Steam flow will NOT be within the capacity of the bypass valves. | |||
Enter 34AB-C71-001-1, Scram Procedure | |||
D. Steam flow will NOT be within the capacity of the bypass valves. | |||
Enter 34GO-OPS-005-1, Power Changes, after the turbine is tripped to lower | |||
reactor power. | |||
A. Incorrect because 285 MW(e) is more than 25% rated steam flow (bypass capacity). | |||
285 MW(e) is also above the first stage turbine pressure bypass point (27.60/0 power = | |||
260 MW(e). Also incorrect because 34GO-OPS-005-1 is only used when reactor | |||
power level is greater than 350/0. Plausible if applicant doesn't know rated electrical on | |||
Unit 1 (- 91 5 MW(e) | |||
B. Incorrect because 285 MW(e) is more than 250/0 rated steam flow (bypass capacity). | |||
285 MW(e) is also above the first stage turbine pressure bypass point (27.60/0 power = | |||
260 MW(e). Plausible if applicant doesn't know rated electrical on Unit 1 (- 915 MW(e) | |||
C. Correct. | |||
D. Incorrect because 34GO-OPS-005-1 is only used when reactor power level is | |||
greater than 35%. Plausible if the applicant thinks that the RPS turbine trip will be | |||
bypassed but forgets that the Reactor High Pressure scram will cause a scram. | |||
Plausible if applicant reasons that this procedure was previously being used during the | |||
preceding power reduction(s). | |||
Friday, September 28, 2007 9:24:39 AM | |||
11 | |||
QUESTIONS REPORT | |||
for SRO | |||
SRO-only due to link to lOCFR55.43 (5): Assessment of plant conditions and selection of appropriate | |||
procedures. | procedures. | ||
A2.Ability to (a)predict the impacts of the following on the MAIN TURBINE GENERATOR AND AUXILIARY SYSTEMS;and (b)based on those predictions, use procedures | A2. Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following on the MAIN TURBINE GENERATOR AND | ||
to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences | AUXILIARY SYSTEMS; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate | ||
of those abnormal conditions | the consequences of those abnormal conditions or operations: (CFR: 41.5 / 45.6) A2.07 Loss ofreactor/turbine | ||
or operations: (CFR: 41.5/45.6)A2.07 Loss | pressure control system: Plant-Specific 3.8 / 3.9 | ||
pressure control system: Plant-Specific | References | ||
3.8/3.9 References | 34AB-N61-002-1, Main Condenser Vacuum Low | ||
34AR-650-148-1, Turbine Vacuum Low-Low annunciator procedure | |||
34GO-OPS-005-1, Power Changes | |||
34GO-OPS-013-1, Nonnal Plant Shutdown | |||
B21-SLLS-LP-01401, Main Steam & Low Low Set lesson plan | |||
Tier: | |||
2 | |||
Group: | |||
Keyword: | |||
EHC | |||
Source: | |||
Cog Level: | |||
HIGHER | |||
Exam: | |||
Test: | |||
SRO | |||
Author/Reviewer: | Author/Reviewer: | ||
BLC/ | Friday, September 28,2007 9:24:39 AM | ||
QUESTIONS REPORT for SRO | 2 | ||
NEW | |||
/ | HT2007-301 | ||
-30 l/SRO/BLC/ | BLC/RFA | ||
12 | |||
QUESTIONS REPORT | |||
for SRO | |||
82. 262001A2.08 003/2/1/4160VACINEW/FUND/HT2007-30 l/SRO/BLC/RFA | |||
how the | While performing an electrical tagout, a system operator inadvertently opened breaker | ||
of the | #1 in 125VDC Cabinet 1D (1 R25-S004) which proviqes control power to a 4160VAC | ||
emergency bus. Subsequent attempts to re-close the breaker are unsuccessful, i.e., | |||
of the | the breaker keeps tripping open. | ||
Assuming that the 1A RHR SW Pump was initially.running for a surveillance test, which | |||
is | ONE of the following states how this pump's 4160 VAC breaker will be affected by the | ||
loss of control power, including the correct procedure needed to operate the breaker? | |||
A. The pump breaker will automatically open. | |||
The control power undervoltage trip must be disabled in accordance with | |||
34AB-R22-001-1, Lpss of DC Busses, in order to close ANY of the breakers on this | |||
emergency bus. | |||
B. The pump breaker will automatically open. | |||
The control power undervoltage trip must be disabled in accordance with | |||
34AB-R22-001-1, Loss of DC Busses, in order to re-close ONLY this breaker on | |||
this emergency bus. | |||
Group: 1 Source: NEW Exam: HT2007-301 | C~ The pump will continue to run. | ||
The ONLY way to stop the pump is to depress the button marked "push-to-trip" | |||
(inside the breaker cubicle) in accordance with 34S0-R22-001-1, 4160VAC | |||
System. | |||
D. The *pump will continue to run. | |||
The ONLY way to stop the pump is to depress the button marked "push-to-trip" | |||
(inside the breaker cubicle) in accordance with 34AB-R22-001-1, Loss of DC | |||
Busses. | |||
/ | |||
Friday, September 28, 2007 9:24:39 AM | |||
13 | |||
QUESTIONS REPORT | |||
for SRO | |||
A. Incorrect because only a few breakers have this auto-open feature and they are | |||
only located on 4160VAC emergency bus 1F. (This pump is powered from 1E.) Also | |||
incorrect because this AOP does not provide guidance for overriding this trip feature. | |||
Plausible because this trip-open feature does exist on the 1C RHR SW pump. | |||
B. Incorrect because only a few breakers have this auto-open feature and they are | |||
only located on 4160VAC emergency bus 1F. Also incorrect because this AOP does | |||
not provide guidance for overriding this trip feature. Plausible if the applicant knows | |||
that this AOP provides guidance for restoring control power. | |||
C. Correct. | |||
D. Incorrect because the loss of control power renders the switch on the outside of the | |||
cubicle door inoperable. Also incorrect because the switch on the outside of the door | |||
only works when the breaker is racked in the TEST position. Also incorrect because | |||
the guidance to locally open the breaker is not found in the AOP. Plausible if the | |||
applicant remembers that the charging spring will still be charged. | |||
SRO only because linked to lOCFR55.43(5): Assessment of facility conditions and selection of appropriate | |||
procedures during normal, abnormal, and emergency situations. | |||
A2. Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following on the A.C. ELECTRICAL DISTRIBUTION; and (b) | |||
based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those | |||
abnormal conditions or operations: (CFR: 41.5 / 45.6) A2.08 Opening a disconnect under load ..... 3.3 /3.6 | |||
References | |||
34S0-R22-001-1, 4160VAC System | |||
R22-4160VAC-LP-02702, 4160 VAC lesson plan | |||
34AB-R22-001-1, Loss ofDC Buses AOP | |||
Tier: | |||
2 | |||
Keyword: | |||
4160VAC | |||
Cog Level: | |||
FUND | |||
Te~: | |||
SRO | |||
Friday, September 28, 2007 9:24:39 AM | |||
Group: | |||
1 | |||
Source: | |||
NEW | |||
Exam: | |||
HT2007-301 | |||
Author/Reviewer: | Author/Reviewer: | ||
BLC/ | BLC/RFA | ||
14 | |||
QUESTIONS REPORT | |||
for SRO | |||
83. 295003AA2.04 00 l/l/l/TRANSFORMERINEW/HIGHERlHT2007-30 l/SRO/BLC/RFA | |||
Unit 1 and 2 are operating at 100% power with all4KV busses normally aligned. | |||
A transformer fire and fault occurs on Startup transformer 2C and all automatic actions | |||
associated with the transformer fault occur as expected. | |||
Which ONE of the following identifies how the unavailability of the transformer affects | |||
the AC system lineup and describes the performance of the 34SV-SUV-013-0, Weekly | |||
Breaker Alignment surveillance? | |||
At:' BOTH units are in an active LCO for 3.8.1, AC Sources - Operating | |||
The surveillance is required to be performed WITHIN 1 HOUR even though its | |||
acceptance criteria will NOT be met. | |||
B. BOTH units are in an active LCO for 3.8.1, AC Sources - Operating | |||
'The surveillance is required to be performed IMMEDIATELY even though its | |||
acceptance criteria will NOT be met. | |||
Unit 2 | C. ONLY Unit 2 is in an active LCO for 3.8.1, AC Sources - Operating | ||
The surveillance is required to be performed IMMEDIATELY and its acceptance | |||
criteria WILL be met. | |||
D. ONLY Unit 2 is in an active LCO for 3.8.1, AC Sources - Operating | |||
The surveillance is required to be performed WITHIN 1 HOUR and its acceptance | |||
criteria WILL be met. | |||
Friday, September 28, 2007 9:24:39 AM | |||
with the | 15 | ||
the | Group: | ||
1 | |||
Source: | |||
NEW | |||
Exam: | |||
The | HT2007-301 | ||
The | |||
required to be | |||
an | |||
Friday, September 28, 2007 9:24:39 AM | |||
Group: | |||
Author/Reviewer: | Author/Reviewer: | ||
BLC/ | BLC/RFA | ||
QUESTIONS REPORT | |||
for SRO | |||
Note: Both SATs 1C and 2C are fed from the same point on the 230 kV grid. A SAT | |||
2C fault results in PCB s 179470,179480 tripping open, which affects SAT 1C | |||
availability. | |||
A. Correct | |||
Plausible | B. Incorrect because TS 3.8.1.A.1 requires surveillance within one hour. Plausible | ||
because action statement is similar time frame. | |||
C. Incorrect because both units will be in an active LCD. Also incorrect becau.se TS | |||
3.8.1.A.1 requires surveillance within one hour. Plausible because transformer is on | |||
Unit 2. | |||
D. Incorrect because both units will be in an active LCD. Also incorrect because the | |||
( | acceptance criteria will not be met. | ||
Plausible because transformer is on Unit 2. | |||
SRO only because of tie to lOCFR55.43(2): Tech specs | |||
AA2. Ability to determine and/or interpret the following as they apply to PARTIAL OR COMPLETE LOSS | |||
/ | OF A.C. POWER: (CFR: 41.10/43.5/45.13) AA2.04 System lineups | ||
3.5/3.7 | |||
3. | References | ||
34SV-SUV-013-0, Weekly Breaker Alignment Checks | |||
S22-ELECT-LP-02701, Electrical Distribution System lesson plan | |||
Tech Spec 3.8.1, AC Sources - Operating | |||
Tier: | |||
1 | |||
Keyword: | |||
TRANSFORMER | |||
Cog Level: | |||
QUESTIONS REPORT for SRO | HIGHER | ||
Test: | |||
/ | SRO | ||
Friday, 'September 28,2007 9:24:39 AM' | |||
16 | |||
QUESTIONS REPORT | |||
for SRO | |||
84. 295004AA2.02 OOI/I/I/DC POWERINEW/FUND/HT2007-30I/SRO/BLC/RFA | |||
with | Unit 2 was operating at 500/0 power when the 125VDG Distribution'Gabinet 20, | ||
2R25-S129 was lost and the following annunciator was received: | |||
the | ECCS/RPS DIVISION 1 TROUBLE (602-110) | ||
The SRO is in the process of identifying which analog transmitter trip system (ATTS) | |||
units were affected and is performing a loss of safety function determination in | |||
accordance with the Technical Requirements Manual (TRM). | |||
Which ONE of the following identifies the affected analog transmitter trip units and | |||
describes the TRM Loss of Function Diagrams (LFD)? | |||
A. Two RPS ATTS cabinets will be de-energized. | |||
The loss of function statement found at the bottom of the LFD identifies the channel | |||
combinations which are no longer available for the safety function. | |||
B. Two RPS ATTS cabinets will be de-energized. | |||
The loss of function statement found at the bottom of the LFD identifies the channel | |||
combinations req.uired to be operable in order to maintain the safety function. | |||
C~ Two EGGS ATTS cabinets will be de-energized. | |||
The loss of function statement found at the bottom of the LFD identifies the channel | |||
combinations required to be operable in order to maintain the safety function. | |||
D. Two EGCS ATTS cabinets will be de~energized. | |||
The loss of function statement found at the bottom of the LFD identifies the channel | |||
combinations which are no longer available for the safety function. | |||
Friday, September 28, 2007 9:24:39 AM | |||
17 | |||
QUESTIONS REPORT | |||
for SRO | |||
2 | Each ATTS panel has two internal power supplies. Only one power supply needs to be | ||
available to supply the entire ATTS panel. The ECCS division consists of panels | |||
H11-P925, P926, P927 and P928. ' | |||
125VDC Dist Cab 2D Breakers 1& 2 power up both of the power supplies for panel | |||
2H11-P925. Breakers 5 &7 power up both 'of the power supplies for paneI2H11-P927. | |||
The loss of function statement typically found at the bottom of the LFD identifies the | |||
channel combinations required to be operable in order for instrument function capability | |||
as defined in the instrumentation specification to be maintained. | |||
A. Incorrect because the DC cabinet which was lost does not provide power to the | |||
RPS ATTS cabinets. Also 'incorrect because the LFD identifies the channels required | |||
for the safety function. Plausible since RPS ATTS cabinets are similar to the ECCS | |||
cabinets. | |||
is | B. Incorrect because the DC cabinet which was lost does not provide power to the | ||
. | RPS ATTS cabinets. | ||
C. Correct. | |||
D. Incorrect because the LFD identifies the channels required for the safety function. | |||
Plausible if applicant does not understand the content provided in LFDs. | |||
SRO only because linked to lOCFR55.43 (2): Tech specs | |||
AA2. Ability to determine and/or interpret the following as they apply to PARTIAL OR COMPLETE LOSS | |||
OF D.C. POWER: (CFR: 41.10/43.5 /45.13) AA2.02 Extent ofpartial or complete loss ofD.C. power.... 3.5/3.9 | |||
References | |||
TRM Section 11.0, Loss ofFunction Diagrams | |||
34AB-R22-001-2, Loss ofDC Buses AOP | |||
34AR-602-110-2, ECCS/RPS Division 1 Trouble annunciator procedure | |||
Tier: | |||
1 | |||
(5): Assessment | Group: | ||
of facility conditions | Keyword: | ||
and selection of appropriate | DC POWER | ||
Source: | |||
Cog Level: | |||
FUND | |||
Exam: | |||
Test: | |||
SRO | |||
Author/Reviewer: | |||
Fripay, September 28, 2007 9:24:39 AM | |||
1 | |||
NEW | |||
HT2007-301 | |||
BLC/RFA | |||
18 | |||
QUESTIONS REPORT | |||
for SRO | |||
85. 295014G2.4.31 001/1/2/RODS/NEW/HIGHER/HT2007-30l/SRO/BLC/RFA | |||
Unit 2 is starting up and reactor power is 140/0 power. The operator is pulling rods to | |||
achieve 2 bypass valves to roll the turbine. | |||
Due to a previous rod being difficult to move, the CRD drive water pressure had been | |||
temporarily raised to 300 psid and not re-adjusted back down to a normal pressure. | |||
When the operator placed the rod movement control switch to the single notch out | |||
position for the next control rod, the rod quickly moved from position 16 to 22. | |||
(intended position was 18) | |||
Which ONE of the following identifies an expe,cted annunciator that will be received | |||
and the evaluation of this event? | |||
A. | |||
ROD OUT BLOCK (603-238) | |||
This is a mispositioned control rod. Tech Spec 3.1.6. Rod Pattern Control has a | |||
required action statement. | |||
B. ROD DRIFT (603-247) | |||
This is NOT a mispositioned control rod. Tech Spec 3.1.3 Control Rod Operability | |||
has a required action statement. | |||
C~ RMCS/RWM ROD BLOCK OR SYSTEM TROUBLE (603-239) | |||
This is a mispositioned rod. There are no required actions for tech specs for this | |||
condition. | |||
D. ROD OVERTRAVEL (603-248-1) | |||
This is NOT a mispositioned rod. There are no required actions for tech specs in | |||
this condition. | |||
Friday, September 28, 2007 9:24:39 AM | |||
19 | |||
Group: | |||
2 | |||
Source: | |||
NEW | |||
Exam: | |||
HT2007-301 | |||
Author/Reviewer: | |||
BLC/RFA | |||
QUESTIONS REPORT | |||
for SRO | |||
Note: This condition will cause both annunciators 603-238 &603-239 to alarm. | |||
A. Incorrect because BPWS Tech Spec is only applicable in Modes 1 &2 when | |||
thermal power is < 100/0. Plausible because this alarm will be received and the rod is | |||
considered mispositioned lAW 34GO-OPS-065-0, Section 7.5.1 | |||
B. Incorrect because the rod is considered mispositioned lAW 34GO-OPS-065-0, | |||
Section 7.5.1. (Alarm may not be received.) Plausible if applicant thinks that the rod is | |||
inoperable. | |||
C. Correct. | |||
D. Incorrect because this alarm is only applicable for full-out position 48. Also | |||
incorrect since rod is considered mispositioned lAW 34GO-OPS-065-0, Section 7.5.1. | |||
Plausible if applicant knows that tech specs do not apply and does not understand the | |||
alarm input. | |||
SRO only because this question is tied to tech spec 10CFR55.43 (2) | |||
APE: 295014 Inadvertent Reactivity Addition | |||
. | |||
2.4.31 Knowledge of annunciators alarms and indications / and use ofthe response instructions. (CFR: 41.10/45.3) | |||
IMPORTANCE 3.3 /3.4 | |||
References | |||
34GO-OPS-065-0, Control Rod Movement | |||
34AR-603-248-1, Rod Overtravel annunciator procedure | |||
34AR-603-247-1, Rod Drift annunciator procedure | |||
34AR-603-238-1, Rod Out Block annunciator procedure | |||
34AR-603-239-1, RMCS/RWM Rod Block or System Trouble annunciator procedure | |||
34AB-C11-004-1, Mispositioned Control Rods | |||
Tech Spec 3.1.6, Rod Pattern Control | |||
Tech Spec 3.1.3, Control Rod Operability | |||
Tier: | |||
1 | |||
Keyword: | |||
RODS | |||
Cog Level: | |||
HIGHER | |||
Test: | |||
SRO | |||
Friday, September 28, 2007 9:24:39 AM | |||
20 | |||
QUESTIONS REPORT | |||
for SRO | |||
86. 295020AA2.04 001/1/2/HPCI/RCIC/NEW/HIGHER/HT2007-30l/SRO/ | |||
A heatup and pressurization on Unit 2 was in progress with the following plant | |||
conditions: | |||
Reactor pressure: 130 psig | |||
HPCI/RCIC: Operable in standby lineup | |||
MSIVs: Closed | |||
The heatup and pressurization was temporarily stopped to accomodate opening the | |||
MSIVs in accordance with 34GO-OPS-001-2, Attachment 2, (Opening the MSIVs with | |||
Reactor Pressure> 0 psig.) While pressure was being equalized across the MSIVs, | |||
reactor pressure gradually lowered to 125 psig. Once the MSIVs were open, the crew | |||
re-commenced the heatup and pressurization by withdrawing control rods and reactor | |||
pressure is now at 160 psig. (no other actions have been taken) | |||
Which ONE of the following describes the impact on the startup and the actions which | |||
are allowed by tech specs given the current status of HPCI and RCIC? | |||
A. The heatup and pressurization can continue. | |||
The mode switch may be taken from startup to run. | |||
Restore HPCI to operable within 14 days. | |||
B~ The heatup and pressurization can continue. | |||
The mode switch may NOT be taken to run. | |||
Restore HPCI to operable within 14 days. | |||
C. The heatup and pressurization can NOT continue. | |||
The mode switch may NOT be taken to run. | |||
Reduce steam pressure to =150 psig within 36 hours. | |||
D. The heatup and pressurization can NOT continue. | |||
Place the mode switch to the shutdown position in 12 hours | |||
Reduce steam pressure to =150 psig within 36 hours. | |||
Friday, September 28, 2007 9:24:39 AM | |||
21 | |||
QUESTIONS REPORT | |||
for SRO | |||
HPCI isolated at 128 psig. The crew should recognize that reactor pressure (125 psig) | |||
lowered below the HPCI isolation setpoint while they were equalizing across the MSIVs. | |||
Thus; an inadvertent containment isolation (Group 3) has occurred. | |||
A. Incorrect because LCO 3.0.4 condition a or c cannot be met. Plausible if applicant | |||
thinks that LCO 3.0.4 condition b applies. | |||
B. Correct. | |||
C. Incorrect because the heatup and pressurization in Mode 2 can continue. Plausible | |||
if applicant thinks that the LCO can be exited by simply lowering pressure. | |||
D. Incorrect because the heatup and pressurization in Mode 2 can continue with RCIC | |||
operable. Plausi.ble if the applicant thinks that both HPCI and RCIC have isolated and | |||
that Condition E is applicable. | |||
SRO only because this question is tied to lOCFR55.43(2): Facility operating limitations in the technical | |||
specifications and their bases. | |||
AA2. Ability to determine and/or interpret the following as they apply to INADVERTENT CONTAINMENT | |||
ISOLATION: (CFR: 41.10/43.5/45.13) AA2.04 Reactor pressure | |||
3.9/3.9 | |||
References | |||
. | |||
34GO-OPS-001-2, Plant Startup procedure | |||
. Tech Spec 3.5.1, ECCS-Operating | |||
34S0-E41-001-2, HPCI procedure | |||
E51-RCIC-LP-03901, RCIC lesson plan | |||
Tier: | |||
1 | |||
Keyword: | |||
HPCI/RCIC | |||
Cog Level: | |||
HIGHER | |||
.Test: | |||
SRO | |||
Friday, September 28, 2007 9:24:.39 AM | |||
Group: | |||
Source: | |||
Exam: | |||
Author/Reviewer: | |||
2 | |||
NEW | |||
HT2007-301 | |||
22 | |||
QUESTIONS REPORT | |||
for SRO | |||
87. 295025EA2.06 OOI/l/l/STEAM COOLING/MODIFIED BANK/HIGHER/HT2007-301/SRO/BLC/RFA | |||
A loss of §!! high and low pressure injection has occurred on Unit 2 with the following | |||
conditions: | |||
All rods inserted | |||
Reactor Water Level. | |||
-190 inches and decreasing 2"/min | |||
Reactor Pressure | |||
858 psig being controlled by LLS logic | |||
Steam Cooling is in progress | |||
Because of successful maintenance efforts, HPCI has become available and the crew | |||
has just started injecting to the vessel. The current reactor water level is -189 inches | |||
and rising. | |||
Given these conditions, which ONE of the following procedures is required to be | |||
implemented? | |||
. | |||
A. | |||
CP-2, RPV Flooding | |||
B. CP-1, Steam Cooling | |||
C. CP-1, Emergency Depressurization | |||
D~ RC RPV Control (Non-ATWS) | |||
EOPs require remaining pressurized following a loss of all high and low pressure | |||
injection systems and beginning steam cooling (@ -185") UNTIL an injection system is | |||
regained; then ED. In this case ED'g will eliminate the injection system (HPCI); and | |||
EOPs specifically exempt ED in this situation. The question satisfiesKA because | |||
requires interpretation of RPV water level as it pertains to high reactor pressure, i.e. | |||
being in steam cooling. | |||
A. Incorrect because level instrumentation is available. Plausible because this is,an | |||
override step in the steam cooling procedure. | |||
B. Incorrect because an override step in the steam cooling procedure states that if | |||
reactor water level is increasing, then perform RC/P (non atws). Plausible if the | |||
applicant realizes that level is still less than -185" (entry condition for steam cooling). | |||
C. Incorrect because an override step in the steam cooling procedure states that if any | |||
system is regained then emergency depressurization is required IF level cannot be | |||
restored. Since level is being restored, then emergency depress is not required. | |||
Plausible if the applica~t fails to assess that level is being raised and strictly adheres to | |||
the override step. | |||
D. Correct. | |||
Friday, September 28, 2007 9:24:39 AM | |||
23 | |||
QUESTIONS REPORT | |||
for SRO | |||
SRO only because of link to lOCFR55.43 (5): Assessment of facility conditions and selection of appropriate | |||
procedure. | procedure. | ||
EA2.Ability to determine and/or interpret the following as they apply to HIGH REACTOR PRESSURE: (CFR: 41.10/43.5/45.13)EA2.06 Reactor water leve1.3.7/3.8[ | EA2. Ability to determine and/or interpret the following as they apply to HIGH REACTOR PRESSURE: | ||
(CFR: 41.10/ 43.5 / 45.13) EA2.06 Reactor water leve1. | |||
3.7/3.8 | |||
[N0 reference provided to applicant] | |||
References | References | ||
Licensee's | Licensee's LOR Exam Bank (modified) | ||
LOR Exam Bank (modified) | |||
Media Number: LR-LP-20309 | Media Number: LR-LP-20309 | ||
Objective Number: 201.083.A.04 | Objective Number: 201.083.A.04 | ||
LR-LP-201083 | LR-LP-201083 | ||
SRO NRC CAT-B, RO NRC CAt-B, Active--1, References | SRO NRC CAT - B, RO NRC CAt - B, Active - -1, References - 31EO-EOP-015-2S, rls, KeyWords - PUBLISH, | ||
-31EO-EOP-015-2S, rls, KeyWords-PUBLISH, PROCEDURE,BIENNIAL(B) | PROCEDURE,BIENNIAL(B) | ||
EOP-CP1-LP-20309, Contingency | EOP-CP1-LP-20309, Contingency Procedures (CP-1) lesson plan | ||
Procedures (CP-1)lesson plan Tier: Keyword: Cog Level: Test: 1 STEAM COOLING HIGHER SRO Group: 1 Source: MODIFIED BANK Exam: HT2007-301 | Tier: | ||
Keyword: | |||
Cog Level: | |||
Test: | |||
1 | |||
STEAM COOLING | |||
HIGHER | |||
SRO | |||
Group: | |||
1 | |||
Source: | |||
MODIFIED BANK | |||
Exam: | |||
HT2007-301 | |||
Author/Reviewer: | Author/Reviewer: | ||
BLC/ | BLC/RFA | ||
QUESTIONS.REPORT for SRO 88.295026G2.1.28 | Friday, September 28, 2007 9:24:39 AM | ||
001/1/1/TORUS | 24 | ||
TEMP/NEW/FUND/HT2007-301/SRO/BLC/RFA | |||
Which ONE of the following describes the suppression | QUESTIONS .REPORT | ||
pool water temperature | for SRO | ||
instrumentation | 88. 295026G2.1.28 001/1/1/TORUS TEMP/NEW/FUND/HT2007-301/SRO/BLC/RFA | ||
and tech spec 3.3.3.1, Post Accident Monitoring (PAM)instrumentation | Which ONE of the following describes the suppression pool water temperature | ||
instrumentation and tech spec 3.3.3.1, Post Accident Monitoring (PAM) instrumentation | |||
channel requirements? | channel requirements? | ||
[Reference | [Reference provided] | ||
provided]A.The T48-R647 recorder receives input from only the upper temperature | A. The T48-R647 recorder receives input from only the upper temperature elements. | ||
elements.The 2 torus temperature | The 2 torus temperature channels required by TS 3.3.3.1 can ONLY be comprised | ||
channels required by TS 3.3.3.1 can ONLY be comprised of two lower elements, i.e., N009A-D.B.The T48-R647 recorder receives input from both upper and lower temperature | of two lower elements, i.e., N009A-D. | ||
The 2 torus temperature | B. The T48-R647 recorder receives input from both upper and lower temperature | ||
channels required by TS 3.3.3.1 can ONLY be comprised of two lower elements, i.e., N009A- | elements~ | ||
elements.The 2 torus temperature | The 2 torus temperature channels required by TS 3.3.3.1 can ONLY be comprised | ||
channels required by TS 3.3.3.1 can ONLY be comprised of one lower element (N009A-D)AND one upper element.(N301-N311) | of two lower elements, i.e., N009A-D | ||
C~ The T48-R647 recorder receives input from only the upper temperature elements. | |||
The 2 torus temperature channels required by TS 3.3.3.1 can ONLY be comprised | |||
of one lower element (N009A-D) AND one upper element. (N301-N311) | |||
D..The T48-R647 recorder receives input from both upper and lower temperature | D..The T48-R647 recorder receives input from both upper and lower temperature | ||
elements..The 2 torus temperature | elements. | ||
channels required by TS 3.3.3.1 can ONLY be comprised of one lower element (N009A-D)AND one upper element.(N301-N311) | . | ||
A.Incorrect because TRM Table 10.3-1 requires one N009 and one N300 temperature | The 2 torus temperature channels required by TS 3.3.3.1 can ONLY be comprised | ||
element.Plausible since the TS function is for pool water temperature. | of one lower element (N009A-D) AND one upper element. (N301-N311) | ||
B.Incorrect because T48-R647 only receives input from the N300 elements.Also incorrect because TRM Table 10.3-1 requires one N009 and one N300 temperature | A. Incorrect because TRM Table 10.3-1 requires one N009 and one N300 temperature | ||
element.Plausible since the TS function is for pool watetr temperature. | element. Plausible since the TS function is for pool water temperature. | ||
C.Correct D.Incorrect because recorder T48-R647 only receives input from N300 elements.Plausible since this recorder is for torus temperature | B. Incorrect because T48-R647 only receives input from the N300 elements. Also | ||
indication. | incorrect because TRM Table 10.3-1 requires one N009 and one N300 temperature | ||
SRO only because of tie to 10CFR55.43 | element. Plausible since the TS function is for pool watetr temperature. | ||
(2): Tech specs Provide applicant only the Tech Spec 3.3.3.1.(Don't provide TRM)295026 Suppression | C. Correct | ||
Pool High Water Temperature | D. Incorrect because recorder T48-R647 only receives input from N300 elements. | ||
2.1.28 Knowledge of the purpose and function of major system components | Plausible since this recorder is for torus temperature indication. | ||
and controls.(CFR: 41.7)IMPORTANCE | SRO only because of tie to 10CFR55.43 (2): Tech specs | ||
3.2/3.3 34SV-SUV-019-1/2, Attachment | Provide applicant only the Tech Spec 3.3.3.1. (Don't provide TRM) | ||
2, Torus Temperature | 295026 Suppression Pool High Water Temperature | ||
Monitoring | 2.1.28 Knowledge of the purpose and function of major system components and controls. | ||
(CFR: 41.7) IMPORTANCE 3.2 /3.3 | |||
34SV-SUV-019-1/2, Attachment 2, Torus Temperature Monitoring | |||
TS 3.3.3.1, PAM Instrumentation | TS 3.3.3.1, PAM Instrumentation | ||
TRM Table T10.3-1, Sheet 5 of7, Qualified Post Accident Monitoring | TRM Table T10.3-1, Sheet 5 of7, Qualified Post Accident Monitoring Instrumentation | ||
Instrumentation | 34AR-657-072-1, Multipoint Rcdr 1T47-R611 Temp High annunciator procedure | ||
34AR-654-009-1, Multipoint Rcdr 1T47-R612 Temp High annunciator procedure | |||
Friday, September 28, 2007 9:24:39 AM | |||
25 . | |||
Tier: | |||
Tier: Keyword: Cog Level: Test: 1 TORUS TEMP FUND SRO QUESTIONS REPORT for SRO Group: 1 Source: NEW Exam: HT2007-301 | Keyword: | ||
Cog Level: | |||
Test: | |||
1 | |||
TORUS TEMP | |||
FUND | |||
SRO | |||
QUESTIONS REPORT | |||
for SRO | |||
Group: | |||
1 | |||
Source: | |||
NEW | |||
Exam: | |||
HT2007-301 | |||
Author/Reviewer: | Author/Reviewer: | ||
BLC/ | BLC/RFA | ||
QUESTIONS REPORT for SRO 89.295028EA2.06 | Friday, September 28, 2007 9:24:39 AM | ||
OOI/l/l/DW | 26 | ||
TEMP/NEW/FUND/HT2007-301/SRO/BLC/RFA | |||
A loss of drywell cooling has occurred.The SRO reaches the following ste.p in the primary containment | QUESTIONS REPORT | ||
control flowchart drywell temperature | for SRO | ||
leg: P:ERF:O:RM | 89. 295028EA2.06 OOI/l/l/DW TEMP/NEW/FUND/HT2007-301/SRO/BLC/RFA | ||
:C:O:N:C:URRENTLY | A loss of drywell cooling has occurred. The SRO reaches the following ste.p in the | ||
RC:[Ajpoiint | primary containment control flowchart drywell temperature leg: | ||
P:ERF:O:RM :C:O:N:C:URRENTLY | |||
limiting condition of operation? | RC:[Ajpoiint A | ||
A."Bulk" means a weighted average of the containment | Which ONE of the following describes the meaning of the word "Bulk" and the tech | ||
atmosphere, i.e., drywell AND the torus air spaces.In the event of a DBA, with the intial drywell average air temperature | spec bases for the drywell temperature limiting condition of operation? | ||
=340 of, the resultant peak accident temperature | A. "Bulk" means a weighted average of the containment atmosphere, i.e., drywell AND | ||
is maintained | the torus air spaces. | ||
below the drywell design temperature. | In the event of a DBA, with the intial drywell average air temperature =340 of, the | ||
B."Bulk" means a weighted average of the containment | resultant peak accident temperature is maintained below the drywell design | ||
atmosphere, i.e., drywell AND the torus air spaces.During a DBA, with the intial drywell average air temperature | temperature. | ||
=150 of, the resultant peak accident temperature | B. "Bulk" means a weighted average of the containment atmosphere, i.e., drywell AND | ||
is maintained | the torus air spaces. | ||
below the drywell design temperature. | During a DBA, with the intial drywell average air temperature =150 of, the resultant | ||
c."Bulk" means a weighted average of ONLY the drywell air space temperature. | peak accident temperature is maintained below the drywell design temperature. | ||
During a DBA, with the intial drywell average air temperature | c. "Bulk" means a weighted average of ONLY the drywell air space temperature. | ||
=340 of, the resultant peak accident temperature | During a DBA, with the intial drywell average air temperature =340 of, the resultant | ||
is maintained | peak accident temperature is maintained below the drywell design temperature. | ||
below the drywell design temperature."Bulk" means a weighted average of ONLY the drywell air space temperature. | D~ "Bulk" means a weighted average of ONLY the drywell air space temperature. | ||
During a DBA, with the intia!drywell average air temperature | During a DBA, with the intia! drywell average air temperature =150 of, the resultant | ||
=150 of, the resultant peak accident temperature | peak accident temperature is maintained below the drywell design temperature. | ||
is maintained | , | ||
below the drywell design temperature. | . | ||
,.Friday, September 28, | Friday, September 28, 2007 9:24:39 AM | ||
27 | |||
Group: 1 Source: NEW Exam: HT2007-301 | |||
Group: | |||
1 | |||
Source: | |||
NEW | |||
Exam: | |||
HT2007-301 | |||
Author/Reviewer: | Author/Reviewer: | ||
BLC/ | BLC/RFA | ||
of=150 to preclude reaching the 340 OF design temperature | QUESTIONS REPORT | ||
of containment. | for SRO | ||
Plausible if applicant does not know the definition | A. Incorrect because bulk implies average. Also incorrect because analyses require a | ||
of bulk or does not know the LCO bases.B.Incorrect because bulk implies average.Plausible if applicant thinks that the drywell also includes the torus airspace.C.Incorrect because analyses require a drywell starting temperature | drywell starting temperature of =150 to preclude reaching the 340 OF design | ||
of=150 to preclude reaching the 340 OF design temperature | temperature of containment. Plausible if applicant does not know the definition of bulk | ||
of containment. | or does not know the LCO bases. | ||
Plausible if applicant does not know the LCO bases.D.Correct.SRO only because of link to 10CFR55.43 | B. Incorrect because bulk implies average. Plausible if applicant thinks that the drywell | ||
(5): Tech Spec 3.6.1.5 bases for 150 deg LCO limit.Per discussion | also includes the torus airspace. | ||
w/RFA on 9/25/07: Ability to differentiate | C. Incorrect because analyses require a drywell starting temperature of =150 to | ||
between torus air space and drywell air space is implied.EA2.Ability to determine and/or interpret the following as they apply to HIGH DRYWELL TEMPERATURE: (CFR: 41.10/43.5/45.13)EA2.06 Torus/suppression | preclude reaching the 340 OF design temperature of containment. Plausible if applicant | ||
chamber air space temperature: | does not know the LCO bases. | ||
D. Correct. | |||
SRO only because of link to 10CFR55.43 (5): Tech Spec 3.6.1.5 bases for 150 deg LCO limit. Per discussion | |||
w/ RFA on 9/25/07: Ability to differentiate between torus air space and drywell air space is implied. | |||
EA2. Ability to determine and/or interpret the following as they apply to HIGH DRYWELL | |||
TEMPERATURE: (CFR: 41.10/ 43.5 /45.13) EA2.06 Torus/suppression chamber air space temperature: | |||
Plant-Specific | Plant-Specific | ||
3.4/3.7 References | 3.4 / 3.7 | ||
'EOP-TERMS-LP-20304, EOP Terminology | References | ||
&Definitions | 'EOP-TERMS-LP-20304, EOP Terminology & Definitions | ||
TS 3.6.1.5, Drywell Air Temperature (including | TS 3.6.1.5, Drywell Air Temperature (including bases) | ||
bases)TRM Table TI0.3-1, Qualified Post Accident Monitoring | TRM Table TI0.3-1, Qualified Post Accident Monitoring Instrumentation | ||
Instrumentation | 34SV-SUV-019-1, Surveillance Checks | ||
34SV-SUV-019-1, Surveillance | Tier: | ||
1 | |||
QUESTIONS REPORT for SRO 90.295033G2.4.50 | Keyword: | ||
DW TEMP | |||
/HIGHER/HT2007 | Cog Level: | ||
- | FUND | ||
Test: | |||
that the | SRO | ||
of these secondary containment | Friday, September 28, 2007 9:24:39 AM | ||
28 | |||
QUESTIONS REPORT | |||
for SRO | |||
90. 295033G2.4.50 001/1/2/REFUEL/NEW/HIGHER/HT2007-30l/SRO/BLC/RFA | |||
A refueling accident occurred in the Unit 1 fuel pool and the following alarms were | |||
received in the Unit 1 control room: | |||
REFUELING FLOOR VENT EXHAUST RADIATION HIGH | |||
REFUELING FLOOR AREA RADIATION HIGH | |||
The operator has determined that the 1D11-K611 A-D are causing the valid EXHAUST | |||
rad alarm and the refueling floor 1D21-K601 0 is causing the valid AREA rad alarm. | |||
Which ONE of the following describes the significance of these secondary containment | |||
alarm setpoints? | alarm setpoints? | ||
[Reference | [Reference provided] | ||
provided]A.The annunciator | A. The annunciator setpoint for the EXHAUST rad monitor satisfies the entry condition | ||
setpoint for the EXHAUST rad monitor satisfies the entry condition value listed in the secondary containment | value listed in the secondary containment control table 6. | ||
control table 6.The threshold for an alert classification, due to fuel damage by fuel handling accident, is NOT met.B.The annunciator | The threshold for an alert classification, due to fuel damage by fuel handling | ||
setpoint for the AREA rad monitor satisfies the entry condition value listed in the secondary containment | accident, is NOT met. | ||
control table 6.The threshold for an alert classification, due to fuel damage by fuel handling accident, IS met.c.The ,annunciator | B. The annunciator setpoint for the AREA rad monitor satisfies the entry condition | ||
setpoint for the AREA rad monitor satisfies* | value listed in the secondary containment control table 6. | ||
the entry condition value listed in the secondary containment | The threshold for an alert classification, due to fuel damage by fuel handling | ||
control table 6.The threshold for an alert classification, due to fuel damage by fuel handling accident, IS met.The annunciator | accident, IS met. | ||
setpoint for the EXHAUST rad monitor DOES NOT meet the entry condition value listed in the secondary containment | c. The ,annunciator setpoint for the AREA rad monitor satisfies* the entry condition | ||
control table 6.The threshold for an alert classification, due to fuel damage by fuel handling accident, is NOT met.Friday, September 28, 2007 9:24:39 AM 29 | value listed in the secondary containment control table 6. | ||
QUESTIONS REPORT for SRO REFUELING FLOOR VENT EXHAUST RADIATION HIGH (601-409)REFUELING FLOOR AREA RADIATION HIGH (601-110)A.Incorrect because the exhaust alarm is only HIGH (versus HIGH HIGH).Plausible if applicant does not know there is a HIGH HIGH alarm available. | The threshold for an alert classification, due to fuel damage by fuel handling | ||
B.Incorrect because the ARM setpoint is 15 mr/hr, i.e., the operator must used | accident, IS met. | ||
occurs above the alarm setpoint value, which cannot be determined | D~ The annunciator setpoint for the EXHAUST rad monitor DOES NOT meet the entry | ||
from the information | condition value listed in the secondary containment control table 6. | ||
provided.Plausible if applicant does not know the alarm setpoint is below the 50 mr/hr threshold value.C.Incorrect because the ARM alarm setpoint is 15 mr/hr.The alert classification | The threshold for an alert classification, due to fuel damage by fuel handling | ||
is not reached or cannot be determined | accident, is NOT met. | ||
from the information | Friday, September 28, 2007 9:24:39 AM | ||
provided.Plausible if applicant does not know the difference | 29 | ||
between the HIGH HIGH alarm and the HIGH alarm D.Correct.Provide Reference: | |||
Page 33 of 46 in 73EP-EIP-001-0, Section 18.0 Fuel Damage By Fuel Handling Accident Provide Reference: | QUESTIONS REPORT | ||
Table 4 and Table 6 of Secondary Containment | for SRO | ||
Control (not flowchart) | REFUELING FLOOR VENT EXHAUST RADIATION HIGH (601-409) | ||
SRO-only because linked to 10CFR55.43 | REFUELING FLOOR AREA RADIATION HIGH (601-110) | ||
(5): Assessment | A. Incorrect because the exhaust alarm is only HIGH (versus HIGH HIGH). Plausible if | ||
of facility conditions | applicant does not know there is a HIGH HIGH alarm available. | ||
and selection of appropriaate | B. Incorrect because the ARM setpoint is 15 mr/hr, i.e., the operator must used | ||
procedures | 1D21-P600 recorder to determine reading. Also incorrect because alert classification | ||
during normal, abnormal, and emergency situations. | occurs above the alarm setpoint value, which cannot be determined from the | ||
Also | information provided. Plausible if applicant does not know the alarm setpoint is below | ||
(7): Fuel handling facilities | the 50 mr/hr threshold value. | ||
and procedures. | C. Incorrect because the ARM alarm setpoint is 15 mr/hr. The alert classification is not | ||
EPE: 295033 High Secondary Containment | reached or cannot be determined from the information provided. Plausible if applicant | ||
Area Radiation Levels 2.4.50 Ability to verify system alann setpoints and operate controls identified | does not know the difference between the HIGH HIGH alarm and the HIGH alarm | ||
in the alann response manual.(CFR: 45.3)IMPORTANCE | D. Correct. | ||
3.3/3.3.References | Provide Reference: Page 33 of 46 in 73EP-EIP-001-0, Section 18.0 Fuel Damage By Fuel Handling Accident | ||
31EO-EOP- | Provide Reference: Table 4 and Table 6 of Secondary Containment Control (not flowchart) | ||
Control flowchart 73EP-EIP-00I-0, Section 18, Fuel Damage By Fuel Handling Accident | SRO-only because linked to 10CFR55.43 (5): Assessment of facility conditions and selection of appropriaate | ||
procedures during normal, abnormal, and emergency situations. Also linked to 10CFR55.43 (7): Fuel | |||
handling facilities and procedures. | |||
BLC/RFA Friday, September 28, 2007 9:24:39 AM 30 | EPE: 295033 High Secondary Containment Area Radiation Levels | ||
QUESTIONS REPORT for SRO 91.295038G2.2.22 | 2.4.50 Ability to verify system alann setpoints and operate controls identified in the alann response manual. | ||
00l/1/1/RELEASE/NEW/FUND/HT2007-301/SRO/BLC/RFA | (CFR: 45.3) IMPORTANCE 3.3 /3.3 | ||
While operating at 1000/0 power, the following alarm is received: OIG AVG ANNUAL REL LIMIT WILL BE EXCEEDED (601-406-2) | . | ||
Which ONE of the following radiation monitors triggered this alarm and which limiting condition of operation (LCO)includes the required actions if the radiation monitor is declared inoperable? | References | ||
A.Offgas pretreatment | 31EO-EOP-O14-1, Unit 1 Secondary Containment Control flowchart | ||
rad monitors (D11-K601 and K602)Main Condenser Offgas LCO 3.7.6 B!I Offgas pretreatment | 73EP-EIP-00I-0, Section 18, Fuel Damage By Fuel Handling Accident | ||
rad monitors (D11-K601 and K602).Offsite Dose Calculation | 34AR-601-409-1, Refueling Floor Vent Exhaust Radiation High annunciator procedure | ||
Manual (ODCM)Gaseous Effluent Monitoring | 34AR-601-110-1, Refueling Floor Area Radiation High annunciator procedure | ||
Instrumentation | Tier: | ||
LCO 3.1.1 C.Stack offgas rad monitor (Normal range D11-K600A and B)Main Condenser Offgas LCO 3.7.6 D.Stack offgas rad monitor (Normal range D11-K600A and B)Offsite Dose Calculation | 1 | ||
Manual (ODCM)Gaseous Effluent Monitoring | Group: | ||
Instrumentation | 2 | ||
LCO 3.1.1 A.Incorrect because LCO 3.7.6 does not include action statements | Keyword: | ||
when this rad monitor becomes inoperable. | REFUEL | ||
Plausible because the rad monitor alarm setpoint is based on the 240 micoCurie limiting condition of op*eration | Source: | ||
in LCO 3.7.6.B.Correct.C.Incorrect because the alarm is not triggered by the stack rad monitor.Also incorrect because LCO 3.7.6 does not include action statements | NEW | ||
when this rad monitor becomes inoperable. | Cog Level: | ||
Plausible because the rad monitor alarm setpoint is based on the 240 micoCurie limiting condition of operation in LCO 3.7.6.Also plausible if applicant does not know what causes alarm and simply relies on annunciator | HIGHER | ||
wording.D.Incorrect because the alarm is not triggered by the stack rad monitor.Plausible if applicant simply relies on the annunciator | Exam: | ||
label or does not know the basis for gaseous instrumentation | HT2007-301 | ||
setpoints in ODCM.SRO only because tied to 10CFR55.43 | Test: | ||
(2): Licensing basis ODCM EPE: 295038 High Off-Site Release Rate 2.2.22 Knowledge of limiting conditions | SRO | ||
for operations | Author/Reviewer: | ||
and safety limits.(CFR: 43.2 I 45.2)IMPORTANCE | BLC/RFA | ||
3.4 14.1 References | Friday, September 28, 2007 9:24:39 AM | ||
LCO 3.7.6, Main Condenser Offgas HNP ODCM, Chapter 3, Gaseous Effluents 34AR-601-406-2, O/G Avg Annual ReI Limit Will Be Exceeded annunciator | 30 | ||
28, 2007 9:24:39 AM 31. | QUESTIONS REPORT | ||
Tier: Keyword: Cog Level: Test: 1 RELEASE FUND SRO QUESTIONS REPORT for SRO Group: 1 Source:, NEW Exam: HT2007-301 | for SRO | ||
91. 295038G2.2.22 00l/1/1/RELEASE/NEW/FUND/HT2007-301/SRO/BLC/RFA | |||
While operating at 1000/0 power, the following alarm is received: | |||
OIG AVG ANNUAL REL LIMIT WILL BE EXCEEDED (601-406-2) | |||
Which ONE of the following radiation monitors triggered this alarm and which limiting | |||
condition of operation (LCO) includes the required actions if the radiation monitor is | |||
declared inoperable? | |||
A. | |||
Offgas pretreatment rad monitors (D11-K601 and K602) | |||
Main Condenser Offgas LCO 3.7.6 | |||
B!I Offgas pretreatment rad monitors (D11-K601 and K602) | |||
. Offsite Dose Calculation Manual (ODCM) Gaseous Effluent Monitoring | |||
Instrumentation LCO 3.1.1 | |||
C. Stack offgas rad monitor (Normal range D11-K600A and B) | |||
Main Condenser Offgas LCO 3.7.6 | |||
D. Stack offgas rad monitor (Normal range D11-K600A and B) | |||
Offsite Dose Calculation Manual (ODCM) Gaseous Effluent Monitoring | |||
Instrumentation LCO 3.1.1 | |||
A. Incorrect because LCO 3.7.6 does not include action statements when this rad | |||
monitor becomes inoperable. Plausible because the rad monitor alarm setpoint is | |||
based on the 240 micoCurie limiting condition of op*eration in LCO 3.7.6. | |||
B. Correct. | |||
C. Incorrect because the alarm is not triggered by the stack rad monitor. Also incorrect | |||
because LCO 3.7.6 does not include action statements when this rad monitor becomes | |||
inoperable. Plausible because the rad monitor alarm setpoint is based on the 240 | |||
micoCurie limiting condition of operation in LCO 3.7.6. Also plausible if applicant does | |||
not know what causes alarm and simply relies on annunciator wording. | |||
D. Incorrect because the alarm is not triggered by the stack rad monitor. Plausible if | |||
applicant simply relies on the annunciator label or does not know the basis for gaseous | |||
instrumentation setpoints in ODCM. | |||
SRO only because tied to 10CFR55.43 (2): Licensing basis ODCM | |||
EPE: 295038 High Off-Site Release Rate | |||
2.2.22 Knowledge of limiting conditions for operations and safety limits. (CFR: 43.2 I 45.2) | |||
IMPORTANCE 3.4 14.1 | |||
References | |||
LCO 3.7.6, Main Condenser Offgas | |||
HNP ODCM, Chapter 3, Gaseous Effluents | |||
34AR-601-406-2, O/G Avg Annual ReI Limit Will Be Exceeded annunciator procedure | |||
Friday, SeptE?mber 28, 2007 9:24:39 AM | |||
31. | |||
Tier: | |||
Keyword: | |||
Cog Level: | |||
Test: | |||
1 | |||
RELEASE | |||
FUND | |||
SRO | |||
QUESTIONS REPORT | |||
for SRO | |||
Group: | |||
1 | |||
Source:, | |||
NEW | |||
Exam: | |||
HT2007-301 | |||
Author/Reviewer: | Author/Reviewer: | ||
BLC/ | BLC/RFA | ||
QUESTIONS REPORT for SRO 92.400000A2.03 | Friday, September 28, 2007 9:24:39 AM | ||
OOl/2/1/CCW/NEW/HIGHER/HT2007-301/SRO/BLC/RFA | 32 | ||
Unit 2 is at.300/0 power during a startup after an extended outage when the following alarm is received: RBCCW HX OUTLET TEMP HIGH (650-249)The control room operator observes the RBCCW pump suction temperature | |||
is 101°F and dispatches | QUESTIONS REPORT | ||
the system operator to increase service water flow through the heat exchanger. | for SRO | ||
As the operator is locally throttling | 92. 400000A2.03 OOl/2/1/CCW/NEW/HIGHER/HT2007-301/SRO/BLC/RFA | ||
open the service water valve, service water system pressure lowers below the RBCCW system pressure and the following alarm is received: HX PSW/RBCCW DIFF PRESS LOW (650-238)Which ONE of the following identiffes | Unit 2 is at .300/0 power during a startup after an extended outage when the following | ||
a service water valve listed in the high temperature | alarm is received: | ||
annunciator | RBCCW HX OUTLET TEMP HIGH (650-249) | ||
procedure that should have been opened to correct the high temperature | The control room operator observes the RBCCW pump suction temperature is 101°F | ||
condition and also identifies | and dispatches the system operator to increase service water flow through the heat | ||
the minimum required tech spec actions for the low pressure condition? | exchanger. As the operator is locally throttling open the service water valve, service | ||
A.2P41-F440A, RBCCW Hx service water discharge valve.Service water grab samples are required to be taken once per shift even if the service water system effluent rad monitor is operable.B!'2P41-F440A, RBCCW Hx service water discharge valve.The service water system effluent rad monitor | water system pressure lowers below the RBCCW system pressure and the following | ||
be operable.Grab samples are not required to be taken.C.2P41-F491, RBCCW Hx-PSW discharge valve.The service water system effluent rad monitor | alarm is received: | ||
be operable.Grab samples are not required to be taken.D.2P41-F491, RBCCW Hx-PSW discharge valve.Service water grab samples are required to be taken once per shift even if the service water system effluent rad monitor is operable.Friday, September 28, 2007 9:24:39 AM 33 | HX PSW/RBCCW DIFF PRESS LOW (650-238) | ||
Group: 1 Source: NEW Exam: HT2007-301 | Which ONE of the following identiffes a service water valve listed in the high | ||
temperature annunciator procedure that should have been opened to correct the high | |||
temperature condition and also identifies the minimum required tech spec actions for | |||
the low pressure condition? | |||
A. 2P41-F440A, RBCCW Hx service water discharge valve. | |||
Service water grab samples are required to be taken once per shift even if the | |||
service water system effluent rad monitor is operable. | |||
B!' 2P41-F440A, RBCCW Hx service water discharge valve. | |||
The service water system effluent rad monitor is required to be operable. | |||
Grab samples are not required to be taken. | |||
C. 2P41-F491, RBCCW Hx - PSW discharge valve. | |||
The service water system effluent rad monitor is required to be operable. | |||
Grab samples are not required to be taken. | |||
D. 2P41-F491, RBCCW Hx - PSW discharge valve. | |||
Service water grab samples are required to be taken once per shift even if the | |||
service water system effluent rad monitor is operable. | |||
Friday, September 28, 2007 9:24:39 AM | |||
33 | |||
Group: | |||
1 | |||
Source: | |||
NEW | |||
Exam: | |||
HT2007-301 | |||
Author/Reviewer: | Author/Reviewer: | ||
BLC/ | BLC/RFA | ||
valves are the heat exchanger outlet valves whereas the P41-F491 valve is a common discharge valve for both heat exchangers. | QUESTIONS REPORT | ||
The F491 valve will affect the pressure.A.Incorrect because the service water grab samples are ONLY required if the rad monitor is inoperable. | for SRO | ||
Plausible because this is one of the required actions listed in this ODCM LCO.B.Correct.C.Incorrect because this is not the valve listed in the high temperature | The P41-F440A(B) valves are the heat exchanger outlet valves whereas the P41-F491 | ||
valve is a common discharge valve for both heat exchangers. The F491 valve will | |||
Plausible if the applicant knows that this valve is named in the dP alarm procedure to adjust the | affect the pressure. | ||
pressure.D.Incorrect because this is not the valve listed in the high temperature | A. Incorrect because the service water grab samples are ONLY required if the rad | ||
monitor is inoperable. Plausible because this is one of the required actions listed in this | |||
Incorrect because the service water grab samples are ONLY required if the rad monitor is inoperable. | ODCM LCO. | ||
Plausible because this is one of the required actions listed in this ODCM LCO.Plausible if the applicant knows that this valve is named in the dP alarm procedure to adjust the | B. Correct. | ||
pressure.Also plausible if applicant knows that dP alarm procedure states that if the dP instruments | C. Incorrect because this is not the valve listed in the high temperature alarm | ||
procedure. Plausible if the applicant knows that this valve is named in the dP alarm | |||
(2): Facility operating limitations | procedure to adjust the PSWIRBCCW differential pressure. | ||
in the technical specifications | D. Incorrect because this is not the valve listed in the high temperature alarm | ||
and their bases.Also tied to lOCFR55.43 | procedure. Incorrect because the service water grab samples are ONLY required if the | ||
(5): Assessment | rad monitor is inoperable. Plausible because this is one of the required actions listed in | ||
of facility conditions | this ODCM LCO. Plausible if the applicant knows that this valve is named in the dP | ||
and selection of appropriate | alarm procedure to adjust the PSWIRBCCW differential pressure. Also plausible if | ||
procedures | applicant knows that dP alarm procedure states that if the dP instruments are | ||
during normal, abnormal, and emergency situations. | inoperable, then confirm the rad monitor is operable. | ||
A2.Ability to (a)predict the impacts of the following on the CCWS and (b)based on those predictions, use procedures | SRO only because this question is tied to lOCFR55.43 (2): Facility operating limitations in the technical | ||
to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences | specifications and their bases. Also tied to lOCFR55.43 (5): Assessment of facility conditions and selection of | ||
of those abnormal operation: (CFR: 41.5/45.6) | appropriate procedures during normal, abnormal, and emergency situations. | ||
A2.03 High/low CCW temperature | A2. Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following on the CCWS and (b) based on those predictions, use | ||
..2.9/3.0 References | procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those abnormal operation: (CFR: 41.5/45.6) | ||
34AR-650-238-2, Hx PSW/RBCCW DiffPress Low annunciator | A2.03 High/low CCW temperature .. 2.9 / 3.0 | ||
References | |||
34AR-650-238-2, Hx PSW/RBCCW DiffPress Low annunciator procedure | |||
34AR-650-249-2, RBCCW Hx Outlet Temp High annunicator procedure | |||
Instrumentation | 34S0-P42-001-1, Section 7.3.8, Adjusting RBCCW/PSW Differential pressure | ||
HNP ODCM, Section 2.1.1, Liquid Effluent Monitoring Instrumentation Control | |||
QUESTIONS REPORT for SRO 93.600000G2.4.29 | P42-RBCCW-LP-00901, RBCCW lesson plan | ||
00 l/l/l/E-PLAN/MODIFIED | Tie~ | ||
BANK/HIGHERlHT2007- | .2 | ||
Keyword: | |||
CCW | |||
10:00 am: Fire brigade dispatched | Cog Level: | ||
following a fire reported to the control room in an unidentified | HIGHER | ||
electrical | Test: | ||
panel in the Southwest corner of Unit 2 Reactor Building 130'elev.10:10 am: Fire brigade leader arrives at the scene and contacts the control room to inform the SRO that a breaker was on fire.10: 12 am: Fire brigade leader reports to control room that the power supply to 2E11-F015A | SRO | ||
RHR injection valve (600V MCC E-A Frame 3C)was burning.Which ONE of the following describes the emergency plan classification | Friday, September 28, 2007 9:24:3.9 AM | ||
34 | |||
QUESTIONS REPORT | |||
for SRO | |||
93. 600000G2.4.29 00 l/l/l/E-PLAN/MODIFIED BANK/HIGHERlHT2007-30l/SRO/BLC/RFA | |||
Unit 2 is in a refueling outage and the "A" Loop of RHR is in shutdown cooling. | |||
The following events occurred at the times listed b~low: | |||
10:00 am: Fire brigade dispatched following a fire reported to the control | |||
room in an unidentified electrical panel in the Southwest corner of | |||
Unit 2 Reactor Building 130' elev. | |||
10:10 am: Fire brigade leader arrives at the scene and contacts the control | |||
room to inform the SRO that a breaker was on fire. | |||
10:12 am: Fire brigade leader reports to control room that the power supply | |||
to 2E11-F015A RHR injection valve (600V MCC E-A Frame 3C) | |||
was burning. | |||
Which ONE of the following describes the emergency plan classification | |||
requirements? | requirements? | ||
A.Declare an Unusual Event beginning at 10:00.Do not declare an Alert.B.Declare an Alert beginning at 10:12.Do not declare an Unusual Event.C.Declare an Unusual Event beginning at 10:00.Declare an Alert beginning at 10:12.D.Declare an Unusual Event at 10:10.Do not declare an Alert.Need to cover this question with licensee....E-Plan classification | A. | ||
is'Changing at Hatch, but question will still work.This KIA was changed from 6000000 G2.4.49[Ability to perform w/o reference to procedures | Declare an Unusual Event beginning at 10:00. | ||
those actions that require immediate operation of system components | Do not declare an Alert. | ||
and controls]TO 6000000 G2.4.29[Knowledge | B. Declare an Alert beginning at 10:12. | ||
of the emergency plan]BECAUSE the Hatch Fire AOP does not include any immediate actions.SRO only because of link to 10CFR55.43 | Do not declare an Unusual Event. | ||
(5): Assessment | C. Declare an Unusual Event beginning at 10:00. | ||
of facility conditions | Declare an Alert beginning at 10:12. | ||
and E-plan classification. | D. Declare an Unusual Event at 10:10. | ||
APE: 600000 Plant Fire On Site 2.4.29 Knowledge | Do not declare an Alert. | ||
RO 2.6/SRO 4.0 References | Need to cover this question with licensee....E-Plan classification is 'Changing at Hatch, but | ||
Draft 73EP-EIP-001-0, EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION | question will still work. | ||
AND INITIAL ACTIONS EP-LP- | This KIA was changed from 6000000 G2.4.49 [Ability to perform w/o reference to procedures those actions | ||
Activities | that require immediate operation of system components and controls] | ||
Friday, September 28, 2007 9:24:39 AM 35 | TO | ||
Tier: Keyword: Cog | 6000000 G2.4.29 [Knowledge of the emergency plan] BECAUSE the Hatch Fire AOP does not include any | ||
Test: 1 E-PLAN HIGHER SRO QUESTIONS REPORT for SRO Group: 1 Source: MODIFIED BANK Exam: HT2007-301 | immediate actions. | ||
SRO only because of link to 10CFR55.43 (5): Assessment of facility conditions and E-plan classification. | |||
APE: 600000 Plant Fire On Site | |||
2.4.29 Knowledge ofthe emergency.plan. (CFR: 43.5 /45.11) IMPORTANCE RO 2.6 / SRO 4.0 | |||
References | |||
Draft 73EP-EIP-001-0, EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION AND INITIAL ACTIONS | |||
EP-LP-20101-03, Initial/Terminating Activities | |||
Friday, September 28, 2007 9:24:39 AM | |||
35 | |||
Tier: | |||
Keyword: | |||
Cog Leve~: | |||
Test: | |||
1 | |||
E-PLAN | |||
HIGHER | |||
SRO | |||
QUESTIONS REPORT | |||
for SRO | |||
Group: | |||
1 | |||
Source: | |||
MODIFIED BANK | |||
Exam: | |||
HT2007-301 | |||
Author/Reviewer: | Author/Reviewer: | ||
BLC/ | BLC/RFA | ||
QUESTIONS REPORT for SRO 94.G2.1.14 | Friday, September 28, 2007 9:24:39 AM | ||
/FUND/HT2007 | 36 | ||
- | |||
QUESTIONS REPORT | |||
a plant personnel notification (including | for SRO | ||
94. G2.1.14 001/3/1INOTIFICATIONSINEW/FUND/HT2007-30I/SRO/BLC/RFA | |||
that is first required when the reactor is made critical and is AGAIN required when the mode switch is transferred | Which ONE of the following identifies a plant personnel notification (including the | ||
to RUN?A!'On-shift Lab foreman In accordance | specific procedure) that is first required when the reactor is made critical and is AGAIN | ||
with 34GO-OPS-001-2, Plant Startup B.Northern/Southen | required when the mode switch is transferred to RUN? | ||
Control Center In accordance | A!' On-shift Lab foreman | ||
with 34GO-OPS-001-2, Plant Startup C.Plant Manager lAW Reactivity | In accordance with 34GO-OPS-001-2, Plant Startup | ||
Management | B. Northern/Southen Control Center | ||
Program, 40AC-ENG-016-0 | In accordance with 34GO-OPS-001-2, Plant Startup | ||
D.Reactor Engineer lAW Reactivity | C. Plant Manager | ||
Management | lAW Reactivity Management Program, 40AC-ENG-016-0 | ||
Program, 40AC-ENG-016-0 | D. Reactor Engineer | ||
A.Correct.B.Incorrect because the procedure does not state this because at these points, the dispatcher | lAW Reactivity Management Program, 40AC-ENG-016-0 | ||
is not affected.Plausible if applicant perceives that impending tie-to-the-grid | A. Correct. | ||
activities | B. Incorrect because the procedure does not state this because at these points, the | ||
are being approached. | dispatcher is not affected. Plausible if applicant perceives that impending tie-to-the-grid | ||
C.Incorrect because the procedure does not state this.Plausible if applicant reasons that these plateaus are important for the plant manager to be aware of.D.Incorrect because the procedure does not state this.Plausible if applicant reasons that these plateaus are important for the reactor engineer to aware of.SRO only because of link to 10CFR55.43 | activities are being approached. | ||
(5): procedures | C. Incorrect because the procedure does not state this. Plausible if applicant reasons | ||
2.1.14 Knowledge of system status criteria which require the notification | that these plateaus are important for the plant manager to be aware of. | ||
D. Incorrect because the procedure does not state this. Plausible if applicant reasons | |||
2.5/3.3 References | that these plateaus are important for the reactor engineer to ~e aware of. | ||
34GO-OPS-001-2, Plant Startup Tier: 3 Keyword:.NOTIFICATIONS | SRO only because of link to 10CFR55.43 (5): procedures | ||
Cog Level: FUND Test: SRO Friday, September 28, 2007 9:24:40 AM Group: 1 Source: NEW Exam: HT2007-301 | 2.1.14 Knowledge of system status criteria which require the notification ofplant personnel. (CFR: 43.5 / 45.12) | ||
IMPORTANCE 2.5 / 3.3 | |||
References | |||
34GO-OPS-001-2, Plant Startup | |||
Tier: | |||
3 | |||
Keyword: | |||
. NOTIFICATIONS | |||
Cog Level: | |||
FUND | |||
Test: | |||
SRO | |||
Friday, September 28, 2007 9:24:40 AM | |||
Group: | |||
1 | |||
Source: | |||
NEW | |||
Exam: | |||
HT2007-301 | |||
Author/Reviewer: | Author/Reviewer: | ||
BLC/ | BLC/RFA | ||
QUESTIONS REPORT for SRO 95.G2.1.7 | 37 | ||
-30 l/SRO/BLC/ | |||
QUESTIONS REPORT | |||
Core flow is 50.82 Mlbm/hr Reactor power is 780/0 OPRMs are OPERABLE Given these plant conditions, which ONE of the following is correct?A':I The OPRMs are NOT armed at this point on the power-to-flow | for SRO | ||
map.Tech Specs require only the period based algorithm for the OPRM operability. | 95. G2.1.7 001/3/1/0PRM/NEW/HIGHERlHT2007-30 l/SRO/BLC/RFA | ||
B.The OPRMs are armed at this point on the power-to-flow | Unit 2 is operating with the following conditions: | ||
map., Tech Specs require only the period based algorithm for the OPRM operability. | Core flow is 50.82 Mlbm/hr | ||
C.The OPRMs-are NOT armed at this point on the power-to-flow | Reactor power is 780/0 | ||
map.Tech Specs require both the amplitude and period algorithms | OPRMs are OPERABLE | ||
for the OPRM operability. | Given these plant conditions, which ONE of the following is correct? | ||
D.The OPRMs are armed at this point on the power-to-flow | A':I The OPRMs are NOT armed at this point on the power-to-flow map. | ||
map.Tech Specs require both the amplitude and period algorithms | Tech Specs require only the period based algorithm for the OPRM operability. | ||
for the OPRM operability. | B. The OPRMs are armed at this point on the power-to-flow map. | ||
A.Correct B.Incorrect because this point is outside the OPRM armed region of>250/0 power and<600/0 core flow.Plausible if applicant does not know when the OPRMs auto-arm themselves. | , Tech Specs require only the period based algorithm for the OPRM operability. | ||
C.Incorrect because only the period based algorithm is required by tech specs.Plausible if applicant does not know basis for OPRM trip function or reasons that two o.ut of three | C. The OPRMs- are NOT armed at this point on the power-to-flow map. | ||
operable.D.Incorrect because this point is outside the OPRM armed region of>25°ft>>power and<600/0 core flow.Also incorrect because only the period based algorithm is required by tech specs.Plausible if applicant does not know when the OPRMs auto-arm themselves | Tech Specs require both the amplitude and period algorithms for the OPRM | ||
or does not know the bases for the OPRM'trip function.SRO only because | operability. | ||
(2): Tech Specs bases 2.1.7 Ability to | D. The OPRMs are armed at this point on the power-to-flow map. | ||
and make operational | Tech Specs require both the amplitude and period algorithms for the OPRM | ||
judgments based onoperating | operability. | ||
characteristics | A. Correct | ||
B. Incorrect because this point is outside the OPRM armed region of >250/0 power and | |||
interpretation.(CFR: 43.5/45.12/45.13)IMPORTANCE | < 600/0 core flow. Plausible if applicant does not know when the OPRMs auto-arm | ||
3.7/4.4 References | themselves. | ||
34GO-OPS-005-2, Power Changes, Attachment | C. Incorrect because only the period based algorithm is required by tech specs. | ||
1, Power-to-flow | Plausible if applicant does not know basis for OPRM trip function or reasons that two | ||
o.ut of three algorithms are required operable. | |||
bases)Friday, September 28, | D. Incorrect because this point is outside the OPRM armed region of >25°ft>> power and | ||
< 600/0 core flow. Also incorrect because only the period based algorithm is required by | |||
Tier: Keyword: Cog Level: Test: 3 OPRM HIGHER SRO QUESTIONS REPORT for SRO Group: 1 Source: NEW Exam: HT2007-301 | tech specs. Plausible if applicant does not know when the OPRMs auto-arm | ||
themselves or does not know the bases for the OPRM'trip function. | |||
SRO only because oflink to 10CFR55.43 (2): Tech Specs bases | |||
2.1.7 Ability to evaluate plant performance and make operational judgments based onoperating characteristics / | |||
reactor behavior / and instrument interpretation. (CFR: 43.5 / 45.12 / 45.13) IMPORTANCE 3.7 / 4.4 | |||
References | |||
34GO-OPS-005-2, Power Changes, Attachment 1, Power-to-flow map | |||
Tech Spec 3.3.1.1., RPS Instrumentation (including bases) | |||
Friday, September 28, 2007 9:24:40 AM | |||
38 | |||
Tier: | |||
Keyword: | |||
Cog Level: | |||
Test: | |||
3 | |||
OPRM | |||
HIGHER | |||
SRO | |||
QUESTIONS REPORT | |||
for SRO | |||
Group: | |||
1 | |||
Source: | |||
NEW | |||
Exam: | |||
HT2007-301 | |||
Author/Reviewer: | Author/Reviewer: | ||
BLC/ | BLC/RFA | ||
QUESTIONS REPORT for SRO 96.G2.2.19 | Friday, September 28, 2007 9:24:40 AM | ||
/FUND/HT2007 | 39 | ||
-30 l/SRO/BLC/ | |||
QUESTIONS REPORT | |||
with 50AC-MNT-001-0, Maintenance | for SRO | ||
Program, which ONE of the following describes how"minor work" and"tool pouch work" are classified, including when a maintenance | 96. G2.2.19 001/3/2/WORK/NEW/FUND/HT2007-30 l/SRO/BLC/RFA | ||
work order (MWO)is required?At:I Minor work and tool pouch work are BOTH classified | In accordance with 50AC-MNT-001-0, Maintenance Program, which ONE of the | ||
as"minor maintenance." Minor Work is documented | following describes how "minor work" and "tool pouch work" are classified, including | ||
with a CR or an MWO.Tool pouch work outside the power block does not require documentation. | when a maintenance work order (MWO) is required? | ||
B.Minor work and tool pouch work are BOTH classified | At:I Minor work and tool pouch work are BOTH classified as "minor maintenance." | ||
as"minor maintenance." Tool pouch work is documented | Minor Work is documented with a CR or an MWO. Tool pouch work outside the | ||
such as a CR or an MWO.Minor work outside the power block does not require documentation. | power block does not require documentation. | ||
C.Tool pouch work is ONLY classified | B. Minor work and tool pouch work are BOTH classified as "minor maintenance." | ||
as"elective maintenance." Minor work is ONLY classified | Tool pouch work is documented such as a CR or an MWO. Minor work outside the | ||
as"other maintenance." Minor Work is documented | power block does not require documentation. | ||
with a CR or an MWO.Tool pouch work outside the power block does not require documentation. | C. Tool pouch work is ONLY classified as "elective maintenance." | ||
D.Tool pouch work is ONLY classified | Minor work is ONLY classified as "other maintenance." | ||
as"elective maintenance." Minor work is ONLY classified | Minor Work is documented with a CR or an MWO. Tool pouch work outside the | ||
as"other maintenance." Tool pouch work is documented | power block does not require documentation. | ||
with a CR or an MWO.Minor work outside the power block does not require documentation. | D. Tool pouch work is ONLY classified as "elective maintenance." | ||
A.C*orrect.B.Incorrect because minor work requ*ires documentation; | Minor work is ONLY classified as "other maintenance." | ||
whereas tool pouch work sometimes doesn't require documentation. | Tool pouch work is documented with a CR or an MWO. Minor work outside the | ||
Plausible if applicant does not know the titles of minor maintenance | power block does not require documentation. | ||
sub-categories. | A. C*orrect. | ||
C.Incorrect because both tool pouch and minor work can be classified | B. Incorrect because minor work requ*ires documentation; whereas tool pouch work | ||
as either corrective, elective, or"other." Plausible if applicant does not know that minor maintenance | sometimes doesn't require documentation. Plausible if applicant does not know the | ||
can be involved with the three major categories | titles of minor maintenance sub-categories. | ||
of maintenance | C. Incorrect because both tool pouch and minor work can be classified as either | ||
activities; | corrective, elective, or "other." Plausible if applicant does not know that minor | ||
i.e.corrective, elective, or other.D.Incorrect because both tool pouch and minor work can be classified | maintenance can be involved with the three major categories of maintenance activities; | ||
as either corrective, elective, or"other." Also incorrect because minor work requires documentation; | i.e. corrective, elective, or other. | ||
whereas tool pouch work sometimes doesn't require documentation. | D. Incorrect because both tool pouch and minor work can be classified as either | ||
Plausible if applicant does not know that minor maintenance | corrective, elective, or "other." Also incorrect because minor work requires | ||
can be involved with the three major categories | documentation; whereas tool pouch work sometimes doesn't require documentation. | ||
of maintenance | Plausible if applicant does not know that minor maintenance can be involved with the | ||
activities; | three major categories of maintenance activities; i.e. corrective, elective, or other OR | ||
i.e.corrective, elective, or other OR also plausible if applicant does not know the titles of the sub-categories | also plausible if applicant does not know the titles of the sub-categories of minor | ||
of minor maintenance. | maintenance. | ||
Friday, September 28, 2007 9:24:40 AM 40 | Friday, September 28, 2007 9:24:40 AM | ||
Group: 2 Source: NEW Exam: HT2007-301 | 40 | ||
Group: | |||
2 | |||
Source: | |||
NEW | |||
Exam: | |||
HT2007-301 | |||
Author/Reviewer: | Author/Reviewer: | ||
BLC/ | BLC/RFA | ||
for Work Control Center.2.2.19 Knowledge | QUESTIONS REPORT | ||
work order requirements.(CFR: 43.5/45.13)IMPORTANCE | for SRO | ||
2.1/3.1 References | SRO-only because ofjob/task requirements for Work Control Center. | ||
50AC-MNT-001-0, Maintenance | 2.2.19 Knowledge ofmaintenance work order requirements. (CFR: 43.5 / 45.13) IMPORTANCE 2.1 /3.1 | ||
Program (Section 8.1.6.2)NMP-GM-006, Work Management (Section 4.10)Tier: 3 Keyword: WORK Cog Level: FUND Test: SRO Friday, September 28, 2007 9:24:40 AM 41 | References | ||
QUESTIONS REPORT for SRO 97.G2.2.34 | 50AC-MNT-001-0, Maintenance Program (Section 8.1.6.2) | ||
/HIGHERlHT2007 | NMP-GM-006, Work Management (Section 4.10) | ||
-30 I/SRO/BLC/ | Tier: | ||
3 | |||
The following 10 rods have been declared"slow": (see attached map)22-31,26-15, 26-39, 26-47, 30-15, 30-23, 34-39, 38-15, 38-23, 38-31,42-27. | Keyword: | ||
Which ONE of the following identifies | WORK | ||
the, minimum required actions if HCU accumulator | Cog Level: | ||
26-27 develops a nitrogen leak which cannot be repaired?[Reference | FUND | ||
provided]A.Be in Mode 3 within 12 hours, i.e., all rods inserted.B.Declare rod 26-27"slow" within 8 hours.No further LCO actions are required.Declare rod 26-27 inoperable | Test: | ||
within 8 hours.Insert the rod within the following 3 hours and disarm (either electrically | SRO | ||
OR hydraulically) | Friday, September 28, 2007 9:24:40 AM | ||
the rod within 4 hours.D.Declare rod 26-27 inoperable | 41 | ||
within 8 hours.Insert rod 26-27 within the following 3 h0l:lrs and disarm (ONLY hydraulically | |||
-electrically | QUESTIONS REPORT | ||
not allowed)the rod within 4 hours.A.Incorrect because none of these rods | for SRO | ||
Plausible if applicant determines | 97. G2.2.34 001/3/2/CRDM/NEW/HIGHERlHT2007-30 I/SRO/BLC/RFA | ||
TS 3.1.4 Action A applies.B.Incorrect because the TS LCO 3.1.4 requirements | Unit 2 was operating at 1000/0 power with the following conditions: | ||
are no longer met when the nitrogen leak developed. | The following 10 rods have been declared "slow": (see attached map) | ||
Plausible if applicant determines | 22-31, 26-15, 26-39, 26-47, 30-15, 30-23, 34-39, 38-15, 38-23, 38-31,42-27. | ||
that TS LCO 3.1.5 Action A is allowed.C.Correct.D.Incorrect because TS 3.1.3 bases allow either dis-arming | Which ONE of the following identifies the, minimum required actions if HCU | ||
method.Plausible if applicant does not know bases allowances | accumulator 26-27 develops a nitrogen leak which cannot be repaired? | ||
for reactivity | [Reference provided] | ||
control methods.SRO only because of link to 10CFR55.43 | A. | ||
(2): Tech Specs 2.2.34 Knowledge | Be in Mode 3 within 12 hours, i.e., all rods inserted. | ||
the internal and external effects on core reactivity.(CFR: 43.6)IMPORTANCE | B. Declare rod 26-27 "slow" within 8 hours. No further LCO actions are required. | ||
2.8/3.2*References | C~ Declare rod 26-27 inoperable within 8 hours. Insert the rod within the following 3 | ||
34SV-CII-003-1, Attachment | hours and disarm (either electrically OR hydraulically) the rod within 4 hours. | ||
3, CRD Signoffmap (marked up with the 10 rods)Tech Spec 3.1.3, Control Rod Operability (including | D. Declare rod 26-27 inoperable within 8 hours. Insert rod 26-27 within the following 3 | ||
bases)Tech Spec 3.1.4, Control Rod Scram Times (including | h0l:lrs and disarm (ONLY hydraulically - electrically not allowed) the rod within 4 | ||
bases)Tech Spec 3.1.5, Control Rod Scram Accumulators (including | hours. | ||
bases) | A. Incorrect because none of these rods are considered adjacent. Plausible if | ||
THE TECH SPECS TO STUDENTS WITH CORE MAP DO NOT DISTRIBUTE | applicant determines TS 3.1.4 Action A applies. | ||
THE BASES TO ANY OF THE TECH SPECS.Friday, September 28, 2007 9:24:40 AM 42 | B. Incorrect because the TS LCO 3.1.4 requirements are no longer met when the | ||
Tier: Keyword: Cog Level: Test: 3 CRDM HIGHER SRO QUESTIONS REPORT for SRO Group: 2 Source: NEW Exam: HT2007-301 | nitrogen leak developed. Plausible if applicant determines that TS LCO 3.1.5 Action A | ||
is allowed. | |||
C. Correct. | |||
D. Incorrect because TS 3.1.3 bases allow either dis-arming method. Plausible if | |||
applicant does not know bases allowances for reactivity control methods. | |||
SRO only because of link to 10CFR55.43 (2): Tech Specs | |||
2.2.34 Knowledge ofthe process for detennining the internal and external effects on core reactivity. (CFR: 43.6) | |||
IMPORTANCE 2.8/3.2* | |||
References | |||
34SV-CII-003-1, Attachment 3, CRD Signoffmap (marked up with the 10 rods) | |||
Tech Spec 3.1.3, Control Rod Operability (including bases) | |||
Tech Spec 3.1.4, Control Rod Scram Times (including bases) | |||
Tech Spec 3.1.5, Control Rod Scram Accumulators (including bases) | |||
DISTRIBUTE ONLY THE TECH SPECS TO STUDENTS WITH CORE MAP | |||
DO NOT DISTRIBUTE THE BASES TO ANY OF THE TECH SPECS. | |||
Friday, September 28, 2007 9:24:40 AM | |||
42 | |||
Tier: | |||
Keyword: | |||
Cog Level: | |||
Test: | |||
3 | |||
CRDM | |||
HIGHER | |||
SRO | |||
QUESTIONS REPORT | |||
for SRO | |||
Group: | |||
2 | |||
Source: | |||
NEW | |||
Exam: | |||
HT2007-301 | |||
Author/Reviewer: | Author/Reviewer: | ||
BLC/ | BLC/RFA | ||
QUESTIONS REPORT for SRO 98.G2.3.9 | Friday, September 28, 2007 9:24:40 AM | ||
43 | |||
-30 l/SRO/BLC/ | |||
QUESTIONS REPORT | |||
identification | for SRO | ||
of dryweilleakage. | 98. G2.3.9 001/3/3/CONTAINMENT/NEW/HIGHER/HT2007-30 l/SRO/BLC/RFA | ||
Curre'nt plant conditions | A unit shutdown was just completed to facilitate identification of dryweilleakage. | ||
are: | Curre'nt plant conditions are: | ||
450 psig Mode Switch in SHUTDOWN Given these conditions, which ONE of the following describes the containment | Reactor pressure 450 psig | ||
Mode Switch in SHUTDOWN | |||
have been met for Shift Supervisor | Given these conditions, which ONE of the following describes the containment purge | ||
authorization | procedure and when the minimum requirements have been met for Shift Supervisor | ||
for the initial drywell entry?A.Drywell and torus purging are NOT allowed to be performed concurrently. | authorization for the initial drywell entry? | ||
02 concentration | A. | ||
is>10%as indicated on 2P33-R601A(B), and/or 2P33-R603 recorder(s) | Drywell and torus purging are NOT allowed to be performed concurrently. | ||
and confirmed> | 02 concentration is > 10% | ||
19.50/0 by only ONE lab sample.Drywell and torus purging are NOT allowed to be performed concurrently. | as indicated on 2P33-R601A(B), and/or 2P33-R603 | ||
02 concentration | recorder(s) and confirmed> 19.50/0 by only ONE lab sample. | ||
is>100/0 as indicated on 2P33-R601A(B), and/or 2P33-R603 recorder(s) | B~ Drywell and torus purging are NOT allowed to be performed concurrently. | ||
and confirmed> | 02 concentration is > 100/0 as indicated on 2P33-R601A(B), and/or 2P33-R603 | ||
19.50/0 by at least TWO lab samples.C.Drywell and torus purging can be performed concurrently. | recorder(s) and confirmed> 19.50/0 by at least TWO lab samples. | ||
02 concentration | C. Drywell and torus purging can be performed concurrently. | ||
is>100/0 as indicated on 2P33-R601A(B), and/or 2P33-R603 recorder(s) | 02 concentration is > 100/0 as indicated on 2P33-R601A(B), and/or 2P33-R603 | ||
and confirmed> | recorder(s) and confirmed> 19.50/0 by only ONE lab sample. | ||
19.50/0 by only ONE lab sample.D.Drywell and torus purging can be performed concurrently. | D. Drywell and torus purging can be performed concurrently. | ||
02 concentration ,is>100/0 as indicated on 2P33-R601A(B), and/or 2P33-R603 recorder(s) | 02 concentration ,is> 100/0 as indicated on 2P33-R601A(B), and/or 2P33-R603 | ||
and confirmed> | recorder(s) and confirmed> 19.5% | ||
19.5%by at least TWO lab samples.A.Incorrect because two lab samples are required.Plausible if applicant does not know procedure requirement. | by at least TWO lab samples. | ||
B.Correct.C.Incorrect because concurrent | A. Incorrect because two lab samples are required. Plausible if applicant does not | ||
purging has the potential to bypass the torus feature in Mode 3 if a LOCA occurs.Also incorrect because two lab samples are required.Plausible if applicant does not know the restriction | know procedure requirement. | ||
on concurrent | B. Correct. | ||
purging operations | C. Incorrect because concurrent purging has the potential to bypass the torus feature | ||
in Mode 3 if a LOCA occurs. Also incorrect because two lab samples are required. | |||
requirements. | Plausible if applicant does not know the restriction on concurrent purging operations in | ||
D.Incorrect because concurrent | Mode 3 or does not know the drywell entry authorization requirements. | ||
purging has the potential to bypass the torus feature in Mode 3 if a LOCA occurs.Plausible if applicant does not know the restriction | D. Incorrect because concurrent purging has the potential to bypass the torus feature | ||
in Mode 3 if a LOCA occurs. Plausible if applicant does not know the restriction on | |||
purging operations | concurrent purging operations in Mode 3. | ||
in Mode 3.Friday, September 28, 2007 9:24:40 AM 44 | Friday, September 28, 2007 9:24:40 AM | ||
QUESTIONS REPORT for SRO SRO only because tied to 10CFR55.43(4): | 44 | ||
KIA G2.3.9 SRO only because tied to Shift Supervisor | |||
responsibilities. | QUESTIONS REPORT | ||
2.3.9 Knowledge | for SRO | ||
a containment | SRO only because tied to 10CFR55.43(4): KIA G2.3.9 | ||
purge.(CFR: 43.4/45.10)IMPORTANCE | SRO only because tied to Shift Supervisor responsibilities. | ||
2.5/3.4 References | 2.3.9 Knowledge ofthe process for perfonning a containment purge. (CFR: 43.4/ 45.10) IMPORTANCE 2.5 / 3.4 | ||
References | |||
Entry procedure 34S0-T48-002-2, CAC/CAD system operating procedure Tier: 3 Group: Keyword: | 31GO-OPS-005-0, Primary Containment Entry procedure | ||
34S0-T48-002-2, CAC/CAD system operating procedure | |||
Tier: | |||
3 | |||
Group: | |||
Keyword: | |||
CONTAINMENT | |||
Source: | |||
Cog Level: | |||
HIGHER | |||
Exam: | |||
Test: | |||
SRO | |||
Author/Reviewer: | Author/Reviewer: | ||
BLC/ | Friday, September 28, 2007 9:24:40 AM | ||
to the AOP)for"saturation | 3 | ||
time." Plausible if applicant does not know the AOP terminology. | NEW | ||
C.Incorrect because the LCO cO.nditions | HT2007-301 | ||
are not met and required action A and B must be met.Plausible if applicant mis-interprets | BLC/RFA | ||
the allowance for both RHR subsystems | 45 | ||
and recirc pumps to be removed from operation for up to 2 hours per 8 hour period.D.Incorrect because this is the definition (according | |||
to the AOP)for"saturation | QUESTIONS REPORT | ||
time." Also incorrect because the LCO conditions | for SRO | ||
are not met and required action A and B must be met.Plausible if applicant does not know the AOP terminology | 99. G2.4.11 001/3/3/SHUTDOWN CLGINEW/HIGHER/HT2007-30 l/SRO/BLC/RFA | ||
Unit 2 was in Mode 4 with the following conditions: | |||
the-allowance | "A" loop of RHR operating in shutdown cooling, Coolant temp 180 deg F | ||
for both RHR subsystems | Both Recirc pumps under clearance out of service | ||
and recirc pumps to be removed from operation for up to 2 hours per 8 hour period.SRO-only due to the link to 10CFR55.43 | Following a trip and reset of an RPS MG set, the control room operator is unable to | ||
(2): Tech Specs G2.4.11 Knowledge of abnormal condition procedures.(CFR: 41.10/43.5/45.13) | re-open the outboard shutdown cooling isolation valve (2-E11-F009). All local efforts to | ||
IMPORTANCE | manually open this valve have not been succesful. | ||
3.4/3.6 References | Given these conditions, which ONE of the following identifies the required actions, if | ||
Tech Spec 3.4.8, RHR Shutdown Cooling System-Cold Shutdown (including | any, in accordance with Tech Spec 3.4.8, RHR Shutdown Cooling. System - Cold | ||
bases)34AB-E11-001-2, Loss of Shutdown Cooling AOP Tier: 3 Keyword: SHUTDOWN CLG Cog Level: HIGHER Test: SRO Friday, September 28, 2007 9:24:40 AM 47 | Shutdown and a-Iso defines the term "boil off time" in accordance with | ||
QUESTIONS REPORT for SRO | 34AB-E11-001-2, Loss of Shutdown Cooling? | ||
00l/3/4/FIRE | At:! "Boil-offtime" is the time from when the loss of shutdown cooling occurred until the | ||
BRIGADE/NEW/FUND/HT2007-301/SRO/BLC/RFA | time water level reaches TAF. | ||
Which ONE of the fo'liowing | Verify an alternate method of decay heat removal is available within 1 hour. | ||
describes the MINIMUM required number of fire brigade members, including their assignment | Ambient heat losses can be cons.idered as, or contributing to, the alternate method. | ||
limitations? | B. "Boil-off time" is the time from when the loss of shutdown cooling occurred until the | ||
A.4 members+1 leader (total of 5)Person.nel | time 212 deg F is reached. | ||
assigned to the fire brigade CAN also be used to fulfill the minimum shift crew composition | Verify an alternate method of decay heat removal is available within 1 hour. | ||
requirements | Ambient heat losses can b.e considered as, or contributing to, the alternate method. | ||
as defined by plant Tech Specs.4 members+1 leader (total of 5)A minimum of three of these persons must have competent knowledge of safety-related | C. "Boil-off time" is the time differential between the time of complete loss of | ||
systems and.components. | shutdown cooling and the time water level reaches TAF. | ||
C.5 members+1 leader (total of 6)Personnel assigned to the Fire Brigade can NOT be used to | No tech spec action is required, LCO conditions are currently met. | ||
D. "Boil-off time" is the time differential between the time of complete loss of | |||
requirements | shutdown cooling and the onset of boiling. | ||
as defined by Tech Specs.D.5 members+1 leader (total of 6)A minimum of three of these persons must have competent knowledge of safety-related | No tech spec action is required, LCO conditions are currently met. | ||
systems and components. | Friday, September 28, 2007 9:24:40 AM | ||
A.Incorrect because fire brigade members cannot be used to fulfill tech spec crew composition | 46 | ||
req'ts.Plausible since system operators can be fire brigade members;only 3 required by tech specs for system operators only..normal shift may have 6 or 7 system operators. | |||
B.Correct.C.Incorrect because only 5 total are required.Plausible if applicant thinks that the fire brigade leader is'in addition to the fire brigade.D.Incorrect because only 5 total are required.Plausible if applicant thinks that the fire brigade leader is in addition to the fire brigade.SRO only because | Group: | ||
Conditions | 3 | ||
and limitations | Source: | ||
in the facility license.2.4.26 Knowledge of facility protection | NEW | ||
requirements | Exam: | ||
including fire brigade and portable fire fighting equipment usage.(CFR: 43.5/45.12)IMPORTANCE | HT2007-301 | ||
2.9/3.3 References | Author/Reviewer: | ||
BLC/RFA | |||
QUESTIONS REPORT | |||
for SRO | |||
A. Correct. | |||
B. Incorrect because this is the definition (according to the AOP) for "saturation time." | |||
Plausible if applicant does not know the AOP terminology. | |||
C. Incorrect because the LCO cO.nditions are not met and required action A and B | |||
must be met. Plausible if applicant mis-interprets the allowance for both RHR | |||
subsystems and recirc pumps to be removed from operation for up to 2 hours per 8 | |||
hour period. | |||
D. Incorrect because this is the definition (according to the AOP) for "saturation time." | |||
Also incorrect because the LCO conditions are not met and required action A and B | |||
must be met. Plausible if applicant does not know the AOP terminology or | |||
mis-interprets the-allowance for both RHR subsystems and recirc pumps to be removed | |||
from operation for up to 2 hours per 8 hour period. | |||
SRO-only due to the link to 10CFR55.43 (2): Tech Specs | |||
G2.4.11 Knowledge of abnormal condition procedures. (CFR: 41.10/43.5/45.13) IMPORTANCE 3.4 / 3.6 | |||
References | |||
Tech Spec 3.4.8, RHR Shutdown Cooling System - Cold Shutdown (including bases) | |||
34AB-E11-001-2, Loss of Shutdown Cooling AOP | |||
Tier: | |||
3 | |||
Keyword: | |||
SHUTDOWN CLG | |||
Cog Level: | |||
HIGHER | |||
Test: | |||
SRO | |||
Friday, September 28, 2007 9:24:40 AM | |||
47 | |||
QUESTIONS REPORT | |||
for SRO | |||
100. G2~4.26 00l/3/4/FIRE BRIGADE/NEW/FUND/HT2007-301/SRO/BLC/RFA | |||
Which ONE of the fo'liowing describes the MINIMUM required number of fire brigade | |||
members, including their assignment limitations? | |||
A. 4 members + 1 leader (total of 5) | |||
Person.nel assigned to the fire brigade CAN also be used to fulfill the minimum shift | |||
crew composition requirements as defined by plant Tech Specs. | |||
B~ 4 members + 1 leader (total of 5) | |||
A minimum of three of these persons must have competent knowledge of | |||
safety-related systems and .components. | |||
C. 5 members + 1 leader (total of 6) | |||
Personnel assigned to the Fire Brigade can NOT be used to fulfill the minimum shift | |||
crew composition requirements as defined by Tech Specs. | |||
D. 5 members + 1 leader (total of 6) | |||
A minimum of three of these persons must have competent knowledge of | |||
safety-related systems and components. | |||
A. Incorrect because fire brigade members cannot be used to fulfill tech spec crew | |||
composition req'ts. Plausible since system operators can be fire brigade members; | |||
only 3 required by tech specs for system operators only..normal shift may have 6 or 7 | |||
system operators. | |||
B. Correct. | |||
C. Incorrect because only 5 total are required. Plausible if applicant thinks that the fire | |||
brigade leader is 'in addition to the fire brigade. | |||
D. Incorrect because only 5 total are required. Plausible if applicant thinks that the fire | |||
brigade leader is in addition to the fire brigade. | |||
SRO only because oftie to 10CFR55.43(1): Conditions and limitations in the facility license. | |||
2.4.26 Knowledge of facility protection requirements including fire brigade and portable fire fighting equipment | |||
usage. (CFR: 43.5 /45.12) IMPORTANCE 2.9 /3.3 | |||
References | |||
30AC-OPS-003-0, Plant Operations | 30AC-OPS-003-0, Plant Operations | ||
40AC-ENG-008-0S, Fire Protection | 40AC-ENG-008-0S, Fire Protection Program | ||
10CFR50.48, Fire Protection. | |||
Tier: 3 Keyword: FIRE BRIGADE Cog Level: FUND Test: SRO Friday, September 28, 2007 9:24:40 AM Group: 4 Source: NEW Exam: HT2007-301 | Tier: | ||
3 | |||
Keyword: | |||
FIRE BRIGADE | |||
Cog Level: | |||
FUND | |||
Test: | |||
SRO | |||
Friday, September 28, 2007 9:24:40 AM | |||
Group: | |||
4 | |||
Source: | |||
NEW | |||
Exam: | |||
HT2007-301 | |||
Author/Reviewer: | Author/Reviewer: | ||
BLC/ | BLC/RFA | ||
48 | |||
}} | }} | ||
Latest revision as of 18:03, 14 January 2025
| ML080460189 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Hatch |
| Issue date: | 02/14/2008 |
| From: | Michael B Division of Reactor Safety II |
| To: | |
| References | |
| 50-321/07-301, 50-366/07-301 | |
| Download: ML080460189 (50) | |
See also: IR 05000321/2007301
Text
Draft submittal
(Pink Paper)
Senior Reactor Operator Written Exam
HATCH DECEMBER 2007 EXAM
05000321/2007301 AND 05000366/2007301
DECEMBER 3 - 6, 2007, AND
DECEMBER 10, 2007, (WRITTEN)
QUESTIONS REPORT
for SRO
76. 201003A2.05 OOl/2/2/CRDMINEW/FUND/HT2007-301/SRO/BLC/RFA
Unit 2 is performing a shutdown in accordance with 34GO-OPS-013-2, Normal Plant
Shutdown. All control rods have b.een fully inserted per the selected rod sequence
when the operator reaches this step in the procedure:
WHEN all control rods are fully inserted, PLACE the Reactor Mode Switch in
SHUTDOWN AND record the' time REACTOR placed in Condition 3 in the
Operators Log AND below:
Time in Condition 3----------
Which ONE of the following predicts how the CRD Mechanisms will be affected and
identifies the preferred procedure used to bypass the discharge volume high level trip
and reset the scram after the mode switch is placed in the SHUTDOWN position?
A~ Reactor pressure WILL cause the CRDM internal ball valve to shift after the
accumulator depressurizes.
34GO-OPS-013-2, Normal Plant Shutdown
B.
Reactor pressure WILL cause the CRDM internal ball valve to shift after the
accumul'ator depressurizes.
34AB-C71-001-2, Scram Procedure
C. All full-in (green) lights on the full core display will EXTINGUISH until the scram is
reset.
34GO-OPS-013-2, Normal Plant Shutdown
D. All full-in (green) lights on the full core display will EXTINGUISH until the scram is
reset.
34AB-C71-001-2, Scram Procedure
A. Correct.
B. Incorrect because the 34GO-OPS-013-2 procedure includes steps to reset the
scram. Plausible if applicant does not know that the shutdown procedure contains the
steps to bypass the high SDV level trip and reset the scram.
C. Incorrect because the S51 (overtravel in) and S52 (normal full-in) reedswitches
ensure the green full-in light remains illuminated. Plausible since the applicant may
know that the CROM will be in the overtravel position until the scram is reset.
D. Incorrect because the S51 (overtravel in) and S52 (normal full-in) reedswitches
ensure the green full-in light remains illuminated. Also incorrect because the
34GO-OPS-013-2 procedure includes steps to reset the scram. Plausible 'since the
applicant may know that the CRDM will be in the overtravel position until the scram is
reset. Also plausible if applicant does not know that the shutdown procedure contains
the steps to bypass the high SDV level trip and reset the scram.
Friday, September 28, 2007 9:24:38 AM
1
QUESTIONS REPORT
for SRO
A2. Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following on the CONTROL ROD AND DRIVE MECHANISM;
and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those
abnormal conditions or operations: (CFR: 41.5/45.6) A2.05 Reactor Scram
4.1*/4.1
SRO-only (tie to 10CFR55.43(5): Assessment of facility conditions and selection ofappropriatae procedures during
norrmal, abnormal, and emergency situations.
References
34GO-OPS-013-2, Normal Plant Shutdown
34AB-C71-001-2, Scram Procedure
C11-CRDM-LP-00102, Control Rod Drive Mechanism lesson plan
Tier:
2
Group:
Keyword:
Source:
Cog Level:
FUND
Exam:
Test:
Author/Reviewer:
Friday, September 28, 2007 9:24:39 AM
2
NEW
HT2007-301
BLC/RFA
2
QUESTIONS REPORT
for SRO
77. 204000G2.1.2 001/2/2/RWCU/BANK-MOD/HIGHER/HT2007-30 l/SRO/BLC/RFA
A leak has developed on the RWCU system. The following conditions currently exist:
RWCU HX room ambient temperature (N016C)
195° F
RWCU HX room ambient temperature (N016D)
195° F
RWCU HX room differential temperature (N022C/N023C) 105°F ~T
RWCU HX room differential temperature (N022D/NO*23D) 105°F ~T
158' elevation south east area (2D21-K601 B)
1100mR/Hr
Based on these current plant conditions, which ONE of the following choices describes
the required operator actions in accordance with the Secondary Containment Control?
[Reference provided]
A. A reactor shutdown per 34GO-OPS-013 or 34GO-OPS-014 is required.
An immediate reactor scram is currently not re'quired~
B~ An immediate reactor scram is required.
Emergency depressurization is not required.
C. An immediate reactor scram is required.
Emergency depressurization is required.
D. A reactor shutdown is currently not required.
Operate the HVAC per 34S0-T41-005 and attempt to isolate the RWCU leak.
A. Incorrect because a primary system is discharging into secondary containment and
the differential temperature and area radiation level is greater than max safe. These
conditions require an immediate reactor scram. Plausible if the applicant knows that a
reactor shutdown is required when an area is above max safe and the leak is NOT a
primary system.
B. Correct.
C. Incorrect because an emergency depressurization is not required. Plausible since
the applicant may not know that the two area temps (or two ambient temps) are in the
same area (and therefore do not meet the intent of two areas above max safe.)
D. Incorrect because ventilation systems should NOT be operated when a secondary
containment radiation condition exists. Also incorrect because a reactor scram is
required based on a primary system discharging with one area differential temperature
above max safe. Plausible if applicant interprets the differential temperature as an
ambient temperature.
Friday, September 28, 2007 9:24:39 AM
3
QUESTIONS REPORT
for SRO
This question is SRO only because it is tied to 10CFR55.43(5).
Do NOT provide the flowchart to the applicant as a reference. Provide ONLY Table 4 and Table 6 as a
reference to the applicant.
SYSTEM: 204000 Reactor Water Cleanup System
2.1.2 Knowledge of operator responsibilities during all modes ofplant operation. (CFR: 41.10/45.13)
IMPORTANCE 3.0/4.0
References
31EO-EOP-014-2, Secondary Containment Control Flowchart
Tier:
2
Group:
2
Keyword:
Source:
BANK-MOD
Cog Level:
HIGHER
Exam:
HT2007-301
Test:
Author/Reviewer:
BLC/RFA
Friday, September 28, 2007 9:24:39 AM
4
QUESTIONS REPORT
for SRO
78. 211000G2.1.14 002/2/1/E-PLANINEW/HIGHER/HT2007-30I/SRO/BLC/RFA
A transient has occurred involving a failure to scram (ATWS) that requires Standby
Liquid Control (SLC) intiation per the emergency operating procedure guidance.
Based on this status, which ONE of the following identifies the required personnel
notifications in accordance with 73EP-EIP-004-0, Duties of Emergency Director?
At:' Dismissal of non-essential personnel from the plant site is mandatory.
Notification of protective action recommendations (PARS) to state and local
authorities is NOT mandatory for these conditions.
B. Dismissal of non-essential personnel from the plant site is mandatory.
Notification of protective action recommendations (PARS) to state and local
authorities IS mandatory for these conditions.
C. Dismissal of non-essential personnel from the plant site is NOT mandatory.
Staff augmentation MUST be performed if the emergency event is occurring outside
of normal working hours, on the weekend, or on a holiday by activating the HNP
Autodialer System in the control room.
D. Dismissal of non-essential personnel from the plant site is NOT mandatory.
The emergency response facilities (ERFs) MUST be activated.
A. Correct.
B. Incorrect because these conditions represent a site area classification, (new E-Plan
classification is SS2) which does not necessarily require a mandatory PAR. Plausible
if applicant thinks that this is a general emergency classification.
C. Incorrect because a site *evacuation is required (73EP-EIP-004-0, Step 7.4.11).
Plausible if applicant thinks that this is an Alert classification.
D. Incorrect because a site evacuation is required (73EP-EIP-004-0, Step 7.4.11).
Plausible if the applicant thinks that this is an Alert classification.
SRO only based on 10CFR55.43 (5): assessment of facility conditions and selection of procedures
Do NOT provide any references for this question.
SYSTEM: 211000 Standby Liquid Control System
2.1.14 Knowledge of system status criteria which require the notification ofplant personnel. (CFR: 43.5 / 45.12)
IMPORTANCE 2.5 / 3.3
References
DRAFT 73EP-EIP-OOI-0, Emergency Classification and Initial Actions
73EP-EIP-004-0, Duties ofEmergency Director
Friday, September 28, 2007 9:24:39 AM
5
Tier:
Keyword:
Cog Level:
Test:
2
HIGHER
QUESTIONS REPORT
for SRO
Group:
1
Source:
NEW
Exam:
HT2007-301
Author/Reviewer:
BLC/RFA
Friday, September 28, 2007 9:24:39 AM
6
QUESTIONS REPORT
for SRO
79. 212000A2.20 001/2/1/RPS/NEW/HIGHERJHT2007-30 l/SRO/BLC/RFA
During an outage, maintenance is in progress on seven hydraulic control units'(HCUs)
to replace the scram valve diaphrams. The following conditions currently exist:
Mode switch: REFUEL position, all rods inserted
Discharge volume isolation test switch: ISOLATE position, under clearance
Scram discharge volume high level bypass switch: NORMAL position
Due to a clearance error, one of the HCUs begins to slowly fill the discharge volume as
the mechanics begin working and the following alarm is received:
SCRAM DISCH VOL NOT DRAINED (603-119)
With these current conditions, which ONE of the following describes the operation of
the RPS logic and the technical specification allowan'ces associated with the high level
bypass switch?
At:I A reactor scram has NOT occurred.
Placing the high level bypass switch in the bypass position will PREVENT a scram.
Bypassing this trip does NOT require entering ,.an RPS Instrumentation LCO action.
B. A reactor scram has NOT o*ccurred.
Placing the high level bypass switch in the bypass position will PREVENT a scram.
Bypassing this trip does requires entering an RPS Instrumentation LCO action.
C. A reactor scram has occurred.
If the high level switch had been in the bypass position, the scram would have still
occurred.
Bypassing this trip does NOT require entering an RPS Instrumentation LCO action.
D. A high level scram has occurred.
If the high level switch had been in the bypass position, the scram would have been
PREVENTED.
Bypassing this trip requires entering an RPS Instrumentation LCO action.
Friday, September 28, 2007 9:24:39 AM
7
Group:
1
Source:
NEW
Exam:
HT2007-301
Author/Reviewer:
BLC/RFA
QUESTIONS REPORT
for SRO
A. Correct.
B. Incorrect because the bypass switch will work when the mode switch is in Refuel (or
shutdown). Also incorrect because the high level trip is only required in Mode 5 IF a
rod is withdrawn. Plausible if applicant doesn't know that the bypass switch also works
when the mode swtich is in the refuel position (versus only the shutdown position).
C. Incorrect because the not drained alarm comes in at 3 gallons; whereas the high
level trip occurs at 63 gallons, i.e., a scram has not occurred yet. Also incorrect
because the bypass switch will prevent the high level trip when the mode switch is in
Refuel (or shutdown). Plausible if applicant doesn't know alarm setpoint and thinks that
the bypass switch only works when the mode switch is in the shutdown position.
D. Incorrect because the not drained alarm comes in at 3 gallons; whereas the high
level trip occurs at 63 gallons, i.e., a scram has not occurred yet. Also incorrect
because the high level trip is only required in Mode 5 IF a rod is withdrawn. Plausible if
applicant doesn't know alarm setpoint and thinks that this trip feature is required during
mode 5 with all rods inserted.
SRO only because ofA2 K&A and 10CFR55.43 (2): Facility operating limitations in the technical specfications and
their bases.
A2. Ability to (a) predict the impacts ofthe following on the REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM; and (b) based
on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences ofthose abnormal conditions
or operations: (CFR: 41.5 / 45.6) A2.20 Full system activation (full-SCRAM) .. 4.1 */ 4.2*
References
34AR-603-119-1, Scram Disch Vol Not Drained annunciator procedure
34AR-603-101-1, Scram Disch Vol High Level Trip alarm procedure
34AR-603-110-1, Scram Disch Vol High Level Trip Bypass alarm procedure
Tech Spec 3.3.1.1, RPS Instrumentation
Tier:
2
Keyword:
Cog Level:
HIGHER
Test:
Friday, September 28, 2007 9:24:39 AM
8
QUESTIONS REPORT
for SRO
80. 215004A2.02 002/2/1/REFUEL/NEW/HIGHERlHT2007-301/SRO/BLC/RFA
A complete core offload was performed at the begining of a refueling outage.
Four bundles have just been reloaded around SRM "0" and the prescribed fuel reload
sequence continues by spiralling outward from SRM "D." The operability status of the
remaining SRMs are:
SRM "A" is inoperable; post maintenance testing is in progress
During the testing on SRM "A", the operator inadvertently withdraws the SRM "c"
detector a small amount and the following alarms are received:
SRM DETECTOR RETRACTED WHEN NOT *PERMITTED (603-222)
ROD OUT BLOCK (603-238)
Which ONE of the following identifies the impact on refueling operations?
A. Core alterations must now be suspended.
B~ Core alterations may continue in the northwest quadrant.
C. Core alterations may continue only in the northeast quadrant.
D. Core alterations may continue anywhere in the core except in the quadrant where
SRM "A" is located.
A. Incorrect because core alterations are allowed in a quadrant without an a9jacent
operable SRM provided that the bundles being spiral reloaded are in a single fueled
region containing an operable SRM. Plausible if applicant does not know that tech
specs allows refueling with only one operable detector.
B. Correct.
C. Incorrect becaus~ the partially withdrawn SRM is inoperable. Plausible if applicant
knows that the single fueled region tech spec LCO provision was exercised to begin the
reload.
D. Incorrect because SRM C is inoperable due to being partially withdrawn. Also
incorrect because core alterations may not be performed in the southwest quadrant
where SRM "c" is located.
Friday, September 28, 2007 9:24:39 AM
9
Group:
1
Source:
NEW
Exam:
HT2007-301
Author/Reviewer:
BLC/RFA
QUESTIONS REPORT
for SRO
SRO only because this is linked to 10CFR55.43(6): Procedures and limitations involved in intial core loading,
alterations in core configuration, control rod programming, and determination ofvarious internal and external effects
on core reactivity. Also linked to Tech specs 3.3.1.2
A2. Ability to (a) predict the impacts ofthe following on the SOURCE RANGE MONITOR (SRM) SYSTEM; and
(b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences ofthose abnormal
conditions or operations: (CFR: 41.5 / 45.6) A2.02 SRM inop condition. .. .
3.4 / 3.7
References:
C51-SRM-LP-01201, SRM lesson plan
TS 3.3.1.2, SRM Instrumentation
34AR-603-222, SRM Detector Retracted When Not Permitted annunciator procedure
34AR-603-238, Rod Out Block annunciator procedure
F15-RF-LP-04502, Refueling
Tier:
2
Keyword:
REFUEL
Cog Level:
HIGHER
Test:
Friday, September 28, 2007 9:24:39 AM
10
QUESTIONS REPORT
for SRO
81 . 245000A2.07 001/2/2/EHC/NEW/HIGHER/HT2007-30 l/SRO/BLC/RFA
Due to a slowly degrading condenser vacuum leak on Unit 1, the control room crew
has reduced reactor power from rated power over the last several hours. Current plant
conditions are:
285 MW(e)
Condenser vacuum at 25.0 "Hg and steady
The SRO is evaluating whether the current power configuration will facilitate a manual
turbine trip while maintaining the reactor critical.
Which ONE of the following predicts the plant response if the turbine is manually
tripped at this power, including the required procedure to be implemented after the
turbine is manually tripped?
A. Steam flow will be within the capacity of the bypass valves.
Enter 34GO-OPS-005-1, Power Changes, to adjust reactor power if necessary after
the turbine is manually tripped.
B. Steam flow will be within the capacity of the bypass valves.
Enter 34GO-OPS-013-1, Normal Plant Shutdown
C~ Steam flow will NOT be within the capacity of the bypass valves.
Enter 34AB-C71-001-1, Scram Procedure
D. Steam flow will NOT be within the capacity of the bypass valves.
Enter 34GO-OPS-005-1, Power Changes, after the turbine is tripped to lower
reactor power.
A. Incorrect because 285 MW(e) is more than 25% rated steam flow (bypass capacity).
285 MW(e) is also above the first stage turbine pressure bypass point (27.60/0 power =
260 MW(e). Also incorrect because 34GO-OPS-005-1 is only used when reactor
power level is greater than 350/0. Plausible if applicant doesn't know rated electrical on
Unit 1 (- 91 5 MW(e)
B. Incorrect because 285 MW(e) is more than 250/0 rated steam flow (bypass capacity).
285 MW(e) is also above the first stage turbine pressure bypass point (27.60/0 power =
260 MW(e). Plausible if applicant doesn't know rated electrical on Unit 1 (- 915 MW(e)
C. Correct.
D. Incorrect because 34GO-OPS-005-1 is only used when reactor power level is
greater than 35%. Plausible if the applicant thinks that the RPS turbine trip will be
bypassed but forgets that the Reactor High Pressure scram will cause a scram.
Plausible if applicant reasons that this procedure was previously being used during the
preceding power reduction(s).
Friday, September 28, 2007 9:24:39 AM
11
QUESTIONS REPORT
for SRO
SRO-only due to link to lOCFR55.43 (5): Assessment of plant conditions and selection of appropriate
procedures.
A2. Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following on the MAIN TURBINE GENERATOR AND
AUXILIARY SYSTEMS; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate
the consequences of those abnormal conditions or operations: (CFR: 41.5 / 45.6) A2.07 Loss ofreactor/turbine
pressure control system: Plant-Specific 3.8 / 3.9
References
34AB-N61-002-1, Main Condenser Vacuum Low
34AR-650-148-1, Turbine Vacuum Low-Low annunciator procedure
34GO-OPS-013-1, Nonnal Plant Shutdown
B21-SLLS-LP-01401, Main Steam & Low Low Set lesson plan
Tier:
2
Group:
Keyword:
Source:
Cog Level:
HIGHER
Exam:
Test:
Author/Reviewer:
Friday, September 28,2007 9:24:39 AM
2
NEW
HT2007-301
BLC/RFA
12
QUESTIONS REPORT
for SRO
82. 262001A2.08 003/2/1/4160VACINEW/FUND/HT2007-30 l/SRO/BLC/RFA
While performing an electrical tagout, a system operator inadvertently opened breaker
- 1 in 125VDC Cabinet 1D (1 R25-S004) which proviqes control power to a 4160VAC
emergency bus. Subsequent attempts to re-close the breaker are unsuccessful, i.e.,
the breaker keeps tripping open.
Assuming that the 1A RHR SW Pump was initially.running for a surveillance test, which
ONE of the following states how this pump's 4160 VAC breaker will be affected by the
loss of control power, including the correct procedure needed to operate the breaker?
A. The pump breaker will automatically open.
The control power undervoltage trip must be disabled in accordance with
34AB-R22-001-1, Lpss of DC Busses, in order to close ANY of the breakers on this
emergency bus.
B. The pump breaker will automatically open.
The control power undervoltage trip must be disabled in accordance with
34AB-R22-001-1, Loss of DC Busses, in order to re-close ONLY this breaker on
this emergency bus.
C~ The pump will continue to run.
The ONLY way to stop the pump is to depress the button marked "push-to-trip"
(inside the breaker cubicle) in accordance with 34S0-R22-001-1, 4160VAC
System.
D. The *pump will continue to run.
The ONLY way to stop the pump is to depress the button marked "push-to-trip"
(inside the breaker cubicle) in accordance with 34AB-R22-001-1, Loss of DC
Busses.
/
Friday, September 28, 2007 9:24:39 AM
13
QUESTIONS REPORT
for SRO
A. Incorrect because only a few breakers have this auto-open feature and they are
only located on 4160VAC emergency bus 1F. (This pump is powered from 1E.) Also
incorrect because this AOP does not provide guidance for overriding this trip feature.
Plausible because this trip-open feature does exist on the 1C RHR SW pump.
B. Incorrect because only a few breakers have this auto-open feature and they are
only located on 4160VAC emergency bus 1F. Also incorrect because this AOP does
not provide guidance for overriding this trip feature. Plausible if the applicant knows
that this AOP provides guidance for restoring control power.
C. Correct.
D. Incorrect because the loss of control power renders the switch on the outside of the
cubicle door inoperable. Also incorrect because the switch on the outside of the door
only works when the breaker is racked in the TEST position. Also incorrect because
the guidance to locally open the breaker is not found in the AOP. Plausible if the
applicant remembers that the charging spring will still be charged.
SRO only because linked to lOCFR55.43(5): Assessment of facility conditions and selection of appropriate
procedures during normal, abnormal, and emergency situations.
A2. Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following on the A.C. ELECTRICAL DISTRIBUTION; and (b)
based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those
abnormal conditions or operations: (CFR: 41.5 / 45.6) A2.08 Opening a disconnect under load ..... 3.3 /3.6
References
34S0-R22-001-1, 4160VAC System
R22-4160VAC-LP-02702, 4160 VAC lesson plan
34AB-R22-001-1, Loss ofDC Buses AOP
Tier:
2
Keyword:
4160VAC
Cog Level:
FUND
Te~:
Friday, September 28, 2007 9:24:39 AM
Group:
1
Source:
NEW
Exam:
HT2007-301
Author/Reviewer:
BLC/RFA
14
QUESTIONS REPORT
for SRO
83. 295003AA2.04 00 l/l/l/TRANSFORMERINEW/HIGHERlHT2007-30 l/SRO/BLC/RFA
Unit 1 and 2 are operating at 100% power with all4KV busses normally aligned.
A transformer fire and fault occurs on Startup transformer 2C and all automatic actions
associated with the transformer fault occur as expected.
Which ONE of the following identifies how the unavailability of the transformer affects
the AC system lineup and describes the performance of the 34SV-SUV-013-0, Weekly
Breaker Alignment surveillance?
At:' BOTH units are in an active LCO for 3.8.1, AC Sources - Operating
The surveillance is required to be performed WITHIN 1 HOUR even though its
acceptance criteria will NOT be met.
B. BOTH units are in an active LCO for 3.8.1, AC Sources - Operating
'The surveillance is required to be performed IMMEDIATELY even though its
acceptance criteria will NOT be met.
C. ONLY Unit 2 is in an active LCO for 3.8.1, AC Sources - Operating
The surveillance is required to be performed IMMEDIATELY and its acceptance
criteria WILL be met.
D. ONLY Unit 2 is in an active LCO for 3.8.1, AC Sources - Operating
The surveillance is required to be performed WITHIN 1 HOUR and its acceptance
criteria WILL be met.
Friday, September 28, 2007 9:24:39 AM
15
Group:
1
Source:
NEW
Exam:
HT2007-301
Author/Reviewer:
BLC/RFA
QUESTIONS REPORT
for SRO
Note: Both SATs 1C and 2C are fed from the same point on the 230 kV grid. A SAT
2C fault results in PCB s 179470,179480 tripping open, which affects SAT 1C
availability.
A. Correct
B. Incorrect because TS 3.8.1.A.1 requires surveillance within one hour. Plausible
because action statement is similar time frame.
C. Incorrect because both units will be in an active LCD. Also incorrect becau.se TS 3.8.1.A.1 requires surveillance within one hour. Plausible because transformer is on
Unit 2.
D. Incorrect because both units will be in an active LCD. Also incorrect because the
acceptance criteria will not be met.
Plausible because transformer is on Unit 2.
SRO only because of tie to lOCFR55.43(2): Tech specs
AA2. Ability to determine and/or interpret the following as they apply to PARTIAL OR COMPLETE LOSS
OF A.C. POWER: (CFR: 41.10/43.5/45.13) AA2.04 System lineups
3.5/3.7
References
34SV-SUV-013-0, Weekly Breaker Alignment Checks
S22-ELECT-LP-02701, Electrical Distribution System lesson plan
Tech Spec 3.8.1, AC Sources - Operating
Tier:
1
Keyword:
TRANSFORMER
Cog Level:
HIGHER
Test:
Friday, 'September 28,2007 9:24:39 AM'
16
QUESTIONS REPORT
for SRO
84. 295004AA2.02 OOI/I/I/DC POWERINEW/FUND/HT2007-30I/SRO/BLC/RFA
Unit 2 was operating at 500/0 power when the 125VDG Distribution'Gabinet 20,
2R25-S129 was lost and the following annunciator was received:
ECCS/RPS DIVISION 1 TROUBLE (602-110)
The SRO is in the process of identifying which analog transmitter trip system (ATTS)
units were affected and is performing a loss of safety function determination in
accordance with the Technical Requirements Manual (TRM).
Which ONE of the following identifies the affected analog transmitter trip units and
describes the TRM Loss of Function Diagrams (LFD)?
A. Two RPS ATTS cabinets will be de-energized.
The loss of function statement found at the bottom of the LFD identifies the channel
combinations which are no longer available for the safety function.
B. Two RPS ATTS cabinets will be de-energized.
The loss of function statement found at the bottom of the LFD identifies the channel
combinations req.uired to be operable in order to maintain the safety function.
C~ Two EGGS ATTS cabinets will be de-energized.
The loss of function statement found at the bottom of the LFD identifies the channel
combinations required to be operable in order to maintain the safety function.
D. Two EGCS ATTS cabinets will be de~energized.
The loss of function statement found at the bottom of the LFD identifies the channel
combinations which are no longer available for the safety function.
Friday, September 28, 2007 9:24:39 AM
17
QUESTIONS REPORT
for SRO
Each ATTS panel has two internal power supplies. Only one power supply needs to be
available to supply the entire ATTS panel. The ECCS division consists of panels
H11-P925, P926, P927 and P928. '
125VDC Dist Cab 2D Breakers 1& 2 power up both of the power supplies for panel
2H11-P925. Breakers 5 &7 power up both 'of the power supplies for paneI2H11-P927.
The loss of function statement typically found at the bottom of the LFD identifies the
channel combinations required to be operable in order for instrument function capability
as defined in the instrumentation specification to be maintained.
A. Incorrect because the DC cabinet which was lost does not provide power to the
RPS ATTS cabinets. Also 'incorrect because the LFD identifies the channels required
for the safety function. Plausible since RPS ATTS cabinets are similar to the ECCS
cabinets.
B. Incorrect because the DC cabinet which was lost does not provide power to the
C. Correct.
D. Incorrect because the LFD identifies the channels required for the safety function.
Plausible if applicant does not understand the content provided in LFDs.
SRO only because linked to lOCFR55.43 (2): Tech specs
AA2. Ability to determine and/or interpret the following as they apply to PARTIAL OR COMPLETE LOSS
OF D.C. POWER: (CFR: 41.10/43.5 /45.13) AA2.02 Extent ofpartial or complete loss ofD.C. power.... 3.5/3.9
References
TRM Section 11.0, Loss ofFunction Diagrams
34AB-R22-001-2, Loss ofDC Buses AOP
34AR-602-110-2, ECCS/RPS Division 1 Trouble annunciator procedure
Tier:
1
Group:
Keyword:
DC POWER
Source:
Cog Level:
FUND
Exam:
Test:
Author/Reviewer:
Fripay, September 28, 2007 9:24:39 AM
1
NEW
HT2007-301
BLC/RFA
18
QUESTIONS REPORT
for SRO
85. 295014G2.4.31 001/1/2/RODS/NEW/HIGHER/HT2007-30l/SRO/BLC/RFA
Unit 2 is starting up and reactor power is 140/0 power. The operator is pulling rods to
achieve 2 bypass valves to roll the turbine.
Due to a previous rod being difficult to move, the CRD drive water pressure had been
temporarily raised to 300 psid and not re-adjusted back down to a normal pressure.
When the operator placed the rod movement control switch to the single notch out
position for the next control rod, the rod quickly moved from position 16 to 22.
(intended position was 18)
Which ONE of the following identifies an expe,cted annunciator that will be received
and the evaluation of this event?
A.
ROD OUT BLOCK (603-238)
This is a mispositioned control rod. Tech Spec 3.1.6. Rod Pattern Control has a
required action statement.
B. ROD DRIFT (603-247)
This is NOT a mispositioned control rod. Tech Spec 3.1.3 Control Rod Operability
has a required action statement.
C~ RMCS/RWM ROD BLOCK OR SYSTEM TROUBLE (603-239)
This is a mispositioned rod. There are no required actions for tech specs for this
condition.
D. ROD OVERTRAVEL (603-248-1)
This is NOT a mispositioned rod. There are no required actions for tech specs in
this condition.
Friday, September 28, 2007 9:24:39 AM
19
Group:
2
Source:
NEW
Exam:
HT2007-301
Author/Reviewer:
BLC/RFA
QUESTIONS REPORT
for SRO
Note: This condition will cause both annunciators 603-238 &603-239 to alarm.
A. Incorrect because BPWS Tech Spec is only applicable in Modes 1 &2 when
thermal power is < 100/0. Plausible because this alarm will be received and the rod is
considered mispositioned lAW 34GO-OPS-065-0, Section 7.5.1
B. Incorrect because the rod is considered mispositioned lAW 34GO-OPS-065-0,
Section 7.5.1. (Alarm may not be received.) Plausible if applicant thinks that the rod is
C. Correct.
D. Incorrect because this alarm is only applicable for full-out position 48. Also
incorrect since rod is considered mispositioned lAW 34GO-OPS-065-0, Section 7.5.1.
Plausible if applicant knows that tech specs do not apply and does not understand the
alarm input.
SRO only because this question is tied to tech spec 10CFR55.43 (2)
APE: 295014 Inadvertent Reactivity Addition
.
2.4.31 Knowledge of annunciators alarms and indications / and use ofthe response instructions. (CFR: 41.10/45.3)
IMPORTANCE 3.3 /3.4
References
34GO-OPS-065-0, Control Rod Movement
34AR-603-248-1, Rod Overtravel annunciator procedure
34AR-603-247-1, Rod Drift annunciator procedure
34AR-603-238-1, Rod Out Block annunciator procedure
34AR-603-239-1, RMCS/RWM Rod Block or System Trouble annunciator procedure
34AB-C11-004-1, Mispositioned Control Rods
Tech Spec 3.1.6, Rod Pattern Control
Tech Spec 3.1.3, Control Rod Operability
Tier:
1
Keyword:
RODS
Cog Level:
HIGHER
Test:
Friday, September 28, 2007 9:24:39 AM
20
QUESTIONS REPORT
for SRO
86. 295020AA2.04 001/1/2/HPCI/RCIC/NEW/HIGHER/HT2007-30l/SRO/
A heatup and pressurization on Unit 2 was in progress with the following plant
conditions:
Reactor pressure: 130 psig
HPCI/RCIC: Operable in standby lineup
MSIVs: Closed
The heatup and pressurization was temporarily stopped to accomodate opening the
MSIVs in accordance with 34GO-OPS-001-2, Attachment 2, (Opening the MSIVs with
Reactor Pressure> 0 psig.) While pressure was being equalized across the MSIVs,
reactor pressure gradually lowered to 125 psig. Once the MSIVs were open, the crew
re-commenced the heatup and pressurization by withdrawing control rods and reactor
pressure is now at 160 psig. (no other actions have been taken)
Which ONE of the following describes the impact on the startup and the actions which
are allowed by tech specs given the current status of HPCI and RCIC?
A. The heatup and pressurization can continue.
The mode switch may be taken from startup to run.
Restore HPCI to operable within 14 days.
B~ The heatup and pressurization can continue.
The mode switch may NOT be taken to run.
Restore HPCI to operable within 14 days.
C. The heatup and pressurization can NOT continue.
The mode switch may NOT be taken to run.
Reduce steam pressure to =150 psig within 36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br />.
D. The heatup and pressurization can NOT continue.
Place the mode switch to the shutdown position in 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />
Reduce steam pressure to =150 psig within 36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br />.
Friday, September 28, 2007 9:24:39 AM
21
QUESTIONS REPORT
for SRO
HPCI isolated at 128 psig. The crew should recognize that reactor pressure (125 psig)
lowered below the HPCI isolation setpoint while they were equalizing across the MSIVs.
Thus; an inadvertent containment isolation (Group 3) has occurred.
A. Incorrect because LCO 3.0.4 condition a or c cannot be met. Plausible if applicant
thinks that LCO 3.0.4 condition b applies.
B. Correct.
C. Incorrect because the heatup and pressurization in Mode 2 can continue. Plausible
if applicant thinks that the LCO can be exited by simply lowering pressure.
D. Incorrect because the heatup and pressurization in Mode 2 can continue with RCIC
operable. Plausi.ble if the applicant thinks that both HPCI and RCIC have isolated and
that Condition E is applicable.
SRO only because this question is tied to lOCFR55.43(2): Facility operating limitations in the technical
specifications and their bases.
AA2. Ability to determine and/or interpret the following as they apply to INADVERTENT CONTAINMENT
ISOLATION: (CFR: 41.10/43.5/45.13) AA2.04 Reactor pressure
3.9/3.9
References
.
34GO-OPS-001-2, Plant Startup procedure
. Tech Spec 3.5.1, ECCS-Operating
34S0-E41-001-2, HPCI procedure
E51-RCIC-LP-03901, RCIC lesson plan
Tier:
1
Keyword:
HPCI/RCIC
Cog Level:
HIGHER
.Test:
Friday, September 28, 2007 9:24:.39 AM
Group:
Source:
Exam:
Author/Reviewer:
2
NEW
HT2007-301
22
QUESTIONS REPORT
for SRO
87. 295025EA2.06 OOI/l/l/STEAM COOLING/MODIFIED BANK/HIGHER/HT2007-301/SRO/BLC/RFA
A loss of §!! high and low pressure injection has occurred on Unit 2 with the following
conditions:
All rods inserted
Reactor Water Level.
-190 inches and decreasing 2"/min
Reactor Pressure
858 psig being controlled by LLS logic
Steam Cooling is in progress
Because of successful maintenance efforts, HPCI has become available and the crew
has just started injecting to the vessel. The current reactor water level is -189 inches
and rising.
Given these conditions, which ONE of the following procedures is required to be
implemented?
.
A.
B. CP-1, Steam Cooling
C. CP-1, Emergency Depressurization
D~ RC RPV Control (Non-ATWS)
EOPs require remaining pressurized following a loss of all high and low pressure
injection systems and beginning steam cooling (@ -185") UNTIL an injection system is
regained; then ED. In this case ED'g will eliminate the injection system (HPCI); and
EOPs specifically exempt ED in this situation. The question satisfiesKA because
requires interpretation of RPV water level as it pertains to high reactor pressure, i.e.
being in steam cooling.
A. Incorrect because level instrumentation is available. Plausible because this is,an
override step in the steam cooling procedure.
B. Incorrect because an override step in the steam cooling procedure states that if
reactor water level is increasing, then perform RC/P (non atws). Plausible if the
applicant realizes that level is still less than -185" (entry condition for steam cooling).
C. Incorrect because an override step in the steam cooling procedure states that if any
system is regained then emergency depressurization is required IF level cannot be
restored. Since level is being restored, then emergency depress is not required.
Plausible if the applica~t fails to assess that level is being raised and strictly adheres to
the override step.
D. Correct.
Friday, September 28, 2007 9:24:39 AM
23
QUESTIONS REPORT
for SRO
SRO only because of link to lOCFR55.43 (5): Assessment of facility conditions and selection of appropriate
procedure.
EA2. Ability to determine and/or interpret the following as they apply to HIGH REACTOR PRESSURE:
(CFR: 41.10/ 43.5 / 45.13) EA2.06 Reactor water leve1.
3.7/3.8
[N0 reference provided to applicant]
References
Licensee's LOR Exam Bank (modified)
Media Number: LR-LP-20309
Objective Number: 201.083.A.04
LR-LP-201083
SRO NRC CAT - B, RO NRC CAt - B, Active - -1, References - 31EO-EOP-015-2S, rls, KeyWords - PUBLISH,
PROCEDURE,BIENNIAL(B)
EOP-CP1-LP-20309, Contingency Procedures (CP-1) lesson plan
Tier:
Keyword:
Cog Level:
Test:
1
STEAM COOLING
HIGHER
Group:
1
Source:
MODIFIED BANK
Exam:
HT2007-301
Author/Reviewer:
BLC/RFA
Friday, September 28, 2007 9:24:39 AM
24
QUESTIONS .REPORT
for SRO
88. 295026G2.1.28 001/1/1/TORUS TEMP/NEW/FUND/HT2007-301/SRO/BLC/RFA
Which ONE of the following describes the suppression pool water temperature
instrumentation and tech spec 3.3.3.1, Post Accident Monitoring (PAM) instrumentation
channel requirements?
[Reference provided]
A. The T48-R647 recorder receives input from only the upper temperature elements.
The 2 torus temperature channels required by TS 3.3.3.1 can ONLY be comprised
of two lower elements, i.e., N009A-D.
B. The T48-R647 recorder receives input from both upper and lower temperature
elements~
The 2 torus temperature channels required by TS 3.3.3.1 can ONLY be comprised
of two lower elements, i.e., N009A-D
C~ The T48-R647 recorder receives input from only the upper temperature elements.
The 2 torus temperature channels required by TS 3.3.3.1 can ONLY be comprised
of one lower element (N009A-D) AND one upper element. (N301-N311)
D..The T48-R647 recorder receives input from both upper and lower temperature
elements.
.
The 2 torus temperature channels required by TS 3.3.3.1 can ONLY be comprised
of one lower element (N009A-D) AND one upper element. (N301-N311)
A. Incorrect because TRM Table 10.3-1 requires one N009 and one N300 temperature
element. Plausible since the TS function is for pool water temperature.
B. Incorrect because T48-R647 only receives input from the N300 elements. Also
incorrect because TRM Table 10.3-1 requires one N009 and one N300 temperature
element. Plausible since the TS function is for pool watetr temperature.
C. Correct
D. Incorrect because recorder T48-R647 only receives input from N300 elements.
Plausible since this recorder is for torus temperature indication.
SRO only because of tie to 10CFR55.43 (2): Tech specs
Provide applicant only the Tech Spec 3.3.3.1. (Don't provide TRM)
295026 Suppression Pool High Water Temperature
2.1.28 Knowledge of the purpose and function of major system components and controls.
(CFR: 41.7) IMPORTANCE 3.2 /3.3
34SV-SUV-019-1/2, Attachment 2, Torus Temperature Monitoring
TS 3.3.3.1, PAM Instrumentation
TRM Table T10.3-1, Sheet 5 of7, Qualified Post Accident Monitoring Instrumentation
34AR-657-072-1, Multipoint Rcdr 1T47-R611 Temp High annunciator procedure
34AR-654-009-1, Multipoint Rcdr 1T47-R612 Temp High annunciator procedure
Friday, September 28, 2007 9:24:39 AM
25 .
Tier:
Keyword:
Cog Level:
Test:
1
TORUS TEMP
FUND
QUESTIONS REPORT
for SRO
Group:
1
Source:
NEW
Exam:
HT2007-301
Author/Reviewer:
BLC/RFA
Friday, September 28, 2007 9:24:39 AM
26
QUESTIONS REPORT
for SRO
89. 295028EA2.06 OOI/l/l/DW TEMP/NEW/FUND/HT2007-301/SRO/BLC/RFA
A loss of drywell cooling has occurred. The SRO reaches the following ste.p in the
primary containment control flowchart drywell temperature leg:
P:ERF:O:RM :C:O:N:C:URRENTLY
RC:[Ajpoiint A
Which ONE of the following describes the meaning of the word "Bulk" and the tech
spec bases for the drywell temperature limiting condition of operation?
A. "Bulk" means a weighted average of the containment atmosphere, i.e., drywell AND
the torus air spaces.
In the event of a DBA, with the intial drywell average air temperature =340 of, the
resultant peak accident temperature is maintained below the drywell design
temperature.
B. "Bulk" means a weighted average of the containment atmosphere, i.e., drywell AND
the torus air spaces.
During a DBA, with the intial drywell average air temperature =150 of, the resultant
peak accident temperature is maintained below the drywell design temperature.
c. "Bulk" means a weighted average of ONLY the drywell air space temperature.
During a DBA, with the intial drywell average air temperature =340 of, the resultant
peak accident temperature is maintained below the drywell design temperature.
D~ "Bulk" means a weighted average of ONLY the drywell air space temperature.
During a DBA, with the intia! drywell average air temperature =150 of, the resultant
peak accident temperature is maintained below the drywell design temperature.
,
.
Friday, September 28, 2007 9:24:39 AM
27
Group:
1
Source:
NEW
Exam:
HT2007-301
Author/Reviewer:
BLC/RFA
QUESTIONS REPORT
for SRO
A. Incorrect because bulk implies average. Also incorrect because analyses require a
drywell starting temperature of =150 to preclude reaching the 340 OF design
temperature of containment. Plausible if applicant does not know the definition of bulk
or does not know the LCO bases.
B. Incorrect because bulk implies average. Plausible if applicant thinks that the drywell
also includes the torus airspace.
C. Incorrect because analyses require a drywell starting temperature of =150 to
preclude reaching the 340 OF design temperature of containment. Plausible if applicant
does not know the LCO bases.
D. Correct.
SRO only because of link to 10CFR55.43 (5): Tech Spec 3.6.1.5 bases for 150 deg LCO limit. Per discussion
w/ RFA on 9/25/07: Ability to differentiate between torus air space and drywell air space is implied.
EA2. Ability to determine and/or interpret the following as they apply to HIGH DRYWELL
TEMPERATURE: (CFR: 41.10/ 43.5 /45.13) EA2.06 Torus/suppression chamber air space temperature:
Plant-Specific
3.4 / 3.7
References
'EOP-TERMS-LP-20304, EOP Terminology & Definitions
TS 3.6.1.5, Drywell Air Temperature (including bases)
TRM Table TI0.3-1, Qualified Post Accident Monitoring Instrumentation
34SV-SUV-019-1, Surveillance Checks
Tier:
1
Keyword:
DW TEMP
Cog Level:
FUND
Test:
Friday, September 28, 2007 9:24:39 AM
28
QUESTIONS REPORT
for SRO
90. 295033G2.4.50 001/1/2/REFUEL/NEW/HIGHER/HT2007-30l/SRO/BLC/RFA
A refueling accident occurred in the Unit 1 fuel pool and the following alarms were
received in the Unit 1 control room:
REFUELING FLOOR VENT EXHAUST RADIATION HIGH
REFUELING FLOOR AREA RADIATION HIGH
The operator has determined that the 1D11-K611 A-D are causing the valid EXHAUST
rad alarm and the refueling floor 1D21-K601 0 is causing the valid AREA rad alarm.
Which ONE of the following describes the significance of these secondary containment
alarm setpoints?
[Reference provided]
A. The annunciator setpoint for the EXHAUST rad monitor satisfies the entry condition
value listed in the secondary containment control table 6.
The threshold for an alert classification, due to fuel damage by fuel handling
accident, is NOT met.
B. The annunciator setpoint for the AREA rad monitor satisfies the entry condition
value listed in the secondary containment control table 6.
The threshold for an alert classification, due to fuel damage by fuel handling
accident, IS met.
c. The ,annunciator setpoint for the AREA rad monitor satisfies* the entry condition
value listed in the secondary containment control table 6.
The threshold for an alert classification, due to fuel damage by fuel handling
accident, IS met.
D~ The annunciator setpoint for the EXHAUST rad monitor DOES NOT meet the entry
condition value listed in the secondary containment control table 6.
The threshold for an alert classification, due to fuel damage by fuel handling
accident, is NOT met.
Friday, September 28, 2007 9:24:39 AM
29
QUESTIONS REPORT
for SRO
REFUELING FLOOR VENT EXHAUST RADIATION HIGH (601-409)
REFUELING FLOOR AREA RADIATION HIGH (601-110)
A. Incorrect because the exhaust alarm is only HIGH (versus HIGH HIGH). Plausible if
applicant does not know there is a HIGH HIGH alarm available.
B. Incorrect because the ARM setpoint is 15 mr/hr, i.e., the operator must used
1D21-P600 recorder to determine reading. Also incorrect because alert classification
occurs above the alarm setpoint value, which cannot be determined from the
information provided. Plausible if applicant does not know the alarm setpoint is below
the 50 mr/hr threshold value.
C. Incorrect because the ARM alarm setpoint is 15 mr/hr. The alert classification is not
reached or cannot be determined from the information provided. Plausible if applicant
does not know the difference between the HIGH HIGH alarm and the HIGH alarm
D. Correct.
Provide Reference: Page 33 of 46 in 73EP-EIP-001-0, Section 18.0 Fuel Damage By Fuel Handling Accident
Provide Reference: Table 4 and Table 6 of Secondary Containment Control (not flowchart)
SRO-only because linked to 10CFR55.43 (5): Assessment of facility conditions and selection of appropriaate
procedures during normal, abnormal, and emergency situations. Also linked to 10CFR55.43 (7): Fuel
handling facilities and procedures.
EPE: 295033 High Secondary Containment Area Radiation Levels
2.4.50 Ability to verify system alann setpoints and operate controls identified in the alann response manual.
(CFR: 45.3) IMPORTANCE 3.3 /3.3
.
References
31EO-EOP-O14-1, Unit 1 Secondary Containment Control flowchart
73EP-EIP-00I-0, Section 18, Fuel Damage By Fuel Handling Accident
34AR-601-409-1, Refueling Floor Vent Exhaust Radiation High annunciator procedure
34AR-601-110-1, Refueling Floor Area Radiation High annunciator procedure
Tier:
1
Group:
2
Keyword:
REFUEL
Source:
NEW
Cog Level:
HIGHER
Exam:
HT2007-301
Test:
Author/Reviewer:
BLC/RFA
Friday, September 28, 2007 9:24:39 AM
30
QUESTIONS REPORT
for SRO
91. 295038G2.2.22 00l/1/1/RELEASE/NEW/FUND/HT2007-301/SRO/BLC/RFA
While operating at 1000/0 power, the following alarm is received:
OIG AVG ANNUAL REL LIMIT WILL BE EXCEEDED (601-406-2)
Which ONE of the following radiation monitors triggered this alarm and which limiting
condition of operation (LCO) includes the required actions if the radiation monitor is
declared inoperable?
A.
Offgas pretreatment rad monitors (D11-K601 and K602)
Main Condenser Offgas LCO 3.7.6
B!I Offgas pretreatment rad monitors (D11-K601 and K602)
. Offsite Dose Calculation Manual (ODCM) Gaseous Effluent Monitoring
Instrumentation LCO 3.1.1
C. Stack offgas rad monitor (Normal range D11-K600A and B)
Main Condenser Offgas LCO 3.7.6
D. Stack offgas rad monitor (Normal range D11-K600A and B)
Offsite Dose Calculation Manual (ODCM) Gaseous Effluent Monitoring
Instrumentation LCO 3.1.1
A. Incorrect because LCO 3.7.6 does not include action statements when this rad
monitor becomes inoperable. Plausible because the rad monitor alarm setpoint is
based on the 240 micoCurie limiting condition of op*eration in LCO 3.7.6.
B. Correct.
C. Incorrect because the alarm is not triggered by the stack rad monitor. Also incorrect
because LCO 3.7.6 does not include action statements when this rad monitor becomes
inoperable. Plausible because the rad monitor alarm setpoint is based on the 240
micoCurie limiting condition of operation in LCO 3.7.6. Also plausible if applicant does
not know what causes alarm and simply relies on annunciator wording.
D. Incorrect because the alarm is not triggered by the stack rad monitor. Plausible if
applicant simply relies on the annunciator label or does not know the basis for gaseous
instrumentation setpoints in ODCM.
SRO only because tied to 10CFR55.43 (2): Licensing basis ODCM
EPE: 295038 High Off-Site Release Rate
2.2.22 Knowledge of limiting conditions for operations and safety limits. (CFR: 43.2 I 45.2)
IMPORTANCE 3.4 14.1
References
LCO 3.7.6, Main Condenser Offgas
HNP ODCM, Chapter 3, Gaseous Effluents
34AR-601-406-2, O/G Avg Annual ReI Limit Will Be Exceeded annunciator procedure
Friday, SeptE?mber 28, 2007 9:24:39 AM
31.
Tier:
Keyword:
Cog Level:
Test:
1
RELEASE
FUND
QUESTIONS REPORT
for SRO
Group:
1
Source:,
NEW
Exam:
HT2007-301
Author/Reviewer:
BLC/RFA
Friday, September 28, 2007 9:24:39 AM
32
QUESTIONS REPORT
for SRO
92. 400000A2.03 OOl/2/1/CCW/NEW/HIGHER/HT2007-301/SRO/BLC/RFA
Unit 2 is at .300/0 power during a startup after an extended outage when the following
alarm is received:
RBCCW HX OUTLET TEMP HIGH (650-249)
The control room operator observes the RBCCW pump suction temperature is 101°F
and dispatches the system operator to increase service water flow through the heat
exchanger. As the operator is locally throttling open the service water valve, service
water system pressure lowers below the RBCCW system pressure and the following
alarm is received:
HX PSW/RBCCW DIFF PRESS LOW (650-238)
Which ONE of the following identiffes a service water valve listed in the high
temperature annunciator procedure that should have been opened to correct the high
temperature condition and also identifies the minimum required tech spec actions for
the low pressure condition?
A. 2P41-F440A, RBCCW Hx service water discharge valve.
Service water grab samples are required to be taken once per shift even if the
service water system effluent rad monitor is operable.
B!' 2P41-F440A, RBCCW Hx service water discharge valve.
The service water system effluent rad monitor is required to be operable.
Grab samples are not required to be taken.
C. 2P41-F491, RBCCW Hx - PSW discharge valve.
The service water system effluent rad monitor is required to be operable.
Grab samples are not required to be taken.
D. 2P41-F491, RBCCW Hx - PSW discharge valve.
Service water grab samples are required to be taken once per shift even if the
service water system effluent rad monitor is operable.
Friday, September 28, 2007 9:24:39 AM
33
Group:
1
Source:
NEW
Exam:
HT2007-301
Author/Reviewer:
BLC/RFA
QUESTIONS REPORT
for SRO
The P41-F440A(B) valves are the heat exchanger outlet valves whereas the P41-F491
valve is a common discharge valve for both heat exchangers. The F491 valve will
affect the pressure.
A. Incorrect because the service water grab samples are ONLY required if the rad
monitor is inoperable. Plausible because this is one of the required actions listed in this
ODCM LCO.
B. Correct.
C. Incorrect because this is not the valve listed in the high temperature alarm
procedure. Plausible if the applicant knows that this valve is named in the dP alarm
procedure to adjust the PSWIRBCCW differential pressure.
D. Incorrect because this is not the valve listed in the high temperature alarm
procedure. Incorrect because the service water grab samples are ONLY required if the
rad monitor is inoperable. Plausible because this is one of the required actions listed in
this ODCM LCO. Plausible if the applicant knows that this valve is named in the dP
alarm procedure to adjust the PSWIRBCCW differential pressure. Also plausible if
applicant knows that dP alarm procedure states that if the dP instruments are
inoperable, then confirm the rad monitor is operable.
SRO only because this question is tied to lOCFR55.43 (2): Facility operating limitations in the technical
specifications and their bases. Also tied to lOCFR55.43 (5): Assessment of facility conditions and selection of
appropriate procedures during normal, abnormal, and emergency situations.
A2. Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following on the CCWS and (b) based on those predictions, use
procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those abnormal operation: (CFR: 41.5/45.6)
A2.03 High/low CCW temperature .. 2.9 / 3.0
References
34AR-650-238-2, Hx PSW/RBCCW DiffPress Low annunciator procedure
34AR-650-249-2, RBCCW Hx Outlet Temp High annunicator procedure
34S0-P42-001-1, Section 7.3.8, Adjusting RBCCW/PSW Differential pressure
HNP ODCM, Section 2.1.1, Liquid Effluent Monitoring Instrumentation Control
P42-RBCCW-LP-00901, RBCCW lesson plan
Tie~
.2
Keyword:
Cog Level:
HIGHER
Test:
Friday, September 28, 2007 9:24:3.9 AM
34
QUESTIONS REPORT
for SRO
93. 600000G2.4.29 00 l/l/l/E-PLAN/MODIFIED BANK/HIGHERlHT2007-30l/SRO/BLC/RFA
Unit 2 is in a refueling outage and the "A" Loop of RHR is in shutdown cooling.
The following events occurred at the times listed b~low:
10:00 am: Fire brigade dispatched following a fire reported to the control
room in an unidentified electrical panel in the Southwest corner of
Unit 2 Reactor Building 130' elev.
10:10 am: Fire brigade leader arrives at the scene and contacts the control
room to inform the SRO that a breaker was on fire.
10:12 am: Fire brigade leader reports to control room that the power supply
to 2E11-F015A RHR injection valve (600V MCC E-A Frame 3C)
was burning.
Which ONE of the following describes the emergency plan classification
requirements?
A.
Declare an Unusual Event beginning at 10:00.
Do not declare an Alert.
B. Declare an Alert beginning at 10:12.
Do not declare an Unusual Event.
C. Declare an Unusual Event beginning at 10:00.
Declare an Alert beginning at 10:12.
D. Declare an Unusual Event at 10:10.
Do not declare an Alert.
Need to cover this question with licensee....E-Plan classification is 'Changing at Hatch, but
question will still work.
This KIA was changed from 6000000 G2.4.49 [Ability to perform w/o reference to procedures those actions
that require immediate operation of system components and controls]
TO
6000000 G2.4.29 [Knowledge of the emergency plan] BECAUSE the Hatch Fire AOP does not include any
immediate actions.
SRO only because of link to 10CFR55.43 (5): Assessment of facility conditions and E-plan classification.
APE: 600000 Plant Fire On Site
2.4.29 Knowledge ofthe emergency.plan. (CFR: 43.5 /45.11) IMPORTANCE RO 2.6 / SRO 4.0
References
Draft 73EP-EIP-001-0, EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION AND INITIAL ACTIONS
EP-LP-20101-03, Initial/Terminating Activities
Friday, September 28, 2007 9:24:39 AM
35
Tier:
Keyword:
Cog Leve~:
Test:
1
HIGHER
QUESTIONS REPORT
for SRO
Group:
1
Source:
MODIFIED BANK
Exam:
HT2007-301
Author/Reviewer:
BLC/RFA
Friday, September 28, 2007 9:24:39 AM
36
QUESTIONS REPORT
for SRO
94. G2.1.14 001/3/1INOTIFICATIONSINEW/FUND/HT2007-30I/SRO/BLC/RFA
Which ONE of the following identifies a plant personnel notification (including the
specific procedure) that is first required when the reactor is made critical and is AGAIN
required when the mode switch is transferred to RUN?
A!' On-shift Lab foreman
In accordance with 34GO-OPS-001-2, Plant Startup
B. Northern/Southen Control Center
In accordance with 34GO-OPS-001-2, Plant Startup
C. Plant Manager
lAW Reactivity Management Program, 40AC-ENG-016-0
D. Reactor Engineer
lAW Reactivity Management Program, 40AC-ENG-016-0
A. Correct.
B. Incorrect because the procedure does not state this because at these points, the
dispatcher is not affected. Plausible if applicant perceives that impending tie-to-the-grid
activities are being approached.
C. Incorrect because the procedure does not state this. Plausible if applicant reasons
that these plateaus are important for the plant manager to be aware of.
D. Incorrect because the procedure does not state this. Plausible if applicant reasons
that these plateaus are important for the reactor engineer to ~e aware of.
SRO only because of link to 10CFR55.43 (5): procedures
2.1.14 Knowledge of system status criteria which require the notification ofplant personnel. (CFR: 43.5 / 45.12)
IMPORTANCE 2.5 / 3.3
References
34GO-OPS-001-2, Plant Startup
Tier:
3
Keyword:
. NOTIFICATIONS
Cog Level:
FUND
Test:
Friday, September 28, 2007 9:24:40 AM
Group:
1
Source:
NEW
Exam:
HT2007-301
Author/Reviewer:
BLC/RFA
37
QUESTIONS REPORT
for SRO
95. G2.1.7 001/3/1/0PRM/NEW/HIGHERlHT2007-30 l/SRO/BLC/RFA
Unit 2 is operating with the following conditions:
Core flow is 50.82 Mlbm/hr
Reactor power is 780/0
Given these plant conditions, which ONE of the following is correct?
A':I The OPRMs are NOT armed at this point on the power-to-flow map.
Tech Specs require only the period based algorithm for the OPRM operability.
B. The OPRMs are armed at this point on the power-to-flow map.
, Tech Specs require only the period based algorithm for the OPRM operability.
C. The OPRMs- are NOT armed at this point on the power-to-flow map.
Tech Specs require both the amplitude and period algorithms for the OPRM
operability.
D. The OPRMs are armed at this point on the power-to-flow map.
Tech Specs require both the amplitude and period algorithms for the OPRM
operability.
A. Correct
B. Incorrect because this point is outside the OPRM armed region of >250/0 power and
< 600/0 core flow. Plausible if applicant does not know when the OPRMs auto-arm
themselves.
C. Incorrect because only the period based algorithm is required by tech specs.
Plausible if applicant does not know basis for OPRM trip function or reasons that two
o.ut of three algorithms are required operable.
D. Incorrect because this point is outside the OPRM armed region of >25°ft>> power and
< 600/0 core flow. Also incorrect because only the period based algorithm is required by
tech specs. Plausible if applicant does not know when the OPRMs auto-arm
themselves or does not know the bases for the OPRM'trip function.
SRO only because oflink to 10CFR55.43 (2): Tech Specs bases 2.1.7 Ability to evaluate plant performance and make operational judgments based onoperating characteristics /
reactor behavior / and instrument interpretation. (CFR: 43.5 / 45.12 / 45.13) IMPORTANCE 3.7 / 4.4
References
34GO-OPS-005-2, Power Changes, Attachment 1, Power-to-flow map
Tech Spec 3.3.1.1., RPS Instrumentation (including bases)
Friday, September 28, 2007 9:24:40 AM
38
Tier:
Keyword:
Cog Level:
Test:
3
HIGHER
QUESTIONS REPORT
for SRO
Group:
1
Source:
NEW
Exam:
HT2007-301
Author/Reviewer:
BLC/RFA
Friday, September 28, 2007 9:24:40 AM
39
QUESTIONS REPORT
for SRO
96. G2.2.19 001/3/2/WORK/NEW/FUND/HT2007-30 l/SRO/BLC/RFA
In accordance with 50AC-MNT-001-0, Maintenance Program, which ONE of the
following describes how "minor work" and "tool pouch work" are classified, including
when a maintenance work order (MWO) is required?
At:I Minor work and tool pouch work are BOTH classified as "minor maintenance."
Minor Work is documented with a CR or an MWO. Tool pouch work outside the
power block does not require documentation.
B. Minor work and tool pouch work are BOTH classified as "minor maintenance."
Tool pouch work is documented such as a CR or an MWO. Minor work outside the
power block does not require documentation.
C. Tool pouch work is ONLY classified as "elective maintenance."
Minor work is ONLY classified as "other maintenance."
Minor Work is documented with a CR or an MWO. Tool pouch work outside the
power block does not require documentation.
D. Tool pouch work is ONLY classified as "elective maintenance."
Minor work is ONLY classified as "other maintenance."
Tool pouch work is documented with a CR or an MWO. Minor work outside the
power block does not require documentation.
A. C*orrect.
B. Incorrect because minor work requ*ires documentation; whereas tool pouch work
sometimes doesn't require documentation. Plausible if applicant does not know the
titles of minor maintenance sub-categories.
C. Incorrect because both tool pouch and minor work can be classified as either
corrective, elective, or "other." Plausible if applicant does not know that minor
maintenance can be involved with the three major categories of maintenance activities;
i.e. corrective, elective, or other.
D. Incorrect because both tool pouch and minor work can be classified as either
corrective, elective, or "other." Also incorrect because minor work requires
documentation; whereas tool pouch work sometimes doesn't require documentation.
Plausible if applicant does not know that minor maintenance can be involved with the
three major categories of maintenance activities; i.e. corrective, elective, or other OR
also plausible if applicant does not know the titles of the sub-categories of minor
maintenance.
Friday, September 28, 2007 9:24:40 AM
40
Group:
2
Source:
NEW
Exam:
HT2007-301
Author/Reviewer:
BLC/RFA
QUESTIONS REPORT
for SRO
SRO-only because ofjob/task requirements for Work Control Center.
2.2.19 Knowledge ofmaintenance work order requirements. (CFR: 43.5 / 45.13) IMPORTANCE 2.1 /3.1
References
50AC-MNT-001-0, Maintenance Program (Section 8.1.6.2)
NMP-GM-006, Work Management (Section 4.10)
Tier:
3
Keyword:
WORK
Cog Level:
FUND
Test:
Friday, September 28, 2007 9:24:40 AM
41
QUESTIONS REPORT
for SRO
97. G2.2.34 001/3/2/CRDM/NEW/HIGHERlHT2007-30 I/SRO/BLC/RFA
Unit 2 was operating at 1000/0 power with the following conditions:
The following 10 rods have been declared "slow": (see attached map)
22-31, 26-15, 26-39, 26-47, 30-15, 30-23, 34-39, 38-15, 38-23, 38-31,42-27.
Which ONE of the following identifies the, minimum required actions if HCU
accumulator 26-27 develops a nitrogen leak which cannot be repaired?
[Reference provided]
A.
Be in Mode 3 within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />, i.e., all rods inserted.
B. Declare rod 26-27 "slow" within 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br />. No further LCO actions are required.
C~ Declare rod 26-27 inoperable within 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br />. Insert the rod within the following 3
hours and disarm (either electrically OR hydraulically) the rod within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />.
D. Declare rod 26-27 inoperable within 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br />. Insert rod 26-27 within the following 3
h0l:lrs and disarm (ONLY hydraulically - electrically not allowed) the rod within 4
hours.
A. Incorrect because none of these rods are considered adjacent. Plausible if
applicant determines TS 3.1.4 Action A applies.
B. Incorrect because the TS LCO 3.1.4 requirements are no longer met when the
nitrogen leak developed. Plausible if applicant determines that TS LCO 3.1.5 Action A
is allowed.
C. Correct.
D. Incorrect because TS 3.1.3 bases allow either dis-arming method. Plausible if
applicant does not know bases allowances for reactivity control methods.
SRO only because of link to 10CFR55.43 (2): Tech Specs 2.2.34 Knowledge ofthe process for detennining the internal and external effects on core reactivity. (CFR: 43.6)
IMPORTANCE 2.8/3.2*
References
34SV-CII-003-1, Attachment 3, CRD Signoffmap (marked up with the 10 rods)
Tech Spec 3.1.3, Control Rod Operability (including bases)
Tech Spec 3.1.4, Control Rod Scram Times (including bases)
Tech Spec 3.1.5, Control Rod Scram Accumulators (including bases)
DISTRIBUTE ONLY THE TECH SPECS TO STUDENTS WITH CORE MAP
DO NOT DISTRIBUTE THE BASES TO ANY OF THE TECH SPECS.
Friday, September 28, 2007 9:24:40 AM
42
Tier:
Keyword:
Cog Level:
Test:
3
HIGHER
QUESTIONS REPORT
for SRO
Group:
2
Source:
NEW
Exam:
HT2007-301
Author/Reviewer:
BLC/RFA
Friday, September 28, 2007 9:24:40 AM
43
QUESTIONS REPORT
for SRO
98. G2.3.9 001/3/3/CONTAINMENT/NEW/HIGHER/HT2007-30 l/SRO/BLC/RFA
A unit shutdown was just completed to facilitate identification of dryweilleakage.
Curre'nt plant conditions are:
Reactor pressure 450 psig
Mode Switch in SHUTDOWN
Given these conditions, which ONE of the following describes the containment purge
procedure and when the minimum requirements have been met for Shift Supervisor
authorization for the initial drywell entry?
A.
Drywell and torus purging are NOT allowed to be performed concurrently.
02 concentration is > 10%
as indicated on 2P33-R601A(B), and/or 2P33-R603
recorder(s) and confirmed> 19.50/0 by only ONE lab sample.
B~ Drywell and torus purging are NOT allowed to be performed concurrently.
02 concentration is > 100/0 as indicated on 2P33-R601A(B), and/or 2P33-R603
recorder(s) and confirmed> 19.50/0 by at least TWO lab samples.
C. Drywell and torus purging can be performed concurrently.
02 concentration is > 100/0 as indicated on 2P33-R601A(B), and/or 2P33-R603
recorder(s) and confirmed> 19.50/0 by only ONE lab sample.
D. Drywell and torus purging can be performed concurrently.
02 concentration ,is> 100/0 as indicated on 2P33-R601A(B), and/or 2P33-R603
recorder(s) and confirmed> 19.5%
by at least TWO lab samples.
A. Incorrect because two lab samples are required. Plausible if applicant does not
know procedure requirement.
B. Correct.
C. Incorrect because concurrent purging has the potential to bypass the torus feature
in Mode 3 if a LOCA occurs. Also incorrect because two lab samples are required.
Plausible if applicant does not know the restriction on concurrent purging operations in
Mode 3 or does not know the drywell entry authorization requirements.
D. Incorrect because concurrent purging has the potential to bypass the torus feature
in Mode 3 if a LOCA occurs. Plausible if applicant does not know the restriction on
concurrent purging operations in Mode 3.
Friday, September 28, 2007 9:24:40 AM
44
QUESTIONS REPORT
for SRO
SRO only because tied to 10CFR55.43(4): KIA G2.3.9
SRO only because tied to Shift Supervisor responsibilities.
2.3.9 Knowledge ofthe process for perfonning a containment purge. (CFR: 43.4/ 45.10) IMPORTANCE 2.5 / 3.4
References
31GO-OPS-005-0, Primary Containment Entry procedure
34S0-T48-002-2, CAC/CAD system operating procedure
Tier:
3
Group:
Keyword:
CONTAINMENT
Source:
Cog Level:
HIGHER
Exam:
Test:
Author/Reviewer:
Friday, September 28, 2007 9:24:40 AM
3
NEW
HT2007-301
BLC/RFA
45
QUESTIONS REPORT
for SRO
99. G2.4.11 001/3/3/SHUTDOWN CLGINEW/HIGHER/HT2007-30 l/SRO/BLC/RFA
Unit 2 was in Mode 4 with the following conditions:
"A" loop of RHR operating in shutdown cooling, Coolant temp 180 deg F
Both Recirc pumps under clearance out of service
Following a trip and reset of an RPS MG set, the control room operator is unable to
re-open the outboard shutdown cooling isolation valve (2-E11-F009). All local efforts to
manually open this valve have not been succesful.
Given these conditions, which ONE of the following identifies the required actions, if
any, in accordance with Tech Spec 3.4.8, RHR Shutdown Cooling. System - Cold
Shutdown and a-Iso defines the term "boil off time" in accordance with
34AB-E11-001-2, Loss of Shutdown Cooling?
At:! "Boil-offtime" is the time from when the loss of shutdown cooling occurred until the
time water level reaches TAF.
Verify an alternate method of decay heat removal is available within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />.
Ambient heat losses can be cons.idered as, or contributing to, the alternate method.
B. "Boil-off time" is the time from when the loss of shutdown cooling occurred until the
time 212 deg F is reached.
Verify an alternate method of decay heat removal is available within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />.
Ambient heat losses can b.e considered as, or contributing to, the alternate method.
C. "Boil-off time" is the time differential between the time of complete loss of
shutdown cooling and the time water level reaches TAF.
No tech spec action is required, LCO conditions are currently met.
D. "Boil-off time" is the time differential between the time of complete loss of
shutdown cooling and the onset of boiling.
No tech spec action is required, LCO conditions are currently met.
Friday, September 28, 2007 9:24:40 AM
46
Group:
3
Source:
NEW
Exam:
HT2007-301
Author/Reviewer:
BLC/RFA
QUESTIONS REPORT
for SRO
A. Correct.
B. Incorrect because this is the definition (according to the AOP) for "saturation time."
Plausible if applicant does not know the AOP terminology.
C. Incorrect because the LCO cO.nditions are not met and required action A and B
must be met. Plausible if applicant mis-interprets the allowance for both RHR
subsystems and recirc pumps to be removed from operation for up to 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> per 8
hour period.
D. Incorrect because this is the definition (according to the AOP) for "saturation time."
Also incorrect because the LCO conditions are not met and required action A and B
must be met. Plausible if applicant does not know the AOP terminology or
mis-interprets the-allowance for both RHR subsystems and recirc pumps to be removed
from operation for up to 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> per 8 hour9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> period.
SRO-only due to the link to 10CFR55.43 (2): Tech Specs
G2.4.11 Knowledge of abnormal condition procedures. (CFR: 41.10/43.5/45.13) IMPORTANCE 3.4 / 3.6
References
Tech Spec 3.4.8, RHR Shutdown Cooling System - Cold Shutdown (including bases)
34AB-E11-001-2, Loss of Shutdown Cooling AOP
Tier:
3
Keyword:
SHUTDOWN CLG
Cog Level:
HIGHER
Test:
Friday, September 28, 2007 9:24:40 AM
47
QUESTIONS REPORT
for SRO
100. G2~4.26 00l/3/4/FIRE BRIGADE/NEW/FUND/HT2007-301/SRO/BLC/RFA
Which ONE of the fo'liowing describes the MINIMUM required number of fire brigade
members, including their assignment limitations?
A. 4 members + 1 leader (total of 5)
Person.nel assigned to the fire brigade CAN also be used to fulfill the minimum shift
crew composition requirements as defined by plant Tech Specs.
B~ 4 members + 1 leader (total of 5)
A minimum of three of these persons must have competent knowledge of
safety-related systems and .components.
C. 5 members + 1 leader (total of 6)
Personnel assigned to the Fire Brigade can NOT be used to fulfill the minimum shift
crew composition requirements as defined by Tech Specs.
D. 5 members + 1 leader (total of 6)
A minimum of three of these persons must have competent knowledge of
safety-related systems and components.
A. Incorrect because fire brigade members cannot be used to fulfill tech spec crew
composition req'ts. Plausible since system operators can be fire brigade members;
only 3 required by tech specs for system operators only..normal shift may have 6 or 7
system operators.
B. Correct.
C. Incorrect because only 5 total are required. Plausible if applicant thinks that the fire
brigade leader is 'in addition to the fire brigade.
D. Incorrect because only 5 total are required. Plausible if applicant thinks that the fire
brigade leader is in addition to the fire brigade.
SRO only because oftie to 10CFR55.43(1): Conditions and limitations in the facility license.
2.4.26 Knowledge of facility protection requirements including fire brigade and portable fire fighting equipment
usage. (CFR: 43.5 /45.12) IMPORTANCE 2.9 /3.3
References
30AC-OPS-003-0, Plant Operations
40AC-ENG-008-0S, Fire Protection Program
10CFR50.48, Fire Protection.
Tier:
3
Keyword:
FIRE BRIGADE
Cog Level:
FUND
Test:
Friday, September 28, 2007 9:24:40 AM
Group:
4
Source:
NEW
Exam:
HT2007-301
Author/Reviewer:
BLC/RFA
48